ML20246F459
| ML20246F459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1989 |
| From: | Bockhold G GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Casto C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246F451 | List: |
| References | |
| NOT-01723, NOT-1723, NUDOCS 8908300348 | |
| Download: ML20246F459 (27) | |
Text
_ - _ - - _ - _ _ -..,
Nuclear Plant Vogtte "3
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Waynesboro. Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 724 8114 404 $54 f>%1 m
Nuclear Plant Vogtle GeorgiaPower rne r.aarnem elecinc nstem Nuclear Plant Vogtle - Units 1 & 2 Written Examination Comments June 12, 1989 Log: NOT-01723 Security Code: NC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 ATTENTION:
Mr. Charles Casto
Dear Mr. Casto:
Attached are the comments compiled by the Training Department regarding the Written Examination conducted at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant on June 12, 1989. Your consideration of these comments in grading of the examination is appreciated.
Very truly yours, G. Bockhold, Jr.
General Manager f D' RED:msh 1
ATTACEMENT xc:
W. G. Hairston (w/o attachments)
C. K. McCoy (w/o attachments) i 1
8908300348 890823 PDR ADOCK 05000424 V
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1 2,.__2LeMI_EXIIEDE_13
_9NE_%eNI-WIDE _ EEL 4 BIG PCg3 62 REHE99EIBILIIIER_11E11 QUESTION 3.96 (1.99)
Concerning the Reactor Coolant Pump #3 seal, describe the source and motive f orce f or injection, and to where the leakof f flows.
j ANSWER 3.06 (1.00)
Water flows from a standpipe (B.25) through the seal by static head (0.25)
Top seal leakoff goes to the containment sump (0.25)
Bottom seal leakoff (joins #2 seal leakoff and) goes to the RCDT (0.25)
REFERENCE LO-LP-16491-83 Objectives 2 h 3, p.
B.
KA:
983999K193 (3.3) 993B98K193
..(KA's) i
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' Question 3.06 Facility.Connent: Answer to the question references the top and bottom seal leakoff from the #3 seal in the answer key..
The question only asks where the~1eakoff goes and does net j
'specify that the' candidate'should include the specific part of the seal providing this-leakage.
Recommendation:
We recommend that reference to the top and bottom part of
. the seal be deleted as required information for full credit.
No references attached l
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h__E6MI_sysIE55.181_MD_P(MIdlDE_MgSIC O esit9tst1Rik111EF_11tn cg>.1 QUESTION 3.25 (1.58)
Fill in the f ollowing blanks with the correct parameters f or the Safety Injection Pumps.
Design shut off heads psig in the RCS Design runout heads.____________ psig Rated flows
____________ gpm ANSWER 3.25 (1.58)
(8.5 each) 1.
1548 psig.(+ or - 198 psig) 2.
75 psig
(+ or - 18 psig)
.3.
425 gpm
(+ or - 25 gpm)
REFERENCE 1
LO-LP-13281-93-C, Obj ecti ve 5, pp. 13 L 14 KA:
986888K683 (3.6)
BB6009K683
..(KA's) i i
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O Question'3.25 Facility' Comment:
The design runout head for the Safety Injection (SI) pumps.
was listed in the answer key as.75 psig which is indicated as bc.:ing taken from Vogtle lesson plan LO-LP-13201-03-C.
This material was taken from this source as contained in the attached reference (3.25-a),but the 75,psig is a typographical error as can be' checked by converting-1650 ft.
water head to psig.
The proper answer should be approximately 710 psig'as indicated on page 6 of the same lesson plan and enclosed as reference 3.25-b.
Recommendation:.
We recommend that the answer to part -2 of this question be changed to 710 psig i 100 psig.
. References 3.25-a and 3.25-b enclosed.
{m
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'o-'e-is201-Os Ill.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES n
1.'
STATE THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERMEDIATE HEAD E-Q SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM l
Provides cool, borated water to the RCS to mit-1 igate a: consequences of LOCA, SLB, or SGTRg works
-in conjunction with high and low head portions of ECCS 2.
DRAW A ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF THE INTER, MEDIATE HEAD i
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM.
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR COMPONENTS:
a.
RWST b.
SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS (SIP's) c.
LOOP PENETRATIONS (B0TH HQT AND COLD LEGS) d.
VALVES WITH SAFETY RELATED (SI) CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND REMOTELY OPERATED VALVES e.
INJECTION THROTTLE VALVES Refer to LO-TP-132C11-005 3.
DESCRIBE THE FLOW PATH ESTABLISHED BY THE-INTER-MEDIATE HEAD SI SYSTEM UPON RECEIPT OF AN SI ACTUATION SIGNAL.
Injection phase in the flow path established on receipt of SI actuation signal - shown darkened on deawing LO-TP-13201-005 4.
LIPT Tr4E STARTING DUTY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SI PUMPS.
2 consecutive starts from ambientetemperature A subsequent restart is permitted after 15 min-utes if motor is lef t running or af ter 45 min-utes if the motor is lef t idle
.j(. 5.
STATE THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS FOR THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS:
a.
SHUTOFF HEAD (PP.ESStlRE)
- 3550 ft., or 1540 psi, or 1625 psig in RCS b.
RATED FL0tl 425 gpm 13
'( )'
()
LO-LP-13201-03 111. LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES hbre. RUNOUT HEAD (PRESSURE)
Flow = 650 gom 1650 ft., or 75 psi 6.
DESCRIBE THE FLOW PATH FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.
a.
Containment sumps to RHR pump suctions via 8811A and B (RWST suctions 8812A and B shut) b.
RHR pumps to RHR heat exchangers c.
RHR heat exchangers tot il Cold legs via 8809A and B 2)
Suction of CCP's via 8804A i
CCP's to cold legs via 8801A and B 11 Mini-flow to RWST isolated (850BA and B, 8509A and B shut) ~
2)
Suction header cross-connected to SIP's (8924, 8807A and B open) 3)
Suction from RWST (112D and E) shut e.
SIP's to cold legs via 8835 1)
Mini-flow to RWST isolated (8813,8814, 8920 shut) 2)
Budtion header cross-connected to CCP's 3)
Suction from RWST (8806) shut i
7.
DESCRIBE THE FLOW PATH FOR MOT LEG RECIRCULATION-Notes performed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after initiation of ECCS -- already in cold leg recirculation l
a.
RHR heat exchangers tot
- 1) het lets via 8716A and B and 8840 (colp leg injection ~ valves 8009A and B shut) 14
O O
<0.<p.13201 03 lli.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES N E.
Major Components
, hh 1.
SIP-A and SIP-B Located on Level B, Auxiliary Building a.
b.
Power supplies 1)
SIP A--4160KV, 1AA02, Breaker 16
- 2) SIP B--4160KV, 1BA03, Sr.eaker 17 Design pressure-1750 psig c.
d.
Design temperature--300"F e.
Design flow--425 gpm Objective 5b f_. Design head--2690 ft. (1150 psi)
LO-TP-13201-004 1)
TDH (f t or psil is diHerence between pump inlet and pump discharge pressure g.
Maximum flow-650 gpa Objective 5c g
h.
Design head at max flow-1650 f t. (710 psig) 1.
Design shutoff head--1625 psig Objective 5a 1)
Shutoff head occurs when the resistance to flow is equal to the pressure being supplied J.
Required NPSH at any flow--less than 15 ft.
Values given here i differ from pump k.
Motor has two motor coolers (30 gpa each curves due to:
NSCW)
- 1) Static pressur g
difference 1.
Pump be'arings have oil cooler (10 gpm NSCW) 2)
Instrument and will run only 40 seconds without NSCW accuracy flow. Pump has eleven impellors and a mechanical seal m.
Each pump is 100% capacity for ESF analysis n.
Handswitches on QMCB-A and respective shut-down panel i
1)
Sive alarm on SSMP when in Pull-to-Locl; StartingdutyoftraSipump Objective 4 o.
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1 QUESTION 3.27 (1.09)
Which ONE of the f ollowing correctly describes system response if operator error causes an inadvertent Train "A" S1 signal to be sent to the Safeguards Sequencer (s) during surveillance testing?
a.
Only the Train A diesel will start Only the Train A sequencer will operate No loads will sequence on b.
Only the Train A diesel will start Only the Train A sequencer will operate Only Train A loads will sequence on c.
Both the Train A and B diesels will start Only the Train A sequencer will operate Only Train A loads will sequence on d.
Both the Train A and B diesels will start Both the Train A and B sequencers will operate Only Train A loads will sequence on e.
Both the Train A and B diesels will start Both the Train A and B sequer.cers will operate Both Train A and B loads will sequence on ANSWER 3.27 (1.Be) a.
(1.0)
REFERENCE LO-LP-B1481-04-C, Objective 6, pp. 12 & 13.
KA:
264008K411 (3.5) 064000K411
..(KA's)
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Question 3.27 Facility Comment: The question lists anever (a.) as the only choice. To make (a.) the correct answet, the SI signal would have to be isolated to the single output to the sequencer. During normal surveillance activities, the " relay mode selector" switch is placed in test which prevents any spurious Safeguards System actuations during tceting as indicated in reference 3.27-a.
If this switch is in test the SI signal to the sequencer would also be blocked due to the inability of the slave relays to energize.
The candidates assumed that if the signal went out to the sequencer that it also was sent to the remaining "A" train loads due to an error in testing which would result in response (b.) being the correct response.
Recommendation:
We recommend that the answer key be changed from (a.) to (b. )
Reference 3.27-a enclosed.
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ESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES g
h.
Panel also contains LEDs for General Warning l { g g h h 1) Two normally energized (General Warning
~
not present) LEDs, indicate general warning status of both trains
^1
- 2) Lense covers are colored green (this
(
train) amber (opposite train)
J
- 3) De-energize when associated train general warning is present (trip or testing) 6.
Output Relay Test fa. Checks continuity of circuit from master relays to coils of slave relays.
(Picks up where logic test lef t off) b.
Utilizes 15 VDC signal, insufficient to actually pick up slave relays h
Requires INPUT ERROR INHIBIT and MULTIPLEX c.
TEST Switches from logic test panel to be placed in INHIBIT position d.
MODE SELECTOR Switch 11 Fron OPERATE to TEST
- 2) Prevents actual actuation by selecting the 15 VDC power supply for master L
relay operation
- 3) Enables master relay selector a.
MASTER RELAY BELECTOR
- 1) Selects master relay to be tested 2) 11 positions f.
RELAY TEST PUSHBUTTON
- 1) Allows test to be performed
- 2) Checks for continuity g.
BLAVES OPERATED lights in Will light to indicate successful test 25
o o.
QUESTION 4.10 (2.50)
. State the RPS trips which provide protection'from exceeding the following thermal limits:
a.
.DN8 less than 1.3 (3 trips required)
(1.5) b.
Peak Clad Temperature greater than 4700. degrees F (2 trips required)-
(1,0)
-ANSWER 4.10 (2.50) a..
1.
OT Delta-T Trip [+0.5]
2.
Loss of. flow trips
'+0.5" 3.
Low pressure trips l+0.5 b.
1.
High neutron flux tri
[+0.5]
2.
OP_ Delta-T trip [+0.5 REFERENCE 1.
Vogtle: LO-LP-36001-03-C.
193009K105
..(KA's)
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. Question 4.10 L,
y ;_
. Facility Conunent: For answer to part "a"_ also accept as possible ansvers:
- 1. ' Undervoltage on RCP' bus -
2.
Underfrequency on RCP bus 3.
Power range / negative rate trip-Recommendation:
Change answer key for part "a" to read:
a.
1.
OT Delta T trip 2.
Low flow trip
- 3. -Low pressure trip 4.
Undervoltage on RCP. bus 5.
Underfrequency on RCP bus 6.
Power range negative rate trip (Any three for.5 pts each)
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LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS-
. BASES i
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Contin The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a preset or calculated level.
In addition to redundant channels and trains variables,.therefore providing Trip System functional div the-The functional diverse Reactor trips for which no direct credit was ass analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. 'The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal-whenever Reactor trip is initiated.
This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecess actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actu(itior System.
Manual Reactor Trip The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.
Power Range, Neutron Flux In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting.
The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during suberitical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power exc'ursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power 4
operations to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion from all power levels.
l The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically; reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.
PowerRange.NeutronFlux,dichRates The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of a rupture of a contrcl rod drive housing.
Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ej,ection from mid power.
The Power Range Negative Rate trip provides protection for control rod drop accidents.
At high power a single or multiple rod drop accident could cause local flux peaking which could cause an unconservative local Of4BR to exist.
The Power Range Negative Rate trip will prevent this from occurring by tripping the reactor.
No credit is taken for operation of the Power Range Negative Rate trip,
for those control rod drop accidents for which DNBRs will be greater than 1.30.
V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 2-4
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LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Undervoltage'and Underfreauency - Reactor Coolant pump Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coalant Pump Bus trips pro-vide core protection against DNB as a result of complete loss of forced coolant flow.
The specified Setpoints assure a Reactor trip signal is generated before the Low Flow Trip Setpoint is reached.
Time delays are incorporated in the Underfrequency and Undervoltage trips to prevent spurious Reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients.
For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers following the loss of power to the reactor coolant pump bus circuit breakers shall not exceed 1.2 seconds.
For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers after the Underfrequency Trip Setpoint is reached shall not exceed 0.3 second.
On decreasing power the Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pum Bus trips are automatically blocked by P-7 (a pow of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse cham,er level of approximately 10%
ber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, reinstated automatical by P-7.
Turbine Trio A Turbine trip initiates a Reactor trip.
On decreasing power the Reactor trip from the Turbine trip is automatically blocked by P-9 (a power level of, approximately 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-9.
Safety Infection Input from FSF If a Reactor trip has not already been generated by the Reactor Trip System instrumentation the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a Reactor trip upon any, signal which initiates a Safety Injection.
The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a Safety Injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.
Reactor Trip System Interlocks The Reactor Trip System interlocks perform the following functions:
P-6 On increasing power, P-6 allows the manual block of the Source Range trip (i.e., prevents premature blocx of Source Range trip), and deenergizes the high voltage to the detectors. On decreasing power, Source Range Level trips are automatically reactivated and high voltage restored.
V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 2-7
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o QUESTION 6.03 (1.00)
STATE the associated Technical Specification bases for EACH of the following isolation signals.
(1.0) a.
SI. signal b.
High-High steam generator level ANSWER 6.03 (1.00)
Minimizes RCS cooldown from break of feed to steam lines [+
a.
b.
Protects turbine and prevents excessive cooidown [+0.5].
1 REFERENCE 1.
.Vogtle: LO-LP-18201-06-C.
059000K419
..(KA's) l 1
2 b
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v Question 6.03-Facility Coment:
1.
Poorly worded question; does not specify which isolation signal for SI.
SI will initiate a feedwater isolation and a containment isolation signal.
2.
There are no Tech Spec Bases for these signals.
Recommendation:
Delete question l
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O m g_,,201_o,_C l
_ lll. LESSON' OUTLINE
- NOTES j
1 i
a) Those that do trip pumps are sometimes referred to as " full" J
feedwater isolation b) Those that don't trip pumps may be
'l referred to as " partial" feedwater isolation i
6.
FWI actuation signals
- 1) Safety injection a) Any signal b) Isolates and trips MFPs c) Trips main turbine
- 2) High High steam generator level (P-14) a) 2/4 NR channels on 1/4 SGs greater than 78%
b) Isolates and trips MFPs c) Also provides main turbine trip signal
- 3) Reactor trip [P-4) with Low Tavg (2/4 less than 564 F) a) Closes valves only b) ~Does not trip MFPs or main turbine
- 4) Manual a
i a) Feedwater can be manually isolated by closing FWI valves (1/2 l
switches) for individual lines l
?
1)TsehW-PWI"minimirse 710E"4eshre.
fNilF M M feed or stean di g
)
25"Ni*leMW'14 ~ protects turbine andAm
- v w 4vecwlw yz='.
li W *amiount of water in steam sgg; ;
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eL-----_--__-, - - - -, _ _ - - - - - - - -
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v LO-LP-18201-07-C
~
lIL LESSON OUTLINE
- NOTES 1
1
- 3) -Provente excessive ~ccolckne cn fbe trip
. %er e reducos the offacts,of, steam d
~ line; break.
d.
Reset of FWI followings i
l
- 1) St f
a) SI must be reset I
b) Rx trip breakers must be reclosed to reset P-4
- 2) S/G Hi Hi Level - P-4 a) S/G Hi Hi Level must decrease i
below the setpoint b) MFP's must be restarted c) No reset required on valves unless coincident with P-4 (1) If P-4, then P-4 nust be reset to reopen valves
- 3) Rx trip and low teve a) Manually reset the FWI switches e
on QfC8 b) The initiating condition can 6till be present
- 11. Calometric measurement Required daily a.
Procedure 14030-1 Power range calorimetric channel calibration
- 1) This procedure is used to calibrate the power range NIS to within 2% of the calorimetric power and provide for manual calculation of the calorimetric
- 2) Done with computer or manually b.
Parameters used for manual calorimetric
- 1) SG pressure
- 2) Feedwater inlet temperature 12
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QUESTION 5.17 (2.50)
STATE SIX (6) conditions that will trip an emergency a.-
diesel generator after a nonnal start that are DISABLED on an emergency start.
(Tripvaluesnotrequired).
(1.5) f b.
STATE the FOUR (4) conditions that will trip an emergency diesel after an emergency start.
(Trip values not required).
(1.0) 1 ANSWER 6.17 (2.50) a.
1.
High lube oil temp 2.
engine bearing high temp 3.
crankcase pressure high 4.
turbo charger oil pressure low 5.
Jacket water pressure low 6.
engine high vibration 7.
turbo charger high vibration Any six -(6) [+0.25] each; [+1.5] max b.-
1.
generator differential trip (187 A,8 or C /186 A LOR set) 2.
Iow lube oil pressure 3.
high jacket water temp 4.
[+0.25] each REFERENCE 1.
Vogtle LO-LP-11201-03-C Obj. 7 064000K402
..(KA's) 1
h.
n,.
l Question-6.17 y
Facility. Comments: For anawer to part "a" n eept the following' alternate answers:
1.
Phase overcurrent 2.
Loss of field 3.
Generator neutral overcurrent Recommendation:
Change answer "a" to the following:
1.
High lube oil temp 2.
Engine bearing high temp 3.
Crankcase pressure.hig..
- 4.. Turbo charger oil pressure low
' 5.-. Jacket water pressure low 6.
Engine high vibration 7.
Turbo charger high vibration 8.
Generator phase overcurrent 9.
Loss of field
- 10. Generator neutral overcurrent (ground)
..Any'six for.25 pts each; [+1.5] max
(
1.
1-a
LO-LP-11202-08-C.
lli.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES
~
2)
DC 6.
Remote Shutdown Panels (A & B)
Diesel generatw ESF HVAC controls a.
b.
Indication fr diesel generator breaker (open/ closed)
(
Diesel generator ammeters (3 phases) c.
7.
Generatw protection-Diesel generator lockout relays (LORs)
Objective 4 a.
OMR 297 (EDG lockout relays) 1)
There are 3 lockout relays on the generate control panel 2)
Each has a trip and reset position 3)
Lockout relays a) Lockout relay 186A (1)
Trips diesel and output breaker (2)
Trips when a diesel generate differential relay picks up (187)
(3)
Does not discriminate between emergency and n emal start M;M@gT965Wj M eanL-emneratsIefisiiut-breahsK and-ehuta down-diese1%
generatar and engine, sucept tin' SU conditTon i
f.
(2)
Relay trips upon receipt of following relays T.(art.oss of field (140)
(b) Generator, neutral 0.C. -
(151 N)
(sb Generator phase over-
' current (151VA,152VB, 151VC) m I
e
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l QUESTION' '6.261 (1.00 h
STATE TWO.(2) conditions, EITHER of which,-will satisfy the minimum administrative SRO control; room manning ~ requirements during
~ modes 1,-2, 3, and 4.
(1.0)-
ANSWER 6.26 (1.00) 1.-
One (1).SRO with license on both units
[+0.5) 2.-
One (1) SRO at each unit- [+0.5]
REFERENCE 1.
Vogtle: Procedure 10003-C.
194001A103
..(KA's)
O 2
Question 6.26 Facility Cocunent: Poorly worded question:
1.
Does not specify if OSOS is to be included as SRO or not.
2.
Does not specify whether it is T.S. admin or Ops e.dmin.
3.
Does not specify whether it is for both units or one unit.
I 4.
Does not specify status of SRO license: Dual or unit specific.
Recommendation:
Delete question.
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ENCLOSURE 4 NRC RESOLUTION OF FACILITY COMMENTS SR0 Examination Question 4.10 NRC Resolution: Comment. accepted. Answer key changed to reflect facility comment.
LO-LP-360001-03-C of Vogtle Lesson Plans does not properly reflect cited Tschnical Specification Bases.
Question 6.03 NRC resolution:
Comment' accepted.
Question deleted from exam.
Point values adjusted accordingly.
Question 6.17 NRC resolution:
Comment accepted.
Alternate answers are acceptable for full credit.
Question 6.26 NRC resolution: Comment not accepted due to the following:
1..
Both Technical Specifications and Procedure 10003-C state minimum SRO manning requirements as requested in question.
2.
Minimum Technical Specification and Procedure 10003-C requirements are the same.
i 3.
Question asks for minimJm control room manning requirements. Vogtle has common control room, hence, no reference to unit needed.
4.
Specification to dual or unit specific is part of answer.
Direction was given to all candidates during test by proctor, to " consider l
minimum licensed SR0 requirements for SR0s licensed on one or both units."
R0 Examination Question 3.06 NRC resolution: Comment accepted. This is consistent with the intent of the answer key as written.
I
2 Question 3.25 NRC resolution:
Comment partially accepted. Answer key has been changed.
to 710 psig.
However, a tolerance band.of +/- 50 psig has been selected.
=Questior.3.27 NRC resolution:. Comment partially accepted. This question has more than one correct answer based on assumptions of the' positions of certain test switches.
Question has been deleted from the exam.
Point values adjusted accordingly.
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w w-ENCLOSURE 5-SIMULATION. FACILITY REPORT j
Facility Licensee:..
Georgia Power Company
' Facility Docket.Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 Operating Tests Administered.On: June 13 - 15, 1989
. During~- the conduct of the simulator portion of-the operating tests, ithe following. items were observed :
ITEM DESCRIPTION Steam break During the simulation of a steamline break the pressures of.the non-faulted steam generators trend down with the faulted steam generator (s).
This'is negative training in that.the operators
' " learn"' to define steadily decreasing steam generator pressures as stable 'for purposes of the simulator.
In real situatio'ns, such indications would require transfer to a procedure-for all. faulted steam generators.
Pressurizer
- As pressurizer pressure decreases as in a Safety Injection level situation, pressurizer level will increase, taking the.
~
pressurizer to a solid condition; This again is negative training' in that the operators expect to go solid after every safety injection.
This' was particularly noted during a scenario 'where a faulted PORY was.used in contradiction to the guidance of the E0Ps to prevent lifting the code safeties due' to solid pressurizer ~ conditions.
Reactor Due to modeling problems' with decay heat and the pressurizer, a low pressure safety injection occurred. after almost every reactor trip within 10-30 seconds regardless of operator actions to reduce cooldown.
L "A" CCP This switch will not go to the pull to lock position.
This
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controller required unnecessary involvement by the simulator operator to simulate the desired conditions.
Circ. water This program was inadvertently dropped by the computer during one of the scenarios requiring the simulator to be stopped and backed up for five minutes to reset tt, proper conditions. This error detracted from the sense of realism associated with the scenario.
.Tave/ Tref This recorder failed during the running of one of the exam recorder scenarios.
l Delta."I" This alarm comes in erroneously. Under certain conditions the alarm causes the operators to take additional actions not intended for the scenario.
I t.
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