ML20248D399

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Amends 125 & 123 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively, Revising TS 3/4.7.11,Table 3.7-1, Max Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint W/Inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves
ML20248D399
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 05/28/1998
From: Steven Bloom
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20248D402 List:
References
NUDOCS 9806020423
Download: ML20248D399 (11)
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Text

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UNITED STATES g

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WASHINGTON D.C. So66Mm01

$9.....,o PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-275 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.125 License No. DPR-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 23,1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requireme,nts have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to inis license amendment, and paiagraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

9806020423 980528 i

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Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No.125, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented witnin 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v=--

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Steven D. Bloom, Projeu Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects til/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:

May 28, 1998 i

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UNITED STATES a

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l PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-323 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.123 License No. DPR-82

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 23,1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformW with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations ct the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2)

Technical Specifications l

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No.123, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

]teven D. Bloom, Projec DD&

Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects lil/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date ofissuance: May 28, 1998 l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

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eMENDMENT NO.125 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 AblQAMENDMENT NO.123 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82 DOCKET NOS. 50-275__AND 50-323 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginallines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1a B 3/4 7-2*

B 3/4 7-2*

  • No changes were made to this page. Reissued to become a one-sided page.

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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

-j 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Tabie 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specifica-tion 4.0.5.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-1

TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE SAFETY NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT VALVES ON ANY OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER) 1 87*

2 47*

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29*

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  • Unless the Reactor Trip System breakers are in the open position.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.125 Unit 2 - Amendment No.123

.3/4.7 PL ANT SYSTEMS y

BASES 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES The primary purpose of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the reactor coolant system if the preferred heat sink. provided by the condenser and the circulating water system, is not available.

Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The MSSV design includes staggered'setpoints, according to Table 3 7-2 so that only the needed valves will actuate.

Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip.

The design basis for the MSSVs comes from ASME Code Section III and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to less than or equal to 110%

of design pressure.

This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence or accident considered in the design basis accident and transient analysis.

The tolerance on the MSSV setpoints assures

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that the secondary system will not be overpressurized if the MSSVs lift at the high end of their tolerance band, and assures that the steam generators (SGs) will not be overfilled during a SG tube rupture if the MSSVs lift at the low end of their tolerance band.

A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per SG ensures that sufficient relief capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels.

The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions applied in TS Table 3.7-1 are derived on the following bases:

One MSSV Inocerable The limiting FSAR Condition II accident for overpressure concerns is a loss of external load / turbine trip. The event is analyzed with the RETRAN-02 computer program to demonstrate the adequacy of the MSSVs to maintain the main steam system lower than 1210 psia, or 110% of the 1085 psig SG design pressure.

In a PG&E calculation. the transient is reanalyzed to determine the effect of only four MSSVs per SG being available.

The analysis assumes a 3% tolerance for cli the available MSSVs.

The MSSV on each SG with the lowest nominal setarint was assumed unavailable, and the Unit 2 model is used because of its higla' thermal rating. The results of the calculation show that the peak pressure:. In the SGs are lower than 1210 psia, or 110% of the 1085 psig SG design rtwssure.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. M8,125 Unit 2 - Amendment No. M7.123

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

Thus, with one MSSV inoperable per SG. the remaining MSSVs are capable of 3roviding sufficient 3ressure relief capacity for the plant to operate at 100%

trip setpoints must be lowered an additional 6% pplied to the high neutron flux 1ATED THERMAL POWER (RTP).

However, the value a RTP to account for instrument and channel uncertainties. The instrument uncertainties are derived from

" Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems. Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, 24 Month fuel Cycle Evaluation." WCAP 11082. Revision 5.

This adjustment results in a setpoint of 94% RTP: however, the setpoint will remain at 87% RTP for additional conservatism.

More than One MSSV Inocerable For more than one MSSV on each loop inoperable. the following Westinghouse algorithm contained in NSAL 94-001 is used:

Hi 0 - (100/0)

K where:

Hi 0 =

Safety Analsysis PR high neutron flux setpoint, percent Nominal NSSS 3ower rating of the plant (including reactor 0

coolant pump leat). MWt Conversion factor. 947.82 (Btu /sec)/MWt K

=

w, Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the operable

=

MSSVs on any one SG at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation as appropriate, in lb/sec.

For exam)1e. if the maximum number of inoperable should be a summation of the MSSVs per SG is t1ree, then w's at the highest operable MSSV capacity of the operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs.

heat of vaporation for steam at the highest MSSV opening h

=

3 pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate. Btu /bm Number of loops in plant N

=

For the case of two and three inoperable MSSVs per SG. the setpoints derived are 53% and 35% RTP, respectively. However, the values applied to the high

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neutron flux tri) setpoints must be lowered an additional 6% RTP to account for instrument and clannel uncertainties, which results in setpoints of 47% and 29%

RTP, respectively.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-la Unit 1 - Amendment No.125 Unit 2 - Amendment No.123 1

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PLANT SYSTEMS

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BASES j

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM BACKGROUND The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps take suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) (TS 3/4.7.1.3) and pump to the steam generator secondary side via separate and independent connections to the main feedwater (MFW) piping outside containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (MSSVs)

(TS 3/4.7.1.1) or atmospheric dump valves (TS 3/4.7.1.6).

If the main condenser is available, steam may be released via the steam bypass valves and recirculated to the CST.

The AFW System consists of two motor driven AFW pumps and one steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. Each motor driven pump provides 100% of AFW flow capacity, and the turbine driven pump provides 200%

of the required capacity to the steam generators (ref. 3), with "100% capacity" as defined in the AFW design basis accident analysis (loss of normal feedwater)

(ref. 1). The pumps are equipped with independent recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class IE power supply and feeds two steam generators, although each pump has the capability to be manually realigned to feed other steam generators. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of the requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump.

The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of feeding all steam generators with vital AC powered control valvas actuated to the appropriate steam generator by remote manual action. One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met.

The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators during norinal unit startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions.

The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at the setpoint of the MSSVs. Subsequently, the AFW System supplies sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam released through the ADVs.

The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator water level--low-l l

low by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) (TS 3/4.3.2).

i Other conditions that actuate the motor driven or the turbine driven AFW pumps include: loss of offsite power, safety injection, trip of all MFW pumps, ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal, and transfer to diesel.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 6Br75 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 61774 December 26, 1995

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