ML20244B883
| ML20244B883 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1989 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904190465 | |
| Download: ML20244B883 (45) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1988038
Text
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hlAR '31 1989
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Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414-
Duke Power' Company
.
.
ATTN: Mr. H. B.. Tucker, Vice Prasident
Nuclear Production Department'
,
422 South Church Street-
Charlotte, NC 28242
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT' CONFERENCE SUMMARY-
.
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-413/88-.38 AND 50-414/88-38)
This letter refers to the- Enforcement Conference held 'at our request !on
~
March 17, 1989.
This" meeting concerned activities authorized for your Catawba.
facility. .
l
The. issues discussed at this conference related to inoperability of the
Containment Air' Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System.
'
A list of attendees, a. summary, and a copy of your handout are enclosed.
We
are continuing 'our review of ' these issues to determine the appropriate
enforcement. action.
'
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
will be placed in the .NRC Public Document Room.-
- Should:you h' ave 'any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
b
% . L.
Stewart D. Ebneter
Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.- List of Attendees
2. -Enforcement-Conference Summary
3.. Handout (s)
cc w/encls:
T. B. Owen, Station Manager
-Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire
State of South Carolina
bec w/encis:. (See page 2)_
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8904190465 090331
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Duke' Power Company.
2
,
NAR 31 1989
bec w/encls:
- K. N. Jabbour, NRR
- NRC Resident Inspector
DRS Technical Assistant
Document Control Desk
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ENCLOSURE 1
LIST OF ATTENDEES
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination
Staff
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP
M. B. Shym1ock, Section Chief, DRP
K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP
M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP
Duke Power Company
M. D. McIntosh, General Manager, Nuclear Support
T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba
R. C. Futrell, Manager, Nuclear Safety Assurance
D. Rehn, Design Engineering Manager
J. Thomas, Design Engineering Manager
G. Swindlehurst, Engineering Supervisor
P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance
R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba
T. W. Deese, Maintenance Engineering Services, Catawba
,
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ENCLOSURE 2
j
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
On March 17, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the
NRC in the Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia to discuss the inoperability of
the Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer (VX) System.
l
Opening remarks were made by S. Ebneter, NRC RII Regional Administrator, voicing
NRC concerns with respect to the deportability of the event in question.
In
response to his questions concerning communication with the resident
inspectors,
T. B. Owens explained DPC's open policy with the resident
'
inspectors.
DPC then gave a presentation (enclosure 3) on the subject listed
above.
The DPC presentation covered a system description, design basis,
sequence of events, root cause discussion, corrective action, safety
significance and a summary / conclusion.
DPC stated that deficiencies in their wire labeling program and an inadequate
post modification test led to the inoperability.
DPC discussed the unusual
effects of the wiring error and the difficulty encountered in assessing the
error.
DPC discussed corrective action with regard to the labeling program and
post modification testing.
In response to a question as to when the auxiliary safeguards test was performed
(the surveillance test which detected the ir. operability) after the error was
corrected, the licensee committed to obtain that information for the resident
inspectors.
The NRC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's
understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.
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ENCLOSURE 3
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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN SYSTEM WIRING
3-17-89
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 2
INTRODUCTION
M. D. McINTOSH
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
T. B. 0 WEN
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
ROOT CAUSE
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
G. B. SWINDLEHURST
-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
IV
T. B
0 WEN'
OPERABILITY EVALUATION
D. REHN
OTHER ISSUES
POST MOD TESTING
T. B. 0 WEN
'
COMMUNICATING OUTSTANDING
OPERABILITY ISSUES
VISUAL VERIFICATION OF
DAMPER POSITION
SUMMARY
M. D. McINTOSH
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CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN AND HYDROGEN SKIMMER SYSTEM
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION / DESIGN BASIS
DESIGN BASIS - CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN SUBSYSTEM
DAMPER OPENS
10 SECONDS AFTER "SP" SIGNAL ( 2 3.0 PSIG
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE)
l=0.40 PSIG (INCREASING) CPCS SIGNAL 10
SECONDS FOLLOWING SP.
(OPENING PREVENTED AT
<0.25 PSIG DECREASING CPCS SIGNAL)
s 0.5 PSIGliP ACROSS DAMPER
FAN STARTS
10 MINUTES AFTER "SP" SIGNAL
2 CPCS SIGNAL SETPOINT
FAN / DAMPER PROVIDES RAPID RETURN OF AIR UPPER TO
LOWER CONTAINMENT
EACH FAN IS 40,000 CFM.(100% CAPACITY)
AIR RETURN COOLS LOWER CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE TO
MAINTAIN EQ AND FORCES AIR THRU THE ICE CONDENSER
.
_ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _
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CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN SYSTEM
REF. 1557- 1
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HYDROGEN SKIMMER'AND AIR RETURN SYSTEM.
VX
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Event Summary-
I
January,.1988
NSM-20223 completed - moved VX
test Switches.
.-U2 EOC1 outage.
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01/19/88 and 01/24/88
Post Mod Test; 1 ARF-D-2 Cycles
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automatically
2-19-88
Unit 2 enters MODE 4 after
, refueling outage.
3'-31-88~(42 days later)' ' Quarterly. Aux Safeguards. Test
p
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Damper doesn't cycle
!
automatically. . Unit 2
"A"-
Train VX declared inoperable.
04-01-88
Wires found " rolled" in VX
Test Circuit.
Upon-
correction, 2 ARF-D-2 cycles
automatically
1 train of VX out-of-service for 42 days.
2 trains of VX out-of-service for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and 22
minutes during those 42 days.
.
4
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EVENT DESCRIPTION
9-10-87
NEW VX TEST CIRCUITRY WIRING INSTALLED.
OLD
CIRCUITRY STILL CONTROLS VX SYSTEM.
9-10-87
QUARTERLY VX OPERABILITY PT CONDUCTED USING OLD
AND.
WIRING.. DAMPER 2 ARF-D-2 CYCLES PROPERLY.
12-2-87
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12-25-87
UNIT 2 ENTERS EOC1 REFUELING OUTAGE
1-3-88
VX WIRING WORK COMPLETE
1-19-88
POST MOD TEST CONDUCTED - USES QUARTERLY VX
OPERABILITY PT - DAMPER CYCLES BUT TIME DELAY IS
SLOW ON IT AND THE 2A AIR RETURN FAN.
,
1-24-88
TIMERS RECALIBRATES - DAMPER 2 ARF-D-2 CYCLES
PROPERLY.
2-19-88
UNIT 2 ENTERS MODE 4 FOLLOWING E0C1 OUTAGE.
3-31-88
QUARTERLY AUX. SAFEGUARDS TEST CONDUCTED -
2 ARF-D-2 DOES NOT CYCLE UNIT 2 A TRAIN VX DECLARED
'
IN0PERABLE.
4-1-88
WIRES FOUND ROLLED IN VX DAMPER TEST CIRCUIT.
WIRES ARE RETERMINATED CORRECTLY AND DAMPER
CYCLES.
"A" TRAIN VX RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS.
4-6-88
PIR 2-C88-0151 WRITTEN
.
4-8-88
CMD ASKED TO RESOLVE PROBLEM 0F ROLLED LEAi'S
.
4-11-88
DE ASKED TO EVALUATE PAST OPERABILITY OF VX
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EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)
4-15-88
DE OPERABILITY EVALUATION RECEIVED.
DAMPER IS
EVALUATED AS HAVING BEEN OPERABLE.1/19/88.-
.4/1/88.
WOULD HAVE CAUSED " FALSE TEST INDICATIONS
(DURING A TEST)", BUT, "DURING AN ACCIDENT.THE
AUTOMATIC OPEN CIRCUITRY FOR THE DAMPER WOULD HAVE
OPENED THE DAMPER."
5-19-88
CMD RESPONDS.
FELT THE LEADS MUST HAVE BEEN
ROLLED AFTER THE MOD.
5-20-88
STATION IAE ENGINEER ASKED TO APPROVE CMD
' RESOLUTION.
HE RESPONDS (5-25-88) AND RAISES --
.;
QUESTIONS ON PMT & QA INVOLVEMENT.
5-27-88
. PROJECTS ASKED TO ADDRESS IAE'S CONCERNS
7-19-88
PROJECTS APPROVES CMD'S RESOLUTION AND DIRECTS
INQUIRES ON PMT & QA TO PERFORMANCE & QA GROUPS,
RESPECTIVELY.
7-20-88
PERFORMANCE GROUP ASKED TO RESOLVE PMT QUESTION
8-1-88
PERFORMANCE RESPONDS.
THEIR POSITION IS THAT THE-
DAMPER WAS INOPERABLE AFTER THE JANUARY TEST.
THEY SUGGEST DAMPER WOULD " CYCLE UNTIL FAILURE".
SINCE THE PMT WORKED THEY CONCLUDE THE WIRES WERE
ROLLED AFTER THE PMT.
8-5-88
QA ASKED TO RESOLVE WHY THEY MISSED THE ROLLED
LEADS.
.
8-16-88
QA RESPONDS.
THEY CHECK THE WIRING AFTER
TERMINATION, NOT AT THE WIRE MARKER STAGE
ASKED TO REEVALUATE ORIGINAL OPERABILITY
STATEMENT.
-
_
_ _ _ - _ _ _
_ _ _ _
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EMENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)
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9-14-88
DE RESPONDS.
THEY AGREE PRELIMINARILY WITH
PERFORMANCE ON DAMPER INOPERABILITY PRIOR:T0
4-1-88,.BUT BELIEVE A WIRING CHECK AND RESOLUTION
OF THE " CYCLE UNTIL FAILURE" ISSUE MUST BE
L
COMPLETED BEFORE FINAL DETERMINATION.
9-21-88
IAE REQUESTED TO PERFORM A P0lNT'T0 POINT WIRING
CHECK
9-30-88
IAE BEGINS A REVIEW 0F WIRING DIAGRAMS BEFORE
STARTING FIELD CHECK 0F WIRING.
10-15-88 :0N SITE DE, MES, & CSRG STAFF REVIEW ELECTRICAL
THRU
DIAGRAMS FOR RESOLUTION OF ISSUES.
12-15-88
12-16-88
COMPLIANCE /IAE/ PERFORMANCE / DESIGN MEET TO DISCUSS
12-19-88
UPON SUBSEQUENT REVIEW WITH COMPLIANCE ENGINEER,
EVENT IS DETERMINED REPORTABLE.
12-19-88
CSRG BEGINS PREPARATION OF THE LER
1-9-89
LER SUBMITTED TO THE STATION MANAGER.
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN STATION MANAGER AND COMPLIANCE
ENGINEER ESTABLISHES THE NEED TO PERFORM FURTHER
REVIEW,
A TASK FORCE IS ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
ACTUAL WIRING.
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1-26"89
NO FURTHER WIRING DISCREPANCIES ARE FOUND BY THE
TASK FORCE.
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1-27-89
LER, REV.~0 SUBMITTED, WITHOUT.THE SAFETY
ANALYSIS.
o
2-6-89
DISCUSSION WITH THE NRC' RESIDENTS CONCERNING THE-
NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE SAFETY EVALUATION AND CAUSE
OF'THE PROBLEM PROMPTED FURTHER DISCUSSION IN
RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF HOW THE PMT'S COULD WORK
IF THE WIRES WERE ROLLED AT THE. TIME 0F THE TESTS.
2-10-89
IAE, PROJECTS, COMPLIANCE, PERFORMANCE
CMD,.AND
,
STATION ~ MANAGER MEET TO DISCUSS ~ POSSIBILITY OF A
" SNEAK PATH".
2-23-89
SAFETY ANALYSIS DEVELOPED BY DESIGN ENGINEERING'.
2-24-89
PERFORMANCE VX AND AUX SAFEGUARDS TESTS' CONDUCTED
WITH WIRES ROLLED BACK TO INCORRECT POSITIONS.
SNEAK PATH VERIFIED.
2 ARF-D-2 CYCLES.
2-28-89
FOLLOWUP TEST CONDUCTED.
DAMPER DOES NOT CYCLE.
,
3-6-89
STATION MANAGER, DE, PROJECTS, PERFORMANCE, IAE,
COMPLIANCE MEET TO DISCUSS TEST RESULTS.
3-16-89
-SAFETY ANALYSIS SUBMITTED WITH REV. 1 TO THE LER.
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ROOT CAUSE-
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' WIRES WERE INCORRECTLY LABELED DURING ORIGINAL
.
INSTALLATION-
,
THE LABELING ERROR MADE THE INSTALLATION APPEAR
-
To BE CORRECT - NO IV, No QC-0N LABELLING
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MARKERS DID NOT REQUIRE IV.
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IMMEDIATE
4-1-88.
WIRING ERROR CORRECTED / DAMPER
RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY
PLANNED
1.
REQUIRE IV 0F THE INSTALLATION OF-WIRE MARKERS.
.
2.
IMPROVE OPERABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS.
.-
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POST MOD TESTING FOR
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DUKE POWER POST MOD TESTING
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Rev #
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Part #
Unit #
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BRIEF NSM DESCRIPTION
l3
INSTALLATION TESTS
Type of Test
Documentation
Piifciirred by
(Verify installation per codes and sta:1dards and design documents.
Ex: Hydrostatic tests, motor rotatio:1 checks, etc.)
(Termination Verification)
I4
VERIFICATION TESTS
Type of Test
Documentation
Performed by
(Verify component or system functions.
Ex: Valve atroking, pump run, indica ting lights, instrument
calibrations, etc.)
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RETESTS
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Type of Test
Documentation
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(Verify component or system meets desi gn basis parameters.
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Date:
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Distribution:
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PART A-
INSTALLATION VERIFICATION
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DESIGN ENG,
CATAWBA NUCLEAR EE
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WIRE TABULATION DRAWINGS
. CONSTRUCTION
-
PROCESS OF WIRE LABELLING
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(NOT IV'ED)
TERMINATION OF CABLES
(IV & QA)
PART B
FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR EE
PERFORMANCE TEST
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CORRECTED QUICKLY UPON DISCOVERY
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DIFFICULTY OF FINDING SOLUTION
CONTINUED EFFORT NOT TO BE SATISFIED WITH UNKNOWN
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
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EXISTING DES /GN ENGINEERING
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-
EVALUATION
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INDENTIFIES ENGINEERING CONTACTS
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DUKE - NRC MEET /NG AT
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
HELD ' AUGUST 1988
.
ATTENDED BY REGION 11, STATION MANAGERS,
-
DUKE MANAGEMENT
.
DISCUSSION OF VIEWS ON OPERABILITY
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EVALUATIONS, JCO'S AND 10CFR50.59
EVALUATIONS
APPROVAL FOR EVALUATIONS MUST BE
.
'
BY APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF MANAGEMENT
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OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS, JCO'S
AND 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
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DES /GN ENGINEERING OPERABILITY
GUIDELINES
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DEVELOPS CONSISTENCY IN TERMINOLOGY
-
ASSOCIATED WITH OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS
IDENTIFIES FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN
.
EVALUATIONS
DESCRIBES WHEN 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS,
-
JCO'S AND REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT NEEDED
SUMMARIZES DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
-
ADDRESSES CURRENT AND PAST
-
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DESIGN ENGINEERING OPERABILITY
GUIDELINES (CON'T)
REQUIRES APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT
-
APPROVAL, l.E., 3 LEVEL SIGN-OFF
CLEARLY IDENTIFIES SYSTEM CONDITION:
-
OPERABLE, CONDITIONALLY OPERABLE, OR
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DES /GN ENGINEERING OPERABIL/TY
GU/ DEL /NES (CON'T)
MILESTONES:
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ISSUED DRAFT VERSION FOR COMMENT
-
10/05/88
ISSUED REVISED VERSION 11/18/88
-
WILL BE TESTED 2EOC2 OUTAGE AT CATAWBA
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE'
AIR. RETURN FAN DAMPER ACTUATION DELAY -
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OBJECTIVE
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BACKGROUND
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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS. METHODOLOGY
-
APPROACH
COMPUTER CODE.
-
-
SIMULATION MODEL
ASSUMPTIONS
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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS
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EQ EVALUATION
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EQ EVALUATION RESULTS
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CONCLUSION
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THE OBJECTIVE 0F THE ANALYSIS IS TO DETERMINE THE
SAFE!Y SIGNIFICANCE OF-A 30 MINUTE ADDITIONAL.DELAYL
IN AIR RETURN FLOW-0N THE FSAR LICENSING BASIS:
-
CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSE
PEAKLCONTAINMENT PRESSURE-
-
CONTAINMENT-STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES-
-
MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSUREL(LOCA-ECCS)
-
STEAMLINE BREAK
-
- EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
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AIR RETURN (VX) FANS' PROVIDE INTER-COMPARTMENTAL FLOW-
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.TO FORCE STEAM'INTO ICE CONDENSER AND: COOL' LOWER
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CONTAINMENT.
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DAMPER CROSS-WIRING DEFEATED AUTOMATIC AND MANUAL OPEN;
.
' SIGNALS.:-
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' ASSUMED SINGLE FAILURE-(DIESEL GENERATOR)-RENDERS.'"B"-
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TRAIN OF SAFEGUARDS'IN0PERABLE.
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OPERATORLACTION T0 CORRECT PROBLEM AND 0 PEN DAMPER,
COMPLETED WITHIN 30 MINUTES.-
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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY:
APPROACH
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' PERFORM SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIMITING DESIGN BASIS
CONTAINMENT' RESPONSE TRANSIENT.
DOUBLE-ENDED P8;MP' SUCTION LOCA-YIELDS PEAK
-
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE
COINCIDENT LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER ASSUMED
-
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BASELINE CASE ASSUMES FAN DAMPER ACTUATION AT 10 MINUTES.
e
SENSITIVITY CASE INCORPORATES ADDITIONAL 30 MINUTE. DELAY-'
DAMPER ACTUATION AT 40 MINUTES.
e
EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF AIR RETURN FLOW DELAY ON THE
CONTAINMENT RESPONSE
-
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EVALUATE EFFECT OF 30 MINUTE DELAY IN FAN DAMPER ACTUATION
ON OTHER FSAR ANALYSES.
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ANALYSIS USES FATHOMS ~ CODE, BASED ON COBRA-NC-(NUREG/CR-3262,
MARCH 1986).
A WESTINGHOUSE VERSION OF COBRA-NC WAS USED TO
' ANALYZE POST-SLB SUPERHEAT ISSUE.
FATHOMS IS THE STATE-0F-THE-ART:
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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS CODE.
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FATHOMS WAS USED'TO ANALYZE EFFECTS OF POSTULATED MCGUIRE MISSILE
SHIELD DISPLACEMENT RESULTING FROM MISSING TIE-DOWN BOLTS
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(11/06/87 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE)
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THE CONTAINMENT IS MODELED'WITH FOUR NODES, WHICH IS COMPARABLE TO
'
THE FSAR MODEL.
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VOLUMES, HEAT SINKS, AND JUNCTIONS BASED ON FSAR DATA.
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VX FAN LOCATED AT JUNCTION BETWEEN UPPER CONTAINMENT AND DEAD-ENDED
COMPARTMENT.
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MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE FOR BLOWDOWN, REFLOOD, AND POST-REFLOOD
PERIODS FROM FSAR (TABLES 6.2.1-30, 36, 40),
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HEAT TRANSFER TO ICE ADJUSTED TO MATCH FSAR ANALYSIS.
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ASSUMPTIONS
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5 FT .0F BYPASS AREA ASSUMED TO EXIST IN DIVIDER BARRIER..
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. TRAIN "A" 0F SAFEGUARDS ASSUMED TO OPERATE AS DESIGNED WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF THE' FAN DAMPER DELAY.
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TRAIN "A" SPRAY ~0N AT 45 SECONDS (3400 GPM).
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ICE' CONDENSER- DRAINS DISCHARGE DRAIN FLOW INTO LOWER CONTAINMENT
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lCE MASS ~ ASSUMED CURRENT LICENSING BASIS MINIMUM'(2.132 X 10
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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS:
RESULTS
,
e
THE CASE WITH THE 30 MINUTE DAMPER DELAY HAS A PRESSURE RESPONSE
SIMILAR TO THE BASELINE CASE IN MAGNITUDE AND SHAPE, BUT SHIFTED
IN TIME.
.
e.
PEAK PRESSURE OCCURS MUCH LATER AFTER ICE MELT (6993 SEC).
No
NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PRESSURE DUE TO FAN DAMPER ACTUATION DELAY.
0
e
PEAK TEMPERATURE WITH THE 30 MINUTE DAMPER DELAY IS 6 F HIGHER
THAN THE BASELINE CASE, BUT SIMILAR IN SHAPE.
HIGH TEMPERATURES
PERSIST IN LOWER CONTAINMENT LONGER THAN THE BASELINE CASE.
e
WITH THE 30 MINUTE DAMPER DELAY THE LOWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE.
EXCEEDS THE CURRENT EQ PROFILE.
IT HAS BEEN-VERIFIED THAT NO
UNACCEPTABLE IMPACT ON EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED..
e
DIVIDER BARRIER REVERSE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND SUBCOMPARTMENT
WALL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ANALYSES ONLY INVOLVE IMMEDIATE POST-
LOCA RESPONSE (< 2 MINUTES).
VX. SYSTEM HAS NO IMPACT.
e
MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS USED FOR LOCA BACKPRESSURE
REMAINS CONSERVATIVELY LOW AS ANALYZED IN FSAR.
e
THE STEAMLINE BREAK CONTAINMENT RESPONSE WITH THE DAMPER DELAY
WOULD RESULT IN A LONGER DURATION AT HIGH TEMPERATURES.
THIS IS
BOUNDED BY THE LOCA CASE ANALYZED.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _
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EQ EVALUATION-
1
1
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'28: DIFFERENT TYPES OF EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRED FOR LOCA,
,
..
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.19 TYPES 0F. EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED CABLES REQUIRED FOR LOCA
e
.
ENVIRONMENT.-
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. EQUIPMENT TEST PROFILES WERE COMPARED TO THE DEGRADED'LOCA
TEMPERATURE-AND PRESSURE PROFILES RESULTING FROM THE.30 MINUTE
FAN DAMPER DELAY.
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EQ EVALUATION RESULTSL
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0RIGINAL QUALIFICATION ON 16 TYPES OF EQUIPMENT ENVELOPED THE-
'
TEMPERATURE PROFILE RESULTING FROM THE 30 MINUTE FAN DAMPER DELAY.
e-
ADDITIONAL CALCULATION / ANALYSIS' REQUIRED FOR 3' PIECES 0F EQUIPMENT.
!
e
PRESSURE WAS ENVELOPED FOR ALL 19 PIECES OF EQUIPMENT.
e
ALL CABLES REQUIRED.FOR LOCA ENVIRONMENT ENVELOPED'BOTH THEL
1 TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE PROFILES.
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CONCLUSION-
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THE 30 MINUTE.-DELAY PRESENTS'NO UNACCEP. TABLE. IMPACT ON
CONTAINMENT OR' EQUIPMENT.
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