ML22193A114

Issuance of Amendment Nos. 270 and 272 Elimination of the Requirements to Maintain the Post-Accident Sampling System

ML22193A114
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/12/2022
From:	Robert Kuntz Plant Licensing Branch III
To:	Coffey B Florida Power & Light Co, Point Beach
Kuntz R
References
EPID L-2002-LLA-0044
Download: ML22193A114 (17)

Text

September 12, 2022 Mr. Bob Coffey Executive Vice President, Nuclear Division and Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power & Light Company Mail Stop: EX/JB 700 Universe Blvd Juno Beach, FL 33408

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 270 AND 272 RE: ELIMINATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (EPID L-2022-LLA-0044)

Dear Mr. Coffey:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 270 and 272 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27, respectively, for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Point Beach). The amendments consist of changes to the technical specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 25, 2022.

The amendments delete TS 5.5.3, Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), eliminating the requirements to maintain the PASS at Point Beach consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-366, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).

B. Coffey A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert F. Kuntz, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 270 to DPR-24

2. Amendment No. 272 to DPR-27

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-266 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 270 License No. DPR-24

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), dated March 25, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 4.B of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 270, are hereby incorporated in the renewed operating license. NextEra Energy Point Beach shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by February 28, 2023.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Digitally signed by Nancy Nancy L. L. Salgado Date: 2022.09.12 15:49:38 Salgado -04'00' Nancy L. Salgado, Chief Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications and Renewed Facility Operating License Date of issuance: September 12, 2022

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-301 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 272 License No. DPR-27

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), dated March 25, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 2

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 4.B of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 272, are hereby incorporated in the renewed operating license. NextEra Energy Point Beach shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by February 28, 2023.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Digitally signed by Nancy L. Nancy L. Salgado Date: 2022.09.12 Salgado 15:50:08 -04'00' Nancy L. Salgado, Chief Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications and Renewed Facility Operating License Date of issuance: September 12, 2022

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 270 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24 AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 272 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 Replace the following pages of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27, and Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 REMOVE INSERT Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 REMOVE INSERT Appendix A, Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 5.5-2 5.5-2

D. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, NextEra Energy Point Beach to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and E. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, NextEra Energy Point Beach to possess such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility, but not to separate such materials retained within the fuel cladding.

4. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations: 10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 CFR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, and Section 70.32 of 10 CFR Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Levels NextEra Energy Point Beach is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 1800 megawatts thermal.

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 270, are hereby incorporated in the renewed operating license.

NextEra Energy Point Beach shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications.

C. Spent Fuel Pool Modification The licensee is authorized to modify the spent fuel storage pool to increase its storage capacity from 351 to 1502 assemblies as described in licensees application dated March 21, 1978, as supplemented and amended. In the event that the on-site verification check for poison material in the poison assemblies discloses any missing boron plates, the NRC shall be notified and an on-site test on every poison assembly shall be performed.

Renewed License No. DPR-24 Amendment No. 270

C. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, NextEra Energy Point Beach to receive, possess and use at any time any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed source for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; D. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, NextEra Energy Point Beach to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and E. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, NextEra Energy Point Beach to possess such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility, but not to separate such materials retained within the fuel cladding.

4. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations: 10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 CFR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, and Section 70.32 of 10 CFR Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Levels NextEra Energy Point Beach is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 1800 megawatts thermal.

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 272, are hereby incorporated in the renewed operating license.

NextEra Energy Point Beach shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications.

C. Spent Fuel Pool Modification The licensee is authorized to modify the spent fuel storage pool to increase its storage capacity from 351 to 1502 assemblies as described in licensees application dated March 21, 1978, as supplemented and amended. In the event that the on-site verification check for poison material in the poison assemblies discloses any missing boron plates, the NRC shall be notified and an on-site test on every poison assembly shall be performed.

Renewed License No. DPR-27 Amendment No. 272

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.2 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. The systems include Containment Spray, Safety Injection (High Head) and Safety Injection (Low Head) systems. The program shall include the following:

a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements; and

b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.

5.5.3 DELETED

Point Beach 5.5-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 270 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 272

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 270 AND 272, RESPECTIVELY, TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, Commission) dated March 25, 2022 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML22084A062), NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the licensee), requested changes to the technical specifications (TSs) for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Point Beach).

The proposed changes would delete TS 5.5.3, Post Accident Sampling System (PASS),

eliminating the requirements to maintain the PASS at Point Beach consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-366 Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) (ML003734020).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, the NRC imposed requirements on licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of the post-accident sampling system (PASS) were described in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements (ML051400209)

The NRC issued orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and related administrative controls was added to the TS of the operating plants and was included in the initial TS for plants licensed during the 1980s and 90s.

Additional expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.

Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have led the NRC staff to Enclosure 3

conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe accidents. The NRC's efforts to oversee the risks associated with nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory costs to licensees and the public have prompted the NRC to consider eliminating the requirements for PASS in TSs and other parts of the licensing bases of operating reactors.

The NRC staff has completed its review of the topical reports submitted by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) that proposed the elimination of PASS. The justifications for the proposed elimination of PASS requirements center on evaluations of the various radiological and chemical sampling and their potential usefulness in responding to a severe reactor accident or making decisions regarding actions to protect the public from possible releases of radioactive materials. As explained in more detail in the safety evaluations (SEs) for the two topical reports, the staff has reviewed the available sources of information for use by decision-makers in developing protective action recommendations and assessing core damage. Based on this review, the staff found that the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with the owners groups that licensees can remove the TS requirements for PASS, revise (as necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and pursue possible design changes to alter or remove existing PASS equipment.

2.1 Background

In a letter dated May 5,1999 (as supplemented by letter dated April 14, 2000), the CEOG submitted the topical report CE NPSD-1157, Revision 1, Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post-Accident Sampling System from the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG Utilities. A similar proposal was submitted on October 26, 1998 (as supplemented by letters dated April 28, 1999, April 10 and May 22, 2000), by the WOG in its topical report WCAP-14986, Post Accident Sampling System Requirements: A Technical Basis. The reports provided evaluations of the information obtained from PASS samples to determine the contribution of the information to plant safety and accident recovery. The reports considered the progression and consequences of core damage accidents and assessed the accident progression with respect to plant abnormal and emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidance, and emergency plans. The reports provided the owners groups' technical justifications for the elimination for the various PASS sampling requirements.

The specific samples and the staff's findings are described in the following evaluation.

The NRC staff prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) relating to the elimination of requirements on post-accident sampling and solicited public comment (65 FR 49271) in accordance with the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the PASS requirements from TS. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this model apply were informed [65 FR 65018] that they could request amendments confirming the applicability of the SE to their reactors and providing the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments. The licensee has informed the NRC staff by letter dated March 25, 2022, that the model SE is applicable to its requested amendment, and it provided the plant-specific verifications and commitments set out in the model SE, as discussed below.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The technical evaluations for the elimination of PASS sampling requirements are provided in the SEs dated May 16, 2000, for the CEOG topical report CE NPSD-1157 and June 14, 2000, for the WOG topical report WCAP-14986. The NRC staff's SEs approving the topical reports are located in ADAMS at Accession Nos. ML003715250 for CE NPSD-1157 and ML003723268 for WCAP-14986.

The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant specific amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related administrative controls from TSs, would also supersede the PASS specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.

As described in its SEs for the topical reports, the NRC staff finds that the following PASS sampling requirements may be eliminated for plants of Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse designs:

1. reactor coolant dissolved gases

2. reactor coolant hydrogen

3. reactor coolant oxygen

4. reactor coolant pH

5. reactor coolant chlorides

6. reactor coolant boron

7. reactor coolant conductivity

8. reactor coolant radionuclides

9. containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration

10. containment oxygen

11. containment atmosphere radionuclides

12. containment sump pH

13. containment sump chlorides

14. containment sump boron

15. containment sump radionuclides The NRC staff agrees that sampling of radionuclides is not required to support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of an accident because the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt manner.

The NRC staff does, however, believe that there could be significant benefits to having information about the radionuclides existing post-accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term recovery operations. As stated in the SEs for the topical reports, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this function by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from the reactor coolant system (RCS), containment sump, and containment atmosphere. (See item 1 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.) These contingency plans must be available to be used by a licensee during an accident; however, these contingency plans do not have to be

carried out in emergency plan drills or exercises. The contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, containment sump, and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee to derive information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in containment and boron concentration and pH of water in the containment sump. The staff considers the sampling of the containment sump to be potentially useful in confirming calculations of pH and boron concentrations and confirming that potentially unaccounted for acid sources have been sufficiently neutralized. The use of the contingency plans for obtaining samples would depend on the plant conditions and the need for information by the decision makers responsible for responding to the accident.

In addition, the NRC staff considers radionuclide sampling information to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage without having an indication of overheating on core exit thermocouples. However, the staff agrees with the topical reports contentions that other indicators of failed fuel, such as data from letdown radiation monitors (or normal sampling systems), can be correlated to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 2 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)

In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, the NRC staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. Although this capability may not be needed to support the immediate protective action recommendations during an accident, the information would be useful for decision makers trying to limit the public's ingestion of radioactive materials. (See item 3 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)

The NRC staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of PASS that are described in the topical reports, related SEs and this proposed change to TSs are unlikely to result in a decrease in the effectiveness of a licensee's emergency plan. Each licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(q) to determine if the change decreases the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. Evaluations and reporting of changes to emergency plans should be performed in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures.

The NRC staff notes that requirements for hydrogen monitoring have changed since the NRC staff approved TSTF-366 and issued the model safety evaluation. In particular, the TSTF-366 model safety evaluation includes a statement that redundant, safety-grade, containment hydrogen concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are addressed in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1 and RG 1.97, and are relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,Section VI.2.a.(i)(4). As part of the 2003 rulemaking that revised 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission eliminated the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident hydrogen release and relaxed the requirements for hydrogen monitoring. The 10 CFR 50.44 final rule (68 FR 54123; September 16, 2003) states, [t]he final rule reclassifies the hydrogen monitors as non safety-related components for currently-licensed nuclear power plants.

In addition, 10 CFR 50.44(b)(4)(ii) requires equipment for monitoring hydrogen in the containment atmosphere following a significant beyond design-basis accident for accident management, including emergency planning. In a letter dated August 13, 2004, the NRC issued Amendment No. 213 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 and Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 (Point Beach, Units 1 and 2, respectively)

(ML041750666) that addressed impacts to TSs associated with the 10 CFR 50.44 rule change.

In the safety evaluation for these amendments, the NRC staff stated that [t]he elimination of

Post-Accident Sampling System requirements from some plant-specific TS (and associated CLIIP notices) indicated that during the early phases of an accident, safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. As described in the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the staff subsequently concluded that Category 3 hydrogen monitors also provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration during the early phases of an accident.

The staff sees value in maintaining the capability to obtain grab samples for complementing the information from the hydrogen monitors in the long term (i.e., by confirming the indications from the monitors and providing hydrogen measurements for concentrations outside the range of the monitors). As previously mentioned, the licensee's contingency plan (See item 1 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments) for obtaining highly radioactive samples will include sampling of the containment atmosphere and may, if deemed necessary and practical by the appropriate decision-makers, be used to supplement the hydrogen monitors.

3.1 Verifications and Commitments As requested by the NRC staff in the notice of availability for this TS improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

1. Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere.

The licensee has drafted contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. The licensee has committed to maintain the contingency plans within site procedures CAMP 611, CAMP 612, and EPIP 8.4.3. The licensee will implement this commitment by February 28, 2023.

2. Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold (typically this is 300 Ci/ml dose equivalent iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or correlations of sampling or letdown line dose rates to coolant concentrations.

The licensee has the capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold.

The licensee has committed to maintain the capability for the Alert classification within its implementing procedures and implemented with the implementation of this amendment. The licensee will implement this commitment by February 28, 2023.

3. Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs.

The licensee has established the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. The licensee has committed to maintain the capability for monitoring iodines within its emergency plan implementing procedures. The licensee has implemented this commitment.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program.

Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements.

The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements (items requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent changes). The NRC staff has agreed that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, Revision 0, Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes, provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff. (See letter dated March 31,2000 from S. Collins, Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to R. Beedle, NEI (ML003696998)). The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The NRC staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, on July 7, 2022, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 or change a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding in the Federal Register on May 17, 2022 (87 FR 29886) that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.

Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Kuntz, NRR C. Ashley, NRR Date of issuance: September 12, 2022

ML22193A114 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NRR/DORL/LPL3/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC OGC NLO NAME RKuntz SRohrer VCusumano KDowling DATE 7/13/22 7/13/22 7/25/22 9/9/22 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/BC NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NAME NSalgado RKuntz DATE 9/12/22 9/12/22