ML20245F063
| ML20245F063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245F046 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905020247 | |
| Download: ML20245F063 (2) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
-E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.
132 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 TOLEDO EDIS0N COMPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER-STATION, UNIT N0. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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By letter dated June 17,1985 (No.1159), the Toledo Edison Company (TE) proposed an amendment to Appendix A Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.1.
The proposed change would revise the TS Action Statement concerning the Limiting Condition for Operation for the main steam line safety valves. The revision would require the plant to go to Mode 4 (hot shutdown) rather than Mode 5 (cold shutdown) during valve inoperability within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following entry to Mode 3(hotstandby). TE has proposed this change to eliminate an inconsistency i
between the Applicability requirement and the Action Statement.
In response to i
the TE request in a letter dated August 29, 1988 (Serial No. 1570), this action i
has been processed as the lead plant for the B&W Owners Group.
2.0 DISCUSSION The Main steam overpressure protection system is designed with nine main steam safety valves on each of the two steam (generator) loops. The main steam l
safety valves are needed to relieve excess steam in the event of various transients to ensure overpressure protection for the plant's secondary side.
Pressure relief is required at 1050 psig system design pressure.
The TS 3.7.1.1 Action Statement requires that one or more main steam safety valves inoperable operation in Modes 1, 2, and 3 may proceed if the_ inoperable valve is restored to operable status or the High Flux Tri) Setpoint is reduced (power level reduced) per Table 3.7-1 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Otlerwise, the existing TS states that the unit be placed in Mode 3 (hot standby) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The I
proposed revision would, instead, require the plant to enter Mode 4 (hot shutdown) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following entry to Mode 3 (hot standby).
U705020247 890425 DR ADOCM 050003 p
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' i T.S. 3.7.1.1 is applicable only in Modes 1, 2, and 3, since the main steam safety valves are required to provide overpressure protection in these modes.
Other operating modes (4 and 5) do not exceed a reactor coolant system temperature of 280*F, which corresponds to a saturation pressure of 49.2 psia, substantially below the main steam system design pressure. Therefore, when main steam safety valves are inoperable, operation in Mode 4 is safe since overpressure protection is not required, and it is unnecessary to go to Mode 5.
If the operating temperature inadvertently would exceed 280*F in Mode 4, the system would still be protected because of the action of the Reactor i
Coolant System low temperature overpressure protection features. The staff issued a safety evaluation of the low temperature overpre:,sure protection feature on July 25, 1980. The action of these featurcs would limit pressure l
to 438 psig.
The proposed 12-hour tw requirement to reach Mode 4 is' consistent with other TS's that require the p M.', to go to Mode 4.
There is not accident initiating I
from Mode 4 that would require the operation of the main steam safety valves, and the safety function of TS 3.7.1.1 or the plant is not being degraded by this change. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
l This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation
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or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in d
10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined,that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
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and there has been no public concent on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 1
10CFR51.22-(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmentalimpact i
statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will oe conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations, and the l
issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
Lynn Kelly Dated: April 25, 1989 l
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