ML20246N432

Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrected Amends 74 & 62 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively

ML20246N432
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	08/25/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20246J037	List: ML20246J032 ML20246N432
References
NUDOCS 8909080124
Download: ML20246N432 (10)

Text

n

};.-

4.'1 REISSUED 8/25/89

'.. c' ** * %'c,.

.* i;'

UNITED STATES I'[7 h

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

5. c N b W.!.

W ASHINGTON, D C. 20515 s.

g.... e

\\

1 4

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10 AND AMENDMENT NO.63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA M CITY OF ANAHEIM. CALIFORNIA SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET h* 5. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated April 26, October 11, October 24, November 7, and December 16, 1988; and January 16, January 20, and March 28, 1989, Southern California Edison Company (SCE), et al., (the licensees) requested changes to the Technical Specifications for Facility Operating Licenses No. NPF-10 and No. NPF-15 that authorize operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 2 and 3 in San Diego County, California. These requests - designated as PCNs 250, 252, 254, 256, 259, 260, 281, and 283 -

proposed to extend the interval for certain of the required 18 month surveillance tests in order to support the nominal 24 month fuel cycle.

Both Units 2 and 3 are operating in their first such cycle and will be forced to shut down to perform the 18 month surveillance unless the required interval is extended. SCE has submitted proposed changes to cover all the 18 sonth surveillance tests which cannot be performed during plant operation. Eser of these requests would have changed the required interval from "at 14st snce every 18 months" to "at least once per refueltag interval." By letter dated March 20, 1989, SCE amended these requests to define " refueling interval" as 24 months. This definition has been included in the Frequency Notation table of the Technical Specifications (Table 1.2) by Amendments 73 and 61 to Licenses No. NPF-10 and No. NPF-15 respectively.

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION PCN-250 By letter dated April 26, 1968, the licensees proposed to change Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.10,

• Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation," to 8909080124 890825 PDR ADDCK 05000361 P

PDR

-l

REISSUED 8/25/89

. extent the 18 month surveillance intervai to at least once per refueling interval (24 cenths). Specification 3/4.3.3.10 requires the loose-part detection system to be operable in Modes I and 2, defines surveillance tests to verify operability, and specifies compensatory actions to be taken when the minimum operability requirements are not met.

The loose-part detection instrumentation serves to provide early dettetion of loose metallic parts in the primary system to avoid and/or mitigate danace to primary s Monitoring System (ystem components. The Vibration and Loose PartsY& LPM) mo components. The selected locations provide qualitative indications of vibration throughout the primary system.

Surveilltrce Requirement 4.3.3.10.c states that each channel of the locse-part detection system shall be demonstrated operable by the perfor-mance cf a channel calibration at least once per 18 months. SCE states that the channel calibration repeats the functional testing done monthly anc also checks the sensors.

SCE has revieweo the history of the 18 month surveillance tests of the V&LPt' at SONGS Units 2 and 3 from the start of commercial operation to the date ef the review (hovember 1, 1987). All deficiencies which occurred curing that time, except one, were found during the caily and monthly surveillance and by alam indications.The one exception - Channel 14, Core Internals, Channel 8 - failed a common mode rejection section of the 18 morth test. SCE states that this would be conservative in that an alarm would occur sooner than necessary due to the noise effect. In addition, SCE states that )& LPM does not perform a safety-related function but is solely a monitoring system.

Based upon the ability cf the daily and monthly surveillance to detect deficiencies, and the fact that the VALPH is not safety-related, the staff conclboes that extension of the 18 month surveillatte interval to 24 mcnths is acceptable.

PCN-252 By letter 4Rted October 24, 1988, the licensees proposed to change Technical W" interval to at least once per refueling interval (24 months).

ification 3/4.8.1.1, "AC Sources " to extend the 18 month surveillance This Specification requires operability of two physically independent I

circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system, and two separate and independent diesel generators, I

in Modes 1 through 4. It also defines pericdic surveillance tests to verify operability and specifies compensatory action to be token when minimum operability requirements are not met.

Operability of the AC sources ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for safe shut-down of the facility and for mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b requires sach independent circuit between the offtite transmission network and the 1-A

REISSUED 8/25/89

. or. site Class IE distribution system to be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 months by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power from the normal offsite power source to the alternate offsite power source. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d requires each diesel generator to be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 months by performing an inspection of the diese'. generator; by starting the diesel generator automatically on a simulated loss of offsite power, with and without an ESF test signal; and by testing the load capacity, sequencing, load shed, load rejection, logic, and fuel transfer features of diesel operation.

SCE states that a review of the required 18 month surveillance? tests has determined that ro significant problems occurred. One failure to activate the auto transfer of the bus tie breakers occurred due te misalignment of a breaker. This was classified as a startup problem which should not recur. One failure to achieve the two-hour rating of 110% of full load would have been detected on a monthly surveillance test. SCE also reviewed the maintenance history of start-on-demand failures, which showed seven failures on the four diesel generators between January 1984 and June 1987.

It was noted that, without exception, all the failures were detectable by monthly surveillance testing. The failure history indicates that the AC power systems have been extremely reliable. Additionally, weekly, monthly, and cuarterly tests remain unchanged and have been shown to be effective in detecting problems. All vendor reconsnended preventative maintenance will continue to be performed on the same schedule.

The staff has evaluated the licensees' submittal and has found that the proposed change affects only the frequency of the 18 month surveillance tests of the AC power systems, which may result ih a small reduction in confidence in system operability and in the associated margin of safety.

However, the failure history indicates that the systems at SONGS 2 and 3 have been extremely reliable. In addition, the weekly quarterly, and monthlysurveillancetestswillcontinuetoprovideeffectiveindications of system capability. Also, Technical Specification 4.0.2 allows the current 18 month interval to be extended by 25%, to 22.5 months. For these reasons, any reduction in confidence in system operability is expected to be small fer an increase from the currently allowable 22.5 months to 24 months. Therefore, a surveillance interval of 24 months is acceptable.

However, the 25% extension of the surveillance interval allowed under Technical.

cification 4.0.2 will no longer be permitted, and the proposed Technical cjfication has been modified accordingly.

PCN-254 By letter dated December 16, 1988, the licensees proposed to change Technical Specification 3/4.8.4, " Electrical Equipment Protective Devices,"

to extend the 18 month surveillance intervals to at least once per refuel-ing interval (24 months). Specification 3/4.8.4.1 requires circuits entering containment to be provided with overcurrent protective devices (listed in Table 3.81) which must be operable-in Modes 1 through 4.

Specification 3/4.8.4.2 requires thermal overload protection to be bypassed by a device integral with the motor starter for each valve listed in Table 3.8-2.

Each bypass device is required to be operable whenever its motor-4 l

,(L t REISSUED 8/25/89

. cceratec valve is required to be operable. These Specifications also cefine surveillance tests and inspections to verify operability, and compensatory actions to be taken when the minimum operability requirements are not met.

The overcurrent protective devices provide protection to the containment penetration to maintain containment integrity. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.1.a requires containment penetration conductor overcurrent devices to be demonstrated operable at least once par 18 months. The medium voltage (4 KV - 15 KY) circuit breakers are demonstrated operable by performing a channel calibration of the associated protective relays and an integrated system functional test of at least 10% of the circuit treakers of each voltage level selected on a rotating basis. For any circuit breaker found inoperable, an additional representative sample of at least IC of the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested. The lower voltage circuit breakers are demonstrated.

ocerable by perforr.ing functional testing of a representative sample of.

each type, as cescribed above for the medium voltage circuit breakers.

The thermal overload bypass ensures that the motor will not trip off due to a thermal overload. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.2.a requires veri-fying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed by integral bypass devices at least once per 18 months. Surveillance Requirements 4.8.4.2.b anc c require the same verification following maintenance on a valve motor starter, and following any periodic testing durin overload device was temporarily placed in force, g which the thermal respectively.

SCE has examined the history of the 18 month tests of the electrical epuipment protective devices at SONG $ 2 and 3 from the beginning of commercial operation to the present. All surveillance on Unit 2 have been successful. All but two of the overcurrent protective device surveillance

- en Unit 3 have been successful. One failure was caused by loose screws.

The other failure required replacement of a neutral relay. All thermal overload bypass surveillance on Unit 3 have been successful.

The staff has evaluated the licensees' submittal. We have determined that the surveillance history has bee acceptable.

In addition verification of the thensal. overload bypasses will continue to be perfor,med following maintenance er periodic testing which affect the thermal overloads. For these reasons, squipment reliability woule not be significantly degraded by extension of the surveillance intervals. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

1 PCN-256 By letter dated November 7,1988, the licensees proposed to change Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1 " Reactor Protective Instrumentation,'

and 3/4.3.2, " Engineered Safety features Actuat. ion Sytten Instrumentation,"

to extend the 18 month surveillance intervals for the bypass logic to at least once per refueling interval (24 months). Specification 3/4.3.1 defines the Reactor Protective System (RPS) instrumentation channels and bypasses required to be operable, defines periodic surveillance tests to l

l j

REISSUED 8/25/89

.. verify operability, and specifies compensatory Letion to be taken when minima operability requirements are not met. Specification 3/4.3.2 defines the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instru-mentation channels and bypasses required to be operable, defines periodic

{

surveillance tests to verify operability, and specifies compensatory action to be taken when minimum operability requirements are not met.

j Operability of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and bypasses ensures that (1) associated ESFAS action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient functional capability is available from diverse parameters. The RPS and ESFAS have bypass circuits that cisable system trips for startup, shutdown, testing, or maintenance.

Eypasses are catalogued as either trip channel bypasses or operational I

s ty: esses. Trip channel bypass logic allows manual bypass of one and only one channel at any time. Operational bypasses are either automatic, manual, or a combination of the two, and may involve bypass of the selected parameter (s) on more than one of the two channels. Surveillance Require-ments 4.3.1.2-(for the RPS) and 4.3.2.2 (for the ESFAS) require that the total bypass function be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 months during channel calibration testing of each chaanel affected by bypass opera tion.

SCE states that, except for the Steam Generator Low Flow (5/G LF) bypass logic, monthly surveillance tests are the same as the 18 month surveillance tests. The monthly test of the S/G LF tests the bypass logic on a single channel basis. In addition, all bypasses are annunciated on the main control board and operating procedures require control room personnel to check for proper bypass operation during plant evolutions. Most failures of a bypass would be indicated on the annunciators and would be detected by the operators.

By letter dated June 30, 1989 SCE stated that calibration of all RPS and ESFAS channels was completed during the February 1989 and May/ June 1989 outages of Unit 2 and that they are withdrawing their request to extend the surveillance interval for the RPS and ESFAS channel calibrations for Unit 2. The licensees are committed to calibrate all RPS and ESFAS channels on an 18 month. interval for both Units 2 and 3, which will maintain instrument drif t within acceptable limits. In addition, Technical Spect-fication 4.0.2 allows the current 18 month interval to be extended by 251, to 22.5 months. For these reasons, and because the monthly bypass logic surveillance tests are nearly identical to the 18 month surveillance tests, any reduction in confidence in bypass logic operability is expected i

to be small for an increase from the currently allowable 22.5 months to 24 l

l months. Therefore, a surveillance interval of 24 months is acceptable.

However, the 251 extension of the surveillance interval al? owed under Technical Specification 4.0.2 will no longer be permitted, and the proposed Technical Specification has been modified accordingly.

Also, the wording proposed by SCE in Surveillance Requirements 4.3.1.2 shd 4.3.2.2 conflicts with Surveillance Requirements 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1. While the surveillance

}

4 ". -

REISSl;ED 8/25/89 I

i l interval for the bypass logic test will become tne refueling interval (2a months), the surveillance interval for the channe'J calibrations will remain at 18 months. However, SCE's proposed wording of Surveillance Requirements 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.2 would continue to tie bypass logic testing to channel calibration testing. Therefore, the staff has changed the l

wording to remove the connection between the two tests.

1 PCN 259 By letter dated October 11, 1988, the licensees proposed to change Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.3, " Containment Dome Air Circulators," to extend the 18 month surveillance interval to at least once per refueling interval (24 months). Specification 3/4.6.4.3 defines the number of containment dome air circulator trains required to be operable, defines periodic surveillance tests to verify operability, and specifies compen-satory action to be taken when minimum operability requirements are not met.

Operability of the dome air circulators ensures adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA). In conjunction with other containment systems, the dome air circulators will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding its flannable limit. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.3 require that each dome air circulater train be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 months by starting the system on a Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS), by verifying that it operates for at least 15 minutes, and by verifying a system flow rate of at least 37,000 cubic feet per minute.

SCE states that Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.3 is met by testing all of the Engineered Safety Feaures (ESF) Actuation System (ESFAS) relays in an actuation subsystem (e.g., CCAS) as a total unit.

The Plant Protection System (PPS) encompasses the Reactor Protective System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Actuation System (ESFAS), including the electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry recuired to perform those functions. Surveillance Requirements 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 require periodic surveillance testing of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation channels, respectively. Table 4.3-2 of Specification 4.3.2.1 specifies monthly and semiannual functional testing of the ESFAS instrumentation. SCE states that these requirements are satisfied by performance of the PPS Monthly Test and the ESF Semiannual Functional fest, which together test the ESF actuation logic from sensor inputs through actuation of the tested devices. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)Section 7.3.1.1.1.9 describes a typical test program. The active logic components in the ESFAS actuation path are the PPS bit, tables.

PPS matrix relays PPS initiation relays, ESFAS subgroup relays, ESF motor controllers, and the ESF actuated devices. The PP$ Monthly Test checks the PPS bistables, matrix relays, and initiation relays. The ESF Samf aenval Functional Test checks the ESFAS subgroup relays and_ motor controllers and actuates the devicts. SCE states that the major clifference between the combination of these two tests and the 18 month ESFAS test is that the latter tests all of the logic and actuated devices for a particular ll

p

[: ~ '

• REISSUED 5/25/59 j

• L

. furctier. at or.ce. Components which cannot be tested during power operation are tested dLring the first cold shutdown longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if they

1. ave not beer tested in th-last six ecnths. All. of the CCAS components can be operated at power, however, access to the containment is necessary to instali ard monitor the test instrumentation required for the flow measurement. SCE has reviewed the history of the flow measurement tests since the start of comicrcial operation and has found that all have been sa tisf actory.

The staff has evaluated the licensees' submittal. We have determined that the monthly and semiannual functienal tests cf the ESFAS channels provide sufficient assurance of Containment Dome Air Circulator response to the CCAS signal te allow extension of the 12 nonth surveillance interval to 24 months. In adeition, the test history of the flow measurement tests u.dicate the* spiem reliability would not be significantly degradec by extensier cf the surveillance interval. Therefore, the staff fincs the preposte change acceptable.

FCh-260 By letter dated January 20, 1989, the licensees proposed to charge Technical Specifict.tions 3/4.7.1.2, "Aniliary Feedwater System,* 3/4.7.3, "Corgerent Coolir,g Water System," 3/4.7.4, " Salt Water Cooling' System,"

ar.d 3/4.T.;0, " Emergency Chilled Water System," to extend the 18 month surveillarcre interval to at least er.ce per refueling interval (24 months).

These Specifications define the equipment and/cr flow paths that are required to be operable, define periodic surve111atce tests to verify c;trability, and specify compensatory action to be taken when minimum operability requirements are not met.

OperaM11ty of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Syst=c. ensures that the Reacter Coolant Systemi can be cooled down to less than 350 d6grees Fahren-heit from norral operating ccnditions in the event of a total loss of offsite Fewer. Oper6bility of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued Operability of the Salt Water Cooling (SWC)g normal and accident conditions.

operation of safety related equipment durin 4

System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of equipment during normal and accident cenditions. Operability of the Emergency Chilled Water System (ECWS) insures that sufficient space cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during accident conditions. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1.b requires that each AFW pump be descnstrated operable at least once per 18 months by verifying that each autos.atic valve in the AFW flow path and each AFW pump be verified to actuate to its oesired position upon an Energency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) test signal. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.3.b requires that at lawst two CCW loops be demchstrated operable at least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that_each automatic valve servicing safety related equipseht actuates to'its correct position, and Signal (SIAS) pump starts automatically upon a Safety In.iection ActuationSurve that each CCW test signal.

L

.... p REISSUED 8/25/89

'A 1 at least' two SWC locps be demonstrated operable at least once per 10 r.cr.tr.s caring shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position, and that each SWC pump starts automatically upon a SIAS test signal. Surveillance Fecuirement 4.7.10.b requires that each ECWS be demonstrated operable at least once per IB months by verifying that each Emergency Chilled Water pump and each power operated or automatic valve servicing safety related equiprent actuates to its correct position upon any of the following test signals: SIAS, Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS), Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS), and Fuel Fandling Isolation Signal (FHIS) when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool.

SCE states that these requirements are met by testing all of the ESFAS relays in an actuation subsystem (e.g., SIAS) as a total unit, witn the exception of the Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) valves.

As cescribed under PCh-259 above, the FPS Penthly Test and the ESF Semi-ernual Functional Test together test the E5F.actustion logic from sensor inputs through actuation of the tested devices. Components which cannot be testec curing plant operation are tested during the first cold shutcown longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if they have riot been tested in the last 6 merths. SCE stetes that all cf the components covered by the above surveillance Requirements can be tested at power. In addition, Specifica-tion 4.0.5 requires inservice testing of all ASKE Class 1, 2, and 3 valves in accordanc.e with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The staff nas evaluated ? 9 licensees' submittal. We have determined that the renthly ano semiannual functional tests of the ESTAS channels provide sufficient assurance of AFW, CCW, SWC, and ECWS response to ESFAS signals to allow extension of the 18 month surveillance interval to 24 sonths.

In accition, the inservice testing of the pumps and valves provides added assurance that these systems are capable of performing their design functions. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

PCN-281 By letter dated January 16, 1989, the licensees proposed to change.

Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.3,

• Seismic Instrumentation," to extend the 18 monta surveillance interval to at least once per refueling interval (24 months).. Specification 3/4.3.3.3 defines the seismic monitoring instrumentation required to be operable, defines periodic surveillance tests to verify operability, and specifies compensatory action to be taken when minimum operability requirements are not met.

Operability of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that suffi-cient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the fartility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100.

Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.3.1 requires performance of channel cali.

brations at least once per 18 months.

I<

~

s.

r i: 51. n.-:

l

! i i

S:E has reviewed the history of the 18 month surveillance tests from the start cf comercial operation to the present. Only one test failed. SCE states that the monthly channel check and the semiannual functional test j

provide a nigh level of assuranct that the system is capable of performing i

its design function, j

The staff has evaluated the licensees' submittal. We have determined that the morthly and semiannual functional tests of the seismic monitoring instrumentation provide evidence of system operability. In addition, Technical Specification 4.0.2 allows the current 18 month interval to be extended by 25%, to 22.5 months. For these reasons, and because the staff believes that accelerometer characteristics will not change significantly for an increase from the currently allowable 22.5 months to 24 months, a surveillance interval of 24 months for the channel calibration is accept-atle. However, the 25% extension of the surveillance interval allowed under Technical Specification 4.0.2 will no longer be permitted, and the proposec Technical Specification has been modified accordingly.

P3-283 By letter detec March 28, 1989, the licensees proposed to change Technical Specification 3/4.7.8.1, " Fire Suppression Water System," to extend the 18 month surveillance interval to at least once per refueling interval (24 renths) for those valves not testable during ?lant operation that are located in areas that are inaccessible during iin-refueling operations.

Specifiestion 3.4.7.8.1. defines the operabili.y requirements of the Fire Suppression Water System, defines periodic surveillance tests to verify crerability, and specifies compensatory action *,o be taken when minimum operability requirements are not met.

Operability of the Fire Suppression Water System ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any plant area where safety related equipment is located.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.1.1.e. requires that the fire suppression water system be demonstrated operable by performing a system functional test at least once per 18 months; Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.1.1.e.2 requires that each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation be cycled through at least one complete cycle of travel.

SCE has reviewed the results of the surveillance tests and found that no unsatisfactory' conditions have been identified as a result of the surveillance.

i The staff has evaluated the licensees' submittal. Because a 24 month surveillance interval conforms to the guidance of the National Fire Protection Association Stantards we conclude that the increase in the surveillanceintervalwillnotsIgnificantlyreducethereliabilityof these fire protection systems. Therefore, the proposed change is accept-able.

e 4

L

.). *y REISSbED S/25/69

.a 3.C C 3 tac

• C TH STATE OTFICIAL The NRC staff has advisto the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Departrent of Health Services, State of California, of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No coments mere received.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments involve changes in the installation or use of a facility corponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that approval of FCNs 250, 254, 259, 260 and 283 involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that rnay be releasec offsite and that there is no significant increase in incivicual cr cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previeusly issued a proposed finding for these changes that the amencments involve ne significant hazards consideration and there has been no public ccament on such finding. Accordingly, these assendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact state-nert or environr;. ental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.25, an Environmental Assessment anc Finding of No Significant Impact for PCNs 252, 256, and 281 has been prepared ano published in the Federal Register on July 28, 1989 (54 FR 31394 ).

Accordingly, based upon the environmental assessment, the Ccmission has determined that the issuance of these amendrents will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

5.0 00hCLUSI0h We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:

D. Hickman, N. Trehan, I. Ahmed Dated: July 27, 1989 I

REISSUED 8/25/E9

- o,...,

7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SOUTHERN CALIF 0P.NIA EDISON COMPANY. ET AL.

DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-352 NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF A"ENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

. The 'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (Comission) has issued Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No, NPF-10 and Amendment No.63to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15, issued to Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside, California and the

1ty. of Anaheim, California (the licensees), which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, located in San Diego County California.

The amendments were effective as of the date of issuance.

TheseamendmentsrevisethefollowingTechnicalSpecifications(TS)to increase the interval for the 18 month surveillance tests to at least once per refueling interval, which is defined as 24 months: TS 3/4.3.1, Reactor protective Instrumentation"; TS 3/4.3.2, ' Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation"; TS 3/4.3.3.3, " Seismic Instrumentation", and TS 3/4.8.1.1, "AC Sources."

The applications for amendments comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's regulations. The Comission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments.

Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments and Opportunity for Hearing.in conne: tion with this action were published in Jhe FEDERAL REGISTER I

% Vr* %

REISSUED a/25/89 l k

.4..

4 i

. on February 21,1959 (54 FR 7493) and February 24, 1989 (54 FR 8033 and 8035).

No request _for a hearing or petition for. leave to intervene w:s filed following these notices.

The Comission has prepared an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact related to the' action and has detemined that an environ-mental impact statement need not be prepared and that issuance of the amendments will have no significant adverse.effect on the qua19y d the human environment.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for arendments dated April 26, October 11, Octobe-24, v. ember 7, and-December 16,1988, and January 16, January 20, ard Nwt.h 25,1989; (2) Amendment No. 75 to License No. NPF-10 and Amendment Nc. 63 :: i,cer.se No. NPF-15; (3) the Cc :missier ', related Safety Evaluation dated July 27.1989; and (4) the

[

Comission's Environmental Assessment dated July 24,158Y (6: FR 31394). All of these items are available for public inspection at the sona 5.sion's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC 20555, and the General Library, University of California, P. O. Box 19557, Irvine, California 32713.

~

A copy of items (2), (3) and (4) may be.obtained upon request atdressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comis.sion, Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 28thday of July 1989.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0pt115510N k

jh5

=

=

Donald E. Hickman, Project Manager Project Directorate V _

Division of Reactor Projects III IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I

..