ML20244C180

Environ Assessment & Finding of Not Significant Impact Re Util Applications for Amend to License DPR-21,increasing Spent Fuel Pool Capacity to 3,229 Fuel Assemblies Plus 20 Defective Fuel Containers

ML20244C180
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	06/06/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Shared Package
ML20244C163	List: ML20244C159 ML20244C180 ML20244C188
References
NUDOCS 8906140154
Download: ML20244C180 (12)

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. /fh UNITED STATES j0 "jff )i.g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASH WGTON, D. C. 20555 N

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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO THE EXPANSION OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-21 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-245

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Description of Proposed Action By letter dated June 24, 1988, as supplemented by letters dated July 29 August 12  ;

and December 2,1988, and February 14 March 1 March 22 and April 10, 1989, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO or the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-21 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1, to specify the maximum storage capacity of the spent fuel pool. The current storage capacity of 2184 fuel assemblies is not specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). The amendment would authorize the licensee '

to store up to 3229 fuel assemblies, plus 20 defective fuel containers in the i spent fuel pool. By letters dated Auoust 22 and December 8, 1988, the staff '

issued approvals to begin specific work on the spent fuel pool modifications.

The increase in spent fuel pool capacity would be achieved by removing the seismic restraints of the current spent fuel racks and moving these racks to a corner of the pool to make room for the addition of 10 new spent fuel racks.

The current and new racks were qualified by the licensee to be free standing racks not requiring the added seismic restraints. The new racks are not double-tiered and all racks will sit on the spent fuel pool floor.

1.2 Need for Increased Storage Capacity The staff's safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 39, dated June 30, 1977, approved storage for 2184 fuel assemblies in the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The pool lost full core discharge capability in 1987. Therefore, the licensee has proposed to expand its spent fuel storage capability to 3229 fuel assemblies, which is projected to provide storage capacity until the year 1999 while maintaining full core offload capacity.

The proposed plan for installing the new racks fundamentally meets the objective of keeping occupational exposures to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable. The operations will occur in pool areas as remote as possible from the currently stored spent fuel.

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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 provided for limited away-from-reactor storage, and stipulated that a spent fuel repository would be available by 1998. Since the Act does not require a repository before this date, it is not clear whether there will be any place to ship spent fuel in the 1980's or early-to-mid-1990's. Therefore, in the interim, the licensee needs to provide more storage capacity.

1.3 Alternatives Commercial reprocessing of spent fuel has not developed as originally anticipated.

In 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed its staff to prepare a Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) on spent fuel storage. The Commission directed the staff to analyze alternatives for the handling and storage of spent light water power reactor fuel with rarticular emphasis on developing long-range policy. The GEIS was to consider alternative methods of spent fuel storage, as well as the possible restriction on termination of the generation of spent fuel through nuclear power shutdown.

A " Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel" (NUREG-0575), Volumes 1-3, was issued by the NRC in August 1979. The finding of the FGEIS is that the environmental impact costs of interim storage are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel 'is stored. A comparison of the impact costs of various alternatives reflects the advantage of continued generation of nuclear power versus its replacement by coal-fired power generation. Continued nuclear generation of power versus its replacement by oil-fired generation provides an even greater economic advantage. In the bounding case considered in the FGEIS, that of shutting down the reactor when the existing spent fuel storage capacity is filled, the cost of replacing nuclear stations before the end of their normal lifetime makes this alternative uneconomical. The storage of spent fuel as evaluated in NUREG-0575 is considered to be an interim action, not a final solution to permanent disposal.

One spent fuel storage alternative considered in detail in the FGEIS is the expansion of the onsite fuel storage capacity by modification of the existing spent fuel pools. Applications for more than 100 spent fuel pool expansions have been received and have been approved or are under review by the NRC. The finding in each case has been that the environmental impact of such increased storage capacity is negligible. However, since there are variations in storage design and limitations caused by the spent fuel already stored in some of the pools, the FGEIS reconrnends that licensing reviews be done on a case-by-case l basis to resolve plant-specific concerns.

The continuing validity and site specific applicability of the conclusions in NUREG-0575 have been confirmed in the Environmental Assessments for the Surry and H.B. Robinson Plants independent spent fuel storage installations.

The licensee has considered several alternatives to the proposed action of the spent fuel pool expansion. The staff has evaluated these and certain other alternatives with respect to the need for proposed action as discussed in

Section 1.2 of this assessment. The following alternatives were considered by the staff: ,

(1) Shipment of spent fuel to a pemanent federal fuel storage / disposal facility.

(2) Shipment of fuel to a reprocessing facility.

(3) Shipment of fuel to another utility or site for storage.

(4) Reduction of spent fuel generation.

(5) Construction of a new independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). '

(6) No action taken.

Each of these alternatives is discussed below.

1. Shipment of Spent Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storace/ Disposal Facility Shipment to a permanent federal fuel storage disposal facility is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing a repository under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA). However, the facility is not likely to be ready to receive spent fuel until the year 2003, at the earliest. The existing Millstone Unit I spent fuel storage pool lost full core offload capability in 1987 (only 452 of the 2184 storage cells are vacant). Therefore, spent fuel acceptance and disposal by DOE is not an alternative to increased onsite pool storage capacity.

As an interim measure, shipment to a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility is another alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. DOE, under the NWPA, has recently submitted its MRS proposal to Congress. Because Congress has not authorized an MRS and because one is not projected to be available before 1998, this alternative does not meet the near-tem storage needs of Millstone Unit 1.

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Under the NWPA, the federal government has the responsibility to provide not more than 1900 metric tons capacity for the interim storage of spent fuel. The impacts of storing fuel at a Federal Interim Storage (FIS) facility fall within those already assessed by the NRC in NUREG-0575. In enacting NWPA, Congress found that the owners and operators of nuclear power stations have the primary responsibility for providing interim storage for spent nuclear fuel. In accordance with the NWPA and 10 CFR Part 53, shipping of spent fuel to an FIS facility is considered a last resort alternative. At this time, the licensee cannot take advantage of FIS because existing storage capacity is not maximized.

Therefore, the licensee has been diligently pursuing this application for the spent fuel pool expansion at this time.

2. Shipment of Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility Reprocessing of spent fuel from Millstone Unit 1 is not viable because presently there is no operating consnercial reprocessing facility in the United States, nor is there the prospect for one in the foreseeable future.

3. Shipment of Fuel to Another Utility or Site For Storage The shipment of spent fuel from Millstone Unit 1 to the storage facility of another utility company could provide short-term relief from the storage capacity problem. However, the NWPA and 10 CFR Part 53 clearly place the responsibility for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel with each owner or operator of a nuclear power plant. Moreover, transshipment of spent fuel to and its storage at another site would entail potential environmental impacts greater than those associated with the proposed increased storage at Millstone Unit 1. site.

Therefore, this is not considered a practical or reasonable alternative.

4. Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation Improved usage of fuel in the reactor and/or operation at a reduced power level i would extend the life of the fuel in the reactor. In the case of extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads would take place. Millstone Unit I has already extended time between refuelings from .,

1 year to more than 18 months, with a goal of 2 years. However, even if I Millstone Unit I were to go to even more extended burnup, the current storage capacity would still be quickly exhausted as discussed in Item 1 above. i Operation at reduced power would not make effective use of available resources  !

and would result in economic penalties. '

5. Construction of A New Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Additional storage capacity could be developed by building a new, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), similar either to the existing pool or a dry storage installation. The NRC staff has generically assessed the impacts of the pool alternative and found, as reported in NUREG-0575, that "the storage of LWR spent fuels in water pools has an insignificant impact on the environment." A generic assessment for the dry storage alternative has not been made by the staff. However, assessments for the dry cask ISFSI at the Surry Power Station and the dry modular concrete ISFSI at the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 and the Oconee Nuclear Station resulted in findings of no significant impact.

While these alternatives are environmentally acceptable, such a new storage i facility, either at Millstone Unit 1 or at a location offsite, would require new site-specific design and construction, including equipment for the transfer of spent fuel. NRC review, evaluation and licensing of such a facility would also be required. It is not likely that this entire effort would be completed in time to meet the need for additional capacity as discussed above. Furthennore, such construction would not utilize the existing expansion capability of the existing pool and thus would waste resources.

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6. No Action Taken If no action were taken, i.e., the spent fuel pool storage capacity remains at 2184 locations, the storage capacity would become exhausted in the very near future and Millstone Unit I would have to be shut down. Such termination of operations would result in no further generation of spent fuel, thereby elim-inating the need for increased spent fuel storage capacity. The impacts of terminating the generation of spent fuel by ceasing the operation of existing nuclear power plants (i.e., ceasing generation of electric power) when their spent fuel pools become filled was evaluated in NUREG-0575 and found to be undesirable. This alternative would be a waste of an available resource, Millstone Unit 1 itself, and is not considered viable.

In sumary, the orily long-term alternative that could provide an alternative solution to the licensee's spent fuel storage capacity problem is the construc-tion of a new independent spent fuel storage installation at the Millstone Unit I site or at a location away from the site. Construction of such an additional spent fuel storage facility could provide long-term increased storage capacity for Millstone Unit 1. However, it is not likely that this alternative could be implemented in e timely manner to meet the need for additional capacity for Millstone Unit 1. Further, this alternative would waste resources.

1.4 Fuel Reprocessing History Currently, spent fuel is not being reprocessed on a commercial basis in the United States. The Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) plant at West Valley, New York, was shut down in 1972 for alterations and expansion. In September 1976, NFS informed the Commission that it was withdrawing from the nuclear fuel reprocessing business. The Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS) proposed plant in Barnwell, South Carolina, is not licensed to operate. The General Electric Coinpany (GE) Morris Operation (formerly Midwest Recovery Plant) in Morris, Illinois, is in a decommissioned condition.

In 1977, President Carter issued a policy statement on commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which effectively eliminated reprocessing as part of the relatively near-term nuclear fuel cycle.

Although no plants are licensed for reprocessing fuel, the storage pools at Morris and at West Valley are licensed to store spent fuel. The storage pool at West Valley is not full, but the licensee (the current licensee is New York Energy Research and Development Authority) is presently not accepting any additional spent fuel for storage, even from those power generating facilities that had contractual arrangements with West Valley. (In fact, spent fuel is being removed from NFS and returned to its owners). On May 4, 1982, the license held by GE for spent fuel storage activities at its Morris operation was renewed for another 20 years; however, GE is committed to accept only limited quantities of additional spent fuel for storage at this facility from Cooper and Sac l

Onofre Unit 1.

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2.0 RADIOACTIVE WASTES q

Millstone Unit I contains radioactive waste treatment systems designed to collect and process the gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive material. The radioactive waste treatment systems are evaluated in the Final EnvironmentalStatement(FES)datedJune1973. The FES was re-evaluated by the staff prior to issuance of the full term operating license (evaluation dated December 1984). There will be no change in the waste treatment systems described I in the FES because of the proposed spent fuel pool (SFP) rerack. 1 2.1 Radioactive Material Released to the Atmosphere With respect to releases of gaseous materials to the atmosphere, the only radioactive gas of significance that could be attributable to storing additional spent fuel assemblies for a longer period of the time is the noble gas radio-nuclide Krypton-85 (Kr-85). Experience has demonstrated that after spent fuel has decayed 4 to 6 months, there is no longer a significant release of fission products, including Kr-85, from stored spent fuel containing cladding defects.

To determine the average annual release of Kr-85, we assumed that all of the Kr-85 released from any defective fuel discharged to the SFP would be released prior.to the next refueling. Enlarging the storage capacity of the SFP has no effect on the calculated average annual quantities of Kr-85 released to the atmosphere each ' year. There may be some small change in the calculated quantities due to a change in the fuel burnup; this is expected to be a small fraction of the calculated annual quantities. However, for the purpose of estimating potential radiation doses to members of the public due to the proposed increased storage of spent fuel assemblies, the NRC staff conservatively assumed an additional release of 125 Ci/ year of Kr-85 (US NRC 1985).

Iodine-131 releases from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be significantly increased because of the expansion of the fuel storage capacity since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will oecay to negligible levels between refuelings.

Most of the tritium in the SFP water results from activation of boron and lithium in the primary coolant and this will not be affected by the proposed changes because BWR primary coolant does not use chemical neutron absorbers like boron.

A relatively small amount of tritium is contributed during reactor operation by fissioning of reactor fuel and subsequent diffusion of tritium through the fuel and fuel cladding. Tritium release from the fuel essentially occurs while the fuel is hot, that is, during operations and, to a limited extent, shortly after shutdown. Thus, expanding the SFP capacity will not significantly increase the tritium activity in the SFP.

Storing additional spent fuel assemblies is not expected to increase the bulk water temperature during normal refueling above the value used in the design analysis. Therefore, it is not expected that there will be any significant change in the annual release of tritium or iodine as a result of the proposed modifications from that previously evaluated. Most airborne releases of tritium and iodine result from evaporation of reactor coolant, which contains tritium and iodine in higher concentrations than the SFP. Therefore, even if there were

a higher evaporation rate from the SFP, the increase in tritium and iodine releases from the plant, as a result of the increase in stored spent fuel, would be small compared to the amount normally released from the plant and that which was previously evaluated in the FES. Section 6.15 of the Millstone Unit 1 TS, which sets limits for liquid and gaseous radioactive effluent discharges from the plant, is not being changed by this action.

2.2 Solid Radioactive Wastes The concentration of radionuclides in the pool water is controlled by the SFP cleanup system and by decay of short-lived isotopes. The activity is highest during refueling operations when reactor coolant water is introduced into the pool, and decreases as the pool water is processed through the SFP cooling and cleanup system. The increase, if any, of radioactivity due to the proposed modification should be minor because of the capability of the cooling and cleanup system to continuously remove radioactivity in the SFP water to accept-able levels.

We do not expect any significant increase in the amount of solid waste generated from the SFP cleanup due to the proposed modification. The expected increase in total waste volume shipped from the Millstone Unit I would be minimal and would not have any significant additional environmental impact.

2.3 Radioactive Material Released to Receiving Waters There should not be a significant increase in the liquid release of radionuclides from the plant as a result of the modifications. It is expected that neither the flow rate nor the radionuclides concentration of the floor cleanup water will change as a result of these modifications. The SFP demineralized removes soluble radioactive materials from the SFP water. The amount of radioactivity on the SFP demineralized resin may increase slightly due to the additional spent fuel in the pool, but the soluble radioactive material should be retained on the resins. After processing, the amount of radioactivity released to the environment as a result of the modification would be negligible.

3.0 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT By letters dated August 22 and December 8,1988, the staff found it acceptable ,

to remove the seismic restraints and relocate the existing racks and to install the 10 new spent fuel storage racks. The occupational dose for this modifica-tion was estimated by the licensee to be 35 man-rems and the actual dose was 30 man-rems. This exposure is higher than found at some other facilities that completed spent fuel pool expansions because of the labor intensive work required to remove and dispose of the seismic restraints (approx. 1400 cubic feet of components removed). The total worker exposure for Millstone Unit 1 '

has steadily improved over the last 5 years with their average refueling outage j year exposure and non-refueling outage year exposure (630 and 150 man-rem, respectively) at or below the BWR industry average (650 man-rem). Even with l

l the 30 man-rem exposure for modifying the SFP, the 1989 exposure at Millstone Unit 1 is estimated to be 500 man-rem, which is less than the 575 man-rems projected for the everage BWR.

l Therefore, the 30 man-rem radiation dose for this project will not affect the licensee's ability to maintain individual occupational doses within the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, and is as low as is raasonably achievable. Normal radiation control procedures (NUREG-0800, US NRC 1981) and Regulatory Guide 8.8 (US NRC 1978) will preclude any significant occupational radiation exposures.

The increase in storage capacity from 2184 to 3229 fuel assemblies should not increase the direct radiation dose to operating personnel because of extensive shielding by pool water and by the pool structure. Any dose rates from the spent fuel should be minimal and, in most cases, undetectable.

Based on present and projected operations in the SFP area, we estimate that the proposed operation of the modified SFP should add only a small fraction to the total annual occupational radiation dose at Millstone Unit 1.

Thus, we conclude that the proposed storage of spent fuel in the modified SFP will not result in any significant long term increase in doses received by workers.

4.0 NON-RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT The new spent fuel racks were fabricated by Chicago Bridge and Iron and were shipped by truck to the Millstone site for installation in the pool. This is not expected to impact terrestrial resources not previously disturbed during the original construction.

The only nonradiological effluent affected by the SFP expansion is the additional waste heat rejected from the plant. The total increase in heat load rejected to the environment will be an insignificant amount compared to the current total heat load from all plant sources to the environment. No impact on aquatic biota is anticipated. Thus, the increase in rejected heat will have negligible impect on the environment.

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The licensee has not 3roposed any change in the use or discharge of chemicals in conjunction with tie expansion of the fuel pool. The proposed fuel pool expansion will not require any change to the NPDES permit.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the non-radiological environmental impacts '

of expanding the spent pool will be insignificant.

5.0 SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS The staff, in its related Safety Evaluation to be published at a later date, has addressed both the safety and environmental aspects of a fuel handling accident, I an event that bounds the potential adverse consequences of an accident attri-butable to operation of a spent fuel pool with high density racks. A fuel

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9 handling accident may be viewed as a " reasonably foreseeable" design basis event which the pool and its associated structures, systems, and components (including the racks) are designed and constructed to prevent. The environmental impacts of the accident were found not to be significant.

The staff has considered accidents whose consequences might exceed a fuel handling accident, that is beyond design basis events. An accident investigated by the NRC involves a structural failure of SFP resulting in loss of all contained cooling water, followed by fuel heatup and a zircaloy cladding fire.

The details of th'h severe accident are discussed in NUREG/CR-4982, entitled

" Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Issue 82."

Subsequently, the staff issued NUREG/CR-5176, entitled " Seismic Failure and Cask Drop Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pools at Two Representative Nuclear Power Plants." This report considers the structural integrity of the SFP and the pool response to the circumstances considered. More recently the staff issued NUREG/CR-5281, "Value/ Impact Analyses of Accident Preventive and Hitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools" and NUREG-1353, " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools." In NUREG-1353, the staff concluded, on the bases of the information presented and analyzed in the other three documents in the series, that Generic Issue 82 concerning the possibility of Zirceloy cladding fires in spent fuel pools was resolved and required no further study.

The staff believes that the probability of such an accident occurring at Millstone is extremely low. This belief is based upon the Commission's requirements for the design and construction of spent fuel pools and their contents (e.g., racks), and adherence to approved industry codes and standards.

For example, in the Millstone Unit I case, the pool is an integral part of the reactor building, which is designed to Seismic Category I standards. The foundation mat and walls are comprised of reinforced concrete. The spent fuel storage racks are Seismic Category I and thus required to remain functional during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. The cooling water system is extremely reliable; in the highly unlikely event of a total cooling system failure, makeup water sources are available. These are but a few of the considerations used by the staff in assessing the adequacy of the rerack.

The staff acknowledges that if the severe accidents occurred as described above, the environmental impacts could be significant; however, these events are highly unlikely and are not reasonably foreseeable, in light of the design of the spent fuel pool system and racks. Therefore, further discussion of severe accidents is not warranted, and the stoff concludes that an Environmental Impact Statement need not be prepared.

6.0

SUMMARY

The Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel concluded that the cost of the various alternatives reflects the advantage of continued generation of nuclear power with the accompanying spent fuel storage. Because of the differences in SFP designs, the FGEIS recommended environmental evaluation of SFP expansions on a case-by-case basis.

The occupational radiation dose for the proposed operal. ion of the expanded spent fuel pool is estimated by the staff to be less than one percent of the total annual occupational radiation exposure for a facility of this type. The small l increase in radiation dose should not affect the licensee's ability to maintain individual occupational doses at Millstone Unit I within the limits of 10 CFR

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Part 20, and as low as is reasonably achievable. Furthermore, the non-radiological impacts of expanding the spent fuel pool will be insignificant, and none of the alternatives are practical or reasonable.

6.1 Alternative Use of Resources i

This action does not involve the use of resources not previously considered in l connection with the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Final Environmental State-ment, dated June 1973, the Environmental Assessment issued December 17, 1984, regarding the full term operating license, and the Millstone Unit 3 Environmental Report (encompassing the Millstone Station), dated October 28, 1982.

6.2 Aaencies and Persons Consulted The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request. No other agencies or persons were consulted.

7.0 BASIS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR NOT PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT The staff has reviewed the proposed spent fuel pool modification to Millstone Unit I relative to the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51. Based upon the environmental assessment, the staff has concluded that there are no significant radiological or 'non-radiological impacts associated with the proposed action and that the proposed license amendment will not have significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Therefore, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.31, not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendment.

8.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Proposed Change to Technica? Specifications, Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion,"

dated June 24, 1988.

J. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Information, Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion,"

dated July 29, 1988.

3. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Infonnation, Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion,"

dated August 12, 1988.

4. Letter from M. L. Boyle (NRC) to E. J. Mroczka (NNECO), " Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion," dated August 22, 1988.

5. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion, Additional Information," dated December 2, 1988.

6. Letter from J. F. Stolz (NRC) to E. J. Mroczka (NNECO), " Spent Fuel Pool  !

Expansion", dated December 8, 1988.

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7. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Information, Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion (TAC No. 68157)," dated February 14, 1989.

8. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion, Additional Infomation (TAC No. 68157)," dated March 1,1989.

9. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Infomation Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion (TAC No. 68157)," dated March 22, 1989.

10. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNECO) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Infomation Spent Fuel Pool Capacity Expansion (TACNo.68157),"datedApril 10, 1989.

II. USNRC, NUREG-0575, " Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel," Volumes 1-3, August 1979.

12. USNRC, NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan," Section 13, July 1981 (formerly issued as NUREG-75/087).

13. USNRC, NUREG/CR-4982, " Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Issue 82," July 1987.

14 USNRC, NUREG/CR-5176, " Seismic Failure and Cask Drop Analyses of the Spent Fuel Pools at Two Representative Nuclear Power Plants," January 1989.

14a. USNRC, NUREG/CR-5281, "Value/ Impact Analyses of Accident Preventive and Mitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools." March 1989.

14b. USNRC, NUREC/CR-1353, " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools" April 1989.

15. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 8.8, Revision 3. "Infomation Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be as Low as is Reasonably Achievable," June 1978.

16. USNRC, " Environmental Assessment Related to the Construction and Operation of the Surry Dry Cask Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation," 1985.

17. USNRC, " Environmental Assessment Related to the Construction and Operation of the H.B. Robinson Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation," 1986.

18. USNRC, "i' environmental Assessment Related to the Construction and Operation of the Occmee Nuclear Station Independent Spent fuel Storage Installation,"

1988.

19. USAEC, " Final Environmental Statement Related to the Continuation of Construction of Unit 2 and the Operation of Millstone Units 1 and 2,"

Docket Nos. 50 245/336, June 1973.

20. USNRC, " Amendment to Provisional Operating License, Amendment No. 39,"

Docket No. 50-245, June 30,'1977.

21. NNECO, " Final Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Report," Docket No. 50-423, October 28, 1982.

22. USNRC, " Environmental Assessment " Docket No. 50-245, December 17, 1984.

Principal Contributor: Michael L. Boyle Dated: June 6, 1989 j

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