Text

Summarizes Enforcement Conference on 890628 Re Environ Qualification Deficiencies Identified in Insp Rept 50-302/89-09.List of Attendees & Handouts Encl
	ML20247E354
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/18/1989
From:	Ebneter S; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Wilgus W; FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
	NUDOCS 8907260142
	Download: ML20247E354 (76)
	v • d • e

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v July.18,'1989

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Docket No. 50-302

License No. DPR-72

Florida Power Corporation

Mr. W. S. Wilgus

Vice President, Nuclear Operations

ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing

P. O. Box 219-NA-21

Crystal River, FL 32629

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-302/89-09) l

l

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on

June 28, 1989. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Crystal

River facility. The issues discussed at this conference related to those

environmental qualification (EQ) deficiencies identified during the subject

inspection and Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) corrective actions.

In this meeting you discussed the specific details for each of the eleven

deficiencies as presented in the handouts enclosed. The staff concluded that

there was little new information prnented that would differ signifi-

cently from the facts presented in the , sport details.

You took the position in the meeting that-none of the deficiencies, separately

or collectively, were considered to be safety significant. However, you did

admit ~that the EQ program was somewhat transparent at the station in that the

requirements were simply added' to existing procedures and not highlighted.

Also, you did not have a dedicated EQ group as do most other utility programs.

Based on actions you took in 1985 (Refuel V), you believed your EQ program

was conservatively addressing E0 deficiencies by replacement of components /

equipment rather than analyzing your. total EQ concerns. You also indicated

that your proposed EQ enhancement efforts would have discovered the staff's

findings. You concluded your presentation with a statement that

escalated enforcement or a civil penalty is not necessary to inform or

encourage FPC to improve the way it implements the EQ program.

During the meeting, there was a great deal of discussion about the planned

completion date for the EQ enhancement effort. You indicated that you would

provide additiunal information to the staff regarding the completion of this

program.

,

8907260142 890718 i

FDR ADOCK 0500gC 2 l(

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v -July 18, 1989.

Florida Power Corporation 2

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A listL of attendees

I and a copy of your handouts are enclosed. We are

continuing our review of. these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement

_

, , action.

In accordance- with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy-of- this letter and its enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY r

M. L. ERNST

Stewart D. Ebneter

Regional Administrator

'

Enclosures:.

<

1. List of Attendees

-2. Handouts (3)

cc'w/encls:

P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

R. C.' Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support

State of Florida

, bcc w/encls:

j NRC Resident. Inspector

J. Lieberman, DOE

G. R. Jenkins, EICS

NRC Resident Inspector

Document Control Desk

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ENCLOSURE 1-

ENFORCEMENT-CONFERENCE.

LIST-0F ATTENDEES

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Licensee: Florida Power Corporation Date: June 28,.-1989.

Facility: .. Crystal River IR Nos.: S0-302/89-09'

.

Location: NRC Region II Office, Atlanta, Ga.

Florida Power Corporation

A. H. Geiston, Supervisor, Site. Nuclear Engineering Services

g P. Havens, Corporate Counsel

'

'R. Iwachoin Senior I & C Engineer

M. W.~ Kirk, Nuclear _ Operations Engineer

D' A. Shook, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering

.

E.'C..Simpson, Director,' Nuclear Operations Engineering and Projects

' P. R.'Tanguay, Manager . Nuclear Operations Engineering

-

- W. S. Wilgus, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

- K. R. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

- U.S. NRC

A. Boland, Technical Assistant, RII

~

- T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

S. D.'Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII

M. L'. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII

R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel, RII

C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) RII

l

P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident' Inspector,lDRP, RII '

N. Merriweather,. Reactor Inspector, DRS, RII'

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, DRS, RII

M. V. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 2, DRP, RII-

B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Specialist, RII

G. Wunder, Acting Project Manager, NRR

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h_ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Enclosure 2

Handout 1

AGENDA

FPC/NRC E.Q. ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

JUNE 28, 1989

I. INTRODUCTION W. S. WILGUS

II. E.Q. PROGRAM REVIEW E. C. SIMPSON

III. REVIEW OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES D. A. SHOOK

IV. CONCLUSION K. R. WILSON

.

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. ' Enclosure 2" Page 2

Handout 1

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FPC E.O. PROGRAM

. BACKGROUND

. STATUS OF RECENT FPC ACTIONS / ASSESSMENTS

. OVERVIEW OF AREAS OF FOCUS IN FPC'S E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT EFFORTS

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FPC 5 0. PROGRAM

BAQE9ROUND/RECENT-FPC ASSESSMENTS ,

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o E.Q. ~ REQUIREMENTS - AND UNDERSTANDING HAVE EVOLVED'

FROM 1974 TO PRESENT

l o WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE TODAY IN THE AREA OF E.Q. IS VERY

DIFFERENT FROM'WHAT THE STAFF WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED

IN THE PAST i

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. .

o NRC PIIDT INSPECTION.(MAR 1985)

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NOTED CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON E.Q. PROGRAM

-

l NOTED CONSIDERABLE WORK STILL NEEDED TO ' BE -

l' COMPLETED

-

IDENTIFIED EIGHT FINDINGS

L.

o FPC APPROACH TO E.Q. PROGRAM IN 1985

-

REFUEL V (SEPT.1985) - CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED

l-

r AND UPGRADED EQUIPMENT VS. QUALIFYING EXISTING

EQUIPMENT TO E.Q. REQUIREMENTS

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INCORPORATED E.Q. INTO OUR EXISTING PROGRAMS

AND PROCESSES

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RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS INDICATED THAT THIS'

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APPROACH MAY NOT HAVE RESULTED IN SUFFICIENT

SENSITIVITY TO E.Q. SPECIFIC ISSUES

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o LFPC INITIATED'A' VERIFICATION TASK TO CONFIRM'THAT" H

ALL EQUIPMENT ADDED - DURING REFUEL V WERE PROPERLY'~

IDENTIFIED 'IN THE SAFETY LISTING AS 10CFR50~.49' SCOPE:

ITEMS,- COMPLETED JULY 1987

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o- JAN. 1988,' FPC COMPLETED REG. GUI'DE '1.97 , b

' MODIFICATIONS IN REFUEL VI AND. COMPLETED THE FINAL

GROUP OF E.Q. ITEMS

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o FPC . PERFORMED A VERIFICATION REVIEW OF"' THE REG. .!:

GUIDE 1.97 MODIFICATIONS INSTALLED IN REFUEL VI '- -

COMPLETED ~ JUNE 11988

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o' AUG . :- 198 8, REGION II PERFORMED AN E.Q. AUDIT ~ "'

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o NOV.:1988 - FPC/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING ON'E.Q. AND: .

INDUSTRY. AWARENESS .

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NOV. 1988 - FPC QUALITY PROGRAMS AUDIT /

o DEC.1988 - FPC INITIATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT. PROJECT PLAN

o DEC. 1988 - REJOINED NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP'CN'E.Q.

o MAR. 1989 - COMPLETED DEVEI4PMENT OF FPC~

~1

ENHANCEMENT PROJECT PLAN 1

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o APRIL 24-28, 1989 - NRC E.Q. AUDIT

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o MAY 1, 1989 - CONSULTANT BEGAN ASSESSMENT OF FPC

E.Q. PROGRAM (ANTICIPATE JULY 1989 COMPLETION)

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PRELIMINARY FPC EaO. ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM .

o PROGRAM SCOPE DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF FPC AND NRC

AUDITS OF FPC'S E.Q. PROGRAM AND PRELIMINARY

'

DISCUSSION WITH THE INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT

o PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT FALLS INTO THE FOLLOWING SEVEN

AREAS:

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ORGANIZATION

.

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E.Q. MASTER LIST

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PRELIMINAltLIP_q_E.O. ENHANCEMENT PROGBAM '

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DEDICATED E.Q. GROUP ON"SDS 1

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PROCEDURES

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REVISE PROCEDURES TO BETTER DEFINE E.Q. PROGRAM

RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERFACES <

FIELD VER.LFICATION EFFORT

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PERFORM FIELD REVERIFICATION OF CR-3 E.Q. EQUIPMENT

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VERIFICATION EFFORT A.?PROACH

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UTILIZE COMPREHENSIVE WALKDOWN PROCEDURE

INCLUDING GENERIC AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

COLLECTION SHEETS

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REORGANIZE VENDOR QUALIFICATION PACKAGES INTO A

FORMAT THAT IS COMPLETE, SELF-SUFFICIENT, AND EASILY

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UTILIZED

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REORGANIZATION EFFORT WILL INCLUDE A TECHNICAL RE-

REVIEW TO ASSURE COMPLETENESS

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DEVELOP E.Q. SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE MANUAI;/E.Q.

INSTALLATION DETAIL DRAWINGS

.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROFTL_RE

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RE-EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL ZONE MAP SHEETS

WILL BE CONDUCTED TO RECONFIRM RADIATION AND '

TEMPERATURE ASSUMPTIONS

B_.O. MASTER LIST (EOML) REVERIFICATION

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FPC INTENDS TO REVERIFY THE E.Q. MASTER LIST AT

CR-3

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STA.GE:1-- E.Q.. AWARENESS TRAINING WILL'BE'PROVIDED

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STAGE 2 ' INVOLVES A L COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING ~ PROGRAM -

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- 89-09-01

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ITEM 89-09-01

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO

CONSIDER CRACKS IN THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINE j

LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WHEN

CATEGORIZING THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AS A MILD !,

ENVIRONMENT.

S Y S TJ LM S I N V O L V E D

SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR CONTROL CENTER UNITS 3A1,

3B2, AND 3B3 COULD HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY

AFFECTED BY A HARSH ENVIRONMENT IN THE i

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AUXILIARY BUILDING. THESE MCC's CONTROL

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SEVERAL AUXILIARY BUILDING COMPONENTS.

(LER #88-27, dated January 9, 1989)

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FPC POSITION

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FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A CRACK IN_THE SUBJECT-

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zAUXILIARY STEAM LINE COULD 'HAVE EVENTUALLY

, CREATED A. HARS5 TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT. .j

.HOWEVER, 'FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE

DEFICIENCIES .WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.

.THEREFORE, THEY DO.NOT' INDEPENDENTLY, OR-WHEN

COLLECTIVELY- CONSIDERED WITH OTHER

DEFICIENCIES, MARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT

ACTION.

. ROOT CAUSE

.

THE INSTALLED MODIFICATION INTENDED' TO

ELIMINATE THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINES AS A

SOURCE ONLY WORKS FOR LINE BREAKS BUT NOT

.

CRACKS.

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BAFETY BIG]iIFICANCE

.

. THE SUBJECT LINE ONLY CONTAINS STEAM APPROXIMATELY

FIFTEEN DAYS PER YEAR. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A CRACK

WOULD OCCUR DURING THE FIFTEEN DAY USE PERIOD IS

MINIMAL.

. THE POSTULATED 1811 CRITERIA CRACKS ARE NOT AT HIGH

STRESS LOCATIONS AND ARE, THEREFORE, UNLIKELY.

. PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AREA AND LIKELY WOULD PROMPTLY

DISCOVER AND ISOLATE THE CRACK PRIOR TO THE CREATION -

OF A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.

. THE. STAFF HAS RECOGNIZED THE MINIMAL SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE IN GRANTING (JUNE 5,

1989) CR-3 A TEMPORARY EXEMPTION, TO GENERAL DESIGN

CRITERIA (GDC)-4, WITH RESPECT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL

AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS

(HE7B) UNTIL THE END OF REFUEL VII (CURRENTLY

SCHEDULED FOR THE SPRING OF 1990). THE STAFF

INCLUDED IN THE EXEMPTION THOSE MODIFICATIONS MADE

FROM THE ORIGINAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT.

THIS INCLUDES THE SUILTECT SYSTEM.

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SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE. ACTIOl{g,

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THE SUBJECT LINE WAS PROMFfLY CONFIRMED AS ISOLATED.

IT WILL NOT BE USED ONTIL ONGOING ANALYSES OF THE.

AREA ARE COMPLETE.

. AS STATED ABOVE, FPC REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A

GDC-4 EXEMPTION THAT BOUNDS THE SUBJECT ISSUE.

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.i

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FPC WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ITS HELB PROGRAM AND l

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ASCiRTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL ROOT CAUSES IF OTHER f

SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES ARE IDENTIFIED. i

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FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q. ENHANCEMENT l

PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.

.

ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE PERFORMED IN

AUGUST 1989.

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89-09-01

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OTHER CONSIDERATION

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF

VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFIC 12 'CY :

>

.

WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPOP'"ED BY THE LICENSEE.

.

WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN

A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.

. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.

.

WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED AND FPC's HELB EFFORTS

SHOULD PREVENT RECURRENCE.

. WAS NOT WILLFUL.

!

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CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B, FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

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-89-09-02-

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ITEM'89-09-02

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ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO

INSTALL QUALIFIED TAPE SPLICES ON THREE MOTOR

H

OPERATED VALVES. ONE MOV IS INSIDE THE-

-REACTOR BUILDING - AND - TWO MOV's ARE IN THE

TURBINE BUILDING.

SYSTEMS INVOLVED

MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES (FWV-14

!

AND 15) I4CATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.

i

WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM NORMALLY CLOSED

.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE (WDV-406) LOCATED'

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IN THE REACTOR BUILDING.

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89-09-02

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ZE0_ POSITION

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A BREAK IN THE MAIN STEAM LINE

COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

ENVIRONMENT FOR FWV-14 AND 15. ALSO, AN ACCIDENT IN THE

REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH ENVIRONMENT

FOR WDV-406.

,

FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE

DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. THEREFORE,

THEY DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED

ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

ROOT CAUSE

THE E,Q. UPGRADE PROGRAM ADDRESSED SPLICES ON MOV'S AT

THE SAME TIME OTHER MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE

RESPECTIVE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES. THESE MOV'S DID NOT

REQUIRE ANY OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR SPLICES

.

WAS NOT RECOGNIZED.

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. .. 89-09-02-

SAFETY S. SIGNIFICANCE + - *

,

]

. FEEDWATER SYSTEM (FWV-14, 15) )

[. 4

q

l

1

. THE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.

l

.

THE POTENTIAL HARSH ENVIRONMENT INVOLVES TEMPERATURE AND' l

HUMIDITY ONLY.

.

. SPLICES ' WERE CONTAINED IN AN ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURE AND

WOULD HAVE MINIMAL EXPOSURE TO THE POTENTIAL HARSH.

ENVIRONMENT.

.. THE. REQUIRED' FUNCTION FOR' THESE VALVES . IS TO PROMPTLY

CLOSE ON A SIGNAL FROM THE EPIC EQUIPMENT'- THIS ACTION

. TAKES PLACE BEFORE' THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO THE HARSH

ENVIRONMENT.

'

.

EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP WHICH

IS.THE SOURCE.0F WATER THESE VALVES ARE ISOLATING.

. 'EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE BACK-UP VALVES FWV-30, 31,

36, 29, 32, 33.

.

THE SPLICES WERE AN INDUSTRIAL TYPE SPLICE AND LIKELY

DID NOT REQUIRE E.Q.- QUALIFICATION FOR THEIR INTENDED

SAFETY FUNCTION. FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY

' INSTALLING RAYCHEM SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY

THE SPLICE.

. BASED ON Ti3E ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

?

L_:=__rurm ~

-

"w " mm"r"'-- * ' -- - - ~ ~

w ,,g ;; ,n ,,. ;g - ;g , . . ,

=y .i

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'

. ,

E'nclosure"2' Page 9

'

r-

.

,

Handout 2 i.

- -

,

89-09-02

.

,

I

l

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Cont'd.)

.

. WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM

. THE VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED.

.

THE REQUIRED FUNCTION FOR THIS VALVE IS TO REMAIN CLOSED.

THIS VALVE WILL RECEIVE A SIGNAL FROM E.S. (ENGINEERING

SAFEGUARDS) TO INSUPE IT IS CLOSED. THIS SAFETY FUNCTION

WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO A i

HARSH ENVIRONMENT.

.

E.S. ALSO PROMPTLY CLOSES THE BACKUP VALVE WDV-405.

.

THE TERMINATIONS WERE A KERITE TYPE SPLICE AND WERE

LIKELY QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR INTENOED SAFETY FUNCTION.

FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY INSTALLING RAYCHEM

SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY THE SPLICE.

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

.

'

_. ______________~~ll'" -- -

' ~

E

--

' ' ' ' ' ~ " " ' ' '

* ~ " ' ' " ' ~ ~ ' ' " ' "

' "

m ,

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p; , .. ,, = -

,

-

,.

- - - ---

.

,

Enclosure 2 Page 10

. , Handout 2

4

9.

- -

89-09-02

1

!

BHORT TEFJJSRRECTIVE ACTIONS

I

. SPLICES WERE REPLACED WITH QUALIFIED

RAYCHEM SPLICES. j

i

.

WALKDOWN WAS PERFORMED TO IDENTIFY ANY

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE TURBINE .

LOILDING. !

l

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT AND

CORRECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.

)

,

1

,

l

t

c

-

. _ - - - - - - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - - .,

'P-*****'*FR&"%

-

M*= *

mw vrmw . g-- 3g ,

,

gg.p.y , , . T , w A cl41

fnclosure 2- Page 11

.-

Jiandout 2.

2:

4

, - -

89-09-02

_

v

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH ;

V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF

VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED BY THE LICENSEE.

I

.

WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED NO GREATER THAN I

A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.

I

'

. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.

. WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED.

)

. WAS NOT WILLFUL.

.

CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

>

~ ~

~ ' ^ " ~ ^ ~

--__-._.._l___11-. -- - -

~

~~ ' ~ '

m p. . i , : .2 3p J

-

4

< -

, ,

, ,. ,

,

74

Enclosure l2' Page 12

' Handout'2

-

'

-

- 89-09-03

-

!

ITEM 89-09-03 ;

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO

INCLUDE PENETRATION EPA-128 ON THE E.Q. MASTER

LIST.

SYSTEM INVOLVED _

PENETRATION, EPA-128, CONTAINS INSTRUMENTATION

CABLES FOR TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS (AH-536, 537,

538, 539-TE)- THAT MEASURE REACTOR BUILDING

TEMPERATURE.

A

h

.-

, . , . , , . - - . , n... ,s., -

- - - ~

_

,, ,

- _ - - - -

r.. ,

- 4, ,

.,, ;. ,

<

,

. ,

y

Enclosure 2-

'

Page 13

Handout' 2-

- -

89-09-03

.

PPC POSITIQ){

.

i

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION !

EPA-128 WAS NOT ON THE E.Q. MASTER' LIST. THE

STAFF ACKNOWLEDGED BY INSPECTION REPORT 50-

302/89-09 (PAGE 6) 'u{AT ACCEPTABLE QUALIFICATION

DOCUMENTATION WAS IN THE FILE AND THE

TERMINATIONS APPEAR TO BE SATISFACTORY.

THEREFORE, THE D'FICIENCY

E WAS NOT SAFETY

SIGNIFICANT. THIS DEFICIENCY DOES NOT

INDEPENDENTLY, OR WhEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED

WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED

ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

-

JtOOT CAUSE

)

ENGINEER ERROR RESULTED IN THE PENETRATION BEING

'

l

OMITTED FROM THE E.Q. MASTER LIST. '

i

'

i

I

l

<

""

. - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - _ . _ - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - -

~ ' ' '

' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ^ " " ^ ^ ' ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ '

..

g,.

. . , . ,

.<

.; .y

. . . .+-

.

, ,

-

.. , -

i.. ., ,

Encl osur,5.. .

~

l e 2- Page 14

,

lHandou't 2 :

'

-

89-09-03

,,

.

D.AEETY SIGNIFICANCE

'

.

THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION WAS QUALIFIED.

i

. MINOR DOCUMENTATION DEFICIENCY.

. NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

l

.

h

i

_.x-- . _ . - - - .. . . , - - .. -~

3 '

' y's{ , +

. (c.

_

t

-

.' <.>

r J.i L

-- - - - - - - - -

.y

'3

t'

' Enclosure 2 Page 15

' ' Nandout 2

- -

89-09-03

SHORT_ TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION

.

THE E.Q. MASTER LIST WAS UPDATED.

1

i

.

A REVIEW OF'ALL REG. 1.97 ITEMS TO ENSURE

4

THEY ARE ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIST WILL BE '

COMPLETED SHORTLY.

.I,0NG TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION

-

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT L

SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.

.

ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE PERFORMED

IN AUGUST 1989.

.

COMPLETE REG. 1.97 REVIEW TO ENSURE ALL

ITEMS ARE ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIST.

.

>

l

,

, - .

. _.

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ - . - ..

.

- --

. - . , - . . , . . . . - - 1

yo

,

. . . . ,

gm y +, ,

.. - - ." " , .

- n - . ~ x-- 7 .

Enclosure"2~ .

. Pa,ge 16 * ,~ "

?',.E, Handout 2 .

F I6 ,

.

.-- 89-09-03

,.y ; .-. .

'

, ;.i

,;

ay ?

,

_j

OTHER CONSIDERATION.1

. CONSISTENT WITH 1 CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS . CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST. ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE '{

REQ IRED- TO OPERATE 'UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

.

4

s t

,

'

, ,., ,- 4 -m.-4

7. ,

--.c,-w...3,.~%e,7-~. *

- :_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -

m:- , m ,.symy ,

y .. .

-- - -

-e w=- =

gm - 3

En'closurG 2?' " "f- Page 17.

"

. l Handout2 4

w

'l

'

. .. 89-09-04 "i

- v!

.

!

'I

)

.

ITEM 89-09-04

.e

ACCORDING TO THE' STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE AN

E.Q. FILE OR ANALYSIS ..FOR THE TAPED-TYPE

,

TER74INATION ON AHC-112.. FPC WISHES TO CORRECT

THE STAFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS ISSUE IN-

THAT THERE WERE E.Q. FILES FOR TAPED-TYPE l

i

SPLICES; HOWEVER, THE REVIEW PERFORMED TO

REMOVE THE KERITE SPLICE FROM THE MASTER LIST

WAS IN ERROR.

4 .

l

SYSTEM INVOLVED

THE . AIR HANDLING SYSTEM (CIRCUIT AHC-112).

LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE

' BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A HARSH ENVIRONMENT

IN THE REACTOR BUILDING -

THIS CIRCUIT j

.

PROVIDES POWER TO A REACTOR BUILDING AIR

HANDLING FAN.

I

i

'l

i

'

b i___________[__1_.__._ [ E~ '

' '

-

'

-* l!

"' '

IlhdoM1 ' '

Page 18-

l

IiHandout'2

.

s a ..

i!

,;j

-

- 89-09-04

.,

..

-) ' I

1 FPC POSITION

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE KERITE TAPE

i

CONFIGURATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ACTIVE

,

E.Q. FILE. THE ARCHIVED E.Q.. FILE CONTAINED

A TEST REPORT THAT QUALIFIED THE AS-INSTALLED

CONFIGURATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE AS-FOUND

TAPED CONFIGURATION WAS QUALIFIABLE, AND THE

l

DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. THE l

i

DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDIVIDUALLY, OR WHEN '

COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER

DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT

ACTION.

ROOT CAUSE

FPC ENGINEERING'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE TESTED

CONFIGURATION WAS IN ERROR.

.

l

!

\

l

1

I

,

,

,,, ,- .--

. . . . _ . , , , . . . . . . . , . . .

, . . _ . . . . , _ , , , , , . . . . , , , , -

_ -- _ _ . _ _

,. ~

m ,~ . . -

- - = , - . . -y

"Endl o su re . 2,.y-- . ,

4

~ ~

Page 19

-

1

J. Handout;2 .

,

4

i. ..

.,

-

- 89-09-04

.

-

.f

i

I

a

.

EAZETY SIGNIFICANCE

. THE AS~FOUND INSTALLATION WAS

QUALIFIABLE.

. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE.

.

I

,

~~ "'

~ ~ " ~ * * * ~ ~ " ~

"""#'

-

" ' " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' " ~

- _ - - - - - _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . ..

__ . _ _ - _ -

- _ . .

'

3

Enclosure 2.' Page 20

. Handout.2~ g

. 89-09-04

BHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE KERITE TEST

REPORT AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTION.

THE TEST REPORT WAS REVIEWED FOLLOWING

THE INSPECTION PER NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

PROCEDURE 222 AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE.

. AN ACTIVE E.Q. FILE HAS BEEN CREATED THAT .

!

CLEARLY ESTABLISHES QUALIFICATION.

. THE FPC ENGINEER WAS COUNSELLED ON USING

VENDOR DOCUMENTATION AND- CLEARLY

UNDERSTANDING IT BEFORS USING IT AS

TECHNICAL INPUT.

I

JtONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

!

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT SHOULD MINIMIZE

.

SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

i PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL

l

ADDRESS THE USE OF TEST DOCUMENTATION.

o

l'

= w w =, +- - r

4 .s y 9, m -p y

og gg-,ggg_pe % ,g y. ..maene e q m. , ,e

W

________-.m__. _ . _ _ . - - . - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - --

v,r=

'

'. Enclosure 2- Page 21 m$

,

, ,

. Handout 2 ?]

i

-

- 89-09-04 (3

~

. -ih

.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

'

j

l

i

!

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY j

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

A( TION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY, CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

.

h

.y ... ,, .,

s ..g,. .. . . , -

...-,....~,-..-,.-~,,.9*-. fy,

- - _ _ - _ - _ - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - . - . _ - - - -

.m . ,_- .4-

-

, ;.,_ - -

y

' *

Enc *losure 2- Page 22

Handout 2-

-

- 89-09-05

ITEM 89-0?-05

'

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO

MAINTAIN SILICONE FLUID LEVEL IN THE GEMS

REACTOR BUILDING LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION

BOXES.

I

FYSTEMJ NVOLVED

REACTOR BUILDING FLOOR AND SUMP LEVEL

TRANSMITTER TERMINATION BOXES (WD-303-LT-A&B,

WD-302-LT-B).

.

i

1

'

4

i

1

e

i

l

1

!

1

l

. - , . . . . . . -..,_ ,. .. ._ .

,.]

_ .. _ _

,

7*

Enclosure 2 .Page 23

+ ,H3ndo'ut 2 ,

-

- 89-09-05

,

1

FPC POSITION

FPC - ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE THREE GEMS LEVEL !

TRANSMITTERS DID NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE SILICON

FLUID IN THE INSTRUMENT TERMINATION JUNCTION

BOXES, AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTION.

HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THIS

DEFICIENCY WAS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. THE

DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN 1

i

COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER

l

DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT

i

ACTION.

2OOT CAUSE

PROCEDURES DID NOT INCLUDE VENDOR

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAINTAIN SILICON FLUID

LEVEL IN THE LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION

.

BOXES.

!

,

i

,,- , . - . , ,- -

,.<,,...,m.-_,.~ .. ,. --,v-+

. * ~pg=

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

44

Endlosure2- Page 24 l

Handout' 2.

.

s

1

- -

89-09-05

f!AFETY _ SIGN.JJ_ICANCE 'l

l

W D_-_3_0 2 -LT- B

!

l

. THIS TRANSMITTER IS LOCATED IN THE REACTOR SUMP. a

l

. FPC HAS NOT POSTUfATED ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT

REQUIRING THIS TRANSMITTER. THEREFORE, THE i

TRANSMITTER IS QUALIF1ABLE FOR ITS DESIGN FUNCTION.

I

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE.

!

ILD-3 03-LT-A Q l

1

. THESE TRANSMITTERS ARE LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR -l

BUILDING ON THE WALL.

. SILICON OIL IS REQUYRED TO PROTECT AGAINST !

SUBMERGENCE. l

. THE BOXES ARE NOT SUBMERGED DURING ACCIDENT

CONDITIONS.

.

THE BOXES CONTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE QUALIFIED FOR

LOCA/HELB CONDITIONS. j

.

. THREFORE, THE TRANSMITTERS ARE QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR

DESIGN FUNCTION WITHOUT OIL.

1

)

. THESE TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE INDICATION FOR INITIATION

OF SUMP RECIRCULATION.

,

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, HERE WAS NO SAFETY i

SIGNIFICANCE.

i

L 1_ _ -. -

-

- - - ~ ~ - - - -

-I

,

a -- @agi %$

! . Ehclosure 2

.. 'llandout 2 ,

- 89-09-05

.

,

SHORT TERM CORRECfIVE ACTION

. THE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS WERE FILLED WITH

SILICON OIL.

. SP-175 (CONTAINMENT SUMP AND FLOOD LEVEL

MONITORING SYSTEM CALIBRATION) HAS BEEN

REVISED TO CHECK FOR OIL.

. E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED TO ?.EQUIRE THE OIL.

.LONG TERM CORRECTIVP ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE

VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS ARE ADDRESSED IN

PROCEDURES.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989. THIS WILL

HEIGHTEN ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE

-

AND

PERSONNEL AWARENESS OF EQ REQUIREMENTS.

.

i

. ~ ~ ,v . . - ..

,--.y.,,, ,

,-~~..,.._...,e,.,.,.,.._.y,.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _

,

. . . - - . _ _ _ - - - -

- _--_--_- ,

'

.Enciosure~2' Page 26

.c Handout 2

l

- _

89-09-01

,

QTHER CONSIp3RATIONJ

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES TPAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPR7 ATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

,

, ., , ., . ,-- .,,..,.f,...,v.~.- .4.- -

. ~ - - . . - - - - - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . - - _ _ . . - - _ - _ - - . - - . _ . _ . . _ . - - . _ . - - - - . . . . - _ _ _- . - - . . - - - . . . - . _ _ - - . . . . - - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

- _ _ _ _

. . _ _ _ - -

_, - . _ , .

Inclosure 2 ~

Page 27

..- Handout 2'

4

- - 89-09-06

"

.

ITEM 89-09-06

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC HAD FOUR

LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATORS INSTALLED INSIDE

THE CONTAINMENT WITHOUT FUNCTIONING T-DRAINS

AND GREASE RELIEFS.

ByBT_E_liS INVOLVED

-

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

.

MOTOR OPERATED PORV BLOCK VALVE (RCV-11) .

CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

. MOTOR OPERATED SAMPLE VALVES (CAV-1, 3,

.

AND 4),

. ,

, ..

- , . . _ . m ..cm, _ . , , , . , - . , , - - . - , ,;

____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

. _ _

Cnclosure 2 Page 28 ){

-- Handobt2 l

.

. 89-09-06

FPC POSITION -

!

-FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE MOTOR OPERATED

i'

VALVES DID NOT HAVE OPERABLE GREASE RELIEFS

AND T-DRAINS WERE EITHER MISSING OR

INOPERABLE. HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED ,

LATER, THE- DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY j

SIGNIFICANT. HOWEVER, THE AS-FOUND CONDITIONS

DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT

l

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

JtOOT CAUBJ

. FAILURE WAS DUE TO FPC RELIANCE ON

LIMITORQUE AND NOT DOING AN INDEPENDENT

EVALUATION OF THE LIMITORQUE

CONFIGURATION R6QUIREMENTS.

. FAILURE WAS ALSO DUE TO THE FACT THAT FPC

DID NOT SUFFICIE'ITLY EMPHASIZE THE

IMPORTANCE OF NO1 PAINTING OVER THE T-

DRAINS AND GREASE RELIEFS.

l ,

.,, . ....e.,..nr.~, -

. , . .

. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a

, - -

_ -

__ _

-__

,

En&losure 2 Page 29

, 'iiandout'2

'

r

-

89-09-06

BAPETY SIGNIFICANCE .

'

BCV-11

. PORV IS A BACKUP VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF RCV-

11.

. CR-3 HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN

INVENTORY.

. CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS

THIS EVENT.

CAV-L ' 3. 4

. THESE VALVES ARE NORMALLY CLOSED

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.

. THESE VALVES PROMPTLY RECEIVE AN ES

SIGNAL TO CLOSE AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED

THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION EEFORE BEING

EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.

. ALL VALVES HAVE BACKUP VALVES.

CAV-1 - CAV-2

CAV-3 - CAV-2

CAV-4 - CAV-6

BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE IS NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE.

f

l

. . . . . . . . , . . . , . -

r--- . _- . _ - - . .

_ - . _ _ _

-- .__.

. Enclo'sure 2- Page 30

'

. Handout 2-

-

- 89-09-06

, .

,

i.

F].QBT TERM CORBECTIVE ACTION

ALL E.Q. VALVES IN THE REACTOR . BUILDING WERE

INSPECTED AND ANY DEFICIENCIES PROMPTLY

COPRECTED.

IeO19_TlRM _ CORRJpTIVE ACTJ.O_li

.

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT

SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES. f

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE i

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.

.

,,.:.wo .u .c# ,

-^ 1

--n~~.___.n.._---

.

-- - _ - _ _ - _ _

L Enclosure 2 Page 31-

. tiandoui2- 1

1

- 89-09-06

l i

~

l

l !

l

'

CYHER CONSID.JRATIONS

!

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

-PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEF. ORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE C DER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE. !

!

.

h

u____..__________ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __ _

..

-

__ _ . . - -_ _ _

_ _ . -. . _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - ,

,

p . Enclosure 2 Pege 32

l . Handout 2 '

I

"c' 'l

l. -

- 89-09-07

',

'

-

l

i

1

j

.

3

ETEM 89-09-07 )

j

l

I

!

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED .TO

'

!

ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE IN THE E.Q. FILE A 40-

{

YEAR QUALIFIED LIFE ON ASCO SOLENOID VALVE (S) .

SYSTEM INVOLVED

MAIN STEAM (11 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SOLENOID

VALVES).

'

1

.

i

1

'

!

. . . . . - -

-a__.Amnm..-. --._--

, __ .-

,.,

7

Enclosure 2 Page 33 i

L: Handout 2-' l

!.-. . .

J

l

,- -

- 89-09-07

!

'. .

'{

)

FPC POSITION

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE QUALIFIED LIFE

I

CONTAINED IN THE E.Q. FILE WAS NON- )

CONSERVATIVE. HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD THE

VALVES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, THEY HAVE ALWAYS H

BEEN QUALIFIED. THE MINOR ANALYSIS DEFICIENCY

IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. THIS DEFICIENCY

INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED

WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, DOES NOT WARRANT

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

BOOT CAUSE

-

' FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR BOUND AREA SPECIFIC

TEMPERATURES IN CALCULATING QUALIFIED LIFE.

,

h

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . __ ._ _

,. __ _ _

.. ._. _ __ - _ _ _ . - - _ - _ . _ .

_ - _ _ _ ,

.y

End$suri2 - -

Page 34

Jiandout 2 ,

89-09-07

,

.

h'

SAFETY BIGFIFICANCE

. THE MAIN STEAM SOLENOID VALVES WERE

QUALIFIED. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO SAFETY -

SIGNIFICANCE.

a

.

1

M

A

N **'4F*% Y't '$

'Ud--- - - _ - . - - , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _

g ~

. , ;, , _- p

r Eoiclosure 2 'i Page 35

' '~

1- . .

,

l

-

. . Handout 2' '

1

l :.

.

. , 89-09-07

-

1

l

pHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

i

. A NEW QUALIFIED L'IFE WAS ESTABLISHED.

!

f

. QUALIFIED YEARS OF 8. l

. TEMPERATURE OF 140 F.

. THE E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED AS APPROPRIATE.

.

O

h

)

. , _ , . _ .

. , .

_

, _

.,._,.-..,.,__,-..,,--,.-_..,.;..-.,y,--.-..-,,,

_

,

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

,

t-

4

J .

Eheiosure 2' Page 36

Handout 2 .,

.

-

- 89 -09-07

..

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOli

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.

.

THE SOLENOID VALVES WERE AND REMAIN ON

THE REFUEL VII LIST OF ITEMS TO BE

REPLACED.

. VERIFY ACTUAL TEMPERATURES OF THE

SOLENOID VALVES DURING JULY AND AUGUST OF

1989.

!

.

RECALCULATE QUALIFIED LIFE FROM FIELD

MEASURED TEMPERATURES.

.

REVISE E.Q. FILES AS APPROPRIATE.

1

i

L

i

1

,

1

$

l

. . . . - , ., - - . . - . . . , -

.--.-.7,r..-.......,,,,- ---)

r-,

yc w- ;.g

.

' Enclosure 2, Page 37

s .

. Handout.2

-

- 89-09-07

OTHER CONSIDEA&TJp]iB

.

CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERA"'E UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

' ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

l

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

.

h

n , . ~ . . , . _ .-

,,..,,,o,.

.

. , . , . ,.,,n.,,.,.. . . , . . ~ . . . , . . .

.._m_,,.,%._~...,-..-- .,

n.mm_-____m - - - - . - - - - . -

.-

3 'a -

y =

.y

3 .

}

. Enclohure2 Page 38

'

1- - Haddout2-

1

. . 89-09-08

l

j

ITEM __89-09-0% '

i

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC's PLANT

PROCEDURES MP-405 DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER

!

VENDOR BEND RADIUS LIMITATIONS AND PM-133 DID

NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER VENDOR REQUIREMENTS

i

REGARDING BEARING LUBRICATION PROCEDURES.

l.

4

Y S T E M S _ I t!y pq L VJ R

i

MP-405 (BEND RADIUS)

s

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

TRANSMITTERS (RC-003A-PT1, 2, 3, AND RC-

014A-DPT1, 2, 3).

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LEVEL

'

TRANSMITTERS (SP-017-LT, SP-020-LT).

c. PM-133_ (LUBRICATION)

AIR HANDLING SYSTEM FAN (AHF-1A).

>

)

'

_ i_ __________f___ _ 'Z1

..

-

_ ~ - -

, -- -

. , , ._ .

,n,, ,

A

h Enclo5ure 2- _ . - - <

Page'39

[ Handout 2

-

- 89-09-08

..

,

FPC POSJfJ_QE

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT MP-405 DID NOT CONTAIN

MINIMUM BENDING CRITERIA FOR RAYCHEM SPLICES.

HOWEVER, THF AS-FOUND RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE

QUALIFIABLE. THE DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY

SIGNIFICANT. MORErVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES

NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

,

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT

1

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT.

FPC ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PM-133 DID NOT

l

REFLECT THAT THE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT '

THE FAN MOTOR SHOULD BE RUN FOR A PERIOD OF

TIME WITH THE DRAIN PLOG OPEN TO ALLOW FOR {

j

EXPANSION. HOWEVER, FPC's LUBRICATION )

PRACTICES SATISFY THE INTENT OF THE VENDOR AND l

ARE ADEQUATE. MOREOVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES

NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

CONSIDERED WITH OTilER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

l

BOAT CAUSE

PROCEDURES DID NOT INCLUDE VENDOR !

RECOMMENDATIONS. .

~ ~

' ~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - " ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

_-_ -

, ,

'

Enclosura 2 Page 40

+. 'Handodt2

l]

'

- 89-09-08

l

.

i

BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

MP-4 0fi

!

i

.

AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABLE USING 1

WYLE TEST REPORT #17859-02P AND, #17859-

02B. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

b1GNIFICANCE.

MP-133

. IF A FAILURE HAD OCCURRED, A REDUNDANT

SAFETY SYSTEM (BUILDING SPRAY) WAS

AVAILABLE.

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE.

i

<

.

l,,

a s ,

. .

ai_MLwi i_ __ ___ _ _ _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ ___i__ ___

.

= . , . . __,_ _

. -

.

, -_ - . _ __-_.

,

- .. __ _ . -

-- ,

'

Dnclosure 2 _Page 41

., , Handout'2

-

- 89-09-08

-

.

SHORT TERM SORRECTIVE ACTIOH

HP-4.01i

. SPLICES WERE CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED WITH

SPLICES MEETING VENDOR RECOMMENDED

MINIMUM' BENDING RADII.

. MP-405 HAS BEEN REVISED.

. FPC PURCHASED THE WYLE TEST REPORTS FROM

COMMONWEALTH EDISON AND PERFORMED 7sN

ENGINEERING REVIEW THAT DEMONSTRATES THE

AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABLE.

I .Ei .121

. REVISION TO PM-133 HAS BEEN INITIATED AND ;

!

WILL BE COMPLETE PRICR TO THE NEXT OUTAGE -I

.WHEN LUBRICATION OF THE AIR HANDLING FAN

MOTORS t'ILL OCCUR.

.

t

n'

.

l

'

)

.

.1 ,,

f4 / ag>+ g *

- +3- g - ie,==+%s -

t == 9,rWc t mr iepqpe g,m me g gy ep + m- e *-e =gnous

L CE_i_'J2im__m__!__ ____i'.___ _

'

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, , .

, .. . - - . - - = - _ - . - - - -

- - - - - , - - - - -

'7~ ,

.

,

, Diclossre,2 o

. y ,;Page,45,=---.

-

...-

LHandout?2-

.

-

--89-09-08

,.c

-*

., , ,

'

's,._i

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE.ACTIQH

. FPC: HAS' INITIATED A' LONG' TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE'

VENDOR' RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MAINTENANCE

, PROCEDURES.

. INHANCED TRAINING 'ON- E.O. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN- AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL

HEIGHTEN PERSONNEL AWARENESS OF

IMPORTANCE OF VENDOR REQUIREMENTS AND

-RECOMMENDATIONS.

-

e

'

,,

l.. )

r

{.

{ 4

l: '

k^ +'

.

'

i-

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, .,; -

, ,

7

,

. .

i Page 43'

.... Erclosure 2

i

"[Nandout'2

'

.

i. :-

R/ '

.

- 89-09-08

.

,

a

b

.

~

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

'

..- CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2', ' APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

-

V.B, FPC HAS .' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY.

EFFORTS TO REVIEW ' PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

' PRIOR- DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION "ULLY

MITIGATING-ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

1

[I

4

/

$

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-

q -

p,..-.. . -s ..., , , , , ...#.. 4-.. ,, y p , . , , . . . , . .

mi__E__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

T

~ ~ ~

~ ~

Enclosure 2 'Page 44'

. ,s

Handout'2 -

,

v

-

. 89-09-10

.,

. 4

JTEM 89-09-10

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE

WEEP HOLES IN THE TERMINATION BOXES CONTAINING

WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS AND THE E.Q. FILE

WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONTAIN A

SIMILARITY ANALYSIS.

i

SYSTEM INVOLVED

THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS ARE LOCATED IN

THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM

INSIDE CONTAINMENT. :

!

l

.

l

,

.- - -

..c .- , m....._.. . , _ - . , ...._..,~..y_..m.,- .. .

- - _ . _ _ _ . - _ -

f*nclosuFe 2 Page'45 i

-o Handout 2

l

-

89-09-10 I

L 1

L i

l 1'

FPC POSITION

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE TERMINAL BOXES

CONTAINING THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS DID

!

NOT CONTAIN WEEP HOLES OR A SIMILARITY j

k

ANALYSIS WAS NOT IN'THE E.Q. FILE. HOWEVER, j

'!

FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEF.'CIENCIES

WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. THEREFORE, THEY l

DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY )

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT 1

i

ESCAIATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

1

ROOT CAUJJE

WEEP HOLES WERE NOT INSTALLED DUE TO

INADEQUATE COMPARISON OF THE AS-INSTALLED

CONFIGURATION TO THE QUALIFIED TEST

.

CONFIGURATION.

>

--

.m- , q ,7 .

...,,.r; -y ,.3 r .. .,_w,...,..,,,, . ~ ~ - -,

.

_ _ _ _ __ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _

Hlg Ecclosure 2 s

Page.46

.

. Handout 2 .i

.

-

- 89-09-10

-

.

BAFETY BJGNIFICANCE

1

. THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS WERE USED

IN THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING

SYSTEM (RCITS).

l

.

RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A

DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT AND ACCORDINGLY WAS

NOT ADDRESSED IN CR-3 EMERGENCY

PROCEDURES.

l

. RCITS WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATIONS.

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

i

'

SIGNIFICANCE.

1 l

L i

1 1

l~

t

'

6

'

I

t

i-

.+. . , , =.g , +-

7 = ~ q, .er- = = - - '

g

a

+4 pus e -qg, mp-g .y yngpes ge p gy=ir e * Mie

L = 2__ _ __ - - - - _ - - ' - H

_ _ . - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _

Ehclosure 2: Page 47

. i'

-

Handout 2-

.

89-09-10 'I

.

,

SHORT TERM COERECTIVE ACTION

!

WEEP HOLES WERE PROMPTLY INSTALLED IN THE

TERMINAL BOXES CONTAINING WEIDMULLER TERMINAL

BLOCKS.

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL FURTHER

ASSURE THAT THE isS-INSTALLED DESIGN

CONFIGURATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE

TESTED CONFIGURATIONS.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 AND MILL ADDRESS

.

THIS ISSUE.

>

l

'

1

i' -- - , n.,.. m. .. .w. ,r, ...; - . . - ,c.,,,, - ~ , . . . . . - , - . ~ - . .,.I

. - . _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - - -- _

- _

- _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _

-___ _ _ _ - -_-_ - .

.Encicsure 2' Page 48 I

.

Hanopui.2

-

- 89-09-10

l

c

i

l

I

'

i

l

QTEEE CONSIDERATIONS

l

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B.. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY i

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

- REQUIRED TO OPERATE !"NDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

.

- .. . . , - . . . .

. . - . . , . . . , . . _ . . . . - . - . - .

ma____-_-._ _______-_.__.__2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _

_ , _ , . _ - _ - _ - . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ , . - - , . . . - _ _ , _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . , . _ . , . _ _ - . - _

$b*y h g $0

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IMAGE EVALUATION

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-

,89-09-11A

n%;, 71.-:] 7,s,

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g. , ..

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[;0 ITEM 89-09-11A

,

+.. i

M-

,

ps

.

c.

'

FPC.' PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TEAT THE 90RV s.

' BLOCK

p g

- ,

H-- VALVE. RCV-11 WAS . FOUND WITH ' CRACKED NIRING AND

r?

r, <

.jf' '

l'

'

DEGRADED. GREASE IN.THE GEAR BOX.

i.'

i

SYSTEM INVOLVED

t

I.' l <

4

REACTdR' COOLANT SYSTEM (RCV-11) -

PORV BLOCK

- VALVE.

r ..

3:."

e

i

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PI f,;

r.

>A

..

4

[ ,

F

n, , ,:n - ,__ .-..n i

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,,

L- ..x. -- - - . - - ~ , - - - - - - - . - ~ -

- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - - -

,

m yg ~

vw w

4-

[Handou't:2.-

d w. -

-89-09-11A

_

~

FPC POSITION

,

..,

c EPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE JORV BLOCK VALVE WAS

FOUND WITH DEGRADED GREASE AND CRACKED WIRING.

HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE

? ,

DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICANT.

THEREFORE'THEY DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN

COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER-

DEFICIENCIES, WARR?.NT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT

ACTION.-

JtOOT CAUSE

FAILURE TO. ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE FULL EFFECT

OF THE UNIQUE LOCAL AMBIENT TEMPERATURES ON

'THE PORV BLOCK VALVE WIRING.

.

-.

f

g- . , - , , s. _ , . . . _ _ . . . , _ . _ . . . . _ . . . . . _ . . . . , , _ _ _ . _ . _.., _ _.__._ _ _,

E- _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___

, _ -

Enclosure 2 -Page 51

E*Handsut 2.-

,

-89-09-11A

BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

. THE PORV PROVIDES A BACKUP TO THE BLOCK

VALVE.

. CR-3 HAS THE MAKEUP CAPABILITY TO

MAINTAIN INVENTORY SHOULD BOTH VALVES

FAIL OPEN.

. CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS A

LEAK THE SIZE CREATED BY BOTH VALVES'

FAILED OPEN.

I

.

!

)

,

l

f

,. - -= .. __, . . . . . . , . , , . . , , , , . . . , _ _ _ _ _ . . .

,

_ _ _ . _ - ,

.

Enclo'sure 2 Page 52

. Handout 2

. .89-09-11A

q

..

SHORT__ TERM CORREQ_TJVE ACTION

. THE BLOCK VALVE HAS BEEN CLOSED.

. TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN ON

JUNE 15, 1989 TO BETTER DETERMINE THE

ACTUAL LOCAL CONDITIONS.

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM TO MINIMIZE

DEFICIENCIES LIKE THIS.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989.

. ADDITIONAL TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE

EVALUATED TO BETTER ESTABLISH THE

QUALIFIED LIFE.

,

..... ,.. p w n w m. - - .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __

f

~

'dnclosure'2/ Page 53 >

'

z.. . Haridout 2

. .89-09-117

QINER CONSIDERATIONS -

. ' CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART .2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD ~ NOT. ISSUE A NOTICE OF~

VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

,

. WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE' LICENSEE.

. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.

. WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN

A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.

. ACTIONS TO CORRECT THE IMMEDIATE DEFICIENCY.

WERE PROMPTLY TAKEN (REPLACE COMPONENTS).

. WAS NOT WILLFUL.

.. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

.

- _. ~7,,...,pw.- +

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

._. . -. _.______

En' closure'2 Page 54

. Handout 2

- . 89-09-11B

'

..

ITEM 89-09-11B

FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT 17 CABLES AND <

SPLICES WERE LOCATED BELOW THE SUB!CF :;ENCE

LEVEL AND HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ANALYZED

FOR SUBMERGED OPERATION.

SYSTEMS INVOLVED

REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEMS (RC

ITS) LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (RC-163A/B-LT1, RC-

164 A/B-LT1) .

REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

TRANSMITTERS (RC-14A/B-DPT1, 2, 3).

l

MAKEUP SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE

(MUV-505).

SECONDARY PIJd4T SYSTEM EFIC LEVEL TRANSMITTERS

(SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT).

,

i

l

. _ _ . . . , . . _ . . .,

m_____----___ m____ . ___.. _

'Enclos'urG 2:

-

.Page 55-

'

d.LHa'ndouf2.

-

89-09-11B-

-

.

FPC POSITION

'

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT- 17 CABLES AND FOUR

r TERMINATION' BOXES WERE .FOUND BELOW THE'

SUBMERGENCE. LEVEL AND HAD NOT BEEN

SPECIFICALLY QUALIFIED FOR SUEMERGED USE.

HOWEVER,- - SINCE . THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS WILL

PERFORM THEIR INTENDED' DESIGN FUNCTION PRIOR

TO SUBME!tGENCE OR HAVE COMPLIMENTARY EQUIPMENT

THAT WOULD . PERFORM THE INTENDED SAFETY

FUNCTION, THE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY

SIGNIFICANT. MOREOVER, THE DEFICIENCIES DO

NOT INDEPENDENTLY , - OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

ROOT CAUSE

INADEQUATE DESIGN COORDINATION -BETWEEN

.

DISCIPLINES REGARDING THE LOCATING OF

EQUIPMENT DURING PLANT MODIFICATIONS.

)

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+ \

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I

_- . . . . _ . _ _

._

_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - __ a

Enclosure 2 Page 56

.. . Handout 2

-

89-09-11B

<

.

BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

.RC-163A/B-LT1, RC-164 A/B-LT1 ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT

ARE PART OF THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM

(RCITS).

. RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS -

ACCIDENT.

. RCITS IS NOT IN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.

. RCITS IS NOT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

RC-14A/B-DPT1, 2, 3 ARE TRANSMITTERS THAT PROVIDE A TRIP

SIGNAL TO THE RPS SYSTEM.

. THE TRIP SIGNAL IS PROMPTLY SENT BEFORE THE CABLES

AND TERMINATIONS ARE SUBMERGED.

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>

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. . . . . . , , . .

-

._

---_u_ . - - - - . - - - _ - _ _ - - - - . -

__ _ - _-_-_ _

_ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - ._ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

I En* closure; 2 l 'Page 57

>f**;liandout2

. _ 8 9 -09-11B '.

<

>

MUV-505

. LETDOWN COOLER' ISOLATION VALVE.

.- VALVE .IS CLOSED WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS *.OT

IN SERVICE.

. WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS BEING USED, THE

o

' VALVE IS OPENED AND IS BACKED UP BY MUV-49 AND 498.

. THIS VALVE PROMPTLY RECEIVES AN E.S. SIGNAL TO CLOSE

- AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED ITS SAFETY FUNCTIONS BEFORE

BEING EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMENT.

. SHOULD THE WIRING SHORT TO GROUND, A FUSE WILL BLOW.

THIS WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE VALVE IS CLOSED, 'AND IT

WILL REMAIN IN ITS' SAFE STATE.

SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT

CONTROL THE EFIC VECTOR VALVES -

LACK OF: CONTROL CAN

CAUSE OVERFILLING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS.

. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ADDRESS AN OVERFILLING EVENT.

. OTHER INSTRUMENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE

EQUIVALENT INFORMATION.

.. EFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW INDICATORS

. LOSS OF SUBCOOLED MARGIN - SPDS DISPLAY

. DECREASE IN RC PRESSURE

1

. EFIC MANUAL CONTROL IS AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATOR.

BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

l

i

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]

l

1

-

.)

l

L. Enclosure 2 Page 58

. Handout 2

- -

89-09-11B

..

.

SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION f

. ALL AFFECTED CABLES AND SPLICES HAVE BEEN

MOVED TO ABOVE THE DESIGN BASIS FLOOD

LEVEL.

. COUNSELLING HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE

CONDUIT SUPPORT ENGINEERS.

)

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE

THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROPERLY LOCATING

EQUIPMENT.

I

(

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE j

. i

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL i

l

STRENGTHEN THE NEED TO COORDINATE )

EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS WHEN DOING

MODIFICATIONS.

.

, , , _ - . , , - ,

_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

LEntfosure 2- =Page 59

~ '

s ' Handout ~2L

. -

n ,

-

89-09-11B

'

.

i. i ;OTHER CONSIDERATION 8' !

.- CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, ' PARAGRAPH

'V.G, THE STAFF 'SHOULD NOT ISSUE 'A NOTICE OF

VIOLATION-BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY: .

- . WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.

,

. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTED.

. WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN

A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.

. WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED.

. WAS NOT WILLFUL.

I

.. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.B. FPC HAS' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO. REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR ' DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED i

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

!

I

.

h

'

!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. _ - .__ _

..

,Coclosure 2' Page 60

. Handout 2

.89-09-11C

.

i

l

ITEM 89-o9-11C i

!

FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT A TOTAL OF ELEVEN

RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE USED ON THE MAIN STEAM

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER

FLOW TRANSMITTERS THAT WERE INCORRECTLY SIZED.

I

SYSTEMS INVOLVED

i

MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (MS-106-

PT THROUGH MS-113-PT).

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTERS (EF-24-

FT THROUGH EF-26-FT).

1

i

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>

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. - . , .,

.l

.

- - _ - _ - . . _ _ _ .. 1

. _ _ . . _ _ - - _ - _ . - _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _

_

'

LEncidsure.2? Pagel61

, Handout:2

., ,.

-89-09-11C

.

,

FPC POSITION

FPC ' ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN MORE

APPROPRIATE TO USE A DIFFERENT RAYCHEM SPLICE

ON 'CERTAIN TRANSMITTERS IN THE' EMERGENCY

FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND MAIN STEAM SYSTEM.

HOWEVER, FOR REISONS' DISCUSSED LATER, THE

DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY' SIGNIFICANT. l

'ACCORDINGLY, THE DEFICIENCIES DO NOT

INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED

WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ' ESCALATED

ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

ROOT CAUSE !

,

IN HINDSIGHT, FPC BELIEVES BETTER ENGINEERING.

JUDGMENT COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE SELECTION

OF CERTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE SLEEVES.

'

i ,

l

= _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

Endidsu,ra2 Page 62

'.Hsndout 2

_ .89-09-11C

1

!

RAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

!

. FPC CONSERVATIVELY CLASSIFIED THE SPLICES

INADEQUATE IN THAT THE AS-INSTALLED i

SPLICE DIMENSION WAS LESS THAN . 05 INCHES i

TOO LARGE. THE SLEEVE MAY NOT HAVE

REDUCED IN SIZE SUFFICIENTLY TO ESTABLISH l

A SEAL.

4

. THE AS INSTALLED CONFIGURATION WAS

QUALIFIABLE BASED ON A COMMONWEALTH

EDISON E.Q. TEST REPORT.

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DEFICIENCY.

,

6

I

. i

.- . - - - _ .

Enclosure .2 Page 63

s n

. Handoet 2 l

-

89-09-11C

,,

,

SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. FPC HAS CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED THE

SPLICES WITH NEW (BETTER SIZED) RAYCHEM

SPLICES.

O

I

. CABLES ARE BEING MEASURED TO MORE

ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE

SPLICE BEFORE ITS INSTALLATION.

i

JaONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOJi

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM E.Q.

ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE !

THE PROBABILITY OF THIS EVENT HAPPENING

AGAIN.

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE l

PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 TO PROVIDE A

'

BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON E.Q. TECHNICAL

)

DETAILS.

{

I

l

. THE COMMONWEALTH EDISON REPORT WILL BE

ADDED TO THE E.Q. FILE.

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i

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _

C

i Ehclostare 2 Page 64

Yandout'2

- -

89-09-11C

,

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A. NOTICE OF

VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

. WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.

. WAS REPORTED PROMPTLY.

. WAS A CONSERVATIVE REPORT.

. WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN

A SEVERITY LEVEL IV.

. WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED. i

. WAS NOT WILLFUL.

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

i

V.B, FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY

EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY

MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIATE.

!

i

_ - . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

ML20247E354

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