ML20247C763
| ML20247C763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/07/1989 |
| From: | Salomon S NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA) |
| To: | Rathje M NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247C775 | List: |
| References | |
| JCCCNRS-WG-1, JCCCNRS-WG-10, JCCCNRS-WG-12, JCCCNRS-WG-2, JCCCNRS-WG-3, JCCCNRS-WG-4, JCCCNRS-WG-5, JCCCNRS-WG-6, JCCCNRS-WG-7, JCCCNRS-WG-8, JCCCNRS-WG-9, NUDOCS 8907240448 | |
| Download: ML20247C763 (461) | |
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JUL 7 1989 ,
. , , i MEMORANDUM FOR: Mary Jean Rathje, Records Manager ^ Upt Public Document Room, SECY
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FROM: Stephen N. Salomon, Technical Analyst U.S.-Soviet Cooperation for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety International Policy and' Reactor Safety Cooperation, GPA/IP
SUBJECT:
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DOCUMENT FILE IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM FOR THE V.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY International Programs desires that the Public Document Room set up a document file for documents related to the U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian' Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS). Such a Committee was established by a Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. signed by Chairman Zech, Jr.,
on April 26, 1988.
Immediate document: that should be initially included in the file are:
Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety -
reprinted texts of documents from April through December 1988 Report on the First Meeting of the Working Groups of the U.S./U.S.S.R.
Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, Moscow, December 5-9, 1988 Working Group Meeting Agenda, June 5-9, 1989 A document that, thould be included as soon as finalized:
Memorandum of the Meeting of the Working Groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, June 5-9, 1989 (M-2)
Two documents already in the PDR but that should be cross-referenced are:
Report on the Visit of a U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation to the Soviet Union, August 19-31, 1988, NUREG-1348 Reports of Nuclear Safety Team Visit to USSR, March 18, 1988 (includes Report of a Trip to the U.S.S.R. by a U.S. Government Nuclear Safety Team, March 2-13, 1987; Report of a Trip to the USSR by an NRC-00E Nuclear Safety Team, March C-13, 1987. See memorandum for distribution from James R. Snea dated March 18,1988)
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Mary. Jean.Rathje. 2 l
-c An additional background document that GPA/IP is considering to include is: ;
Report on a Tour of U.S. Nuclear Reactor. Safety Facilities and Institutions by a Delegation of Experts from the Soviet Union, !
' October 13-'17, 1987 l I
Also, a related document is: ;
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. Report of a Visit by a Soviet Delegation Headed by Chairman Malyshev, l May.16-24, 1989- ;
.I.' understand that the code word for the file will be:
Review Group'- JCCCNRS :j The file will take from seven to ten werking days to establish from what I 1 understand. Also, each document will be coded individually and be available )
in hard copy and 48XARMS fiche.
If you have additional questions, I can be reached on x20368.
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cc: M. D. Collins ;
Project Officer, NUDOCS !
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m M-2 Memorandum of the Meeting of the Working Groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety June 5-9, 1989 The second meeting of the working groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) was held in the Washington, DC area on June 5 to 9, 1989, in accordance with the Protocol of the first meeting of the JCCCNRS of August 31, 1988 (hereinafter called the Protocol).
The USSR side of the working groups was headed by N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS. The US side of the working groups was headed by James M. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS. A list of the members of the working groups and all other US-USSR participants is appended.
(Appendix I)
The working groups met at the Pavilion Hotel in Rockville, Maryland, a Washington, D.C., suburb. The groups discussed seven of the ten areas of civilian nuclear reactor safety cooperation as described in the Protocol. The reports of the seven working groups are appended hereto.
(Appendix II)
During the course of these meetings the US and USSR Co-Chairmen of the JCCCNRS signed the Procedures to Implement an Inspector Exchange Pursuant to Item 1.2 of the Protocol. The first exchange is to take place in July 1989. The signed Procedures are appended herete.
(Appendix III)
During the course of the activities within the seven Working Groups, the US and USSR Co-Chairmen met frequently to discuss matters relating to overall cooperation under the JCCCNRS and in followup to the Memorandum of the Meeting in Moscow on December 5-9, 1988 (M-1). The discussion of these matters is grouped under the following appropriate headings:
1.
Conclusions Groues and Soecific Future Activities Within Individual Workino jerkinc Grouo 1 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 1 are:
(a) The structure and philosophy of the Soviet nuclear power plant inspection program, as constituted since 1984, are very similar to the US NRC program.
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(b) Because nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union are government )
wned and operated, the USSR philosophy of nuclear power plant regulation includes a degree of direct responsibility for plant safety.
(c) Working Group 1 discussed the methods and approaches of both countries concerning the regulatory aspects of ensuring nuclear reactor safety; information was exchanged on the evaluation of l operating events and inspection practices. The program for 1 cooperation in 1990 was discussed. i i
Proposed future activities of Working Group 1 are: 1 1
(a) Discuss results of the US/ USSR inspector exchange program to identify additional future activities associated with the reactor inspection program.
(b) Discuss criteria for and indicators of safe operation, including quantitative performance indicators as well as the more qualitative ,
indicators used in the systentic assessment of licensee performance ]
(SALP). {
i (c) Discuss how inspectors evaluate overall plant safety on a day-to-day basis, including the parameters and indicators reviewed to determine the plant safety status. !
(d) Discuss how regulations and requirements are changed and have changed as a result of the accumulation of experience, research resuits,etc. Areas to be discussed include changes to the regulations (including the backfit process), the incorporation of national standards (e.g., ASME, IEEE, ANSI), the approval of license amendments, and changes to the reactor inspection manual.
(e) Discuss the emergency response function used during a major nuclear facility incident; in particular, the interactions with other government agencies and industry groups.
(f) Discuss in greater detail the function and specific activities of the Scientific Technical Safety Center that is affiliated with the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN).
Workino GrouoJ The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 2 are:
(a) Both delegations recognize that the other has much to offer in tems of safety concepts. A continuing dialog will contribute to the safety enhancement of reactors in both countries.
(b) Both delegations felt that the time available to review the documentation supplied was brief and that further dialog would be needed to better understand cach other's design.
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(c) Both delegations identified issues which need further exploration.
These issues were discussed briefly but considerably more time will be needed to fully explore them.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 2 are:
(a) Mutual understanding of the US and USSR regulations and guides (b) Participation by regulatory authorities as well as design organizations from both countries would be beneficial (c) Emergency Guidsnce for Operators / Design Features (d) Station Blackout (e) ATWS analysis including the possibility of calculations (f) Seismic design considerations (g) Mid-loop operation (h) In-depth containment study Future activities in the above areas will concentrate on identifying and discussing safety significant differences. Both sides will be prepared for this before scheduling the next meeting of this Working Group.
Proposals for the work plan of this Group will be examined at the October 1989 JCCCNRS meeting.
Workino Group 1 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 3 are:
(a) The US and USSR agree that radiation embrittlement is greater at low temperatures, and that the flux level can have an important effect on the level of embrittlement. Both have developed trends for embrittlement.
(b) The primary variables are agreed to be material composition, flux l and fluence, and temperature. The influence of neutron spectrum and flux levels is not clearly delineated, and further work is necessary. Cooperative efforts on flux level effects are encouraged.
(c) The US has noted a strong effect of copper and nickel on embrittlement on their Mn-Mo-Ni steel with a secondary effect of Phosphorous. The USSR has noted a strong influence of Phosphorous and Copper on their Cn-Mo-V steel and little or no effect of nickel.
Molybdenum has beneficial effect according to USSR research and some US research.
(d) USSR research reports n 2gpparept saturation of radiation etabrittlement up to 5x10 n/cm .
(e) A large statistical data base is necessary in order to adequately predict safety of nuclear power plants, not just a few tests. The USSR emphasized that tests of decommissioned reactor materials are very important.
(f) US has shown good correlation of Drop Weight NDT with Charpy Shifts in research programs. The correlation to J-integral fracture toughness is very good for some compositions but is not yet found to be generally defined. The correlation between Charpy Shifts and K shifts is generally good but current use of Charpy Shifts appears b be inadequate for some cases.
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l (g) The US dosimetry program has developed many bench marks that permit prediction of flux and fluce to about 10-15% accuracy. The US continues to report dosimea ( using an energy criterion of " greater than 1 MeV," and sometimes ou DPA (displacement per atom); and the
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USSR reports their dosimetry using an energy criterion of " greater than 0.5 MeV," and they always include DPA values.
(h) The US has described a large effort on embrittlement of reactor vessel supports. It is understood that because of different design
! considerations, the USSR does not believe they have an embrittlement problem for supports.
(1) Both the US and USSR use DPA to help correlate radiation embrittlement, but do not use the same procedures. The working group proposes to exchange these procedures with a view toward presentations and discussion at a future WG-3 meeting.
(j) The major US points on radiation damage mechanisms are as follows:
(1) Mn-Mo steels embrittle due to yield stress increases (2) Yield stress increases due to irradiation induced precipitation are reasonably consistent with theory (3) Precipitation of Cu-Mn-Ni-ferrite phases is accelerated by radiation enhanced diffusion (4) Copper-nickel-temperature-flux-fluence plus other variables interact to mediate embrittlement (5) " matrix" defect (s) are enhanced by nickel but their character is not known (6) Flux effects are important and low flux provides more embrittlement. Possible mechanisms have been identified but not confirmed, and this leads to different extrapolated predictions (k) The USSR and US have conducted studies of annealing recovery of embrittlement of VVER-440 and US PWR reactor vessels over many years, specifically evaluating the factors of material composition
'(Cu, P, Ni) time, temperature, fluence, and effect of cyclic irradiation and annealing. In general, more recovery is found for higher annealing temperatures. Both agree that a reasonably optimum for time is about 150-170 hours.
(1) The USSR has found clear trends for annealing recovery as a function of a P content alone; the US has found trends for annealing recovery that are more closely tied to Cu and Ni content.
J (m) The gS and USgR find that high annealing temperatures (460 C or 850 F) are technically feasible for service applications, and can result in recovery of 70 to nearly 100%, depending on the material composition. :
3 (n) The USSR has conducted a very extensive program to evaluate factors important to annealing, has verified those factors in demonstration tests, has applied them to actual in-place annealing of 5 vessels, and is completing 2 more at this time. Annealin g have been 4
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conducted at 420 and 460 C for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, with no less than 70%
recovery of properties to ensure normal operation of the plant.
They have verified the effect of the anneal through irradiation and anneal of control (surveillance) samples, and also by direct measurements of hardness on the annealed vessel wall.
(o) The USSR has demonstrated the feasibility of annealing operating reactor vessels starting with the Novovoronezh -3 in 1987 and has returned all the plants to service, with no evidence of distortion or other degradation to the plant. These annealings were conducted during normal periodic shutdowns.
(p) The USSR has found that reirradiation after annealing does not increase the rate of radiation embrittlement of reactor vessels after annealing. Ingeneralag5eementwithUSfindings,theUSSR has found that annealing at 340 C does not ensure a lessened level of recovery of embrittlement; thus, the wet annes11ng of reactor vessels cannot be recommended.
(q) The US has verbally offered an invitai!on to the USSR to participate in the International Group on Radiation Damage Mechanisms in Finland in the fall of 1989, and the USSR has indicated a desire to accept.
In addition, the NRC will provide a copy of the charter and other background information on the study group.
(r) Collaboration on the study of materials from decommissioned reactors was considered to be desirabic. To be carefully explored is the possibility for scientists from both countries to participate in the I
studies conducted by the other, and to share the results of those collaborative studies.
(s) Using US equipment and instruments, joint programs might be conducted using materials which are directly cut from the reactor vessel of VVER-440 (including Novovoronezh-1) nuclear power reactors, and from other irradiated materials. Shippingport materials are not being examined due to budget limitations. The US will provide information from testing materials from the Gundremmengen reactor vessel.
(t) The USS.i has offered cooperation and participation in their cooperat1.e program with the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on neutron dosimetry, using the zero power reactor facility at the Rez, Czechoslovakia Research Center.
l (u) It is proposed that Working Group 3 undertake a specific objective to pool their knowledge in order to form a common basis for the understanding and conduct of reactor vessel annealing. Discussion of the information available for such a co:non basis could be a subject of discussion at the next meeting of the Working Group 3.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 3 are:
(a) Guidelines for the reports to be given at seminar in Moscow in September / October 1990 5
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(1) Summing up of annealing experience for VVER-440 reactor vessels
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and the methodology for determining radiation embrittlement of vessel metal after annealing.
(2) Non-destructive (including surveillance) methods for monitoring metal characteristics of reactor vessels during operation and after annealing.
(3) Tendency toward radiation embrittlement of VVER-1000 materials (steel alloyed with nickel-chromium ISxENMFAA and its welded seams).
(4) Research on VVER-440 reactor vessel materials removed from operating units.
(5) On the nature of radiation damage to reactor vessel materials and related factors.
(6) Theoretical and experimental research of the thermodynamics applied to the problem of thermal shock in the reactor vessel.
(7) Elastic-plastic analysis of fracture mechanics of the embrittled reactor vessel with the goal of ensuring its reliable operation. Results of research of reactor vessel models.
(b) On the conduct of joint research on problems of radiation metallurgy and increasing operational reliability of reactor vesseh and supports.
(1) Sum up and analyze the tcientific and technical results obtained in the US and USSR on annealing irradiated materials and vessels; form into practical recommendations which could be used for reactor vessel annealing.
(2) Using US instruments, carry out joint research programs on materials cut directly from the vessel of a VVER-440 reactor removed from operation. The programs would also examine other irradiated materials.
(3) Participate in joint research of neutron flux density on radiation damager of vessel materials and supports, including research conducted within the framework of international programs.
(4) Research on radiation embrittlement of cladding materials, including chemical composition characteristics and other possible factors. Influence of post-irradiation annealing on change in mechanical and corrosion characteristics of the materials.
(5) Corrosive-mechanical characteristics of base metal and the metal of the welded seam in coolant environment under the effect of ionizing radiation of varying intensity.
(6) Determination of vessel life time, especially as influenced by more precise elastic-plastic fracture evaluations, research on thermal shock, and calculation of uncertainties in determining metal characteristic.s and the presence of defects.
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Workino Group 4 The conclusions and recommendation of Working Group 4 are:
(a) Fire safety is a very important part of nuclear power plant safety and therefore must be an important part of plant design and operation.
(b) There are still aspects of nuclear plant fires that are highly uncertain with regard to their impact on safety and deserve further consideration. These primarily deal with the primary and secondary effects of fires on plant operation. They deal with system interaction under the effects of fire.
Proposed future activities for Working Group 4 are:
(a) Exchange information and explore opportunities for cooperative research on calculational models (COMFBRN-III) for fire propagation, the effects of water, smoke, and energy transport during fire-fighting efforts, where and under what conditions fires start, and fire risk assessment methods.
(b) Exchange information and experiences on backfitting fire prevention measures (i.e., penetration seals) on older nuclear plants.
(c) Exchange new publications dealing with nuclear power plant fire safety issues.and current regulatory documents that pertain to regulatory requirements for fire protection in nuclear power plants.
Concentration should be given to system interactions under the effects of fire.
(d) Determine the feasibility of exchanging information and proposing future cooperative research on treatment of seismically-induced fires; specifically, how fire-fighting equipment is designed for seismic events.
(e) Exchange information on fire suppression, inethods and their effectiveness on energized electrical equipment. ,
(f) Exchange information on fire brigade numerical strength and fire-fighting equipment requirements at nuclear power plants.
(g) To study the possibility of having US and USSR teams inspect nuclear
! power plants in the area of fire safety in both the US and the USSR.
(h) Exchange information on various combustion phenomena to include experimental and modeling efforts on deflagration, deflagration to detonation transition (DDT), and detonation. This exchange is inclusive of (I) USSR work being performed at the Kurchatov '
Institute (Fridman and Dorofeev) and the All Union Research Institute of Fire Protection (Korokhenko and Shebeko) on the effects 1 of water sprays and aerosol on DDT and detonation, DDT modeling for 7
,l non-uniform conditions and detonations and (2) US experimental and modeling results of investigations on flame acceleration and DDT, detonations, and deflagrations.. This Working Group will coordinate 1 hydrogen work with Working Group 6. j l
(1) Consultation to investigate the feasibility of a joint cooperative program to perform experi e nts at facilities in the USSR and US to 1 investigate various combustion modes at high temperature, elevated !
pressure and in a steam environment. This would include the development of joint objectives, common data base, data reduction, modeling and the exchange of experts.
-(j) Exchange information on development of models for transport and combustion of hydrogen and the g plication of there models for practical purposes.
(k) Exchange information en high temperature zirconium oxidation ,
modeling. Consultation to establish the feasibility of joint research, common objectives and data base, modeling and exchange of experts.
Wpr_hino Group 6 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 6 hre:
(a) Both sides agret that an importsnt topi: for future US-USSR cooperation involves the severo accident related phenomena and processes which determine the challenge and the loads (i.e.,
pressures. temperatures) % fight water containments (PWRs/BWRs for the US; VVERs for tne USSR). The cuantification of these loads is also utilized in Level-II Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs).
Initially the US-USSR cooperative efforts will focus on the most important phenomena which are generic to both the containment types utilized in US and USSR Among these phenomena are hydrogen deflagration / detonation, corium-concrete interactions and corium-water interactions. To address the above, we have agreed on the following program of work for the remainder of 1989 as well as 1990 and beyond: ,
I (1) Interface issues between a Level-I and a Level-II PRA (methods,
- approaches,importantissues). Containment Event Trees and how they are utilized in Level II PRAs [Quantifications (how knowledge of phenomena is utilized; how phenomena uncertainties are taken into account); and use of Event Trees to develop accident management procedures]. As part of this activity the .
l US will make available to the USSR the second draft [to ba published in July 1989) of NUREG-1150 and the NRC contractor's reports developed for its support. The activity described under this item is proposed for Spring 1990 and is consistent with the intent of Protocol Item 6.2a.
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(2) Corium-Concrete Interaction (Protocol Item 6.2b) l Initial discussions and exchange of information in the fall of l 1989 will focus on the consequences of corium-concrete 1 interactions (i.e., how they affect the containment leads and l also how they augment the radioactivity in the containment); j other issues to be addressed include coritm relocation l patterns, the formation of insulating crusts and corium debris l bed coolability. This activity will be properly coordinated i and integrated with the MACE program and the calculation and i evaluation of the SURC-4 experiment which the Soviets have I agreed to take part in order to avoid any duplication. In the !
next US-USSR meeting in which the status of analytical and !
experimental efforts will be discussed (and the status of j current knowledge and understanding) an assessment will be made whether further jo'. US-USSR cooperative efforts can be identified and d'
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(3) Corium-Water W eractions Even though a i art of this issue (i.e., debris bed coolabil!ty) is to be addra sed under activity (2) above, it is significant and broad enow.g, to require special attention. This is ,
proposed for fall 1989.
(4) Generation and mbustion (H2 , C0) Under Severe Accident Conditions Both corium-concrete interactions and corium-coolant interactions produce C0 and H The issues to be addressed underthisactivitycouldincfu.de: overall mixing behavior (dynamic vs. quasi-static); condensation processes inside a l conta'nment leading to high combustible concentrations; deflagration / detonation and DDT limits under a variety of severe accident conditions and how they load a containment.
These issues are listed in some more detail in Appendix I to Uorking Group 6's Memorandum of Meeting. Assess whether future joint US-USSR cooperative efforts [e.g., exchange of information, or some type of joint programs] are warranted and define specific areas (this could be better accomplished after a " standard" problem has been defined and analyzed). This is proposed for Spring 1990.
(5) Even though issues associated with fission product releases during both design basis and severe accidents were discussed in grest detail by both sides during this meeting, it was decided :
to explore further some specific issues such as the behavior of the various chemical forms of iodine. At a future meeting to be held in fall 1990 between US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about the nature and extent of this ferther exploration. As part of this activity the US will make available to the USSR published information on the behavior of fission products under severe accident conditions.
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.(6) Because of the great interest expressed in filtration and l venting during severe accidents, it was also decided to -j exchange information and continue to explore further the l proposed bases for such systems as well as possible performance criteria. At a future meeting to be held in Spring 1990 between US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed '
about the nature and extent of this area.
, (7) Both sides also agreed that it would be.important to have general discussions, on an annuai basis, which would cover the total range of both the US and USSR supported severe accident ,
programs. '
l (8). The US and the USSR will prepare a draft agreement concerning i the precise form and content of bilateral cooperation addressed i under activities (1) through (7) above. This agreement should '
be discussed at the next Working Group meeting (fall 1989) and finalized at the Working Group meeting to be held in the Spring of 1990.
Workino Grouc 7 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 7 are:
(a) The USSR noted that the schedule for meetings of Working Group 7.1 had been set for September 18-22, 1989 in Moscow and of Working Group 7.2 for September 25-28, 1989 in Kiev. The USSR provided the US with a listing of USSR members of these groups, structure of the work and list of topics. This-is appended hereto.
(Appendix IV)
Workina Groun 8 The conclusions-and recommendations of Working Group 8 are:
(a) 'The major conclusion of this operational experience excnange is the need for continuing centralized reporting and review of events, with emphasis on collection of accurate and complete information, rigorous evaluation, and subsequent dissemination of information and lessons learned.
(b) The US and USSR data collection, analysis, and dissemination share many common technical aspects, reporting thresholds, safety problems and concerns, and similar goals. We have much to learn from each other.
(c) Maintain a close, direct contact in exchanging reactor operating experience reported through IRS reports for further understanding of lessons-learned from mutual operating experience.
(d) Share methods to identify safety significance of operating events and accident precursors, and assess tpproaches by reviewing mutual experience.
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l (e) We should have continuing technical discussion of safety significant <
events and event classes. l Proposed future activities of Working Group 8 are:
(a) Plan another information exchange meeting in 1989 to discuss j items of mutual interest. The topics of interest to include: )
(1) indicators of nuclear power plant safety with emphasis on measures to monitor maintenance.
(2) implications of human factors on nuclear rower plant safety.
(3) technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
(b) Plan a second meeting of the Working Group in 1990 to:
(1) discuss in depth methods for identifying accident precursors.
(2) assess the effectiveness of feedback and dissemination of operational experienco.
(3) technical discussior, of sclected safety significant events or event classes.
(c) Plan a third meeting of the Working Group in 1991 to review mutual operational experience and analyses.
Workino Group 10 '
Proposed future activities of Working Group 10 are:
(a) A workshop is proposed ',o be held in Moscow, May 1990, covering the following topics:
(1) Improvement in the composition and control of water chemistry in light water nuclear power plants.
(2) Corrosion product release and transport.
(3) Non-destructive examination techniques for monitoring degradation of components due to erosion and corrosion.
(4) Study of alternative or new materials to resist the effects of erosion and corrosion. ,
A detailed agenda will be mutually developed at a later date.
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(b) -It was agreed that reciprocal visits to institutions, experimental facilities and nuclear power plant sites in 1990 by US and USSP.
delegations would be beneficial to both sides. The visits could include up to approximately 10 people for two to three weeks. Each side will submit proposed places to visit along with details of facilities, experiments and data to be seen or obtained. The times and detailed arrangements for these visits should be agreed upon within the next six months.
(c) Finally, it was agreed that there would be a mutual exchange of information, in the form of published papers, and reports in the areas of:
(1) Methods for determining degradation of piping due to corrosion cracking (2) Effects of corrosion on zirconium alloys (3) Methods and systems of control (including automated) of corrosion and erosion of nuclear power plant components.
- 2. Succested Topics for Future Workino GrouDs Additional topics were examined for consideration by the JCCCNRS at its next meeting tentatively scheduled for October 1989 in the US. These topics were:
(a) Plant Aging and Life Extension - The US noted that this subject was already an area of emphasis by the NRC and by US industry.
(b) Safety Concepts for the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants.
The US noted that this area encompassed work by US industry, the Department of Energy, and the NRC. Discussion centered on constraints in this area such as proprietary data.
(c) Methods to Incorporate Effects of Pressure Vessel Embrittlement into Plant Operating and Control Procedures. Both US and USSR agreed this was an area of somewhat narrow scope but would require a separate working group.
- 3. Cost Sharino Prooram on Chernobyl The USSR Co-Chairman noted he was developing a preliminary proposal in this area. The US noted that any US response would await details of this proposal as well as the estimates of cost involved. Were the US to agree on any parts of this proposal, cooperation with other international partners would be treated outside the US-USSR Protocol which is a bilateral agreement.
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-4. USSR Participation in Thermohydraulic Research by Joinina the International Code Assessment Prooram (ICAP)
The USSR exprer, sed interest in participating in ICAP under which the US )
provides thermal hydraulic codes in return for an assessment of the codes, or information in kind from research from the receiving country. )
The US will work to obtain necessary approvals for the participation so '
that it can be considered at the next JCCCNRS meeting in October 1989. A i visit of US thermal hydraulic experts to the facility at Electrogorsk was discussed. The US noted that conducting code assessment involves at i least 2 engineers full time. This research cooperation will be subject to US export requirements due to computer involvement.
- 5. Visits i l
During the course of these meetings, several working group participants '
visited US nuclee.r power plants. Representatives from Working Group 4, Working Group 8 and Working Group 10 visited the North Anna facility in Virginia on June 8. Representatives of Working Group 6 visited the Three Mile Island 2 facility in Pennsylvania on June 8. Lastly, representatives of Working Group 2 will visit the South Texas facility in Texas on June 12. The Co-Chairmen feel that these visits add great value to these cooperative exchanges among the specialists of both countries.
- 6. Meetina with US Industry and Other US Non-Governmental Organizations On Friday, June 9, the JCCCNRS Co-Chairmen and Working Group Leaders met with members of the US industry and other non-governmental organizations.
The working groups summarized their activities, and followup sessions were held by each working group to allow members of US industry and other non-governmental organizations and the members of the working groups to identify and pursue areas of mutual interest with potential industry participation. A list of US industry ar.d other non-governmental organizations who were represented is appended hereto. (Appendix V)
- 7. Next Meetina of JCCCNRS Following the " Record of the Eighth Meeting of the US/ USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" which was L
signed in the Soviet Union on May 26, 1989, the Co-Chairmen of the US/ USSR JCCCNRS have agreed to prepare both detailed proposals for their 1990 programs and general summaries of program direction for 1991 at the second meeting of the JCCCNRS which they agree will be in the United
. States during the month of October 1989. Information on any further proposals in this meeting will be exchanged between JCCCNRS Co-Chaimen in August 1989.
- 8. Payment Policy Additionally, that same record of the 8th JCM also addressed the sending side payment policy. Both Co-Chairmen adopt the guidance of that policy and they will consider innovative approaches for financing equitable and 13
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balanced assignments in developing their 1990 work programs, summarize associated exceptions to the sending side payment policy, and provide their findings to the Joint Committee at the Ninth Heeting in 1990.
9 .' [pnelusion The US and USSR Co-Chairmen of the JECCNRS believe that the exchange of information was both useful and beneficial to both sides. They look forward to the continued efforts of the individual working groups.
Further, they anticipate reviewing progress at the next meeting of the JCCCNRS, which, as previously noted, is scheduled for October 1989 in the US.
June 9, 1989 i
FOR THE US NUCLEAR REGULATORY FOR THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR COMMISSION- ;
THE UTILIZATJ N OF ATOMIC ENERGY
/Japss M. Taylor
_-,2 ,
sh I f
/ Rikolii N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi p S Co-Chairman of .JCCCNRS USSR/ Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS 0 9. 0 S $$ , i
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i APPENDIX I LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND ALL OTHER US-USSR PARTICIPANTS j I
i
U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
June 1989 Rockville, Marylard, U.S.A. !
U.S. Participants Lando 'W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ..
t JCCCNRS Co-Chainnan James M. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor '
Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, NRC, and U.S. Co-Chairman '
of the JCCCNRS JCCCNRS Members James H. Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Themis P. Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issues Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Edward L. Jordan, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of l Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy (DOE) j JCCCNRS Advisors l Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA),NRC(SeniorAdvisortoJCCCNRS) i l
James R. Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, NRC (U.S. Executive Secretary of JCCCNRS)
Theodore Wilkinson, Director, Office of Nuclear E2ergy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, l Department of State !
1 Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of ;
International Research and Development Policy, DOE j i
U Other Participants Edward C. Shomaker, Senior Project Manager, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, International Programs, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA/IP)
James W. Clifford, Regional Coordir.ator, Regional Operations Staff, Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research Stephen N. Salomon, Technical Analyst, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, GPA/IP Gordon Fowler, International Relations Specialist, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, GPA/IP Ellen Brouns, International Relations Assistant / Typing, International Policy and Reactor Safety Cooperation, GPA/IP Michael K. Launer, Cor. tract Interpreter, Department of Mdern Languages, florida State University Working Group 1. Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices 1
Co-Leaders:
Charles E. Rossi, Director, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Of fice of Nucleer Reactor Regulation, NRC Frederick J. Hebdon, Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Other
Participants:
l .-
Patrick W. Baranowsky, Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Charles J. Haughney, Chief Special Inspections Branch, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Stuart D. Rubin, Chief, Diagnostic Evaluation and Incident Investigation Branch, Division of Operational Assessment, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC James W. Shapaker, Technical Assistant, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC l Milton B. Shymlock, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II (Atlanta), NRC !
2
Eric W. Weiss, Chief, Operations Officer Section, Incident Response
' Branch, Division of Operational Assessment. Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Oleg Volkonsky, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Harris Coulter, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Working Group 2, Analysis of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.
Co-Leader:
Ashok C. Thadani, Assistant Director for Systems, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Other
Participants:
Marvin W. Hodges, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Jack Kudrick, Section Chief, Plant Systems Branch, Division of Engineering'and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Dominic Tondi, Section Chief Electrical Systems Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Mark P. Rubin, Technical Assistant, Assistant Director for Systems, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Jose A. Calva, Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Operational Event Assessments, Office of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation, NRC George Sege, Senior Task Manager, Reactor and Plant Safety Issues ,
Branch, Division of Safety Issue Resolution Research, Office of !
Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Kenneth A. Raglin, Director, Technical Training Center, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Wayne Lanning, Chief. Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC 3
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L Igor Kozak, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Joseph Mozur, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Working Group 3,' Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structure and Annealing of the Housing Co-Leader:
Guy A. Arlotto, Director, Division of Engineering, Office of Huclear Regulatory Research, NRC Other
Participants:
Ching-Yao Cheng, Chief, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC .
Barry J. Elliot, Senior Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC I Robert A. Hermann, Section Leader, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Samson S. Lee, Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Michael E. Mayfield, Senior Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Prycr N. Randall, Senior Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Charles Z. Serpan, Chief, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Alfred Teboada, Senior Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Hesearch, NRC Keith R. Wichman, Section Leader, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systehis Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC RichardD.Cheverton,(Consultant),ProgramManager,PressureVessel Technology Section, Engineering Technology Division, Oak Ridge j National Laboratory (ORNL) 4
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Francis B.K. Kam, (Consultant), Leader, Radiation, Shielding and
. Dosimetry Group, Computing and Telecommunication Division, ORNL Randy .K. Hanstad, (Consultant), Leader, Fracture Nechanics Group, Metals and Ceramics Division, ORNL William E. Pennel,.(Consultant), Manager, HSST Program, Engineering Technology Division, ORNL JanR. Hawthorne,(Consultant), Materials'EngineeringAssociates, Inc. , Lanham, Maryland -
John J. Houstrup, (Consultant), Professional Engineer, Structural Consultant, Signal Mountain, Tennessee G. Robert Odette, (Consultant), Professor, University of. Californf a, Santa Barbara, California Paul G. Shewmon, (Consultant), Professor, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards Paul C.S. Wu, Nuclear Safety Technology Division, Office of Safety Approach, Department of Energy Natalie Latter, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of Stcte John Glad Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State i j
Working Group 4, Fire Saf.ety ~
Co-Leadar:
Brian W. Sheron, Director, Division of Systems Research, Offits of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Other
Participants:
Gary R. Buriiic~k, Special Assistent, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Iven Catton, Member, Myisory Committee e Reactor Safegu6rds, NRC Dennis J. Kubichi, Fire Protution Engineer. Office of Nucleet Reactor Regulatic% NRC r
Ca'lyle Michelson, Vice Chaimes, Myisory Comittee on Recctor Safeguards, NRC David P. Notley; Fire Frotection Engineer, Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation, NRC Frank J. Witt, Chemical Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactcr Regulation, NRC S
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Patricia R..Worthington,' Senior Chemist, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC StevenP.Nolan,(Consultant), Member,TechnicalStaff, Adverse Environmental Safety Assessment Division, Sandia National Laboratory Thomas A. Etorey, (Consultant), Fire Protection Engineer, Science
.. Applications International Corporation Vladimir Klimenko, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Evgeinni Ostrovsky, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Working Group 6, Severe Accidents Co-Leader: i Themis P. Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issues Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Other
Participants:
Timothy S. Margulies, Risk Applications Branch, Division of .
Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC ,
l Ralph 0. Meyer, Leader, Accident Phenomenology Section, Accident l Evaluation Branch, Division of Systems Research, Office of Nuclear '
Regulatory Research, NRC Denwood F. Ross, Jr., Deputy Director for Research, Office of l Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC !
1 Brian & Sheron, Director, Division of Systems Research, Office of Nuclear Reguletory Research, NRC ;
Leonard Soffer, Leader, Section A, Severe Accident Issues Branch, l Division of Safety Issues Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Fesearch, NRC Thomas S. Kress, (Consultant), Manager, Severe Accident Programs, !
! ORNL 1 f.
D.ana A. Powers, (Consultant), Supervisor, Severe Accident j Phenomenology, Sandia National Laboratories
}
L Kyrill Borissow, Ir,terpreter, Language Services, Department of State Galina Tunik, Interpreter, Language . Services, Department of State l
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Working Group 8, Exchange of Operational Experience Group Co-Leader:
Thomas M. Novak, Director, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Other
Participants:
Edward L. Jordan, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Clemens J. Heltemes, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Earl J. Brown, Reactor Systems Section, Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation ot Operational Data, NRC Robert L. Dennig, Section Chief, Trends and Patterns Section, Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Jack R. Rosenthal, Chief, Reactor Operations and Analysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Mark H. Williams, Chief, Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Gary Mays, (Consultant), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee ,
Vladimir A. Goldgor, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Nicholas Berkoff, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Working Group 10. Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components Co-Leader:
James E. Richardson, Assistant Director for Engineering, Division of i Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Other
Participants:
Conrad E. McCracken, Chief, Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor j Regulation, NRC 7
i h_m_m.____.__.m_____ _
' Alfred Taboada, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Frank J. Witt, Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC CarlJ.Czajkowski,(Consultant),DepartmentofNuclearEnergy, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York Peter Griffith, (Consultant), Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts John P. Houstrup, (Consultant), Professional Engineer, Structural Consultant, Signal Mountain, Tennessee Otakar Jones, (Consultant), Professional Engineer, Jonas, Inc.,
Wilmir9 ton, Delaware William J. Shack, (Consultant), Associate Director, Materials and Components Technology Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne,. Illinois Paul C.S. Wu, Nuclear Safety Technology Division, Office of Safety Appraisals, Department of Energy Irena Firsow, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Dimitri Zarachnak, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State U.S.S.R. Participants JCCCNRS Co-Chairman Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First Deputy Director, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy JCCCNRS Member
- Alexander T. Gutsalov, Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety Other Participant Alexander N. faavrishin, Interpreter, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy 8
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p Working Group 1,' Safety Approaches atid Regulatory Practices J
Co-Leader:
- Alexander T. Gutsalov, Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
Other
Participants:
Anatoly T. Mazalov, Deputy Head, Main Operations Department, GAEN
-(June 5-7)
Mikhail I. Miroshnitchenko, Head, Core Physics Division, GAEN (June 5-7)
Working Group 2, Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.5.5.R. and U.S.
Co-Leader:
- Gleb L. Lunin, Division Head, Kurchatcv Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
- Sergei A. Astakhov, Researcher, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy
- Valentin G. Fedorov, First Deputy General Designer, Hydropress Design Bureau
- Nikolay S. Fil, Division Head, Hydropress Design Bureau Makhail L. Klonitski, Head, Architecture and Design Bureau, Atomenergoproject Institute (June 5-7) '
- Boris K. Maltsev, Head, Technological Systems Division, Atomenergoproject Institute Igor S. Mino, Head, Thermal and Mechanical Monitoring Division, Atomenergoproject Institute (June 5-7) l Gennady Institute (June A. Novikov,) 5-7 Chief Project Engineer, Atomenergoproject
- Sergei M. Tax, Chief Project Engineer, Atomenergoproject Institute j
- Viatcheslav G. Sadtchikov, Chief Specialist, Fuels and Energy Bureau, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 9
_ _ _ - _ ____-m_____ __________-_. _ __m____ ______.-._ . _-___________-__m._--.__ ____.-m_-___-m. _m.m_m .m__* _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - ___.__m_ _.-_._-_. _ _ _ _ _m 2____n__im _ _ _ ___ __
l Working Group 3. Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support 5tructure and Annealing of the Housing Co-Leader:
Amir D. Amaev, Head of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
Alexander M. Krukov, Head of Group, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (June 5-7)
Sergei K. Morozov, Head of Departrent All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Vladimir A. Nikolaev, Head of Laboratory, Prometey Machinery InstituteComplex(June 5-7)
Working Group 4, Fire Safety Co-Leader:
uty Director, All-Union Research Alexander Institute forYa. Koroltchenko, Fire Protection Dep(June 5-7)
Other
Participants:
- Anatoly K. Mikeev, Head, Main Fire Department, Ministry of Interior Working Group 6, Severe Accidents Co-Leader:
- 0 leg Ya, Shah, Deputy Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
- Vladimir A. Pavshuk, Head of Division, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy
- Evgenyi G. Basansky, Head of Laboratory, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations
- Valeryi F. Fedulov, Head of Radiation Safety Division, Scientific Center, GAEN 10 l
Working Group 8. Exchange of Operational Experience Co-Leader:
- Vladimir M. Vitkov, Division Head, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Other
Participants:
- Stanislav A. Lesnoy, Director, Research Center, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Viktor A. Kotchanov, Head of Laboratory, All-Union Research !
Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (June 5-7)
Working Group 10, Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components Co-Leader:
- Ivan A. Stepanov, Division Head, Research and Design, Institute of Power Technology Other
Participants:
Vladimir G. Kritski, Head of Laboratory, Power Technology Institute (June 5-7)
Bulat I. Nigmatulin, Division Head, All-Union Research Institute for NuclearPowerPlantOperations(June 5-7)
- Alexander A. Tutnov, Head of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Notes:
The eight Soviets marked with an asterisk (*) visited the South Texas Project on Monday, June 12.
The five Soviets markcd with a double asterisk (**) visited the North Anna Nuclear Power Station on Thursday, June 8.
The four Soviets marked with a triple asterisk (***) visited the Three i Mile Island Nuclear Power Station on Thursday, June 8.
11
t APPENDIX 11 MEMORANDA 0F MEETINGS OF THE SEVEN WORKING GROUPS 1
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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 1
, SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES The main topics covered by the USSR and US participants included the following:
- 1. Operating Events Assessment
.US participants discussed the regulations of the US governing the reporting of operating events at nuclear facilities and the role of the regulatory organization in analyzing reported matters. The discussion focused on the short-term evaluation of significant events and problems that are reported to Headquarters, with a regional perspective on the followup effort provided by region-based and onsite inspectors, and on the evaluation of industry reports of defects and noncompliance with NRC regulations.
USSR participants discussed their procedure for responding to events at nuclear power plants which result in a reactor shutdown. The functional ,
relationship of onsite inspection groups, the District and Headquarters 1 organizations of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (Gosatomenergonadzor (GAEN)) and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy was explained.
- 2. Communication of Safety Concerns to the Industry US participants discussed the NRC's practices for alerting all nuclear facilities of safety concerns steming from an operating event or problem at a facility. The genesis and preparation of Information Notices, Bulletins and Generic Letters were discussed, including licensee obligations to inform the NRC of actions taken in response to generic communications and/or document actions taken for subsequent verification through the inspection process.
USSR participants discussed how the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) informs operating reactor facilities of events or situations having generic appifcability through the issuance of two types of information letters. One type of information letter informs, whereas the second type not only informs but broadly defines what action must be taken by one or more reactor facilities to achieve resolution to a problem.
In. discussing this process, a paper was presented concerning a situation involving a positive temperature coefficient of reactivity in VVER-1000 reactors. The USSR participants also discussed a situation which arose concerning defects in the steam generators of VVER-1000 reactors. The USSR side then described the actions taken to eliminate these situations.
WGl-1
- 3. Reactor Inspection Program US participants discussed the structure and philosophy of the NRC's Reactor Inspection Program, including a regional perspective on program implementation. Through direct observation and verification the NRC determines whether a plant is being operated safely, whether plant management is effective, and whether regulatory requirements are being satisfied.
USSR participants broadly described the reactor inspection program administered by the USSR State Committee (GAEN). The inspection program provides for the conduct of planned inspections at periodic intervals (including a comprehensive inspection conducted triennially), and the conduct of unscheduled inspections in response to operating events or identified problems.
- 4. Assessment of Facility Management US participants discussed the purpose and use of the NRC's program for the systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP), including a regional perspective on the implementation of the SALP program. The application cf SALP results in establishing site specific master inspection plans was discucsed, and the role of the semi-annual Senior Management Meeting in identifying facilities that warrant closer scrutiny was also addressed.
USSR participants discussed the organizational structure for the management of nuclear power plant operations, and the corresponding supervisory levels engaged in the inspection and assessment of management performance. The USSR also discussed the functional aspects of this supervision.
The major conclusions of Working Group 1 are:
(a) The structure and philosophy of the USSR nuclear power plant inspection program, as constituted since 1984, are very similar to the NRC program.
(b) Because nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union are state owned and operated, the USSR philosophy of nuclear power plant regulation includes a degree of direct responsibility for plant safety.
The major recommendations of Working Group 1 are:
(a) Working Group 1 discussed the methods and approaches of both countries concerning the regulatory aspects of ensuring nuclear reactor safety; information was exchanged on the evaluation of operating events and inspection practices. The program for cooperation in 1990 was discussed.
The Working Group leaders from both the US and USSR feel that the discussions were useful and informative, and express the hope for further successful cooperation within the Working Group. ,
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Proposed future' activities of Working Group 1 are as follows:
(a) Discuss results of the US/ USSR inspector exchange program to identify additional future activities associated with the reactor inspection program.
(b) Discuss criteria for and indicators of safe operation, including quantitative performance indicators as well as the more qualitative indicators used in the systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP).
(c) Discuss how inspectors evaluate overall plant safety on a day-to-day basis, including the parameters and indicators reviewed to to determine the plant safety status.
(d) -Discuss how regulations and requirements are changed and have changed as a result of the accumulation of experience, research results, etc. Areas to be discussed include changes to the regulations (including the backfit L
process), the incorporation of national standards (e.g., ASME, IEEE, ANSI),'the approval of license amcndments, and changes to the reactor inspection manual.
(e) Discuss the emergency response function used during a major nuclear facility incident; in particular the interactions with other government -
agencies and industry groups.
(f) Discuss in greater detail the function and specific activities of the
-Scientific Technical Safety Center that is affiliated with the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN), and how similar activites are accomplished in the US.
WGl-3
Appendix 1
- US Participants in the Second Meeting of Working Groups of the Joint Coordi-nating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
June 5-9, 1989 Washington, D.C.
Working Group 1 Safety ADoroaches and Reaulatory Practices Co-Leader:
Rossi, Charles E., Director, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hebdon, Frederick J., Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Manegement, Policy Development and Analysis Staff, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Other
Participants:
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Baranowsky, Patrick W., Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Haughney, Charles J., Chief, Special Inspections Branch, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Rubin, Stuart D., Chief, Diagnostic Evaluation and incident Investigation Branch, Division of Operational Assessment, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Shapaker, James W., Technical Assistant, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Shymlock, Milton B., Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II (Atlanta)
Weiss, Eric W., Chief, Operations Officer Section, Incident Response Branch, Division of Operational Assessment, Office for Analysis and
, Evaluation of Operational Data WG1-4 L________________--_____-__--__
- Appendix 2 USSR Participants in the Second Meeting of Working Groups of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).
. June 5-9, 1989 Washington D.C.
-Working Group 1 Safety Acoroaches and Reaulatory Practices Co-Leader: Gutsalov, Alexander T., Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, USSR State Committee for the Super;ision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
Other participants:
Mazalov, Anatoly T., Deputy Head, Main Operations Depa< tment, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
Miroshnitchenko, Mikhail 1., Head, Core Physics Division, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
)E r
WGI-5
Appendix 3 Additional documents exchanged during the Working Group I topic discussions are noted below.
- 1. Documents US participants provided to the Soviets for the first time during the session discussions:
(a) Undated paper entitled, "NRC Review of Operating Events." This paper describes the NRC's program for evaluating cperating events at nuclear power plants and for responding to significant events and issues.
(b) Copy tif the report of the Emergency Operational Procedures (EOP)
Inspection performed at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, and forwarded to the licensee by letter dated August 10, 1988.
(c) Copy of the report of the Safety System functional Inspection (SSFI) performed at the Cooper Nucleat Station, and forwarded to the licensee by letter dated September 22, 1987.
(d) Copy of the Diagnostic Evaluation Team report for the Fermi Atomic Power Plant, dated November 1988.
2.
Documents USSR participants provided to the US for the first time during the session discussions:
(a) " Decree on the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety," GAEN, Moscow (1988)
(b) " Instructions on the Supervision of Safety During Operation of Nuclear Power Plants," GAEN, Moscow (1986)
(c) " Rules and Standards in Nuclear Power: Guidelines for Investigating and Reporting Violations in Operating Nuclear Power Stations," GAEN, Moscow (July 1,1987)
(d) State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, "Infor-mation and Commentary" (Newsletter), GAEN, Moscow (April 1989)
WGI-6
_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - -J
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 2 ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE USSR AND US ,
The main topics covered by USSR and US participants include:
- 1. Safety Philosophy for Nuclear Power Plant Design and Operation. Both the USSR and the US TJmmariZed the safety philosophy governing design and operation of nuc; ear power plants. The US presentation addressed defense-in-depth, accident prevention and mitigation, the licensing process, types of standards applied, the scope of NRC review, use of Technical Specifications, and NRC safety Evaluation Reports. The USSR presentation addressed safety improvements designed into Rovno, design according to USSR national standards, use of the deterministic approac'-
in design, design criteria, design transients and accidents, and ideas under consideration for future designs. There were numerous questions from both delegations regarding emergency procedures and operator actions during the course of an accident or transient.
Of special interest is the difference in philosophy, and consequently plant design, for operator response to plant transient conditions.
- 2. General Arrangement of reference plant. The US presented the site location and general site arrangements of the South Texas plant.
Photographs of the site and its surroundings were shown. The USSR presented the general site arrangement for Rovno and a vertical cross-section of the plant. There was a discussion of siting and design considerations such as population density, proximity to hazards, and seismicity.
- 3. Safety System Functional Design and Capabilities. Both delegations presented the scope and functional design of major plant systems. System design criteria in such areas as design margin, single failure capability, and defense-in-depth were highlighted. Specific topics dis-cussed in considerable detail included: 1) Reactor Protection System;
- 2) Normal and Emergency AC/DC power; 3) Containment design and capabilities; 4) Steam generator; 5) ECCS, and; 6) Emergency Feedwater System. The USSR delegation also presented and discussed the Service Water System. Highlights of the discussions included: 1) Extensive discussion of station blackout, ATWS, Intersystem LOCA, and Feed and Bleed capability; 2) An indication by the USSR participants that the sensors used for safety system functions do not have control systems functions in the ROVNO design; 3) The USSR discussed their experiences with primary-to-secondary system leaks in the steam generators, and the US described steam generator tube rupture experience; and 4) Differences in ECCS design were noted although both Countries use nearly identical criteria.
WG2-1
- 4. Reactor Design. Both delegations presented general descriptions of the two reactor designs and noted strong similarities.
The US design has additional pressure relief capability (by PORVs); the USSR noted design modification in this regard for their plants.
- 5. Transient and Accident Assessments. Both delegations provided discussions on safety limits and the scope of transient and accident analysis as used in plant design. Both countries use similar methods and criteria to evaluate similar events.
The major conclusions are:
- 1. Both delegations recognize that the other has much to offer in terms of safety concepts. A continuing dialog will contribute to the safety enhancement of reactors in both countries.
- 2. Both delegations felt that the ~ time available to review the documentation supplied was inadequate and that further dialog would be needed to better understand each other's design.
- 3. Both delegations identified issues which need further exploration. These issues were discussed briefly but considerably more time will be needed to fully explore them.
Both delegations agreed to consider the following issues for future discussions. Future communication would be necessary to develop a detailed agenda for the next meeting in the Soviet Union.
I 1. Mutual understanding of the US and the USSR regulations and guides.
> 2. Participation by regulatory authorities as well as design organizations from both countries would be beneficial.
- 3. Emergency guidance for Operators / Design Features.
- 4. Station Blackout.
- 5. ATWS nalysis including the possibility of calculations.
- 6. Seismic design considerations.
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- 7. Mid-loop operation
- 8. In-depth containment study l
l WG2-2 1'.
Appendix 1 Participants MISE: Lunin, Gleb L. .
l" Astakhov, Sergei A.- Fedorov, Valentin G. Fil, Nikolay S.
Klonitski, Makhail L. Maltsev, Boris K. Mino, Igor S. Novikov,-
Gennady A. Tax, Sergei M. Sadtchikov, Viatcheslav G.
Mji: Thadani, A.
Hodges, W. Collins, T. Kudrick, J. Tondi, D. Rubin, M. Calvo, J. Sege, G. Ragland, K. Lanning,-W.
WG2-3
Appendix 2 Materials Exchanged
- 1) Viewgraphs of presentations by both delegations
- 2) Additional information requests by both delegations WG2-4
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 3 RADIATION EMBRITTLEMENT OF THE PRESSURE VESSEL AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE AND ANNEALING OF THE VESSEL
- - The main topics covered by USSR and US participants included:
1.- Embrittlement. Trends and Variables
- 2. Embrittlement in thick sections and application to structures
- 3. Embrittlement and radiation damage mechanisms
- 4. Vessel surveillance programs and embrittlement regulations
- 5. Annealing, recovery and post annealing reembrittlement trends
- 6. Application and system considerations, and annealing experience The major conclusions are:
- 1. The US and USSR agree that radiation embrittlement is greater at low temperatures, and that the flux level can have an important affect on the level of embrittlement. -Both have developed trends for embrittlement.
- 2. The primary variables are agreed to be material composition, flux and fluence and temperature. The influence of neutron spectrum and flux levels is not clearly delineated, and further work is necessary.
Cooperative efforts on flux level effects are encouraged.
- 3. The US has noted a strong effect of copper and nickel on embrittlement on their Mn-Mo-Ni steel with a secondary effect of Phosphorous. The USSR has noted a strong influence of Phosphorous and Copper on their Cn-Mo-V steel and little or no effect of nickel. Molybdenum has beneficial effect according to USSR research and some US research.
- 4. USSRreseaghrepgrtsnoapparentsaturationofradiationembrittlement up to 5x10 n/cm
- 5. A large statistical data base is necessary in order to adequately predict safety of nuclear power plants, not just a few tests. The USSR emphasized that tests of decommissioned reactor materials are very important.
- 6. US has shown good correlation of Drop Weight NDT with Charpy Shifts in research programs. The correlation to J-integral fracture toughness is very good for some compositions but is not yet found to be generally defined. The correlation between Charpy Shifts and K shifts is generally good but current use of Charpy Shifts appeaff to be inadequate for some cases.
- 7. The US dosimetry program has developed many benchmarks that permit prediction of flux and fluence to about 10-15% accuracy. The US con-tinues to report dosimetry using an energy criterion of " greater than 1 MeV," and sometimes includes DPA (displacement per atom); and the USSR reports their dosimetry using an energy criterion of " greater than 0.5 )
MeV," and thay always include DPA values. 1
)
WG3-1 J
- 8. The US has described a large effort on embrittlement of reactor vessel supports. It is understood that because of different design considerations, the USSR does not believe they have an embrittlement problem for supports.
- 9. Both the US and USSR use DPA to help correlate radiation embrittlement, but do not use the same procedures. The working group proposes to exchange these procedures, with a view toward presentations and discussion at a future WG-3 meeting.
- 10. The major US points on radiation damage mechanisms are as follows:
o Mn-Mo steels embrittle due to yield stress increases o Yield stress increases due to irradiation induced precipitation are ,
. reasonably consistent with theory o Precipitation of Cu-Mn-Ni-ferrite phases is accelerated by radiation enhanced diffusion o Copper-nickel-temperature-flux-fluence plus other variables interact to mediate embrittlement o " matrix" defect (s) are enhanced by nickel but their character is not known o Flux effects are important and low flux provides more embrittlement.
Possible mechanisms have been identified but not specified - lead to different extrapolated predictions
- 11. The USSR and US have conducted studies of annealing recovery of embrittlement of VVER-440 ar,d US PWR reactor vessels over many years, specifically evaluating the factors of material composition (Cu, P, Ni) time, temperature, fluence, and effect of cyclic irradiation and annealing. In general, more recovery is found for higher annealing temperatures. Both agree that a reasonably optimum for time is about 150-170 hours.
- 12. The USSR has found clear trends for annealing recovery as a function of a P content alone; the US has found trends for annealing recovery that are more closely tied to Cu and Ni content.
- 13. The QS and USgR find that high annealing temperatures (460 C or 850 F) are technically feasible for service applications, and can result in recovery of 70 to nearly 100%, depending on the material composition.
- 14. The USSR has conducted a very extensive program to evaluate factors important to annealing, has verified those factors in demonstration tests, has applied them to actual in-place annealing of 5 vessels, and is r.ompletjng2moreatthistime. Annealings have been conducted at 420 and 460 C for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, with no less than 70% recovery of properties to ensure normal operation of the plant. They have verified the effect of the anneal through irradiation and anneal of control (surveillance) samples, and also by direct measurements of hardness on the annealed vessel wall.
- 15. The USSR has demonstrated the feasibility of annealing operating reactor vessels starting with the Novovoronezh -3 in 1987 and has returned all WG3-2
I the plants to service, with no evidence of distortion or other degradation to the plant. These annealings were conducted during normal periodic shutdowns.
- 16. The USSR has found that reirradiation after annealing does not increase the rate of radiation embrittlement of reactor vessels after annealing.
In gengral agreement with US findings, the USSR has found that annealing at 340 C does not ensure a lessened level of recovery of embrittlement; thus, the wet annealing of reactor vessels cannot be recommended.
i The major recommendations are:
- 1. The US has verbally offered an invitation to the USSR to participate in the International Group on Radiation Damage Mechanisms, and the USSR has indicated a desire to accept. In addition, the NRC will provide a copy of the charter and other background information on the study group.
- 2. Collaboration on the study of materials from decommissioned reactors was considered to be desirable. To be carefully explored is the possibility for scientists from both countries to participate in the studies conducted by the other, and to share the results of those collaborative studies.
- 3. Using US equipment and instruments, joint programs might be conducted using materials which are directly cut from the reactor vessel of VVER-440 nuclear power reactors (including Novovoronezh), and from other irradiated materials. Shippingport materials are not being examined due !
to budget limitations. The US will provide information from testing materials from the Gundremmingen reactor vessel.
- 4. The USSR has offered cooperation and participation in their cooperative program with the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on neutron 1 dosimetry, using the zero power reactor facility at the Rez, Czechoslovakia Research Center.
- 5. It is proposed that Working Group 3 undertake a specific objective to pool their knowledge in order to form a comon basis for the understand-ing and conduct of reactor vessel annealing.- Discussion of the infor-mation available for such a comon basis could be a subject of discussion l at the next meeting of the Working Group 3.
Proposed future activities of the Working Group are as follows:
Suggestions for the Joint USSR-US Coordinating Comittee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety - Topic #3 for 1990.
- 1. Guidelines for the reports to be given at the seminar in Moscow in Sept./Oct. 1990 1.1 Suming up of annealing experience for VVER-440 reactor vessels and l the methodology for determining radiation embrittlement of vessel l metal after annealing.
i WG3-3
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1.2 Non-destructive (including surveillance) methods for monitoring metal characteristics of reactor vessels during operation and after annealing.
1.3 Tendency toward radiation embrittlement of VVER-1000 materials (steel alloyed with nickel-chromium 15x2NMFAA and its welded seams).
1.4 Research on VVER-440 reactor vessel materials removed from operating units.
1.5 On the nature of radiation damage to reactor vessel materials and related factors.
1.6 Theoretical and experimental research of the thermodynamics applied to the problem of thermal shock in the reactor vessel.
1.7 Elastic-plastic analysis of fracture mechanics of the embrittled 1 reactor vessel with the goal of ensuring its reliable operation. ;
Results of research of reactor vessel models. !
- 2. On the conduct of joint research on problems of radiation metallurgy and increasing operational reliability of reactor vessels and supports.
2.1 Sum up and analyze the scientific and technical results obtained in the US and USSR on annealing irradiated materials and vessels; form into practical recommendations which could be used for reactor vessel annealing.
2.2 Using US instruments, carry out joint research programs on materials cut directly from the vessel of a VVER-440 reactor removed from operation. The programs would also examine other irradiated materials.
2.3 Participate in joint research of neutron flux density on radiation damage of vessel materials and supports, including research con-ducted within the framework of international programs.
2.4 Research on radiation embrittlement of cladding materials, including chemical composition characteristics and other possible factors.
Influence of post-irradiation annealing on change in mechanical and i corrosion characteristics of the materials.
2.5 Corrosive-mechanical characteristics of base n.etal and the metal of i the welded seam in coolant environment under the effect of ionizing radiation of varying intensity.
2.6 Determination of vessel life time, especially as influenced by more
- j. precise elastic-plastic fracture evaluations, research on thermal shock, and calculation of uncertainties in determing metal char-acteristics and the presence of defects.
- 3. Long-term prospects.
3.1 Examine proposals for joint testing of reactor vessels of power stations which have been shut down.
3.2 Internships of USSR specialists on radiation metallurgy in US laboratories 3.3 Examine proposals for irradiating US-LWR reactor vessel materials in USSR power stations, followed by research conducted within the framework of joint programs.
l WG3-4
Appendix 1 1
List of Participants i US NRC' Guy A.' Arlotto, Director, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear I Regulatory Research (RES) C. 2. Serpan, Jr., Chief, Materials Engineering l Branch, RES "
A. Taboada, Senior Materials Engineer, RES P. N. Randall, Senior Materials Engineer, RES M. E. Mayfield, Senior Materials Engineer, RES X. Wichman, Section Leader, Materials Engineering Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
B..Elliot, Senior Engineer, NRR S. Lee, NRR R. Herman, Section Leader, NRR C. Y. Cheng, Materials Engineering Branch, NRR Dak Ridae National Laboratory. Tennessee R. D. Cheverton R. Nanstad F. B. Kam W. Pennell J. R. Hawthorne, Materials Engineering Associates, Lanham, MD G. R. Odette, Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA J. Houstrup, Consultant, Connecticut P. G. Shewman, ACRS, Professor, Ohio ~ State University, Columbus., OH P. Wu, DOE 1UiB Amir D. Amaev, Head of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow
. Alexander M. Kruykov, Head of Group, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow Sergei K. Morozov, Head of Department, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Vladimir A. Nikolaev, Head of Laboratory, Prometey Machinery Institute Complex L
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, Appendix 2 List of Materials Exchanged !
WG-3.1 through 3.7 are USSR papers already transmitted and translated.
.WG-3.8 Series of new papers in Russian -
WG-3.9 Embrittlement Trends and Variables, J. R. Hawthorne, MEA (hand out) ;
- WG-3.10 Dose Rate Embrittlement of Support Structures, R.D. Cheverton, l ORNL (hand out) l WG-3.11 Irradiation Effects in Heavy-Section Steels'and Applications to !
Reactor Vessels, R. K. Nanstad, ORNL (hand out) !
WG-3.12 A Review of Fundamental Mechanisms and Models of Irradiation Embrittlement of Pressure Vessel Steels, G. R. Odette, UCSB (hand j -
out)
WG-3.13 Neutron Dosimetry and Pressure Vessel Fluence Spectra Analysis, F. B. Kam, ORNL (hand out)
WG-3.14 Surveillance and Vessel Probability of Failure, P. N. Randall and
-H. W. Woods (hand out)
WG-3.15 Probability of Vessel failure from PTS Events, H. W. Woods (hand out)
Plus: o NUREG/CR-4183 Vol. I and Vol. 2, ORNL/TM9567/V1 PTS Evaluation of H. B. Robinson Unit 2 NPP o NUREG/CR-4267, PNL-5469, Vessel Integrity Simulation Analysis (VISA) Code Sensitivity Study o f 50.61 Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events o Reg. Guide 1.154 Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized !
Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water Reactors o ORNL/NRC/LTR-85/32 Comparison of Plant-Specific Analyses of Pressurized Thermal Shock (Based on Oconee Calvert Cliffs, and H. B. Robinson), D. L. Selby, ORNL, Oct. 15, 1985 WG-3.16 Annealing of the Housing - USA Overview, C. Z. Serpan, Jr. (band cut)
WG-3.17 Annealing Recovery and Reembrittlement, J. R. Hawthorne, MEA (hand out) l WG-3.lB Annealing Applications and Experience, A. Taboada (hand out) i WG3-6 l
I MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 4 FIRE SAFETY The main topics discussed by the USSR and US participants included: -
- 1. Fire safety design criteria, practices, and methods in both the US and USSR. Discussion focused on a variety of important issues, such as smoke contrcl, effects of water as a fire suppressant, determination of fire zones, penetration seals, effectiveness of protective coatings and other protective measures, risk assessment methods, and fire safety systems in nuclear plants.
- 2. Regulatory practices. In particular, the discussions focused on the different regulatery organizational structures used in the USSR and the US, and how regulatory authority was carried out in both countries using their respective regulatory structures. Backfitting of older plants was discussed.
- 3. Operational experience. In particular, the USSR participants presented information in statistical form on the various causes of nuclear plant fires in the USSR, and gave a detailed presentation on a large fire at a fast reactor in the USSR in 1978.
- 4. Risk assessments. The US gave a presentation on the results of the re-cent fire risk scoping study, showing the contribution of fires to core melt probability for several US plants. Other area: discussed included treatment of seismically-induced fires, seismic effects on fire-fighting equipment, and risks associated with computers utilized in nucler.r power plants. Use of Halon as a fire suppressant was discussed in light of current environmental concerns with the effect of Halon on the ozone layer.
- 5. Hydrogen transport and combustion. US discussions focused on an overview of current work, and a more detailed discussion on flame acceleration and transition from deflagration. The USSR discussed hydrogen mixing experi-ments and the results of the effect of sprays on mixing and on the poten-tial for deflagration to detonation transition (DDT). Qualitative re-sults were presented on the minimum cloud for DDT using both soft (spark plug, het wire) and strong (high explosives) ignition sources.
The major conclusions of the meeting are:
- 1. Fire safety is a very important part of nuclear power plant safety and therefore must be an important part of plant design and operation.
- 2. There are still aspects of nuclear plant fires that are highly uncertain with regard to their impact on safety and deserve further consideration.
, These primarily deal with the primary and secondary effects of fires on
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plant operation. They deal with system interactions under the effects of fires.
-The Fire Safety Working Group has concluded that future interactions of the working group would be beneficial, and future areas of cooperation between the USSR and the US in the area of fire safety, including hydrogen behavior, are i proposed as follows:
Future Areas for Exchanae for 1990-1991
- 3. Exchange information and explore opportunities for cooperative research on calculational models (COMPBRN-III) for fire propagation, the effects l of water, smoke, and energy transport during fire-fighting efforts, where '
and under what conditions fires start, and fire risk assessment methods.
- 2. Exchange information and experiences on backfitting fire prevention mea-sures (i.e., penetration seals) on older nuclear plants.
- 3. Exchange new publications dealing with nuclear power plant fire safety issues and current regulatory docurnents that pertain to regulatory re-quirements for fire protection in nuclear power plants. Concentration should be given to the effects of system interactions caused by fires.
- 4. Determine the feasibility of exchanging information and proposing future cooperative research on treatment of seismically-induced fires; specifi-cally, how fire-fighting equipment is designed for seismic events.
- 5. Exchange information on fire suppression methods and their effectiveness on energized electrical equipment.
- 6. Exchange information on fire brigade numerical strength and fire-fighting equipment requirements at nuclear power plants.
- 7. To study the possibility of having US and USSR teams inspect nuclear power plants in the area of fire safety in both the US and the USSR.
- 8. Exchange information on various combustion phenomena to include experi-mental and modeling efforts on deflagration, deflagration to detonation transition (DDT), and detonation. This exchange is inclusive of (I) USSR work being performed at the Kurchatov Institute (Fridman and Dorofeev) and the All Union Research Institute of Fire Protection (Korokhenko and Shebeko) on the effects of water sprays and aerosol on DDT and detona-tion, DDT modeling for nonuniform conditions and detonations and (2) US experimental and modeling results of investigations on flame acceleration and DDT, detonations, and deflagrations. The working group will coordinate H2work with Working Group 6.
- 9. Consultation to investigate the feasibility of a joint cooperative pro-gram to perform experiments at facilities in the USSR and US to investi-gate various combustion modes at high temperature, elevated pressure and in a steam environment. This would include the development of joint WG4-2
1 I
objectives, common data base, data reduction, modeling and the exchange
. of experts. !
- 10. Exchange information on development of models for transport and combus-tion of hydrogen and the application of these models for practical pur-poses.
- 11. - Exchange information on high temperature zirconium oxidation modeling.
Consultation to establish the feasibility of joint research, common ob-jectives and data base, modeling and exchange of experts.
WG4-3
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I Appendix 1 Participants Brian W. Sheron, Director, Division of Sytems Research, RfS. USNRC US Group Leader Alexandra Kovoltchenko, Deputy Director, All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection USSR Group Leader o Anatoly Mikeev, Head, Main Fire Department, Ministry of the Interior Dennis Kubicki, Fire Protection Engineer, NRR, USNRC David Notley, Fire Protection' Engineer, NRR, USNRC Steven Nolan,' Sandia National Laboratory Tom Story, Science Applications International Corporation
. Patricia Worthington, Senior Research Engineer, RES, USNRC Carlyle Michelson, Member, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
- Ivan Catton, Member, Advisory Committee on keactor Safeguards
-Igor Korobowsky, Interpreter Vladimir Klimenko, Interpreter
- Part-time WG4-4
1 I
Appendix 2 Materials Exchanged
)
Vugraphs of Presentations Chernobyl Implications Report (2 volumes) NUREG-1251 i Hydrc, provided to the US by USSR (3 copies)
- 1. at ":;et Conditions in Spatially Nonuniform Combustible Mixtures, S. B. .ieev, A. S. Kochurko, B. B. Chaivanov, IAE-4871/13, I. V.
Kuichste: institute of Atomic Energy.
- 2. Experimental Study of Detonation Initiation in Motor Fuels Sprayed in Air, V. I. Alekseev, S. B. Dorofeev, V. P. Sidorov, B. B. Chaivanov, IAE-4871/13 I. V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.
Hydrogen Reports provided to the USSR by US-(3 copies)
- 1. FLAME Facility, The Effects of Obstacles and Transverse Venting on Flame Acceleration and Transition to Detonation for Hydrogen-Air Mixtures at Large Scale, Prepared by M. P. Sherman, S. R. Tieszen, W. B. Benedick, HURlG/CR-5275, SAND 85-1264, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1989.
- 2. Modeling for Large-Scale Flame Acceleration Experiment, K. D. Mary, HUREG/CR-4855, SANDB7-8203, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 1987.
WG4-5 u_________--_-------------_------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
i HEMORANDUM OF HEETING WORKING GROUP 6 SEVERE ACCIDENTS )
l The main topics covered by USSR and US participants included discussions on protocol items 6.la, 6.lb, and 6.lc, which had evolved out of discussions of the meeting of the JCCCNRS in August 1988. {
i There were four US presentations on item 6.la.
These concerned fission product releases to the fuel-clad gap during reactor operation, fission product releases during severe core damage accidents prior to reactor pressure vessel failure, severe accident phenomenology and releases after reactor pressure vessel failure, and aerosol and fission product transport within the primary coolant system and containment. !
In the discussion that followed, the }
USSR expressed interest in information regarding the variation of the gap thermal conductivity with fission product activity and in obtaining or developing sequences of fission product transport calculations for specific accident interest.
validation of the VICTORIA, CORCON and VANESA codes.There was also discuss There were three USSR presentations on item 6.la.
The first described an analytic method particularly suitable for describing releases of fission products in the early phases of an accident. The next described pulsed power testing of VVER-1000 type fuel elements in two research reactors during the period 1983-1988, and proposals for future testing. The third presentation described scenarios. a severe accident computer code which is capable of analyzing VVER In the discussion, the USSR suggested that the data from the proposed Soviet tests be shared with that from the US PBF tests. It was also noted IAEA. that questions on CORCON and VANESA had been directed to the US, via the The US responded that these questions had not yet been received, but would be answered.
Item 6.lb was then taken up. A presentation by the US discussed the chemical form of iodine released from the fuel, the stability of cesium iodide (CsI),
and the importance of aqueous iodine chemistry in the containment. A USSR presentation then discussed two experiments planned for 1989 and 1990 to study surface upon adsorption of iodine and the transfer of iodine from steam to water condensation.
There was considerable discussion on the presence and importance of organic iodine, as well as remarks on the regulatory aspects of iodine in the US, the revision of Standard Review Plan section 6.5.2, and the potential implications of iodine chemistry with regard to filtration systems.
Item 6.lc was begun with a US presentation which discussed severe accident containment challenges and failure modes amenable to venting, filtration materials, filtered venting applications outside the US, and US efforts. Two USSR presentations then discussed (1) a potential filtered venting system for VVER-1000 type reactors, including a proposed testing of an experimental mock-up of this system at Hanford, Washington, within the context of the international ACE program, and (2) recent USSR criteria on severe accident releases and an examination of potential filtration systems. There was WG6<1
considerable discussion on US efforts in this area as well as US practices with regard to containment leak -ate, exclusion area size and iodine chemical form. There was also interest expressed in the potential use of granulated titanium dioxide (TiO 2
) as a filtration material.
A brief presentation by the US also covered the NRC severe fuel damage partners program. This is an international consortium covering a broad area of severe accident research topics.
The major conclusions are that both sides agreed that the information exchanged was useful and beneficial. The exchanges on the question of iodine '
chemistry clarified how each side was pursuing this issue. The discussions on filtered venting were also useful and informative.
The major recommendations were as follows:
Both sides agreed that an important topic for future US-USSR interactions involves the severe accident related phenomena and processes which determine the challenge and the loads (i.e., pressures, temperatures) to light water containments (PWRs/BWR: for the US; VVERs for the USSR). The quantification of these loads is also utilized in Level-II Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs). Initially the US-USSR cooperative efforts will focus on the most important phenomena which are generic to both the'US and USSR containment types. Among these phenomena are hydrogen deflagration / detonation, corium-concrete interactions and corium-water interactions. To address the above, we have agreed on the following program of work for the remainder of 1989 as well as 1990 and beyond:
A. Discuss the interface issues between Level-I and Level-II PRA (methods, approaches, important issues). Discuss Containment Event Trees and how they are utilized in Level II PRAs (Quantifications (how knowledge of phenomena is utilized; how phenomena uncertainties are taken into account); and use of event trees to develop accident management procedures]. As part of this activity the US will make available to the Soviets the second draft [to be published in July 1989) of NUREG-IISO and the NRC contractor's reports developed for its support. The activity described under this item is proposed for spring 1990 and is c:nsistent with the intent of Protocol Item 6.2a.
B. Corium-Concrete Interaction (Protocol Item 6.2b)
Initial discussions and exchange of information in the fall of 1989 will focus on the consequences of corium concrete interactions (i.e., how they affect the containment loads and also bow they augment the radioactivity in the containment); other issues to be addressed include corium relocation patterns, the formation of insulating crusts and corium debris bed coolability. This activity will be properly coordinated and integrated with the MACE program and the calculation and evaluation of the SURC-4 experiment which the Soviets have agreed to take part in order to avoid any duplication. In the next US-USSR meeting in which the status of analytical and experimental efferts will be discussed (and the status of current knowledge and understanding) an assessment will be made WG6-2
whether further joint US-USSR cooperative efforts can be identified and defined.
C. Corium Debris Bed Coolability
- Even though a part of this issue (i.e., debris bed coolability) is to be addressed under activity B. above, it is significant and broad enough to require special attention. This is proposed for fall 1989.
D. Generation of Combustibles (H2, CO) Under Severe Accident Conditions Both corium-concrete interactions and corium-coolant interactions produce CO and H overall $.ixing The behavior issues to(dynamic be addressed under this activity vs. quasi-static); could include:
condensation processes leading to high concentrations; deflagration / detonation limits under a variety of severe accident conditions and how they load a containment. These issues are listed in some more detail in Appendix I.
Assess whether future joint US-USSR cooperative efforts (e.g., exchange of information, or some type of joint programs) are warranted and define specific areas (this could be better accomplished after a " standard"
. problem has been defined and analyzed). This is proposed for spring 1990. The working group will coordinate H 2work with Working Group 4.
E. Even though issues associated with fission product releases during both design basis and severe accidents were discussed in great detail by both sides during this meeting, it was decided to explore further some specif-ic issues such as the behavior of the various chemical forms of iodine.
At a future meeting to be held in fall 1989 betweer. US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about the nature and extent of this further exploration. As part of this activity, the US will make available to the USSR published information on the behavior cf fission products under severe accident conditions.
F. Because of the great interest expressed in filtration and venting during severe accidents, it was also decided to exchange information and continue to explore further the proposed bases for such systems as well as possible performance criteria. At a future meeting to be held in spring 1990 between US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about the nature and extent of this area.
G. Both sides also agreed that it would be important to have general discus-sions, on an annual basis, which would cover the total range of both the US and USSR supported severe accident programs.
The US and USSR will prepare a draft agreement concerning the precise form and I
content of bilateral cooperation addressed under the activities A. through G.
l above. This agreement should be discussed at the next Working Group meeting l (fall 1989) and finalized at the Working Group meeting to be held in the spring of 1990.
WG6-3
Apper. dix 1 Hydrogen Safety Proposals for Cooperation
- 1. Investigation of detonation properties of hydrogen / air / steam mixtures.
Inter:bange of information. Possible joint experiments.
1.1 Determination of minimum initiation energy and detonation cell size as a function of the composition, initial temperature and pressure.
1.2 Experimental study and numerical modeling of heterogeneous systems detonation properties. .The effect of droplet size and concentration on detonation properties.
- 2. Investigation of detonation onset conditions. Interchange of information and joint experiments.
2.1 The effect of scale, obstacles and steam on the possibility of deflagration to detonation transition (DDT).
2.2 Experimental study and numerical modeling of detonation in nonuniform combustible mixtures (self initiation of detonation).
Self initiation conditions in the presence of radioactive components, ionizing radiation, temperature and concentration gradients, and pressure perturbations. Minimum detonation formation distances.
2.3 Experimental and numerical modeling of potential mitigation systems.
- 3. Development of new combustion and detonation medels and incorporation into generic containment codes.
p 3.1 DDT simulation.
3.2 Modeling of detonation self initiation in nonuniform mixtures.
3.3 Development of numerical models for heterogeneous mixtures.
WG6-4
Appendix 2 Participants US Co-Leader: Themis P. Speis, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC Soviet Co-Leader: Oleg'Ya. Shah, Deputy Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy US Working Group: D. F. Ross, Deputy Director, RES, USNRC B. Sheron, Director, DSR, RES, USNRC R. Meyer, Section Leader, AEB, DSR, RES, USNRC L. Soffer, Section Leader, SAIB, DSIR, RES, USNRC T. Margulies, PRAB, NRR, USNRC D. Powers, SanJia National Laboratory T. Kress, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Soviet Working Group: Vladimir A. Payshuk, Head of Division, Kurchatov Institute .of Atomic Energy Evgenyi G, Basansky, Head of Laboratory, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Oper-ations Valeryi F. Fedulov, Head of Radiation Sifety Division, Scientific Center, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
WG6-5
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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 8 EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE I. THE SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION The following main topics were covered by USSR and US participants:
J. . REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR OPERATING EXPERIENCE US participants presented the current requirements for event reporting. The significance of the types of events being reported was emphasized by specific examples. A summary was presented of the types of events reported by US plants.
The USSR speaker described'their event reperting system and ,
described new rules developed and implemented since the Chernobyl accident. . Event investigation by special commissions with participation by designer / manufacturer / supplier, the State Atomic Energy Administration, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy was addressed.
- 2. NATIONAL DATABASES - INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL l
US speakers described the databases maintained by NRC (Seauence Coding and Search System) as well as those maintained by INPO (Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System) and various vendors.
i Details of coding of event and component failure information and retrieval were addressed by NRC.
l USSR participants discussed their national databases for operational events and component failures. Detailed descriptions of their data structure and retrieval capabilities were provided. Relative merits of the two sets of systems were noted.
t
- 3. USE OF DATABASES IN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE US speakers discussed the use of stored information to identify classes of events that warrant investigation. Following a brief discussion of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program, a specific example was used to illustrate the approach for risk quantification l
of operating events. In addition, the results of two studies - one related to component failures and the other related to a specific system failure - were presented. The causes and corrective actions were discussed.
The USSR speaker discussed the evaluation and feedback of operational data for Soviet plants which experienced non-scheduled outages and shutdowns in the past two years. Copy of an additional paper on " Survey of Observations of Violation in Work at Soviet 440 PWRs during 1987-1988" was provided.
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L II. ' CONCLUSIONS The major conclusion of this operational experience exchange is the need for continuing centralized reporting and review of events, with emphasis on collection of accurate and complete information, rigorous evaluation,
.and subsequent dissemination of information and lessons learned.
The US and USSR data collection, analysis, and dissemination share many common technical aspects, reporting thresholds, safety problems and concerns, and similar goals. We have much to learn from each other.
.III. RECOMMENDATIONS The major recommendations are:
- 1. Maintain a close, direct contact in exchanging reactor operating experience reported through IRS reports for further understanding of
. lessons-learned'from mutual operating experience.
- 2. Share methods to identify safety significance of operating events and. accident precursor.s, and assess approaches by reviewing mutual.
experience.
- 3. We should have t.ontinuing technical discussions of safety significant events and event classes.
IV. PROPOSED FUTURE ACTIVITIES Proposed future activities of this Working Group are as follows:
- 1. Plan another information exchange meeting in 1989 to discuss items of mutual interest. The topics of interest to include:
- a. indicators of nuclear power plant safety with emphasis on measures to monitor maintenance
- b. implications of human factors on nuclear power plant safety
- c. technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
- 2. Plan a second meeting of the Working Group in 1990 to:
- a. discuss in-depth methods for identifying accident precursors
- b. assess the effectiveness of feedback and dissemination of operational experience
- c. technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
WG8-2
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- 3. Plan a third meeting of the Working Group in 1991 to review mutual operational experience and analyses i
WG8-3
Appendix 1 Participants E EiB T. Novak, Group Co-Leader V. Vitkov, Group Co-Leader Director, Division of Safety Programs Div!sion Head, All-Union
.0ffice for Analysis and Evaluation Research Institute for of Operational Data, NRC Nuclear Power Plant Operations E. Brown, Senior Mechanical Engineer S.A. Lesnoi, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation Research Center, All-Union of Operational Data, NRC Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations R. Dennig, Chief V.A. Kotchanov, Head of Trends and Patterns Section Laboratory Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations C. Heltemes, Deputy Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC E.-Jordan, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC G. Mays (Contractor)
Dak Ridge National Laboratory J. Rosenthal, Chief Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC M. Williams, Chief l
Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC WG8-4
1 Appendix 2
. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
' Survey of Observations of Violation in Work at Soviet 440 PWRs During 1987-1988," S.A. Lesnoi, et al.
WG8-5
HEMORANDUM OF HEETING WORKING GROUP 10 EROSION / CORROSION DESTRUCTION OF PIPING AND COMPONENTS A workshop on Topic No.10, " Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components" was held on June 5-7, 1989. Theoretical and engineering aspects of corrosion and erosion degradation of nuclear power plant piping were discussed. A list of participants is shown in Appendix 1. There was a mutual exchange of information on the basis of reports by US and USSR specialists on the design, standards and practical use of materials, water chemistry, in-service experience, and identification (NDE), control and prevention of the erosion and corrosion of piping. Phenomenological aspects of erosion and corrosion were discussed, as well as models for forecasting corrosion-erosion degradation, and the mechanism of erosion-corrosion processes. A list of papers presented is shown in Appendix 2.
The following proposed topics for a workshop to be held in Moscow, May 1990, were discussed:
- 1. Improvement in the composition and control of water chemistry in light water nuclear power plants.
- 2. Corrosion product release and transport.
- 3. Non-destructive examination techniques for monitoring degradation of components due to erosion and corrosion.
- 4. Study of alternative or new materials to resist the effects of erosion and corrosion.
A detailed ager.da will be mutually developed at a later date.
It was agreed that reciprocal visits to institutions, experimental facilities and nuclear power plant sites in 1990 by US and USSR delegations would be beneficial to both sides. The visits could include up to approximately 10 people for two to three weeks. Each side will submit proposed places to visit along with details of facilities, experiments and data to be seen or obtained.
The times and detailed arrangements for these visits should be agreed upon within the next six months.
Finally, it was agreed that there would be a mutual exchange of information, in the form of published papers, and reports in the areas of:
- 1. Methods for determining degradation of piping due to corrosion cracking
- 2. Effects of corrosion on zirconium alloys
- 3. Hethods and systems of control (including automated) of corrosion and erosion of nuclear power plant components.
I WG10-1 l
l
Appendix 1 Participants ES.B
- 1. S'epanov,-Institute t of Power Technology (Group Co-Leader)
A. Tutnov, Kurchatov Institute V.'Kritski, Institute of Power Technology B. Nigmatulin, All Union Research Institute of NPP E
'J. Richardson, NRC (Group Co-Leader)
C. McCracken, NRC A. Taboada, NRC' F. Witt. NRC P. Wu, DOE-J. Houstrup, ASME P. Griffith, MIT.
C. Czajkowski, Brookhaven National Laboratory W. Shack, Argonne National Laboratory O. Jonas, Consultant A
I-l WG10-2
i.
Appendix 2 List of Papers Presented '
ES.B
- 2. " Quantitative and probabalistic analysis of the risk of destruction of structural elements of nuclear reactors as a means of evaluating the service life of these elements under conditions of incomplete and indeterminate initial data about the state of the facility." (Russian)
- 2. "The influence of the concentration of dissolved oxygen on the behavior i of corrosion products dispersed in the coolant of a boiling-water !
reactor." (Russian)
- 3. " Release of corrosion products from the surface of steel in the coolant water of an atomic power plant." (Russian)
- 4. "The basic dependence of currosion and erosion of carbon steels in power plant water loops on equilibrium thermodynamic factors." (Russiar)
- 5. " Magnetite solubility in the regeneration medium in atomic power plant water at elevated temperatures." (Russian)
- 6. " Solubility of steel corrosion products under conditions simulating various water chemistry processes in power plants." (Russian)
- 7. " Behavior of copper corrosion products in the water loops of power plants." (Russian)
- 8. " Experimental resehrch on the influence of hydrodynamics and physical and chemical properties of water media with high parameters on the process of appearance and development erosion and corrosion destruction." (Russian)
- 9. " Criteria for determining permissable size of defects in pipes."
(Russian)
- 10. " Magnetite solubility in boiling water power plant coolant." (Russian)
- 11. "A thermodynamic model of cobalt corrosion product behavior in boiling water reactor channels." (Russian)
- 12. " Basic tasks and ways of providing reliable and safe atomic power plant operation." (Russian)
D. " Electrochemical Methods for Corrosion Studies at Nuclear Power Plants."
(Viewgraphs in English and Russian)
- 14. "On the Principal Relationship Between Power Plant Stainless Steel Loop Erosion-Corrosion and Thermodynamic Equilibrium Factors." (English) 1 WG10-3
- 15. " Corrosion Products Release From Steel Surface Into BWR Water Coolant."
(English)
M 0 Jonas: "PWR Feedwater System Design Characteristics"
- 0. Jonas: "PWR Feedwater Chemistry" Sanchez-Caldera, LE, Griffith, P. Rrbinowicz: "The Mechanism of Corrosion-Erosion in Steam Extraction Line; of Power Stations," Trans. ASME Jn1 of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, Vol.110, April 1988 DeFreitas, Germano: ' Dissolution Rates ir. the Wake of a Welding Backup Ring,"
Engineer's Thesis in ME, MIT, f eb: cary 1986 Keck, R.G. and Griffith. P: "Models and Equations for the Prediction of Erosion-Corrosion Wear in Steam Extraction Piping," ASME Paper No. 97-JPGC-PWR-35 Taboada, A.: "Past Experiences With Pipe Wall Thinning in Nuclear Power Plants" (Viewgraphs)
Czajkowski, C.J.: " Erosion-Corrosion at Nuclear Power Stations" Houstrup, J.P.: The Design of Nuclear Piping" Houstrup, J.P.: "ASME Evaluation Methods for Erosion-Corrosion Damage in Nuclear Piping" Shackr., W.J.: Phenomenology of Erosion-Corrosion" Shacks, W.J.: "Phenomenological Models for Erosion-Corrosion" Shacks, W.J.: "Hethods for Preventing Erosion-Corrosion: Materials, Water Chemistry, and Design" Witt, F.: " Zinc Injection in the BWRs for Radiation Buildup Control" (Viewgraph) l WG10-4
n APPENDIX 111 PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT AN INSPECTOR EXCHANGE PURSUANT TO ITEM 1.2 0F THE PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT C00RDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY l
I l
i I
l l
l 1
Procedures to Implement an Inspector Exchange Pursuant to Item 1.2 of the Protocol of the First Meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Item 1.2 of the Protocol of the First Meeting of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) proposed that the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. (held pursuant to the authority set forth in the Memorandem of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety of April 26, 3988) establishes a means for each side to develop an understanding of the other's methods used to ensure adherence to design and operational requirements and specifications through an exchange of inspectors.
The goal of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. inspector exchange program is to develop knowledge of the safety culture of the host country through an understanding of licensee / operator and regulator / inspector methods for ensuring adherence to design and coerational requirements and specifications. It is expected that the participating inspectors will return with a basic understanding of regulatory and inspection procedures, and inspector and operator safety approaches of the host country. The goal is for the participating inspectors to obtain this understanding to the degree necessary to accurately describe
%e program to their peers upon their return.
In order to successfully implement Item 1.2 of the Protocol, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S.S.R. State Counittee on Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety adopt the procedures belc : .
- 1) Number of Participants in the Exchanoe. Each country will send a single group consisting of two inspectors and one interpreter (further referred to as a " group").
- 2) tenoth of Exchance. The group will be in the host country for a term of approximately seven weeks. The Excharge will begin during the month of July 1989. The host country is to be informed about the exact date no later than one month before the departure date of the group.
- 3) Sites at Which the Exchances Will Occur. The Soviet group will visit the Catawba nuclear facility near Rock Hill, South Carolina, which is operated by the Duke Power Company. The U.S. group will visit the Zaporozhye nuclear facility, which is located in the Ukraine about 200 miles southeast of Kiev on the Dnieper River.
- 4) Loaistics Arrangements. The sending country will provide for transportation of its group to the vicinity of the capital of the host country and for their return. The group will visit the headquarters of the national regulatory body on their way to the site (one day) and on their way back (two days), and during the Exchange the group will spend a few days in the regional office of the host regulatory body. The group will work at the designated
.g.
I site for the rest of the term of the exchange. The group will remain within a twenty-five mile radius of the site unless accompanied by a host country official. The host country will arrange a mid-visit break for the visiting group for four or five days at an appropriate location. The host country will be responsible for arranging and paying for all living expenses of the sending country's group within the host country. This includes transportation, accommodations, and food.
- 5) Identification of Group Members. The sending country will provide the host country at least thirty-five days before the group's arrival in the the country with the following information concerning each group member:
-name, surname;
-profession;
-length of service in the nuclear power industry;
-length of service in the regulatory body;
-post occupied at present;
-date of birth and place of birth;
-passport number.
- 6) fouioment that May be Brovoht Into the Host Country. The group will be allowed to bring cameras, tape recorders, personal dosimetry equipment (e.g., dosimeters, radiation measuring equipment), and portable personal computers. The cameras and tape recorders will not be taken onto the reactor site without the specific permission of the appropriate host country authorities.
- 7) Access to Reactor Site Documents. The sendi.,g country group will have access to all documents available to the host country's inspectors, except as restricted by the applicable laws and regula' ions of the host country. Inspection or reactor plant related documents will not be taken offsite without the permission of the appropriate host country authorities.
The host side, however, will provide assistance to the visiting group in obtaining necessary information concerning the supervision practices at the site.
- 8) Communication To and From the Group. The host country will provide access to and provide assistance in placing telephone calls to the sending country's embassy or consulate. The host country will assist the sending country (as nectssary) in contacting its personnel.
- 9) Emeroency Transportation. In the event of an emergency (e.g., the serious illness of a group member the host country will provide transportation for as many group m) embers as the group leader considers necessary as quickly as possible to a location from which the sending country can provide additional travel assistance.
- 30) Medical Care in the Host Country. The U.S.S.R. will provide (as necessary) appropriate medical care for the U.S. group. The U.S. will provide the Soviet group with medical insurance coverage.
3 II) Site and Reactor Plant Access. - The sending c)untry's group will be escorted by an official representative of the host government whenever they are on the reactor site and will follow all health, safety, and security rules prescribed by the host country or the reactor operating organization. A briefing will be provided by the host country or reacto,* operating organization covering site specific health, safety, and security rules.
- 12) Host Country Coordinator. The host country will identify a person at the reactor site who has the authority and responsibility to resolve any problems or issues that develop while the group is in the host country, including any problems or issues not addressed in this implementing procedure.
The hest country coordinator will also be the communication point of contact for both routine and emergency situations.
These implementing procedures apply only to a single exchange of inspectors and interpreters. Any subsequent exchanges pursuant to Item 1.2 of the Protocol will be addressed through separate implementing procedures.
FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY FOR THE U.S.S.R. STATE COMMITTEE FOR COMMISSION THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY
] , /r /
_ 7?mn I Wa/r l! > __
James M. Taylor // Nik6af N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi
, U.S. Co-Chairman of'JCCCNRS U.S.S.R. Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS Date d
/
me //ff Date 0.i O{ D
~~ ~ ~~
1 l
APPENDIX IV PROPOSAL OF THE 50V]ET 5]DE ON THE REALIZAT]0N OF COOPERATION IN THEME 7 0F THE PROTOCO' OF THE FIRST MEET]NG OF THE USSR-US JOINT C00RDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REA 31 AUGUST 1988 (RUSSIAN)
____-_-____--___-----------~
Translation PROPOSALS OF THE S0VIET SIDE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COOPERATION WITHIN THEME 7 0F THE PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE JOINT USSR-USA COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVIL NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY 31 AUGUST 1988
- 1. Within the framework of subdivision 7.1. of the Protocol there is to j be designated an independent subgroup that will unify the full subject matter of the dosimetric and radioecological areas. The general name of the subject matter of the subgroup is " Principles of forma $, ion of individual and collective dosages of external and internal irradiation from various sources."
- 2. From a proposal of the American side (see U.S. Correspondence 89-7) this group of subjects includes the following subpoints: 7.1.A (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9); 7.1.C (1, 2, 3); 7.1.D. (IB, 20); 7.1.E (2, 3).
- 3. In accordance with point 2, the following outline is preposed:
7.1, Transfer of radionuclides in the environment and irradiation dosesofhumanbeings(Director: Asst. Director of Scientific Production Association [ SPA; NP0; Nauchno-proizvodstvennaya ob'yedineniye] "Tayfun" Borzilov V.A.).
7.1.1. Transfer of radionuclides in the environment (Director:
Asst. Director of SPA "Tayfun" Bonilov V.A.).
7.1.1.A. Models of short- and medium-term prediction
- 1. Description of the radioactive release source.
- 2. Atmospheric transfer of gas-aerosol radioactivity, its concentration in the air.
- 3. Fallout onto the earth's surface.
- 4. Local exposure dosage from radioactive trail.
- 5. Modeling of radioactive contamination of an aqueous medium at the early stage of a nuc* ear reactor accident. l
- 6. Transport of radionuclides through ground food I chains.
- 7. Transport of radionuclides through water food chains.
- 8. Modeling the radioecologic61 situation in an aqueous medium during the initial and medium-term period following a nuclear reactor accident.
7.1.1.9. Obtaining rapid information on radioactive contamination of objects in the environment.
I
- 1. Principles of data gathering.
- 2. Measurements of concentration of radioactive particles in the air and spectral measurements of ground contamination occurring from the air.
- 3. Aerial gamma-spectrometric measurements of the degree of external gama-radiation and deposition density of local contamination by radionuclides.
- 4. Ground field gamma-spectrometry and' interpretation of data.
- 5. 'Methodsofutilizingaerialmeans(aerial gamma-photography) to evaluate extent of radioactive contamination.
- 6. System of rapid monitoring of radioactive contamination of bodies of water during the initial period following a nuclear reactor accident.
- 7. Use of a fixed radiation monitoring network to evaluate the extent of radioactive contamination.
7.1.1.C. Models of long-term prediction and data gathering system.
- 1. Vertical transfer of radionuclides in the soil.
- 2. Time of presence of radionuclides in the soil (periods of natural self-purification).
- 3. Radioactive contamination of the urban environment.
4 Time of presence of radionuclides in an aqueous medium.
- 5. Repeated radio-aerosol contamination of the air.
- 6. Estimation of uncertainties.
7.1.1.D. ' Methods for substantiating and verifying models.
- 1. Models of atmospheric transfer.
- 2. Models of soil transfer.
- 3. Models of water transfer.
The names of participants on the Soviet side with respect to pt. 7.1.1.
will be provided later.
7.1.2. Doses of irradiation of human beings (Director -
Likhtarev I.A., Director of Division of Dosimetry and Radiation Hygiene of All-Union Scientific Center for Radiological Medicine of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences [AUSCRM USSR AMS])
7.1.2.A. Dosimetric models for early prediction.
- 1. External irradiation from a cloud.
- 2. Internal inhalation irradiation.
- 3. External irradiation from local fallout.
- 4. Trensfer of radionuclides through terrestrial food
! chains.
- 5. Transfer of radionuclides through water food chains.
- 6. Coefficients of dose conversion for peroral intake of radionuclides.
- 7. Estimation of uncertainties.
2
7.1.2.B. Dosimetric models of prediction for " intermediate periods in the development of the radiation situation."
- 1. External irradiation and dosages.
- 2. Doses of internal irradiation due to terrestrial food chains.
- 3. Doses of internal irradiation due to water food chains.
7.1.2.C. Dosimetric modsis of long-term prediction.
- 1. External irradiation from distributed sources.
- 2. Internal irradiation due to terrestrial food chains.
- 3. Internal irradiation due to water food chains.
- 4. Synthesis of empirical data.
- 5. Estimation of uncertainties.
7.1.2.D. Methods for substantiating and verifying models.
- 1. External irrad1ation.
- 2. Internal irradiation from alimentory uptake of radionuclides.
- 3. Internal irradiation from inhalation uptake.
- 4. Stability, replicability of models, temporal drift of parameters.
Within the framework of subsection 7.1.2. the following will participate on the Soviet side:
from All-Union Scientific Center of Radiological Medicine of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences [AUSCRM USSR AMS; VNTsRM; Vsesoyuznyy nauchnyy tsentr radioaktivnoy meditsiny] - Likhtarev I.A. (Director), Los' I.P.,
Repin V.S. , Shandala N.K., Kovgan L.N. , Bondartnko 0.I. , Chumak V.V.
from the Institute of Biophysics [IB], USSR Ministry of Public Health
[IBF MZ SSSR] - Knizhnikov V.A., Barnudarov R.M., Savkin H.I.,
Pavlovskiy 0. A.
from Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of Radioactive Hygiene of the USSR Ministry of Public Health [LenNIIRG MZ RSFSR; Leningradskiy Nauchnoissledovatel'skiy institut radioaktivnoy gigiyeny) - Balonov M.I.,
Konstantinov Yu.A.
from I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy [IAE; Institut atomnoy energiyi] - Murzin N.Y.
- 4. Per section 7.2:
- thematically the fundamental positions of the section proposed by the American side are acceptable;
- it is advisable to designate as the head organization on the Soviet side with respect to this section AUSCRM USSR AMS, and Prof. Likhtarev I.A. its director; 3
- it is proposed that the following directors of subsections on the-c . Soviet' side be designated:
- on clinical effects of [0LB--a Russian abbreviation]--Prof. Bebeshko V.G.;
- on epidemiological aspects (long-term effects) and systems of registers--Prof. Burunov V.A.;
- on dosimetric aspects--Prof. Likhtarev I.A.;
- on the section regarding improvement of methodology of risk assessment (stochasticeffects)--seniorscientificresearcherDeminV.F.;
- on genetic effects of radioactive irradiation-~Pilinskaya M.A.;
For work within section 7.2 it is' advisable to draw upon the following specialists:
lfrom AUSCRM USSR AMS: Prisyazhnyuk A.Ye., Chabak A.K., Ledoshchuk B. A.,
Shklyar G.I., Prevarskiy B.P., Tsvetkova 0.M.;
.1 from I.V. Kurchatov 1AE: Bykov A. A.;
from IB of USSR Ministry of Public Health: Barabanova A.V.
- 5. It is proposed that Il' yin L.A. and Romanenko A.E. be designated directors of the entire area 7.
- 6. Time and place of meetings:
- p. 7.1. 18-22 September 1989, Obninsk near Moscow.
- p. 7.2. 25-29 September 1989, Kiev.
[TheU.S.SidehasattachedheretoforreferencethetextofU.S.
Correspondence 89-7whichismentionedinparagraphnumber2.,above.]
4 I
L- - ------ - _- _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ ____
ATTACHMENT.
Draft Agenda for Protocol Item No. 7, Heslth Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations, as.presente<i in U.S. Correspondence 89-7
.to the U.S.S.R. dated March 28, 1989
..t ;
JCCCNRS ' WORKING GROUP DRAIT AGENDA Name of Working Group:
Health Effects and Environmer,tal Protection Considerations.
U. S. Working Group Leader:
Murray Schulman, US DOE.
Designee for Leader of Item 7.1 Environmental Transport:
Lynn Anspaugh.
U. S. Working Group
Participants:
.M. H. Dickerson,'P. Gudiksen, LLNL, F. O. Hoffman, ORNL, W. L. Templeton, PNL, F. W. Whicker, Colorado State University, A..Bouville, NCI, H. L. Beck, EML, Lynn R. Anspaugh, LLNL, E. M. Romney, UCLA, K. Eckerman, ORNL, TBD, EG and G, H. T. Peterson, Jr., NRC, F. Congel, NRC.
Additional. U.S.
Participants:
E. Shomaker, NRC,'A. Reynolds, DOE, C., Eberhard, DOS.
Date/ Time of Meeting:
July 17 - July 21,.1989.
l Location of Meeting:
l' Moscow, USSR.
Objective:
Development of an ongeing program of research cooperation and ,
information exchange to verify models which can rapidly forecast '
radionuclides plume distribution, deposition and potential committed doses from severe reactor accidents.
10 PICS FOR im,00SSION 7.1 A. Models for Use at Very Early Times
- 1. Source term (P. Gudiksen)
- 2. Air concentration (M. Dickerson) !
- 3. Ground deposition (P Gudiksen)
- 4. External exposure from immerrion (K. Eckerman)
- 5. Ir.halation (K. Eckerman)
- 6. External exposure from gro9nd deposition (H. Beck)
- 7. Terrestrial food-chain transport (W. Whicker)
- 8. Aquatic food-chain transport (W. Templeton)
- 9. Dose conversion factnrs for ingestion (K. Eckerman)
- 10. Uncertainty (O. Hoffman) l
l 7.1 B. Acquisition of Data at Early Times i
- 1. Criteria for data to be collected (L. Anspaugh) j
- 2. Measurements of air concentration and spectral )
measurements of ground deposition from an aerial '
platform (EG and G) ,
- 3. Conversion of airborne spectral measurements of ground i deposition to external gamma exposure rate and j radionuclides deposition density (EG and G) j
- 4. Ground based field spectrometry and interpretation a (H. Beck) 7.1 C. Models for Use at Intermediate Times (Following Data Collection) j
- 1. External exposure and dose (L. Anspaugh)
~
- 2. Dose from ingestian of terrestrial foods (A. Bouville)
- 3. Dose from ingestion of aquatic foods (W. Templeton) 7.1 D. Models for Use at later Times (Following Le gthy Data Collection)
- 1. External exposure and dose
- a. Vertical movement of radionuclides in soil (E. Romney)
- b. Exposure and dose from distributed sources (H. Beck)
- c. Fate of radionuclides in uchan environments (L. Anspaugh)
- 2. Dose from ingestion
- a. Long term availability of radionuclides in soil ,
(E. Romney)
- b. Long term availability of radionuclides in the aquatic for d web (W. Templeton)
- c. Synthesis of empirical data (A. Bouville)
- 3. Dose from secondary aerosols (L. Anspaugh)
- 4. Uncertainty (O. Hoffman) 7.1 E. Methods of Model Validation
- 1. Atmospheric transport (M. Dickerson)
- 2. External dose (H. Beck)
- 3. Dose from ingestion
- a. Case studies (W. Whicker)
- b. (BIOMOVS) Biospheric Model Validation Study (O. Hoffman)
- c. Body burdens measured following Chernobyl (A. Bouville)
JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations i Topic 7.1: Environmental Transport Team Leader:
U. S.: Dr. Lynn Anspaugh, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory U. 5. S. R.: Oleg A. Pavlowski, Institute of Biophysics, MPH
7 l
1 7.1 A. Models for use at Early Times l At the moment of occurrence of a major accident, we expect that the available data will be quite sparse. There will be an i immediate need to forecast the direction of the cloud and the i possible doses that might result, meteorological data would likely be all that would be available. To deal with this situation, a standby "most likely" source term would have to be 1 developed Er the front end of a complex model. This model '
would ideally forecast air concentrations and ground depositions (both from dry and wet processes) and the dose from the significant pathways of external gamma exposure and ingestion of radionuclides with food. Also to be included would be the less important pathways of inhalation and external exposure from immersion. To be included in this discussion are the generic topics of dose factors (Sv/Bq inhaled or ingested), uncertainty, and radiaticn physics as it pertains to external exposure. The goal is to exchange information and to develop a bilateral position on how best to achieve this objective. A detailed discussion of the Soviet experience following the Chernobyl accident will greatly add to the evolution of this topic.
7.1 B. Acquisition of Data at Early Times Following an initial period of calculation and protective actions, it is necessary to acquire rapidly empirical data so that rnore accurate assessments may be made. At early times, this is best done with airborne platforms capable of collecting and measuring air concentrations and of measuring the spectral composition of the deposited material on the soil surface. From these data, the surface external exposure rate and the deposition density of individual radionuclides can be inferred.
Other, less expensive methods can be used to infer the same data at locations of lesser contamination and where more time is available to prepare for such measurements. The goal of this topic is to Exchange information on techniques of accomplishing this objective and to prepare a position statement on how such ,
measurements can best be made and interpreted. i 7.1 C. Models for Use at Intermediate Times (following Data Collection)
After the deposition densities n.d/or external exposure rates have been measured and the radionuclides composition of the source has been determined, attention can turn to the calculation of doses over longer time periods to populations
- hat have not been evacuated. This requires a more comprehensive knowledge of the local geography, demography and agriculture. The key issue is to project the one-year dose from external exposure and from the ingestion of terrestrial and aquatic food stuffs. The goal is to exchange information on this topic and to develop a joint statement on the preferred methods of accomplishing this goal. As a great deal of the dose commitment via ingestion will be accumulated during this o
one-year period, much of the discussion of the generic features of food chain transport should take place during consideration of this topic. Food chains (e.g., mushrooms, tea, fresh fish) found to be of special interest following the Chernobyl accident would be a valuable part of this discussion.
7.1 D. Models fo, use at Later Times A key issue in assessing accidents is the projection of dose far into the future. Important considerations are the long-term vertical migration of radionuclides in terrestrial and aquatic environments. The experience in studying fallout from weapons tests will be of great value here. The goal of this discussion is to exchange information and develop methods of making such forecasts.
7.1 E. Methods of Model Validat. ion The validation of all levels of models is a most important aspect. The goal of this topic is to provide a general discussion of techniques of model validation and of past efforts in model validation. The goal would include development of a general protocol for model validation. As this topic is very complicated, maximum advantage should be made of the efforts by others in BIOMOVS and the IAEA.
JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Name of Working Group:
Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations U.S. Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS:
James Taylor (Participating)
U.S. Working Group Leader:
Murray Schulman Designee for Leader of Item 7.2 Health Effects: )
H. Goldman, UC-Davis U.S. Working Group
Participants:
C. Lushbaugh, ORAU, R. Jensen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, W. J. Schull, Univ of Texas, S. Fry, ORAU, G. Beebe, NCI, E. Gilbert, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, R. Catlin, R. C.
, Associates, L. Anspaugh, LLNL, F. Congel, NRC, S. Yaniv, NRC Additional U.S.
Participants:
l E. Shomaker, NRC, A. Reynolds, DOE, C. Eberhard, DOS 1
Date/ Time of Meeting: July 24 - July 28, 1989 Location of Meetir.;- Kiev, USSR l
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Objective: .
Development'cf an ongoing program of research cooperation and information- exchange for documenting, ' analyzing and assessing the long-term. health consequences of radiation exposure from
-large scale nuclear reactor accidents.
. Topics for Discussion: .
A; Acute Effects of;High Doses
- 1. Lessons Learned Regarding Diagnosis, Treatment
. and Recovery of Heavily Irradiated People (C. Lushbaugh)
- 2. Dose Prevention, Reduction and Mitigation (R.Catlin)
- 8. Delayed Health Effects from Chernobyl Accident Exposures
- 1. Protocol Design and Infrastructure Requirements for Implementing an Epidemiological Analysis of Appropriate Soviet Cohorts.(G. Seebe)
- 2. -Internal / External Dose Assessment: Personnel Dosimetry (L. Anspaugh)
- 3. Application of Biological Dosimetry (R. Jensen).
- 4. Biological Consequences:- Statistical Methodology for Estimating Cancer. Risk (E. Gilbert)
- 5. Genetics and Prenatal Effects (W. J. Schull)
- 6. Registry Development, Data Base Management and Analysis (S. Fry)
C. Improving Health Risk Estimates From Individual or Population Exposure to High or Low Radiation Doses and Rates
- 1. Models and Data Needs (M. Goldman) - Stochastic
- 2. Models and Data Needs (S. Yaniv) - Non-Stochastic JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations Topic 7.2: HEALTH EFFECTS Team Leader:
Professor Marvin Goldman, University of California-Davis, California 7.2A Acute Effects of High Doses.
Improve understanding of and lessons learned from the diagnosis, treatment and recovery of heavily irradiated people.
US--C. Lushbaugh USSR--A.E. Baranov/A.K. Guskova/ Participants from All-Union Center of Rad. Med., Kiev
1 Dosimetry...For each person receiving high radiation doses, data are needed on the amount and quality of radiation exposure.
The internal dose estimate from deposited radionuclides in the body, as well as the external dose from local environmental exposures should be developed for each patient of concern. The time course of exposure (dose rate and duration) is also needed for these patients. Where the dose:; are estimated, the means used for estimation should be made available. Any estimate of error on these individual doses should also be available.
Clinical... Clinical signs and symptoms for acute radiation exposure diagnosis should be available for each exposed person.
Time of appearance of specific symptoms and degree of deviation from the normal values are needed. The population normal values used for each parameter / measurement are needed for the specific exposed populations. The method used to score and grade each patient with regard to estimated " radiation dose" on the basis of clinical / biological measurements is of particular importance and interest. The speed (i.e. the time necessary to wait), with which such " triage" determinations are made is of interest. The accuracy and correlation with physical dosimetry is also an area to be discussed.
Treatment... Modification of " radiation dose effect" ty combined injuries (whole body with radiation induced local injury, radiation plus trauma including thermal burns) and its implication for medical management of affected patients should '
be reviewed and discussed.
Recovery... Comparative recovery rates in patients with roughly similar " doses", but differing treatment protocols .
should be discussed and reviewed. Secondary and late i manifesting conditions in patients after the acute phase should be reviewed. Follow-up examination protocols and needs for specific measurements should be discussed. Psychological management of heavily irradiated patients and the follow-up of their status is of interest and should be discussed.
Dose Reduction Efficacy (US-R. Catlin: USSR-??)
Individual dose reduction through use of special procedures, such as KI to reduce radioiodine uptake, should be 1 reviewed. Side reactions, allergies or other negative effects j should be discussed. The amount used for specific population i classes, and the timing and duration of administration should be j discussed to better understand level of dose reduction that may j be optimal. The role of such therapy in risk reduction is of l great importance. j REAC/TS... Sharing of views and experiences regarding the I value and organization of a Radiation Emergency Assistance l Center and Training Site (REAC/TS) for improving follow-up ]
l medical care of radiation accident victims and training for j emergency response, l
)
{
i I
7.28 Delayed Health Effects from Chernobyl Accident Exposures.
- 1. Epidemiology...(US-G. Beebe, USSR-7?)
Develop a plan and an epidemiological protocol to study specific cohorts of irradiated populations. Included should be a separate study of the Pripyat population, the "in-close" population of some 24,000, estimated to have received about 0.4-0.5 Gy, the ca. 100,000 evacuees who may have received an average dose of about 0.05 Gy. In addition, it is of primary importance to determine the possible range and magnitude of doses received by all workers involved in the Chernobyl recovery aperation. These may number about 200,000 and the range of coses may be up to total:; of about 2 Gy in the first year. The infrastructure of the study protocol should be related to the ,
lessons learned in the Hiroshima / Nagasaki study. The criteria for choice of " control" cohoris should also be discussed. The type of measurements to be made on the living persons, the frequency and the possible relation to morbidity and mortality should be discussed.
- 2. C'ose Assessment...(US-L Anspaugh, USSR-0.
Pavlovski??)
Individual doses are available for many of the exposed .
persons. Local / area monitoring as well as personnel dosimeters used to estimate / determine personnel doses are of interest for discussion and review of the entire data base. External exposure and dose component should be separately determined from the internal absorbed, and committed doses. The absolute magnitude and ratio of internal to external dose are needed.
The thyrcid dose and whole body dose should be reviewed. The relation between early and future committed dose should be reviewed with the aim of developing an empirical predictive model for dose is of interest for further cooperation.
- 3. Biological Dosimetry. . . (US-R. Jensen, USSR-??) i The calibration of new and established methods of I biological dosimetry should be reviewed and updated. Modern means of flow cytometry and molecular and cellular biolony which record latent radiation exposure is of interest. Models for l
persistence of biological " radiation markers" and their ;
calibration are of interest. The calibration, determination of errors and artifacts should also be included. An intercomparison of existing methods should be undertaken. Cross calibration in appropriate animal models is desirable.
- 4. Biological Consequences: Statistical Methodology for Estimating Cancer Risk (US-E. Gilbert, USSR-L. IL'in??)
l Estimates of latent cancer risk is needed. Horbidity l and mortality in appropriate age and exposure categories and 1
cohorts is needed. Particular evidence for childhood diseases is of major interest. In addition, the unique exposures of thyroid need major attention regarding risk related to dose rate, sex-and age should be addressed in detail. !
- 5. Genetic and Prenatal Effects (US-W. Schull, USSR-??)
Estimates of abortion frequencies in the " exposed" population should be available. It is thought that there may have been many voluntary abortions perfcrmed from fear of radiation, rather than from overexposure. Are there data on this point and how complete is it? The study of children who were exposed during gestatien is a most impcrtant goal. Choice of a proper comparison cohort is needed. Psychological and mental testing should be correlated to possible deviations or alterations in physical : measurements, such as head circumference. Study protocols should be developed to determine !
if radiation iaduced genetic or cytogenetic lesions can be
. detected.
- 6. Analysis, Database Development and Management (US-S.
Fry, USSR-??)
Interactive registries and database development and security methods should be reviewed. Development of registries for subpopulations of interest for future studies also should be considered. Bilateral cooperation in setting up computer methodology for the data management should be discussed.
Information .is needed on existing systems available for tracking individuals over the long term and retrieving morbidity and/or ceuse of death data for large populations. A means to have access to data and still protect individual privacy, should be discussed and reviewed. Protocols should be developed for exch&nge/ sharing of data among project investigators.
7.2C Improving Health Risk Estimates i 1. Stochastic Models and Data Needs (US-M. Goldman, USSR-L. IL'in)
Organ specific risk models should be developed to provide a total-body " summed-site" model. The use of absolute or relative specific organ risk models in a population age adjusted model should be studied to assist in providing an individual probabilistic estimate of expectation risk. The models should address the influence of dose and dose rate on the calculation. The problem of non-uniform exposure of individuals should also be addressed. A series of measures of metrics of detriment, in addition to cancer death-rate increments should be developed. The relation to non-radiation stochastic risks should be addressed.
pr -
+ ,
~2.- Non-stochastic Models and Data'Needs (US-S. Yaniv,
. USSR-??).'
.. Injury tc, skin, kidney and lung from internal and/or extertial radiation.needs:to be -reviewed. Possible effects on organ function,. such as thyroid should be discussed. Role of therapy in injured organ. interactions.should be evaluated.
(-
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I
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- --.---_ _ ___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ __j
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4 E1__--_---------_----_---
APPENDIX V WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, JUNE 9, 1989 U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT C00RDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLE INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES (asofJUNE8,1989) i h
l e .
'f.'
' WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, JUNE 9, 1989 U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR !S INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES- I (as of JUNE 8, 1939) j ,
- 1. Charles Negin i Grove Engineering i
- 15215 Shady Grove. Road i Rockville, MD 20850. l 301/258-2727.
Areas of interest: life extension, abnormal waste dispocal, data management with waste. !
First contact: 3/15/89 !
L
- 2. . Byron _ Lee, Jr. , President i Nuclear Management and Resources Council- i 1776 Eye St.., N. W.. l Suite 30
. Washington, D. C. 20035-2496 202/872-1250 1 Areas.of interest: all !
First contact: 3/27/89 l
" 1
- 3. Harold B. Finger, President and i Chief Executive Officer !
U.-S. Council for Energy Awareness l Suite 400 i 1776 Eye St., N. W. !'
Washington, D. C. 20036-2495 202/293-0770 ,
Areas of interest: all 'l
.First contact: 3/29/89 i 1
- 4. Stanley J. Anderson, Vice President International'and Supplier Division (INPD) )
or j George-I.'Hutcherson, Manager I World Association of Nuclear Operators (WAND)
L Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPD) 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Suite 15
.s Atlanta, GA 30339 404/953-7602 Areas of' interest: operations First contact: 4/12/89 1
__.__._b_______.__ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .-.___m____m__.__._2___m_ __ . m__m _ . . - . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _
'e'
'p .
Industry Participants (continued) 5.- Milton Levenson
' Consultant to Bechtel-
'21 Politzer Drfve Menlo Park, CA 94025 415/322-1025 Areas of interest: uns First contact: 5/8/89.pecified
' 6. Howard Larson Senior Vice President
. Nuclear Energy, Services CT Danbury,5220 203/796-Areas of interest: decommissioning and in-service inspection first contact: 5/8/89
- 7. Laurence M. Strassner President Nuclear Support Servic,es, Inc.
Post Office Box 3120 Hershey, PA 17033 717/838-8125' Areas of interest: valves-and operations, diagnostics and testing First contact: 5/9/89 B. Robert Horne, Vice President International Operations Henze-Movats, Inc.
200 Chastain Center Boulevard Suite 250 Kennesaw, GA .. 30144 404/424-6343 Areas of interest: valves First contact: 5/9/89
- 9. Thomas S. Baer U. S. Ecology, Inc.
9200 Shelbyville Road Suite 526 Louisville, KY 40222 Area of interest: plant operations for waste prevention First contact: 5/10/89
- 10. Alexander Zucker, Associate Director Nuclear Systems and Engineering Martin Marietta Systems Oak Ridge National Laboratory Post Office Box 2008 Dak Rid 37831-6248 615/574ge,TN 9920 Area of interest: all First contact: 5/11/89 2
1
- Industry Participants (Continued)
L ". . 11. Gail de Planque, President c American Nuclear Society 555 North Kensin La Gran L 312/352ge6611 Park, IL 60525gton Avenue Area of interest: all plus' dosimetry First. contact: 5/11/89
$12. Lawrence E.'Newhart, President and CEO Operating Plant Services, Inc-1818 Market Street, 22nd Floor
>1 <
Philadelphia, PA 19103-215/299-2434 Area of Interest:
First contact: -5/16/89
- 13. Robert Harstern, Group Vice President Industrial Services
-and and
- 14. Scott Lebsack, Vice President Projects U. S. Testing Co.
1415 Hoboken, NJ 07030
-(800)777-8378X214.
Areas of interest: quality assurance, outage support and erosion / corrosion First contact: 5/12/89
- 15. Paul' North, Manager Nuclear Reactor Research and Technology EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Mail Stop 2057-208/529-9833 P. O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID. 83415
-Areas of. interest: all First contact:' 5/15/89.
-16.~ Mike Silvers, President Pullman Power Products Pittsburgh, PA-
'412/562-7507 Areas of interest: all First contact: 5/16/89
' 17. Song T. Huang, Senior Section Manager Ralph M. Parsons Co.
100 W. Walnut Street Pasadena, CA 91124 818/440-3342.
. Areas of interest: nuclear safety, architect / engineering, and waste management First contact: 5/16/89 3
L Industry Participants (Continued) '
i
~18.- Thomas W. ' Jenkins, Director Soviet Programs
- 22. John E. Cormier, Director Simulation Systems Vadim Zinger, Business Manager,' Eastern Euro)e Anthoriy J. Tvarkunas, Program Manager, WER 'roject Ashok Arora j
- Singer Link-Miles Simulation Corporation 8895 McGaw Road Columbia, MD 21045 301/290-5773' -
Area of interest: control room simulators Letter: 5/16/89 123. James H. Taylor, Manager Licensing Services !
Babcock and Wilcox P.O. Box 10935 Lynchbur VA 24506-0935 {
804/385-$817 Areas of interest: broad I First contact: 5/18/89
- 24. Herschel Specter New York State Power Authority 123 Main Street :
White Plains, NY 10601 l' 914/681-6994=
Areas of interest: emergency planning and preparedness First contact: 5/18/89 ,
- 25. Ian B. Wall i Soviet /EPRI Coordinator, Nuclear Power Division i Electric Power Research Institute t 3412 Hillview Avenue i Post Office Box 10412 !
Palo Alto, CA 94303 415/855-2954 Areas of interest:
~ severe accidents, fire protection, and embrittlement I and annealing i First contact: 5/18/89 !
- 26. Robert Mucica Rockwell International Rocket Dyne Division 6663 Canoga Ave. '
Mail Stop HA02 !'
Cano 91303 818/ga Park, CA 718-3355
.l Areas of interest: PRA and reliability assessment i First contact. 5/19/89 4
Industry Participants (Continued)
- 27. .Amos Holt, Vice' President or David Rosow, Director
' South West Research Institute San Antonio, TX 78284 512/522-2076 Areas of interest: nuclear safety and in-service inspection
.First contact: 5/19/89
- 28. Edward A. Warman', Senior Consulting Engineer Stone and Webs D r 245. Summer St.
Boston, MA 021C7
'517/589-6510 or 589-1499 Areas of interest: comparative analyses and severe accidents First contact: 5/22/C9
- 29. Don Leone, Assistant Manager Mechanical Department Sargent and 8. undy 55 East Monroe St.
Chicago, IL 60603 312/269-3886 Areas of interest: not specified First contact: 5/22/89
- 30. Richard Broots Enginee'r and Manager Newport News Industrial Corporation 700 Thimble Shoals Boulevard, Suite 113 Newport News. VA 23606 804/380-7271 Areas.of interest: embrittlement, service to nuclear industry and valve repair First cont.ct: 5/24/89
- 31. Robert Liner, Division Manager Science Application International Corporation 1710 Goodrich Drive McLean, VA 22102 703/821-4514 Area of. interest: reactor safety Note: someone else may come First contact: 5/30/89
- 32. David Rosow Southwest Research Institute 6220 Culebra Road P.O. Drawer 28510 San Antonio, TX 78284 512/522-2495
..- Area of interest: in-serv' ice inspection First contact: 5/30/89 i
5 L _ _ . _ - - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_--- - - --- - - - -
Industry Participants (Continued)
- 33. Edward Siegel and
- 34. Charles Brinkman Plant Structural Services Division Combustion Engineering 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville', MD 20852 301/881-7040 and 203/285-4188 Area of interest: erosion / corrosion and radiation embrittlement First contact: 5/30/89 35.- Alex .Zarechnak and
- 36. Douglas Chapin 1 MPR Associates
- 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 202/659-2320 Areas of interest: analyses of plants and operational experience First contact: 5/31/89
- 37. Steven Stamm Plant Services Division Stone and Webster P. O. Box 2325 Boston, MA 02107 615/365-1245 617/589-7499 Areas of interest: operational reporting, service water, and erosion / corrosion
.First contact: 5/31/89
- 38. James Gleason, Director Nuclear Engineering and and
- 39. Sherwin Hyten, Director Utility Services Wyle' Laboratories P.O. Box 077777 Huntsville, AL 35807-7777 205/837-4411 Areas of interest: aging (environmental analysis), comparative analysis, severe accidents First contact: 6/2/89
' 40. Jay James, Principal James Engineering 6329 Fairmont Avenue El Cerrito, Ca 94530 Areas of interest: safety and risk assessment First :ontact: 6/2/89 6 i
f i
b Industry Participants (Continued)
L
- 41. Norman Mulvenon, Export Manager
'EG&G-ORTEC 100 Midiand Road' Dak Ridge, TN 37831 615/483-2174 Areas of interest: .all,' instruments for detection First contact: 6/5/89
- 42. - Chris Hamilton, Manager Power Reactor Development General Atomics P. D. Box 85608 San Die 92138 619/455go,CA 3364 Area of interest: severe accidents-
- First contact
- .6/b/83
- 43. Noel Grimm, Principal Engineer Nuclear Advanced Technical Division Westinghouse Electric P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355 412/374-5179
- Area of interest: .. reactor vessel annealing First contact: 6/5/89
- 44. Michael A. Schoppman Ishington Nuclear Representative
/lorida Power and Light 3 Metro Center, Suite 610 I
Bethesda, MD 20814 301/652-2500 Area of interest. operating events assessment first contact: 6/7/89
' 45.
Darrell Eisenhut, Senior Vice President
, Consulting Services Group l NUS Corporation 910 Clopper Road Gaithersburg, MD 20877-0962 Areas of interest:
First contact: 6/7/89 Note: For additional information, contact:
Stephen Salomon, Technical Analyst International Programs Office of-Governmental and Public Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 301/492-0368 7
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Documents f rom April through December 1988 (Reprinted Texts)
j-Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear i
Reactor. Safety v
- Documents from April through December 1988 (ReprintedTexts)
- 1) Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
.(April 26, 1988) 2)- Protocol' on- Discussions by. the Delegations of the U.S. A.
and the U.S.S.R. on Problems of Safety of Nuclear Energy.
dnd of the Visit of the U.S.A. Delegation to Soviet.
Enterprises Associated with Nuclear Power (August 31, '
1988) 3)' Joint .U.S.-U.S.S.R. Press Release on Visit of U.S.
~ Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Delegation to U.S.S.R.
(August 31,1988) 4)
Protocol of: the First Meeting of the Joint US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (Augurt 31,1988) 5)
Memorandum of the First Meeting of'the Working Groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (December 9,1938)
Memorandum on DOE Seminar in Moscow (December 9, 1988) 6)
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r E MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION IN THE FIELD
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OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND.THE ,
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALISTLREPUBLICS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as the representative 1
for the USA, and the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (SCUAE), as the representative for the USSR, hereinafter referred to as the " Parties," desiring to establish close and long-term cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor (CNR) safety.:
Noting that' fruitful cooperation on civilian nuclear-reactor safety can enhance the safety of civilian power in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and i
In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Agreement between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed on June 21, 1973; as amended, [hereafter " Peaceful Uses Agreement"]; and in accordance with the objectives outlined in
. discussions on this subject between the two countries in August 1986, March 1987 and October 1987; Have agreed as follows;
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2 Article I 4
(he purpose of this Memorandum is to establish an arrangement for . -
cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety (CNRS) in furtherance of the Peaceful Uses Agreement in order to increase civilian nuclear reactor safety, and to improve the methods and practices of regulatory activity with regard to CNR's operated by the Parties of this memorandum.
Cooperation under this Memorandum shall be carried out as agreed on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and full reciprocity between the Parties.
l Article II The areas of cooperation under this memorandum will be as follows:
- 1. Policy and practices of regulatory activity regarding safety of civilian nuclear reactors (CNRs);
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.2. Problems of safety in design,. construction,' training, operation and management of CNRs;
' 3; Research directed at improving the safety of CNRs; and.
- 4. Questions on health effects and environmental protection requirements arising from the use of CNRs.
- - 5. For purposes of this Memorandum, CNRs can include nuclear reactor plants for civilian electric power generation, district heating, o
process. heating, and other associated technologies as may be agreed to by.
both Parties.
Article III
- 1. In order to implement this Memorandum, there shall be established a Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).
- 2. The JCCCNRS shall consist of an equal number (6) of
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representatives from each party. All decisions taken by the JCCCNRS shall be reached by agreement of the Parties.
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- 3. The JCCCNRS will coordinate and review all aspects of this Memorandum and shall take such action as is appropriate for its effective .
implementation.
- 4. The JCCCNRS will present its proposed' programs,.together with any recommendations for amendments if needed to add such programs to the Memorandum, for review and approval by the Joint Soviet-American Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses'of Atomic Energy, established under'the Peaceful Uses Agreement, in accordance with the laws and_ regulations of the Parties.
- 5. The JCCCNRS may organize, establish and arrange working groups, conferences and seminars of specialists for joint discussion and study of specific topics related to civilian nuclear reactor safety (CNRS) or its regulation and may also review and comment on the reports of such working groups, conferences and seminars. Specific projects and programt for nuclear safety cooperation, exchanges of scientific and technical safety information, personnel and equipment, and procedures for addressing and resolving questions of such matters as payment of costs under this cooperation, and patent / publications rights for joint activities administered under the hemorandum, may be developed separately by the .
l JCCCNRS, in accordance with laws and regulations of the Parties.
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- 6. The JCCCNRS may assist in arranging transactions between or s
among organizations within or outside this arrangement for services contracted on a commercial basis, in accordance with national laws and l
regulations of the Parties. l
- 7. Consistent with Article 1, such other forms of cooperation i
as the JCCCNRS recommends to its respectise Governments may be added by agreement of the Parties. f 4
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- 8. The JCCCNRS will decide on its membersh4p and ,eeting schedule, f Generally, it will be convened once a year, alternately in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless agreed otherwise. Times and places for meetings will be agreed upon in advance.
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Article IV i.
- 1. This cooperation may be conducted according to plans and s
programs of the following principal establishments ard organizations as agreed to by the Parties in writing pursuant to Article 3.5:
-- In the United States of America:
1 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Department of Energy; j l
national laboratories, academies, and institutes as appropriate, and other government departments and nuclear industry establishments and/or organizations as appropriate.
-- In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy:
I the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the State Committee for Supervision of Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry; and other ministries, organizations, institutes as appropriate.
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- 2. Each Party may unilaterally adjust the list of its establishments and organizations participating in this cooperation, and will inform the other Party of any such adjustments.
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i Article V i
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- 1. Cooperation under this Memorandum will be conducted in i
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accordance with the respective international obligations, nationa .aws and regulations of the parties, and within the limits of available funds, on the basis of the fullest possible reciprocity in terms of equal access to facilities, information and personnel on both sides.
- 2. Any questions of interpretation and it.glementation relating to this Memorandum that arise during the period it is in force will be decided by agreement of the Parties.
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' Article VI .
- 1. This Memorandum will enter into force upon' signature, will remain in force for five (5) years, and is subject to extension of additional five (5) year terms by written agreement of the Parties following joint review at the end of each five-year period.
- 2. 'All joint projects and experiments being conducted when the effective period of this Memorandum ends will, if agreed, .be continued to their conclusion on accordance with the terms of this Memorandum.
- 3. Either Party has the right to withdraw from this Memorandum of Cooperation on six (6) months' written notice.
DONE at Washington, D.C. on the twenty-sixth of April 1988, in the English and Russian li.nguages, both texts being equally authentic.
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FOR THE V.S. NU'.1. EAR FOR THE USSR STATE REGULATORY COMMb110N COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY original signed by original signed by .
l Lando W. Zech, Jr. A. N. Protsenko h
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REPRINT Protocol on Discussions by the Delegations-of the U.S. A. and the U.S.S.R. on Problems of Safety.
of Nuclear Energy and of the Visit of the U~ S.A. Delegation to Soviet Enterprises Associated with Nuclear Power August 19 - 31, 1988 In accordance with the decisions of the Seventh Session of the Joint U S. U.S.S.R. Committee on. Cooperation in Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy, and with.the signing in Washington on April 26, 1988, of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the field .of civilian nuclear reactor safety that was registered in the joint communique of President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on June 2, 1988, a U.S. delegation, headed by Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr. of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi.ssion, visited the U.S.S.R from August 19 through 31, 1988.
The visit provided the occasion for the first sersion of the Joint
' Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS),
which was created in accordance with the Memorandum of Cooperation.
In discussions held in Moscow August 22-24 :and August 31, f representatives of both countries discussed many aspects of nuclear power stations. The delegations are listed in an appendix.
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4 Programs for cooperation were revieved by the two sides in very
' pro'uctive d meetings and agreement was reached on specific future cooperative-efforts, which are described in a separate protocol between Mr. James Taylor, t'1e U.S. co-chairman of the JCCCNRS, and Dr. Nikolai -Ponomarev-Stepnoy, the U.S.S.R. co-chairman of the JCCCNRS.
These proposals will be reviewed for approval by both governments.
In addition, to participating in the Joint Committee discussions, Chairman Zech met with the leaders and other senior officials from the Soviet organizations working oc ensuring nuclear power safety, in particular Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the State Committee for Supervision
- of Nuclear Power Safety, and' Minister Nikolai Lukonin of the Ministry of Atomic Power. In addition, Chairman Zech and various U.S. delegation i
l members visited the following faci?ities and installations in the U.S.S.R. to observe Soviet approaches to nuclear safety:
- 1) The Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Enerov in Mescow.
Here the Soviets outlined the role and functions of the Institute and the U.S. visitors toured the materials test (MR) reactor, the experimental facility for study of High Temperature Gas Reactors and the first Soviet-reactor, now being used for neutron standards calibration.
. 2) The Novovoronezh Atomic Power Station:
- The U.S. delegation was briefed on the station's activities, including construction and operation over the years of prototypes of several VVER reactors, such as the VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors. The group toured the control rooms and turbine hall for units 3 and 4, VVER-440 reactors that came into operation in the early 1970's, and observed the refueling i activities underway on Unit 4. Unit 3 was in full power operation. They i
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3 also~ received a briefing on the work on the Training and Commissioning L- Center and toured'several training ind simulator facilities.
- 3) The Izhora Production Association at Koloino, ncar Leninarad:
Discussions were held at Izhorskiy Zavod on Soviet metallurgy and manufacturing techniques for nuclear plant-components. The U.S. visitors toured various testing and examination laboratories, the electro-slag furnace operations, press cnd rolling mill operations and reactor component fabrication facilities. Work in underway centered on the.VVER
- 1000 components and vessels. . The finished reactor vessel .for.the first Cuban nuclear power. plant has been completed but not yet shipped..
- 4) The Khlopin Radium Institute at Gatchina, near Leninarad:
Several U.S. delegation members viewed the hot cells and associated laser fuel cutting compartment at the Khlopin Institute. The Soviet side described. a new program of fuel kinetics analysis for simulation of core degradation.that' has been initiated recently and will include Chernobyl fuel specimens later this year. The U.S. side was invited to participate directly in the Institute's program as a part of joint activities and' will ' consider this proposal over the course of the next year..
- 5) Chernobyl Atomic Power Station:
Most of.the U.S. delegation members visited the Chernobyl Station (RBMK-type reactors) where they held discussions with plant personnel about such matters as the safety changes introduced since the 1986 accident and the status of radiation cleanup at the plant and neighboring areas. The delegation, the first foreign representatives to do so, toured the outer rooms of the sarcophagus built around destroyed Unit 4 and observed drilling to retrieve core samples. The damaged turbine hall
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4 for Unit 4, which had high radioactivity levels, was also visited very briefly. The delegation saw the control room for . Unit 4 and some members -
also saw the control room of Unit 1, which was operating at full power.
The delegation also toured the evacuated town of Pripyat, and was told there are no plans to resettle it at this time.
- 6) The All-Union lenter for Radiation Medicine in Kiev:
Separate from the Chernobyl visit, and in parallel with it, two members of the U.S. delegation visited the Center for discussion on health and environmental issues and research activities related to Chernobyl. The U.S. noted the encouraging work already begun in this field by regional organizations in Kiev and urged that the scope and coordination of this work be expanded so as to make available a more comprehensive data base on results of the accident.
- 7) The Rovno Nuclear Power Station:
for the first time, a delegation from the U.S. visited this plant including: (1) a tour of the control room and turbine hall of Unit 3, a VVER-1000 plant which began operation in 1986; (2) a visit to Unit 4, a l VVER-1000 plant now under construction; and (3) discussions about the two l VVER-440 reactors which began operation in 1980 and 1981. Discussions
' focused on various operational safety features of Unit 3, additional safety features planned for Unit 4 and the fact thct a fifth unit is now planned for the site.
In all meetings and visits, Chairman Zech and his Soviet colleagues, including those that met him at the nuclear power stations and other installations, emphasized the importance of a strong commitment to safety in all aspects of the design, construction, operation and management of
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ja .i nuclear power plants. The two-sides noted that while there are some !
e' . differences in designs and safety viewpoints between the countries, both l
are committed to safe operation of their civilian nuclear power plants.
The two sides agreed that safe operation of today's-reactors is a key L
factor in the-future worldwide use of nuclear power.
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Both countries look forward to continued enhancements of safety through greater understanding of each other's arp eaches and-to making further improvements in the safety of their respective plants.
Considering the scale of the programs being conducted in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in nuclear power, the planned cooperation will be important from the standpoint of improvement of nuclear safety of reactors of U.S. and-Soviet design.
original signed by:
Lando W. Zcch, Jr Alexander Protsenko .
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chairman of the U.S.S.R. -1 Commission State Committee on the
'for the U.S. Utilization of Atomic.
Energy for the U.S.S.R.
Moscow, August 31, 1988 Accendices
- 1. U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation
- 2. U.S.S.R. Nuclear. Safety Delegation ,
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Appendix 1 U.S. Nuclear Safety. Delegation to U.S.S.R. l August 1988 Lando .W. Zech..Jr., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Head of Delegation NRC Representatives Dennis K. Rathbun, Executive Assistant to Chairman Zech T. Patrick Gwynn, Technical Assistant to Chairman Zech Linda E. Portner, Special Assistant to Chairman Zech Harold Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA)
Senior Advisor to Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
James Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Co-Chcirman of the JCCCNRS James Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Themis Speis, Deputy. Director for Generic Issue Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Edward Jordan, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data James Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, US Executive Secretary of JCCCNRS Deoartment of Enerov Representatives Sol Rosen,- Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy Murray Schulman, Executive Assistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of Energy Research Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of International Research and Development Policy Marvin Goldman, University of California (under contract to DOE)
Department of State Representative
' Theodore Wilkinson, Director, Office of Nuclear Energy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
U.S. Embassv. Moscow Representative
! John Ward, Science Counselor Interpreters Joseph Lewin Igor Kozak
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Appendix 2 List of the Soviet Delegation
'- August 1988_ 1 USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Enerav
- 1. Protsenko A.N. -' Chairman (leader of delegation)
- 2. Semenov B.A. - First Deputy Chairman
- 3. Asmolov V.G. - Chief of Section, Kurchatov Institute
- 4. Bolshov L.A. - Chief of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute
- 5. Yermakov N. I. - Chief, Department of Nuclear Power
- 6. Kuvshinnikov B. A. - Deputy Director, International Scientific and Technical Cooperation Deptrtment
- 7. Nikitin Yu. M. - Director of Section, Scientific-Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering
'8. Ponomarev-Stepnoy N.N. - Academician, First Depbty Director of Kurchatov Institute, Co-Chairman of
. Joint Committee 4
- 9. Sukhoruchkin V.K. - Senior' Scientist of Kurchatov Institute, Secretary of Committee
- 10. Cherkashov Yu.M. - Deputy Director, Scientific-Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering-USSR Ministry of Atomic Enerav i
- 1. Abagyan A. A. - Director General, Scientific Production ~
Organization " Energy"
- 2. Ignatenko Yc.I. - Chief, Mr.in Scientific-Technical Department
'3. Latin Ye.P. - Deputy Director, Scientific Production Organization
" Energy" i
- 4. Tatarnikov V.P. - Chief Engineer, Scientific Research ,
Design-Construction and Research Institute i "ATOMENERG0PROEKT" USSR State Committee for Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power Plant Doerations
- 1. Sidorenko V.A. - First Deputy Director
- 2. Krushelnitsky V.N - Office Chief
- 3. Petrov V.A. - Chief, Scientific-Eng heering Center for Safety in Nuclear Power ,
USSR Ministry of Public Health
- 1. Buldakov L.A. - First Deputy Director of the Institute of Biophysics
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RELRINT Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Press Release on Visit of U.S. Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Delegations to U.S.S.R.
August 19-31, 1988 In accordance with the decisions of the Seventh Session of the Joint-U.S. - U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and with the signing in Washington on April 26,1988 of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety that was registered in the joint communique of President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on June 2,1988, Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr. of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission led a seventeen member U.S. delegation to the Soviet Union August 19 - 31 to discuss and reach agreement on specific proposals for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety. A list of the mcmbers of the U.S. delegation is attached.
Members of the U.S. delegation were received by leaders and senior officials of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Nuclear Power and the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety.
- Chairman Zech's visit started U.S. - Soviet bilateral cooperation under the Memorandum of Cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety, signed in Washington, D.C. on April 26 by Chairman 4
Alexander Protsenko of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of 4
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.i 2 i Atomic Energy and Chairman Zech. In particular, this memorandum established a Joint Coordinating Committ'ee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor .
Safety, with representatives from each country, to define areas of exchange' and develop cooperative proposals. Mr. James Taylor of the U.S.
NRC and Dr. Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi of the Kurchatov Institute are
, co-chairman of this Committee.
1 Meetings of the Joint Coordinating Committee were held in Moscow August 22 - 24 and on August 31, focusing on possible areas of cooperation in civilian nuclear reactor. safety:
-- safety approaches and regulatory practices in both countries.
-- exchange of completed analyses of the safety of nuclear power plants.in the U.S'. and Soviet Union.
-- radiation effects on reactor vessels and structures and annealing of.
reactor vessels.
-- fire protection. .
-- modifications and backfitting (changes to older plants).
. severe accidents.
-- health effects and environmental protection.
-- exchange of operational experience.
-- diagnostics, analysis equipment and systems for supporting nuclear plant operators.
-- erosion / corrosion of piping.
i Proposals for potential joint activities in these areas were .
reviewed by the.two sides during very productive meetings, and agreement was reached on specific future cooperative efforts, including meetings, seminars, comparative analyses, exchanges of information and visits to
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3 each other's civilian' nuclear power plants and related facilities.
'* Programs for work in the above areas will be reviewed for approval by both governments.
These discussions follow an exchange of visits in 1987 by senior safety officials from the two countries. In addition to participating in the Joint Committee discussions, Chairman Zech met with leaders and other senior. officials from the Soviet organizations working on ensuring nuclear power safety: in particular, Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, Chairman Alexander Protsenko of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy and Minister Nikolai Lukonin of the Ministry of Atomic Power. In addition, Chairman Zech and the U.S. delegation members toured the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, the Chernobyl, Novovoronezh and Rovno nuclear power plants, and the Izhora fabrication plant for heavy equipment for nuclear power plants located near Leningrad. As is his custom, Chairman Zech made a point of speaking with plant operators and inspection officials about the importance of nuclear safety.
In all his meetings Chairman Zech emphasized the importance of a strong commitment to. safety.in all aspects of the design, construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants. In these discussions, U.S. and Soviet officials noted that while there are some differences in designs and safety viewpoints between the countries, both are committed to safe operation of their civilian nuclear power plants. The two sides agreed that safe operation of today's reactors is a key factor to the future worldwide use of nuclear power.
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l Both countries look forward to continued enhancements of safety through greater understanding of each other's approache; and to making 9 further improvements in the safety of their respective plants. The cooperation planned between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., with their large ,
nuclear power programs, begins an important exchange with the objective of improving nuclear safety in reactors of U.S. and Soviet design.
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>t REPRINT Appendix 1 U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation to U.S.S.R.
- August 1988 Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Head of.
.,- Delegation NRC Representatives Dennis K.-Rathbun, Executive Assistant to Chairman Zech T. Patrick Gwynn, Technical'. Assistant to Chairman Zech Linda E. Portner, Special Assistant to Chairman Zech Harold Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA)
Senior. Advisor to Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear.
Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
James Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS James Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 'Re' gulation Themis Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issue Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Edward Jordan, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data James Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, US Executive Secretary nf JCCCNRS
. Department of Enerov Representatives l Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy Murray Schulman, Executive A;sistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of Energy Research Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of
-International Research and Development Policy Marvin Goldman, University of California (under contract to DOE)
Department of State Representative Theodore Wilkinson, Director, Office of Nuclear Energy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
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U.S. Embassy. Moscow Representative John Ward, Science Counselor Interpreters .
Joseph Lewin Igor Kozak I
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, i PROTOCOL OF'THE FIRST MEETING 0F THE JOINT US-USSR
. J0 INT. COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY The first meeting of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS), established in accordance with the Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of April 26, 1988, was held in Moscow, USSR on August 122 to 24.and 31, 1988.
The US delegation was headed.by Jcmes M. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The USSR delegation to the JCCCNRS was headed by N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov-Institute of Atomic Energy. A list of I
.the members of both delegations and advisors is appended hereto j (Appendices I and II).
l l'~ The JCCCNRS meeting in Moscow was opened and addressed by the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Lando W. Zech, Jr., by the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of. ;
Nuclear Power, B.A. Semenov, and the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power Operations, V.A. Sidorenko.
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PROPOSED AREAS FOR COOPERATION Ten possible areas for cooperation it, the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety were identified during the Meeting of the US-USSR Joint-Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Washi.ngton in April'1988. In order to prepare for the first meeting of the JCCCNRS, the Co-Chairmen exchanged preliminary materials on -the indicated topics. At this first' meeting of the JCCCNRS, both . sides provided information on the status of work and proposals of programs of joint work on each of these ten topics. It_ was agreed to formulate specific programs of work for 1989 in several of the areas considered as high priority and to agree on more general proposals for later work in 1990. These programs of work will be circulated for the review and approval of both governments and for review and approval by the Joint American-Soviet. Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic.
Energy at its next meeting in Moscow in the spring of 1989.
In accordance'with the Memorandum of Cooperation (M0C) in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between;the US and USSR, signed in Washington, D.C. on April- 26, 1988, tha JCCCNRS will adhe:a to paragraph 3.5 with regard to forms of cooperation at a government level and to paragraphs 3.6 and 4 of that M0C with regard to participation by commercial organizations and other parties in pursuit of the purposes of the M00.
The JCCCNRS considers that its Co-Chairmen must be kept advised of all activities performed under this M0C, and both parties agree that exchanged materials will be provided via the Co-Chairmen of the respective l
countries.
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- 1. Safety Acoroaches and Reoulatory Practices The US led the discussion with an overview of US Nuclear Regulatory J Commission (USNRC) activities to establish, implement, and enforce the US civilian reactor safety program. The activities described included, among others, the quality assurance program,' general design criteria.for nuclear-facilities, the process for review and issuance of licenses for nuclear-facilities, and programs for inspection and enforcement of the safety.
regulations.- 1 1
The USSR turned the discussion towards future cooperative efforts. A program of work for 1989 was proposed consisting of:
1.1 Measures on improving regulatory activity based on results of operational experience of nuclear power plants and based on inspections.
Group meetings once each year, to be held in each country alternately.
First meeting in US April - May 1989. Subsequent meeting in USSR in 1990. Date to be agreed upon later.
1.2 Developing an understanding of the methods used to ensure adherence l
to design and operational requirements and specifications through an exchange of inspect vs at one or more sites in operation for an agreed upon period in 1989. Details to be worked out by both parties and be agreed upon at April - May 1989 group meeting in US. Appropriate inspection procedures and information to be exchanged beforehand.
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' 2. Analysis of the Safety-of Nuclear Power Plants 'in the USSR and the US;.
The USSli' presented its proposals in this area. Their presentation was followed by the USNRC's description of the methodology and analyses it -
curren'.ly uses'for safety assessments in the US. The USDOE then reviewed the analyses it has performed to date on the safety characteristics of the l VVERs. The discussion.then turned to future cooperation. It was agreed that this topic was high priority to both sides and a proposed program of-wois for 1989 was worked out for review and approval. This program will consist of:
2.1 Exchange of completed analyses of tM level of safety of design of power units at Zaporozhe Nuclear Power Plant and the Scuth Texas Nuclear Power Plant. Following study of these analyses, questions and comment <.,
.would be exchanged. Working grnup to meet to explain selected safety important differences. The co-leader.s (US and USSR) of the working group would develop and recommend further safety assessment work to the JCCCNRS for approval.
Group meeting - twice each year; the first meeting to be in April - May-1989 in US.
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2.1.1 A seminar on the results of the US DOE's analysis of features of Soviet designed VVER's will be held in the USSR during November 1988 )
J 2.2 Topics and directions for safety research. Seminars once each year. -
The first seminar in November 1988 in USSR concurrently with 2.1.1 l seminar.
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2.. In late 1989, conduct a joint meeting of operations and sarety experts to explore and discuss our countries' uses of Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques in the enhancement of operational safety. This will be correlated with Topic 1.1.
P Meeting of work groups 2.1, 2.3, and 8.2 will te held in USSR late in ;
1989. Time and place will be determined later.
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- 3. Radiation Embrittlement of the Housina and Suncort Structures and l Annealina of the Housinas The USSR led with a description of the scope of its research on radiation -
embrittlement of the housings at VVER's, and thermal annealing to repair the damage from embrittlement. The US followed with a presentation on US irradiation effects program underway relative to materials, compositions, microstructure, specimen types, reactor environments, etc., and reaciatory programs for the control of embrittlement. A program of work was proposed for 1989 consisting of:
3.1) Mechanisms and modeling of radiation embrittlement - an exchange of information on the effects of chemical composition, fluence and irradiation temperature on embrittlement. Findings from fine-scale metallography are most important. Emphasis should be on lic,nt water reactor (LWR) materials and operating conditions. Seminar with exchange of information beforehand. Seminar in US April - May 1989.
3.2) Annealing of LWR vessels - an exchange of information on:
(1) research results on optimum temperature for recovery of embritticment and reduction of embrittlement rate (2) engineering studies of annealing procedures, measurement of results and practical problems, and (3) results on thermal annealing of large pressure vessels, including the effect of annealing on the reembrittlement rate. Methods, procedures, and design details for the equipment and methods used to anneal large pressure vessels. Seminar with exchange of information beforehand. Seminar in US April - May 1989.
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3.3) A prospective program plan for 1990 was also proposed to include:
1 a) Application of radiation embrittlement and system studies to the ]
regulation of reactor pressure vessel integrity. An exchange of information on pressurized thermal shock (PTS) scenarios, experimental and theoretical studies of thermohydraulics and linear-elastic and elastic-plastic fracture mechanics analyses of embrittled vessels, and research results done to verify the procedures used.
b) Examine proposal for more extensive cooperation on topic three.
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A. Fire Safety The US began the discussion with a review of the design basis developed for fire protection and prevention features used in US plants. The US ,
presentations also addressed the methods for safe shutdown of a plant during a single fire, fire risk studies and fire research tests. The USSR reviewed its programs and identified proposed areas for further cooperation in improving fire prevention systems and organizational and control methods for fire safety. Areas of cooperation include:
4.1
.1 Exchange of information on the effects of hydrogen concentration levels on the propagation of flames, maximur expected pressure following an explosion, a .d the rate of hydrogen release in containment following a severe core damage accident.
.2 Exchange of information on the combustion processes of hydr ogen-containing vapor-gas m xtures in large volumes (e.g.
containments)
.3 Exchange of information on capabilities of electrical cable to withstand fire, and desien of cable penetration through bulkheads.
.4 Exchange of information on methods for ficy. ting largi fires under high radiation conditions for extenued periods of time.
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.5 Exchange of information 01 fire suppression systems, ventilation I
f systems to protect the cont.ol room environment from external fire. l l
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. L6. Exchange of information on. fire-protection coating for structural:
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.1 Regulatory criteria and standards,. and their bases, for: the required ,
level of. fire protection at nuclear power plants. This topic would' ,
- includc fire-related Probabilist'ic Risk Assessment-based analyses for s US plant.
.2 Establish discussions and exchange on mat'nematical modeling of fire propagation and combustion product release in a typical- nuclear power plant.
Working group'tc meet and discuss topics 4.1.1 through 4.1.6 in April - May in'US with information exchange beforehand.
-Working group to meet and discuss topic 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 in late 1989 in the. USSR, with information exchange.beforehand.
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- 5. ' Modersj2ation/Backfittina The US led the discussion with a view towards obtaining a mutual understanding.of the general. approaches and processes used in evaluating what additional safety-improvements should be made to existing nuclear a power p'lants.. _The' USSR responded outlining their efforts in this area <.
Both sides agreed to the following cooperation:
a) A jchit seminar for information exchange will be held in late 1989 to discuss:
- 1) Identification of the design bases against which improvements are compared.
- 2) The criteria used to determine the need for modernization /backfitting.
- 3) Methods used to tinprovt equipment reliability.
Information exchange beforehand b) If deemed necessary, a followup meeting will be held in 1990.
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- 6. Severe Accidents 1 I.
The US led the discussion with an overview of the USNRC activities in
- several areas of severe accident research including severe accident precursors, phenomena, challenges to various containments, USNRC policy on severe accidents and accident management. The USSR presentation focussed on proposed areas of cooperation noting, among others, the usefulness of exchanges of information in the area of hydrogen safety and control and the interaction of molten fuel with concrete, formation and propagation of aerosols, and numerical models of processes during development of severe ac;idents. Both sides agreed that these areas covered the important issues associated with severe accidents.
Meetinas in 1989 6.1 a) Core damage, release and transport of fission products from the fuel, primary system and containment.
b) Formation and propagation of iodine.
c) Filtration and venting during severe accident Group meeting April - May, 1989; US; Information exchange beforehand 6.2 a) Dominant accident initiators and phenomena associated with severe accidents, b) Core-concrete interaction.
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October, 1989; USSR, Leningrad. Information exchange beforehand.
, Group meeting and participation in international conference " Fiftieth Anniversary of'the Discovery.of Fission;" USSR, Leningrad; October 1989; special' session on safety problems. .
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5 6.3 International seminar on hydrogen safety; February 1989; USSR _
Bakuriani; US participants will be invited. Group meeting and .
participation in-this seminar.
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- 7. Health ' effects and environmental 'orotection considerations.
The USSR led the discussion of the aspects of cooperation which they
> believed were-the most promising for protection of health and the environment. .The US followed with a discussion of its. rules, standards
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and practices pertaining to radiation protection, environmental monitoring and emergency preparedness.
It was agreed that there are five subtopics of importance to the health and environmental issues. It was further agreed that four of these should be addressed through the formation of four.' working groups. The'five subtopics are:
1 - Environmental Transport 2 - Health Effects 3 - Radiation Biology Research 4 - Ecological Effects 5 - Criteria for Radiation Protection and for Nuclear Facility Siting For 1989 it is proposed that the Environmental Transport and Health Effects working groups begin.their activities and that in 1990 the Radiation Biology Research and Ecological Effects working groups begin their task. The fifth subtopic will be deferred at this time and will be addressed later. The 1989 meeting will be tentatively planned for mid-year in Kiev, USSR.
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> l1)- Environmental: Transport Plan'and begin a cooperative environmental transport and monitoring information xchange. This will include selected parts of data. base on the radiation situation in the environment in the USSR and other countries after the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and the validation of USSR and US'models on the atmospheric and terrestral radionuclides transport. An important' goal is to . verify models which can rapidly forecast radionuclides plume distribution, deposition and potential committed doses.
- 2) Health Effects Cooperate in the design of a detailed protocol to conduct studies of possible late radiation effects on populations exposed. US assistance will be provided for computerizing data base management and analysis.
Studies should be planned to include a long tern followup and will include incidence of cancers, congenital defects, and genetic effects. Also
' included is a rt. view of earlier accomplished studies on the
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radiobiological effects on populations of Chernobyl experience for diagnosis, treatment, and management of heavily irradiated persons.
- 3) Radiation Biology Research A joint study and information exchange is proposed to develop and validate specific means of measuring radiation damage and doses to cells. Included are relevant studies on molecular mechanisms of effects and their relation to both acute and late health effects in exposed populat' ors.
- 4. Ecological Effects s The consequences of large releases of radioactive materials and chemicals from nuclear power plant accidents should be studied in animals and l 14 4
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cplants. 'The. data.from Chernobyl should be used to develop and validate models of ecological impact and recovery.
~ 5. 'The concept of developing criteria for radiation protection and for L
nuclear facility siting will be discussed by both sides at the next meeting of the Joint Committee; included in .this topic will be planning for a joint seminar on radiation safety and severe accidents.
Furthermore, consideration will be given to the design and operation of automated radiation .early warning systems, and to tho time of a Soviet specialist's visit to one or two US nuclear facilities with available above mentioned systems.
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- 8. Exchanae'of Operational Exoerience
-The USSR led the discussion with its proposals for joint seminars and' exchanges of information to develop criteria for evaluation of safe .
operations, information systems to handle operational experience data from-plants, methods for understanding events and applying this knowledge to identify precursors of dangerous accidents. They also addressed the work of power plant personnel and their interaction with automatic control systems.
The USNRC discussed US government and industry programs to collect, assess and feedback operational experience to US reactor facilities. They described the improvements in operational performance which the US industry has made in the last four years and discussed specific examples of experience feedback in which foreign experience had been beneficial.
A joint program of work was proposed consisting of:
8.1 Conducting a seminar in April or May 1989 in the US to:
Develop an understanding of national data banks structure, search capability and methods of representing information derived from the data banks. The . scope of data banks reviewed include component and system level, operational events, and incidents. During the seminar considerations for feedback of relevant operating information and planning for initiating a bilateral exchange of operational experience between US .
and USSR would be discussed.
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8.2 Conducting a seminar in the Fall of 1989 in USSR to review and .
3 develop criteria for evaluation of-safety of operation, including methods, scope of equipment ~and safety systems.
Propose future cooperation for.1990 for the next Joint Committee meeting.
-Areas discussed-included:
1 a) Methodology.to determine events that may be precursors of severe
- accidents. i b) Criteria for evaluation of safety of operation includir.g' methods, I
scope of equipment, and safety systems. )
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- 10. Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Pipino and Components The US led with a review of the technical bases underiying the causes of and means for prevention of erosion / corrosion in single and two-phase piping systems in nuclear power plants, prediction methodologies and inspection or surveillance programs for erosion / corrosion detection.
The USSR delegation provided a review of their studies in this area and the basic directions of joint studies concerning research on and protection from corrosion and erosion destruction of piping and equipment of nuclear power plants, including basic and applied research on carbon and stainless steel, zirconium alloys, on water chemistry processes, corrosion and mechanical properties and an exchange of operational experience.
The working plan for 1989-1991 shall be reviewed by the working group during the seminar on Topic 2 in November 1988 in the USSR. The workshop shall be conducted in the US in April - May 1989.
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- 9. Diagnostics. Analysis Eauipment and Systems for Synoortina Operators i
The USSR led with a discussion of their existing _ work on diagnostic and-analysis equipment and other expert systems' to support operators and other i
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p lant personnel. They proposed that future cooperative work be considered concerning, among other things, methods and means for. controlling and diagnosing the status of the core and basic engineering equipment in reactors, joint development of analysis equipment for emergency situations, and training systems for nuclear power plant operators.
.The US fol. lowed with a presentation on various operator support systems and techniques in use in the US including a safety parameter display system, safety system bypass status monitor, vibration monitoring and diagnostic techniques.
A program of work for 1989-1990 was jointly proposed consisting of:
a) Conducting a workshop late in 1989 in USSR on the analysis of systems of technical diagnostics and development of algorithms for vibration, acoustic emission, and other signals.
. b) Conducting a second workshop in 1990 in US on the use and development i of simulators and operator support systems, personnel training, and professional physiological selection of personnel.
Further planning in this area would be conducted at the next Committee I
meeting.
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. Areas of future cooperation include:
l a) Exchange of information on prediction methods for determining piping degradation through erosion and/or corrosion, including primary causes, mathematical modeling, experimental verification and prevention.
b) Exchange of information on methods for predicting the location of erosion / corrosion degradation and its rate in piping systems and criteria for controlling continued degradation.
c) Exchange of information in developing new corrosion resistant steel for nuclear power plant piping and equipment.
I d) Basic research on the mechanism of nodule corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of zirconium alloys e) Developing future water chemistry processes and automated programs for calculating corrosion, erosion products output and radiolysis, taking into account physical and structural properties of reactors.
f) Further studies of the mechanisc and kinetics of electro-chemical and structural processes at the apex of maximum permissible defects which determine the corrosion and mechanical properties of the material, g) Developing automated systems of control of the corrosion condition of nuclear power plant equipment (corrosion monitoring).
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' Procedures for Establishing Workina Grouns and Exchance of Information t' Prior to Meetinas and Seminars Each Co-Chairman will establish' working procedures for all working groups established by this protocol. These procedures will address working group .
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. composition, its responsibilities and its development of agenda. a l
i As established in this protocol, information exchanges conducted in.
advance of meetings and seminars, should be completed as early as possible and in any event no later than sixty days preceeding such meetings.or seminars. q DATE OF THE SECOND MEETING 0F THE JCCCNRS The JCCCNRS agreed that the second meeting would be held in the fall of 1989 in the U.S. The exact date and place will be determined by correspondence. The parties will exchange materials on cooperation planning for year 1990 and subsequent years as well as suggestions for the agenda of the second JCCCNRS in advance.
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Done in Mdscow, USSR on August 31, 1988 in duplicate in the Russian and
- English languages, both exts being equally authentic.
Original signed by:
For the US For the USSR James M. Taylor Nicolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS 22 f
Appendix'l Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
August,'1988 Moscow, U.S.S.R U.S. Representatives:
Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
JCCCNRS Co-Chairman
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James Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for'0perations, NRC, and US Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS i
Committee Members James Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Themis Speis, Deputy Director'for Generic Issue Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Edward Jordan, Director,' Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC I Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear' Energy, Department of Energy (DOE)
Murray Schulman, Executive Assistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of. Energy Research, DOE JCCCNRS Advisors Harold Denton,- Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA), NRC (Senior Advisor to JCCCNRS)
James Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, NRC (U.S. Executive Secretary of JCCCNRS)
Marvin Goldman, Professor of Radiology, University of California e
(under contract to DOE)
Theodore Wilkinson, Director, Office of Nuclear Energy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
' Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of International Research and Development Policy, DOE i
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! 2 Dennis K. Rathbun, Executive Assistant to Chairman Zech, NRC Thomas P. Gwynn, senior Technical Assistant to Chairman Zech, NRC Linda E. Portner, Special Assistant for Administration to Chairman Zech, NRC John K. Ward, Science Counselor, U.S. Embany, Moscow i,
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- REPRINT p .
Appendix 2 Joint Coordinating Committee p* for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety
.. (JCCCNRS)
. August, 1988 o' Moscow, U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R. Representatives B. A. Semenov, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of. Nuclear Power i V.A. Sidorenko, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committte for Safety. Supervision of Nuclear Power Operations JCCCNRS Co-Chairmen N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Academician, First Deputy Director of the
. Institute for Nuclear Energy in I.V. Kurchatov Committee Members j A.T.' Gutsalov, Chief, GNTU GAEN (his) Deputy for this meeting -
V.N. Krushelnitsky, Chief of the GAEN Administration A.A. Abagyan, Director. General of NPO "Energiya" (his) Deputy for this
. meeting .Ye. P. Larin,. Deputy Director General {
V.G. Asmolov, Chief of Section, Institute for Nuclear Energy in I.V. !
Kurchatov N.I. Yermakov, Chief, Glavatomenergo, GKAE Ye. I. Ignatenko, Chief, GNTU MAE of the USSR
. Committee o Counselors ;
L. A. Il'in, Academician, Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (his)
Deputy for this meeting - L.A. Buldokow, Deputy Director of IBF l B.A. Kuvshinnikov, Deputy Chief of UMNTS GKAE of the USSR V.K. Sukhoruchkin, Senior Scientist, Institute of Nuclear Energy in I.V. l Kurchatov
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REPRINT M-1 MEMORANDUM 0F THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUPS OF THE US-USSR JOINT C0ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY DECEMBER 5-9, 1988 The first~ meeting of the working groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating ' Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
. was held;in Moscow, USSR, on December 5 to 9,1988, in accordance with'the Protocol of the First Meeting of the JCCCNRS of August 31, 1988 (hereafter called the Protocol).
.The US side of the working groups was headed by Denwood Ross, Deputy Director,- Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Sol Rosen, Director, International i
Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy, led the Department of Energy seminar. DOE representatives participated only in item 2.1.1 of the Protocol. The USSR side of the working groups were headed by N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First A
Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.
list of the members of the working groups is appended hereto, i
(Appendices I and II).
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The working groups met at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and discussed three of the ten areas of civilian nuclear reactor safety cooperation as described in the Protocol. They are:
- 1. ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE USSR AND THE US (Protocol item 2) 1.1. Exchange of completed analysis of the level of design of power units at Zaporozhie Nuclear Power Plant and the South Texas Nuclear Power Plant (Protocol item 2.1).
Whereas the exchanged South Texas Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report consists of 20 volumes, the exchanged ,
" Technical justification report on construction and operation safety of Rovno Nuclear Power Plant Unit-4 with VVER-1000 reactor" is an 800 page summary document, provided as an equivalent to the Zaporozhie NPP. The USSR side will provide at agreed time detailed appendices to the " Technical justification repcrt," including the information on the differences between Rovno and Zaporozhie Nuclear Power Plants, or Rovno NPP could be suggested for the joint analysis.
1.2. A seminar was conducted on the results of the US DOE's analysis of features of Soviet designed VVER's (Protocol item 2.1.1) (see separate Memorandum).
_ a 1.3. Topics and directions for safety research. (Protocol item 2.2).
l The US side provided'a copy of NRC report NUREG-1319 which is a summary description of NRC research. The Soviet side presented a The US paper on its research programme and give it to the US side.
side had provided'in advance of the meeting several detailed research plans on a number of NRC projects. The US side considered
- it highly useful if the USSR side provided the US-side with documents of. a similar nature. In this way, gaps could be identified and a more systematic approach could be taken.
Both sides were able to develop a number of research proposals.
Topics on pressure vessel integrity, probabalistic risk assessment methods, and severe accident code verification have features related to the Protocol. Topics that are not mentioned in the Protocol are thermal-hydraulic research, cost sharing program on Chernobyl, plant aging, and safety concepts for the next generation of nuclear power plants.
Details follow:
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1 3.1'.P!? ESSURE VESSEL INTEGRITY l
Both the-US and USSR sides provided presentations on !
activities related to pressure vessel integrity. Many of the details of the future' program are to be developed in accordance with item 3'of the Protocol. Both sides agreed that the areas listad below are of special interest in the areas of pressure l vessel integrity.
The USSR side provided some methodology on the calculation
.of reactor pressure vessel rupture probability, and the US side also presentea some results. Both side. mutually agreed that the exchange of the details of these methods and calculations is important. ,
The ft,llowing is what US ,,'RC could offer:
.The NRC has experimental data (8 year effort that is half completed) that evaluates- The effects of materi,al chemistry (Ni, Cu, P); radiation flux eticcts in . test reactor; temperature (500 F - 600 F); effects of radiation, annealing and reirradiation and; mechanisms of embrittlement.
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' In addition, the NRC has test results of Gundremmengen and l ' Shippingport reactor vessel materials test (Charpy-V) of archive material and vessel material. Also, there is a comparison to Test f Reactor irradiation with operating power reactor irradiations on L these materials.
A possible cooperative effort is to join the recently organized International study group on radiation damage mechanisms which is organized by NRC.
The following is what NRC would like:
- 1) Details of USSR reactor vessel annealing experience and research efforts.
- 2) The NRC understands that the NV-1 reactor vessel will be cut up. NRC would like to-get toughness valces (Charpy-V) as a function of vessel thickness. NRC could offer to perform fracture mechanics test (compact tensile specimens).
- 3) NRC would 1ike to get data showing effect of various flux (including low flux) levels as they ffect the shift in NDT for materials similar to USA materials. hdr. would also like to get data that shows the effect of temperature (down to room temperature if possible) on the shift in NDT. l
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- 4) Data on the embrittlement effects of various concentrations of phosphorus. .
- 5) Any information on mechanisms of radiation damage.
The Soviet side will consider the NRC proposals ana present its proposals to the US side.
L J.3.2 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) METHODS l l
A meeting in late 1989 in the USSR on the uses of PRA is envit,ioned in item 2.3 of the Protocol. The two sides mutually agreed that this meeting sh;uld cover both the results and also i
methodologies from each country. In particular, the USSR noted a :
desire to expand and improve its methods for containment response (Level 2 assessment).
1.3.3 SEVERE ACCIDENT CODE VERIFICATION Both the NRC and the USSR side presented information on severe accident scenarios and on the interaction of molten core debris with concrete. The NRC suggested, and the USSR agreed. that it would be useful for the USSR to analyze one of the NRC experiments .
known as SURC-4. The NRC would provide in*;tial conditions and geometry, and the USSR side would provide a prediction of the j
results with their code known as f i
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) RASPLAV. Afterwards, the NRC would provide the measured datt for comparison with the Soviet predictions. This proposal is consistent with item 6.2 (b) of the Protocol.
1.3.4 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC RESEARCH The NRC presented details on its thermal-hydraulic research program. The USSR side noted that they needed additional analytic capability for small breaks and transients, and thought that the NRC code.RELAP-5.might be useful. The USSR side suggested that in return for the code, the USSR could provide results from their intoljral far.ility at Electrogorsk of 1:3000 scale and later on 1:500 f.cale. To optimize the usefulness of this experiment-the NRC
-would like early involvement in the test matrix. The Soviet side will consider this possibility. The NRC stated that ' is exchange
-was not specifically provided for in the Protocol-, and that transmission of this code, as for any computer code, would have to conform to the export requirements of the US. Because of these
' factors no firm commitment could be made at this time by the US.
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I 1.3.5 COST SHARING PROGRAM ON CHERN0BYL j
The US5R informed the NRC of the preparation of a cost-sharing program for exploration of the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Both sides agreed that such a program is important, although not specified in the Protocol. The USSR will provide details of this propesal in future.
1.3.6 PLANT AGING The NRC presented research related to aging effects on nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components. The USSR side considers it useful to use probabilistic approach for the assessment of the lifetime of the core structural elements, plant equipment, and buildings (fuel elements, graphite, piping, metal structures, etc.) under the cond' tion of incomplete knowledge and high uncertainty. Such an approach is also considered by the NRC.
Although not specifically part of the Protocol, it was agreed that this research topic was important to both and should be the subject of cooperation in the future, in accordance with direction of the JCCCNRS.
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' 1,3.7 SAFETY CONCEPTS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF NPP The USSR . side presented a paper on Nuclear Power Plants of new~.-
generation. Both sides agreed that it is important to establish a working group to develop. safety concepts for.the new generation of fluclear Power Plants. At present, the Protocol does not provide
' for such a working group, and this topic is recommended for consideration at the next meeting of the JCCCNRS.
1.3.8 EROSION-CORROSION Although the USSR is conducting cesearch on this topic, the NRC believes that further confirmatory safety research is not necessary. However, both sides recognize that the Electric Power Research Institute (EPP.I) is conducting additional erosion / corrosion research primarily for economic reasons but it has safety implications.
- 2. FIRE SAFETY (Protocol item 4)
A The discussion of this working group covered exchange of information on the following:
~9 Capabilities of electrical cable to withstand fire, and design cf cable penetrations through bulkheads (Protocol item 4.1.3).
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Methods for fighting large fires under high radiation conditions 1for extended periods of time (Protocol item 4.1.4). -
Fire. suppression systems, ventilation systems to protect the control room environment from external fire (Protocol item L 4.1.5)
Fire protection coating for structural steel (Protocol item 4.1.6).
Use of probabilistic techniques in fire risk assessment at nuclear' power plants-(Not in the Protocol).
Hydrogen accumulation as it related to fire safety at nuclear
. power plants (Part of Protocol item 4.1.1).
Both sides agreed that the following topics would be discussed in the April /May 1989 working sessions:
2.1 Research related to,. and methods for determining, causes
- and effects of fires involving electrical equipment.
2.2 Research related to the modeling of temperatures within fires and within compartments.
2.3 Risks associated with computers utilized in nuclear power plants.
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A. Computer Equipment as a fire hazard. )
l B. The effect of fire and fire suppressants on computer equipment and the control of safety systems.
2.4 The categorization of components within power plants as regard the risks from fires and explosions. This will include a compre-hensive discussion on US and Soviet regulatory effort in fire protection including recent fire experiences. Sub-topic wiil include:
A. Protection of structural steel B. Fire Barrier penetration seals C. Fire suppression systems D. Protective Enclosures for electric cable
- 2.5 Modeling of hydrogen burn within containment.
2.6 Visit to a representative American nuc' ear power plant.
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l 3. EROSION / CORROSION DESTRUCTION OF PIPING AND COMPONENTS I (Protocol item 10)
The first session of working group was held on December 7, 1988.
Participants in the session were niembers of the working group and specialists from the USA and USSR. l Reports on topics in the field of erosion-corrosion were presented and discussed at the session.
The working group adopted a draft plan for cooperation in the period of 1989 through 1991-Topics for discussion at the first workshop to be held in April, 1989 were agreed upon and are sho'vn in Appendix 3.
This plan provides for holding annual seminars and exchanges of information and of specialists. The working group submits this plant to the JCCCNRS for approval (Appendix 4). .
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Realiiing the importance of items III and IV of the Plan, that provide for the exchange of specialists and mutual visits, the working group considers it essential to obtain additional agreement on these points from governmental organizations, private firms, and 1'
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The working group noted that the USSR has presented a list of the participants in this cooperation and that the USA will provide a similar list in the first quarter of 1989.
- 4. ALL UNION SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE FOR NPP'S l In addition, Dr. Ross and various US working group members visited the All-Union Scientific Institute for Nuclear Power Plants in Moscow. The role of this institute was outlined and the US visitors discussed severe accident modeling and several erosion-corrosion topics, including experimental facilities and results.
- 5. ' CONCLUSION Heads of both sides believe that cnchange of information and seminars were worthwhile and very informative. They look forward to continued progress at the April /May 1989 meeting to be held in the United States.
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Done in Moscow, USSR, on December 9,1988, in duplicate with Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Original signed by:
For the US For the USSR Denwood Ross Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy Acting Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS
{
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i REPRINT APPENDIX I .
1 PARTICIPANTS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF WORKING GROUPS FOR JOINT C0ORDINATING COMMITTEE CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY (JCCCNRS)
DECEMBER 5-9, 1988 MOSC0W, USSR 1
I U.S. Representatives Acting JCCCNRS Co-Chairman DENWOOD ROSS Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC ,
-l Members:
JAMES RICHARDSON Assistant Director for Engineering Division of Engineering and System Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatory Research,- NRC ALFRED TABOADA Materials Engineering Branch Office of Nuclear Regulatory Re' search, NRC M. WAYNE H0DGES Chief, Reactor Systems Branch Division of Engineering and System Technology -)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC l
.. DENNIS KUBICKI Fire Protection Engineer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC d:EPHEN SALOMON Technical Analyst International Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs, NRC JOSEPH LEWIN Contract Interpreter for NRC L
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REPRINT
-APPENDIX 2 PARTICIPANTS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF WORKING GROUPS FOR JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY (JCCCNRS)
DECEMBER 5-9, 1988 l MOSC0W, USSR U.S.S.R. Representatives JCCCNRS Co-Chairman-N. N. PONOMAREV-STEPN0Y FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE Members:
A. Y. GAGARINSKYI DEPUTY DIRECTOR I. V..KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE E. P. RYAZANTSEV DEPUTY DIRECTOR I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE V. G. ASM0LOV DEPARTMENT HEAD I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE
.V. K. SUKH0RUCHKIN LABORATORY HEAD I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC' ENERGY INSTITUTE
. A. A. TUTNOV LABORATORY HEAD I. V. KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE A. D. AMAEV LABORATORY HEAD
- 1. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE L. M. LUZANOVA LABORATORY HEAD I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE
o-r o
R. V.-ARUTYUNYAN SENIOR RESEARCHER I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE G. L. LUNIN DEPARTMENT HEAD
- 1. V. KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE ..
I. S. SLESAREV DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECT 0P I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE ,
l A. V. KHRUS1ALEV SENIOR RESEARCHER-t I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE
.A. Y.-KRAMER0V LABORATORY HEAD
- 1. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE B. A. KUVSHINNIKOV DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL COOPERATION
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STATE COMMITTEE FOR UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY-l
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- 8. 1. NIGMATULIN DEPARTMENT HEAD ALL-UNION RESEARCH I
INSTITUTE OF NPP L. P. KABANOV PROFESSOR MOSCOW ENERGETIC INSTITUTE i
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.I. A. STEPANOV DEPARTMENT HEAD i
RESEARCH & DESIGN ,
4 INSTITUTE OF POWER TECHNOLOGY ENGINEER OF NUCLEt.R SAFETY DIVISION,
- 0. A. PR0SHINA I. V. KURCHAT0V ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE J
l A. N. GAVRISHIt' RESEARCH ASSOCIATE NUCLEAR SAFETY DIVISION ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE
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V., N. BELOUS HEAD OF LABORATORY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF POWER ENGINEERING
. L. N. KARAHANYAN HEAD OF GROUP
-RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF POWER ENGINEERING i
M. G. SALTAN0V SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATE ALL-UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS L. V. SERGEEVA SENIOR SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATE INSTITUTE OF ATOMIC ENERGY A. F. CHABAK HEAD OF LABORATORY INSTITUTE OF ATOMIC ENERGY E. V. KUZNETS0V HEAD OF DIVISION CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF HEAVY ENGINEERING
- 0. L. GREENEVICH ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF POWER ENGINEERING
. G. A. SALTAN0V DEPUTY DIRECTOR ALL-UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING A. P. SHEVCHUK LABORATORY HEAD ALL-UNION RESEARCH
- INSTITUTE r0R FIRE PROTECTION
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9 G. I. SMELKOV DIVISION HEAD ALL-UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR FIRE PROTECTION l
Y.'N. SHEBEKO DIVISION HEAD ,
ALL-UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR FIRE PROTECTION I. F. POEDINTZEV DIVISION HEAD ALL-UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR FIRE PROTECTION 1
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l REPRINT l APPENDIX 3 i
l Proposed Topics for US/ USSR Workshop on Erosion-Corrosion to be held April /May 1989
'i . Power Plant Experiences and Engineering Considerations l l
1 a) Codes, standards and general practices for design, materials, water chemistry and inspection applied to the construction of piping systems for nuclear power plants. !
b) History of pipe wall thinning in nuclear power plant piping including experiences of pipe thinning in both liquid phase and liquid vapor phase lines.
c) Verification and prevention of erosion-corrosion in nuclear power plants.
d) Remedial action to address pipe wall thinning issue including control of degradation, repairs and replacements, criteria for structural evaluation of deterf orated pipe.
l~ e) Regulatory effcrts to address pipe wall thinning.
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- 2. Research and Development Activities a) Review of major variables that control erosion-corrosion.
b) Phenomenological aspects of erosion-corrosion.
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Prediction models for erosion-corrosion in piping c) systems.
I d) Feedwater system design and operating characteristics that relate to potential erosion-corresion wear.
e) Water chemistry practices in nuclear power plants and relationship.
f) Inspection Procedures for locating, characterizing and verifying existence of erosion-corrosion in piping of j nuclear power plants.
. g) Methods of preventing erosion-corrosion.
h) Analytical methods for establishing the acceptable level of wall thinning in piping of nuclear power pl ant s . 4 1
i) Flow Considerations in erosion-corrosion of pipe.
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l REPRINT APPENDIX 4 Plan for Cooperation for. the Period of 1989-1991 I. Joint workshops
- 1) April /May 1989 in the USA. Corrosion of piping.
- 2) May 1990 in the USSR. Control of water chemistry, Corrosion Monitoring.
- 3) May 1991 in the USA. Corrosion Resistant materials. ,
II. Exchange of information on the following topics:
- 1) methods for predicting steam generator degradation, j
- 2) development of new, alternate materials for power plant l
piping and steam generator tubing, and I
- 3) mechanisms of cortosion at the crack tip of material {
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defects.
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III. Exchange of information and specialists on the following topics: .
- 1) methods for determining piping degradation, due to stress corrosion cracking,
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- 2) corrosion-erosion and corrosion cracking of zirconium alloys,
- 3) water chemistry control, and
- 4) development of the on-line methods and systems for monitoring stress corrosion cracking.
IV. Acquaintance with the level of researches and monf toring methods in the leading organizations in the USA and the USSR (mutual visitations of research laboratories by groups of 10 American/ Soviet specialists).
. V. Revies of the results of the cooperation and discussion of the areas for further joint activities (final report of the Working Group to the Coordifiating Committee on Civillen Nuclear Reactor Safety, Ncvember of 1991).
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l REPRINT 1
MEMORANDUM ON DOE SEMINAR IN MOSC0W The Department of Energy presented the results of its i
analysis of the safety related features of VVEn reactors at a meeting held in Moscow, December 6-9, 1988.
The Soviet side took note of the results. Both sides agreed that the meeting was useful and mutually beneficial in order to arrive at a better understanding of the safety approaches used in both countries. A list of participants is attached.
1 Original signed by:
For the USSR For the US SOL ROSEN GLEB LUNIN i
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LIST OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ANALYSIS TEAM SQL ROSEN DOE
. EDWARD E. PURVIS DOE WILLIAM C. HORAK BNL JOHN WEEKS BNL LESTER 0AKS ORNL BRUCE SPENCER ANL DAVID MA ANL ;
ANL l RONALD KULAK I
JAMES SENICKI ANL )
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i LIST OF THE PARTICIPANTS FROM THE USSR
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I. V. KURCHAT0V INSTITUTE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY
- 1. S. A. ASTAKH0V
- 2. A. S. DUKH0VENSKY
- 3. V. A. V0ZNESENSKY
- 4. M. A. MALCHEVSKY
- 5. Y. I. SAVCHUK
- 6. A. V. ZHURBENK0
- 7. K. B. KOSOUROV !
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- 8. A. A. KHRUSTALEV EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN BUREAU "HYDROPRESS"
- 1. .. G. FED 0 ROV
- 2. d. 1. BIRYUK0V
- 3. N. S. FIL
- 4. A. K. PODSHIBYAKIN
- 5. V. P. SPASKOV l
ATOMENERG0 PROJECT
- 1. I. S. MIN 0 '
- 2. G. A. NOVIK0V
- 3. M. L. KLONITSKY
- 4. G. S. TARANOV GOSATOMENERGONADZOR (STATE NUCLEAR POWER INSPECTION)
- l. A. T. GUTSALOV
- 2. A. M. BUKRINSKY
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'4 U.S.-U.S.S.R.
JOINT COORDINATING COMMrITEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFE'IY WORKING GROUP MEETING AGENDA JUNE 5-9,1989
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All Working Groups i
I Monday, June 5,1989 1
9:00-12:00 Topic: Open'.ng and Oveniews 9:00-10:30 Opening Plenary Session -
Welcoming United States' remarks and introduction of American and Soviet co-chairmen.
(NRC Commission Meeting Room, One White Flint North Building, Roc!:ville) 10:30-11:00 Coffee break and transit to breakout rooms where workmg groups will conver.e.
11:00-12:00 Individual Working Group Overviews - Brief presentations by both Soviet and U.S. group leaders, or their designees, to provide introductory information and describc the content of the rueetings to follow.
(Pavilion Hotel. Rockville) 12:00-1:30 Lunch Note: Because of the need for sequential interpretation, the agenda items indicated are the total time for presentation, interpretation, and questions. The estimated time allotments should be, approximately, presentation-40 percent, interpretation-40 percent, and questions-20 percent.
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Working Group 1.0 Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practice Jone 5-9,1989 U.S. Working Group Leaders: Charles E. Rossi, Director, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Frederick J. Hebdon, Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC U.S. Working Goup
Participants:
' NRC: Total: 8*
C. Rossi F. Hebdon S. Rubin C. Haughney P. Baranowsky J.Shapaker
- M. Shymlock Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
C. Michelson Soviet Working Group Leader: A. Outsa!ov, Head, Main Scientific and Technical Department, U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets) Total: TBD Day, Date, and Time of Meetings: Monday, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5110 Tuesday, June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wednesday, J une 7, 9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Thursday, J une 8,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Friday, June 9,1:30-3:30 Location of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined i
Oorking Group 13 Omprwing F.cgulatory Activity)only.
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Monday, June 5,1989 lj i
Working Group 1.1 l 1:30-5:00 Topie: Operating Events Assessment i
Comprehensive discussion of the regulations goveming the reporting of operating events at nuclear facilities and the role of the regulatory organization in analyzing reported matters 1
1:30-2:30 Program for the short-term evaluation of significant events and problems !
at nuclear facilities. Emphasis will be on the NRC headquarters staff evaluation of information reported by licensees and additional information i obtained from the regions. How this information is subsequently put to use ,
will also be discussed - P.Baranowsky, NRC l 2:30-3:15 Region and on-site follow of significant events and problems at nuclear facilities. Emphasis will be on inspection effort performed for the short term evaluation of operating events - M.Shymlock, NRC
~ 3:15-3:30 Deverage Break 3:30-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion of requirements imposed on nuclear facility operations personnel to report the occurrence of significant events and problems, and the role of the authorities in investigating and evaluating such occurrences S
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Tuesday, June 6,1989 Working Grcup 1.1 -
, 9:00-10:30 Topic: Operating Events Assessment (continued) ,
9:00-9:45 Program for the evaluation of reports of defects and noncompliance.
Emphasis will be on the review of utility / vendor reports of system and component problems made under 10 CFR Part 21 - C.Rossi, NRC 9:45-10:30 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion of the handling of problems at nuclear facilities that are not necessarily uncovered in conjunction with an operational event 10:30-10:45 Coffee Break 10:45-2:45 . Topic: Communication of Safety Concerns to the Industry Comnrchensive discussion of regulatory practices to alert all nuclear facihties of safety concernt, stemming from an operating event or problem at individual facilities 10:45-12:00 Program for feedback of information obtained from significant events and
_ problems to the nucicar industry to preclude the occurrence of similar problems at the same or other plants."Ihe genesis and preparation of Information Notices and Bv!'etins will be discussed - C.Rossi, NRC 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-2:45 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion of Soviet practices in informing nuclear facilities of the possible generic (safety) implications of an event or problem at another facility 2:45-5:00 Topic: Reactor Inspection Program Discussion of program to ascertain, through direct observation and verification of facility operations, (1) whether the facility is being operated safely, (2) whether the management control program is effective and (3) whether tegulatory requirements are being satisfied s
2:45-3:45 Structure and philosophy of the Reactor Inspection Program, with a regional' perspective on program implementation - F.Hebdon, M.Shymlock, NRC 3:45-4:00 Beverage Break 4:00-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation .
Discussion of Soviet reactor inspection program to ensure operational safety 4
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h I. : # Wednesday, June 7,1989 Working Group 1.1 1
9:00-12:00 Topic: Reactor laspection Prograra (continued)
]
9:00-10:15 Use and purpose of special inspections:
- Diagnostic Inspections
- Safety System FunctionalInspections
- Operational Safety Team Inspections
- Emergency Operating Procedures Inspectf.ons -
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- Maintenance inspections I, - S. Rubin, C.Haughney, NRC 10:15-10:30 Coffee Break j 10:30-12:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation. - Discussion of fortz ' zed inspection effort at !
mactor facilities that is prompted by special urcumstances; i.e., is not part of the fundamental (or routine) inspection prograin or is not related to routine follow-up on operati ::al events 12:00-1:30 Lunch I:30-S:00 Topic: Assessment of Facility Management Performance - Discussion of process used to collect and evaluate insights, data and other information on a plant / site basis, in a structured manner, in order to assess and orderstanG the reasons for facility management performance 1:30-3:00 Program for the Systematic Assessment oi Licensee Performance (SALP).
The purpose and use of the SALP prograra will be discussed, and a regional perspective of program implementation will be presented. In -
addition, the application of SALP results and the semi-annual Senior Management Meeting to discuss operating plant performance will be discussed - C.Rossi, M.Shymlock, NRC 3:00-3:15 Beverage Break 3:15-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion of Soviet process for the collection and assessment of information pertaining to the management of reactor facilities "4
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$ Thursday, June 8,1989 Working Group 1.1 -
9:00-2:30 Topic: Summary of Accomplishments and Discussion of Future
- Work Activities Summarize accomplishments of the Working Group sessions, identify and discuss any proposals for future activities, or tentative agreements, that have come out of the session discussions.
9:00-10:30 U.S. Views on Working Group Accomplishments - C.Rossi, NRC 10:30-10:45 Coffee Break 10:45-12:00 U.S.S.R. Views on Working Group Accomplishments 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-2:30 Prepare a draft agenda, as appropriate, for a subsequent Working Group meeting (with!n framework of Working Group charter); dis:uss focus and scope of future activities 2:30-5:00 Topic: Preparation of Final Meeting Notes for Signing - Joint effort in preparing meeting minutes for Working Group 1.1 4 .
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I Working Group 1.2
, Inspector Exchange Program Jane 5,1989 U.S. Working Group Leader: Frederick J. Hebdon, Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff, NRR U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Tatal: 3 F. Hebdon L Whitney B.12mbe Soviu Working Group Leader: A. Outsalov, Head, Main Scientific and Technical Department, U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total: TBD Day, Date, and Time of Meetina: Monday, June 5,1989,11:00-12:00 14 cation of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined i
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Monday, June 5,1989' Working Group 1.2 .
I: 11:00-12:00. Topic: Implementation of Inspector Exchange Agreement,1.2 ,
11:00-11:20 - Discussion between U.S. and U.S.S.R. representatives to resolve any remaining issues / problems 11:20-11:40 Meeting to introduce the inspectors and the Working Group Co-leader from the U.S.S.R., includirig a discussion of the elements of the agreement 11:40-12:00 Ceremony for representatives from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to sign the final agreement,if desired I
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J Working Group 2 4 - Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants'in the U.S.S.R.and the U.S.
June 5-9,1989 U.S. Working Group Leader: Ashok C.Thadani, Assistant Director for Systems, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total:TBD A. Thadani W. Hodges T. Collins J. Kudrick '
D.Tondi M. Rubin Contractors:
To be determined U.S. Department of Energy:
E. Punis Soviet Working Group Leader: G. Lunin, Division Head, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total:TBD Day, Date,' and Time of Meetings: Monday, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday, June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wedaesday, June 7,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5 40 Thursday, June 8,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5.00 Friday, June 9,1:?0-3:30 location of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined 9
l Monday, June 5,1989 3l Working Group 2.1 -
1:30-3:00 Topic: Safely Philosophy for Nuclear Plant Design and Operation I A general discussion of the safety philosophy governing design and I operation of commercial nuclear plants 1:30-2:15 Major design philosophy issues, defense in depth, design margin, design basis, single failure, General Design Criteria - A.Thadani, NRC 2:15-3:00, U.S.S.R. Presentation - Reciprocal Infonnation 3:00-5:00 Topic: General Arrangement of Reference Plants l
3:00-4:00 U.S. presentation on South Texas Plant, site location, general arrangement, buildings and structures - South Texas Project Manager, NRC 4:00-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation on Rovno - Reciprocal Information l l
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Tuesday, June 6,1989 4- Working Group 2.1 o ,
9:00-11:30 Topic: Reactor Design 9:00-10:15 South Texas Reactor design - M.W.Hodges, NRC 10:15-10:45 Coffee Ercak 10:45-11:30 Rovno Reactor design - U.S.S.R.
11:30-2:15 Topic: Transient and Accident Assessments Discussions on scope and safety limits of transient and accident design basis for reference plants 11:30 12:00 Description of FSAR Chapter 15 transient / accident assessments for South Texas, scope of design basis events, safety limits, conservatism in analyses -
T. Collins, NRC 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-2:15 Accident and Transient assessments performed as part of Rovno design process - U.S.S.R.
2:15-5:00 Topic: Safety System Functional Design and Capabilities The swpe and functional design of important plant systems will be presented. System design criteria will be highlighted in such are.as as design margin, single failure, defense in depth 2:15-3:00 South Texas containment design and capabilities - J.Kudrick, NRC 3:00-4:15 ' Rovno containment design and capabilities - U.S.S.R.
4:1f-5:00 South Texas Steam Generator Design .J.Kudrick, NRC i
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Wednesday, June 7,1989 Working Group 2.1 9:00-5:00 Topic: Safety System Functional Design and Capabilities (continued) 9:00-9:30 Rovno Steam Ocnerator Design - U.S.S.R.
9:30-10:15 South Texas ECCS functional design and capabilities, critical support systems - M. Rubin, NRC 10:15-10:45 Coffee Break 10:45-11:30 Rovno ECCS design and critical support systems - U.S S R.
11:30-12:00 South Texas Reactor Protection System - D.Tondi, NRC 12:00-1:30 ' Lunch 1:30-2:30 Rovno RPS design - U.S.S.R.
2:30-3:15 South Texas Electric Power System Design AC/DC normal and emergency
- D.Tondi, NRC 3:15-4:00 Rovno Electric Power System Design - U.S.S.R.
4:00-4:30 South Texas Emergency Feedwater System functional capability and design basis - J.Kudrick, NRC 4:30-5:00 Rovno Emergency Feedwater System Design - U.S.S.R.
12
Thursday, June 8,1989 '
Working Group 2.1 9:00-2:00 Topic: Definition of Data Base and Analysis Methods Discussions will focus on any additional needed data base and information on analysis methods to be used for cooperative activities on reference plants between U.S. and U.S.S.R.
9:00-10:00 Identification of Data Base Needs for Rovno - U.S. presenter to be determined 10:00-10:30 Coffee Hrcak 10:30-11:00 Identification of Data Base Needs for South Texas - U.S.S.R.
11:00-12:00 Identification of requested analyses for Rovno - U.S. presenter to be determined 12:00-1:30- Lunch 1:30-2:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation on Analyses 2:00-5:00 Topic: Discussion of future exchange activities and summary of meeting accomplishments Discussion and identification of future exchange activities. Summary of accomplishments for June meeting. Development of draft Agenda for next working group meeting planned for Moscow, December 1989.-
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Working Group 3 Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structure and -
Annealing of the Housing June 5-9,1989 l U.S Working Group Leader: Guy A. Arlotto, Director, Division of l Engineering. Office of Nuclear Regulatory '
Research, NRC ;
U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total: 20 ,
G. A. Arlotto !
C. Z. Serpan, Jr.
A. Taboada P. N. Randall M. Mayfield R. Woods 4 participants from NRR Oak Ridge National Laboratory / Contractor:
R. D. Cheverton R. Nanstad F.Kam Consultants / Contractors:
J. R. Hawthorne, Materials Engineering Associates !
G. R. Odette. University of i
California at Santa Barbara U.S. Department of Energy:
2 participants '!
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
3 participants Soviet Working Group Leader: A. Ameav, Laboratory Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total:TBD i
Day, Date. and Time of Meetings: Monday, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday., June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 j l Wednesday, June 7,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 i Thursday, June 8,9:00-12:00; 1:30-f:00 {
Friday, June 9,1:30-3:30 !
12xation of Meeting: Pavilion llotel, Room to be determined l
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. r Wnday, June 5,1989.
Working Group 3.1 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-5:00 - Topic: Embrittlement trends and variables: chemical composition, microstructure, fluence, temperature, product form, dose rate (Protocol item 3d)
A comprehensive description of the influence and effect of the noted variables on amount and rate of embrittlement. This section should set forth the basic ideas cf what causes irradiation embritt!cment increases and - :
what the trends look like.
2:40-3:25 Embrittlement Trends and Variables - J.R. Hawthorne, MEA
' 3:25-3:50 - Dose-Rate Embrittlement of Support Structures - R.D.Cheverton, ORNL
- 3:50-4:00 lieverage break 4:00-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Radiation Embrittlement of the Material of the Reactor Housing for the VVER-440 by Results of Tc:ted Exposed Samp!cs - A.D.Amaev, A.M.Krukov, and M.A.Sokolov, Kurchatov Atornie Energy Institute p
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Tuesday, June 6,1989 i Working Group 3.1 -
9:00-10:45 Topic: Embrittlement in thick sections and application to l structures (Protocol item 3.1) 9:00-9:45 - Embrittlement in Hick Section and Application to Structures -
R.Nanstad, ORNL 9:45-10:00 Coffee Break 9:45-10:45 U.S.S.R. Presentation The Influence of Flux Density of Fast Neutmns on the Radiation Embrittlement of Material.c of the Reactor Housing for the VVER-440 -
A.D.Amaev, V.I.Vihrov, A.M.Kurkov, and M.A.Sokolov, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute 10:45-5:00 Topic: Embrittlement and radiation damage mechanisms (Protocol Item 3.1)
A summary discussion of the mechanisms believed to be controlling radiation embrittlement. Particular emphasis on elements like Cu, Ni and P and how they cause embrittlement, and microstructural features such as disloct:tions, grain size, type (bainite, martensite). Include any others, such as temperature, fluence, spectrum.
10:45-12:00 Damage Mechamsm - R.Odette, U.C. Santa Barbara 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-3:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation 3:00-3:15 Beverage Break 3:15-4:15 Dosimetry and Spectrum - F.B.Kam, ORNL 4:15-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation 16
Wednesday, June 7,1989 Working Groops 3.1 and 3.2 9:00-12:00 Topic: Vessel surveillance programs, and embrittlement regulations (Protocol Item 3.1)
A description of the content of surveillance programs, how capsules are placed in reactors, and the type of material property and dosimetry results they provide. Any special features or problems. A description of the rules and regulations or guides for measurement and control of embrittlement.
This includes a discussion of limits on vessel beltline embrittlement based on probability of events.
9:00-10:15 Surveillance and Vessel Proimbility of Failure - P.N.Randall, R. Woods, NRC 10:15-11:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation 11:00-11:05 Coffee Break ~
11:05-11:20 Future Plans - U.S., U.S.S.R.
11:20-11:40 U.S. Summary and Comments 11:40-12:00 U.S.S.R. Summary and Comments
-12:00-1:30 Iamch Working Group 3.2 - Annealing of the Housing 1:30-2:00 U.S. Overview - C.Z.Serptn, Jr., NRC 2:00-2:30 U.S.S.R. Overview
. Annealing Restoration of Mechanical Properti:s of Irradiated Materials of the 440 Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel- A.D.Amayev, A.M.Krukov, E.P.Ryazantse., and M.A.Sokolov, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute;
- and V.I.Badanin, V.A.lgnatov, and V.A.Nikolaev, Central Scientific-Research Institute for Construction Materials, Leningrad 2:00-5:00 Topic: Annealing, recovery and post annealing reembrittlement trends (Protocol item 3.2)
'Ihese include effect of variables including time, temperature, frequency of reannealing, fluence, and composition effects. A comprehensive discussion of the effect of different variables on the amount of recovery of embrittle-ment and of reembrittlement is anticipated. How is recovery and .
rcembrittlement measured? l
\
2:00-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation 2:30-2:45 Beverage Break
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Thursday, June 8,1989
~
Working Group 3.2 9:00-11:00. Topic: Annealing, Recovery and Reembrittlement ( Protocol item ,
3.2 continued) - J.R. Hawthorne, MEA 11:00-2:30 Topic: Application and System Considerations, and Annealing Experience (Protocol item 3.2 continued.)
Discussion of studies conducted to predict stress and strain in the vessel, flange, attachments, etc., and how the heating would be applied. What special problems could occur? Description of actual experience in c(mduction annealings. How accomplished, system effect, determination of effect of anneal (i.e., measurements)?
11:00-12:00 Annealing Applications and Experience - A.Taboada, NRC 12.00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-2:30 U.S.S.R. Presentation 2:30-5:00 Topic: Future Plans - U.S., U.S.S.R. (Protocol Item 3.3) 2:3G-3:30 Discussion of Future Objectives 3:30-4:15 U.S. Summary and Comm nts 4:15-5:00 U.S.S.R. Summary and Comments i
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Working Group 4 j
- Fire Safety )
i June 5-7 and 9,1989 U.S. Working Group Leader: Dr. Brian W. Sheron, Director, Division of Systems Research, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total: 6 B. V;. Sheron j 2. Worthington F. A. Costanzi C. E. McCracken
! D. J. Kubicki Sandia National Laboratory / Contractor:
S. Nolan Soviet Working Group Leader: A. Koroitchenko, Deputy Director All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total: TBD Day Date, and Time of Meetings: Monday, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday, June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wednesday, Jime 7,9:00-12:00; 1:30-4:00 Friday, June 9,1:30-3:30 Location of Meetings: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined t
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l Monday, June 5,1989 Working Group 4 -
1:30-3:30 Topic: U.S. Presentation: U.S. fire safety design for individual plant areas and for specific fire hazards (
Reference:
M-1, item 2-4, in part.)- D.Kubicki, NRC A description will be provided of the guidance provided to the industry for evaluating specific fire ha7ards and determining fire protection require-ments in individual areas throughout the plant. Inc!bded in the evaluation of fire hazards are such items of interest as concentration of combustibles (cable insulation and hydraulic fluids), and ignition source (heated ,
surfaces). Such items as protection of structural steel, protection of f openings in fire rated barriers (penetration seals around electrical cable /
conduits, apen stairs and hatchways, fire doors), protection provided for
- safe shutdown components and systems (automatic fire detection and suppression, spatial suffocation, fire rated protec9tive enclosures and shutdown cables, and provision of independent alternative shutdown capability) are included in the determination of fire protection to be provided for a given area.
3:30-5:00 Topic: U.S.S.IL Presentation: Soviet fire safety criteria and design practices for protection of safe shutdown components Expected is a discussion of the design criteria the Soviets require to evaluate fire hazards and determine what level and type of fire protection is to be provided for limiting of damage and assuring safe shutdown in the event of fire.
Fire Safety and Practical Design of Nuclear Power Plants - A.K.Mikeyev, Fire Department, Ministry of Interior l
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l Tuesday, June 6,1989 Working Group 4 9:00-10:30 Topic: U.S. Presentation: Results of research into modeling of temperatures within fire and with compartments (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2.2) - S.Nolan, SNL A description of the use of fire mmlels to predict temperatures and transport of other products of combustion within areas of a plant is being attempted to assist in evaluating the vulnerability of specific safe shutdown components and the type of protective features to be provided.
10:30-12:00 Topic: U.S.S.R. Presentation: Fire protection fer."Balarke of Plant" areas (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2-4, in part)
Most fire protection for " Balance of Plant" in U.S. reactors is mandated by requirements of ir.surance carriers or the utilities own interests in loss protection. He NRC generally has little official concern except as a fire here can impact r,afe shutdown. We would expect a discussion by the ,
Soviets concerning their approach to fire protection la " Balance of Plant" !
areas.
Anti-Smoke Defense Measures in Spaces in Nuclear Power Stations -
A.Ya.Korolchenko and V.M.Esin, All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-3:00 Topic: U.S. Presentation: Research rdated to and methods for determining causes and effects of fires involving the electrical equipment (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2-1) - S.Nolan, SNL A description will be provided of the various research programs that were designed to determine potential causes of fires in electrical equipment (Shorts, overheating due to poor mechanical connections, etc.) and the effects of such fires (evaluations of fire retardant cable insulation, fire retardant coatings) and fire suppressants (water, foam, halon and CO2 ) on electrical equipment.
3:00-3:30 Beverage Break 3:30-5:00 Topic: U.S.S.R. Pre.centation: Recent fire experience: causes, effects, and fire suppression activities Ognalina fire)(Reference,in part. M-1, Item 2-4)
Expected is a discussion of U.S.S.R. recent fire experience, includMg experiences of interaction, if any, between fire pretection systems and
. Other plant systems such as the Surty pipe break incident and subsequent operation / malfunction of fire detection and fire suppression systems and the card reader controller security door.
- Assuring Fire Safety in Cable Systems, A. Ya. Korolchenko and G.I.
Smelkos. All-Union Resemth Institute for Fire Protection. ,
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I' Wednesday, June 7,1989 Working Group 9:00-10:00 Topic: U.S.S.R. Presentation: Maintenance and testing requirements of fire protection and post fire safe shutdown equipment (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2.4)
Desired here are descriptions of maintenance programs; objectives, frequencies, preventive maintenance strategies, periodic testing, post maintenance testing, and related requirements.
The Orgar.ization of Extinguishing Fires at Unclear Power Stations -
A.K.Mikeyev, Fire Department, Ministry of interior 10:00-11:00 Topic: U.S. Presentation: Risks associated with computers utilized in nuclear power plants (
Reference:
M-1. Item 2-3, A and B)-
D.Kubicki, NRC The discussion of fire risks associated with computern utilized in nuclear power plants has more or less significance depending on the actual function of the computer, i.e., whether it is used by the operators for inforrnation or actuahy controls operation of the reactor. Included in the discussion will be consideration of the computer itself as a fire hazard (combustible vs. fire retardant boards) and the effect of a fire and fire suppressants on the computer equipment and the subsequent control of safety systems.
11:00-12:00 Topic: Planning session for the October 1989 Soviet visit 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-3:00 Topic: U.S. Presentation: Hydrogen transport and combustion codes: development, assessment, and application (
Reference:
M-1.
Item 2.5) - P.Worthington, NRC A summary of cunent activities regarding the hydrogen transport and combustion, code development and assessment (HECTR and HMS) will bt-made along with the role these codes play for an accident management strategy to reduce the consequence of Ha combustion.
3:00-4:00 Topic: U.S.S.R. Presentation: Hydrogen transport and combustion codes: development, assessment, and application (Rcierence: M-1, Item 2.5)
Desired is a summary of research activities related to hydrogen combustion; in particular, any research in the area of high temperature detonation. Also desired is a presentation of any analysis of hydrogen mixing and combustion for the Chernobyl accident.
Problem of Hydrogen Safety in Nuc! ear Engineering - V.I.Makeyev, V.V.Strogonov, and I.A.Bolod'yan, Fire Department, Ministry of Interior l
(continued) 22
i-4:00-4:30 Topic: U.S. Presentation: Transition from deflagration to detonation (DDT) and detonation studies and application to nuclear power plants (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2.5)- P.Worthington,
. NRC
' A summary will be presented of the phenomena related to hydrogen production and combustion in a severe accident. In particular, standing diffusion flame, deflagration-to-detonation transition, and detonation.
Deflagration model assessment and development will be discussed.
4:30-5:00 Topic: U.S.S.R. Presentation: Status of research on transition from deflagration to detonation (DDT) and detonation studies and application to nuclear power plants (
Reference:
M-1, Item 2.5)
Principles Gcrerning the Formation and Combustion of local Hydrogen-Air Mixtures in a Large Volume - Yu.ItShebeko and S.G.Tsarichenko, All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection J-23
7 n'
Working Group 6 Severe Accidents '
June 5-7 and 9,1989 A
U.S. Working Group leader: 'Ihemis P. Speis, Deputy Director,-
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total: 11 T. P. Speis D. F. Ross B. Sheron R. Meyer L Chan L Soffer -r 2 participants from NRR Saadia National LAlmraton/ Contractor:
D. Powers Oak Ridge National laboratory / Contractor.
T. Kress Advison Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
1 participant Soviet Working Group Leader- O. Shah, Deputy Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total:TBD Day, Date, and Time of Meetings: Mor day, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday, June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wednesday, June 7,9:00-12:00; 1:30-3:00 Friday, June 9,1:30-3:30 Imcation of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined 24
7 Monday, June 5,1989 Working Group 6.1 1:30-5:09 Topic: Fission product releases from fuel - Divided into three maior phases depending upon extent of accident progression
- (Protocol item 6.la)
U.S. Presentation:
1:30-2:15 A. Gap activity releases - release of a few percent of noble gases, iodines and cesium when fuel cladding fails due to overheating; processes, models and applicable experimental data i
2:13-3:15 It In-vessel releases (degraded core accident without reactor pressure vessel failure)- release of essentially all noble gases, large fractions of
,; iodine and cesiinm, some tellurium, small amounts of non volatile hssion products; processes, models and applicable experimental data 3:15-3:30 Beverage Break 3:30-5:00' C. Ex-vessel releases (extensive core melt with reactor pressure vessel failure - release of remaining volatile fission products plus significant -
quantities of non-volatile fission products when molten core debns interacts with concrete after reactor pressure vessel fails: aerosol behavior in the containment atmosphere; processes, models and applicable experimental data included in the above presentations (under A., B., and C.) will be discussions of the major factors which affect iission product releases into the containment (e.g., reactor type, reactor coolant system pressure before vessel failure, containment concrete composition, reactor cavity condition, etc.).
Regarding fission product releases into the atmosphere, the presentations will briefly summarize the imponance of containment failure modes.
[ Note: Tr.e subject of dominant accident initiators and phenomena (including containment failure modes) associated with severe accidents is part of Protocol item 6.2 which is to be discussed in Leningiad in October 1989.]
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Tuesday, June 6,1989 Working Group 6.1 -
9:00-12:00 Topic: Fission product (continued) 9:00-10:30 U.S.S.R. Presentation The U.S.S.R. presentatism should cover approximately the same items but from the perspective of their reactor types (with primary fo:us on the VVER):if they prefer to focus on some items to the exclusion of others, they should let us know before the meeting; also, any information/ data from the Chernobyl accident rdated to the above item could be part of the U.S.S.R. presentation Reactor Dynamics cf Testing of Fuct Elements as the Foundation of Safety in Nuclear Power Under Accident Conditions - V.G.Asmolov, L.A.Egorova, V.A.Payshyk, V.E.Khvostivionov, and A.D.Byrim, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute 10:30-10:40 Coffee Break 10:40-12:00 Continue U.S.S.R. Presentation 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-5:00 Topic: Formation and propagation ofiodine (Protocol Item 6.lb) 1:30-3:20 U.S. Presentation A discussion on iodine chemistry in the fuel, the effects of RCS conditions on iocine chemical forms, iodine deposition and revolatization in the containment, and iodine behavior during hydrogen burns; cesium iodine stability; iodine hydrolysis and radiolysis; models and applicable experimental data 3:20-3:30 Beverage Break 3:30-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation The U.S.S.R. presentation should cover approximately the same items but from the perspective of their reactor types (with primary focus on the VVER); if they prefer to focus on some items to the exclusion of others, they should let us know before the meeting; also, any information/ data from the Chernobyl accident related to the above item could be part of the U.S.S.R. presentation 1
1 26 l L______-____-_
Wednesday, June 7,1989
- Working Group 6.1 9:00-12:00 Topic: Filtration artd venting during severe accidents (Protocol Item 6.lc) 9:00-10:25 U.S. Presentation -
Accident scenarios / containment failure modes amenable to venting procedures
- Filters / efficiency (filtration materials)
- Engineering / materials (design conditions)
- Systems analysis (benefits, risks, procedures) 10:25-10:35 Coffee Break 10:35-12:00 U.S.S.it. Presentation -
The U.S.S.R. presentation could cover the same items with focus on the VVElt-1000, assuming they are planning to install filter / vents
'Ihe Modeling of Fission Product Release front Nuclear Power Facilities -
E.G.Isasanskii, A.G.Bondarenko, N.A.Kydryashov, and Yu.l.Sitsko, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations 12hl:30 1,unch 1:30-3:00 Topic: Future planning and summary 27 j
Working Group 8.1 Exchange of Operational Experience -
June S-7 and 9,1989 U.S. Working Group Leader: Thomas M. Novak, Director, Division of Safety Programs, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total:TBD T. Novak W.12nning R. Barrett J. Rosenthal M. Williams E. Brown P. Lam R. Dennig Oak Ridge National Laboratory / Contractor.
G. h: ys/M. Poore Soviet Working Group Leader: V. Vitkov, Division Head, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total: TBD Day, Date, ar.d Time of Meeting: Monday, June 5; 11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday, June 6; 9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wednesday, June 7; 9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Friday, June 9;1:30-3:30 location of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined 28
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Monday, June 5,1989 Working Group 8.1 1:30-5:00 Topie: NRC reporting requirements for event reporting under 10 CFR 50.73 (Protocol item 8.1)- The types of operating events requiring reporting will be discussed 1:30-2:30 U.S. Presentation I l
M. Williams, NRC j Events related to Technical Specifications (TS) l Fission product barriers compromised: _
l.
l - Threatening Natural Phenomenon l - Engineered Safety Feature Actuations i - Events or conditions which would prevent -
I o Shutdown 1- o Decay Heat removal l o Control of radioactivity release I o Mitigation of consequences of an accident
- Radioactivity releases in excess of thresholds 1
2:30-2:40 Beverage Break 2:40-3:40 U.S.S.R. Presentation Soviets should describe types of reporting requirements between plant management and higher authorities Information Systems Breakdown in the Work of Nuclear Power Plants of the Ministry of Nuclear Power - V.M.Vitkov, Yu.K.Zuk, and S.A.1xsnoi, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations.
Ministry of Nuclear Power 3:40--4:30 Overvicw of Sequence Coding and Search Sy: stem (SCSS) program as the National database - M. Williams, NRC l
4:30-5:00 Soviet discussion on National databases related to nuclear power plants Experience and Use of National Information Systems for the Reubility of .
Equipment at Nuclear Power Stations - B.A.Kochanov, S.A.12snoi, and .
A.I.Fandeev, All-Union Research institute for Nu': lear Power Plant Operations k
29
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Tuesdey, June 6,1989 Working Group 8.1 -
9:00-5:00 Topic: Detailed discussion on the coding of LERs into SCSS to include coding of component, systems, and plant effects, including personnel errors (Protocol Item 8.1) 9:00-10:45 U.S. Presentation Presentation of encoding LER into SCSS to include component failure, system failure, and personnel actions - G. Mays, ORNL Describe how steps are linked together in a chronological order to construct an overall event sequence Describe relationships between steps, i.e., predecessor and successor relationships can be searched as well as detailed information of individual steps 10:45-11:00 Beverage Break 11:00-12:00 U.S. Presentation - How the SCSS provides the ability to do general or broad searches at the LER level and more specific at the step or sequence level 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-3:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion by Soviets of National databases for events and component failures Assurance of Program Integrity in National Information Systems for Reliability of Equipment at Nuclear Power Stations - E.S.Alekseeva, A.V.Goncharov, I.V.Ritter, A.R.Khachaturov, and A.A.Shikhov, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations 3:00-3:15 Bevege Break 3:15-5:00 U.S. Presentation Discussion of NRC application of National databases - J.Rosenthal, NRC Use of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program to study events which have the potential for severe core damage 30 Q__________-__________-____
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Wednesday, June 7,1989 Working Group 8.1 9:00-3:30 Topic: Protocol item 8.1 (continued) 9:00-10:00 U.S. Presenta; ion Study of Motor Operated Valve Performance covering 1981-1987 operating experience - E. Brown, NRC
- more than 500 reports reviewed
- 43 plant systems affected
- recommendations of study involved methods and procedures for setting torque switches procedures and diagnostic capability to determine root causes 10:00-10:15 Beverage Break 10:15-11:00 U.S. Presentation Study of Service Water Failures and Degradation in Light Water Reactors - P. Lam, NRC
- review of almost 1,000 events between 1980 and 1987
- recommendations of 1tudy involved testing to verify heat transfer capability additional verification of systems for single failures of active component additional inspections for corrosion, crosion and biofouling maintenance of systems 11:00-12:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Discussion by Soviets on operational experience feedback Operational Data for Nuclear Power Station Units for Non-scheduled Outages and Shut-down for the i ear 1987 - S.A.Lesnoi, V.M.Vitkov, and A.I.Borovkov, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-2:15 U.S. Presentation Presentation of the National Database Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS)- R.Dennig, NRC NPRDS computerized database containing approximately 500,000 engineering reports and more than 80,000 component failure reports rnaintained by Institute of Nuclear Power Operations continued 31
l I i
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.1 1
l INPO members accessibility to database and improvements to make l
program easier to use i
Discussion of component engineering record and component failure information 2:15-2:45 U.S. Presentation l
l National databases maintained by industry - T.Novak, NRC
- Westinghouse Trip Reduction Program ;
( - Westinghouse Reliability Database 2:45-3:00 Beverage Break 3:00-3:30 Soviet Presentation Soviet discussion of use of worldwide data Operating Instructions by Definition and Analysis of Actual Little Used Installed Electrical Capacity at Nuclear Power Stations - M.S.lsaev, A.A.Kozenuk, and I.N.Petrova, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations 3:30-5:00 Topic: Summary of accomplishment for meeting, and identification of agenda /date for next Steering Group Meeting,(headed by Working Group Leaders) Protocol item 8.2 Develop criteria for evaluation of safety of operation, including methods, scope of equipment and safety systems 32
Working Group 10 l
Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Component June S-7 and 9,1989 U.S. Working Group leader: James E. Richardson, Assistant Director, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC U.S. Working Group
Participants:
NRC: Total: TBD J, Richardson C. McCracken A. Taboada National Laboratories / Contractors:
W. Shack C. Czajkowski Consultants / Contractor:
S. Bush J. P. Houstrup O. Jonas P. Criffith U.S. Department of Energy:
To Be Determined Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
To Be Determined Soviet Working Group Leader: I. Stepanov, Division Head, Research and Design Institute of Power Technology Soviet Working Group
Participants:
(to be determined by Soviets)
Total:TBD Day, Date, and Time of Meeting: Monday, June 5,11:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Tuesday, June 6,9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 Wednesday, June 7, 9:00-12:00; 1:30-5:00 ;
Friday, June 9,1:30-3:30 location of Meeting: Pavilion Hotel, Room to be determined 33
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Monday, June 5,1989 Working Group 10 -
1:30-5:00 Topic: Power Plant Experience & Engineering Considerations '
(Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item la)
Codes, standards and general practices for design, materials, water chemistry and inspection applied to the construction and inservice surveillance of piping systems for nuclear power plants (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item lb) 1:30-1:55 U.S. Presentation S. Bush or J.P.Houstrup (ASME-BPVC) 1:55-2:20 U.S.S.R. Presentation History of pipe wall thinning in nuclear power plant piping including experiences of pipe thinning in both liquid phase and liquid vapor phase lines (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item lb)
Corrosion of Structural Materials in the Condensate Circuits at the RBMK Nuclear Power Stations - 1.A.Stepanov, V.N.Belous, and V.N.Baranov, Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering, Moscow 2:20-2:50 U.S. Presentation - A.Taboada, NRC 2:50-3:20 U.S.S.R. Presentation 3:20-3:35 Coffee Break Verification and prevention of crosion-corrosion in nuclear power plants (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item Ic) 3:35-3:50 U.S. Presentation - C.Czajkowski, Brookhaven National Laboratory 3:50-4:15 U.S.S.R. Presentation Remedial action to address pipe wall thinning issue including control of degradation, repairs and replacements, criteria for structural evaluation of ,
deteriorated pipe (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item Id) 4:15-4:40 U.S. Presentation - C.Czajkowski, Brookhaven National laboratory 4:40-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation ;
Experimental and neoretical Investigation of the Influence of W.ater j Chemistry Conditions on Erosion / Corrosion Abrasion - V.I.Nigmatulin, j and M.G.Saltanov, All. Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant l Operations 34 I i
j
L' Tuesday, June 6,1989
- Working Group 10 -
9:00-9:50 Topic: Plant Experience & Engineering Considerations (continued)
Regulatory efforts to address pipe wall thinning, including inspection requirements, acceptance criteria and long range action anticipated (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item le) 9:00-9:25 U.S. Presentation 9:25-9:50 U.S.S.R. Presentation Physical-Chemical Bases of the Modeling of the Composition of Water Coolant of Nuclear Power Stations - V.M.Sedov, LV.Puchkov, V.G.Kritskii, and V.1.Zarembo, Institute of Power Technology t
9:50-5:00 , Topic: Research and Development Activities (Reference M-1, Appendix 3
. Item 2)- Review of major variables that control erosion-corrosion (Reference M-1. Appendix 3, Item 2a) 9:50-10:15 U.S. Presentation - W. Shack, Argonne National Laboratory 10:15-10:40 U.S.S.R. Presentation Thermodynamic Model of the BehEavior of Cobalt Corrosion Products in l . the Channels of Boiling Water Reactors - V.I.Zarembo, V.G.Kritskii, l L.V.Puchkov, and A.A.Slobodov, Institute of PowerTechnology 10:40-10i55 Coffee Break Phenomenological aspects of erosion-corrosion (Reference M-1. Appendix 3, item 2b) 10:55-11:20 U.S. Presentation - W. Shock, Argonne National Laboratory 11:20-11:45 U.S.S.R. Presentation The Solubility of Magnetite in the Coolant of Boiling Water Reactors -
V.I.Zarembo, B.G.Kritskii, A.A.Slbodov, and L.V.Puchkov, Institute of Power Technology Prediction models for erosion-corrosion in piping systems (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item 2c) 11:45-12:10 U.S. Presentation - P.Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Techs.ogy 12:10-1:30 Lunch continued 35
1:30-1:55- U.S.S.R. Presentation The Fundamental Dependence of Erosion / Corrosion of Carbon Steels in .
the Water Circuits of Power Plants of Thermodynamic Factors of Equilibrium - V.Zarembo and V.G.Kritskii, Institute of Power Technology ;
Feedwater system design and operating characteristics that relate to -
potential erosion-corrosion wear. (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item 2d) i 1:55-2:20 U.S. Presentation - OJonas, Consultant ,
2:20-2:55 U.S.S.R. Presentation Water chemistry practices in nuclear power plants and relationship (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item 2e) 2:55-3:20 U.S. Presentation - OJonas, Consultant J 3:20-3:45 U.S.S.R. Presentation The Influence of the Concentration of the Dissolved Oxygen on the Behavior of Corrosion Products Dispersed in the Coolant of Boiling Water -
Reactors - A.A.Efimov, V.G.Kritskii, LN.Moskvin, A.I.Gorshkov, N. A.Durkhisanov, N.G.Katkov, B.A.Gusev, V.T.Korotkov, and A.S.Korolev, Institute of PowerTechnology i Inspection Proccdtues for locating, characterizing and verifying existence ,
of crosion-corrosion in piping of nuclear power plants (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item 2f) 3:45-4:10 Ikeak 4:10-4:35 U.S. Presentation 4:35-5:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation l
J l
1 36
- .r i Wednesday, June 7,1989
. Working Group 10 l
9:00-12:00 Topic: Research and Development Activities (continued)'
Methods for preventing crosion/ corrosion materials, water chemistry, and l: redesign (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, Item 2g)
.9:00-9:25 U.S. Presentation - W. Shack Argonne National laboratory 9:25-9:50 U.S.S.R. Presentation l Analytical methods for establishing the acceptable level of wall thinning in piping of nuclear power plants (Reference M-1, Appendix 3, item 2h) 9.50-10:00 Coffee Break 10:00-10:30 U.S. Presentation - J.Houstrup, Consultant 10:30-11:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation Flow considerations in crosion-corrosion of pipe (Reference M-1,
. Appendix 3, item 21) 11:00-11:30 U.S. Presentation - P.Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 11:30-12:00 U.S.S.R. Presentation 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-5:00 Topic: Summary and Comments - Future Plans - U.S. and U.S.S.R.
1:30-3:00 Summary and Cornments - U.S.
3:00-5:00 Summary and Comments - U.S.S.R.
o 37
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All Working Groups
'O Friday, June 9,1989 ,
8:30-4:30 Topic: Working Group Summaries and Presentation to Industry and Other Interested Parties .
8:30-12:00 Working Group leadets Presentations to Industry and Other Interested Parties (NRC Commission Meeting Room, One White Flint North Building, Rockville)
Each Working Group Leader will have approximately 10 minutes to summarize the activities and results of each working group meeting 12:00-1:30 Lunch and transit to breakout rooms where ad hoc working groups will convene 1:30-3:30 Ad hoc working group sessions with industry and other interested parties to be arranged in consultation with the Department of Energy to discuss working group topics (Pavilion llotel, Rockville) 3:30-4:00 Break and transit back to NRC Commission meeting room (One White Flint North Building, Rockville) 4:00-4:30 Signing ceremony for Working Group Summaries and closing statements t y Co-Chairs 1
l i
9 i 1
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I 38 '
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