ML20246M563
| ML20246M563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1989 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8903270199 | |
| Download: ML20246M563 (22) | |
Text
~
- ll p ' ~.,
l-DakiIbuer Company.
. Htt B. Tamer e
PO Bax33198 ;
Vice President.
. Charlotte, NC 28242
. Nuclear Pmduction e
(704)373 4531 N& O AN0b b
.. pyggpnygg
.}
March'1, 1989.
Mr. S. D. Ebneter
. Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
-l Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Subject:
.McGuire' Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-369 and 50-370 NRC Bulletin No.'85-03 1
Motor-Operated. Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings-Action Item f Report Mr. J. M. Taylor's (NRC/0IE) November 15, 1985 letter (Bulletin'85-03) concerned
~
motor-operated valve (MOV) common mode failures during plant transients due'to
, improper switch settings.. The purpose of this bulletin was to request licensees to develop and implement a-program to ensure that switch settings on certain safety-related motor-operated valves are selected, set and maintained correctly to accommodate the maximum differential pressures expected on these valves during both normal and abnormal events within the design basis. This action was to include the components (i.e.' Action Itemsla-d) outlined in the bulletin.
In.
addition to the development and implementation of the above program, various reports were required to be submitted to the NRC (Action Items e and'f). The Action Item e Report was to provide the.results of Action Item a and contain the program to accomplish Action Items b-d including a schedule for completion of
.those items. The Action Item f report was to provide (1) a verification of completion of the requested program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjustments as a result of the bulletin, and (3) a summary of data in accordance with Tabla 2, " Suggested Data Summary Format".
Toward this end, on May 16, 1986, I submitted a report (as directed by Bulletin Action Item e) outlining our plan to accomplish the requested program by November 15,.1987
-Subsequently, my November 20, 1986 letter discussed a Duke Power Company commitment to an expanded scope for our MOV Improvement Program. This expansion of scope was based on Duke's in-house investigation initiated in response to Bulletin 85-03.
The scope change included all safety-related MOVs that are required to be tested for operational readiness rather than just the Bulletin 85-03 identified MOVs. By my February 18, 1987 letter, I provided the schedule for completion of this operational verification program commitment on all Safety-Related MOVs for each unit (five refueling outages per unit are required to complete the comprehensive program to ensure safety-related MOV operability is maintained for the life of the station).
In addition, the 8903270199 890301 l I
$DR ADOCK 05000369 PNU<
gg g c
1 l
2 l
Mr. S. D. Ebneter j
l
' March 1, 1989
]
Page Two l
February 18, 1987 letter extended our original commitment to complete all actions j
i req'uired by Bulletin 85-03 from the bulletin required date of November 15, 1987 1
to the End of Cycle 5 refueling outage for McGuire Unit 1 and the End of Cycle 4 refueling outage for McGuire Unit 2 (generally an extension of one refueling outage). The submittal of the Bulletin required Action Item f report (s) following completion of the program on each unit was also adjusted appropriately.
Additional information regarding Bulletin 85-03 with respect to McGuire Nuclear 1
Station was provided by my letters of January 14 and May 2, 1988.
In accordance with the above revised schedule, attached is a report which satisfies the requirements of Bulletin Action Item f for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 [although the report for Unit 2 was actually due September 26, 1988 (60 days after the End of Cycle 4 refueling outage), its submittal has been delayed until this unit 1 report due date in order that a single combined station report could be submitted for clarity].
Please note that as discussed in the attached report, instrumented differential pressure testing to validate the calculational methodology used to establish torque switch settings is planned in the immediate future for all safety related MOVs. This testing was the subject of a teleconference between Mr. P. B. Nardoci et.al. (DPC) and Mr. R. J. Kiessel et.al. (NRC/0IE) on June 2, 1988. As committed to in that telecon, the details of this differential test plan and approach will be submitted to the NRC as a supplemental bulletin response, and a final bulletin response will be submitted upon completion of the testing.
It is currently anticipated that the details of this differential test plan and approach will be submitted along with the Catawba Nuclear Station Bulletin Action Item f report which is due (for Unit 1) March 23, 1989 (note that it is also intended to make this a combined Unit 1/2 station report as was done for McGuire).
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Should there be any questions concerning this matter or if additional information is required, please advise.
Very truly yours, M
Hal B. Tucker PBN152.lcs Attachment l
i
Mr. S. D. Ebneter
' March 1, 1989
.Page Three xc:
(w/ attachment):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. D. S. Hood, Project Manager Division of Licensing.
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. G. A. Schnebli U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia '30323 Mr. T..A. Lordi, Manager Westinghouse Owners Group c/o Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Services Integration Division Box 2728 Pittsburgh, PA 15230-2728 Mr. P. K. Van Doorn NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
e
'. h
. ;, i DUKE POWER COWANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION NRC/0IE 80LLETIN 85-03 RESPONSE
~
)
i
l Page-1*
I 1
CONTENTS 1
Section Page 1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background
2 l
1.2 Correspondence 2
1.3 Scope 3
1.4 Completed Program Elements 5
j 2.0 Program Description I
2.1 Action Item a: Review and Document the Design Basis 5
l 2.2 Action. Item b: Establish the Correct Switch Settings 6
2.2.1 Torque Switch 6
2.2.2 Torque Switch Bypass Switch 7
2.2.3 Open Position Limit Switch 8
2.2.4 Overload Protection 8
2.3 Action Item c: Field Set Up Each MOV and Demonstrate MOV 8
Operability 2.3.1-Diagnostic Testing 8
2.3.2' Differential Pressure Testing 8
2.4 Action Item d: Ensure the Correct Switch Settings are 10 Maintained-2.4.1 Procedures 10 2.4.2 Post Maintenance Testing 10 2.4.3 Preventative. Maintenance 10 2.4.4 Surveillance Testing 11 2.4.5 Training and Qualification 11 3.0 Program Findings and Results 3.1 Action Items a and b 11 3.2 Action Item c 12 4.0 Attachments - Design Review Data 13-15 - Test Results 16-19 i
._--___m____._____
Page 2' 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
NRC/0IE Bulletin 85-03 was issued on November 15, 1986 as a result of numerous motor operated valve (MOV) failures and degradations experienced throughout the industry. Typical problems cited for MOVs are:
1.
Symptomatic treatment of MOV problems rather than a thorough root-cause problem determination and corrective actions.
2.
Incorrectly set torque, torque bypass and position limit switches due to deficiencies in station set up procedures, inadequate training for technicians, design deficiencies, or unrealized phenomenon occurring when valves are operated under flow and differential pressure conditions.
The intent of the Bulletin is to ensure certain MOVs in the high pressure injection and auxiliary feedwater systems are properly selected, set and maintained operable for the maximum expected design basis conditions.
To achieve this intent, the following four action items were specified:
1.
Item a - Review and document the design basis for each applicable MOV.
2.
Item b - Establish the correct switch settings based on the findings from Item a.
3.
Item c - Field set up of each MOV.
In addition, demonstrate MOV operability.
4.
Item d - Revise or implement procedures to ensure each applicable MOV is maintained operable throughout the life of the plant.
1.2 Correspondence-Since the Bulletin was issued, several events have occurred within Duke Power Company to alter its timing and scope. These alterations are summarized below with the referenced written correspondence from Duke to the NRC:
1.
May 16, 1986 - Initial response to action item a and the plan and timing for completing action items b through d as required by action item e.
2.
November 20, 1986 - As a result of an identified design deficiency in the selection of Rotork actuator torque switch settings, Duke defines an expanded Bulletin 85-03 approach to all station safety related MOVs to be completed within approximately 5 refueling outages.
3
- Page 3*
i 3.
February 18, 1987 - Duke requests a one refueling outage extension for the McGuire Nuclear Station to complete the original Bulletin 85-03 scope. The reason for this extension was the lack of commercially available equipment to perform signature testing of MOVs equipped with Rotork actuators.
Rotork actuators are installed on a majority of the Bulletin 85-03 valves at these two stations 4..
May 28, 1987 - Duke letter to McGuire Resident Inspector, W T Orders, defining MOV test schedule.
5.
January 14, 1988 - Duke issues the final Bulletin 85-03 response for the Oconee Nuclear Station and restates the February 18, 1987 time schedule for McGuire.
6.
May 2, 1988 - Duke responds to a March 31, 1988 request for additional information regarding the May 16, 1986 response for the McGuire Nuclear Station.
. 1.3 Scope A total of 43 MOVs per unit (86 total) were identified in the May 16, 1986 response as falling into the scope of Bulletin 85-03.
These MOVs are listed below:
Valve Function Auxiliary Feedwater System 1,2 CA-7AC Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction supply.
1,2 CA-9B 1,2B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction supply.
1,2 CA-11A 1,2A Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction supply.
1,2 CA-15A 1,2A Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction supply from nuclear service water.
1,2 CA-188 1,2B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction supply from nuclear service water.
1,2 CA-38B Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,20 l
1,2 CA-42B 1,2B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2D.
1,2 CA-46B 1,2B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2C.
1,2 CA-50B Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2C.
1,2 CA-54AC Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2B.
1,2 CA-58A 1,2A Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,28.
l Page 4 '
1,2 CA-62A 1,2A Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2A.
1,2 CA-66AC Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to steam generator 1,2A.
1,2 CA-86A 1,2B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction from nuclear service water.
1,2 CA-116B Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction from nuclear service water.
Safety Injection System 1,2 NI-9A Centrifugal charging pump discharge to reactor coolant system.
1,2 NI-10B.
Centrifugal charging pump discharge to reactor coolant system.
1,2 NI-1008 Refueling water storage tank supply to safety injection pumps.
1,2 NI-103A Safety injection pump 1,2A suction from refueling water storage tank.
1,2 NI-118A 1,2A safety injection pump discharge to cold legs.
1,2 NI-121A 1,2A safety injection pump discharge to hot legs 2 and 3.
1,2 NI-135B Safety injection pump 1,2B suction from refueling water storage tank.
1,2 NI-136B Decay heat removal heat exchanger 1,2B suction to safety injection pumps.
1,2 NI-150B 1,2B safety injection pump discharge to cold legs.
1,2 NI-152B 1,2B safety injection pump discharge to hot legs 1 and 4.
1,2 NI-162A Safety injection pump discharge to cold legs.
1,2 NI-173A Decay heat removal header to reactor coolant cold legs.
1,2 NI-178B Decay heat removal header to reactor coolant cold legs.
I 1,2 NI-183B Decay heat removal header to reactor coolant hot legs.
1,2 NI-184B Decay heat removal pump section from containment sump line 1,28.
1,2 NI-185A Decay heat removal pump suction from containment sump line 1,2A.
1,2 NI-332A Safety injection pump suction from decay heat removal heat exchanger 1,2A.
1,2 NI-333B Safety injection pump zuction from decay heat removal heat exchanger 1,2A.
1,2 NI-334B Safety injection pump suction from decay heat removal heat exchanger 1,2A.
Chemical and volume control system 1,2 NV-78 Letdown isolation outside reactor building.
1,2 NV-94AC Seal water return isolation inside reactor building.
1,2 NV-958 Seal water return isolation outside reactor building.
1,2 NV-141A Volume control tank to charging pump suction header.
1,2 NV-1428 Volume control tank to charging pump suction header.
i 1,2 NV-221A Refueling water storage tank to centrifugal charging pump suction.
1,2 NV-222B Refueling water storage tank to centrifugal charging pump suction.
1,2 NV-244A Charging line isolation.
1,2 NV-245B Charging line isolation.
~
Page 5 1
1.4 Completed Program Elements 1.
Design Engineering review of MOV design basis, including:
a.
Procurement of vendor valve and actuator data.
b.
Systems review of valve functional requirements for both accident and normal operation.
2.
Design Engineering calculation based on vendor sizing criteria and review of MOV switch settings.
3.
field verification of basic valve and actuator data to ensure conformance to design documents.
4.
Completed signature analysis testing to ensure proper torque, torque bypass and position limit switch settings. That is, stem thrust was measured at torque switch trip and correct placement of torque bypass and position limit switches were verified with signature analysis equipment.
5.
Revised and upgraded procedures for corrective and preventative maintenance, and diagnostic testing.
6.
Revised and updated Design Engineering controlled MOV set point document.
7.
Incorporation of post-maintenance testing to ensure design set points are not affected by certain maintenance activities.
2.0 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 2.1 Action Item a: Review and Document the Design Basis For each of the Bulletin MOVs, system design basis conditions were calculated and documented in a controlled document.
This document contains information such as valve function, failure mode, leakage criterin, as purchased design pressure and temperature, valve normal position, valve motion to perform safety function, inlet pressure, minimum downstream pressure, inlet temperature, flow rate and operating differential pressure.
Listed below for each system is the Design document number.
System Design Document Number Auxiliary Feedwater MCDS-1223.42-00-XXX Safety Injection MCDS-1223.12-00-XXX Chemical and Volume Control MCDS-1223.04-00-XXX (Where XXX is a specific delineator for a particular valve or group of valves)
'________________A
Page 6 '
, provides a summary of the system design basis review for each of the Bulletin MOVs.
O t
2.2 Action Item b: Establish the Correct Switch Settings 2.2.1 Toraue Switch Torque switches for all Bulletin MOVs were' set by station personnel to deliver a prescribed differential pressure thrust (within a thrust range) as measured in-situ by MOV diagnostic equipment. The thrust range is provided by way of a Design Engineering controlled set point document (Design Study MGDS-59/01; Task 30668). Calculations used to generate the input values for this document are also found in an in-house Design Engineering controlled document (MCC-1205.00-00-0010).
To genercte this thrust range, the valve specific differential pressure determined from Item 'a' was used to calculate the thrust theoretically required to open and close the valve. Development of thrust values for gate and globe valves'is based primarily on the standard formula, i
Thrust = Differential Pressure Seat Load + Stem Piston Load
+ Packing Load i
I This is a well established formula that accounts for valve type and size
{
differences. The weakness in the formula is that the largest factor (Differential Pressure Seat Load) is calculated by use of an empirically derived valve factor for each valve type. Typically, all flex wedge gates use a factor of.3 and all globe valves use 1.1.
Test data supporting these factors is difficult to obtain and where it does exist it is usually proprietary.. A range of factors to cover internal valve design differences does not currently exist.
Limited recent differential pressure testing has indicated that these factors can be non-conservative for some valve designs. To add conservatism, a margin was added to the results of the above formula where possible.
In an attempt to obtain more specific valve factors and the most exact valve dimensions, calculations from valve manufacturers were obtained where available. These calculations typically used the nominal factors discussed previously. Where variations did occur they were not usually significant.
Crane-Aloyco, for example, calculated a factor based on seat. angle.
However, the seat angle, and therefore valve factor, was the same for all their gate valves whether it was a flex, solid, or two piece wedge.
Crane-Aloyco did add an additional seating factor to the above equation.
This factor is the force required to mechanically flex a wedge and effect the best possible seat leak tightness.
It should be noted that where older vendor calculations were available for comparison, the new calculations generally provided higher thrust numbers.
I
4
\\
Page 7
. Theoretically, opening' loads should be less than closing loads by the difference in the stem piston load for gate' valves. This load is equal to the cross. sectional area of the stem passing through the packing gland multiplied by.the bonnet pressure.
It aids in opening and has to be overcome for valve closing.
For conservatism, the calculated total closing load was used for the total opening load.
Valve manufacturers were asked to provide in their calculations a thrust limiting component in both the opening and closing direction. Calculated thrusts were then compared to the limiting component allowables where available. Generally, the limiting component allowables were two or more times greater than the required thrust to operate the valve and did not present a problem.
The total. valve thrust requirement is made up of a differential pressure sensitive component (Differential Pressure Seat Load + Stem Piston Load) and a constant component (running load) consisting primarily of packing loads. Test experience has shown that actual packing load can vary widely from design depending on-packing type and installation technique.
If, while monitoring a MOV using a diagnostic device that can measure packing load, the actual-running loads are greater than those in the design calculation, then field procedures and the switch set point document require increasing the total thrust to provide the required differential pressure component plus the running load increase. The amount of increase allowed is controlled by the tolerance band.
Total thrust tolerance bands are always positive and provide allowances for running load variations. The station personnel may vary the total load up to the limit of the tolerance without contacting Design Engineering. The tolerances are set to allow reasonable flexibility without encroaching on the design limits.
Loads requiring a greater tolerance may be indicative of valve / operator problems and require that Design Engineering be contacted.
2.2.2 Toraue Switch Bypass Switch All Bulletin valves have torque bypass switches for valve opening. The bypass is set to 50% +/-25% of travel to' ensure that it covers the high unseating load portion of the valve stroke.
The 25% tolerance minimizes j
the chances for setup error caused by unique valve designs. The.same rotor / cam also provides a close torque bypass for the first 50% +/-25% of close travel. The bypass is always setup on a separate rotor / cam so that light indications will not be affected.
I Prior to the open torque switch bypass modifications, these switches were set to cover static unseating only and relied on the open torque switch to overcome any high load period after initial valve uncracking. As a practice, however, the open torque switches were set to their maximum value even prior to the Bulletin evaluation.
y-E W
Page_8 2.2.3 Open Position Limit Switch'
~
All of the Bulletin valves are set to limit open.
The switches are set by.
station procedures which recognize the potential of inertial effects to cause coasting'into the back seat. All valves were verified not.to be contacting the back seat both procedurally and using signature analysis' equipment.
Open indication is also controlled by this switch.
2.2.4 Overload Protection All safety related motor operated valve starters are equipped with thermal overload devices which are connected to alarm only and are continuously bypassed for motor tripping functions. Motor overload indications are provided'in the Control Room.
I 2.3 Action Item c: Field Set Up Each MOV and Demonstrate MOV Operability 2.3.1 Diagnostic Testing
'All Bulletin MOVs were set up using either.MOVATS or VOTES diagnostic equipment.
Since the MOVATS equipment was designed to be used on Limitorque equipped MOVs a modified MOVATS approach had to be developed for use with Rotork equipped MOVs due to significant design differences. This method. involved obtaining both an open and close spring pack to thrust calibration curve using a thrust test fixture equipped with a load cell and test stem..The actuator was then installed on the valve and signatures were taken to quantify valve running loads, ensure sufficient differential pressure thrust was available and to verify torque bypass and position limit switch positions. The advantages of this modified MOVATS approach is that uncertainties of open versus close calibration differences are eliminated and running loads can be quantified.
All Limitorque actuated valves were set up using a conventional MOVATS approach.
Regardless of the method used, however, the objective was to ensure that the proper differential pressure component was being delivered into the seat in excess of running load at close torque switch trip.
I 2.3.2 Differential pressure Testing As discussed in section 2.2.1, an uncertain factor in the valve sizing equation is the Valve Factor (VF).
Basically, when the VF is multiplied by the seat area and differential pressure it should yield the actuator thrust necessary to overcome differential pressure loading, whether seating or unseating.
By subjecting a valve to differential pressure while measuring stem load, this VF can be extracted from the data, i
P' age 9
)
Monitoring stem' load while.the MOV is bein'g challenged against a prescribed differential pressure'is very desirable.
First the VF can be extracted from the data and can be theoretically used to project the valve thrust requirements at other differential pressure' conditions.
This is important since very few valves can'be differential pressure tested at their maximum worst case' expected differential pressure conditions and extrapolation is therefore necessary. Also, the opportunity is then opened for a ' type I
testing' approach in which the VF derived from. valves that'can'be tested under differential pressure conditions are applied to similar valves that cannot be tested under differential pressure.
In addition, by measuring i
this VF the Design calculations used to determine the required thrust output at torque switch trip can be validated.
Second, the degree of thrust margin can be determined from such testing.
By knowing the margin, signature testing can be performed after minor maintenance to verify that sufficient thrust margin still exists. This greatly simplifies post maintenance testing.
If the MOV is verifitd to stroke under a prescribed differential pressure without monitoring stem load, the only thing that is demonstrated is that the valve worked at.that time under that differential pressure condition.
Rigorous validation of the VF and set up margin are not obtained. However, if the valve is set up using a given methodology and then successfully stroked at' differential pressure, a certain degree of confidence in the set up methodology is provided.
Spring pack displacement techniques have been shown to provide possible erroneous results when monitoring a MOV under differential pressure conditions. With the vary recent advent of technology which measures stem force more directly, the possibility now exists fe? obtaining meaningful instrumented differential pressure stem load measurements. At the time this Bulletin work was performed, this option was not technically available, and i.herefore none was performed.
Future instrumented differential pressure testing to validate the calculational methodology used to establish torque switch settings is planned'in the immediate future for all safety related MOVs. A separate document will be submitted detailing this differential pressure test plan and approach.
S Page 10
- 2.4 Action Item d: Ensure the Correct Switch Settinos are Maintained 2.4.1 procedures The following procedures exist to ensure that station MOVs are set and maintained in a high st, ate of operational readiness:
procedure Number proce0ure Title IP/0/A/3066/01 Limitorque Valve Operator Corrective Maintenance IP/0/A/3066/01A Removal and Installation of Limitorque Actuators IP/0/A/3066/01B Torque / Thrust Measurement of Limitorque Operators using the Rotork Test Bench IP/0/A/3066/01C Limitorque Actuator Performance Test en Kerotest Valves using Force Transducer IP/0/A/3066/06 Testing of Limitorque Operators using MOVATS IP/0/A/3190/10 Limitorque Operator Preventative Maintenance IP/0/A/3066/02 Rotork Actuator Testing and Certification IP/0/A/3066/02A Installation, Removal, and Set-up of Rotork Actuators IP/0/A/3066/028 Rotork Actuator Troubleshooting and Repair IP/0/A/3066/02C Rotork Actuator Performance Testing on Kerotest Valves using Force Transducer IP/0/A/3066/02D Rotork Actuator Preventative Maintenance IP/0/A/3066/02E Rotork Actuator Certification using the Portable Test Bench IP/0/A/3066/02G Testing Rotork Operators using MOVATS IP/0/A/3066/02H Testing Rotork Operators using VOTES IP/0/A/3066/02I Testing Rotork Operators using MOVATS SSR IP/0/A/3066/05 Field Change out Rotork NA2 Actuator Switch IP/0/A/3190/08 Rotork Actuator Periodic Inspection PT/0/A/4350/31 Yearly Rotork Maintenance Review 2.4.2 post Maintenance Testing j
Post maintenance testing is performed for all Bulletin MOVs after valve packing adjustments whenever the valve is capable of being stroked after such adjustment. Any valve with stroke timing exceptions in the existing station IW program is not included in this requirement. The purpose of such testing is to ensure that the design differential pressure thrust values are maintained according to the set point document. Diagnostic testing procedures listed in section 2.4.1 are used to perform this testing.
i 2.4.3 preventative Maintenance Preventative maintenance is performed for all Bulletin and safety related harsh environment Limitorque actuated valves every 18 months using station procedure IP/0/A/3190/10.
4 Page 11 For all Bulletin and safety related Rotork actuated valves, preventative maintenance is performed every 5 years using station procedure IP/0/A/3066/02D.
The reason for this extended frequency is that Rotork actuators use heavy weight gear oil in the gear cases and no lubricant is used in the switch compartment.
o Gear oil is not subject to separation and deterioration as is possible with grease.
In addition, any loss of lubricant due to seal failure would be externally visible in most cases.
2.4.4 Surveillance Testino Periodic surveillance testing is performed under the station IWV program which' consists of stroke time testing all active MOVs on an established schedule.
2.4.5 Training and Qualification Each crew performing maintenance or testing on active actuators must have at least one person in the crew qualified to the station procedure being i
used under the requirements of the Duke Power Employee Training and Qualification System (ETQS). A description of this program is found in the ETQS Manual.
4 3.0 PROGRAM FIM)INGS AND RESULTS 3.1 Action Items a and b
' As a result of the design basis review and establishment of the torque switch settings, several immediate operability questions were generated. Summarized below are the issues and reporting documents:
1.
Licensing Event Report (LER) 369/86-20 McGuire Nuclear Station -
" Unit Shutdown Oue to Incorrect Torque Switch Settings on Rotork Motor Operators.'" A generic problem was identified in which Rotork torque switches were set based on a linear extrapolation of the full rated actuator torque.
The rated torque was verified to be correct at the maximum setting (5) using a torque test bench.
Using the verified torque output at setting 5 as 100%, the lower torque switch settings were assumed to be a linear extrapolation with a setting i equal to 40% of the verified torque output at setting 5.
For example if the verified torque at setting 5 was 100 ft-lbs, then, based on linear extrapolation, setting 4 would be 85 ft-lbs, 3 would be 70 ft-lbs, 2 would be 55 ft-lbs and 1 would be 40 ft-lb';.
This practice was erroneous since the Rotork spring pack benavior is non-linear.
l 2.
NRC/0IE Information Notice (IN) 86-93: "IEB 85-03 Evaluation of Motor-Operators Identifies Improper Torque Switch Settings." This IN was issued as a result of the above listed LER.
\\
I Page 12 3.
LER 369/86-09:
" Motor Operated Valves Found with Undersized Operators Due to Design and Personnel Errors." This LER involved having inadequate actuator torque output due installation of the incorrect actuator gear ratios for valves 1,2NI-9 and 10.
In addition, 1,2NV-7 were identified as having a lower than required torque switch setting (setting of 2 versus a required setting of 4).
3.2' Action Item c Signature analysis test results are summarized in Attachment 2.
In general, all Bulletin gate valves had open torque switch bypass coverage for static unseating only and therefore were relying on the open torque switch to' overcome differential pressure sliding friction.
However, the open torque switches were set to their mnimum values even prior to the Bulletin evaluation.
All Bulletin valves were mod' fied to have a 50% +/-25% open and close torque switch bypass coverage such that full actuator stall capabilities are available i
to overcome opening differential pressure effects.
Bulletin valves 1,2CA-38, 50, 54 and 66 were the only ones with Limitorque actuators.
Preventative maintenance was performed for all eight MOVs. Of these eight, six were refurbished due to mixed grease concerns and one defective torque switch was replaced.
Signature analysis testing identified 15 out of 86 MOVs as having low as found close torque switch set points.
All Bulletin MOVs with Rotork actuators were found overall to be in good condition.
?
I l
l
i i
ATTACHMENT 1: DESIGN REVIEW DATA'- UNIT 1 VALVE AS MAIIMUM VALVE VALVE MOTION TO VALVE ACTUATOR VALVE 10 PURCHASED EIPECTED NORMAL PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTION MF6.
MF6.
SIZE &
DIFF. PRESS. DIFF. PRESS. POSITION OPEN CLOSE CYCLE TYPE
................................................ _ = - _ -
ICA0007 135 115 OPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 1CA0009 135 115. OPEN 1
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 1CA0011 135 115 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 1CA0015 135 135 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 1CA0018 135 135 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 1CA0038 1730 1730 GPEN X
BORG-W LIMITORQUE 4'/6T 1CA0042 1665 1665 DPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 1CA0046 1665 1665 CPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 1CA0050 1730 1730 OPEN I
BORG-W LIMITOROVE 4'/6T 1CA0054 1730 1730 CPEN X
80R6-W LIMITORGUE 4'I6T ICA0058 1665 1665 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 1CA0062 1665 1665 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 1CA0066 1730 1730 OPEN X
BORG-W LIMITORQUE 4'l6T 1CA0006 135 115 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 1CA0116 135 115 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T IN10009 2735 2735 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 1NI0010 2735 2735 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T IN!0100 240 240 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T IN10103 240 240 OPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 1N!0118 1740 1740 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4*/6T IN10121 2485 2485 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T.
IN10135 240 240 OPEN I
WALWDPiH POTORK 6'/GT INI0136 600 600 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T IN10150 1740 1740 OPEN 1
WALWORTH. ROTORK 4'/6T IN!0152 2485 2485 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T INI0162 1740 1740 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T IN!0173 2485 2485 OPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/GT IN10178 2485 2485 OPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T IN10183 2485 240 CLOSED 1
WALWORTH ROTORK 12'/6T INIO!84 450 450 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 18'/6T IN10185 450 450 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 18'/6T IN!0332 240 240 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T IN10333 240 240 CLOSED X
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/61 1N10334 240 240 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTOPK 6'/6T INV0007 600 600 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 3'/6L INV0094 150 150 OPEN 1
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T INV0095 150 150 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T INv0141 150 78.5 GPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4*/6T 1NV0142 150 78.5 OPEN X
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T INV0221 220 204 CLOSED 1
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T INV0222 220 204 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 1NV0244 2735 2717 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTOPK 3'/6T INV0245 2735 2717 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 3'/6T l
1 1
ATTACHMENT 1: DESIGN REVIEW DATA - UNIT 2 VALVE AS MAllMUM VALVE VALVE MOTION TO VALVE ACTUATOR VALVE ID PURCHASED EIPECTED NORMAL PERFORH SAFETY FUNCTION MF6.
MF6.
SIZE &
I DIFF. PRESS. DIFF. PRESS. POSITION OPEN CLOSE CYCLE TYPE 2CA0007 135 115 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2CA0009 135
-115 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/GT 2CA0011 135 115 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2CA0015 135 135 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/GT
]
2CA0018 135 135 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTCCK 6'/6T 2CA0038 1730 1730 OPEN A
BORG-W LIMITORQUE 4'/6T 2CA0042 1665 1665 OPEN I
WALWORTH RUTORK 4'/6T l
2CA0046 f665 1665 OPEN F
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2CA0050 1730 1730 OPEN BORG-W LIMITORQUE 4*/6T 2CA0054 1730 1730 OPEN BOR6-W LIMITORQUE 4*/6T 2CA0058 1665 1665 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4*/GT 2CA0062 1665 1665 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2CA0066 1730 1730 OPEN I
BORG-W LIMITORQUE 4'/6T 2CA0086 135 115 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2CA0116 135 115 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2N!0009 2735 2735 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N10010 2735 2735 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N10100 240 240 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2N!0103 240 240 DPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/ST 2N10l!8 1740 1740 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N10121 2485 2485 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N!0135 240 240 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 2N10136 600 600 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2N!0150 1740 1740 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N10152 2485 2485 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4*/6T 2N!0162 1740 1740 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2N10173 2485 2485 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK B'/6T 2N!0178 2485 2485 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T 2N10183 2485 240 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 12'/6T 2N10184 450 450 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 18'/6T 2N!0185 450 450 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 18'/6T 2N!0332 240 240 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 2N10333 240 240 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 2N10334 240 240 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 6'/6T 2NV0007 600 600 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 3'/SL 2NV0094 150 150 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/GT 2NV0095 150 150 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/GT 2NV0141 150 78.5 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2NV0142 150 78.5 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 4'/6T 2NV0221 220 204 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK 8'/6T i
2NV0222 220 204 CLOSED I
WALWORTH ROTORK B'/6T l
2NV0244 2735 2717 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 3'/6T
]
2NV0245 2735 2717 OPEN I
WALWORTH ROTORK 3'/6T l
i i
I i
ATTAQ MENT 1 HEADER EXPLANATIONS 1
i VALVE 10 The equipment identification designation.
AS PURCHASE 0 DIFF. PRESS.
This is the differential pressure that the valve and actuator i
assembly Were designed to operate against.
j MAXIMUM EXPECTED DIFF. PRESS.
This is the maximum worst case differential pressure conditions which the valve and actuator assembly will be required to operate against. The value listed here was derived taking into account all system conditions which the valve would be required to operate against (both accident and normal operation).
' VALVE NORMAL POSITION Ouring normal plant operations the valve is in this position.
VALVE MOTION TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTION This defines the position the valve must move to in order to i
perform its safety function.
j VALVE MFG.
Manufacturer of the valve.
ACTUATOR MFG.
Manufacturer of the actuator.
l VALVE SIZE & TYPE Valve nominal pipe size and whether it is a gate (GT) or globe (GL) valve design.
i f
1l
]lI' i;llI
.lI jI 1ll J
+
~
EN I
5 5
5 5 5 5 4 6 55M25 I
5 5
29 8 3 7 1 1 7
%. 2 4 4 4 7 6 7 9 6 7 7 9 511 1 5 e2 8 858 63.3 1 7 53 2 6 8 51 1 6 7 2 9 N
50 3 6 4 07.315.7 0 64 3 1
6 6 0 1 2 H. 4 6 094 P t C I 9 8 8 0 77 1 6 7 f 37 4 1 02 4 6 1 3 3 0 e
4 1
E E 7
l 9 9 7 6 0 7B 69 79 0
5 O 8E
/ / / 8 / 8 5 3 1 55 555 / 53 51 1 5 1/11 8 1 / / / / / / / / / 5 / t / /
/ /
/ / 9 / / / 1 1 1
/ 9 / i 1 2 2O 7 89 555/I g 78
/ /
A S 3 9 83 8 1 7 1 4 0 6 9 0 1 55 / 0 1 5 1 7 5 / 3 5 4 53 3 4 9 L I 4
7 925 6
7 7 9 5 1 9. 3 2 1 2 9 9 62 4 6 1 1 4 0 83 6 6 4 1 2 M. 5 1 9 07 A S 4 6 5. 3 8 0. 5 50 95 2 0 1 1 9 3 6 4 75 4 6 7 5 1 3 9 6 4 1 3 5
7 3
/
4 P
4 4 6 4 5325 4 4 2553 8 34 4 5 55 7. 6 25 4 5 523 1 533 5 f
O 5
6 1 1 n
l 5
e KC 0 %5 A
855 0 5 6 0 A 5A 55 M952 85 8 05 2 U
1 N 1M. 9 k
29 9 0 6A A 5A A A 0 A 2A 6 4 5A A A 2 E
8 E I S 52 3 3 3 99 77 1 4 4 5 7 /
3 / 8 3 6 0 0 3 / / 3 / / / 0/
S 1
a I 543 / / /
4 N N I N 1 3 6 57 6 0. 1 659 28 N N N N N 4 N N N 6
- 5. N 4 4 4 T
1 1
P t
0 0
- 0 0 0 0
A F 0 01 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 4 00 00 4 5 7 0 6 0 5.00 01 4 0 6 5 o
L I I 2 0 3 6 6 0 9 3 2 4 6 5 5 71 05 6 7 0 9 2 7 5 1 01 1 7 0 2 3 6 6 0 6 052u0 0 e07 3 60 l
A L L 5 1 4 22 II 9 9 0 78 8 9 1 23 1 1 5 4 9 1 3 6 991 21 54 4 3 32B 1 l I 54 87 u2I 9 4 0 M4 0
f 33 I 8B 1 1 9 93 6 4 22 9 4 4 0 09 7 59 95 525 9 0 9 l 95 856 5 6 2 4
4 9 K
0 er P
u 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
6 7 4 6 4 7
t
- 5. A A F 0 00 00 A N90 8 9 5A 0 0 4 6 7 1 6 51 4 7 / / 3 6 5 9 1 59 952 1 0 / / 2 2 7 2 L L 4 0852 ! 5 0
A 1 9 23 0 1 00 0580 A A 068 6 a
O 0 0 225 4
KI 5
1 7 / 4 03 8 57 9 K
4 57 1 N 1 9 1 1 1 8 6 7 1 1 5 4 1 854 lt 4 25 1 4 N2 4 3 3 9 4 2 251 N 4 6 3 2 2 02 925 N N 60 33 n
1 6 3 35 4 3 64 41 921 4 361 g
8 i
S S
E A H0 00 0 0 0 5 0 O 0 059 0 5 e 5. O S OF 0
0 0 71 3 e8 6 8 0 07 3 4 0 0 0 620 n
OL I 0
4 9 5 e a 2 0 e 2M7 Ma 50 0 7 6 0 1 9 4
%S M99 3 t 5 4 4 3 2551 00 0 3002 eI e
L L
4 7 1 8 9
7 3 1 9
%I 95i2 02297 B5 5 001 65 I r
C N 1
1 1 1
1 2 4
l 2
1 1
1 1 I N
N G
tt r
N OF 0
00 9 0 0 9 0 0 00 8 0 1 0 A A A A A A AA A 0 A AAA0 0 A i / /
aA A o
E LI H6 e 50 e 3 5 e e 0 5 e 0 4 2 5 e 4 0 7 0 e / / / / / / / / / 0 / / / / 4 2 /
P L
97 83 7 a 1 2 059 3 29 9 0 N N N N N N N N N5 N N N N7 5N N N N B N 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 d
N N
ao I
l S I
%35250 0 4 1 34 00658 0 e
0 1 000 0 0 0 0 4 50 0 0 0 02 0 0 0 09 0 0 1 0 0H3 NS 0250 4 2 0 29 0 4 9 0 57 7 6 2 5 4 04 5 920 r
I I
527 07 3 5052 1 9 0 1
P I
N 009 4 0 8 1 7 8 7 9 5 35 2 4 226 M5 N
7 9 0 9 4 6 5 1 0 7 9 4 24 3 9 9 322N1 559 9 T i L 4 3 4 33 t 9 9 2 8 98 3 4 4 3 3 6 4 l 0 4 91 0 1 1 3 1 5 4 4 1
0 0 6 5 4 5 44 4 A
1 L
1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 k
A c
I a
Si 009 394 007 4 P
0 0t 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 2 0 00 09 9 27 62?l 0 0 94 00A A 0 1 2 4 g
N5 H600O 1 / 0 2
A 4 e000 9A 6 20 6 7 7 0 0 0 5A A 4 4 27 5 95 59M6 M2 52 0 N8341 4 6 I
1 F NI I
9 9 5 2 1 / 1 3 52 47 43 2 20 3 / / 0 0 2 4
/ / 2 0 5 8 1 M6 56 03 2N N 5 4 3 4 4 0 691 N N7 8 2 3 4 T l L 4 67I 1 N 2 n
A 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 354 2 1
1 N
irp I I i 0
0 0 0
4 4 8
8 022 E S$
55555 0 550 0550 555 5 3 051 07 51 8 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 1 00 00559 9 S
G INT 555 5 5 4 5 5 1 1 991 1 7 7 22 01 9 7 1 7 1 9 9 9 9 24 4 4 4 4 7221 1 5599 w
A l
l 333221 9 91 4 4 55 4 55552 8 4 9 0 9 4 9 9 0 0 0 880 1 1 5 0 05 5 4 4 0 0 N
7 7 7 09 1 1 1 1 2 0 7 7 4 4 0 2 2 1 0 8 9 1 1 7 7 4 4 5 5 A
1 1 33 1 1 5 4 1 9 4 T f A o
le T
S I 1 022 B
EF S 0 00 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 00 0 0559 9 4 3 0 81 07 81 1 0 0 0 5 50 0W9 1 1 01 0 1
4 55 M22 E F E 0 001 1 099 0 0 00 0 9 0 4 59 4 959 9 0 0 0 98 4 4 4
N I
R 3 3 3 6 69 7 7 9 9 7 7 9 3 3 I 4 2 9 8259 867 7 1 33 2226 1 1 4 4I 77 4 4 4 4 6 9 9 9 9 9 4 99 9 9 d
A BP 2221 1 9 779 977 9 22I 1 5 9 1 4 9 7 1 1
1 a
I o.
E 1
T N I
G l B 55580 05500550553 3 0 0 0 0 00 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 g
E t A 7 77 3 3 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 7 7 1 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 00 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 3
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 22 21 n
N C D 3 3 32253 35 53 3 5 3 33 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 i
T A A L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 53 1 1 2 24 3 31 1 1 1 11 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 I
I P l
n N
t n
E u
S 5
1 1 1 i 1
T 2
1 5 5 1 5 5 5
i T
1 R
OS5 5
1 1 51 1 5 i 2 S
LS -
1
- 9. I 5575 6 1 I 1 T 1 i
1 I i 1 1 5 22 l 5
- 5. i 1 5
i I 8 27.I 1
I f T
- 7. I
- l. 2 4 1 2I S 54 T
C I 1 2
l 21 I 4 4 4 I I i 3 I
1 1
I 3
3 1 4 4
l 1
3 L
2 332 34 3
1 1
U L
2 3
S A
E N
N E
5 T
P S5
- 5. L L2I LL 2
S O S -
L LL LL L L L L L L L L L LL LL L L L L L L LL LL LL L L L L L E
T 1 55S5 52S5 55 1 5S5 555 55555$55 5555S5S$55555555 T
L 1
A 3
0 E
5 S
1 I
T T
i 8
OS5 5
- 5. 7 5
5 5
T 5 T
A A 5
I u
C I l 3 3 2
- 2. 1552.I L S -
1 1 1 T 21 I T 1 T 57.i
- 3. T I / / 1 1
i T 1 i 1 i i i T 1 1 T 1 3I N N 3 2. 3 5 22I 4 1
4 5 4 S5 4 t 3 S2t 4 t t l 33223 l
M 3
4 4
1 1 4 3
2 3
i EL E
u f
L I
P 55 5 7.5 B 3 -
L L L LL 5. L 5
5 L
L L 7. 5 5 $ S SL L L 5. 5 5LLLL LL LLLLLLL L LLL L 5. 5 5 L L L
LL L2 1 l S55551 55 5SSS $SS5 55$555S5 4
1 2
F 4
l 4
4 TN E
I E
7 9 l 6 6 9 0 03 8 1 5 0 223 83MI3523 4 7 4 51 21 24 5 5802u55 0 4 0 2u01 l l 1 1 77 6
0 0
23M556 1 V
0 0l 224 1
33 099 4 4 C
L 0 0 0 0 001 3 4 5
22M 1
0 0 t 0 0 00 t 0 1 0 01 1 10l 0
l l 3330 0 0 l 1 2 A
0 1 0 00 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 t0 0 6 0 00 le01 0e0 001 0 1 CCCC CCC t C C CC tC 0 N N N N N N9 N N 1 1 1 l i I 190 0 00 tG 0 t tt 00tt9 I
9 AAAA AA A aA AAAaA 41 1 1 1 i1 1 i 1 1591 1 1 1NunNI I 1 1 I I l I 1 I I I U Y Y p Y Y eY Y I
1 5 N N uN 5 NNN T
N N N N A
I I I I I I I I I I I I I i1 I I 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 1 t i ItjII:l I
L
g,
(
i t
i w.
=5 B E ? ? '! = 2 & n : s E R z = 9 9 % E = x 2 9ss usES=88Sn9E5scM5ng ElW-EEEedtEddesddis d$_tC55de55.Sct35EEtiec5stide5-s - s - s s s - - s - =. n a s E n
- s SE-=nss
-Es snscEs98gn9 w-sss==s;-;sa s g
s s s s - s.- s s ;
lEU
%%EEEE!!I.@5$(@@$$%@EE(@E5!@4%~5$44435E55283
[
w!B giggl Egg!!!_gE_gEEE65E_2,88 Egg ll8llggggE3_5Eg58_3 j
,z-E s
~ __
I E
[_=5Eg!!gE![8E_E.E_EEE_E,E.gE_E_g]llEEgggg53_EEEsii 3
E_
E
=8B g
g G
3 E-B IEE31-Eg--83-3E--53Ep25EREMEEEEEEgEEWIAsEEE
=
.e5
}
~
~
~~
EB sagan-ga --s-ggg
-s!-s-ggs-in---ags--an-
-E 8
s I"_=
- i a lli_ a t_ t_ i_ E_ I_ R i f E E_ E E 5 t_ E E E t_ i g g g 5 6 5 f i E E E R ~S E R E E 1
=
=
-
-= --=
==
,=-
.v IE. ga-EEs=I_E=8tagnEggEggsggaglgsgsggag-g*sgegs e e
=
-a
=
- = -~_
__c s
L
_mm__~~_
m n
l
,8 l l k l l 6 _E I_ 6_ _6 E_ E_ b_ h h _ E_ g E s E E h s_ g g h k.
I. I. !. g k k E_ E_ b E g g f
IE!
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!EEEEEEE55kk!kkEEEEEEEEIEEE 3
3
_a a
_gE E_G_E_E_EE_EEEE_E_E_E_E_E_EE_E_EE__EE_E_E_R_R_ggI,ggE_E_E__*8888EE88 g"-
=
~
I c
EI N. 5.,9 9, m E_ m E, 9_ 9_ ".ri E, 9_ = 9 3 9, = 9_ k M, 9_ = k 5 m = = = 9_ 9,5 3. m m = m = 9 g.
m m
,m_
a
~
dMdNw MN NN NNNdNddddMddNddddddMddNdMNNNNN 1
m:
samm3-55s 355=mmm=====m=========5m=mm=m555=
of
=
=
J IEI S$wwd w3SS$wS*xxxdddxxwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwxxwww i
=*
=~
=g=8sEssassuesssaggg I
IEIEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE s'
W 4
ATTAQ9ENT 2 HEADER EXPLANATIONS AF OpEN TSS The as found open torque switch setting prior to adjustment using signature analysis.
"L" and "T" are for Rotork actuators in which the torque / limit switch can be set to act as both a limit o
and torque switch (position "L") or only as a torque switch (position "T").
AF CLOSE TSS The as found close torque switch setting prior to adjustment using signature analysis.
"L" and "T" are for Rotork actuators in which the torque / limit switch can be set to act as both a limit and torque switch (position "L") or only as a torque switch (position "T").
AL OpdN TSS The as left open torque switch setting after adjustment using signature analysis.
AL CLOSE TSS The as left'close torque switch setting after adjustment using signature analysis.
TARGET PACKING LOAD This is the design packing load value (1bs.) specified in the Design Engineering controlled switch setting document. This value is for reference only. The actual packing load may exceed this value.
TARGET DIFF PRESS This is the differential pressure component (Differential Pressure Seat Load,1bs. + Stem piston Load,1bs.) loading specified in the Design Engineering controlled switch setting document at the maximum expected differential pressure.
TARGET THRUST AT TST This is the total stem load requirement, lbs., (Differential Pressure Seat Load + Stem Piston Load + Packing Load) at the i
torque switch trip point specified in the Design Engineering controlled switch setting document at the maximum expected differential pressure. To this value typically a +15% tolerance is applied for set up purposes.
If the tolerance must be exceeded due to higher than expected packing load, Design Engineering must be contacted for approval.
AF THRUST AT TST This is the as found total stem load (lbs.) measured at the torque switch trip point using signature analysis prior to any torque switch adjustment.
Page 2, Attachment 2 Header Explanations AL THRUST AT TST This is the as left total stem load (1bs.) measured at the torque swi ch trip point using signature analysis after final torque switch adjustment.
OPEN RUN LOAD The average measured open running load (1bs.) using signature analysis equipment.
In many cases where spring pack displacement techniques are used this value is not measurable because it is below spring pack preload or an open signature was not taken.
CLOSE RUN LOAD The average measured close running load (1bs.) using signature analysis equipment.
In many cases where spring pack displacement techniques are used this value is not measurable because it is below spring pack preload.
AF DELTA p The as found difference between the close torque switch trip load (1bs.) and the close running load (1bs.) as measured using signature analysis equipment at no differential pressure prior to i
close torque switch adjustment. This value is compared to the TARGET DIFF PRESS load for acceptance.
AL DELTA p The as left difference between the close torque switch trip load (1bs.) and the close running load (1bs.) as measured using signature analysis equipment at no differential pressure after final close torque switch adjustment. This value is compared to the TARGET DIFF PRESS load for acceptance.
UNSEAT TIME The time (seconds) when the unseat spike on the MOV thrust signature returns to a running load value.
AL OPEN BYp/ STROKE TIME This is the ratio of the open torque switch bypass duration (seconds) to the total open stroke time (seconds) as measured using signature analysis equipment. Adequate bypass coverage to overcome opening differential pressure effects is demonstrated by this ratio.