ML21348A751

Draft Operating Test (Section a, Section B, Section C) (Folder 2)

ML21348A751
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	12/03/2021
From:	Exelon Generation Co LLC
To:	Thomas Setzer Operations Branch I
Setzer T
Shared Package
ML21263A160	List: ML21348A734 ML21348A737 ML21348A745 ML21348A751 ML21348A752 ML21348A756
References
CAC 000500
Download: ML21348A751 (34)

Text

1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR 2021 NRC RE-EXAM SCENARIO #1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS Recorders will be rolled prior to the scenario and paper from selected recorders will be retained for the examination team as requested.

All procedures, flow charts, curves, graphs, etc. will be in their normal storage places.

All markable procedures, boards, etc. will be erased.

All paper used by the Crew will be retained for the examination team as requested.

The simulator operators will keep a log of all communications during the scenario as requested by the examination team.

SCENARIO SOURCE HISTORY This scenario is a new scenario written for the 2021 NRC re-exam.

INITIAL SETUP Initial Conditions Reset to IC-14, 100% power Lower Reactor Power to 95%

B Loop of RHR is in Torus Cooling Insert Control Rods 38-07 and 34-07 to position 34 Blocking Tags None Event Triggers ET5: Mode Sw or Scram PB

2 Malfunctions INSERTED HPO04TO, Includes K27, K28, K36, K57 Relays - Override RPS062627, Control Rod (26-27) Fails to Scram RPS063839, Control Rod (38-39) Fails to Scram RPS061027, Control Rod (10-27) Fails to Scram RPS063819, Control Rod (38-19) Fails to Scram RPS065439, Control Rod (54-39) Fails to Scram RPS062251, Control Rod (22-51) Fails to Scram RPS062655, Control Rod (26-55) Fails to Scram CRM023807, Control Rod (38-07) Stuck TRG 2 HPC07, HPCI Steam Supply Line Break - 3% SV TRG 3 MFS02B, Reactor Feedwater Pump B High Vibes - 50% SV TRG 4 RRS20, Recirculation Loop Rupture - 3% SV, 15 Min Ramp TRG 5 MSS01, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment - 30%, 20 Min Ramp PCS03A, Torus-Drywell Vacuum Breaker A Fails Open Overrides TRG 1 ANO201RB13, Inner Screen or Pump - ALARM_ON TRG 6 ARI01TO, ARIA 4-ARIA Relay Trip Override - Override ARI02TO, ARIA 4-ARIB Relay Trip Override - Override RPS01TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A1 - Override RPS02TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A2 - Override RPS03TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B1 - Override RPS04TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B2 - Override RPS05TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch A3 - Override RPS06TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch B3 - Override Trip Overrides None Remote Functions None Turnover Procedures None

3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR DIRECTIONS EVENT 1 Secure Torus Cooling Support crew actions for securing Torus cooling.

When directed to open HV-2-10-70B, wait 1 minute and toggle remote function RHR02B, LPCI Line B Stayfull Valve HV-70B, to OPEN.

EVENT 2 Fire in D HPSW Pump Prior to the crew securing the D HPSW pump and when directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 1 and verify the following override activates:

ANO201RB13, Inner Screen or Pump - ALARM_ON When the Fire Brigade is dispatched, acknowledge as all required responders. Wait 1 minute and report as the Fire Brigade Leader that the D HPSW Pump is on fire.

When the crew reports the D HPSW pump has been secured, wait 1 minute and report the fire is out.

EVENT 3 Withdrawal of Control Rods Support crew actions for withdrawing control rods.

EVENT 4 Stuck Control Rod Support crew actions for withdrawing control rods.

EVENT 5 HPCI Steam Leak When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 2 and verify that the following events activate:

HPC07, HPCI Steam Supply Line Break - 3% SV When directed to investigate high temperature in the HPCI room, report that steam is in the HPCI room.

When directed to remove power from the closed HPCI Steam Supply Valve, wait 2 minutes and insert malfunction VED01_02 (HPCI MO-16) or VED01_03 (HPCI MO-15), as appropriate.

4 EVENT 6 High Vibes on B RFP Support crew actions for securing the B RFP.

If dispatched to investigate high vibrations on the B RFP, wait 3 minutes and report the pump is vibrating slightly.

EVENT 7 Steam Leak in the Drywell When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 4 and verify that the following events activate:

RRS20, Recirculation Loop Rupture - 3% SV, 15 Min Ramp When directed to raise the current limiter setpoint for the C Drywell Chiller to 100% and to report DWCW Return Header Pressure, wait 2 minutes and report completion and DWCW Return Header Pressure is 2 psig.

When the reactor is scrammed, verify TRG 5 activates:

MSS01, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment - 30%, 20 Min Ramp When directed to close HV-2-10-70A, wait 2 minutes and toggle remote function RHR02A, LPCI Line A Stayfull Valve HV-70A, to CLOSE, and report completion.

EVENT 8 Low Power ATWS If directed to perform T-216, steps 4.1 and 4.2, wait 15 minutes and insert TRG 6 and verify the following remotes activate:

ARI01TO, ARIA 4-ARIA Relay Trip Override - Override ARI02TO, ARIA 4-ARIB Relay Trip Override - Override RPS01TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A1 - Override RPS02TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A2 - Override RPS03TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B1 - Override RPS04TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B2 - Override RPS05TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch A3 - Override RPS06TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch B3 - Override Report completion of T-216, steps 4.1 and 4.2 to the Control Room.

TERMINATION The scenario may be terminated once drywell sprays are in service and RPV parameters are being controlled.

5 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

A Unit 2 is at 95% power with no equipment out of service. B loop of RHR is in Torus Cooling with the D HPSW Pump. Control Rods 34-07 and 38-07 have been inserted to position 34 for a required retest.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

Secure Torus Cooling Withdraw control rods 34-07 and 38-07.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

None GENERAL INFORMATION:

None

6 CRITICAL TASKS

1.

Isolate the steam leak prior to a second area maximum safe temperature is exceeded in the Secondary Containment.

a. Given the plant experiencing a steam leak in the secondary containment, the crew will isolate the steam leak prior to a second area exceeding the maximum safe temperature in accordance with T-103, Secondary Containment Control.

Failure to do so will result in a loss of the secondary containment due to an excessive heat load.

2.

Insert all Control Rods to shutdown the reactor during a failure to scram.

a. Given a failure of all rods to insert during a scram, the crew will manually insert all control rods to establish shutdown conditions in accordance with T-117, ATWS RPV Control. Failure to do so can result in inadvertent criticality and damage to the fuel cladding.

3.

Initiate containment sprays prior to drywell pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit.

a. Given the plant experiencing a steam leak into the primary containment, the crew will initiate containment sprays and control drywell pressure in accordance with T-102, Primary Containment Control. Failure to do so will result in exceeding the PSP limit and a loss of the primary containment.

7 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Secure Torus Cooling Cause:

N/A Effects:

N/A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Direct the PRO to secure Torus Cooling on the B RHR loop per SO 10.1.D-2, Residual Heat Removal System Torus Cooling, and SO 32.2.A-2, HPSW System Shutdown.

PRO

1. Obtains a copy of SO 10.1.D-2 and performs the following:

a. Verify both white lights are lit for CV-2-10-2677D.

b. Verify alarm 219 G-5, RHR CV-2677D Not Aligned for LPCI, is clear.

c. Direct operator to open HV-2-10-70B.

d. Close MO-2-10-034B, Full Flow Test.

e. Secure the D RHR Pump.

f. Close MO-2-10-039B, Torus Hdr

2. Obtains a copy of SO 32.2.A-2 and performs the following:

a. Shutdown the D HPSW Pump.

b. Close MO-2-10-089D, RHR Hx 2D

c. Verifies CHK-2-32-502D, HPSW 2D P042 Discharge Check Valve, is closed.

8 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Fire in B HPSW Pump Cause:

Short in B HPSW pump motor.

Effects:

Fire alarm in the Inner Screen Pump Area Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PRO

1. Recognize and report alarm 201 B-7A, Inner Screen or Pump Structure Heat/Smoke Det., alarm is in.

CRS

1. Directs dispatching the Fire Brigade per the Rapid Response Card.

PRO

1. Obtains RRC FF-01, Dispatch of Fire Brigade.

2. Sounds the Station Alert Tone.

3. Announces for Fire Brigade to respond to a fire alarm in the Inner Screen House.

4. Acknowledges reports of the Fire Brigade manning stations.

5. Acknowledges and reports that the fire is in the D HPSW Pump.

CRS

1. Directs PRO to secure the D HPSW pump and report completion to the Fire Brigade Leader.

PRO

1. Places the control switch for the D HPSW Pump in STOP.

2. Reports to the Fire Brigade leader that the D HPSW Pump has been secured.

3. Acknowledges and reports that the fire is out.

TS CRS

1. Acknowledges report that the fire is out.

2. Declares the HPSW pump inoperable and enters a 7 day LCO per T.S. 3.7.1.A.

9 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Withdrawing Control Rods to Full Out Position Cause:

None Effects:

None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs URO to restore control rods 34-07 and 38-07 to the full out position.

URO

1. Obtains a copy of SO 62.1.A-2, Withdrawing/Inserting a Control Rod, and performs the following for rod 34-07 and 38-07.

a. Places the Rod Select Power Switch in ON.

b. Depresses the pushbutton for rod 34-07.

c. Verify rod 34-07 is selected on the Full Core Display and the Four Rod Display.

d. Verifies the Rod Withdraw Permissive Light is lit.

e. Places and holds the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch to the NOTCH OVERRIDE position.

f. Places and holds the Rod Control Switch to the OUT NOTCH position.

g. Releases both switches when the control rod reaches position

48.

h. Performs a coupling check for the control rod.

PRO

1. Provides a peer check for rod withdrawal.

10 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Stuck Control Rod Cause:

Stuck Control Rod Blade Effects:

Cannot withdraw or insert control rod.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognize and reports that control rod 38-07 is stuck.

2. Throttles closed MO-2-03-022, Drive Water Press, to raise drive water pressure by 50 psig.

3. Attempts to withdraw the control rod.

4. Recognizes and reports the control rod is moving.

5. Throttles open MO-2-03-022 to return drive water pressure to between 260 psid and 280 psid.

PRO

1. Provides peer checks for the component manipulations.

CRS

1. Acknowledges report from the URO.

11 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

HPCI Steam Leak Cause:

Rupture in HPCI Steam Supply Line Effects:

Rising temperatures in the HPCI room Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognize and Report alarm 210 J-3, High Area Temp Alarm in.

CT1 PRO

1. Investigates the cause of the high temperature alarm.

2. Recognizes and reports that HPCI room temperatures are above the alarm setpoint.

3. Updates the crew on entry into T-103, Secondary Containment Control, due to high area temperatures.

4. Recognizes and reports fire alarms in the Reactor building.

5. Dispatches the Fire Brigade to the HPCI Room.

6. Acknowledges report from the Fire Brigade Leader of steam in the HPCI room.

7. Recognizes and reports HPCI failed to isolate on high temperature.

8. Manually isolates HPCI by closing either the HPCI MO-15 or the HPCI MO-16 valves.

9. Reports that secondary containment temperatures are lowering.

TS CRS

1. Directs URO to dispatch the Fire Brigade to the HPCI room.

2. Acknowledges report of steam in the HPCI room.

3. Acknowledges report of HPCI failing to isolate on high temperature.

4. Directs PRO to manually isolate HPCI.

5. Declares HPCI inoperable and enters a 14 day LCO per T.S.

3.5.1.C.

12 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

B RFP High Vibrations Cause:

Clog in B RFP Oil line Effects:

Rising vibrations on the B RFP Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PRO

1. Recognize and report alarm 202 E-2, B RFPT Vibration High, is in.

2. Checks the vibration monitoring screen of PPC to determine vibration levels.

3. Reports that both vibration probes have exceeded 8 mils and the B RFP is required to be secured.

CRS

1. Acknowledges the report of high vibrations on the B RFP.

2. Determines that feedwater flow must be lowered below 85%.

3. Directs URO to perform a GP-9 power reduction to < 85% power.

4. Directs URO to secure the B RFP per SO 6D.2.A-2, Reactor Feedwater Pump Shutdown.

5. Acknowledges that the B RFP has been secured.

URO

1. Depresses the A and B Recirc Pump Speed pushbuttons as necessary to lower reactor power.

2. Reports reactor power is below 85% and feedwater flow is less than 85%.

3. Performs SO 6D.2.A-2 as follows:

a. Notifies Chemistry of securing B RFP.

b. Opens AO-2139B, Feed Pump B Recirc.

c. Closes AO-2147B, Feed Pump B Check.

d. Places B RFP M/A Station in Manual.

e. Closes MO-2149B, Feed Pump B Disch and verifies remaining RFPs respond.

f. Lowers RFP speed demand to 0 rpm or Emergency Stops the B RFP.

g. Depresses the Turbine Trip B pushbutton.

4. Reports that the B RFP is secured.

13 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 7/8 Event

Description:

Recirc Water Leak/Low Power ATWS Cause: Unisolable rupture in the A Recirc line Effects: Lowering RPV water level and rising Drywell pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew

1. Recognize and report rising drywell pressure.

CRS

1. Enters and executes OT-101, High Drywell Pressure, and T-102, Primary Containment Control

2. Directs URO to maximize Drywell Cooling

3. Directs PRO to close RCIC MO-15 to attempt to isolate the leak.

4. Acknowledges report that drywell pressure is still rising and directs RCIC MO-15 open.

5. Directs URO to isolate RWCU.

URO

1. Starts all Drywell Chill Water Pumps and Chillers.

2. Directs EO to raise the current limiter on the C DW Chiller to 100%

3. Directs EO to report DWCW Return Header pressure.

4. Isolates RWCU as follows:

a. Secures the A RWCU Pump

b. Closes MO-2-12-068, RWCU Outlet.

c. Closes MO-2-12-015, RWCU Inboard Isol, and MO-2-12-018, RWCU Outboard Isol.

PRO

1. Closes RCIC MO-15 and checks drywell pressure.

2. Recognizes and reports drywell pressure is continuing to rise.

3. Reopens RCIC MO-15.

4. Reports that drywell pressure is approaching 1.2 psig.

14 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 7/8 (contd)

Event

Description:

Recirc Water Leak/Low Power ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs URO and PRO to perform a GP-4 Shutdown.

2. Updates and enters T-101, RPV Control.

3. Acknowledges that power is downscale, and 7 control rods are stuck out.

4. Updates and enters T-117, ATWS RPV Control.

5. Directs URO to initiate ARI.

6. Directs URO to perform T-220, Driving Control Rods during a Failure to Scram.

7. Directs PRO to inhibit ADS.

8. Directs establishing RPV water level between +5 and +35.

9. Directs controlling RPV pressure between 800-1000 psig with DEHC.

10. Directs PRO to spray the Torus per T-204, Initiation of Containment Sprays using RHR.

11. Verifies operation is on the safe side of the Drywell Spray Curve.

12. Directs PRO to spray the Drywell with A RHR loop. (Crew may B Loop)

CT2 URO

1. Depresses the Scram Pushbuttons.

2. Places the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

3. Reports control rods are inserting, the mode switch is in shutdown and power is downscale.

4. Report that 7 control rods did not insert.

5. Emergency stops all RFPs.

6. Closes all RFP discharge valves.

7. Open C RFP Discharge bypass valve.

8. Establish RPV water level control with feedwater between +5 and

+35.

9. Verify SDV vents and drains are closed.

10. Initiates ARI.

11. Performs steps of T-220, Driving Control Rods during a Failure to Scram as follows:

a. Places the CRD Flow Controller in Manual and raises flow to maximum.

b. Fully closes MO-2-03-22, Drive Water Press.

c. Places the RWM Bypass Keylock Switch in BYPASS.

d. Inserts the remaining 7 controls rods.

12. Reports to the CRS that all control rods are inserted.

15 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 7/8 (contd)

Event

Description:

Recirc Water Leak/Low Power ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Updates exiting T-117, ATWS RPV Control, and enters T-101, RPV Control.

2. Directs depressurizing the RPV to 500-600 psig with DEHC.

3. Verifies Instrument Air pressure is greater than Drywell pressure URO

1. Initiates an RPV depressurization to 500-600 psig with DEHC.

PRO

1. Closes the 11 and 22 breakers using the sync key.

2. Verifies the 1 and 2 breakers open.

3. Removes the 12 and 21 breakers from PTL.

4. Green flags the 1 and 2 breakers

5. Trips the Main Turbine when generator loading is less than 50kw.

6. Starts all Turbine Lift Pumps.

7. Verifies Group II and III isolations.

8. Verifies HWC has tripped.

9. Verifies Recirc Pumps are at minimum.

10. Reports Instrument Air pressure is greater than Drywell pressure.

11. Bypasses and restores Drywell Instrument Nitrogen as follows:

a. Place AO-3969A and B control switches in CLOSE.

b. Place D/W Inst. N2 keylock switches in BYPASS.

c. Verifies alarm 319 G-1, Drywell Inst. N2 Valves Isolation Bypass is in.

d. Place AO-3969A and B control switches in AUTO/OPEN.

12. Places ADS Inhibit keylock switches in INHIBIT.

13. Sprays the Torus as follows:

a. Place keylock switch 10A-S185A, Ctmt Spray Override 2/3 Core Coverage, in MANUAL OVERRD.

b. Momentarily places 10A-S17A, Ctmt Spray Vlv Cont. switch in MAN.

c. Opens MO-2-10-39A, Torus Hdr.

d. Opens MO-2-10-89A or C, HPSW Hx Out.

e. Starts the associated HPSW pump (A or C).

f. Starts the associated RHR pump (A or C).

g. Throttle open MO-2-10-39A, Torus Spray.

16 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: 7/8 (contd)

Event

Description:

Recirc Water Leak/Low Power ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CT3 PRO

1. Sprays the Drywell as follows:

a. Verifies both Recirc pumps are tripped.

b. Verifies all Drywell Cooling fans are in OFF.

c. Opens MO-2-10-031A, D/W Spray Inboard.

d. Opens MO-2-10-026A, D/W Spray Outboard.

e. Adjusts spray flow as necessary to control pressure.

f. Directs EO to close HV-2-10-70A, RHR Pressurizing Line Block Valve to RHR Loop A.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated once drywell sprays are in service and RPV parameters are being controlled.

1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR 2021 NRC RE-EXAM SCENARIO #2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS Recorders will be rolled prior to the scenario and paper from selected recorders will be retained for the examination team as requested.

All procedures, flow charts, curves, graphs, etc. will be in their normal storage places.

All markable procedures, boards, etc. will be erased.

All paper used by the Crew will be retained for the examination team as requested.

The simulator operators will keep a log of all communications during the scenario as requested by the examination team.

SCENARIO SOURCE HISTORY This scenario is a new scenario written for the 2021 NRC re-exam.

INITIAL SETUP Initial Conditions Reset to IC-9, 10% power Lower Reactor Power to 4-5%

Blocking Tags None Event Triggers ET3: DMF CAS01

2 Malfunctions INSERTED MSS08K, Reactor Pressure Relief Valve K Fail - 0%

EHH04B, EHC Hydraulic Pump B Trip TRG 2 CAS01, Loss of Instrument A Air - 1%

TRG 5 SLC02B, Squib Vlv B Fails to Fire TRG 6 APR01D, APRM Ch 4 Failure - 130%

TRG 7 PCS07, Break in Torus Water Space - 100%, 25 Min Ramp TRG 9 EHH04A, EHC Hydraulic Pump A Trip Overrides TRG 1 ZGI02A4S03, Emerg In Notch Override Switch - OFF ZGI02A4S09, Rod Movement Control Switch - OFF ANO205RF5, RWM Rod Block - ALARM_ON TRG 4 ZGI13A2S80B, RCIC Man Initiation Pushbutton - ARMED ZGI13A2S80A, RCIC Man Initiation Pushbutton - ON, 2 Sec Delete Time ANO204CA2, RCIC Turb or Logic in Test - ALARM_OFF Trip Overrides INSERTED RPS01TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A1 - Override RPS02TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A2 - Override RPS03TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B1 - Override RPS04TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B2 - Override RPS05TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch A3 - Override RPS06TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch B3 - Override Remote Functions TRG 2 IAS03A, A Air Compressor Reset - TRIP TRG 3 IAS01, HV-45988 A Instrument Air Comp Cross-Tie - OPEN IAS02, HV-45989 B Instrument Air Comp Cross-Tie - CLOSE, 5 Sec Delay TRG 8 RHR25, MO-176 Power Supply Breaker - CLOSE Turnover Procedures None

3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR DIRECTIONS EVENT 1 Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Surveillance Support crew actions for testing the SDV Vents and Drains.

EVENT 2 Withdrawing Control Rods Support crew actions for withdrawing control rods.

EVENT 3 Rod Worth Minimizer Rod Block After the crew has withdrew 2 control rods and at the direction of the lead examiner, insert TRG 1 and verify that the following events activate:

ZGI02A4S03, Emerg In Notch Override Switch - OFF ZGI02A4S09, Rod Movement Control Switch - OFF ANO205RF5, RWM Rod Block - ALARM_ON When the crew attempts to initialize the RWM, delete the above malfunctions.

EVENT 4 Instrument Air Compressor Trip When directed by the lead examiner, insert TRG 2 and verify that the following events activate:

CAS01, Loss of Instrument A Air - 1%

IAS03A, A Air Compressor Reset - TRIP When directed to investigate trip of the A Instrument Air Compressor, wait 3 minutes and report there is an acrid odor coming from the compressor.

When directed to perform step 2.7.3 of ON-119, Loss of Instrument Air, wait 1 minute and insert TRG 3:

IAS01, HV-45988 A Instrument Air Comp Cross-Tie - OPEN IAS02, HV-45989 B Instrument Air Comp Cross-Tie - CLOSE, 5 Sec Delay Report completion to the Control Room.

4 EVENT 5 RCIC Spurious Start When directed by the lead examiner, insert TRG 4 and verify that the following events activate:

ZGI13A2S80B, RCIC Man Initiation Pushbutton - ARMED ZGI13A2S80A, RCIC Man Initiation Pushbutton - ON, 2 Sec Delete Time ANO204CA2, RCIC Turb or Logic in Test - ALARM_OFF When directed to investigate RCIC spurious start, wait 5 minutes and report no obvious indications of why RCIC started.

EVENT 6 Squib Valve B Loss of Continuity When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 5 and verify that the following events activate:

SLC02B, Squib Vlv B Fails to Fire When directed to investigate failure of the B Squib Valve, wait 2 minutes, and report no obvious signs of why it failed.

When the operator goes to check squib valve current, inform the operator that current is reading 0 amps.

EVENT 7 D APRM Fails Upscale When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 6 and verify that the following events activate:

APR01D, APRM Ch 4 Failure - 130%

5 EVENT 8 Torus Water Leak When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRG 7 and verify that the following events activate:

PCS07, Break in Torus Water Space - 100%, 25 Min Ramp When directed to investigate lowering Torus water level, wait 3 minutes and report that there is water collecting in the Torus room.

When directed to close the circuit breaker for MO-176, wait 2 minutes and insert TRG 8 and verify the following event activates:

RHR25, MO-176 Power Supply Breaker - CLOSE When directed to close HV-2-10-70B, wait 2 minutes and toggle remote function RHR02B, LPCI Line B Stayfull Valve HV-70B, to CLOSE, and report completion.

EVENT 9 ATWS/ARI Functions Verify the following overrides have been inserted:

RPS01TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A1 - Override RPS02TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch A2 - Override RPS03TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B1 - Override RPS04TO, RPS Auto Scram Ch B2 - Override RPS05TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch A3 - Override RPS06TO, RPS Manual Scram Ch B3 - Override EVENT 10 EHC Pumps Trip Once ARI has been initiated and control rods have been inserted, insert TRG 9 and verify the following event activates:

EHH04A, EHC Hydraulic Pump A Trip If directed to investigate EHC pump trips, acknowledge the direction.

EVENT 11 ADS Valve Fails to Open Verify the following malfunction has been inserted:

MSS08A, Reactor Pressure Relief Valve A Fail - 0%

TERMINATION The scenario may be terminated when an RPV blowdown is in progress and plant parameters are being controlled.

6 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

A Unit 2 is at 4-5% power with no equipment out of service during a reactor startup.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

Scram Discharge Vent and Drain Vale Functional Test of AO-2-03-32A.

Continue Reactor Startup SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

ST-O-003-450-2, Scram Discharge Vent and Drain Vale Functional Test ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

None GENERAL INFORMATION:

None

7 CRITICAL TASKS

1.

Initiate ARI to shutdown the reactor within 10 minutes of the failure to scram.

a. Given the plant experiencing a failure of the scram circuit, the crew will initiate ARI to shutdown the reactor in accordance with T-117, ATWS RPV Control.

Failure to do so will result in thermal hydraulic instabilities and damage to the fuel cladding.

2.

Perform an RPV Blowdown prior to Torus water level reaching 7.

a. Given a rupture in the Torus and a lowering Torus water level, the crew will perform an emergency blowdown prior to Torus water level reaching 7, in accordance with T-102, Primary Containment Control. Failure to do so will result in a loss of suppression capability and possible loss of the primary containment.

8 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SDV Functional Test Cause:

N/A Effects:

N/A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Direct the URO to perform the functional test of AO-2-03-032A, Scram Disch Vol Isolation Vent.

URO

1. Obtains a copy of ST-O-003-450-2 and performs the following:

a. Places the Inboard Scram Disch Vol Isolation Switch in CLOSE and records the closure time of AO-2-03-032A.

b. Verifies AO-2-03-032A is closed.

c. Places the Inboard Scram Disch Vol Isolation Switch in OPEN and records the opening time of AO-2-03-032A.

d. Verifies AO-2-03-036A is open.

e. Reports completion of the surveillance to the CRS.

9 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Continue Reactor Startup Cause:

N/A Effects:

N/A Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs URO to continue the reactor startup per the startup sequence.

URO

1. Obtains a copy of SO 62.1.A-2, Withdrawing/Inserting a Control Rod, and performs the following for withdrawing control rods.

a. Places the Rod Select Power Switch in ON.

b. Depresses the pushbutton for the rods per the startup sequence.

c. Verify rod is selected on the Full Core Display and the Four Rod Display.

d. Verifies the Rod Withdraw Permissive Light is lit.

e. Places and holds the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch to the NOTCH OVERRIDE position.

f. Places and holds the Rod Control Switch to the OUT NOTCH position.

g. Releases both switches when the control rod reaches position

16.

h. Single notch withdraws control rod from position 16 to position

22.

i.

Places and holds the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch to the NOTCH OVERRIDE position.

j.

Places and holds the Rod Control Switch to the OUT NOTCH position until the control rod is fully withdrawn.

2. Performs a coupling check for the control rod.

3. Reperforms the above steps for subsequent control rods.

PRO

1. Provides a peer check for rod withdrawal.

10 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

RWM Rod Block Cause:

None Effects:

None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognizes and reports alarm 211 F-5, RWM Rod Block, is in alarm.

2. Performs alarm response as follows:

a. Verifies power is below the LPSP setpoint.

b. Verifies no indicated rod block on the RWM display.

c. Verifies Rod by Rod sequence is not active.

d. Verifies that BPWS enforcement is not active.

e. Attempts to re-initiate the RWM.

3. Initializes the RWM per SO 62A.1.A-2, Rod Worth Minimizer System Initialization, as follows:

a. Presses and holds the System Initialize pushbutton on the RWM panel.

b. Depresses Fullcore Display.

c. Verifies no substitute rod positions.

d. Depresses RWM Main.

e. Depress and hold System Diagnostic pushbutton and verify light stays lit.

f. Verifies indicator lights operate as expected.

g. Depress and hold System Diagnostic pushbutton and verify light goes out.

4. Recognize and report that the RWM alarm has cleared.

CRS

1. Acknowledges report from the URO.

11 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Compressor Trip Cause:

Failed contactor in the compressor Effects:

Air compressor trip and lowering air pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew

1. Recognize and reports alarm 216 B-1 is in.

PRO

1. Recognizes and reports the A Instrument Air Compressor has tripped.

2. Dispatches EO to investigate trip of the A Instrument Air Compressor.

3. Recognizes and reports alarm 216 D-3, A Instrument Air Header Lo Press, is in.

4. Updates and enters ON-119, Loss of Instrument Air.

5. Acknowledges the report of an acrid odor from the A Instrument Air Compressor.

CRS

1. Acknowledges report from the PRO.

2. Directs PRO to perform step 2.7 of ON-119.

PRO

1. Places the Backup Instrument Air Compressor in RUN.

2. Places control switch for AO80250D in OPEN.

3. Directs EO to perform step 2.7.3 of ON-119.

4. Acknowledges completion of step 2.7.3.

5. Reports the backup compressor is in service and Instrument Air Header A pressure has returned to normal.

12 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

RCIC Spurious Start Cause:

Short in the starting circuit for RCIC Effects:

RCIC turbine starts and injects into the RPV.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew

1. Recognize and reports multiple RCIC alarms are in.

PRO

1. Recognizes and reports that RCIC has started and is injecting into the RPV.

2. Directs EO to investigate spurious start of RCIC.

CRS

1. Updates and enters OT-104, Positive Reactivity Addition.

2. Directs PRO to trip RCIC per the hard card.

PRO

1. Depresses the TRIP pushbutton for RCIC.

2. Closes MO-2-13-021, To Feed Line.

3. Closes MO-2013-131, Supply.

4. Verify closed MO-2013-030, Full Flow Test.

TS

1. Enters a 14 day LCO for RCIC being inoperable per T.S. 3.5.3.A.

13 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

B Squib Valve Loss of Continuity Cause:

Open in the circuit to the valve.

Effects:

Indicating light goes out Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognize and report alarm 211-H-3, Standby Liquid Squib Valve Loss of Continuity

2. Reports that the B Squib valve indicating light is out.

3. Checks the ammeter for the B squib valve and reports that current is reading 0 amps.

4. Dispatches an operator to investigate loss of squib valve B continuity.

5. Acknowledges report from the EO and informs the CRS.

TS CRS

1. Declares the B SBLC subsystem inoperable and enters a 7 day LCO per T.S. 3.1.7.B.

14 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

D APRM Fails Upscale Cause:

Failure of the Monitoring circuit Effects:

Multiple high power alarms Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognize and report alarm 211 A-3, APRM/OPRM Hi-Hi Inop, is in.

2. Recognizes and reports the D APRM has failed upscale.

3. Recognizes that only the D APRM is reading upscale.

CRS

1. Acknowledges the report of the failed D APRM.

2. Directs URO to bypass the D APRM.

URO

1. Acknowledges direction to bypass the D APRM.

2. Places the APRM Selector Switch to the D position.

15 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 8/9 Event

Description:

Torus Water Leak/ATWS Cause: Unisolable rupture in the Torus Effects: Lowering Torus water level and rising Torus Room level.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PRO

1. Recognize and report alarm 226 A-4, Torus Water Level out of Normal Range.

2. Reports Torus water level is lowering.

3. Directs EO to investigate lowering Torus water level.

CRS

1. Acknowledges report of lowering Torus water level.

2. Updates and enters T-102, Primary Containment Control.

3. Directs PRO to perform T-231, HPSW Injection into the Torus, and T-233, CST Makeup to the Tours via HPCI Minimum Flow Line.

PRO

1. Performs the following for T-233:

a. Verifies open MO-2-23-017, Cond Tank Suction.

b. Throttle open MO-2-23-025, Min Flow.

2. Performs the following for T-231:

a. Dispatches an EO to close breaker E324-R-B for MO-2 176.

b. Verifies MO-2-10-154B, Outboard Disch.

c. Verifies RHR pumps are secured.

d. Verifies HPSW pumps are secured.

e. Verify MO-2-10-89B and D are closed.

f. Verifies MO-2-32-2344 HPSW Loop Cross Tie, is closed.

g. Opens MO-2-10-174 and 176.

h. Opens MO-2-10-39B, Torus Hdr.

i.

Starts the B or D HPSW pump.

j.

Throttle open MO-2-10-034B, Full Flow Test.

k. Starts the second HPSW pump (B or D).

l.

Establishes 10,600 gpm flowrate on HPSW.

3. Reports that HPSW is injecting into the Torus.

4. Reports that Torus water level is still lowering.

CRS Updates the crew on performing a GP-4 Shutdown.

16 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 8/9 (contd)

Event

Description:

Torus Water Leak/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs URO and PRO to perform a GP-4 Shutdown.

2. Updates and enters T-101, RPV Control.

3. Acknowledges that power is not downscale.

4. Updates and enters T-117, ATWS RPV Control.

5. Directs ROs to perform their ATWS Rapid Response Cards.

6. Acknowledge reports that ARI is depressurizing the Scram Air Header.

7. Acknowledges all rods are inserted.

8. Updates exiting T-117 and enters T-101, RPV Control.

9. Directs ROs to perform normal scram actions.

(NOTE: Scram actions may vary depending on if RPV water level lowers below +1)

CT1 URO

1. Depresses the Scram Pushbuttons.

2. Places the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

3. Reports control rods are not inserting, and power is not downscale.

4. Initiates ARI.

5. Reports that the scram air header is depressurizing.

6. Reports all control rods are inserted.

7. Emergency stops all RFPs.

8. Closes all RFP discharge valves.

9. Open C RFP Discharge bypass valve.

10. Establish RPV water level control with feedwater between +5 and

+35.

11. Verify SDV vents and drains are closed.

17 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 8/9 (contd)

Event

Description:

Torus Water Leak/ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs depressurizing the RPV to 500-600 psig with DEHC.

2. Verifies Instrument Air pressure is greater than Drywell pressure URO

1. Initiates an RPV depressurization to 500-600 psig with DEHC.

PRO

1. Verifies Group II and III isolations.

2. Verifies HWC has tripped.

3. Verifies Recirc Pumps are at minimum.

4. Reports Instrument Air pressure is greater than Drywell pressure.

5. Bypasses and restores Drywell Instrument Nitrogen as follows:

a. Place AO-3969A and B control switches in CLOSE.

b. Place D/W Inst. N2 keylock switches in BYPASS.

c. Verifies alarm 319 G-1, Drywell Inst. N2 Valves Isolation Bypass is in.

d. Place AO-3969A and B control switches in AUTO/OPEN.

6. Places ADS Inhibit keylock switches in INHIBIT.

CRS

1. Updates that Torus water level continues to lower, and the crew will be performing an RPV blowdown.

2. Updates and enters T-112, RPV Blowdown.

18 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 10 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip Cause: Failed contactor in EHC pump control circuit.

Effects: Bypass valves will close as EHC pressure is lost.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO

1. Recognize and report trip of the A EHC pump.

2. Attempts to start the B EHC pump.

3. Recognize failure of B EHC pump to start.

4. Report that a loss of EHC has occurred and bypass valves are going closed.

5. Dispatches EO to investigate trip of EHC pumps.

CRS

1. Acknowledge report of tripped EHC pump.

2. Direct pressure control with SRVs.

URO

1. Operates SRVs to control RPV pressure.

19 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 11 Event

Description:

ADS Valve Fails to Open Cause: Failed Control Switch Effects: SRV does not open when taken to Open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS

1. Directs URO to prevent uncontrolled condensate injection.

2. Verifies Torus water level is above 7 feet.

3. Directs PRO to open the 5 ADS valves.

CT2 PRO

1. Places the control switches for the 5 ADS valves to OPEN.

2. Recognizes and reports the A SRV failed to open.

3. Opens an additional SRV.

CRS

1. Acknowledges that the A SRV failed to open.

2. Directs PRO to open an additional SRV.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated when an RPV Blowdown is in progress and plant parameters are being controlled.