ML21061A217

Issuance of Amendment Nos. 180 and 180 to Authorize Revision of Certain Emergency Action Levels of the Emergency Plan

ML21061A217
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/19/2021
From:	Dennis Galvin Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Peters K Vistra Operations Company
Galvin D, NRR/DORL/LPL4, 415-6256
References
EPID L 2020 LLA 0116
Download: ML21061A217 (21)

Text

May 19, 2021 Mr. Ken J. Peters Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Attention: Regulatory Affairs Vistra Operations Company LLC Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant 6322 N FM 56 P.O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 180 AND 180 TO AUTHORIZE REVISION OF CERTAIN EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN (EPID L-2020-LLA-0116)

Dear Mr. Peters:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 180 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 and Amendment No. 180 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Comanche Peak), respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Emergency Plan in response to your application dated May 21, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021.

The amendments authorize changes and clarifications to specific Emergency Action Levels and supporting bases discussions of the Comanche Peak Emergency Plan. The changes and clarifications, in part, incorporate clarifications provided in the following NRC Emergency Preparedness Frequently Asked Questions (EPFAQs):

EPFAQ 2015-013, Hostile Action resulting in a loss of control of the facility declarations when fuel damage is likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or results in a loss of physical control of spent fuel EPFAQ 2016-002, Clarification of Equipment Damage as a Result of a Hazardous Event

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Dennis J. Galvin, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 180 to NPF-87

2. Amendment No. 180 to NPF-89

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

COMANCHE PEAK POWER COMPANY LLC AND VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-445 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 180 License No. NPF-87

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) dated May 21, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, by Amendment No. 180, Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to authorize revision to the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan as set forth in the licensees application dated May 21, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021, and evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation for this amendment.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by January 27, 2022.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Andrea D. Veil, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance: May 19, 2021 Michael F. King Digitally signed by Michael F. King Date: 2021.05.19 10:23:19 -04'00'

COMANCHE PEAK POWER COMPANY LLC AND VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 180 License No. NPF-89

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) dated May 21, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, by Amendment No. 180, Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to authorize revision to the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan as set forth in the licensees application May 21, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021, and evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation for this amendment.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by January 27, 2022.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Andrea D. Veil, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance: May 19, 2021 Michael F.

King Digitally signed by Michael F. King Date: 2021.05.19 10:23:40 -04'00'

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 180 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87 AND AMENDMENT NO. 180 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89 COMANCHE PEAK POWER COMPANY LLC AND VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 21, 2020 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letter dated February 24, 2021 (Reference 2), Vistra Operations Company, LLC (the licensee) requested U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) authorization to revise the emergency plan for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Comanche Peak). The current emergency action level (EAL) scheme for this site is based on the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, dated November 2012 (Reference 3). NEI 99-01, Revision 6 was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 4). The NRC authorized the revision to the Comanche Peak EAL scheme based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6, by letter dated June 14, 2016 (Reference 5). The licensees proposed changes would authorize changes and clarifications to specific EALs and supporting bases discussions of the Comanche Peak Emergency Plan. The changes and clarifications, in part, incorporate clarifications provided in the following NRC Emergency Preparedness Frequently Asked Questions (EPFAQs):

EPFAQ 2015-013, Hostile Action resulting in a loss of control of the facility declarations when fuel damage is likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or results in a loss of physical control of spent fuel (Reference 6)

EPFAQ 2016-002, Clarification of Equipment Damage as a Result of a Hazardous Event (Reference 7)

The supplemental letter dated February 24, 2021, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not

change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on June 30, 2020 (85 FR 39222).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Regulatory Requirements Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.47, Emergency plans, sets forth emergency plan requirements for nuclear power reactors. Section 50.47(b) of 10 CFR establishes the planning standards that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet for the NRC staff to make a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Specifically, Planning Standard (4) of 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires that onsite and offsite emergency response plans meet the following:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

The use of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme ensures that implementation methods are relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design but permit site-specific design considerations and preferences.

Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part:

The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the plant boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant.

2.2 Guidance The EAL development guidance was initially established in Generic Letter 79-50, Emergency Plans Submittal Dates, dated October 10, 1979 (Reference 8). This guidance was subsequently revised in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, dated November 1980 (Reference 9), which was endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated October 1981 (Reference 10), as an approach acceptable to the NRC for the development of an EAL scheme.

As industry and regulatory experience was gained with the implementation and use of EAL schemes, the industry issued revised EAL scheme development guidance to reflect lessons learned, many of which have been provided to the NRC for review and endorsement as generic EAL development guidance. Most recently, the industry developed NEI 99-01, Revision 6, which was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013, as acceptable generic EAL scheme development guidance.

Although the EAL development guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is generic and may not be entirely applicable for some non-passive, large light water reactor designs, it bounds the most typical accident and event scenarios for which emergency response is necessary, in a format that allows for industry standardization and consistent regulatory oversight. Licensees may choose to develop site-specific EAL schemes using NEI 99-01, Revision 6, with appropriate site-specific alterations as applicable.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, Use of NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Revision 4, dated January 2003, dated October 8, 2003, including Supplements 1 and 2 dated July 13, 2004, and December 12, 2005, respectively (Reference 11), also provides guidance for developing or changing a standard EAL scheme. In addition, this RIS and its supplements provide recommendations to assist licensees, consistent with Section IV.B.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, in determining whether to seek prior NRC approval of deviations from the guidance.

In summary, the NRC staff considers NEI 99-01, Revision 6, as an acceptable method to develop site-specific EALs that meet the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

2.3 Proposed Changes The licensee proposed to revise the current EAL schemes for Comanche Peak to incorporate clarifications provided under EPFAQs 2015-013 and 2016-002. The licensee also proposed to make the following changes to the currently approved Emergency Plan EALs:

Remove the main steam line radiation monitors from Table R-1, Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds.

Include consideration of Technical Specification (TS) completion times to the reactor coolant activity greater than the TS limits for EAL SU4.1.

Provide an alternate method for assessing EAL HU2 if the installed seismic monitor is out of service.

Update EALs CA2, SS1, and SG1 supporting Bases discussions to include clarification that sources of other than normal power supplies can be credited for these EALs.

Eliminate the station blackout coping time criteria threshold value from EAL SG1.1.

Correct minor errors observed during a line-by-line review of the Comanche Peak EAL Bases Document and the Comanche Peak EAL Wallcharts.

To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this safety evaluation, the following conventions are used (e.g., RU1 or RA1):

The first letter signifies the EAL recognition category:

o A or R - Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent o C - Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction o E - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation o F - Fission Product Barrier o H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety o S or M - System Malfunction The second letter signifies the emergency classification level:

o U = Notification of Unusual Event (Unusual Event) o A = Alert o S = Site Area Emergency o G = General Emergency The number is the applicable number from the site-specific EAL scheme.

An EAL is evaluated either as an individual EAL or as part of an EAL set. An EAL set refers to EALs within an EAL recognition category that include an escalation path for one or more emergency classification levels. Not all EAL recognition categories require an EAL set.

This safety evaluation uses the numbering system from the proposed site-specific EAL scheme; however, the numbering system from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is annotated in [brackets] to aid in cross-referencing the site-specific EAL numbering convention with that of the guidance.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed EAL scheme changes and clarifications by recognition category and EAL set or EAL, as applicable, and verified that the proposed revised EAL scheme is consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, to ensure that the proposed EAL scheme meets the requirements of Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff notes that both the current and proposed EALs have modifications from the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, guidance due to specific plant designs and licensee preference.

The NRC staff verified that the proposed EAL scheme as revised continues to use objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follow logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. In addition, the NRC staff verified that the proposed EAL scheme remains technically complete for each classification level, and accurate and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants.

3.1 Recognition Category R - Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent 3.1.1 EAL Set RU1/RA1/RS1/RG1 [AU1/AA1/AS1/AG1]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL set ensures that an emergency classification is declared when site-specific indications of radioactivity (gaseous or liquid) reach pre-calculated values based on assumed conditions, real-time parameters, and field monitoring results.

The licensee proposed to remove the main steam line radiation monitors from the respective effluent monitor threshold tables. Considering that the main steam line radiation monitors are process monitors designed to detect gross fuel failures and not to assess potential offsite release rates, and that a steam generator tube leak would be bounded by the fission product barrier matrix, offsite dose assessment, or field monitoring, the NRC staff finds this change to be acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL set continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable.

3.2 Recognition Category C - Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction 3.2.1 EAL CA2 [CA2]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of alternating current (AC) power that compromises the performance of safety systems that require AC power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.

The licensee proposed to add a clarification to the EAL technical basis discussion for CA2.1 that, this EAL, states that credit can be taken for any power source that has sufficient capability to operate equipment necessary to maintain a safe shutdown condition, provided it can be aligned within the 15-minute classification criteria. The licensee did not propose a change to the threshold value for CA2.1.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed change for CA2.1 and determined that the proposed clarification is equivalent to and consistent with the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, technical basis discussion for CA2.1. As such, the NRC staff finds the proposed clarification acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.2.2 EAL CU5 [CU5]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with offsite response organizations, including the NRC, are lost.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by updating the name of the plant telephone system from the Private Automatic Branch Exchange to the Intra-Plant Telephone System to accurately reflect the name of current plant-specific equipment. Considering that the proposed change will more accurately reflect current plant equipment in use, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to this EAL acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.2.3 EAL CA6 [CA6]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems that are needed for the current operating mode.

The licensees proposed EAL CA6.1 would require the declaration of an Alert classification level for a hazardous event that results in indications of degraded performance in one train of a multi-train safety system with either indications of degraded performance or visible damage to a second train of the safety system. The proposed indications would be significant enough that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern.

Although different from EAL CA6 as provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, the licensees proposed EAL CA6.1 is acceptable because it would provide for an Alert classification for site-specific plant conditions that would be consistent with the guidance for an Alert declaration provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Specifically, NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Section 2.1.2, Alert, provides that an Alert should be declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Considering that the proposed change for this EAL would align the site-specific threshold values for this EAL with conditions that are consistent with the declaration criteria for an Alert, the NRC staff finds this proposed change acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.3 Recognition Category H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 3.3.1 EAL Set HU1/HA1/HS1 [HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL set ensures that an emergency classification is declared based upon a security-related event.

The licensee proposed to remove EAL HG1 from the Comanche Peak EAL scheme. In Section 4.1.1, EPFAQ 2015-013, of the LAR, the licensee stated that the NRC clarification provided that overlap and redundancy has led to some confusion, particularly when evaluating the impact on public health and safety.

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for EAL HG1 addresses an event in which a hostile force has taken physical control hostile action that results in the loss of physical control of the facility. Such an action can reasonably be expected to exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action guide (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area, which is the criteria for EAL HG7 in NEI 99-01, Revision 6.

Additionally, events that exceed the EPA early PAG exposure levels offsite for any reason would result in a General Emergency declaration for EALs RG1 or RG2. The NRC staff verified that the licensees EALs RG1, RG2, and HG7 are retained in the Comanche Peak EAL scheme and bound the events addressed by EAL HG1 in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. As such, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to this EAL set acceptable.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting,

logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL set continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable.

3.3.2 EAL HU2 [HU2]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared based upon a seismic event that results in accelerations at the site greater than specified for an operating basis earthquake.

To address conditions where the seismic monitor that is used to assess HU2 is out of service, the licensee proposed to modify the threshold value for HU2 by providing an alternate EAL threshold value. The NRC staff determined that the proposed alternate guidance for HU2 is consistent with the alternate guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Considering that the proposed change would continue to provide assessment of seismic events consistent with the guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and is consistent with the Comanche Peak abnormal operations procedure for an earthquake, the NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.4 Recognition Category S - System Malfunction 3.4.1 EALs SS1/SG1 [SS1/SG1]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for these EALs ensures that an emergency classification is declared based upon a loss of AC power sources that compromises the performance of safety systems that require AC power including those necessary for emergency

core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.

The licensee proposed to add a statement to the technical basis discussion for SS1.1 and SG1.1 to clarify to decision makers that the use of other than normal power supplies may be credited in the evaluation of these EALS. The wording proposed is For this EAL, credit can be taken for any power source that has sufficient capability to operate equipment necessary to maintain a safe shutdown condition, provided it can be aligned within the 15-minute classification criteria. Additionally, the licensee proposed to replace the SG1.1 threshold value that is based on a calculated coping time with the condition that long-term reactor coolant system heat removal capability is not likely to be established and maintained per procedure.

These changes remove the potential for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency declaration when sources of AC power, other than offsite and onsite sources of AC power, have the capability to maintain a safe shutdown condition.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed technical basis discussion clarification for SS1.1 and SG1.1 and determined that the proposed addition of clarifying information to the technical basis discussions for SS1.1 and SG1.1 is equivalent to and consistent with the guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and would not impact the accuracy or timing of assessments for SS1.1 and SG1.1.

As such, the NRC staff finds the proposed addition of the proposed clarification acceptable.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed change to the threshold value for SG1.1 and determined that the proposed threshold value more accurately reflects the Comanche Peak extended loss of AC power current capability. Based on capabilities put in place to mitigate the effects of an extended loss of AC power, Comanche Peak would be able to maintain core cooling for an extended period. As such, the current threshold value that would result in a General Emergency declaration based on the site-specific coping time could result in an unnecessary General Emergency declaration and is no longer appropriate. The NRC staff finds the proposed change to replace the SG1.1 threshold value based on coping time with one based on the capability to establish long-term reactor coolant system heat removal capability acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, instrumentation, and setpoints for these EALs continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EALs are worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on-site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for these EALs continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds these EALs acceptable.

3.4.2 EAL SU4 [SU3]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared when an reactor coolant system activity value exceeds an allowable limit specified in TSs.

The licensee proposed to add the TS completion times to the associated SU4.1 EAL threshold values. This clarification would preclude EAL classifications for momentary spikes in reactor coolant activity that are addressed by the required actions of the TSs.

Based on a review of the proposed change to SU4.1 and the guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, the NRC staff determined that the proposed rewording of the threshold value for SU4.1 is specifically addressed by a NEI 99-01, Revision 6, developer note for time-dependent or transient values. As such, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to SU4.1 acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on-site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.4.3 EAL SU7 [SU6]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with offsite response organizations, including the NRC, are lost.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by updating the name of the plant telephone system from Private Automatic Branch Exchange to Intra-Plant Telephone System to accurately reflect the name of current plant-specific equipment. Considering that the proposed change will more accurately reflect current plant equipment in use, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to this EAL acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this emergency classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on-site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.4.4 EAL Set SS2/SG1 [SS8/SG8]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for EAL SS2 [SS8] ensures that a Site Area Emergency is declared when a loss of vital direct current (DC) power occurs for 15 minutes or longer during power operations, startup, hot standby, or hot shutdown, as applicable. Additionally, the threshold value for SG1.2 [SG8] would result in a General Emergency declaration if a concurrent loss of DC and AC power exists for 15 minutes or longer during power operations, startup, hot standby, or hot shutdown, as applicable.

The licensee proposed to add a clarification to the technical basis discussion for SG1.2 that, for this EAL, credit can be taken for any power source that has sufficient capability to operate equipment necessary to maintain a safe shutdown condition provided it can be aligned within the 15-minute classification criteria. This change removes the potential for a General Emergency declaration when sources of power, other than offsite and onsite sources of AC power, have the capability to maintain a safe shutdown condition.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed technical basis discussion clarification for SG1.2 and determined that the proposed addition of clarifying information to the technical basis discussion for SG1.2 is consistent with the guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and would not impact the accuracy or timing of assessments for SG1.2. As such, the NRC staff finds the proposed addition of the proposed clarification acceptable.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL set continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable.

3.4.5 EAL SA9 [SA9]

The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for this EAL ensures that an emergency classification is declared when a hazardous event leads to potential damage to safety systems needed for the current operating mode.

The licensees proposed EAL SA9.1 would require the declaration of an Alert classification level for a hazardous event that results in indications of degraded performance in one train of a multi-train safety system with either indications of degraded performance or visible damage to a second train of the safety system. The proposed indications would be significant enough that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern.

Although different from EAL SA9 as provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, the licensees proposed EAL SA9.1 is acceptable because it would provide for an Alert classification for site-specific plant conditions that would be consistent with the guidance for an Alert declaration provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Specifically, Section 2.1.2 in NEI 99-01 provides that an Alert should be declared when events are in progress or have occurred, which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Considering that the proposed change for this EAL would align the site-specific threshold values for this EAL with conditions that are consistent with the declaration criteria for an Alert, the NRC staff finds this proposed change acceptable.

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL continue to be consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and address the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and

are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses issues regarding completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on-site-specific indications.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the site-specific implementation method for this EAL continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable.

3.5 Miscellaneous In addition to the above proposed changes, the licensee identified minor errors and inconsistencies during a line-by-line review of the Comanche Peak EAL Bases Document and the Comanche Peak EAL Wallcharts. These errors and inconsistencies are indicated in a table that is located in Section 3.2.6 of Attachment 1, Evaluation of Proposed Change, of the LAR.

Based on a review of the Section 3.2.6 table and the proposed changes to the Comanche Peak EAL Bases Document, the NRC staff has concluded that the editorial changes or corrections do not change the intent or meaning of the EALs from the currently approved Comanche Peak EAL scheme.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes do not change the site-specific implementation method for any EALs or sections identified in the Section 3.2.6 table, and continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed corrections to minor errors and inconsistencies acceptable.

3.6 Review Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed changes to the Comanche Peak EAL scheme, and the licensees evaluation of the proposed changes. The licensee chose to modify EALs from their currently approved EAL scheme, which is based on the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6, to clarify certain EALs. The NRC staff verified that these modifications remain consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and the licensees EAL scheme. Therefore, the proposed EAL scheme, as revised, continues meets the requirements in Appendix E.IV.B.1 to 10 CFR Part 50 and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff determined that the proposed EAL scheme, as revised, continues to use objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety.

Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that the licensees proposed EAL scheme, as revised, is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees EAL Bases Document for Comanche Peak, which was provided with the LAR, is acceptable for implementation.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on March 2, 2021. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change the site emergency plan and change requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, published in the Federal Register on June 30, 2020 (85 FR 39222), and there has been no public comment on such finding. The amendments also relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

Sewell, S.K., Vistra Operations Company LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, License Amendment Request 20-004 for Revision to the Emergency Plan -

Changes to Certain Emergency Action Levels, dated May 21, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20142A496).

2.

Hicks, J.C., Vistra Operations Company LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, Supplement to Request a Change to the Implementation Date for License Amendment Request 20-004 for Revision to the Emergency Plan - Changes to Certain Emergency Action Levels, dated February 24, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21055A884).

3.

Nuclear Energy Institute, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, NEI 99-01, Revision 6, dated November 21, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805).

4.

Thaggard, M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Susan Perkins-Grew, Nuclear Energy Institute, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, dated November 2012 (TAC No. D92368),

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML13091A209).

5.

Watford, M. M., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Ken J. Peters, Luminant Generation Company LLC, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 -

Issuance of Amendments Regarding Emergency Action Level Scheme Change (CAC Nos. MF6407 and MF6408), dated June 14, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16137A056).

6.

Emergency Preparedness Frequently Asked Question 2015-013, EPFAQ 2015-013 After Public Comment Hostile Action resulting in a loss of control of the facility declarations when fuel damage is likely within 4-hours or results in a loss of physical control of spent fuel, dated June 20, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16166A366).

7.

Emergency Preparedness Frequently Asked Question 2016-002, EPFAQ 2016-002 Clarification of Equipment Damage as a Result of a Hazardous Event, dated July 14, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17195A299).

8.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter 79-50, Emergency Plans Submittal Dates, dated October 10, 1979 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031320278).

9.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, dated November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040420012).

10.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors, Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, dated October 31, 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090440294).

11.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, Use of NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Revision 4, dated January 2003, dated October 8, 2003, including Supplement 1 dated July 13, 2004, and Supplement 2 dated December 12, 2005 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML032580518, ML041550395, and ML051450482, respectively).

Principal Contributor: Raymond Hoffman Date: May 19, 2021

ML21061A217

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