ML20311A661

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Declaration of David Lochbaum in Support of Riverkeeper'S Motion for Full Adjudication of Its Pending Contention Prior to Any Decision by NRC on the License Transfer
ML20311A661
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/06/2020
From: Lochbaum D
Union of Concerned Scientists
To:
NRC/OCM, NRC/SECY
SECY RAS
References
50-003-LT-3, 50-247-LT-3, 50-286-LT-3, 72-051-LT-2, License Transfer, RAS 55857
Download: ML20311A661 (12)
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Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY AND THE COMMISSION

)

In the Matter of )

)

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, )

INC.; ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN )

POINT 2, LLC; ENTERGY NUCLEAR ) Docket Nos.

INDIAN POINT 3, LLC; HOLTEC ) 50-3 INTERNATIONAL; and HOLTEC ) 50-247 DECOMMISSIONING ) 50-348 INTERNATIONAL, LLC; APPLICATION )72-051 FOR ORDER CONSENTING TO ) November 6, 2020 TRANSFERS OF CONTROL OF )

LICENSES AND APPROVING )

CONFORMING LICENSE )

AMENDMENTS )

__________________________________________)

DECLARATION OF DAVID A. LOCHBAUM I, David A. Lochbaum, declare and state as follows:

1. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from The University of Tennessee in June 1979. I began my professional career in the U.S. nuclear power industry later that month assigned to Georgia Power Companys Edwin I. Hatch nuclear plant.
2. As detailed on my curriculum vitae (Exhibit A), I worked in the nuclear industry with assignments on the Browns Ferry (AL), Grand Gulf (MS), Hope Creek (NJ), Susquehanna (PA), James A. FitzPatrick (NY), Salem (NJ), and Connecticut Yankee (CT) nuclear plants until October 1996.
3. From October 1996 until February 2009, I worked for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) directing its nuclear power safety program by monitoring nuclear safety conditions and interfacing with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S.

1

Congress, state and local officials, and the media with my findings, observations, and recommendations.

4. From March 2009 until March 2010, I worked for the NRC as a reactor technology instructor at the agencys Technical Training Center providing initial qualification and re-qualification training on technology and associated regulatory requirements to NRC employees.
5. From March 2010 until October 2018, I resumed working for UCS directing its nuclear power safety program.
6. In my opinion, the contention raised by Riverkeeper, Inc.1 constitutes an issue requiring resolution prior to the NRCs decision on the proposed transfer of the Indian Point reactor operating licenses to subsidiaries of Holtec International. Riverkeeper detailed instances where Holtec failed to disclose a safety significant design change to the NRC, bribed an official of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), overcharged TVA for Spent Fuel Management demonstrating lack of trustworthiness, lied to government officials in New Jersey, and lied to government officials in New Mexico. 2
7. This proceeding is similar to the case involving the transfer of reactor operating licenses from Georgia Power Company to Southern Nuclear. In that case, Allen L. Mosbaugh and Marvin B. Hobby petitioned the NRC to intervene in the proposed license transfer on grounds that Southern Nuclear lacks the character and competence to operate a nuclear power plant. 3 1

Riverkeeper, Inc., Petition of Riverkeeper, Inc. to Intervene and for a Hearing, February 12, 2020. ML20043F530.

2 Id. at 14-19.

3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OIA-3, page 5, February 18, 1993. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20128P230 2

8. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) handling the Georgia Power Company license transfer case admitted Mosbaugh and concluded: We are convinced that granting of the requested amendment legally requires that Southern Nuclear have the character and competence to operate a nuclear power plant. 4 The ASLBP cited a decision by the NRC in a Three Mile Island proceeding which stated: A generally applicable standard for integrity is whether there is reasonable assurance that the Licensee has sufficient character to operate the plant in a manner consistent with public health and safety and applicable NRC requirements. 5
9. The ASLBP in the Georgia Power Company case admitted Mosbaugh to the license transfer proceeding because: We find there is adequate basis for Mr. Mosbaughs contention that at least one senior officer of Southern Nuclear is lacking in character and that Southern Nuclear lacks the integrity required of a licensee for the operation of a nuclear power plant. If this contention were sustained, we might direct that the license amendment be denied or conditioned on changes in the structure and personnel of Southern Nuclear. 6 Similarly, Riverkeeper has provided comparable contentions regarding the character and integrity of Holtec that, if sustained, might result in the transfer being denied or conditioned.
10. The ASLBP in the Georgia Power Company concluded: Southern Nuclear must meet the regulatory requirement that it demonstrate its character and competence before it be 4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OIA-3, page 7, February 18, 1993. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20128P230 5

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OIA-3, page 7, February 18, 1993 Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20128P230 6

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OIA-3, page 15, February 18, 1993. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20128P230 3

granted operating authority over a nuclear power plant. 7 Similarly, Holtec must also meet this regulatory requirement before being granted the authority being sought.

11. The ASLBP in the Georgia Power Company case terminated the proceeding on August 19, 1996, in response to a joint motion filed by Mr. Mosbaugh and Georgia Power Company requesting dismissal. The contention raised by Mr. Mosbaugh factored in the NRC taking enforcement action on May 9, 1994, in the form of Demands For Information issued to several company officials and on February 13, 1995, in the form of a Proposed Civil Penalty against the company.8 In essence, the enforcement actions constituted the conditions suggested as a possible remedy by the ASLBP in admitting Mr. Mosbaugh to the proceeding. These remedies involving both individuals and the company were undertaken before the reactor operating licenses were transferred from Georgia Power Company to Southern Nuclear.
12. That the question of Holtecs character must be answered before the license transfers are approved is reinforced by the NRCs final rule on parties in the agencies hearings conducted under 10 CFR Part 2 obtaining access to sensitive unclassified safeguards information (SUNSI) and Safeguards Information (SGI). This final rule required that a party requesting access to SUNSI demonstrate a need for the requested information while a party requesting access to SGI demonstrate both a need for it and a trustworthiness and reliability. 9
13. If one must first demonstrate trustworthiness and reliability before receiving SGI, then Holtec must demonstrate trustworthiness and reliability before receiving SGI about Indian 7

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OIA-3, pages 20-21, February 18, 1993. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20128P230 8

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Directors Decision under 10 CFR 2.206 in the Matter of Georgia Power Company et al, DD-97-06, page 12, March 18, 1997. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20137C426 9

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Rule on Interocutory Review of Rulings on Requests by Potential Parties for Access to Sensitive Non-Safeguards Information and Safeguards Information, page 11, April 9, 2008.

Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML080440234 4

Point with the requested license transfers. It makes little sense for a reviewer of SGI to have demonstrated trustworthiness and reliability if the possessor of that SGI has not made a similar demonstration.

14. The important role of trustworthiness and reliability in nuclear power safety is reflected in the times when the NRC has taken enforcement action against individuals found to have fallen short on these standards. For example, on April 29, 2014, the NRC prohibited the former Chemistry Manager at Indian Point from any involvement in NRC-licensed activities for one year. After the NRC determined that the individual falsified records and provide inaccurate information to NRC investigators, the NRCs Director of the Office of Enforcement concluded:

I lack the reasonable assurance that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with Commission requirements and that the health and safety of the public will be protected, if Daniel Wilson were permitted at this time to be involved in NRC-licensed activities. 10

15. More recently and involving a higher-level manager, the NRC prohibited TVAs Vice President Nuclear Technology Innovation from any involvement in NRC-licensed activities for five years. The NRCs Director of the Office of Enforcement concluded: the NRC lacks the requisite reasonable assurance that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commissions requirements and that the health and safety of the public will be protected if Mr. Joseph Shea were permitted at this time to be involved in NRC-licensed activities. 11
16. Due to recurring violations of regulatory requirements, the NRC issued two Orders to the owner of the Millstone nuclear plant. On August 14, 1996, the NRC ordered the 10 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order in the Matter of Daniel Wilson, page 6, April 29, 2014. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML14118A385 11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities Immediately Effective in the Matter of Joseph Shea, IA-20-008, pages 3-4, August 24, 2020. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20219A676 5

owner to establish an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP).12 The NRC explained why this measure was warranted:

The NRC staff noted that NRC inspections and NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] internal audits since 1991, have identified numerous configuration (design) control failures, failures, to implement corrective actions for known problems, failures to implement quality assurance requirements and failures to comply with the terms and conditions of the operating licenses for all three Millstone plants. The NRC staff also noted that they have been indications of weaknesses in the NRCs oversight of the operation of the Millstone plants.

17. On October 24, 1996, the NRC ordered Millstones owner to establish a second independent party to monitor the employee safety concerns program. 13 The NRC described the reason for this measure:

This Order addresses past failures in management processes and procedures for handling safety issues raised by employees, and in ensuring that employees who raise safety concerns are not discriminated against.

18. The Indian Point Chemistry Manager and TVA Vice President cases indicate that the NRC cannot assure adequate public health and safety when individuals found to have violated safety requirements are involved in NRC-licensed activities and therefore bans such individuals from engaging in such activities.
19. The Georgia Power Company and Millstone cases indicate that, while the NRC cannot practically ban a corporate licensee from managing its facilities, the agency can take enforcement actions to restore and sustain the requisite compliance behaviors.

12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Confirmatory Order Establishing Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (Effective Immediately) - Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3. August 14, 1996. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML010570115 13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order Requiring Independent, Third-Party Oversight of Northeast Nuclear Energy Companys Implementation of Resolution of Millstone Station Employees Safety Concerns, October 24, 1996. Available online at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20129G523 6

7 DECLARATION OF DAVID A. LOCHBAUM LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit A Curriculum Vitae 8

Exhibit A David A. Lochbaum EDUCATION June 1979 Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Engineering, The University of Tennessee at Knoxville EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

03/10 to 10/18 Director - Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists Responsible for directing UCSs nuclear safety program, for monitoring developments in the nuclear industry, for serving as the organizations spokesperson on nuclear safety issues, for initiating action to correct safety concerns, for authoring reports and briefs on safety issues, and for presenting findings to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Congress, and state and local officials. Co-authored with Edwin Lyman and Susan Stranahan the book Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster published by The New Press.

03/09 to 03/10 Reactor Technology Instructor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Technical Training Center Responsible for providing initial qualification and re-qualification training on boiling water reactor technology for NRC employees. Activities included revising chapters of the training manual, conducting classroom and control room simulator training sessions, maintaining the test question database, administering examinations, and assisting the development of an interactive 3-D model of the reactor pressure vessel and its internals.

10/96 to 02/09 Director - Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists Responsible for directing UCSs nuclear safety program, for monitoring developments in the nuclear industry, for serving as the organizations spokesperson on nuclear safety issues, for initiating action to correct safety concerns, for authoring reports and briefs on safety issues, and for presenting findings to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Congress, and state and local officials.

11/87 to 09/96 Senior Consultant Enercon Services, Inc.

Responsible for developing the conceptual design package for the alternate decay heat removal system, for closing out partially implemented modifications, reducing the backlog of engineering items, and providing training on design and licensing bases issues at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

Responsible for developing a topical report on the station blackout licensing bases for the Connecticut Yankee plant.

Responsible for vertical slice assessment of the spent fuel pit cooling system and for confirmation of licensing commitment implementation at the Salem Generating Station.

Responsible for developing the primary containment isolation devices design basis document, reviewing the emergency diesel generators design basis document, resolving design document open items, and updating design basis documents for the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

David A. Lochbaum Responsible for the design review of balance of plant systems and generating engineering calculations to support the Power Uprate Program for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.

Responsible for developing the reactor engineer training program, revising reactor engineering technical and surveillance procedures and providing power maneuvering recommendations at the Hope Creek Generating Station.

Responsible for supporting the lead BWR/6 Technical Specification Improvement Program and preparing licensing submittals for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

03/87 to 08/87 System Engineer General Technical Services Responsible for reviewing the design of the condensate, feedwater and raw service systems for safe shutdown and restart capabilities at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

08/83 to 02/87 Senior Engineer Enercon Services, Inc.

Responsible for performing startup and surveillance testing, developing core monitoring software, developing the reactor engineer training program, and supervising the reactor engineers and Shift Technical Advisors at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

10/81 to 08/83 Reactor Engineer / Shift Technical Advisor Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Responsible for performing core management functions, administering the nuclear engineer training program, maintaining ASME Section XI program for the core spray and control rod drive systems, and covering STA shifts at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

06/81 to 10/81 BWR Instructor General Electric Company BWR/6 Training Center Responsible for developing administrative procedures for the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

01/80 to 06/81 Reactor Engineer / Shift Technical Advisor Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Responsible for directing refueling floor activities, performing core management functions, maintaining ASME Section XI program for the RHR system, providing power maneuvering recommendations and covering STA shifts at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

David A. Lochbaum 06/79 to 12/79 Junior Engineer Georgia Power Company Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Responsible for completing pre-operational testing of the radwaste solidification systems and developing design change packages for modifications to the liquid radwaste systems at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. Also qualified as a station nuclear engineer and covered shifts during startups, control rod pattern exchanges, and other power maneuvers.

OTHER QUALIFICATIONS January 2010 Certified as a boiling water reactor technology instructor at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 1982 Certified as a Shift Technical Advisor at the TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant May 1980 Certified as an Interim Shift Technical Advisor at the TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Member, American Nuclear Society (since 1978).

PUBLICATIONS (ABRIDGED LIST)

Books Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster. Co-authored with Edwin Lyman and Susan Q. Stranahan. 2014. The New Press. New York, NY Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis. 1996. PennWell Book. Tulsa, OK.

Reports The Nuclear Power Dilemma: Declining Profits, Plant Closures, and the Threat of Rising Carbon Emissions. Co-authored with Steve Clemmer, Jeremy Richardson, and Sandra Sattler. 2018. Union of Concerned Scientists.

Cambridge, MA.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Safety Culture: Do As I Say, Not As I Do. February 2017. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Near Misses at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants in 2015. March 2016. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2014: Tarnished Gold Standard. March 2015. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2013: More Jekyll, Less Hyde. March 2014. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

The NRC and Nuclear Power Safety in 2012: Tolerating the Intolerable. March 2013. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

The NRC and Nuclear Power Safety in 2011: Living on Borrowed Time. March 2012. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

David A. Lochbaum The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2010: A Brighter Spotlight Needed. March 2011. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Regulatory Roulette: The NRCs Inconsistent Oversight of Radioactive Releases from Nuclear Power Plants.

September 2010. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Fire When Not Ready. Co-authored with Paul Gunter and Jim Warren. Beyond Nuclear, Takoma Park, MD. NC WARN, Durham, NC. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Nuclear Power in a Warming World: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges. Co-authored with Lisbeth Gronlund and Edwin Lyman. December 2007. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Walking a Nuclear Tightrope: Unlearned Lessons of Year-plus Reactor Outages. September 2006. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime. May 2004. Union of Concerned Scientists.

Cambridge, MA.

Davis-Besse: One Year Later. March 2003. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Anatomy of a Flawed Decision: NRC Has a Brain, Bui No Spine. Co-authored with Paul Gunter. August 2002.

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Takoma Park. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Nuclear Plant Risk Studies: Failing the Grade. August 2000. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: A Report on Safety in Americas Nuclear Power Industry. June 1998. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

Potential Nuclear Safety Hazard: Reactor Operation with Failed Fuel Cladding. April 1998. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA.

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