ML20247E354
| ML20247E354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1989 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Wilgus W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8907260142 | |
| Download: ML20247E354 (76) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1989009
Text
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July.18,'1989
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Docket No. 50-302
License No. DPR-72
Florida Power Corporation
Mr. W. S. Wilgus
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing
P. O. Box 219-NA-21
Crystal River, FL 32629
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-302/89-09)
l
l
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on
June 28, 1989.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Crystal
River facility.
The issues discussed at this conference related to those
environmental qualification (EQ) deficiencies identified during the subject
inspection and Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) corrective actions.
In this meeting you discussed the specific details for each of the eleven
deficiencies as presented in the handouts enclosed.
The staff concluded that
there was little new information prnented that would differ signifi-
cently from the facts presented in the , sport details.
You took the position in the meeting that-none of the deficiencies, separately
or collectively, were considered to be safety significant.
However, you did
admit ~that the EQ program was somewhat transparent at the station in that the
requirements were simply added' to existing procedures and not highlighted.
Also, you did not have a dedicated EQ group as do most other utility programs.
Based on actions you took in 1985 (Refuel V), you believed your EQ program
was conservatively addressing E0 deficiencies by replacement of components /
equipment rather than analyzing your. total EQ concerns.
You also indicated
that your proposed EQ enhancement efforts would have discovered the staff's
findings.
You concluded your presentation with a statement that
escalated enforcement or a civil penalty is not necessary to inform or
encourage FPC to improve the way it implements the EQ program.
During the meeting, there was a great deal of discussion about the planned
completion date for the EQ enhancement effort.
You indicated that you would
provide additiunal information to the staff regarding the completion of this
program.
,
8907260142 890718
i
ADOCK 0500gC 2
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-July 18, 1989.
v
Florida Power Corporation
2
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A listL of attendees and a copy of your handouts are enclosed.
We are
continuing our review of. these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement
action.
_
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In accordance- with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy-of- this letter and its enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
r
M. L. ERNST
Stewart D. Ebneter
Regional Administrator
'
Enclosures:.
1.
List of Attendees
<
-2.
Handouts (3)
cc'w/encls:
P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
R. C.' Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support
State of Florida
bcc w/encls:
,
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NRC Resident. Inspector
J. Lieberman, DOE
G. R. Jenkins, EICS
NRC Resident Inspector
Document Control Desk
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ENCLOSURE 1-
ENFORCEMENT-CONFERENCE.
LIST-0F ATTENDEES
l
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
Date: June 28,.-1989.
Facility: .. Crystal River
IR Nos.: S0-302/89-09'
.
Location: NRC Region II Office, Atlanta, Ga.
Florida Power Corporation
A. H. Geiston, Supervisor, Site. Nuclear Engineering Services
P. Havens, Corporate Counsel
g
'R. Iwachoin Senior I & C Engineer
'
M. W.~ Kirk, Nuclear _ Operations Engineer
D' A. Shook, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering
.
E.'C..Simpson, Director,' Nuclear Operations Engineering and Projects
' P. R.'Tanguay, Manager . Nuclear Operations Engineering
-
- W. S. Wilgus, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- K. R. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- U.S. NRC
A. Boland, Technical Assistant, RII
- T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
~
S. D.'Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII
M. L'. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII
R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel, RII
C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) RII
P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident' Inspector,lDRP, RII
l
N. Merriweather,. Reactor Inspector, DRS, RII'
'
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, DRS, RII
M. V. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 2, DRP, RII-
B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Specialist, RII
G. Wunder, Acting Project Manager, NRR
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Enclosure 2
Handout 1
AGENDA
FPC/NRC E.Q. ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
JUNE 28, 1989
I.
INTRODUCTION
W. S. WILGUS
II.
E.Q. PROGRAM REVIEW
E. C. SIMPSON
III. REVIEW OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES
D. A. SHOOK
IV.
CONCLUSION
K. R. WILSON
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' Enclosure 2"
Page 2
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Handout 1
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FPC E.O.
PROGRAM
BACKGROUND
.
STATUS OF RECENT FPC ACTIONS / ASSESSMENTS
.
OVERVIEW OF AREAS OF FOCUS IN FPC'S
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT EFFORTS
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BAQE9ROUND/RECENT-FPC ASSESSMENTS
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E.Q. ~ REQUIREMENTS - AND UNDERSTANDING HAVE EVOLVED'
FROM 1974 TO PRESENT
WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE TODAY IN THE AREA OF E.Q. IS VERY
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DIFFERENT FROM'WHAT THE STAFF WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED
IN THE PAST
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NRC PIIDT INSPECTION.(MAR 1985)
NOTED CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON E.Q. PROGRAM
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NOTED CONSIDERABLE WORK STILL NEEDED TO ' BE -
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COMPLETED
IDENTIFIED EIGHT FINDINGS
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FPC APPROACH TO E.Q. PROGRAM IN 1985
REFUEL V (SEPT.1985) - CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED
-
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AND UPGRADED EQUIPMENT VS. QUALIFYING EXISTING
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EQUIPMENT TO E.Q. REQUIREMENTS
INCORPORATED E.Q.
INTO OUR EXISTING PROGRAMS
-
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INDICATED THAT THIS'
-
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ALL EQUIPMENT ADDED - DURING REFUEL V WERE PROPERLY'~
IDENTIFIED 'IN THE SAFETY LISTING AS 10CFR50~.49' SCOPE:
ITEMS,- COMPLETED JULY 1987
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NOV. 1988 - FPC QUALITY PROGRAMS AUDIT
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DEC.1988 - FPC INITIATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN E.Q.
ENHANCEMENT. PROJECT PLAN
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DEC. 1988 - REJOINED NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP'CN'E.Q.
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MAR. 1989 -
COMPLETED
DEVEI4PMENT
OF
FPC~
ENHANCEMENT PROJECT PLAN
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APRIL 24-28, 1989 - NRC E.Q. AUDIT
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E.Q. PROGRAM (ANTICIPATE JULY 1989 COMPLETION)
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PRELIMINARY FPC EaO. ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
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PROGRAM SCOPE DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF FPC AND NRC
AUDITS
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E.Q.
PROGRAM
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PRELIMINARY
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PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT FALLS INTO THE FOLLOWING SEVEN
AREAS:
ORGANIZATION
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PROCEDURES
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FIELD VER.LFICATION EFFORT
PERFORM FIELD REVERIFICATION OF CR-3 E.Q. EQUIPMENT
-
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-
UTILIZE
COMPREHENSIVE
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REORGANIZE VENDOR QUALIFICATION PACKAGES INTO A
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UTILIZED
REORGANIZATION EFFORT WILL INCLUDE A TECHNICAL RE-
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E.Q.
SPECIFIC
MAINTENANCE
MANUAI;/E.Q.
INSTALLATION DETAIL DRAWINGS
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROFTL_RE
RE-EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL ZONE MAP SHEETS
-
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BE
CONDUCTED TO
RECONFIRM
RADIATION AND
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B_.O. MASTER LIST (EOML) REVERIFICATION
FPC INTENDS TO REVERIFY THE E.Q. MASTER LIST AT
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- 89-09-01
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ITEM 89-09-01
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC FAILED TO
CONSIDER CRACKS IN THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINE
j
LOCATED
IN
THE
AUXILIARY
BUILDING
WHEN
CATEGORIZING THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AS A MILD
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ENVIRONMENT.
S Y S TJ LM S I N V O L V E D
SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR CONTROL CENTER UNITS 3A1,
3B2,
AND
3B3
COULD
HAVE
BEEN
ADVERSELY
AFFECTED
BY
A
HARSH
ENVIRONMENT
IN
THE
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AUXILIARY
BUILDING.
THESE
MCC's
CONTROL
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SEVERAL AUXILIARY BUILDING COMPONENTS.
(LER #88-27, dated January 9,
1989)
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FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A CRACK IN_THE SUBJECT-
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zAUXILIARY STEAM LINE COULD 'HAVE EVENTUALLY
CREATED
A.
HARS5
TEMPERATURE
ENVIRONMENT.
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.HOWEVER, 'FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER,
THE
DEFICIENCIES .WERE
NOT
SAFETY
SIGNIFICANT.
.THEREFORE, THEY DO.NOT' INDEPENDENTLY, OR-WHEN
COLLECTIVELY-
CONSIDERED
WITH
OTHER
DEFICIENCIES,
MARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT
ACTION.
. ROOT CAUSE
.
THE
INSTALLED
MODIFICATION
INTENDED'
TO
ELIMINATE THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINES AS A
SOURCE ONLY WORKS FOR LINE BREAKS BUT NOT
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CRACKS.
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BAFETY BIG]iIFICANCE
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THE SUBJECT LINE ONLY CONTAINS STEAM APPROXIMATELY
.
FIFTEEN DAYS PER YEAR.
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A CRACK
WOULD OCCUR DURING THE FIFTEEN DAY USE PERIOD IS
MINIMAL.
THE POSTULATED 1811 CRITERIA CRACKS ARE NOT AT HIGH
.
STRESS LOCATIONS AND ARE, THEREFORE, UNLIKELY.
PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AREA AND LIKELY WOULD PROMPTLY
.
DISCOVER AND ISOLATE THE CRACK PRIOR TO THE CREATION -
OF A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.
THE. STAFF
HAS
RECOGNIZED
THE
MINIMAL
SAFETY
.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE IN GRANTING (JUNE
5,
1989) CR-3 A TEMPORARY EXEMPTION, TO GENERAL DESIGN
CRITERIA (GDC)-4, WITH RESPECT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL
AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS
(HE7B)
UNTIL THE END OF REFUEL VII
(CURRENTLY
SCHEDULED FOR THE SPRING OF 1990).
THE STAFF
INCLUDED IN THE EXEMPTION THOSE MODIFICATIONS MADE
FROM THE ORIGINAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT.
THIS INCLUDES THE SUILTECT SYSTEM.
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SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE. ACTIOl{g,
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THE SUBJECT LINE WAS PROMFfLY CONFIRMED AS ISOLATED.
.
IT WILL NOT BE USED ONTIL ONGOING ANALYSES OF THE.
AREA ARE COMPLETE.
AS STATED ABOVE, FPC REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A
.
GDC-4 EXEMPTION THAT BOUNDS THE SUBJECT ISSUE.
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
.i
FPC WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ITS HELB PROGRAM AND
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ASCiRTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL ROOT CAUSES
IF OTHER
SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES ARE IDENTIFIED.
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FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM
E.Q.
ENHANCEMENT
.
PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.
ENHANCED TRAINING ON
E.Q.
WILL BE PERFORMED IN
.
AUGUST 1989.
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89-09-01
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OTHER CONSIDERATION
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.G,
THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE
OF
VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFIC 12 'CY :
>
WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPOP'"ED BY THE LICENSEE.
.
WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN
.
A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.
WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.
.
WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED AND FPC's HELB EFFORTS
.
SHOULD PREVENT RECURRENCE.
WAS NOT WILLFUL.
.
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CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B,
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
>
-
- -
-
-
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M 04 C W W WMTdRW"??MWPSE4fnf6^MjdF#h@is@Hb((QMNpsjl-
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' Enclosure.2
Page'6
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~
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-
. . -
-4.
-
-89-09-02-
...
.
7
v.
.
4..
v
.
i
ITEM'89-09-02
j,,
,
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC FAILED TO
INSTALL QUALIFIED TAPE SPLICES ON THREE MOTOR
H
OPERATED VALVES.
ONE MOV
IS
INSIDE THE-
-REACTOR BUILDING - AND - TWO MOV's ARE IN THE
TURBINE BUILDING.
SYSTEMS INVOLVED
MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES (FWV-14
!
AND 15) I4CATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.
i
WASTE
DISPOSAL
SYSTEM
NORMALLY
CLOSED
.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE (WDV-406) LOCATED'
f
IN THE REACTOR BUILDING.
I
.
>
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_
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-
---
-
-
'
'
E
.Enclosura 2
Page.7
,
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3,-
- yw; - m;
+
,
m
.+
,
.
,
,
"
aJiandoQt 2-
-
K
,
~
- 89-09-02
-
4
..
.
7
ZE0_ POSITION
FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A BREAK IN THE MAIN STEAM LINE
COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY
ENVIRONMENT FOR FWV-14 AND 15.
ALSO, AN ACCIDENT IN THE
REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH ENVIRONMENT
,
FOR WDV-406.
FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE
DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.
THEREFORE,
THEY
DO
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY,
WHEN
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED
ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
ROOT CAUSE
THE E,Q. UPGRADE PROGRAM ADDRESSED SPLICES ON MOV'S AT
THE SAME TIME OTHER MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE
RESPECTIVE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES.
REQUIRE ANY OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR SPLICES
.
WAS NOT RECOGNIZED.
!
I
.
l
o
-
,
. _ ,
_ . . . .
Ji
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_ , . . . _
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Page:8-
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H
'
ij
3
-
,
89-09-02-
.
..
SAFETY S. SIGNIFICANCE
- *
+
]
,
FEEDWATER SYSTEM (FWV-14, 15)
.
)
[.
4
q
l
1
THE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.
.
l
THE POTENTIAL HARSH ENVIRONMENT INVOLVES TEMPERATURE AND'
l
.
HUMIDITY ONLY.
. SPLICES ' WERE CONTAINED IN AN ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURE AND
.
WOULD HAVE MINIMAL EXPOSURE TO THE POTENTIAL HARSH.
ENVIRONMENT.
. .
THE. REQUIRED' FUNCTION FOR' THESE VALVES . IS TO PROMPTLY
CLOSE ON A SIGNAL FROM THE EPIC EQUIPMENT'- THIS ACTION
. TAKES PLACE BEFORE' THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO THE HARSH
ENVIRONMENT.
'
EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP WHICH
.
IS.THE SOURCE.0F WATER THESE VALVES ARE ISOLATING.
'EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE BACK-UP VALVES FWV-30, 31,
.
36, 29, 32, 33.
THE SPLICES WERE AN INDUSTRIAL TYPE SPLICE AND LIKELY
.
DID NOT REQUIRE
E.Q.- QUALIFICATION FOR THEIR INTENDED
SAFETY FUNCTION.
FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY
' INSTALLING RAYCHEM SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY
THE SPLICE.
BASED ON Ti3E ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
.
?
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,
E'nclosure"2'
'
r-
Handout 2
i.
.
,
-
-
89-09-02
,
.
,
I
l
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Cont'd.)
.
WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM
.
THE VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED.
.
THE REQUIRED FUNCTION FOR THIS VALVE IS TO REMAIN CLOSED.
.
THIS VALVE WILL RECEIVE A SIGNAL FROM E.S.
(ENGINEERING
SAFEGUARDS) TO INSUPE IT IS CLOSED. THIS SAFETY FUNCTION
WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO A
i
HARSH ENVIRONMENT.
E.S. ALSO PROMPTLY CLOSES THE BACKUP VALVE WDV-405.
.
THE TERMINATIONS WERE A KERITE TYPE SPLICE AND WERE
.
LIKELY QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR INTENOED SAFETY FUNCTION.
FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY INSTALLING RAYCHEM
SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY THE SPLICE.
BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
.
.
_.
______________~~ll'"
--
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Enclosure 2
Page 10
, Handout 2
.
4
9.
89-09-02
-
-
1
1
!
!
BHORT TEFJJSRRECTIVE ACTIONS
I
SPLICES
WERE
REPLACED WITH
QUALIFIED
.
RAYCHEM SPLICES.
j
i
WALKDOWN WAS PERFORMED TO IDENTIFY ANY
.
ADDITIONAL
PROBLEMS
IN
THE
TURBINE
.
LOILDING.
!
l
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
HAS
INITIATED A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT AND
CORRECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.
)
1
,
,
l
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-
. _ - - - - - - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - -
.,
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,
.
fnclosure 2-
Page 11
Jiandout 2
.-
.
2:
4
,
-
-
89-09-02
v
_
_
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.G,
THE
STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF
VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:
WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED BY THE LICENSEE.
I
WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED NO GREATER THAN
I
.
A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.
'
I
WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.
.
WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED.
.
)
WAS NOT WILLFUL.
.
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
>
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Enclosure l2'
Page 12
' Handout'2
-
'
-
- 89-09-03
-
!
ITEM 89-09-03
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC FAILED TO
INCLUDE PENETRATION EPA-128 ON THE E.Q. MASTER
LIST.
SYSTEM INVOLVED _
PENETRATION, EPA-128, CONTAINS INSTRUMENTATION
CABLES FOR TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS (AH-536, 537,
538,
539-TE)- THAT
MEASURE
REACTOR
BUILDING
TEMPERATURE.
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Enclosure 2-
Page 13
'
Handout' 2-
-
-
89-09-03
.
PPC POSITIQ){
i
.
FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION
!
EPA-128 WAS NOT ON THE E.Q. MASTER' LIST.
THE
STAFF ACKNOWLEDGED BY INSPECTION
REPORT
50-
302/89-09 (PAGE 6) 'u{AT ACCEPTABLE QUALIFICATION
DOCUMENTATION
WAS
IN
THE
FILE
AND
THE
TERMINATIONS
APPEAR
TO
BE
SATISFACTORY.
THEREFORE,
THE
D'FICIENCY
WAS
NOT
SAFETY
E
SIGNIFICANT.
THIS
DEFICIENCY
DOES
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY, OR WhEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED
WITH
OTHER
DEFICIENCIES,
WARRANT
ESCALATED
ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
-
JtOOT CAUSE
)
ENGINEER ERROR RESULTED IN THE PENETRATION BEING
'
l
OMITTED FROM THE E.Q. MASTER LIST.
'
i
'
i
I
l
I
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. - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - _ . _ - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - -
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Page 14
l
,
lHandou't 2
'
-
89-09-03
,,
.
D.AEETY SIGNIFICANCE
THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION WAS QUALIFIED.
'
.
i
MINOR DOCUMENTATION DEFICIENCY.
.
NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
.
l
.
h
i
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. _ . - -
-
.. . . ,
-
-
..
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' Enclosure 2
Page 15
' ' Nandout 2
-
-
89-09-03
SHORT_ TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION
THE E.Q. MASTER LIST WAS UPDATED.
.
1
i
A REVIEW OF'ALL REG. 1.97 ITEMS TO ENSURE
.
4
THEY ARE ON THE E.Q.
MASTER LIST WILL BE
'
COMPLETED SHORTLY.
.I,0NG TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION
-
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT
PROGRAM
THAT
WILL
DETECT
L
SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.
ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE PERFORMED
.
IN AUGUST 1989.
COMPLETE REG. 1.97 REVIEW TO ENSURE ALL
.
ITEMS ARE ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIST.
.
>
l
,
,
-
.
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ - . - ..
- --
. _.
. - . , - . . , . . . . - -
1
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.
.
- Enclosure"2~
"
.
?',.E, Handout 2
.
F
I6
,
.
.--
89-09-03
,.y
. - .
.
'
, ;.i
,;
ay
_j
?
,
OTHER CONSIDERATION.1
CONSISTENT WITH 1 CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS . CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST. ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
'{
REQ IRED- TO OPERATE 'UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
.
4
s
t
,
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Page 17.
. l Handout2
"
4w
'l
89-09-04
"i
'
.
..
-
v!
.
!
'I
)
.
ITEM 89-09-04
. e
ACCORDING TO THE' STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE AN
E.Q.
FILE OR ANALYSIS ..FOR
THE TAPED-TYPE
TER74INATION ON AHC-112.. FPC WISHES TO CORRECT
,
THE STAFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS ISSUE IN-
THAT THERE WERE
E.Q.
FILES FOR TAPED-TYPE
l
i
SPLICES;
HOWEVER,
THE REVIEW PERFORMED TO
REMOVE THE KERITE SPLICE FROM THE MASTER LIST
WAS IN ERROR.
4 .
l
SYSTEM INVOLVED
THE . AIR HANDLING SYSTEM
(CIRCUIT AHC-112).
LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE
' BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A HARSH ENVIRONMENT
IN
THE
REACTOR
BUILDING
THIS
CIRCUIT
j
-
.
PROVIDES
POWER TO A REACTOR BUILDING AIR
HANDLING FAN.
I
i
'l
i
b i___________[__1_.__._ [ E~ '
'
'
'
'
-
IlhdoM1
Page 18-
-*
"'
l!
'
' '
IiHandout'2
i!
l
.
a ..
s
,;j
-
- 89-09-04
..
-) ' I
.,
1
FPC POSITION
ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT
THE
KERITE
TAPE
i
CONFIGURATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ACTIVE
,
E.Q.
FILE.
THE ARCHIVED E.Q..
FILE CONTAINED
A TEST REPORT THAT QUALIFIED THE AS-INSTALLED
CONFIGURATION.
ACCORDINGLY,
THE
AS-FOUND
TAPED CONFIGURATION WAS QUALIFIABLE, AND THE
l
DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.
THE
l
i
DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDIVIDUALLY,
WHEN
'
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED
WITH
OTHER
DEFICIENCIES,
WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT
ACTION.
ROOT CAUSE
FPC ENGINEERING'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE TESTED
CONFIGURATION WAS IN ERROR.
.
l
!
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l
1
1
I
,
,
,,,
,-
.--
. . .
. _ . , ,
, . . . .
,
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.
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Page 19
-
1
.
,
4
J. Handout;2
.
4
,
i.
..
.,
-
- 89-09-04
.f
.
-
i
I
a
.
EAZETY SIGNIFICANCE
THE
AS~FOUND
INSTALLATION
WAS
.
QUALIFIABLE.
THEREFORE,
THERE
WAS
NO
SAFETY
.
SIGNIFICANCE.
.
I
,
~~
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~ ~ " ~
- * * ~ ~
"
~
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" ' " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' " ~
-
-
_ - - - - - _ - _ _
. _ _ - _ _ .
..
__ . _ _ - _
-
- _ .
.
3
'
Enclosure 2.'
Page 20
Handout.2~
.
g
89-09-04
.
BHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
FPC WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE KERITE TEST
.
REPORT AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTION.
THE TEST REPORT WAS REVIEWED FOLLOWING
THE INSPECTION PER NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
PROCEDURE 222 AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE.
AN ACTIVE E.Q. FILE HAS BEEN CREATED THAT
.
.
!
CLEARLY ESTABLISHES QUALIFICATION.
THE FPC ENGINEER WAS COUNSELLED ON USING
.
VENDOR
DOCUMENTATION
AND-
CLEARLY
UNDERSTANDING
BEFORS
USING
TECHNICAL INPUT.
I
JtONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
!
!
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT SHOULD MINIMIZE
.
SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
i
PERFORMED
IN
AUGUST
1989
THAT
WILL
l
ADDRESS THE USE OF TEST DOCUMENTATION.
o
l'
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_ . _ _ . - - . - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - --
'. Enclosure 2-
Page 21
m$
'
v,r=
. Handout 2
?]
,
, ,
i
-
- 89-09-04
(3
~
.
-ih
.
.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
'
j
l
i
!
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
j
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
A( TION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY, CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
.
h
.y
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.
.
,
-
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fy,
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- - - - . -
. _ - - - -
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y
Page 22
Enc *losure 2-
'
Handout 2-
-
- 89-09-05
ITEM 89-0?-05
'
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC FAILED TO
MAINTAIN SILICONE FLUID LEVEL IN THE GEMS
REACTOR BUILDING LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION
BOXES.
I
FYSTEMJ NVOLVED
REACTOR
BUILDING
FLOOR
AND
LEVEL
TRANSMITTER TERMINATION BOXES (WD-303-LT-A&B,
WD-302-LT-B).
.
i
1
'
4
i
1
1
e
i
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1
!
1
l
.
-
, . . .
.
.
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._ .
,.]
_ ..
_
_
,
7*
Enclosure 2
.Page 23
,H3ndo'ut 2
+
,
-
- 89-09-05
,
1
FPC POSITION
FPC - ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE THREE GEMS LEVEL
!
TRANSMITTERS DID NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE SILICON
FLUID IN THE INSTRUMENT TERMINATION JUNCTION
BOXES, AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTION.
HOWEVER,
FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THIS
DEFICIENCY WAS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.
THE
DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY,
OR WHEN
1
i
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED
WITH
OTHER
l
DEFICIENCIES,
WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT
i
ACTION.
2OOT CAUSE
PROCEDURES
NOT
INCLUDE
VENDOR
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO
MAINTAIN
FLUID
LEVEL IN THE LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION
.
BOXES.
!
,
- i
,,-
,
. - .
,
,-
-
,.<,,...,m.-_,.~
.. ,.
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- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
44
Endlosure2-
Page 24
l
- Handout' 2.
.
s
1
-
-
89-09-05
f!AFETY _ SIGN.JJ_ICANCE
'l
l
W D_-_3_0 2 -LT- B
!
l
THIS TRANSMITTER IS LOCATED IN THE REACTOR SUMP.
a
.
l
FPC HAS NOT POSTUfATED ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT
.
REQUIRING
THIS
TRANSMITTER.
THEREFORE,
THE
i
TRANSMITTER IS QUALIF1ABLE FOR ITS DESIGN FUNCTION.
I
BASED
ON
THE
ABOVE,
THERE
WAS
NO
SAFETY
.
SIGNIFICANCE.
!
ILD-3 03-LT-A Q
l
1
THESE TRANSMITTERS ARE LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR
-l
.
BUILDING ON THE WALL.
OIL
IS
REQUYRED
TO
PROTECT
AGAINST
!
.
l
SUBMERGENCE.
THE
BOXES
ARE
NOT
SUBMERGED
DURING
ACCIDENT
.
CONDITIONS.
THE BOXES CONTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE QUALIFIED FOR
.
LOCA/HELB CONDITIONS.
j
.
THREFORE, THE TRANSMITTERS ARE QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR
.
DESIGN FUNCTION WITHOUT OIL.
1
)
THESE TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE INDICATION FOR INITIATION
.
OF SUMP RECIRCULATION.
,
BASED
ON
THE
ABOVE,
HERE
WAS
NO
SAFETY
i
.
SIGNIFICANCE.
i
-I
L 1_ _ -.
-
-
- - - ~ ~ - - - -
a --
,
!
. Ehclosure 2
@agi %$
'llandout 2
..
,
- 89-09-05
.
,
SHORT TERM CORRECfIVE ACTION
THE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS WERE FILLED WITH
.
SILICON OIL.
SP-175 (CONTAINMENT SUMP AND FLOOD LEVEL
.
MONITORING SYSTEM CALIBRATION) HAS BEEN
REVISED TO CHECK FOR OIL.
E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED TO ?.EQUIRE THE OIL.
.
.LONG TERM CORRECTIVP ACTION
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT
PROGRAM
THAT WILL
ENSURE
VENDOR
INSTRUCTIONS
ARE
ADDRESSED
IN
PROCEDURES.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.
THIS WILL
-
HEIGHTEN
ENGINEERING
AND
MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL AWARENESS OF EQ REQUIREMENTS.
.
i
. ~ ~
,v
. . -
..
,--.y.,,,
,
,-~~..,.._...,e,.,.,.,.._.y,.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _
_
,
.
.
. - - .
_ _ _ - - - -
- _--_--_- ,
.Enciosure~2'
Page 26
'
.c
Handout 2
l
l
-
_
89-09-01
,
QTHER CONSIp3RATIONJ
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C,
PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES TPAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPR7 ATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
,
,
.,
,
.,
.
,--
.,,..,.f,...,v.~.-
.4.-
-
. ~ - - . . - - - - - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . - - _ _ . . - - _ - _ - - . - - . _ . _ . . _ . - - . _ . - - - - . . .
.
- _
_
_-
. - - . . -
-
- . . . - . _ _ - - .
. . . - - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
- _ _ _
_
. . _ _
_ - -
_,
- . _ , .
Inclosure 2
Page 27
~
Handout 2'
. . -
4
-
- 89-09-06
"
.
ITEM 89-09-06
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC HAD FOUR
LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATORS INSTALLED INSIDE
THE CONTAINMENT WITHOUT FUNCTIONING T-DRAINS
AND GREASE RELIEFS.
ByBT_E_liS INVOLVED
-
MOTOR OPERATED PORV BLOCK VALVE (RCV-11) .
.
CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM
MOTOR OPERATED SAMPLE VALVES (CAV-1,
3,
.
.
AND 4),
.
,
, ..
-
, . . _
. m ..cm,
_ . , , , . , - . , , - - . - ,
, ;
____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_.
. _ _
Cnclosure 2
Page 28
){
Handobt2
l
--
.
. 89-09-06
FPC POSITION
-
!
-FPC
ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT THE
MOTOR
OPERATED
i'
VALVES DID NOT HAVE OPERABLE GREASE RELIEFS
AND
T-DRAINS
WERE
EITHER
MISSING
HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED
,
LATER,
THE- DEFICIENCIES
WERE
NOT
SAFETY
j
SIGNIFICANT.
HOWEVER, THE AS-FOUND CONDITIONS
DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT
l
ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
JtOOT CAUBJ
FAILURE
WAS
DUE
TO
RELIANCE
ON
.
LIMITORQUE AND NOT DOING AN INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION
OF
THE
CONFIGURATION R6QUIREMENTS.
FAILURE WAS ALSO DUE TO THE FACT THAT FPC
.
NOT
SUFFICIE'ITLY
EMPHASIZE
THE
IMPORTANCE OF NO1 PAINTING OVER THE
T-
DRAINS AND GREASE RELIEFS.
l
,
....e.,..nr.~,
-
.,,
. , .
.
.
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
a
, - -
_
-
__
_
-__
En&losure 2
Page 29
,
'iiandout'2
,
r
'
-
89-09-06
BAPETY SIGNIFICANCE
.
'
BCV-11
PORV IS A BACKUP VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF RCV-
.
11.
CR-3
HAS
THE
CAPABILITY
TO
MAINTAIN
.
INVENTORY.
CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS
.
THIS EVENT.
CAV-L ' 3.
4
THESE
VALVES
ARE
NORMALLY
CLOSED
.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.
THESE
VALVES
PROMPTLY
RECEIVE
AN
.
SIGNAL TO CLOSE AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED
THEIR
SAFETY
FUNCTION
EEFORE
BEING
EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.
ALL VALVES HAVE BACKUP VALVES.
.
CAV-1 - CAV-2
CAV-3 - CAV-2
CAV-4 - CAV-6
BASED
ON
THE
ABOVE,
THERE
IS
NO
SAFETY
SIGNIFICANCE.
f
l
. . . . . . .
. , . . . ,
.
-
r---
.
_-
. _ -
-
.
.
_ - .
_
_
_
-- .__.
.
Enclo'sure 2-
Page 30
'
Handout 2-
.
-
- 89-09-06
.
,
,
i.
F].QBT TERM CORBECTIVE ACTION
ALL E.Q. VALVES IN THE REACTOR . BUILDING WERE
INSPECTED
AND
ANY
DEFICIENCIES
PROMPTLY
COPRECTED.
IeO19_TlRM _ CORRJpTIVE ACTJ.O_li
.
HAS
INITIATED A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT
PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT
f
SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
i
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.
.
,,.:.wo
.u
.c#
,
-^ 1
--n~~.___.n.._---
.
-- - _ - _ _ - _ _
L
Enclosure 2
Page 31-
tiandoui2-
1
.
1
- 89-09-06
l
i
l
~
l
!
l
'
CYHER CONSID.JRATIONS
!
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
-PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEF. ORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE C DER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
!
!
.
h
u____..__________
_ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _
__
_
..
-
__
_ . .
-
-_
_ _
_ _ . -. . _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - -
,
,
p
. Enclosure 2
Pege 32
l
Handout 2
'
.
I
'l
"c'
l.
-
- 89-09-07
'
',
-
l
i
i
1
j
.
3
ETEM 89-09-07
)
j
l
I
!
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF,
FPC FAILED .TO
'
!
ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE IN THE E.Q. FILE A 40-
{
YEAR QUALIFIED LIFE ON ASCO SOLENOID VALVE (S) .
SYSTEM INVOLVED
MAIN STEAM (11 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SOLENOID
VALVES).
'
1
.
i
1
'
!
.
. . . .
-
-
-a__.Amnm..-.
--._--
,
_ _
.-
7
,.,
Enclosure 2
Page 33
i
L:
Handout 2-'
l
!.-.
. .
J
l
,-
- 89-09-07
-
!
'.
.
'{
)
FPC POSITION
ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT
THE
QUALIFIED
LIFE
I
CONTAINED
IN
THE
E.Q.
FILE
WAS
NON-
)
CONSERVATIVE.
HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD THE
VALVES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, THEY HAVE ALWAYS
H
BEEN QUALIFIED.
THE MINOR ANALYSIS DEFICIENCY
IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.
THIS DEFICIENCY
INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED
WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES,
DOES NOT WARRANT
ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
BOOT CAUSE
-
' FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR BOUND AREA SPECIFIC
TEMPERATURES IN CALCULATING QUALIFIED LIFE.
,
h
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .
__
._
_
,.
__
_
_
..
._.
_ __
- _ _ _
. - - _
- _ . _ .
_ - _ _ _ ,
.y
End$suri2 -
Page 34
-
Jiandout 2
,
89-09-07
.
,
h'
SAFETY BIGFIFICANCE
THE
MAIN
STEAM
SOLENOID
VALVES
WERE
.
QUALIFIED. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO SAFETY
-
SIGNIFICANCE.
a
.
1
M
A
N
- '4F*%
Y't
$
'Ud---
- - _ - . - - , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _
- g
~
.
,
- ,
_-
p
,
r
Eoiclosure 2
'i
Page 35
'~
'
1-
. .
. . Handout 2'
1
l
,
-
l
'
- .
.
89-09-07
.
,
-
1
l
pHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
i
A NEW QUALIFIED L'IFE WAS ESTABLISHED.
.
!
f
QUALIFIED YEARS OF 8.
l
.
TEMPERATURE OF 140 F.
.
THE E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED AS APPROPRIATE.
.
.
O
h
)
. , _
_
_
, . _ .
. , .
.,._,.-..,.,__,-..,,--,.-_..,.;..-.,y,--.-..-,,,
,
_
,
,
___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
t-
J
.
4
Eheiosure 2'
Page 36
Handout 2
.,
.
-
- 89 -09-07
-
..
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOli
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.
THE SOLENOID VALVES WERE AND REMAIN ON
.
THE REFUEL VII
LIST OF
ITEMS
TO
BE
REPLACED.
VERIFY
ACTUAL
TEMPERATURES
OF
THE
.
SOLENOID VALVES DURING JULY AND AUGUST OF
1989.
!
RECALCULATE QUALIFIED LIFE FROM FIELD
.
MEASURED TEMPERATURES.
.
REVISE E.Q. FILES AS APPROPRIATE.
.
1
i
L
i
1
,
1
$
l
.
. . . - ,
.,
- - . . - . . . ,
-
.--.-.7,r..-.......,,,,-
---)
r-,
yc
w-
- .g
.
' Enclosure 2,
Page 37
s
. Handout.2
.
-
- 89-09-07
OTHER CONSIDEA&TJp]iB
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C,
PARAGRAPH
.
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERA"'E UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
' ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
l
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
.
h
n
, . ~ . . , .
_
.-
,,..,,,o,.
. , . , .
,.,,n.,,.,..
. . , . . ~ .
. . , . . .
.._m_,,.,%._~...,-..--
.,
.
n.mm_-____m
- - - - . - - - - . -
.-
3
'a
-
y
=
3
.y
.
}
. Enclohure2
Page 38
1 -
- Haddout2-
'
1
.
.
89-09-08
l
j
ITEM __89-09-0%
'
i
ACCORDING
TO
THE
NRC
STAFF,
FPC's
PLANT
PROCEDURES MP-405 DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER
!
VENDOR BEND RADIUS LIMITATIONS AND PM-133 DID
NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER VENDOR REQUIREMENTS
i
REGARDING BEARING LUBRICATION PROCEDURES.
l
4
- Y S T E M S _ I t!y pq L VJ R
i
MP-405 (BEND RADIUS)
REACTOR
COOLANT
SYSTEM
PRESSURE
s
TRANSMITTERS (RC-003A-PT1,
2,
3, AND RC-
2, 3).
EMERGENCY
SYSTEM
LEVEL
'
TRANSMITTERS (SP-017-LT, SP-020-LT).
c.
PM-133_ (LUBRICATION)
AIR HANDLING SYSTEM FAN (AHF-1A).
>
)
_ i_
__________f___
_
'Z1
..
'
-
_ ~ - -
h Enclo5ure 2- _ . - -
.
, ,
._
.
,n,,
, --
-
A
,
Page'39
<
[
Handout 2
-
- 89-09-08
..
,
FPC POSJfJ_QE
FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT MP-405 DID NOT CONTAIN
MINIMUM BENDING CRITERIA FOR RAYCHEM SPLICES.
HOWEVER, THF AS-FOUND RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE
QUALIFIABLE.
THE DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY
SIGNIFICANT.
MORErVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY,
WHEN
COLLECTIVELY
,
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT
ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT.
1
FPC ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PM-133 DID NOT
l
REFLECT THAT THE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT
'
THE FAN MOTOR SHOULD BE RUN FOR A PERIOD OF
TIME WITH THE DRAIN PLOG OPEN TO ALLOW FOR
{
j
EXPANSION.
HOWEVER,
FPC's
LUBRICATION
)
PRACTICES SATISFY THE INTENT OF THE VENDOR AND
l
ARE ADEQUATE.
MOREOVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY,
WHEN
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED WITH OTilER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT
ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
l
BOAT CAUSE
PROCEDURES
NOT
INCLUDE
VENDOR
!
RECOMMENDATIONS.
.
~ ~
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ -
'
~
" ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
_-_ -
,
,
'
Enclosura 2
Page 40
'Handodt2
l]
+.
'
- 89-09-08
l
.
i
BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
MP-4 0fi
i
AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABLE USING
1
.
WYLE TEST REPORT #17859-02P AND, #17859-
02B.
THEREFORE,
THERE WAS NO SAFETY
b1GNIFICANCE.
IF A FAILURE HAD OCCURRED, A REDUNDANT
.
SAFETY
SYSTEM
(BUILDING
SPRAY)
WAS
AVAILABLE.
BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY
.
SIGNIFICANCE.
i
i
<
.
l,,
a
s
,
.
. .
.
=
. ,
.
.
__,_
_
ai_MLwi i_ __ ___ _ _ _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ ___i__ ___
-
,
-_ - . _ __-_.
-
..
__
_Page 41
.
-- ,
_
. -
Dnclosure 2
,
'
, Handout'2
.,
-
- 89-09-08
-
.
SHORT TERM SORRECTIVE ACTIOH
HP-4.01i
SPLICES WERE CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED WITH
.
SPLICES
MEETING
VENDOR
RECOMMENDED
MINIMUM' BENDING RADII.
MP-405 HAS BEEN REVISED.
.
FPC PURCHASED THE WYLE TEST REPORTS FROM
.
COMMONWEALTH
EDISON
AND
PERFORMED
7sN
ENGINEERING REVIEW THAT DEMONSTRATES THE
AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABLE.
I
.Ei .121
REVISION TO PM-133 HAS BEEN INITIATED AND
.
!
WILL BE COMPLETE PRICR TO THE NEXT OUTAGE
- I
.WHEN LUBRICATION OF THE AIR HANDLING FAN
MOTORS t'ILL OCCUR.
.
t
n'
.
.
l
)
'
.
.1
,,
f4
/
ag>+
g
- +3-
g
-
ie,==+%s
-
t == 9,rWc t mr iepqpe g,m me g gy ep + m- e
- -e
=gnous
L CE_i_'J2im__m__!__
____i'.___ _
__
'
,
,
.
, .. . - - . - - = - _ - .
, Diclossre,2 o
y
,;Page,45,=---.
- - - - - , - - - -
-
'7~ ,
,
- - - -
.
- .
-
LHandout?2-
...-
.
--89-09-08
-
,.c
-*
.,
,
,
's,._i
'
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE.ACTIQH
FPC: HAS' INITIATED
A'
LONG' TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT
PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE'
VENDOR' RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES.
,
INHANCED
TRAINING
'ON-
E.O.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED
IN- AUGUST
1989
THAT
WILL
HEIGHTEN
PERSONNEL
AWARENESS
OF
IMPORTANCE OF VENDOR REQUIREMENTS AND
-RECOMMENDATIONS.
-
e
'
,,
)
l..
r
{.
{
4
l ':
k^
+
'
.
'
i-
,.
.
.
..
,,7,.,.,..;y,.
,
, - . , .
-w.,, y,
7> j
+ . ,
3,
-
.
,
.
. ; -r
- . .
,
~
.
,a..,,
-.
.; ,
. --
. . - - - - -
,
. .
.,;
-
, ,
,
7
.... Erclosure 2
Page 43'
i
"[Nandout'2
i
.
i. :-
'
R/
'
- 89-09-08
.
a
.
,
b
.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
~
'
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2', ' APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
. . -
-
V.B,
FPC HAS .' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY.
EFFORTS TO REVIEW ' PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
' PRIOR- DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION "ULLY
MITIGATING-ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
1
[I
4
/
$
} lf
-
q
-
p,..-..
.
-s
..., ,
, , ,
...#..
4-..
,,
y p
, . , , . . . , . .
mi__E__________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
~
Enclosure 2
~
'Page 44'
~
~ ~
T
Handout'2
-
,
v
. ,s
-
. 89-09-10
.,
4
.
JTEM 89-09-10
ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE
WEEP HOLES IN THE TERMINATION BOXES CONTAINING
WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS AND THE E.Q.
FILE
WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONTAIN A
SIMILARITY ANALYSIS.
i
SYSTEM INVOLVED
THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS ARE LOCATED IN
THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM
INSIDE CONTAINMENT.
!
l
.
l
,
.-
-
-
..c
.-
,
m....._..
. , _ - . ,
...._..,~..y_..m.,-
.. .
- - _ . _ _ _ . - _ -
- f*nclosuFe 2
Page'45
i
Handout 2
-o
l
-
89-09-10
I
L
1
L
i
l
1
FPC POSITION
'
FPC ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT
THE
TERMINAL
BOXES
CONTAINING THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS DID
!
NOT
CONTAIN
WEEP
HOLES
A
SIMILARITY
j
k
ANALYSIS WAS NOT IN'THE E.Q.
FILE.
HOWEVER,
j
'!
FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEF.'CIENCIES
WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.
THEREFORE, THEY
l
DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY
)
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT
1
i
ESCAIATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
1
ROOT CAUJJE
WEEP
HOLES
WERE
NOT
INSTALLED
DUE
TO
INADEQUATE
COMPARISON
OF
THE
AS-INSTALLED
CONFIGURATION
TO
THE
QUALIFIED
TEST
.
CONFIGURATION.
>
--
.m-
, q ,7
.
...,,.r;
- y
,.3 r
..
.,_w,...,..,,,,
. ~ ~ -
-,
.
_ _ _ _ __
_
,
_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _
_
Hlg Ecclosure 2
Page.46
s
.
. Handout 2
.i
.
-
- 89-09-10
-
.
BAFETY BJGNIFICANCE
1
THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS WERE USED
.
IN THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING
SYSTEM (RCITS).
l
RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A
.
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT AND ACCORDINGLY WAS
NOT
ADDRESSED
IN
CR-3
EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES.
l
RCITS WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL
.
SPECIFICATIONS.
BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY
.
i
SIGNIFICANCE.
'
1
L
1
l~
t
'
6
'
I
t
i-
. + .
L = 2__ _ __ - - - - _ - - ' -
. ,
,
=.g
, +-
7
=
~
q,
.er-
= = - - '
g
a
+4 pus e -qg, mp-g
.y yngpes ge p gy=ir e
- Mie
H
_ _ . - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _
Ehclosure 2:
Page 47
.
i
Handout 2-
'
-
.
89-09-10
'I
.
,
SHORT TERM COERECTIVE ACTION
!
WEEP HOLES WERE PROMPTLY INSTALLED IN THE
TERMINAL BOXES CONTAINING WEIDMULLER TERMINAL
BLOCKS.
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
HAS
INITIATED A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL FURTHER
ASSURE
THAT
THE
isS-INSTALLED
DESIGN
CONFIGURATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
TESTED CONFIGURATIONS.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 AND MILL ADDRESS
.
THIS ISSUE.
>
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.Encicsure 2'
Page 48
I
Hanopui.2
.
-
- 89-09-10
l
c
i
l
l
I
i
'
l
QTEEE CONSIDERATIONS
l
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.B..
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
i
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
- REQUIRED TO OPERATE !"NDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
.
.
-
.. .
.
, - . . .
.
. . - . . ,
. . . , . . _ . . . . - . - . - .
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,89-09-11A
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ITEM 89-09-11A
+ . .
,
- M-
i
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ps
.
c.
FPC.' PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TEAT THE 90RV ' BLOCK
'
p
g s.
- H--
VALVE. RCV-11 WAS . FOUND WITH ' CRACKED NIRING AND
- ,
r?
<
r,
.jf'
DEGRADED. GREASE IN.THE GEAR BOX.
'
'
l'
i.'
i
SYSTEM INVOLVED
t
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<
4
REACTdR' COOLANT SYSTEM (RCV-11)
PORV BLOCK
-
- VALVE.
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3:."
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-
- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -
--
-
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-- - - -
m yg
vw w
,
[Handou't:2.-
~
4-
d
-
-89-09-11A
w.
_
~
FPC POSITION
. . ,
,
c EPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE JORV BLOCK VALVE WAS
FOUND WITH DEGRADED GREASE AND CRACKED WIRING.
HOWEVER,
FOR REASONS
DISCUSSED LATER,
THE
?
,
DEFICIENCIES
WERE
NOT
SAFETY
SIGNIFICANT.
THEREFORE'THEY DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED
WITH
OTHER-
DEFICIENCIES, WARR?.NT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT
ACTION.-
JtOOT CAUSE
FAILURE TO. ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE FULL EFFECT
OF THE UNIQUE LOCAL AMBIENT TEMPERATURES ON
'THE PORV BLOCK VALVE WIRING.
.
-.
f
. , - , , s.
_ , . . . _ _ . . . ,
_ . _ . .
. . _ . . . . . _ . . . . , , _
_ _ . _ .
g-
_.., _ _.__._ _ _,
E-
_ . _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
__
___
, _ -
Enclosure 2
-Page 51
E*Handsut 2.-
,
-89-09-11A
BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
THE PORV PROVIDES A BACKUP TO THE BLOCK
.
VALVE.
CR-3
HAS
THE
MAKEUP
CAPABILITY
TO
.
MAINTAIN INVENTORY SHOULD BOTH VALVES
FAIL OPEN.
CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS A
.
LEAK THE SIZE CREATED BY BOTH VALVES'
FAILED OPEN.
I
.
!
)
,
l
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- -=
..
__,
.
. . . . . , . , , . . , , , , . . . , _ _ _ _ _ . . .
,
_ _ _ . _ -
,
.
Enclo'sure 2
Page 52
. Handout 2
.
.89-09-11A
..
q
SHORT__ TERM CORREQ_TJVE ACTION
THE BLOCK VALVE HAS BEEN CLOSED.
.
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN ON
.
JUNE 15,
1989 TO BETTER DETERMINE THE
ACTUAL LOCAL CONDITIONS.
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
HAS
INITIATED A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT
PROGRAM
TO
MINIMIZE
DEFICIENCIES LIKE THIS.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.
ADDITIONAL
TEMPERATURE
DATA
WILL
BE
.
EVALUATED
TO
BETTER
ESTABLISH
THE
QUALIFIED LIFE.
,
..... ,.. p w n w
m.
- -
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
__
f
'dnclosure'2/
~
Page 53
>
z.. . Haridout 2
'
.89-09-117
.
QINER CONSIDERATIONS
-
' CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART .2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.G,
THE STAFF
SHOULD ~ NOT. ISSUE A NOTICE
OF~
VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:
,
WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE' LICENSEE.
.
WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.
.
WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN
.
A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.
ACTIONS TO CORRECT THE IMMEDIATE DEFICIENCY.
.
WERE PROMPTLY TAKEN (REPLACE COMPONENTS).
WAS NOT WILLFUL.
.
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
..
V.B.
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
.
-
_.
~7,,...,pw.-
+
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
._. .
-. _.______
En' closure'2
Page 54
Handout 2
.
-
.
89-09-11B
'
..
ITEM 89-09-11B
FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT 17 CABLES AND
<
SPLICES WERE LOCATED BELOW THE SUB!CF :;ENCE
LEVEL AND HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ANALYZED
FOR SUBMERGED OPERATION.
SYSTEMS INVOLVED
REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEMS (RC
ITS)
LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (RC-163A/B-LT1,
RC-
164 A/B-LT1) .
REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
TRANSMITTERS (RC-14A/B-DPT1,
2, 3).
l
MAKEUP
SYSTEM
CONTAINMENT
ISOLATION
VALVE
(MUV-505).
SECONDARY PIJd4T SYSTEM EFIC LEVEL TRANSMITTERS
(SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT).
,
i
l
. _ _ . . . ,
. . _ . .
.,
m_____----___
m____
. ___.. _
'Enclos'urG 2:
.Page 55-
-
d.LHa'ndouf2.
'
-
89-09-11B-
-
.
FPC POSITION
'
FPC ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT- 17
CABLES AND FOUR
TERMINATION'
BOXES
WERE .FOUND
BELOW
THE'
r
SUBMERGENCE.
LEVEL
AND
HAD
NOT
BEEN
SPECIFICALLY
QUALIFIED
FOR
SUEMERGED
USE.
HOWEVER,- - SINCE . THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS WILL
PERFORM THEIR INTENDED' DESIGN FUNCTION PRIOR
TO SUBME!tGENCE OR HAVE COMPLIMENTARY EQUIPMENT
THAT
WOULD . PERFORM
THE
INTENDED
SAFETY
FUNCTION, THE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY
SIGNIFICANT.
MOREOVER, THE DEFICIENCIES DO
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY , -
WHEN
COLLECTIVELY
CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT
ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
ROOT CAUSE
INADEQUATE
DESIGN
COORDINATION
-BETWEEN
.
DISCIPLINES
REGARDING
THE
LOCATING
OF
EQUIPMENT DURING PLANT MODIFICATIONS.
)
l
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+
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I
._
_-
. . . . _ . _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - -
__
a
Enclosure 2
Page 56
.. . Handout 2
-
89-09-11B
.
<
BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
.RC-163A/B-LT1, RC-164 A/B-LT1 ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT
ARE PART OF THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM
(RCITS).
RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS -
.
ACCIDENT.
RCITS IS NOT IN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.
.
RCITS IS NOT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
.
RC-14A/B-DPT1,
2, 3 ARE TRANSMITTERS THAT PROVIDE A TRIP
SIGNAL TO THE RPS SYSTEM.
THE TRIP SIGNAL IS PROMPTLY SENT BEFORE THE CABLES
.
AND TERMINATIONS ARE SUBMERGED.
l
>
l
. . . . . . , , . .
._
-
---_u_ . - - - - . - - - _ - _ _ - - - - . -
__ _ - _-_-_
_
_ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - ._
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
I En* closure; 2 l
'Page 57
>f**;liandout2
.
_
8 9 -09-11B '.
MUV-505
<
>
LETDOWN COOLER' ISOLATION VALVE.
.
VALVE .IS CLOSED WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS *.OT
.-
IN SERVICE.
WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS BEING USED, THE
.
' VALVE IS OPENED AND IS BACKED UP BY MUV-49 AND 498.
o
THIS VALVE PROMPTLY RECEIVES AN E.S. SIGNAL TO CLOSE
.
- AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED ITS SAFETY FUNCTIONS BEFORE
BEING EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.
SHOULD THE WIRING SHORT TO GROUND, A FUSE WILL BLOW.
.
THIS WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE VALVE IS CLOSED, 'AND IT
WILL REMAIN IN ITS' SAFE STATE.
SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT
CONTROL THE EFIC VECTOR VALVES
LACK OF: CONTROL CAN
-
CAUSE OVERFILLING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ADDRESS AN OVERFILLING EVENT.
.
OTHER INSTRUMENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE
.
EQUIVALENT INFORMATION.
EFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW INDICATORS
..
LOSS OF SUBCOOLED MARGIN - SPDS DISPLAY
.
DECREASE IN RC PRESSURE
.
1
EFIC MANUAL CONTROL IS AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATOR.
.
BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
l
l
i
!
]
l
1
-
.)
l
L.
Enclosure 2
Page 58
. Handout 2
-
-
89-09-11B
..
.
SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
f
ALL AFFECTED CABLES AND SPLICES HAVE BEEN
.
MOVED TO ABOVE THE DESIGN BASIS FLOOD
LEVEL.
COUNSELLING HAS
BEEN PROVIDED TO THE
.
CONDUIT SUPPORT ENGINEERS.
)
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE
THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROPERLY LOCATING
EQUIPMENT.
I
(
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
j
.
i
.
PERFORMED
IN
AUGUST
1989
THAT
WILL
i
l
)
STRENGTHEN
THE
NEED
TO
COORDINATE
EQUIPMENT
LOCATIONS
WHEN
DOING
MODIFICATIONS.
.
, , , _ - . , , -
,
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
LEntfosure 2-
=Page 59
~ '
s ' Handout ~2L
. -
n
-
89-09-11B
,
'
.
i. i
- OTHER CONSIDERATION 8'
!
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, ' PARAGRAPH
.-
'V.G,
THE STAFF 'SHOULD NOT ISSUE 'A
NOTICE OF
VIOLATION-BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY: .
WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
-
.
WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.
.
,
WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN
.
A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.
WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED.
.
WAS NOT WILLFUL.
.
I
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
..
V.B.
FPC HAS' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO. REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR ' DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
i
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
!
I
.
h
'
!
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
_ _
_ _ _ _
. _ -
. _ _
_
..
,Coclosure 2'
Page 60
. Handout 2
.89-09-11C
.
i
l
ITEM 89-o9-11C
i
!
FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT A TOTAL OF ELEVEN
RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE USED ON THE MAIN STEAM
PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER
FLOW TRANSMITTERS THAT WERE INCORRECTLY SIZED.
I
SYSTEMS INVOLVED
i
MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (MS-106-
PT THROUGH MS-113-PT).
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTERS (EF-24-
FT THROUGH EF-26-FT).
1
i
>
>
.l
. - . ,
.,
.
- - _ - _ - . . _ _ _
..
.
_ _ . .
_ _ - - _ - _ .
- _ _ _ _ - - - _ -
- _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _
_
'
LEncidsure.2?
Pagel61
, Handout:2
,.
.,
-89-09-11C
.
,
FPC POSITION
FPC ' ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN MORE
APPROPRIATE TO USE A DIFFERENT RAYCHEM SPLICE
ON 'CERTAIN
TRANSMITTERS
IN
THE' EMERGENCY
SYSTEM
AND
MAIN
STEAM
SYSTEM.
HOWEVER,
FOR REISONS' DISCUSSED LATER,
THE
DEFICIENCIES
WERE
NOT
SAFETY' SIGNIFICANT.
l
'ACCORDINGLY,
THE
DEFICIENCIES
DO
NOT
INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED
WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES,
WARRANT ' ESCALATED
ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
ROOT CAUSE
!
,
IN HINDSIGHT, FPC BELIEVES BETTER ENGINEERING.
JUDGMENT COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE SELECTION
OF CERTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE SLEEVES.
'
i
,
l
l
=
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ - _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ -
Endidsu,ra2
Page 62
'.Hsndout 2
_
.89-09-11C
1
!
RAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
!
FPC CONSERVATIVELY CLASSIFIED THE SPLICES
.
INADEQUATE
IN
THAT
THE
AS-INSTALLED
i
SPLICE DIMENSION WAS LESS THAN . 05 INCHES
i
TOO LARGE.
THE SLEEVE MAY NOT HAVE
REDUCED IN SIZE SUFFICIENTLY TO ESTABLISH
l
A SEAL.
4
THE
INSTALLED
CONFIGURATION
WAS
.
QUALIFIABLE
BASED
ON
A
COMMONWEALTH
EDISON E.Q. TEST REPORT.
BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY
.
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DEFICIENCY.
,
6
I
.
i
.-
. - - - _ .
Enclosure .2
Page 63
s
n
Handoet 2
l
.
-
89-09-11C
,,
,
SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
HAS
CONSERVATIVELY
REPLACED
THE
.
SPLICES WITH NEW (BETTER SIZED) RAYCHEM
SPLICES.
O
I
CABLES
ARE
BEING
MEASURED
TO
MORE
.
ACCURATELY
DETERMINE
THE
APPROPRIATE
SPLICE BEFORE ITS INSTALLATION.
i
JaONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOJi
HAS
INITIATED
A
LONG
TERM
E.Q.
.
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE
THE PROBABILITY OF THIS EVENT HAPPENING
AGAIN.
ENHANCED
TRAINING
ON
E.Q.
WILL
BE
.
PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 TO PROVIDE A
'
BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON
E.Q.
TECHNICAL
)
DETAILS.
{
l
THE COMMONWEALTH EDISON REPORT WILL BE
.
ADDED TO THE E.Q.
FILE.
l
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _
i
C
i
Ehclostare 2
Page 64
- Yandout'2
-
-
89-09-11C
,
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
V.G,
THE STAFF
SHOULD NOT
ISSUE
A.
NOTICE OF
VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:
WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.
.
WAS REPORTED PROMPTLY.
.
WAS A CONSERVATIVE REPORT.
.
WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN
.
A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.
WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED.
.
i
WAS NOT WILLFUL.
.
CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH
.
i
V.B,
FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY
EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT
PRIOR DEFICIENCIES
BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE
REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED
ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY
MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.
!
i
_ - . _ _ - _ - _
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _