ML20238A359
| ML20238A359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-075, OL-5-I-SC-75, NUDOCS 8708310041 | |
| Download: ML20238A359 (107) | |
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NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION
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POST EXERCISF ASSESSMENT l
I Se ptembe r 28, 1983 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station i
at Scriba, Oswego County, w
New York Decembe r 23, 1983 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II Ftank P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza Regional Director New York, N.Y.
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I Participating Governments The Stage of New York Oswego County Jefferson County i
Onondaga County Nonparticipating Governments None
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6 CONTENTS s
AB B R EV I AT I O N S.............................................................
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S UM MARY...................................... '............................ v i l 1 I NT RO D U CT I O N...........................................................
I 1.1 Ex e r c i s e B a ckg ro und.......................... -...................
1 1.2 Fe d e r a l Ob s e r v e r s.................................................
2 1.3 Evaluation criteria...............................................
4 1.4 Ex e r ci s e Obj e c t i v e s...............................................
5 1.5 Exercise Scenario.................................................
11 1.5.1 Se q ue nc e o f Hbj o r Eve n t s o n Si t e........................... 11 1.5.2 S c e n a r i o S um ma r y........................................... 12 1.5.3 Des cription o f State and County Resource s.................. 13 2 EXE RC I S E EVA LU AT I O N....................................................
21 2.1 New York State and Lake District Operations.......................
21 2.1.1 S t a t e E O C ( Al b a n y )......................................... 21 2.1.2 Lake District E0C..........................................
27 2.1.3 State Pe rsonnel Monitoring Cente r..........................
29 j
2.1.4 Inge s t io n Pa t hway Sa mpl in g................................. 30 2.2 Emergency Operations Facility.....................................
32 2.3 News Media Cent e r and Public Educatio n............................ 35 s
2.3.1 Ne w s Me d i a Ce n t e r..........................................
35 2.3.2 Pu b l i c E d u c a t i o n........................................... 37 2.4 Oswego Countf Operations..........................................
38 2.4.1 Coun ty Wa rning Poin t and E0C............................... 38 2.4.2 Radiological Fi eld Mo nitoring Te ams........................ 44 2.4.3 Fiel.d Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public...... 46 2.4.4 Me d i c a l D r i 1 1..............................................
50 2.5 Je f f e r s o n Co u n t y Op e r a t i o n s....................................... 51 2.5.1 J e f f e r s o n Co u n t y E 0 C.......................................
51 2.5.2 Je f f e r s on Coun ty Re c e p tion Cen t e r.......................... 52 2.5.3 Je f f e rs on Coun ty Co ng re ga t e Ca re Ce n te r....................
54 2.6 Ono n d a g a Co un t y Op e r a t i o n s........................................ 55 2.6.1 Onondaga Count y Re ce ption Ce nt e r...........................
55 2.6.2 Ononcaga Co un t y Co ngr eg a t e Care Ce n t e r s.................... 56 3 SCREDULE FOR CORP 2CTING DEFICIENCIES:
SEPTEM3ER 28,1983 EXE RCI S E....
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S UMMARY O F D E F I C I E N C I E S................................................ 59 6
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. TAB LE 4.1 Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Of f-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Nine Mile Point Site on September 28, 1983, and Two Previous Dates and the October 12,-1983,' Medical Drill......................................
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ABB REVIATIONS s
ANL Argonne National Laboratory CDNATS Civil Defense National Teletype System DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department o f Energy DOH Department of Health (New York State)
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EB S Emergency Broadcast System EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility.
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration l
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HMS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory KI potassium iodide NNPNS Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PIO public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan SEOC state emergency operations center ( Albany)
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TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter USCA U.S. Department of Agriculture
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SUMMARY
i An exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response was conducted for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station at Scriba, N.Y., on September 28, 1983.
Following the exercise, a preliminary evaluation was made by a 22-member federal observer team.
A briefing for exercise participants and the general public was held on September 30, 1983 in the McCrobie Building in Oswego, New York.
The evaluation, deficiencies, and recommendations related to this exercise are included in this report.
In addition, a federally observed medical drill for the Nine Mile Point site was held on October 12, 1983.
The evaluation of this drill is also included in this report.
Each deficiency and the corresponding recommendation is' described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of this report.
Section 3 provides a form for developing a schedule for correcting deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and other deficiencies based on the September 28, 1983, exercise.
Section 4 tabulates the status of the deficiencies observed at all the radiological emergency preparedness exercises held in conjunction with the Nine Mile Point site.
The State of New York and the Lake District The State of New York demonstrated the capability to direct and control the emergency response activities for a prolonged period of time. Operations within the state emergency operations center (SEOC) were well managed and leadership was maintained throughout the exercis e.
The facilities were excellent.
There was suf ficient working space, ventilation, and a complete set of charts and maps.
Ale rting and mobilization procedures were demon-strated and the SEOC was fully staffed in a timely manner.
Internal communications were good; each agency representative received a susmary of all messages.
Due to a backup at a copy machine, some delays in transmitting hard copies of infor=ation received oier the Radiological Emergency Co==u nica t ions System (RECS) were observed in the communications Overall, external communications were good. A malfunction in the Civil area.
Defense National Teletype System (CDNATS) required that contiguous states be notified indirectly through Region I of the rederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in Boston.
In the accident ass essment room, county radiological field monitoring data were received in a timely manne r, displayed appropriately, and used to define the plume boundaries and confirm plant release data.
This was a significant improvement over last ' year's exercise.
Other improvements included:
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e e The use of closed-circuit television.
It was an effective
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means of broadcasting briefings from the operations room to the command and accident assessment areas.
e The use of an emergency response planning area (ERPA) status map with lights color-coded to illustrate protective actions taken.
e The use of new forms for transcribing Radiological Emergency Communications Sys tems (RECS) messages i:nproved their legibility and permitted clear telefax copies to be mad e.
Improved communications between accident o
assessment at the
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state EOC, accident assessment at the emergency operations facility (EOF), and dose sssessment at the county EOC.
Recovery and reentry options were carefully considered and evaluated by a task force consisting of personnel t' rom accident assessment, the State Department of Health, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets.
In addi-tion, each agency having a role in recovery and resntry operations prepared a plan of action for their agency and briefed the other agencies in the operations room.
C The Lake District EOC in Newark, New York, was activated during this l
exercise as a backup for the Central District EOC, which was being repaired and would normally be activated for a radiological emergency at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.
Facilities at the Lake District EOC vere generally excellent.
Due to an insufficient nunber of telephone lines, the timeliness of communications between agency representatives in the LDE0C and their agencies was impaired.
State Personnel Monitoring Center The state personnel monitoring center for emergency workers in Pulaski was very good.
The center was properly set up with trained and co mpe t ent p
- nnel.
Vehicles and personnel were monitored ef fectively according to ablished procedures.
The facilities were adequate to handle the expected
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nt.ber of state emergency workers.
Ingestion Pathway Saeoling Personnel from the State Department of Agriculture and Markets who have the responsibility for ingestion pathway sampling were dispatched from the Oswego County EOC.
These individuals, although knowledgeable about their responsibilities, need additional training in radiological e xpos ure control measures.
In addition, they should be equipped with personal protective equi pmen t, Ceiger counters to check for high levels of contamination, and
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radios.
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Emergency Operations Facility l
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The emergency operations facility (EOF) was activated and mobilized in l
a timely fashion.
The four commercial telephone lines and backup radio
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support for state and county were adequate to provide a continuous information flow.
Emergency operations management and coordination among all organiza-l tions were good.
However, the state and cc mty work area was overcrowded, impeding timely message flow. Although the utility, state, and county used an acceptable methodology to calculate the dose r.nd accident assessment, the three emergency response organizations should it.teract during the development
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of protective action recommendations, rather than after the independent J
develo pnent of three separate sets of recommendations.
Such interactions l
would further enhance the mutuality, consistency, and timeliness of the l
already excellent procedures for developing protective action recommendations.
I Joint News Center and Public Education The joint news center in the McCrobie Building in Oswego was a well-equipped facility with good communications capabilities.
Overall, operations went smoothly and media briefings were held at least hourly.
Emergency instructions for the public were aired over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) stations and were well-coordinat.ed with the public alerting system. EBS messages were generally accurate and informative.
However, no EBS message announcing the countyvide school closing was aired.
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The Oswego County public (.ducation program continues to be extensive and innovative.
A revised public education brochure had been sent to the residents of the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in August, i
1983.
Information on radiological emergency procedures is also contained in the latest Oswego County telephone book.
More recently, a postcard had been sent to area residents reminding them that the exercise would take place.
Limited spot checks made by federal observers indicated that a majority of those interviewed remembered receiving the public education brochure and understood that the sounding of the sirens is a signal for them to tune to their local EBS station for additional emergency information.
Oswego County overall, emergency response capabilities at the Oswego County E0C were very good.
The initial call notifying the county of an unusual event at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station was received at the Oswego County warning point at the sheriff's department in Oswego at approximately 7:05 a.m.
Following receipt of this notification, the County Director of Emergency Preparedness was notified and the procedures for mobilizing the OCEOC staff were initiated.
Tne EOC was fully staffed in a timely manner at approximately 9 :15 a.m. during the alert emergency classification. All county agencies with designated responsibilities were represented at the OCEOC.
In addition, Jef ferson and Onondaga Counties and the Lake District were represented at the Oswego County EOC to coordinate multicounty responses.
In addition to primary ix
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staff, backup personnel were present for the exercise and a shif t change for all agencies was demonstrated at approximately 12:30 p.m.
Emergency operations management of the EOC was very good. The Chairn 7.i of the Oswego County Legislature, the County Administrator, and the County Director of Emergency Preparedness were very effective in directing the emergency response.
Message handling, control, and review were generally very eff ective.
However, an error was observed in on,e of the RECS transmissions received at the EOC.
This error caused some confusion about which emergency classifica-tion level was in effect.
The resulting discrepancy was recognized by the County Director of Emergency Preparedness and other staff in the command room, who quickly clarified the emergency level with officials at the state EOC in Albany.
The Oswego County EOC is a very good f acility.
The physical layout of the central operatious room facilitated the internal flow of information and coordination among the various agencies.
Comprehensive briefings of the EOC staff were conducted periodically to assure the coordination of activities among all agencies.
The facilities, displays, and communications equipment used by management and agency coordinators were outstanding.
Radiological dose assessment capability at the EOC was also very good.
The county radiological officer effectively coordinated staff activities.
Dose projections were completed quickly using both plant and field data.
Protective action recommendations were conservative and prompt.
The county dose assessment team, state liaison, and utility representative coordinated their dose assessment well, enhancing the overall dose assessment process.
The dose assessment room at the EOC was set up well and arranged to allow the staff to work effectively.
However, the status boards in this area were maintained to varying degrees.
In addition to the RECS line, a second direct hot-line between the county EOC and the EOF was operational and staffed throughout the exercise.
This supplemental telephone and its designation in the coanty plan as a direct link between the county nuclear facility liaison officer and the county EOC corrected two deficiencies identified at last year's exercise.
Overall, public alerting and notification were performed effectively and promptly.
The EOC played the primary ro e in alerting the public.
At
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9:30 a.m., the County Director of Emergency Preparedness activated the outdoor siren system from the county EOC and coordinated activation of the tone alert radios through the National Wea:her Service (NVS).
The capability to alert the boating public was effectively demonstrated W the Oswego County Sheriff's Department.
However, the U.S. Coast Guard stauton in Oswego, New York, was not involved in the alerting of the boacir.g public.
The state and the county should discuss arrangements for coordinating this marine alerting function with the Coast Guard.
Airing of the test EBS message was closely coordinated with the activation of the outdoor sirens and tone alert radios at 9:31 a.m.
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e This initial notification and subsequent EBS messages were prepared by the
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Oswego County public information officer (PIO) at the joint news cente r, who was in direct communication with the PIO at the county EOC. EBS messages and news releases were generally accurate, co mplet e, and prepared in a timely manner.
Closing of the }kxico School District schools and the B.0.C.E.S.
School were announced in S S messages.
County PI0s at the county EOC and the joint news center demonstrated a high degree of professionalism.
Protective action recommendations were developed at the county EOC through close communication with pers,onnel at the state EOC in Albany. Free-play problems were introduced at the county EOC and the coordination of responses to these problems was generally very effective.
Representatives of all agencies trere able to accurately assess and anticipate emergency conditions.
Field personnel and resources were deployed as ne,cessary on the basis of technical information presented throughout the exercise.
Hows.er, the sheriff's coordinators did not always consider alternative evacuation routes nor did they inform the public of actions being taken to deel with impediments to evacuation.
By staging necessary equipment along the evacuation
- routes, the highway department coordinator demonstrated an outstanding capability to monitor evacuation.
Recovery and reentry procedures were simulated at the Oswego County EOC. The dose assessment staff evaluated data that were provided by the state and the utility. Protective actions were relaxed and reentry procedures began when the radiation levels were reduced to levels which would not be a threat
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to public health.
Provisions were made through various agencies to provide for the safe and orderly return of people to the evacuated area and a detailed tabletop discussion of the necessary arrangements was held. Oswego County, in cooperation with the state, established a joint coc=tittee to coordinate long-term recovery activities.
I The field monitoring team coordinator quickly mobilized the field teams and began coilseting background data before a release occurred.
Although communications between the dose assessment staff st the EOC and the field monitoring tea =s were greatly improved since last year's exercise, some field monitoring data were not communicated back to the'EOC in the proper units.
The radiological monitoring teams were well-equipped and able to perform their responsibilities.
Both teams demonstrated a good knowledge of the area and reached their monitoring locations quickly.
Howeve r, the two field teams varied in their technical knowledge of monitoring procedures and in the use of their equipment. Both field monitoring tea =s were well-trained in the use of personal dosimetry and the procedure for the use of KI.
The demonstration of actions to protect the public included the activation, mobilization, and deployment of personnel and equipment for five traffic control points, two bus routes for the evacuation of the general population, one ambulance for the evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons, and one personnel monitoring center for county emergency
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workers.
All traffic-control-point personnel were generally familiar with xi
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controlling access to an evacuated area.
Personnel staffing the traffic i
control points were well equipped with exposure control instruments and l
l knowledgeable about instrument use and procedures.
Bus evacuation was l
exceptiona.11y well demonstrated by the Centro of Oswego bus company.
The driver and the company personnel were knowledgeable about their responsi-l bilities and expeditiously carried out the bus evacuation.
The same can be l
l said for the City School of Oswego bus company.
Both bus companies demon-straced competence in emergency worker exposure control.
Evacuation of the mobility-impaired was adequately demonstrated.
The ambulance company demonstrated a very good knowledge of the area and of exposure control.
However, its response was delayed by approximately one hour.
The Oswego
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County personnel monitoring center for emergency workers at Volney was very good.
The center was properly set up with trained and competent personnel.
j Vehicles and personnel were monitored effectively according to established i
procedures.
The facilities were adequate to handle the expected number of emergency workers.
Staff at the Oswego Hospital demonstrated knowledge of i
proper procedures in handling a contaminated injured individual during the
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medier.1 drill of October 12, 1983.
I Jefferson County operations The Jefferson County EOC was well-staf fed and well-managed.
There was adequate communication with the Oswego County EC':.
However, the Jefferson County EOC received some conflicting information from the Oswego County EOC.
For instance, at 9:45, Jefferson was advised that emergency response planning I
areas (ERPAs) 26 and 27 and schools in ERPAs 1-5 were being evacuated.
This l
was later found to be incorrect.
There was also approximately a one-hour delay in advising Jefferson County that a release was in progress.
l The reception center in Jefferson County was adequately staffed and registration was conducted promptly and efficiently, although additional traffic control would be desirable.
Personnel monitoring was conducted but monitors should have additional training in the use of instrumentation.
The i
number of monitoring teams available was not sufficient to monitor the expected number of evacuees within the prescribed 12-hour time limit.
Although not demonstrated, the procedure for the disposal of contaminated wastes appeared to conform to state policy, correcting a deficiency noted last year.
Overall, the congregate care facility appeared to be an adequate shelter. However, it was inadequately staffed to function effectively.
Onondaca County Ooerations The Onondaga County reception center facilities at the New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse were acceptable.
The center was well staf fed with trained volunteers. All activities were performed in a professional manner.
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i Staffing at the Genesee High School congregate care center was not
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adequate to perform the variety of support functions necessary (e.g., police for evacuee entry and control, RACES operators, and monitors).
Documentation of evacuee radiological monito-ing and decontamination had apparently not been coordinated between the agencies at the reception centers and the congregate care center.
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INTRODUCTION i
1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency
'y Hanagement Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments.
e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.
e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) l
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U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
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U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
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U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
U.S. Department of Administration (FDA)
Representatives of _ these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
After formal submission, the radiological emergency response plans for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) were critiqued and evaluated. A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions for changes in the plans.
The NMPNS and the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant are located'at the Nine Mile Point site in Oswego County, near Scriba, New York.
A first
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?s exercise was conducted for NMPNS on September 15, 1981, and a final Post Exercise ' Assessment for that exercise was subsequently issued.
A second exercise involving state and local agencies and utility personnel from the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant was held for the Nine Mile Point site on August 11,,1982.
A final Post Exercise Assessment for the second exercise was issued on October 29, 1982.
The findings presented in this report were based on federal observers' evaluations that were reviewed by FEMA.
A third radiological emergency preparedness exercise was held on September 28, 1983, between the hours of 0630 and 1600 to assess the capability of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations' to implement their radiological emergency, preparedness plans and procedures and protect the public during a radiological emergency at the Nine Mile Point site. The exercise of September 28, 1983, involved the NMPNS.
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An observer team consisting of personnel f rom FEMA Region II, the RAC, FEMA's contractors, and federal and state apncies evaluated the September 28, 1983, exercise.
Twenty-two federal observers were. assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions.
Team leaders coordinated team operations.
Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their i
evaluations.
Observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members.
This final post-exercise assessment is based on these assessments.
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A publie'eritique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general pubil: was held by the RAC Chairman at 10 :00 a.m.
on Friday, September 30, 1983, at the McCrobie Building in Oswego, N.Y.
The findings presented in this pp.Nt-e xe r cis e assessment are based on federal observers' evaluations which have been re, viewed by the RAC chairman, FEMA, @egion II.
FEMA, requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a
- chedule of remedial actices for correcting the def".ciencies discussed in this report.' The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local P<tograms and Support, Washington, s
D.C.,
that (all negative findings observed during the exercise have been i
f corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into statc and local plans, as appropriate.
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1.,2 FEDERAL OB3ERVIUbi
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Twenty-two federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions.
These individuals, their Affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.
Aeronyms for the agencies may be found in the list of abbreviations.
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Exercise Observer Agenev Location (s)
Function (s)
P. M;Intire FEMA FEMA command center overview observation R. Kovieski FEMA Oversight observation Region II RAC chairman F. Fishman FEMA State emergency operations state team leader center (EOC)
L. Olmer EPA State EOC accident as sessment l
A. Smith ANL State EOC communications N. Kelly FEMA Sta:e EOC public information M. Jackson F1-joint news center public information B. Petrush FEMA joint news center public information Oswego County public alerting and notification D. Nevitt UfiMA Lake District EOC; team leader Oswego County ingestion pathway sampling C. Gordon NRC emergency operations team leader facility (EOF)
T. Baldwin ANL Oswego County EOC team leader R. Honkus INEL Oswego County EOC accident assessment J. Levenson ANL Oswego County EOC public information B. Acerno FEMA Oswego County warning point communications Oswego County EOC communications P. Ca=marata FEMA Oswego County EOC general observation M. Wordsman FEMA Oswego County traffic control points; public alerting and notiffeation; evacuation of mobility-impaired T. Buckoski rEMA Oswego County traffic control points; evacuation bus route 49
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Exercise Observer A ger.ev Location (s)
Function (s)
P. Lucz 00T Oswega County boat alerting; public alerting and notification; evacuation bus route N. Chipmun IN!L Oswego County radiological field monitoring; public aler:ing and notification B. Salmonson INEL Oswego County radiological. field moni:oring; emergency worker personnel moni:oring centers J. Opelka ANL Onondaga County reception center; i
l congregate care centers l
. R. Bernacki FDA Jefferson Councy EOC observation; I
reception center; congregate care center 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercice evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evalua: ion criteria set forth in Seccion II of ' KUREC-0654-FEMA-1, Re v. 1 (Nov. 1980).
Following the overview narra:ive for each jurisdiction or ac:ivity, deficiencies and accompanying recommenda:1ons are presen:ed.
Deficiencies are presented in two categories.
The first category includes chose deficiencies char would cause a findirt that offsi:e emergency preparedness was not adequace to provide reasonable assurance that appropri ate l
measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in I
- he vicini:y of :he si:e in :he event of a radiological emergency. These are deficiencies tha: would lead :o a nega:1ve finding.
A nega:ive finding would be based on a: least one deficiency of :his cype.
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The second category includes all other deficiencies where demonstra:ed
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(and observed) performance during :he exercis; was considered faulty, correc-tive ac: ions are considered neessary, but other fac: ors indicated that reasonable assurance could be gi'ven that, in the event of a real radiological emergency, appropria:e measures can be taken :o protec: :he health and safety of :he public.
These other deficiencies also include all other problem areas where performance 'was censidered-adequa:e but where a correc:able weakness was noced (observed). Correction of the weakness would enhance :he ability of :he organi:a: ion :o pe rf o rm : heir adequa:ely demonstra:ed response capability.
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These deficiencies should be relatively easy or straightforward to correct. A finding of adequacy may include a number of deficiencies in this part.
i 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
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The licensee, New York State, and Oswego County planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the on site and off-site support agencies on September 28, 1983.
The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of NMPNS as.well as j
emergency organizations and emergency facilities of New York State and Oswego
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County.
j The exercise was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the NMPNS capabilities to respond to a wide range of ec;e'rgency condi-tions.
This scenario was designed to activate the NMPNS Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) and the Niagara Mohawk Power corporate Emergency Response Plan and Procedures through their various levels. Although che scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities; rather it was to provi8.e sequences that ultimately de'nons trated the operator's ability to respond to evee.s and that exercised both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions.
At no time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operation of NMPNS and the plant management could have suspended the exercise at their discretion, for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.
Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator or player ar:cion prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule.
Federal agencies were notified during the exercise according to existing emergency re?ponse procedures.
Federal agencies with radiological l
emergency preparedness.. possibility did not actively participate in the plan of this exercise.
Federal representatives, however, did act as exercice evaluators.
To provide a conservative exercise in terms of of f-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteorology was used.
Actual meteorology night have led to projected radiological doses below established protective action guides within the areas of interest.
The New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group developed the following objectives for this exercise.
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1.
Radiological Emergenev Preparedness Plan
- a. Evaluate the adequacy and capability of implementation of radiological emergency preparedness plans for New York State, Oswego County, and the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.
- b. Demonstrate the emergency response capabilities of state authorities, local support agencies, NMPNS, and appropriate federal ageneiss.
- c. Demonstrate the capabilities of Oswego County, New York State, and NMPNS to implement the'.r respective radiological emergency preparedness plans in a.
manner satisfying FEMA /NRC acceptance criteria..
l 2.
Notification Procedures
- a. Demonstrate the ability of NMPNS staff to classify actual or potential emergencies as:
e Unusual event, o Alert, e Site area emergency, and
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e Ceneral emergency in accordance with on-site emergency procedures.
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- b. Demonstrate the capability of NMPNS to notify the state, local, and federal government in accordance with federal guidance and established emergency response procedures.
- c. Demonattate the capabilities of NMPNS, the state, and l
Oswego County to communicate technical information to each other.
Also demonstrate their capab'.lities to coetmunicate technical-information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission via the NRC hot-lines.
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- d. Demonstrate the capabilities of the state, the county, and i
NMPNS to notify and act ivate emergency response personnel l-in accordance with established emer$ency response procedures.
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7
- e. Demonstrate the capabilities of the county and the state to (1) alert and notify the affected permanent and transient public within the plume exposure emergency plannfng zone (EPZ) of an incident at the Nine Mile Point site and (2) provide follow-up information as
- required, including activation of the prompt notification system (strens and tone alert radios) and the Emergency Broadcast System.
- f. Demonstrate, as appropriate, the state's and appropriate counties' notification to -and coordination with counties and provinces within the ingestion pathway EPZ and noti"ication of agencies such as railroads.
- g. Demonstrate as appropriate, the notification and request for assistance from federal agencies.
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3.
Emereenev Communications j
- a. Demonstrate the NMPNS communications capabilities among the control
- room, technical support
- center, emergency operations facility, operations support center, and the jcint nus center, and demonstrate the bility of NMPNS to I
maintain communications with the federal government.
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- b. Demonstrate an ef fective means of emergency communications l
among Oswego County, the state, and NMPNS through use of
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the radiological emergemy communications system (RECS) and other established communications syste a.
- c. Demonstrate an information flow between NMPNS and local and state e=ergency response personnel that is adequate to:
e Transmit instructions to activate emergency response
- staff, o Provide accurate and timely transmittal of essential information to assisting agencies, and Operate a 24-hour-per-day alert and notification system.
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- d. Demonstrate the abilities of NMPNS and Oswego County to coordinate,
- control, and deploy radiological field l
monitoring teams via their, respective field communications systems.
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8 4.
Emergenev Resoonse Facilities (NMPNS, New York State, and Oswego Countv)
- a. Demonstrate the activation, adequacy of
- staffing, and prompt set-up of emergency response f acilities,as well as the adequacy of space and habitability for radiological emergency management at:
e NMPNS control room, e NMPNS technical support center, NMPNS oper.ational support center, e
NMPNS emergency operations facility, e
o State EOC, e Office of Disaster Preparedness Lake District EOC, e Oswego County EOC, and e Joint news center.
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- b. Demonstrate the aettvation of emergency operations centers in host (support) counties, as appropriate.
- e. Demonstrate the adequacy of internal communications in state and county EOCs including the use of status boards, 1
charts, maps, diagrams, and other displays.
- d. Evaluate the adequacy and competency of New York State, Oswego County, and NMPNS staff to operate the emergency
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response facilities.
- e. Evaluate the adequacy of access con.rol and security at
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emergency response facilities.
j 5.
Direction and Control
- a. Demonstrate the ability of key emergency personnel at all levels of government and NMPNS to initiate, coordinate, and institute timely and ef fective decisions.
- b. Demonstrate the ability of key emergency and assessment personnel to effectively transfer duties and functions during a work shift ~ehange.
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- c. Demonstrate the existence of (1) effective organizational l
control (direction and control) and (2) an integrated l
radiological emergency response which includes deployment of field monitoring teams; acquisition,
- receipt, and analysis of field data; and effective sharing of field data among the licensee, the state, and county for evaluation and verification.
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- d. Demonstrate the capabilities of federal, state, and county j
emergency response agencie's to identify and provide for resource requirements.
Any required federal response activity may be simulated.
- e. Demonstrate the capcbility of elected and appointed officials to implement appropriate protective action recommendations.
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- f. Demonstrate the capability to coordinate (internally /
j externally) actions among organizations in order to obtain l
support and to make appropriate decisions.
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l 6.
Public Information I
- a. Demonstrate the adequate operation of and interaction among the state, county, and NMPNS public information systems.
- b. Demonstrate the activation and staffing of the joint news center by licensee, state, and local public information personnel and the capability of these personnel to control rumors and issue periodic public information releases and EBS messages.
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- . Demonstrate that the off-site authorities and the licensee can effectively work with the media in a radiological emergency.
l 7.
Accident Assessment and Evaluation
- a. Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting l
procedures of NMPNS and county field monitoring teams.
l Demonstrate the dispatch of liMPNS teams within and beyond the site boundary.
(Referees were to provide field monitoring with sf=ulated data consistent with the simulated release from.M NS).
In addition, demonstrate ingestion pathway and surf ace contamire. tion sampling.
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- b. Demonstrate the abilities of NMPNS, the county, and the C
state to receive, assess, and share radiological data from both county and licensee field teams in accordance with their respective radiological emergency plans.
- c. Demonstrate the abilities of NMPNS, the state, and the
, county to calculate and compare dose projections and to determine appropriate protective actions on the basis of protective action guides.
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- 8. Protective Response
- a. Demonstrate the capabilities of the state tnd Oswego County emergency response organize:.tions to implement appropriate protective action response o). t ions.
The response options include:
e Sheltering and evacuation (sialated) of on-site and off-site areas; e Informing the public of the accident development and any required protective actions; e Activation of receptien and congregate care centers and C
provisifn for monitoring evacuees for contamination; e Identification of and provisions for special popula-
- tions, including provisions for the identification, notification, and evacuation of noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons; Analysis and determination of ingestion exposure pathway e
considerations; and e Provision for removal of impediments from evacuation routes.
i 9.
Radiological Excesure control l
- a. Demonstrate the decision process for limiting exposures to emergency workers,
- b. Demonstrate the processing of state and local emergency workers through personnel monitoring centers and a working knowledge of decontamination action levels.
- c. Evaluate the capability of off-site emergency response
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personnel to implement access control procedures.
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- d. Demonr.. rate methods and resources for distributing dosi-meters and thyroid blocking agents to emergency workers.
- e. Demonstrate the keeping of radiation exposure records and the use of dosimeters and thyroid blocking agents to protect emergency workers.
- f. Demonstrate emergency workers' knowledge of dosimetry and KI usage and of the individual authorized to allow emergency worker exposures above permissible limi::s.
- g. Demonstrate the decision process for authorizing emergency workers to use KI.
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10.
Reentry and Recoverv
- a. Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, assess a situation, and ' identify procedures for reentry.
- b. Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, programs, and policies governing damage assessment and recovery.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Seouence of Major Events on Site Approximate Time Event 0630 start of exercise.
0650 Notification of Unusual Event loss of both 115 KV Feeders.
0805 Declaration of A,lert classification - failure of valve IV-201-31 and dryvell leak in excess of 50 GPM.
1000 Escalation to Site Area Emercenev classification due to a loss-of-coolant accident.
1200 Eseslation to General Emerzenev conditions. Major airborne release begins with no projection f or duration of release.
1420 Restoration of available plant systems - downgrade to site Area Emereenev.
1500 Break in exercise play.
.600 Secure from exercise.
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l 1.5.2 Scenario Summary Nine Mile Point Station Unic No. I was operating at 50% power with a redue: ion in power in progress for a scheduled refueling outage.
The No. 11 feedwater pump v.4 camporarily out of service for a previously detected bearing vibration problem.
All other systems were operating normally and all plant paramecers were all within their normal ranges.
Dryvell purge was in progress chrough the emergency vencilacion system in anticipation of a drywell entry for a refueling outage.
The exercise was initiated by' a system disturbance which resulted in i
che loss of both 115-kV feeders to the site.
This event resulted in a declara: ion of a notification of unusual event.
Upon loss of of f-site power only diesel generacor No. 103 scar:ed.
Diesel generator No. 102 failed to scarc.
Investigation revealed chat ch?re was a problem with 'the overspeed l
mechanism.
Estimates of the time needed to tescore the 115-kV system ranged from 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Estimates of the time needed to repair che diesel generator ranged from 8 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Subsequent to the above events, the operacot were alerted to a leak in
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che drywell and to increasing airborne activities in the plant vent and in the drywell.
The operators secured containment purge.
However valve IVC-201-31 failed to indicace shut.
All o:her valves which were required to operate, operated normally.
The measured leakage was greater than 50 gpm as measured in he floor drain system.
This necessitated a declaration of an alert.
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Accempts to identify the source of the leakage were unsuccessful.
The operators reduced power to the lowest practical level while scill maintaining the plant on-line until off-site power was restored, which was to be in about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
A fire broke out in turbine building exhause fan motor No. 11.
As a result of :he fire and a buildup of smoke in the planc, a stacion evacuacion was called.
The fire was put under control and shortly thereafter ex:inguished.
Following the restoration of off sice power, a LOCA occurred inside con: sin =en:.
This was indicated by a low-water-level alarm, a.high-drywell-pressure alarm, a high-floor-drain-invel alarm, HPCI signal, and main steam j
isola: ion valve closure.
This resul:ed in a reactor crip and a turbine genera:or : rip.
Following the :urbine genera:or crip snd the loss of the j
s:a: ion service transformer, the following electrical faul:s occurred:
I i
i e Fast transfer co power board 11 from 115-kV did cot func: ion (R112 remained open).
e Feedwa:er pump No.
12 breaker from power board No.
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- ripped open and could not be reshut.
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i 13 e Breaker R1012 115 kV to power board \\02 could not be shut.
s ne LOCA neesssitated a declaration of a site area emergency.
The operator used the ADS to depressurize the system to allow for core l
spray operations.
As a result of the turbine trip and the unavailability of the 115-kV system, HPCI was not available and only core spray pumps 112 and 122 were available. With the leak postulated to be in the 12 loop of the core spray system (i.e., pump 122 was spraying its discharge into the drywell),
only core spray pump 112 was available for core cooling.
Upon initiation of core spray flow there was an indication of high DP on the discharge strainer of core spray pump 112 resulting in a reduced flow from this pump.
This reduction in emergency core cooling resulted in a reduction in core water inventory, increasing core temperatures, and subsequent fuel failures.
De operators were alerted to increasing activities and radiation levels in the stack, which occurred because valve IV-201-32 had failed and there was no release path from the drywell to the atmosphere.
The emergency ventilation automatically initiated.
The valve failure was caused by an electrical problem associated with the solenoid valves that allowed the valves to open.
This event resulted in a declaration of a ger,eral emergency.
The operators were not able to isolate the release and the estimated time to repair any of the valves was unknown.
De postulated duration of the release combined with the known activity inside the dryvell resulted in protective action recommendations inside the EPZ approximately one-half hour af ter the release had begun. The operators were able to restore full flow to core spray pump 112 thereby mitigating the core damage.
The release continued for approximately two hours and was terminated by manually isolating the ventilation exhaust.
Electrician 1 were able to repair the supply breakers from 115 kV to power boards 11 and 12 as well as supply breakers to power boards 102 and 103.
Full power was restored to the site making additional cooling and water supply available to the core.
Af ter available plant systems were restored, there was a short break before recovery and reentry planning was to begin.
Information was provided on the results of post-release environmental samples of mtIk and vegetation so the state and county could make appropriate recommendations for area restoration.
1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources All emergency response agenci'es were re s pons '.ble for ensuring that thef. resources were deployed in adequate numbers to provide a reasonable test of Seir capabilities for notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications.
Except as noted below,
- r. tate and county agencies had
14
- ocal authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of
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cheir resources, consistent with this intenc.
The exercise-ini:iating events were controlled by the lead referee at NMPNS. Simulated iniciating events consisted of two types of information: (1) information and data provided to control room personnel by the control room referee and (2) on-site and off si:e dose race data (simulated gamma dose rate and iodine concentration measurements) provided to the si:e and county monitoring teams by referees or evaluators.
The lead referee (on-site) and the state exercise director (off-site) were responsible for controlling and coordinating the sequence of iniciacing events to ensure an orderly flow of exercise events.
The stace controllers or federal evaluacors could supply " problems" for off site participants (such as a disabled vehicle or other impediment on an evacuation rou:e).
All other actions during the exercise occurred as the licensee, state, and county parcicipancs responded in free play to the hypothe:ical initiating events.
As the initiating evencs were provided to the NMPNS staff, the staff members ware to determine the nature of the emergency and implemerc approprince plant emergency response procedures.
These procedures included a determination of the emergency classification in accordance with the NMPNS Emergency Plan.
After the emergency classification was determined, the
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appropriate rederal, stace, and local authorities were s M notified in accordance with the NMPNS emergency response procedures.
Upon notification of the simulaced accident at NMPNS, the s t a t t.
and Oswego County were to complete their initial notifications in accordance with their respec:ive emergency plans and procedures.
Scace and local personnel and facilities were to be activated as appropriate on the basis of the accident classification provided by the site and confirmed by direct com=unication between involved agencies and NMPNS.
The simulated acciden: was to con:inue to develop on the basis of data and informa: ion provided to the control room personnel by the control room referee.
As che situacion developed, information was to be forwarded to New W rk Stace and the county assessment :eams.
These agencies were to analyze, share, and act on the informa: ion and coordinate actions as they would in a real emergency.
Were infor=a: ion would normally be confirmed via an independent source (such as :.he Na:ional Weather Service for weather daca), the confirmatory data were to be obtained.
If the ac:ual da:a conflicted with exercise data provided by the site, the exercise da:a were to be used for accident assessment purposes.
If any inconsis:encies were noted in :he iniciating events, these inconsis:encies were o be by :he accident teams as in a real emergency.
l
15 Certain inconsistencies (such as plume width, release duration, technical reason for the simulated release, etc.) may have been intentional and required due to the need to simulate an accident that has never occurred and the need to provide an exercise that tests the site, state, and local capabilities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time frame.
If an inconsistency was known or determined to be intentional, then the accident assessment group was to note the inconsistency and ignore it.
The lead referee had the authority to resolve or explain any inconsistencies or problems that may have occurred during the exercise.
Resolution of inconsistencies that were not intentional might also have been facilitated through communication among radiological assessment groups.
When the use of an agency's resources was simulated, that agency was responsible for ensuring that all steps necessary to utilize the resource were demonstrated.
For example, an agency simulating the activation of additional personnel had to locate the required call list and have the calls either completed or simulated.
Then a realistic mobilization time had to be estimated and forwarded to agencies that would need to Kr.ow this time estimate.
Use of a resource could be simulated on1) after the estimated mobilization time had elapsed.
In addition, when use of a resource was simulated, the command and control was also to be demonstrated.
All simulations were to be carried out to the greatest extent. possible, thus determining the need for additional resources -such as those used for command, control, and dose record maintenance.
Personnel shift changes of key decision makers and radiological assessment and evaluation staff were to be demonstrated. Actual shift changes for personnel involved in field response activities such as radiological monitoring, decontamination operations, and traffic control were not to be demonstrated during the exercise.
State and local agencies vere to maintain rosters of personnel providing for any required 24-hour operations.
Total counts of emergency workers deployed and simulated to have been deployed were to be maintained.
Information about which personnel movements were real and which were hypothesized was to be readily available at all ti=es.
The following provides a minimum list of personnel and resources that were to be deployed by the state and local governments to demonstrate the capabilities of their resources.
Specific demonstration objectiver
'e also provided.
Public Notification During the exercise, the sirens, tone alert radios, and accompanying Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) announcement were to be demonstrated.
Additional exercise EBS messages were to be prepared.
Actual transmission of these messages to the primary insert station and broadcast by the EBS network was to be simulated.
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e 16 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams In addition to off-site monitoring teams dispatched by NMPNS, Oswego county was co dispatch two radiological monitoring field teams for plume exposure.
Each team was accompanied by a controller.
The controllers had simulated field data that were provided to the teams so they could determine local dose rate readings consistent with the scenario.
Each team was to have i
equipment to determine both gamma dose rates and airborne radioicdine concentrations.
The emphasis was to be on rapid deployment, data-gathering, data-communicating to the EOC, and prompt data-sharing with the state and the EOF.
The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing.
Comolecion of Bus Routes for, Evacuees Oswego County was to activate two bus routes for evacuees.
Bus routes were not preassigned.
The federal evaluators indicated which bus routes were to be demonstrated on the exercise day.
The federal evaluators, in concert with the assigned state controller and appropriate county staff, were to ensure that the selected bus routes did not affect normal public transporta-tion. The bus drivers were to assemble at their normal dispatch locations, be assigned appropriate routes, and be briefed and deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
The buses were to complete their assigned routes but they were not to pick up any evacuees.
Upon completion of the
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general population route, the buses were to report to the appropriate reception or congregate care center.
The buses and drivers were then to be secured and return to the garage.
There were no time constraints on running the evacuation bus routes.
Evacuation of Noninstitutionalized, Mobility-Impaired Persons The county was to demonstrate procedures for identifying and deter-mining the availability of appropriate transportation for evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons.
Federal evaluators were to select three addresses of mobility-impaired persons in Oswego County.
A vehicle for transporting the mobility-impaired was to be dispatched to these addresses for siculated evacuation and was than to proceed to the appropriate relocation ee:ater.
No handicapped evacuees were to be picked up.
Traffie Control Points _
Local agencies supplemented by state resources were to deploy personnel to demonstrate activation of five traf fic control points for major evacuation I
routes in Owego County, not including the
..aree traffic control points preassigned in the county plan.
Traffic control points were not preassigned or repositioned.
To provide a greater test of the capability to respond to
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an actual incident and to allow more free play in the exercise, the federal
17 evaluators were to provide locations of traffic control points to be demonstrated during the course of the exercise to the state controller at the l
county EOC.
The state controller then was to request the county E0C to demonstrate the traffic control point activation.
j Once traffic control points had been established and observed by Eederal evaluators, local officials were.to release personnel to normal duties and simulate continuation of control points where required.
The personnel j
released were not be used for any other exercise function.
Rotation of l
traffic control parsonnel was to be simulated with personnel who woe.ld be
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availab?.e from off-duty scetions.
For training purposes, selected traffic i
control personnel were to report to personnel monitoring centers af ter they were secured from their exercise assignments.
Impediments to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce no more than two free play events to test procedures for removal of impediments from evacuation routes.
This demonstration was to 1iclude the actual dispa':ch of a police or other f
emergency vehicle to the scene, receipt at the EOC of a report from the scene requesting appropriate resources, identification of the availability of the required resources (e.g.,
tow truck, public works equipment),
and an I
estimation of the times of arrival at the scene and for clearing the impediment. No emergency equipment was to be actually de; ployed.
I Personnel Monitoring Centers The county was to set up and demonstrate two personnel mnitoring centers for local emergency workers.
During the exercise, the processing of selected emergency workers who had completed their exercise partie pation was to be demonstrated. Decontamination actions were to be simulated, At the personnel monitoring centers, anythirg that cLight have dameged l
property (such as parking vehicles on grass) was to be sinulated.
All l
necessary equipment was to be assembled at the personnel moni toring center; however, equipment use could be simulated.
Detailed simulation actions were to be implemented at the center by the center leader of the personnel monitoring.
Iri eddition, the state was to demonstrate the activation of a personnel =onitoring center for emergency workers.
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Relocation Centers One reception / congregate care center in Onondaga Count y and one in Jefferson County vare to be opened and staffed for evacuees from 3swego County l
in accordance with the Oswego County emergency response plan.
Supplies required for long-term mass esce (cots, blankets, food, etc.) need not have been acquired or brought to the centers.
However, the center personnel were to obccin estimates on how many evaevees would have been arriving had there been a real emergency.
The center personnel were then to estimate supplies L
18' required for the potential evacuees.
Sources of the potentia 1' supplies were
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to be located and the means for transport.ing the supplies determined.
A limited number of volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure.
Procedures for monitoring and ' decontaminating evacuees were ' to ' be demonstrated at the reception / congregate care center located.in Jefferson County.
At the center located in Onondaga County, only monitoring was to be demonstrated as the decontaminau.on area var. not available during the exercise.
In the event of an actual emergency, the decontamination area would-be available.-
Federal evaluators could introduce free play proble ms. for handling evacuees who arrived at a congregate care center without appropriate documents from referral at the recep.. ton center.
Because prior arrangements must be made to gain access to relocation centers during' an exercise, these centers were selected before the exercise.
Medical Drill There was to be no medical drill in Oswego County during the exercise on September 28, 1983.
A federally observed medical drill for the Nine Mile Point site was held on October 12, 1983.
Ingestion Pathway Sampling The state was to demonstrate the analysis and decision making. process
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for selecting samples from the ingestion exposure pathway-that are consistent with the hypothetical problem posed by the exercise parameters. he state was to demonstrate collection of ingestion pathway samples, primarily. of vegeta-tion, milk, and fruit, as appropriate.
Analysis of the samples was to be simulated.
Volunteer Organizations Response organizations identified in the plans were to participate in the exercise.
Members of volunteer organizations such as volunteer fire departments, ambulance squads, amateur radio operators, and the Red Cross have responsibilities including earning a livelihood that. take precedence ~ over their participation in an exercise..
Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exerc.ise purposes was to be ca an as-available basis.
Closecut of the Exercise Closecuts of the exercise was accomplished by the following actions:
.1.
ne federal observers were not to release any participants f rom the exercise.
Emergency workers were to be secured as soon as possible after they had demonstrated their
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capabilities.- The decision to secure.them was to be made m
4 19 at their controlling E0C, with concurrence from the state EOC, if applicable.
Selected emergency workers were to check v3t through decontamination centers.
Radiological exposure records for emergency workers were to be completed in accordance with the standard operating l
procedures.
The completed doon record forms were to be clearly marked "For Demonstration Only" and forwarded to the responsible agency for review.
2.
The personnel monitoring centers for emergency workers and the reception / congregate care centers were to be secured as soon as appropriate emergency wo rkers and volunteers had checked out through these centers.
3.
Participation of nonessential secte and county EOC q
personnel was to end as soon as their emergency responses had been essentially completed.
Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long-term planning and recovery was to have the concurrence of the Chairman of the State Disaster Preparedness Commissio n, or the chairman's designee, if applicable.
I 4.
When the ite reported termination of the rel ase with no further release expected, items 1 through 3 above wei c to be completed.
Then there was to be a break in exercise play with an assumption
- hat the exercise play advanced one day.
This period allowed the plant situation to deescalate and the recovery phase, reentry, and long-term recovery planning to commence.
The remaining staf f was to close the exercise out by developing a recovery plan.
This course of action was to be a coordinated effort between the state, each county, and the licensee.
The recovery planning was to include:
(a)
Identification of any further ingestion zone sampling that needed to be taken, locations to be sampled, and requirements for personnel to conduct the necessary sampling and transport the samples to the laboratories.
These requirements were to be matched against personnel available, including the projected federal agency support provided by the Federal Radiological. Monitoring and Asseement Plan.
(b) Development of a
24-hour pe rsonnel rotation schedule.
These schedules were to include personnel for security, decontamination, record keeping, and EOC staffing, as appropriate.
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Identification of requirements for 24-hour ingestion
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pathway control such as food interdiction.
This planning was to include comparisons of personnel requirements with available personnel.
(d) Planning crime prevention (security) measures in the evacuated areas.
(e) Planning long-term mass care measures.
(f) Development of tentative plans for eventual reentry into evacuated areas.
When the state, the counties, and the licensee were satisfied that they could have implemented the necessary long-term protective, parallel, and other actions required by the plan, the participants were to reach a joint conclu-sion to terminate the exercise. A final press release and an EBS message were to be issued signifying the termination of the exercise bef ore the state and local EOCs were secured.
t
21 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 2.1 NEW YORK STATE AND LAKE DISTRICT OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC ( Albany) l OVE RVIEW Activation and staffing were ef fectively demonstrated at the state EOC.
All necessary organizations responded.and quickly had representatives at the E00.
Staffing with key personnel was initiated shortly af ter a message from the utility was received over the RECS line at the state warning point stating l
that an alert emergenqr classification level was in effect.
The call was received at about 0820 and initial staffing was completed by 0900. Accident assessment was f ully staf fed by 0930.
The RECS line at the state warning point is monitored continuously at the state EOC during normal working hours. At other times, the RECS line is monitored at the state police warning point.
Both warning points can implement the written ca!1 lists to begin initial staffing of the state EOC.
Additional staff were activated shortly after the declaration of the site area emergency classification level at about 1
1030 and staffing was complete by 1110.
Telephone calls made from the state EOC to alert and mobilize the staff and key agency representatives were handled efficiently.
The calls stated that a test was in progress, noted the emergency classification level, and told recipients whether to report curreat to tha EOC or stand by for mobilization and implement their agencys' standard procedures.
During the alert at about 0930, the dispatch of two state radiological intelligence liaisons from stacc Departcent of Health offices in Syracuse and Rochester to the EOF was simulated. For the exercise, these representatives were repositioned at the EOF; for an actual emergency, they would be flown to the EOF by a state police helicopter.
A shift change was simulated by double staffing in most positions and the presentation of rosters.
The communications staf f at the state EOC would go on 12-nour shifts to provide continuous coverage during an actual emergency. Management of emergancy operations at the state EOC was good. The EOC had five principal functional areas, each located in a separate room or rooms: command, operations, communication ; > accident assessment, and public inf o rmation.
Ef fective leadership was exetaised by a specific individual over h
eac functional area; overall control came from the command room.
A copy of the plan was available for reference.in the operations room. Briefings were held every 30-40 minutes to update staf f and agency representatives in the operations room. These briefings were relayed to command and accident assess-ment personnel by closed-circuit television.
This technique was effective in keeping all key staf f members aware of the progress of the incident.
In
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22 addition, a liaison summarized operations briefings for command personnel.
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Command personnel were also briefed frequently by the radiological officer and personnel capable of relating changes in plant status to plant conditions.
These briefings made the input of operations and accident assessment s t'af f members available to decision a-kars.
The staff was also briefer on the decisions reached by command personnel.
The flow of incoming messages to agency representatives was good.
Copies of incoming messages were distributed to all agency representatives and a status board was maintained and updated on a timely basis.
Writte-pro-eedures were available and used by agency representatives.
Reference materials ned by the accident assessment group were good and included:
a copy of the plan, utility dose projection procedures, and EPA dose projection procedures.
Message handling was very good within the accident assessment room.
All messages, via telephone or RECS, were logged on a message summary form, copied, and distributed to other groups within the EOC.
The form used to transmit copies of plant data over the RECS line had been redesigned and the telefaxed copies of the form were clearly legible, correcting a deficiency noted during the last exercice.
At the general emergency classification level the radiological officer requested field monitoring assistance from DOE as provided by the Federal
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Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan. This request was consistent with procedures in the plan.
State police were responsible for providing the resources, like transportation, necessary to support the federal response.
In the communications area, all messages were logged through the mes-sage control desk.
Sequential numbers were assigned in the operations room and copies were distributed to appropriate destinations. A log was maintained in the operations room noting message number, content, originator, and destin-ation. Copies of the log were distributed to agency representatives. Notifi-cation of an alert was received over the RECS line at about 0820. Within five minutes after receipt of the message, copies had been distributed.
- However, when the general emergency notification was received, a copy of the message did not arrive in the coc: mand room until about one half hour later. The delay was caused by a backlog at the copying machine.
Although state EOC staf f indicated that this backup may have been an artifact of time compression in an l
exercise situation, the state EOC chould consider using additional copying j
f acilities or establishing a system to identify priority messages that could be placed at the head of the copying queue to avoid delays in getting essential information to comm nd and control.
FEMA, Conrail, and Amtrak were notified by the state EOC at the alert level.
However, the Civil Defense National Teletype System (CDNATS) malfunctioned when the state EOC attempted to notify the contiguous states of Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. These notifications were eventually made indirectly
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through FEMA Region I.
The cause of the problem with CDNATS should be
se 23 determined and corrected if the required corrective action falls under the state's purview.
The malfunction of CDNATS introduced a delay of over one hour between receipt of the alert notification and the contacting of FEMA Region I for the indirect notification of contiguous states.
State ' com-munications personnel should be instructed to implement alternative means of notifying contiguous states more quickly when CDNATS malfunctions.
It took about eight minutes to contact the New York State Thruway Authority, as the state EOC caller was repeatedly transferred.
The state should determine whether a new contact number is needed for Je Thruway Ars.ority, particularly for use at times outside normal working hours.
Facilities at the state EOC were exc illent. There was suf ficient work-ing space, ventilation, communications equipment for agencies, and a complete set of charts and maps. A status board, dose rate projection and, weather data charts, and maps showing evacuation routes and bus pickup points, host facility locations, emergency response planning areas (ERPAs ) and their populations, and wind direction sectors around the plant were prominently displayed in the operations room.
Particularly ef fective was the ERPA status board in the operations room. It displayed the ERPAs around NMPNS with lights color-coded to show which protective actions, if any, had been implemented in that E RPA.
When not being used to broadcast briefings, the closed-circuit television broadcast this ERPA status map to the command and accident as ses sment areas.
Maps of the plume emergency planning zone and ERPAs were available in the command room.
A complete set of maps was also available in the accident assessment area.
The dirplay of field monitoring data in this area was comprehensive. Data were labeled with correct units, parameters, and field team designations.
The emergency classification level was clearly posted in the operations, accident as s es sment, and command areas.
The prominent display of population by ERPA, field survey results, and dose projections at the appropriate locations throughout the EOC corrects a previously noted deficiency.
State EOC staff indicated that backup power (three 375 kW generators) and extensive support facilities for prolonged operations were available on a lowe r level at the EOC.
The backup generators would have to be started manually and were not demonstrated for this exercise although they are tested once a week.
An evacuation assessment staff had its own office, located off the accident assessment area, in which maps displayed population by ERPA, evacuation routes, relocation and congregate care centers, and access control points.
This staff estimated" evacuation time by ERPA upon request frca command personnel.
Com=unications facilities at the state EOC were generally excellent.
The RECS line provided the primary communications link among the state EOC, the Oswego County EOC, the Lake Dis t rict. EOC, the state warning point at the state EOC, the Oswego County warning point, the utility control room, the EOF, the utility technical support center, and the alternate state warning point.
9 24 A RECS drop was also available at the officea of the state Department of
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Health and additional utility locations could be added to the RECS network.
Commercial telephone provided secondary communications links with the Oswego County EOC, the EOF, and other licensee facilities.
Communications with the Lake District EOC were backed up by the State Emergency Communications Using Radio Effectively (SECURE) system, commercial telephones, and the Special Emergency Radio Network (SERN). Messages could also be relayed over the Local Government (LG) radio through the Northern or Eastern District EOCs or their constituent counties.
CDNATS and the Civil Defense National Radio System (CDNARS), backed up by commercial. telephones, were availi.ble to contact contiguous states but, as already noted, a malfunction with CDNATS caused a delay in making these contacts.
In the public information area, commercial telephones provided both primary and backup communications with the joint news center.
Hard copies could be sent to and received from the joint news center via telefax.
The state accident assessment staff demonstrated full knowledge of accident assessment procedures.
Initial dose projections were calculated on the basis of plant conditions, knowledge of core inventory, and meteorology.
They were updated frequently as these parameters changed.
Once field data were received at the state EOC, calculations were performed immediately to confirm the plant's release rate.
Hand-held calculators were used by the accident assessment staf f and calculations were double-checked and verified.
A calculating wheel was used to select dispersion factors as a function of
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meteorological data and stability class.
The plume was located and displayed using curves specific to the NMPNS area. Plume boundaries were confirmed with field monitoring data.
County and utility field monitoring locations were preselected and used a common system to designate sampling locations. The use of a common labeling system rather than different county and utility systems made the labels of the sampled points unambiguous and facilitated the use of field data on the map.
The radiological assessment staffs at the state and Oswego County EOCs and the EOF communicated frequently using commercial telephones.
The close communications between the staf f s permitted them to discuss and compara dose projections and to evaluate and quickly reconcile any differences between these projections.
Any questionable data received from county field monitor-ing teams were checked and confirmed before being posted or forwarded to the i
state EO:: assessment staff for evaluation. The field monitoring data were I
transmitted promptly to the state EOC correcting a previous deficiency.
How-ever, in some cases, accident assessment staff at the state EOC found it difficult to decipher sampling locations and activity levels from telef axed copies of the Oswego County Radiological Monitoring Survey Sheets. The county should consider redesigning these sheets to improve the legibility of telefaxed copies.
i 25 The state EOC made prompt protective action recommendations after carefully considerating various options and coordinating with county officials. After the state of emergency had been declared, the state nor tied the county of protective action decisions and gained county concurrence.
Command personnel performed well in keeping their protective action decisions current with the changing status of the plant. The state acted responsibly in recocenending protective actions and, af ter the Governor had declared a state of emergency, ordering such actions to be taken.
Evacuation time estimates were available from the evacuation assessment staff and were used by command personnel in their decision making.
Until a release was reported by the plant, protective action recommend-ations were precautionary, based on plant conditions. Evacuation of the ERPAs closest to the plant was prudent.
All other protective actions were ordered after the plant reported a total uncovering of the core through a loss of coolant. On the basis of this situation, with the exception of the last ERPAs to be sheltered, all of the protective actions were ordered before an actual release.
The actionc were effected to prevent the population from evacuating through the plume should a release occur.
Once the release was known to contain primarily noble gases, sheltering was ordered for the remaining ERPAs.
The use of potassium iodide (KI) was discussed in the command room but the amount of radioiodine released did not warrant orders for its use.
Cood protective actions for the ingestion pathway EPZ were developed promptly.
Maps showing locations of dairy farms, produce farms, and water resources were available at the state EOC.
On the basis of plant conditions, dairy cattle within 10 miles of the plant were placed on stored feed at the alert emergency classification level as a precautionary measure. Later, after the staff learned that the release included some radioiodine, coc=tercial produce was embargoed on the basis of the ingestion pathway protective action guide for child thyroid until sampling and analyses could be completed.
Residents were advised to abstain from consuming their own garden produce, especially rough-surf aced and leafy vegetables, until the commercial embargo had been lifced.
The state EOC could contact the joint news center from both the command room and the public information room.
Important information on the progress of the event and protective actions could be forwarded from the coc: mand room directly to tha state represcutative at the news center.
This procedure appeared to be satisfactory.
Personnel in the public information rooci screened reports from the agency representatives in the operations room and forwarded what they considered to be useful information to the state public information officer at the joint news center.
However, the news center staff indicated that little useful information was being received. At one time, the Commissioner of the State Department of Health came to the public infonnation room to inquire about this lack of information. The state should determine the nature of the problem perceived by the staff at the news center and determine
I 26
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whether additional information on state agency activities can be made
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available without unduly impeding agency operations.
Recovery ant'.
reentry were well demonstrated at the state EOC.
When recovery began, command personnel were briefed by personnel from accident assessment and the State Department of Agriculture and Markets.
Various options were discussed, particularly the disposition of milk from cows in areas subject to possible contamination from deposition.
The Commissioner of the Department of Health assisted in the discussions.
When a decision was reached, it was communicated first to the county and then to the operations and agency staffs in the state E0C and the joint news center.
These communications noted that relaxation of the food embargo was contingent upon the radioanalysis of the ingestion pathway samples.
Safety precautions for the public to take subsequent to reentry were written out in the command room and included such recommendations as having children wash their hands af ter playing outdoors.
While these decisions were being reached in the command room, the agency representatives in the operations room were preparing plans for their agencies' functions during recovery and reentry.
Before the exercise ended, all agency representatives briefed the operations room staff on their agencies' plans and functions.
The scenario adequately tested the capabilities of response agencies to alert and mobilize their representatives.
It was also a good test of decision making and coordination smong state and county officials.
4 Deficiencies That Would 1.ead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the state EOC during this exercise.
l Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficienev:
Notification of a general emergency was l
received at the SEOC communications center but a copy of the :essage did not arrive in the command room until about one half hour later due to a backlog at the copying machine. (NUREG-0654, F.1.d) l Recommendation:
The state should consider using additional copying facilities or establishing a system to identify priority messages that could be placed at the head of the copying queue.
2.
Deficienev:
The Civil Defense National Teletype System (CDNATS) su'1funct ioned when the state EOC attempted to notify five eco'.iguous states.
This malfunction delayed these notifications.
(NUREG-0654, F.1.b) i L L
27 Recommendation:
The cause of the CDNATS problem should be determined and corrected if corrective action f alls under the state's purview.
State communications personnel should be instructed to implement alternative means of notifying contiguous states more quickly when CDNATS malfunctions.
3.
Deficienev:
It took about eight minutes to contact the New York State Thruway Authority; the state EOC caller was repeatedly transferred. (NQREG-0654, E.1)
Recommendation:
The state should determine whether a new contact number is needed for the Thruway Authority, particularly for use at times outside normal working hours.
4 Deficienev:
In some cases, accident assessment staff found it difficult to decipher sampling locations and activity levels f rom telef axed copies of the Os9 ego County Radiological Survey Monitoring Sheets.
(NUREG-0654, F.1.d)
Recommendation:
These sheets should be redesigned to improve the legibility of telefaxed copies.
~
2.1.2 Lake District EOC OVERVIEW The Central District EOC is nor= ally activated for a radiological emergency preparedness exercise invoiring the NMPNS.
During this exercise, the Central District f acility was being repaired and the LDEOC was activated as a temporary backup f acility.
Since the LDEOC is not nor= ally activated in connection with the SMPNS, the deficiencies observed at the Lake District EOC during the exercise of September 28, 1983, have not been placed on the schedule for correcting deficiencies in Sec. 3, nor included in the sue =ary of Jeffeiencies in Sec. 4.
The Lake District EOC is staffed during normal workin, hrurs by the e
operations officer, a secretary; and a maintenance worker.
The ope ctions officer was on site when the initial notification occurred.
Outside normal working hours, one of the f ull-time. staf f members would be telephoned at home.
I= mediately after notification, a call list was used to notify emergency response agencies that an alert emergency classification level had been declared.
The EOC was fully staffed before the site area emergency classification.
~
i 28 1
1 The operations officer was designated as officer-in-charge by the Lake j
District EOC director.
Tnis individual did an exempl&.ry job, holding l
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briefings on the hour, and requesting all representatives to give reports of I
their activities. The officer briefed the staff between the hourly briefings I
when important information was received over the telefax.
All messages were logged and staff members received copies of appropriate messages.
The director addressed the staff when necessary.
Both the director and the operations officer were well-informed en the conduct of emergency operations.
A copy of the plan was available for reference and agency representatives had written procedures.available for reference.
The facilities at the EOC were gene ally exce'. lent.
Agency representatives were easily identified with clearly visible name plates at their work stations. There was sufficient roon for all operations. Maps were complete and prominently displayed.
The status board was large, clearly l
- visible, and kept up to date throughout the exercise.
The emergency
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classification level was prominently displayed. There were separate roomr for l
telefax machines, RACES radios, radiological equipment, and the radiological l
officer.
Men and women had separate sleeping facilities, showers, and restrooms; a kitchen and a decontamination area a re also available to support extended operations. However, only three telepha c lines were available. The lack of telephone lines caused problems for agencies in getting messages in and out quickly, as the telephones had to be shared.
Although the telefax i
i machine and RACES operators served as backup means of commu.1 cations, the ti=ely exchange of messages between agency representatives at the EOC and C
their agencies was impaired by the lack of sufficient telephone lines.
l Additional telephone lines should be supplied to the Lake District EOC.
Telefax, RACES, and cou.=ercial telephones provided coc:munications with the state EOC, the EOF, and the Oswego County EOC.
There "as no RECS direct line to the utility because the Lake District EOC is not normally activated l
for emergencies at NMPNS.
l A telef ax =achine was available for transmitting messages to and from I
the joint news center.
However, this telefax machine was incompatible with Jef f erson County's telef ax machine. The state should assess the situation and determine whether telefaxing equipment compatible with Jefferson County's
]
telefaxing equipment should be made available.
i l
l Radiological intelligence personnel at the Lake District EOC plotted monitored radiological data and kept track of the plume boundaries. Meteoro-logical data were posted and updated.
The radiological officer briefed the personnel in the operations room on plant conditions and radiological data
)
that was forwarded from the state EOC.
The Lake District EOC functions primarily to deploy backup resourens if state or county resources become exhausted during an emergency.
Hence, most actions at the EOC were related to placing agencies on standby and keeping them informed about the progress of the extreise.
The state police k
o S
29 representative placed state police troops on standby in case the state or county requested backup.
The Red Cross representative contacted other Red Cross represancatives at reception centers to assure that they were prerared
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and on standby. The State Agriculture and Markets representative was prepared to support any agricultural i.ampling teams with backup pe rsonnel and to provide trained staff to work with farmers and food worke rs to implement ingestion pathway protective actions.
A radiological of ficer from the state arrived with an adequate supply of 0-200R dosimeters and knew how to use them. The officer had a small bottle j
of KI and knew the maximum dosage allowed.
However, there would be little need for the dosimeters or KI, since the staff would normally not leave the EOC to work in a pote.ntially contaminated area and the facility lies outside the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Lake District EOC during this exercise.
Other Deficienev 1.
Deficienev:
Communications betwee.. agency representatives at the Lake District EOC and their agencies was impaired by the lack of sufficient telephone linet at the EOC.
(NUREG-0654, F.1) i Recommendation:
Additional telephone lines should be installed at the Lake District EOC.
2.1.3 State Personnel Monitoring Center OVERVIEV New York State operated a personnel monitoring center at the state police substation in Pulaski, N.Y.,
for the use of state law-enforcement l
personnel and state radiological monitoring teams.
This f acility was small but adequate to handle the expected number of persons and vehiciss.
It should be able to handle 10-20 people and 5-10 vehicles per hour. The state troopers at the tenter were well-trained and thorough.
Using a CDV-700 monitor equipped with a plastic-covered probe, they demonstrated procedures for determining the need to decontaminate personnel, equipment, and vehicles. The l
monitoring limit indicating the need for decontamination was prominently l
l posted.
Monitoring procedures followed those in the plan.
Spare monitoring equipment was available.
Adequate dosimeters were available for center l
personnel.
l t
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l l
t
30 Decontamination procedures, which were simulated, followed those in the
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plan.
- Showers, soap,
- towels, and clean clothes were available for personnel. Contaminated wash water from the showers would go into the regular sewer system. Vehicles and equipment would be wa.nhed with hoses in an outside area away from the parking lot.
Plans had been developed to control contami-nated wastes generated by vehicle decontamination.
These plans correct a previous deficiency.
Contaminated water would soak into the ground.
Other contaminated wastes would be placed in plastic bags and sealed.
Trash cans were available for contaminated elothing and other e intaminated wastes.
Deficiencies, No deficiencies were observed at the state personnel monitoring center in Pulaski, New York, during this exercise.
2.1.4 Incestion Pathway Samoling 1
OVEWVIEW Sampling for the ingestion pathway was carried out by personnel from the State Department of Agriculture and Markets who were dispatched from the Oswego County EOC.
Their sampling performance was excellent. Memb6cs of the state ingestion pathway sampling team said they had been activated by
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telephone and had arrived at the EOC by about 1000. The team was dispatched to the field at about 1545.
At this time, other personnel at the Oswego County EOC took over the sampling team members' duties as representatives of the state Department of Agriculture and Markets.
The team was equipped with plastic collection bags, containers, writing materials, and identification i
labels for sampling crops, milk, and water.
However, the team should have a Ceiger counter to monitor for heavy surf ace contamination before sampling and thus reduce the risk of unnecessary personal e:cposure.
Soil samples were not j
taken by this team.
Ingestion pathway sampling was simulated and the correct procedures were demonstrated.
The team was highly knowledgeable and well-versed in collecting samples.
This particular team did not have or need j
written sampling procedures.
- However, the state may want to consider including written procedures with the standard equipment for ingestion pathway sampling in case less-knowledgeable personnel are involved in the sampling.
In a real emergency, collected samples would be dropped off at the police station and then taken to the state laboratory in Albany for analysis.
The ceam could not locate two of thi three sampling locations to which they had been dispatched.
A radio night have been useful in obtaining directions to these two locations.
In addition, the sampling teams had no way to report their actions or any dose exceeding the maximum permissable without authorization. Radios should be considered for the ingestion pathway sa=pling teams.
With regard to exposure control, the team members did have KI but did not know the procedures for its use, although they knew that instructions were e
_____-----A
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e 31 i
l-included in the KI container.
They were equipped with low-range (0-200 mR) j dosimeters, record-keeping cards, and film badges.
They knew how of ten to i
read their dosimeters but did not know the maximum dose allowed before l
authorization would be required.
Additional training is needed in standard l
radiological protection procedures, including the use of KI, and the reasons j
l for chese procedures.
The team did not have the proper personal protective j
equipnent, e.g, anticontamination suits, gloves, tongs, and respirators. They J
l did have boots that they use in normal work duties.
Protective equi pment should be furnished.
The team had been instructed to report to the sample drop-off point for monitoring and possible decontamination af ter sampling had been completed.
The team did not finish participating in the exercise until l
1800.
Dispatching the team earlier should be considered to permit more time for collecting ingestion pathway samples.
Deficiencies That Would 1.ead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding for the state j
ingestion pathway sampling team were observed during this exercise.
l l
Other Deficiencies I
1.
.De ficiency :
The ingestion pathway field monitoring team did not have a Geiger counter so they can monitor for heavy surface contamination before sampling.
( NUREC-06 54, l
K.3.a. J.11).
l l
Re commendation :
Ingestion pathway sampling teams should be equipped with Geiger counters so they can check for heavy contamination before sampling and thus reduce the risk of unnecessary personal exposure.
2.
Deficiency:
The ingestion pathway sampling team did not have written procedures. (NUPIG-0654, J.11).
Re commend at ion :
The state should consider including written procedures in the standard equipment for ingestion pathway sampling as backup guidance.
3.
, Deficiency:
The ingestion pathway sampling team could not report its actions or any level of exposure exceeding the exposure action level. (NUREC-0654, K.4).
Re commendat ion :
Radios should be considered for the ingestion pathway sac:pling ' teams.
4.
Deficiency:
Al though members of the ingestion pathway s ampling team knew that the KI container contained instructions for use, they did not know the procedure for
- using, They did not know how often to read their KI.
32 dosimeters nor the ma c aus dose allowed ' before author-
{
ization would be requireo. (NUREG-0654, J.10.f)
Re commendat ion:
Ingestion pr.thway sampling teams need additional training in standard radiological protection procedures, including the use of KI, and the reasons for these procedures.
5.
Deficiency:
The ingestion pathway sampling team did not have personal protective equipment such as anticontamina-tion suits, gloves, tongs, and respirators.
(NUREG-0654 K.5.b)
Recommendation:
Personal protective equipment should be furnished to the ingestion pathway sampling teams.
2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OVE RVIEW The EOF was activated at the alert emergency classification ' level and staffing was complete by 0945.
Teams were available for the management of
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emergency resources, radiation effluent,_ environmental monitoring, and dose projections.
Earlier deficiencies in state and county representation at the EOF vere corrected during this exercise.
The New York State representative could evaluate plant sys tems sad quickly apprise the state EOC of changing plant conditions.
In addition, two state representatives with health physics expertise were available to obtain first-hand information on the radioactive release, compare and confirm accident assessments performed by the utility with those performed by cae state EOC staf f, and help resolve any discrep-ancies.
These representatives also reviewed radiation and air sampling data reported by the utility and county of f-site monitoring teams.
An Oswego County nuclear facility liaison of ficer communicated with the Oswego County EOC to develop and maintain information on dose assessment and the plant's status. A RACES communicator was assigned as back-up communicator to the county representative.
This additional communications capability provided by the liaison officer and the RACES communicator corrects deficien-cies noted during the last exercise.
Facilities and resources at the EOF verd: adequate with the exception of l
the limited work space for state and county emergency response staffs.
Some ove rcrowding was observed and resulted in a brief interruption of message t ran smis s io n.
Additional working space should be made available for state and county emergency response staffs at the EOF.
Displays of appropriate technical data and status boards of plant systems were available and visible n.:
i l
33
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from most locations in the EOF.
These displays assisted New York State and j
Oswego County staf f in evaluatiag releases of radioactive material.
Thu communications systems at the EOF were in place and operational within minutes after activation.
The dedicated RECS line provided primary communications between the EOF and the technical support center, the state EOC, and the Oswego County E0C.
Four commercial telephone lines were available for backup communications.
Messages transmitted via the RECS line contained the following information:
brief event description, emergency classification level, whether a release was taking place, potentially affected l
population and areas, whether prot'ective actions were recommended, and I
appropriate meteorological data.
These messages were recorded on a RECS l
message form, copied, and distributed throughout the EOF.
Portable radio l
linked the EOF and the of f-site monitoring teams.
All teams used the same frequency so that of f-site data could be reported simultaneously to both the I
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utility and the county.
A telefax machine was available to transmit information to and from the joint news center and it provided reliable, I
reasonably fast service.
The joint news center could also be contacted by commercial telephone.
Most activities related to press releases and media communications took place at the joint news ce nt e r.
Press releases issued by the utility were I
generated at the center and telef axed to the EOF for review by the emergency director.
After the release was approved and signed by the emergency director, the joint news nedia was called to authorize dispatch of the press release.
m l
The EOF serves as the central point for the collection, evaluation, and distribution of radiological field monitoring data.
Sharing of such data between the utility, state, and county was observed to be adequate.
Data from the utility of f-s ite monitoring teams were recorded on the new Survey Team Re po r t.
This form was used to record radiation instrument readings, air j
sampling data, personnel dosimetry, and dose calculations.
The environmental survey sample team coordinator reviewed each Survey Team Report for accuracy and coc:pleteness before its distribution throughout the EOF.
This confir-mation of inconing data corrects one aspect of an area that was noted as needing improvement during last year's exercise. The Survey Team Report forms were copied and distributed throughout the EOF within minutes of obtaining of f-site data.
Utility and county representatives had access to each other's off-site monitoring data through the use of the single radio frequency for transmitting field monitoring data noted above.
This procedure ensured rapid check s for consistency between ' county and utility of f-site field monitoring data.
These plans of operation and procedures for the handling of of f-site J
aonitoring data at the EOF corrected a deficiency noted during a previous
)
exercise.
In addition, the RACES communicator at the county desk could
]
provide additional communications between the EOF and the dose assessment room at the county EOC, correcting a previous deficiency.
- l l
_-____________-__a
34 Technical data were transmitted promptly to the state and county
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EOCs.
As chcnges in plant status, radiation releases, and meteorological conditions became known, state esargency response staff at the EOF insured that updated assessments were transmitted.
Prorective actien recommendations by the utility were based on an approved procedure different from the EPA guidelines.
Protective action recommendations were considered independently by the utility at the EOF, the l
state EOC, and the Oswego County EOC.
Af ter each organization had developed its own recommendations, the utility related their findings to the. state without confirming state results.
Discussions among the utility, saa;;, and l
county during the development of protective action recommendations rather than l
after the recommendations had been developed would expedite the current excellent procedures for developing these critical recommendations.
During the exercise, wind speed varied between 4 and 19 mph, but only small shifts in wind direction were noted.
Greater variations in wind direction still need to be incorporated into the exercise scenario to provide a better test of accident assessment capabilities as had been noted during a previous exercise.
De ficienev 'Ihat Would 1.ead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the EOF during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficienev:
Some overcrowding was observed in the limited work space provided for the state and county emergency response staffs.
(NUREC-0654, H.2)
Recommendation:
Additional working space should be made available for state and county emergency response staffs at the EOF.
2.
Deficienev:
The cutuality, consistency, and timeliness of accident assessment and subsequent protective action i
recom=endations between the utility, state, and county 1
could be enhanced.
(No NUREG-0654 reference)
Recommendation:
The utility, state, and county should consider exchanging information during the development of protective action recommendations rather than after such reco==endations are developed independently by each agency.
1 i
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35 i
l 2.3 JOINT NEWS CENTER AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 2.3.1 Joint News Center OVERVIEW Pubic information of ficers (Pios) from the state, county, and utility were present at the joint news center in the McCrobie Building in Osweg o,
N.Y.
According to participants, a system is in place to activate and' staff the joint news center at any time.
For this county, the system is set in l
motion by a call from the county director to the lead county PIO at the I
unusual event emergency classification level.
The lead county PIO then institutes a telephone fan-out using written procedures.
State and county PIO staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of their functions.
Clerical support was excellent.
The joint news center was a well-equipped f acility with adequate space for PIOS and the media. All equipment functioned smoothly. Space, furniture, lighting, and the supply of typewriters were all adequate for both the PI0s and the media representatives.
Both of these groups had adequate access to copiers.
Approximately fif ty media representatives could be accommodated at briefings.
Both the Pios and the media representatives could confer in private.
Haps and displays were avatlable and used during briefings, correcting a deficiency noted during the last exercise.
j Communications capabilities were very good.
Commercial telephones and telefax machines provided communications with the state EOC and the Oswego County EOC.
Radios would be used as backup communications systems but were not demonstrated for this exercise.
Telephones were available for use by media representatives.
However, state and county news releases and EB S I
messages did not i'nclude telephone numbers to be used by the media in calling the joint news center for information.
According to participants, telephone numbers would be provided to wire services.
Overall, news center operations went smoothly.
Media kits were available giving background information on the utility, nuclear power plants,
the area around NMPNS, and radiation.
State and county PIOS participated in briefings that were held at least hourly.
These briefings were taped and the tapes were available for media representatives. These briefings were complete and accurate.
Technical jargon was either avoided or explained and maps and l
other displays were used ef fectively.
Hard copies of news releases and EBS l
messages were available on a timely basis and were posted promptly. The Pios exchanged information, kept each other up to date on developments in their I
respective organizations, and coordinated the release of information.
News l
releases and EB S messages were expeditiously prepared and sequentially j
numbered, correcting a previously noted deficiency.
The new EBS masthead was very ef fective. The Pios reviewed each others' EBS messages and news releases I
36 before release, thus insuring the. accuracy and consistency of' the information
(
released to ; the public.
Radio and television broadcasts were monitored for-discrepancies between released and broadcast information.
The new ERPA maps with flashing lights to. indicate the: status of protective actions also effectively assisted' the verification of public messages aired by DS.
The monitoring of aired DS messages corrects' a previous deficiency..
Ove ra11', DS messages were good and were well-coordinated with the public' alerting system.:
Howeve r, no EB S message ~ was issued ^ to announce county-wide school closing even though the public education brochure stated that this would be done.
An DS message about schools' closing 'should be developed and aired when appropriate during radiological emergencies.
Messages were generally clear and appropriate.
Protective actions were described in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks.
The.D S messages issued after the Governor had declared a state of emergency included important information for farmers and owners of dairy. cattle.
Some DS messages currently advise only those who es inot go to the home of a friend or relative to go to reception centars.
Since some evacuees might be contaminated,- D S messages should advise all evacuees to report to a reception center for a
monitoring regardless of their eventual destinations.
Repetition of instructional DS messages was simulated.
A visit to the WKFM/ WOSC DS station confirmed the availability of Procedure F of the County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan and a copy of the public education. brochure to station personnel.
The station manager
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and program director indicated that the training recommended at the last exercise had been given to announcers.
In addition, the radiological preparedness notification procedures had been posted in both the AM and FM control rooms and a copy of the updated county authorization procedure was on hand. These observations demonstrated that the deficiencies noted during last year's exercise had been rectified.
The rumor control nssuber was staf fed by eight people representing the state, the county, and the utility.
These persens were well-prepared to answer questions and were kept up-to-date on the progress of events'.
In test calls placed by federal observers to the rumor contrel number, questions were adequately answered by the rumor control staf f.
ould Lead to a Neeative Finding j
Deficiencies That i
No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the joint news center during this exercise.
i 1
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I
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37
_0t'er Deficiencies h
1.
Deficiency:
No DS message was issued to announce the countywide school closing even though the public education brochure stated that this would be done.
( NUREG-0654, E.6,7)
)
i Re commendat ion:
An DS message about school closings j
should be developed and aired when appropriate during
]
)
radiological emergencies.
+
1 2.
Deficiency:
Some DS messages advised only those evacuees j
who could not go to the homes of friends or relatives to report to reception centers.
Since some evacuees might be l
4 contaminated, they should all be advised to go to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination if necessary. (NUREG-0654 E.6,.7)
Re coe:mendat ion:
The appropriate DS messages should be revised to advise evacuees to report to a reception center for monitoring before they go to the homes of friends or l
relatives.
l 2.3.2 Public Educstion I
l l
OVE RVIEW The Oswego County public education program continues to be extensive l
and innovative.
The revised public education brochure was sent to the l
residents in the plume exposure pathway EPZ in August. However, this brochure stated that only those who could not go to the homes of friends or relatives needed to go to reception centers.
Since evacuees might be contaminated, the public information brochure should be revised to advise evacuees to report to i
a reception center for monitoring before t'aey go to the homes of f riends or relatives.
l Information on radiological emergency procedures is also contained in the latest Oswego County telephone book.
More recently, a postcard had been sent to area residents reminding them that the exercise was to take place.
Limited spot checks made by federal observers indicated that a majority of those interviewed remembered having received the public education brochure and understood that the sounding of the sirens is a sign'al to tune to their local E3S station for additional emergency information.
1
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a 38 Deficientes That Vould Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the area of public education during this exercise.
Other Deficiency 1.
Deficiency:
The public information brochure stated that evacuees can go to the homes of friends or relatives.
Since evacuees might be contaminated, they should be advised to go to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination if necessary. (NUR' N0654, G.l.2).
i i
Recommendation :
The public information brochure should be revised to advise evacuees to report to a reception center for monitoring before they go to the homes of friends or relatives.
1 I
2.4 Oswego County Operations, 2.4.1 County Warning Point and EOC OVE RVIEV l
The initial call notifying Oswego County of an unusual event at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station was received at the county warning point via l
the RECS telephone line at the Sherif f's Department in Oswego, New York, at j
approximately 0705.
This message stated that an exercise was in progress and that an unusual event had been declared. Following notification of the County Director of Emergency Preparedness, the Sheriff's Department notified the cities of Oswego and Fulton, the U.S. Coast Guard, the State University of Nr.w I
York in Oswe g o, and the State Police Departments at North Syracuse and i
F ul ton.
l The County Director of Emergency Preparedness notified the County Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) staff members of the unusual event and placed them on standby at approximately 0710. The Director activated the Oswego County EOC at approximately 0725 and all key OEP staf f, the County j
Radiological Officer, the nuclear facility liaison of ficer, and the public information officer had arrived by 0755. All county agencies were notified at the alert level and the procedures for mobilizing the complete EOC staf f were initiated between approximately 0830 and 0840. The EOC was fully staf fed in a t ime ly manner by approximately 0915 during the alert.
All agencies with responsibilities designated in the county plan were represented at the EOC.
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39 In addition, Jefferson and Onondaga Counties and the Lake District were represented at the Oswego County EOC to coordinate multicounty responses.
Backup personnel as well as primary staff were present for most agencies and a shift change was demonstrated at approximately 1230 for nearly all agencies.
The demonstration of a shift change for the County Director corrects a deficiency identified at last year's exercise.
Operations management of the EOC was very good.
The Director and the designated relief of ficer were very ef fective in directing and coordinating the energency response. The Chairman.of the County Legislature and the County Adminis trator ef fectively carried out their executive responsibilities throughout the exercise.
The communications equipment and facilities were excellent at the EOC.
Each agency had a separate telephone line and there were ample backup radios with alternate frequencies available in the communications room.
In addition to the sheriff's radio network and the county fire and emergency medical services radio ne two rk, the Radio Amateur Civil Eme rgency Se rvice (RACES) provided backup communications in case commercial telephones broke down.
The backup communications role; of the RACES operators was clearly evident, correcting a deficiency identified at the previous exercis e.
The communications system at the EOC included emergency power sources, dedicated telephone lines for transmitting and verifying
- messages, alternate communications pathways, and prearranged security procedures. This improved communications system corrects a deficiency identified at the 1982 exercise.
The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) hot-line links the county and state EOCs and the EOF directly.
This Oswego County RECS line was s taf fed throughout the exercise and a shif t change was demonstrated for the county RECS operator.
Message handling, control, and review were generally very ef fective.
Verbal transmissions of all RECS messages were followed up with hard copies of the completed RECS f o rms, which were celefaxed from the EOF.
A message log was kept of all RECS communications.
In addition, all agencies kept message logs and forwa rded copies of their internal action cessages to the County Director of Emergency Preparedness, who reviewed them at re gular intervals with the County Executive.
An error was observed in one of the RECS transmissions received at the EOC. The deescalation from general emergency to the alert emergency classification level was not received before the two-day ti=e jump and the discussion of recovery and reentry considerations with state offic!als in Albany.
This error resulted in some confusion at the EOC about what emergency classification was in ef fect.
The resulting discrepancy was recognized by the County Director and other staf f in the command room, who quickly clarified the emergency level with officials at the state EOC in Albany.
The atate, county, and utility should investigate and rectify the cause of this problem.
The Oswego County EOC is a very good f acility.
There are men's and women's dormitories and lavatories, a kitchen and dining area, and the
40 necessary supplies to assure extended continuous operations.
A-100 kW diesel
(
generator is available in case normal electrical service to the building is lost in an emergency. There are separate rooms in the EOC for the command and control, dose assessment, and radio operator staffs.
The central operations room is large enough to contain the desks, chairs, and telephones necessat:y to accommodate two representatives from each emergency response agency.
The physical layout of the central operations room f acilitated the internal flow l
of information and coordination among the various agencies.
Comprehensive briefings of the EOC staff were conducted periodically by the County Director.
During these briefings,
- a. representative from toch agency gave a brief summary of the actions taken by their agencies. The displays, maps, and status boards used by EOC management and agency coordinators were especially i
good.
Since last year's exercise, an intercom has been installed between the dose assessment room and the command and control room.
This communications link allows the County Director to consult with the radiological officer without interfering with the flow of information into the dose assessment room or disrupting activity in the operations room.
This communications link facilitates the flow of information, correcting a deficiency noted at last year's exercise.
Security was good.
Precleared identification badges were required for access to the EOC. Security guards checked identification at the entrance and a sign-in sheet was maintained throughout the exercise.
Radiological dose assessment capability at the Oswego County EOC was very good.
The dose assessment staff was mobilized quickly and the radiological officer ef fectively coordinated all of the activities of his
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staff.
Communications among the dose assessment staff within the EOC, with accident assessment staff at the state EOC in Albany, and with personnel at i
che EOF were efficient and accurate.
This corrects a deficiency in the coordination of state and utility information with Oswego County identified during the last exercise.
Projections of radiological dose to the population were completed quickly using both utility and county field monitoring data.
The county's dose calculations were verified with the state accident assessment staff and discrepancies were quickly resolved.
Conservative protective action recommendations were made promptly.
The county dose assess =ent staff, state liaison, and utility representative coordinated very well with each other; this enhanced the overall dose as s es sment process.
Although a shfit change of the county dose assessment staff was not demonstrated during this exercise, there were sufficient trained personnel to maintain continuous 24-hour operation of this function.
The dose ass essment room at the county EOC was well laid out and arranged to allow the staff to work e f fec tive ly.
Enough telephones were available to allow the county dose assessment personnel to talk with their counterparts on the accident as s es sme nt staff at the state EOC in Albany, the ECF, and the Technical Support Center.
In addition to the RECS line, a second direct hot-line between the county EOC and the EOF was operational and staffed t hroug hout the exercise.
The information exchanged over this telephone line supplemented that which was transmitted over the RECS telephone.
This
l 41
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l supplemental telephone and its designation in the county plan as a direct link between the county nuclear facility liaison officer and the county EOC corrected two deficiencies identified at last year's exercise.
Several l
telefax machines were available for sending and receiving hard copies of RECS com::nnications and other information to and f rom the state EOC and the EOF.
The radio system in the dose assessment room that was used for communications with the field monitoring teams has been greatly improved since the 1982 exercise.
In addition to the primary radio system, RACES operators were available for backup communications with the field monitoring teams.
Status boards in the dose assessment room were used to varying degrees.
During the early stages of the exercise, plant parameters were not j
posted on the RECS message board until hard copy of the information was l
received via telefax.
This caused some confusion but was remedied by the i
early afternoon when the radiological of ficer decided that the information l
should be posted on the RECS board as soon as it was received verbally. Af ter
]
I this decision was made, the RECS message board was always promptly updated immediately af ter verbal transmissions had been received. The dose projection i
board and the field team status board were not updated throughout the entire l
course of the exercise. An effort should be made to update all status boards in the dose assessment room with the same efficiency with which the RECS message board was updated in the af ternoon.
l The Oswego County EOC played the primary role in alerting the public.
At approximately C930, the County Director activated the outdoor siren system I
from the county EOC and coordinated activation of the tone alert radios through the National Weather Servic e.
Spontaneous verification that the sirens had sounded was provided via feedback from a sheriff's mobile radio in the field.
Verification that all 37 outdoor sirens had sounded was received from the utility at approximately 1120.
Verification that activation of the tone alert radios had been successful was confirmed by the sherif f and fire and emergency medical services coordinators in the EOC.
These coordinators received confirmation from their department offices, which are equipped with tone alert radios.
The Oswego County public education program continues to be ve ry ef fective.
Spot checks made by federal ebservers on the day of the exercise revealed that about two-thirds of those questioned remembered receiving the revised brochure that was mailed in August.
About two-thirds of those questioned also knew that the sounding of the outdoor sirens is a signal to turn their radios to an EBS station for additional emergency information.
l Airing of the test DS message was closely coordinated with activation of the outdoor siren system and tone alert radios at 0931.
This initial notification and additional E3S messages were prepared by the Oswego County public information officer at the joint media center, who was in direct com::nnication with the public information of ficer at the county EOC. All EB S messages followed tne prescribed message formats in the county plan and wero supplemented with specific emergency details.
42 These notification messages clearly stated the protective actions
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recommended to the public and incorporated the ERPA designations publicized in the public information brochure to define the affected areas.
The public information of ficer at the Oswego County EOC coordinated the development of information that was to be included in all EBS messages and news releases and the County Director reviewed all such information before it was transmitted to the joint news center for release.
Continuous communications were maintained between the EOC and the joint news center through a direct telephone line that was held open and staf fed throughout the exercise.
Following the declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor, the state assumed primary responsibility for issuing instructions to the public.
Oswego County assumed a support role in this function; the county public information officer provided local emergency details to be included in EB S messages and news releases.
Protective action recommendations were developed at the county EOC through close communication with personnel at the state EOC in Albany.
Actions to protect the public that were demonstrated or simulated during the exercise included the closing of parks and beaches, sheltering of ERPAs 5-15, and evacuation of ERPAs 1-4, 26, and 27.
In response to these recommenda-tions, the activation and deployment of all county resourcesswere coordinated from the county EOC.
The representatives of all agencies were able to accurately assess and anticipate emergency conditions and all field personnel and resources were deployed as needed.
The coordination of response to the
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f ree-play problems that were introduced at the county EOC was generally very effective.
The transportation and social services departments monitored the need for and the availability of vehicles and drivers to evacuate institution-alized and noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons. The transportation department monitored the availability of buses to evacuate the general popula-tion.
It also coordinated deployment of the resources that were used to simulate the evacuation of the noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired and demonstrate two general population bus routes.
The highway department demonstrated an outstanding capability to monitor evacuation routes.
The highway department coordinator anticipated the need to remove impediments by staging the necessary equipment along primary evacuation routes.
The sheriff's coordinators did not consider the possible need to reroute traffic or inform the public in response to the evacuation route i= pediment problem that was introduced at the county EOC.
The sheriff's coordinators need to be trained to consider alternate evacuation routes and keep the public informed of actions that are being taken t.o deal with the congestion or blockage of pri=ary evacuation routes.
Reception and enngregate care centers were activated as a precautionary measure at an early stage in the exercise and the available personnel were placed on standby.
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43 Re cove ry and reent ry procedures were simulated at the Oswego County l
EOC. The dose assessment staff evaluated data that were provided by the state
!s and the utility.
Protective actions were relaxed and reentry procedures were l'
begun when the radiation levels were reduced to levels which were not a threat to public health.
Provisions were made through various agencies to provide for the safe and orderly return of people to the evacuated area.
Detailed tabletop discussions of the necessary arrangements for police and fire protection, distribution of unconta minated foodstuffs and
- water, transportation for t rans it-dependent evacuated
- persons, long-te rm field 1
monitoring, health services, and public information were held in the EOC operations room.
Oswego County, in cooperation with the state, established a joint committee to coordinate long-term recovery activities.
Deficiencies that Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative recommendation were observed at the Oswego County warning point or the Oswego County EOC during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies I.
Deficienev:
The dose projection status board and the j
)
field team status board in the dose assessment room were not updated throughout the course of the entire exercise.
(NUREC-0654, D.4, J.10.a)
Recoe=endation:
The dose assessment staff at the Oswego County EOC should be trained to update the dose projection I
status board and the field team status board as soon as j
updated 1aformation becomes available.
These status i
boards should be updated as soon as possible to f acilitate l
the coordination of internal communications among the dose l
assessment staf f at the EOC.
2.
Deficienev:
The sheriff's coordinators did not consider the possible need to rer ute traf fic or the need to keep the public inf o rmed of congestion or blockages to evacuation in response to either of the two evacuation route impediment problems introduced at the EOC during the exercise. (KUREG-0654, J.10.k)
Re com=endat ion:
The sheriff's coordinators at the EOC l
should be trained to consider alternate evacuation routes j
in case primary evacuation route (s) become congested or blocked for extended periods of time.
The sheriff's coordinators should also be trained to coordinate with the l
i
i 44 public information of fic tr. at the EOC to develop public
(
instructions concerning the rerouting of evacuation traffic and the broadcast of information to assure the public that the authorities are aware of the problem and are acting to remedy it.
3.
De ficiency :
A RECS message notifying county officials of the deescalation from general emergency to the c '.e r t emergency classification level was not received at the center before the discussion of recovery and reentry considerations initiated by of ficials at the state E0C in Albany.
This error resulted in confusion among staff in the command and control room of the County EOC concerning what emergency classification was in effect.
( NUREG-0654 E.1)
Re commende, tion:
The state, county, and utility should review the exercise procedures for advancing time and deescalating emergency classification levels.
The means for verification of the emergency classification level contained in messages that are verbally transmitted over the RECS system should also be included in this review of procedures.
(
2.4.2, Radiological Field Monitoring Teams OVE W IEW The field monitoring team coordinator mobilized the two county field monitoring t ea ms, which reported to their dispatch locations at the Scriba volunteer Fire Department and the County Sheriff's Department in Oswego.
After che cking their equipment, which, according to labels on the various instruments, had been recently calibrated, both field teams were deployed and began collecting background data before a release had occurred.
This early deployment of the field monitoring teams and the collection of background data provided the information necessary to confirm the magnitude of a later
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release, cor recting two deficiencies that were identified during last year's exercise.
Neither field team was briefed on plant conditions before their deployment or while they were. in the field.
Consequently, the monitoring tea =s did not know what readings they could e xpec t to obtain during their field surveys.
The field team coordinator should be trained to provide more 1
information to the monitoring t ea ms including the emergency classification level and the time at which a release has occurred.
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l 45 Both field monitoring teams were well-equipped to take the required air i
samples and area surveys.
Both teams were also very f amiliar with the area and reached their monitoring locations quickly.
However, the two field teams varied in their technical knowledge of monitoring procedures and the use of their equipment.
Both teams were able to perform their responsibilities and one team was very well trained.
The technical depth of the other team should
)
be improved through more training in basic radiological field monitoring j
procedures.
All field monitoring personnel should have equally good monitoring skills to insure that data reported from different locations throughout the county are uniform and reliable and that backup monitoring
)
capability is uniform.
]
Communications between the field teams and the dose assessment staff at the Oswego County EOC have been greatly improved since last year's exercise.
However, flaws in the scenario field data and field controller errors resulted I
in erroneous data being reported to the EOC.
Some additional field data were not communicated to the county EOC in the proper units for ready use by the j
dose assessment staff.
On several occasions, the field teams had to be j
recontracted to verify specific readings or to have an entire series of data j
retransmitted.
This problem can be resolved rather easily by simplifying the data forms that are presently used by the field teams and by providing more
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training in radio communications procedures to the field monitoring personnel.
Both field teams were equipped with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), low-and high-range self-reading desi=eters, and KI.
Both teams were also well-trained in exposure control measures for emergency workers.
They s
read and recorded their dosimeter readings with the prescribed f requency and wre aware of the personnel monitoring center where they would be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.
Deficiencies That Would lead to a Nestative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for the Oswego County radiological field monitoring teams during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies l
l 1.
Deficienev:
The two Oswego County field monitoring teams l
varied in their technical knowledge of monitoring procedures and equipment use.
Both teams were able to perform their responsibilities and one team was very well trained.
The technical depth of the other team should be improved through more training in basic radiological field l
monitoring procedures.
(TJREG-0654, I.8, 0.1.b 0.4.c) l l
Recom.sendation:
All county field monitoring personnel l
should have equal knowledge of monitoring procedures and equal skills in the use of their equipment.
This is 1
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46 important to insure that uniform and reliable data are
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reported from different locations throughout the county and to insure uniform backup monitoring capability.
2.
Deficiency:
Some ficli monitoting data were not communicated to the Oswego County EOC in the proper units for ready use by the dose assessment staff.
On several occasions, the county field teams had to be recontracted to verify specific readings or to have an entire series of data retransmitted. (NUREG-0654, I.8)
Recommendation:
The data forms that are presently in use should be revised and simplified to insure that data communicated from the county field monitoring teams are reported to the EOC in the same units as those used by the dose assessment staff.
The field monitoring personnel should also receive more training in radio communication procedures to insure that data recorded on forms in the field are communicated to the EOC in the proper units.
3.
Deficiency:
Neither of the two Oswego County field monitoring teams was briefed on plant conditions prior to their deployment or while they were carrying out their monitoring responsibilities in the field.
Consequently.
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the field monitoring teams did not know what readings they could expect to find during their field surveys.
(NUREO-0654, I.8).
Re coctmend at ion:
The field team coordinator should be trained to provide more information to the monitoring teams, including the e:se rgency classification level and the time at which a release has occurred.
2.4.3 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public OVE RVIEW The field implementation of actions to protect the public comprised the activation, mobilization, and deployment of personnel and equipment to demonstrate the following:
Alerting of the boating public in 1.ake Ontario; I
Five traffic control points; e
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e Two bus routes for the evacuation of the general population; i.
l e One ambulance for the evacuation of noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons; e One personnel monitoring center for county emergency workers.
The capability to alert the boating public was ' demonstrated by the Oswego County Sherif f 's Depar treent, Boat #330.
The sherif f 's deputies were equipped with TLDs and low-and high-c nge self-reading dosimeters and they were knowledgeable about radiological exposure control measures for emergency
- workers, ne U.S. Coast Guard station in Oswego, New York, was not involved in the ale: ting of the boating public.
The state and county should discuss arrangemercs for coordinating this marine alerting function with the Coast Guard.
1 Due to an actual law enforcement emergency on the day of the exercise, state police were not able to provide resources for the demonstration of traffic control points. Of the five craffic control points activated for this exereire, the Sheriff's Department staffed three of the points and the Volunteer Fire Departments of New Haven and Scriba staf fed one each.
All traffic control point personnel were generally f amiliar with their responsibilities to direct the flow of traffic during an evacuation and control access to evacuated areas.
Howe ve r, these personnel varied in their l
knowledge of the evacuation routes they were required to control and in their familiarity with the location of reception centers to which evacuees would be l
routed.
The volunteer fire personnel had been trained and were knowledgeable of these considerations.
The sheriff's units were unaware of the location of the reception centers and two of the three units observed did not have maps of the primary evacuation routes nor did they know which roads were to be used as the primary evacuation routes.
The sheriff's personnel should be trained in which roads to use as primary evacuation routes and the location of reception centers that would be used in a radiological emergency.
All of the traf fic control point units were able to caintain communications with the EOC through radio communications with their sheriff's or volunteer fire stations.
All o f l
the units periodically com=unicated with their radio dispatcher to supply or receive updated information. All traf fic control personnel were equipped with TLDs as well as high-and low-range self-reading dosimeters, and they knew the l
proper procedures to follow when using these devices.
Both the sheriff and l
volunteer fire personnel were fa=iliar with the procedures requiring them to contact their supervisors when they reached the prescribed level of exposure and they knew they should report to a personnel monitoring center to be l
deconta.:inated, if necessary.
l B us evacuation of the general population was exceptionally well l
executed oy the City School District of Oswego and the Centro of Oswego Bus O
48 Company, which demonstrated routes #1 and #45, respectively.
The bus
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companies were notified by the county transportation coordinator at the EOC to activate and deploy their resources at approximately 1055.
Both buses, which were equipped with two-way radios, were dispatched from the garages within 30 minutes of this initial notification.
The bus drivers carried maps that clearly showed their pickup points and had instructions directing them as follows:
from the bus depot to the first pickup point, from the last pickup point to the reception center, and from the reception center back to their bus depot.
The bus drivers followed their assigned routes and arrived at the correct reception center in a timely manner. Both bus companies were equipped with enough TLDs, low-and high-range self-reading dosimeters, and KI to outfit all drivers for the number of buses each must provide according to the l
plan.
The drivers observed on the day of the exercise had received training in radiological exposure control for emergency workers. They read their self-reading dosiceters at the proper 15-minute intervals, knew the prescribed l
exposure level at which they should contact their supervisors, and knew that they should report to a personnel monitoring center for decontamination, if necessary.
The McFee Volunteer Ambulance Company was notified f rom the county EOC' by the Dep*artment of Social Services coordinator at approximately 1055 to
}
si=ulate the evacuation of four noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons at three addresses.
Af ter calls had been made to several volunteers, one ambulance driver and one technicica, who had been trained to respond to t
radiological emergencies, were activated.
These volunteers mobilized at the
(
garage within 30 minutes but the ambulance was not deployed until approximately 1155.
The delay arose primarily because the radiological 4
technician, who zerced and thoroughly checked the ambulance crew's dosimetry equipment, took an additional 30 minutes to perform these tasks after arriving at the ambulance garage.
The county should coasider providing additional training to the volunteer ambulance personnel.
This training should be l
undertaken with the objectives of increasing the number of personnel who are qualified to respond to radiological emergencies and ' f amiliartzing them with the procedures for checking and issuing dosimeters to facilitate a more ti=ely deployment of vehicles to evacuate the mobility-impaired. Although there were l
some errors in the telephone numbers and addresses of the persons to be located, these errors were quickly rectified by the ambulance crew who must routinely locate addresses with incorrect information. The ambulance crew was very f amiliar with the area and they routed their pickup points to remove. che persons closest to the plant first. The ambulance was equipped with a two-way j
radio.
The ambulance used for this demonstration was designed to carry one l
patient on a stretcher rather than three or four seated passengers.
The I
county may want to consider the use of vans or buses for mobility-impaired i
evacuees who do not requite an ambulance.
Upon completion of the pickup
]
route, the driver was instructed by the dispatcher to return to the garage as the ambulances are not allowed to. leave the county for purposes of an exercise.
The ambulance driver knew that after picking up passengers, he l
would proceed to a reception center outside the county in an actual 7
(
i l
1 l
4 49 radiological emergency.
The ambulance crew was equipped with TLDs and low-t and high-range self-reading dosimeters, which they read frequently.
The ambulance crew was also equipped with KI.
i The personnel monitoring center for Oswego County emergency workers was activated at the Volney Volunteer Fire Station in Volney, New York.
This
)
f acility was well-equipped with the monitoring instruments and decontamination j
equipment necessary to handle the number of emergency workers who were expected to report there.
This center was staffed with well-trained volunteers.
The monitoring and decontamination of personnel and vehicles demonstrated at this facility closely followed the procedures described in Procedure C of the county plan.
i Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding
(
No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed during Oswego County's implementation of actions to protect the public during
]
this exercise.
j
]
Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficienev:
The ambulance used to simulate the evacuation l
of noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons was not j
deployed from the garage until approximately one hour j
after the volunteer ambulance company was notified to mobilize its personnel and dispatch the vehicle.
This delay was primarily due to two reasons.
First, it took several calls to locate and activate the ambulance driver and the radiological technician who had been trained to respond to radiological emergencies.
- Second, the radiological technician took an additional 30 minutes to check and issue the ambulance crew's radiological exposure control equipment af ter this individual had arrived at the garage. (NURIC-0654, K.3.a)
Recommendation:
The county should provide additional training to volunteer ambulance personnel to increase the number of staff who are qualified to respond to radio-logical emergencies and to increase the number of staff who are trained to check and issue radiological exposure control equip =ent to emergency workers.
2.
Deficienev:
The U.S. Coast Guard station in Osvego, New York, was not involved in the alerting of the boating public on Lake Ontario.
(NUREC-0654, C.4, E.6) 1
e 50 Re commenda t ion:
The state and county should meet with the
(
U.S. Coast Guard to discuss arrangements for coordinating the alerting of the boating public on 1.ake Ontario.
3.
Deficienev: The three Oswego County Sheriff's units that staffed traffic control points were unaware of the location of the reception centers to which evacuees would be routed.
Two of the three units did not have maps of the primary evacuation routes nor did they know which roads were to be used as.the primary evacuation rouces.
(NUREG-0654, J.10.j )
Recommendation:
The sherif f's personnel who may be called upon to staff traf fic control points should be trained in how to 1ccato reception centers and in the primary evacuation routes that would be used in a radiological emergency.
2.4.4 Medical Drill OVERVIEW
{
On October 12, 1983, a federally observed medical drill was ha.ld involving the transportation of a contaminated, injured individual from the Nine Mile Point site to the Oswego Hospital. A federal evaluator observed the events at the hospital.
Coc:munications at the Oswego Hospital were excellent.
All pertinent information was received and quickly distributed to the appropriate persennel.
The hospital had a radio to communicate with the ambulance that was transport-ing the victim. Telephone or radio could be used to communicate with on-site fire control.
The hospital received and verified a message stating that a
radiological emergency was in progress.
At about 0810, a call was received f rom on-sien fire control that there was an injured, contaminated male on-site.
In response to this call, hospital personnel began preparations to receive the patient.
At about 0835, on-site fire control called back with a description of the injury, including the activity level at the wound site and the esti=ated time of arrival- (10-12 minutes) of the ambulance at the hospital.
The ambulance arrived at about 0850.
Another call was received from fire control at approximately 0940 noting that the patient had been contaminated with Iodine-131 and giving estimates of the lifetime dose and external exposure.
j l
Hospital facilities and procedures were very good.
The written
(
standard operating procedures were followed by all personnel involved.
I 51 Utility health physicists were present, one with the ambulance crew and one in the treatment room.
All equipment ne ces sary for determining whether the s
patient was contaminated was readily available.
All meters had been calibrated within the past month.
Staff members were also provided with j
dosimeters which were read periodically.
Decontamination was demonstrated adequately. All necessary precautions were taken to avoid spreading contamination through the hospital.
The utility health physicist with the ambulance checked both the crew and the vehicle for contamination after the patient had been removed.
Properly calibrated instrumentation was used and the crew had been provided with dosimeters.
All procedures observed were handled efficiently and properly.
Deficiencies There were no deficiencies observed during the medical drill of October 12, 1983.
l 2.5 JEFFERSON COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.5.1 Jefferson County EOC OVERVIEW
{
The Jef ferson County EOC was proctpely and adequately staf fed.
Within
)
i approximately 75 minutes following initial notification, representatives from
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I 12 separate organizations were present.
Staf f were contacted by telephone l
utilizing prepared call lists.
The County Civil Defense Director aerved as the EOC director. The EOC was well managed and access was controlled through a sign in/out procedure.
I Periodic briefings were conducted to update EOC staff and current status inf ormation was clearly recorded on a blackboard.
Internal message handling i
was efficient.
Incoming messages were received in a separate communications
[
room and ef fectively distributed to appropriate EOC staf f.
Message logs were maintained.
Overall, the facility was exceilent.
There was adequate space for personnel and equipment.
All required maps were posted and the status board was clearly visible.
Adequate co==unications were established with the Oswego County EOC and with the reception center.
A liaison officer from Jefferson County was assigned to the Oswego County EOC. However, the Jef ferson County EOC received s o.e conflicting information from the Oswego County EOC.
For example, at l
0945, the Jefferson County EOC was advised that ERPAs 26 and 27 and the 1
52 schools in ERFAs 1-5 were being evacuated.
This information was later found
(
to be incorrect.
Further, there was at least a 1-hour delay in receiving notification at the Jefferson County E0C that a release of radioactive material had occurred at the plant.
This resulted in a commensurate delay in initiating the radiological monitoring of vehicles and evacuees at the Jefferson County reception center.
For the Jefferson County EOC the scenario was adequate.
The EOC was fully staffed and managed in a realistic manner.
All personnel took their responsibilities seriously and clearly understood their respective functions well.
Deficiencies That Vould Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for the Jefferson County EOC during this exercise.
Other Deficiency 1.
Deficienev:
Incorrect information concerning evacuation instructions in ERPAs 26 and 2? and school evacuations in ERPAs 1-5 was initially transmitted to the Jefferson County EOC.
In addition, there was at least a one-hour delay in receiving notification that a radioactive release had occurred at the plant.
(NUREG-0654, F.1.b, d)
Recommendation:
Procedures to verify the accuracy and timeliness of messages between the Jefferson County EOC acd Oswego County EOC should be developed and implemented.
2.5.2 Jefferson County Receetion Center OVERVIEW The reception center at the Jef ferson Community College was staf fed by six separate organizations and was adequately staffed to handle the registration of evacuees.
Registration was handled in an ef ficient manner utilizing Oswego County reception center registration forms.
Clearly posted signs directed evacuees to the monitoring area.
Evacuees were directed to hand-carry the registration form between stations while they were inside the reception center.
When registration and radiological monitoring were complete, the form was surrendered to the bus driver who would transport the evacuees to the congregate care center.
Vehicles were to be monitored and directed to separate parking areas depending upon whether they were contaminated or not.
Additional police support for traffic control functions would be necessary in an actual
53 t
emergency.
Vehicle monitoring was not demonstrated as a result of delayed information received at the Jef ferson County EOC.
Vehicles were to be decon-taminated in the parking lots using fire hoses.
Contaminated waste water would be allowed to run off into the ground. This procedure conforms to state l
policy and corrects a deficiency f rom prior exercises.
Personnel monitoring was observed and it was estimated that approxi-l mately 15 people per hour could be monitored. A single monitoring team of two I
persons, each equipped with a CDV-700 survey meter, performed the monitoring function.
The monitoring procedure basically followed that indicated in the Oswego County plan.
However, the technique employed by one of the monitors led to frequent, potential contamination of the plastic covering the probe.
This could have resulted in f alse readings on the survey meter. At least six monitoring teams would have been required to monitor the expected 945 evacuees within the specified 12-hour time period.
If an individual was' found to be contaminated, decontamination would be performed at this site.
Decontamina-tion procedures for evacuees were not demonstrated at the Jef ferson County reception center.
Deficiencies That Would 14ad to a Negative Finding t
No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Jef ferson County reception center during the exercise.
Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficienev:
Additional traffic control support may be required to handle the number of evacuees expected at the reception center.
(NUREC-0654, H.4, J.12)
Recommendation:
The county should review staff require-ments to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees through the arrival, monitoring, decontamination, registration, and departing stations.
2.
Deficienev:
Additional radiological monitoring teams would be _ required at the Jefferson County reception center to monitor the expected evacuees within the prescribed 12-hour time limit. (NUREC-0654, H.4, J.12)
Recom=endation:
The county should train additional staff to ensure that all of the evacuees and vehicles expected at the reception center could be monitored within the prescribed time.
3.
Deficienev:
At least one member of the radiological monitoring team at the Jef ferson County reception center f
l
e 54 demonstrated poor monitoring technique.
(
J.12, 0.4.c.).
Recommendation:
A more intensive training program is sug-
- gested to ensure competency in radiological monitoring of individuals.
2.5.3 Jef ferson County Congregate Care Center OVERVIEW Evacuees were to be bused to the congregate care center at, the New York State Office Building.
The lith floor of the building was designated as the shelter and could accommodate approximately 300 persons.
The American Red Cross was unable to participate in the exercise and five staff members of the Je f f e rsot.
County Department of Social Services operated the center.
Consequently, the center was inadequately staffed.
Communication links with the Jefferson Cour.ty EOC and emergency medical facilities were available through telephone and RACES operators.
Medical l
assistance was available from a nearby hospital.
A large kitchen was l
available for preparing hot meals.
Food was available through the Salvation l
g Army. Enough cots and blankets were stored to accommodate over a third of the
(
shelter's planned capacity.
Additional supplies were available from the Red Cross.
Parking facilities were unnecessary, since all evacuees were to be transported by bus from the reception center.
Except for the limited toilet f acilities on this floor, the shelter was adequate.
If shelter capacity was expected to be exceeded, other shelters listed in the plan were to be activated.
For example, Fort Drum could be expected to accommodate over 5000 people.
l l
The scenario was suf ficiently realistic to adequately test the activa-tion response and operation of the reception and congregate care centers. In the future, the decontamination function should be demonstrated at the Jefferson County reception center.
Deficiencies That Would lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead toa negative finding were observed at the Jef ferson County congregate care center during this exercise.
Other Deficienev 1.
Deficienev:
Sanitary facilities within the congregate care f acility were inadequate to acco mmodate the shelter capacity.
(NUREC-0654, J.10.h. ).
k L____
55 Recommendation:
Arrangements should be made to acquire access to rest room facilities on other floors of the building.
Some coordination and planning will be required to direct evacuees to appropriate facilities.
2.6 ONONDACA COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.6.1 Onondara County Receotion Center l
OVERVIEW The Onondaga County reception center was l>cated at the New York State Fairground in Syracuse.
The center was staffed by representatives of eight different agencies.
The staff arrived proeptly and quickly set up the facility. Activities at the reception center were professionally performed.
Registration of evacuees was performed using the Social Services form, following the procedures identified in the plan.
Four monitoring teams from the Department of Public Health performed the radiological monitoring.
The teams were capable of processing approximately 100 people per hour.
Additional equipment was available for more teams, should they have been needed.
If evacuees were found to be contaminated, they were to be decontaminated at this facility.
Decontamination was not demonstrated and only a diagram of the decontamination f acility was observed. The f acility appeared to be adequate and through interviews it was determined that proper procedures were understood.
The scenario adequately tested activation and staffing functions at the reception center.
But the scenario failed to test earlier deficiencies relating to procedures for controlling and handling decontamination vastes from vehicles.
Deficiencies No deficiencies were observed at the Onondaga County reception center during this exercise.
56 2.6.2 Onondaga County Congregate Care Centers
(
OVERVIEW i
i Two congregate care centers were activated in Onondaga County:
the Genesee High School and Baker High School in Baldwinsville.
The center at Genesee High School was primarily staf fed by volunteers from the American Red I
Cross and Syracuse Fire Explorers.
Although activated in a timely manner, staffing was not adequate. For example, police support for evacuee entry and control, RACES operators, and personnel with expertise in radiological monitoring did not participate in the exercise.
i Evacuees were registered at the reception center using the Social Services form prior to arriving at the congregate care center.
Red Cross personnel at the congregate care center were not f amiliar with this form and expected that a Red Cross form would be used. Persons without the appropriate form might have been denied entry to the congregate care center and returned to the reception center.
The center appeared adequate to accommodate the capacity of.500 evacuees.
The school was equipped to handle handicapped personr. Cafeteria facilities were available for food preparation. Telephones were nvailable for coc:munication with other emergency centers.
Although a nursing.etation was established, there appeared to be no quick access to hospital care.
The Baker High School congregate care center was not staffed or activated when the observer arrived.
However, the school principal gave the observer a tour of the center. The school appeared to have all the necessary facilities to accoc:modate at least 500 evacuees.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Onondaga County congregate care center during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies 1.
Deficienev:
Staffing at the Genesee High School was not adequate to perform all the functions at this congregate care center. (NURIC-0654 H.4, J.12)
Recommendation:
Responsibilities of organizations and staff requirements should be reevaluated to ensure adequate support for evacuee entry and
- control, coc=:unications, and radiological monitoring.
2.
Defic'enev:
Documentation of evacuee radiological monitoring and registration had apparently not been
I l.
57 coordinated between agencies.
The problem was. not resolved during the exercise.
In a real emergency, evacuees might have been denied access to the congregate r
care center either because the appropriate form was not used or because volunteers at the center had not been trained to recognize the form that was in use.
(NUREG-j 0654, J.12, 0.4.a. P.3, 4)
{
l Recommendation:
Since the reception and congregate care t
l centers are physically separated and managed by different organizations, it is suggested that the directors of each facility agree on mutually acceptable forms and proce-l dures.
Alternatively, volunteers at the congregate care center may need to be trained te recognize the approved form that would be issued to evacuees at the reception 3
center.
l 3.
Deficiency:
There was no evidence of a capability to provide quick access to hospital care at the Genesee High School congregate care facility. (NUREG-0654, L.4)
Recommendation:
Provisions should be made to ensure rapid transportation to hospital facilities.
)
1 t
l i
l 4.
58 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: SEPTEMB ER 28, 1983, EXE RCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recommendations of federal observers at,the radiological emergency prepared-ness exercise for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station held on September 28, 1983 and the medical drill for the Nine Mile Point site held on October 12, 1983.
Ihese evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (Nov. 1980) and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.
No deficiencies were observed at the state or county level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that approp-tace protective measures can be taken j
to protect the health and safety of thr pd lic living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
Other deficiencies observed at the September 28, 1983, exercise for the NMPNS require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These other deficiencies are summarized in the following table.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Ass ociate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
(
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies.
FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of coe:pletion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.
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C.
i 79 4 SLHMARY OF DEFICIENCIES Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies noted during the September 28,1983, exercise and the October 12, 1983, medical drill.
Table 4.1 summarizes recommendations to correct those deficiencies.
For purposes of verification, the table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based upon the previous exercises of September 15, 1981, and August 11, 1982. The current status of all recommendations is indicated.
e I
q i
1
6 6
8'O Table 4.1 Recommendations to Rasedy Deficiencies in Of f-Site Radiological Emergency C
Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Nine Mile Feint Site' on September 28. 1983, and Two Previous Dates and the Octobe r 12. 1983 Medical Drill Deficiency NUREC-06$4 tdentified FEMA-REF-1 tav. 1. b Previous Exercing Presen}
No.
Recommended corrective Action Reference g,,,,g,,,c 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status 1.
Setter display te needed in the Albany J.10.a K
State C
E0C of taportant data such as poputa-J.10.b
- tion, survey
- resulte, and does projections.
State C
2.
The data forse should be redesigned to F.1.b I
. State-10F N/Obs provide lettering of sufficient eine I
that the telefaz copies are clearly 1
Cowego C
l 1egible.
1
- 3. Procedures for authorizing the use of J.10.e K
State N/0bj l
K1 by emergency workers, dose tevel J.!O.f X
Oswego N/0bj guides for such authorization, and location and methods of distribution of stockpiles of K1 need to be furnished to TEMA for review and demonstrated during the esercises.
4.
Methode for the control of contaminated K.2.a 1
State C
Oswego C
westes generated by vehicle decontaal-Jefferson C
nation should be developed in detail.
Onondaga
'I
(
s
- 5. Future exercisee should consider *out-M.1. 3 K
State I
of-sequence
- recovery and reentry activities so that more time can be devoted to demonstration of these procedures.
6.
Variations in wind speed and direction 1.11 1
State II should be incorporated into the scenario to provide a better test of the accident assessment capability.
7.
The notification of a genersi emergency F.1.d X
State I
wee received at the state ECC communi-cations center. but a copy of the assesse did not arrive in the command room until about one half hour later due to a backlog at the copying eachins.
The state should consider using additional copying f acilities or establishing a systes to identify priority aessages that could be placed at the head of the copying queue.
I l
l C
o.
4
\\
l l
O O
4 81 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) l l
l
~
Deficiency NUREG-0654 Identified FEMA-REP-1 Rav. 1. D Previous taercisg Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercises *
.9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status l
8.
The Civil Defense National Tele t ype l
System (CDNATS) malfunctioned when the F.1.b 1
State 1
state EOC attempted to notify five q
contiguous states.
This malfunction j
delayed making these notifications.
I The cause of the CDMATS probles should be determined and corrected if 4
correceive action falle under the state's purview.
State consunications j
personnel show;d be inst ructed to
{
implement alt e rnative nea rna of i
notifying contiguova states more l
quickly when CDNATS malfunctions.
l 9.
It took about eight minutes to contact 1.1 1
State I
the New York State Thruway Authority; the state EOC caller was repeatedly transferred.
The state should deter-I aine whether a new contact number is l
needed for the Thruway Authority, particularly for use outside normal working hours.
- 10. In some cases, accident asse ssment F.1.d I
State I
staff found it difficult to decipher I
sampling locations and activity levels from telefamad copies of the Orwego i
County Radiological Survey Monitoring l
sheets.
These sheets should be i
redesigned to improve the legibility of J
telefaxed copies.
j 1
l
!!. The ingestico pathway field monitoring K.3.a K
State I
I l
tese did not have a C41ger counter to J.11 monitor for heavy surf ace contamination be f ore sampling.
Ingestico pathway easpling teams should be equipped with Celger counters so that they can check for heavy contamination before sempting and thus reduce the risk of unnecessary personal erposure.
- 12. The ingestion pathway easpling taae d.1d J.11 I
State 1
not have written procedures. The state should consider including written procedures to th% stoodard equiptead I
for togestion pathway as backup guidance.
- 13. The ingestion pat hway sampling t aan K.4 I
State I
could not report its actions or any level of exposure exceeding t he erposure action level.
Radios should be considered for the togestion pathway sampling teams.
93 4
i o
a 82 Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 8 y,
Deficiency f
tdentified NUS.TU-0634 FEMA-W 1 Rev. 1. D Previous Exercisg Presen}
No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercises
- 9/28/83 Jurisdiction'
$tatus 14 Although members of the inge s k!.cn J.10.f 1
State I
pathway sampling tsaa knew that the KI container contained instruction for use.
the tegestion pathway sampling team did not know 'the crocedure for using KI.
They did not how how of ten to read tMtr desteetere nor the maxieue dose allowed be f ore authorization would be required.
' g.
Ingestion pathway sampling teams need additional training in standard radiological protection procedures
't T
including the use of EI, and the a
reasons for these procedures.
- 15. The ingestion pet'nesy sampling taas did K.5.b K
'7tatn
'T i'
V not have personal protective equipment such as anti-contamination suits, q
gloves.
- tongs, or respiratory.
Feraanal protective equipment;thould be
'[
furnished to the ingestion pathway easpling teams.
- 16. Aeditional telefaz and telebhane F.1.d ttta w CD N/Obe equipment should be considered fcx the f
Central District EOC.
,(
r
- 17. It should be verified that, the state H.2.
1 State-EOF C
and local representatives at the EOF know their respective roles as outlined in the state and local plants and act accordingly during the play of the y
e xe rci s e.
c 99
- 14. The plan of operation St.d the'
,8.12
,1 3:ste-EOF C
procedurer for the E0F need to be strengthened to ensure a
timely gathering of and transmittal of fieldc data from the county and from the utility to the state accident as s e s s ment personnel, and between the county and the utility.
I
- 19. Additional telephom capacity (e.g.,
F.1.1 1
State-EOF C
dedicated line) er a ratio between the county representative at the EOF and the ace.ident as se s saeet roos at the EOC whould be providad. -
- 20. Soes overcrowding was observert in the 8.2 1
state-EOF 1
limited work space provided for the state and county emergency Tesponse staf f s at the EOF.
Additional working space should be made available for state and county energency response.
etsffs at the EOF.
j s.
,)
i l
3.
BI Table 4.1 (Cont 'd) s' Deficiency NURIG-0634 identified FEMA-REP-1 Rev. I, b Previous Exercisg Preseng No.
Reconneended Corrective Action Reference Exercises
- 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 21. The autuality, consistency, and time-WR 1
State-EOF I
liness of accident assessment and subsequent protective action recommer.dations between the utility, state, and county could be enhanced.
The utility, state. and county should consider exchanging information during the development of protective action recommendations rather than af ter such recommendations are developed independently by each agency.
- 22. All E8S announcers, particularly E.6 I
JNC C
VKyM/VOSC should be trained on the E85 plan requirements and be provided with a copy of ;rocedure F of the County RIR? Plan.
- 23. A systes such as an internal checklist E.6 K
JNC C
should be devaloped to verify the E.7 content of publir, messages aired by EBS to include and update the status of previously issued a
she' ter and evacus-a tion orders.
s
- 24. Announcers e t' the radio station WKFM E.6 X
JNC C
transmitter location should h&ve and be familiar with the local E85 Operational Area Plan.
They should also have either the original or tevised activat f o:1/authent ication list and code.
In addition, a copy of the public information brochure should be available.
- 25. Talaphone numbers to be used in E.6 E
JNC I
emergency messages should be reviewed.
E.7
- 26. Procedures for the costposing checking.
E.7 K
JNC C
and numbering of EBS messages and news releases should be revtewed.
- 27. Wall maps should be provided in the C.4.&
I JNC C
news center.
- 28. No E85 oessage was issued to announce E.6 I
JNC I
the countyviaa school closings even E.7 through the public education brochure stated that this would be done. An E85 messegu about school closings should be developed and aired when appropriate during radiological eentger.cies.
i
'i s
'3 N
c,,
$s y
s
a e
84 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
Deficiency NUREC-0654 tdantified FEMA-REF-1 Rev. I Previous Esercisg Preseng t
b No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference g,,,,g,,,e 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 29. Some E85 sessages currently asvise only E.6 I
JNC 1
i those who cannot go to homes of friends E.7 l
or relatives to go to reception centers.
Since sees evacuees might be contaminated. they should be advised to go to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination if necessary. The appropriate ERS messages should be revised to advise avecuees to report to a reception center for monitoring bef ore they go to the homes of f riends or relatives.
- 30. The public information brochure stated C.1.2 7
Oswego I
that evacuees who cannot go to the homes of friends or relatives can go to the reception centers.
Since evacuees alght be contaminated, they should all be advised to go to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination if
(
necessary.
The public information brochure should be revised to advise evacuees to report to a receptica center f or monitoring bef ore they go to the homes of friends or relatives.
- 31. Rearrangement of the (County) E0C space 3.3 I
Oswego C
l ahould be censidered to ease informa-l tion flow between the Operations floor and the accisent assessant t roce.
- 32. The role of the RCES staff should be F.1.s I
Osuitgo C
]
clearly defined.
- 33. Additional telephone and/or radio cow =
F.1.d E
oswego C
aunication between the E0F and the county EOC should be provided.
A I
coenunications equipment operator any l
be needed in addition to the county representative.
This would make it possible for the county representative
-j to concentrate on obtaining and making l
certain that the latest data and 1
information are provided to the utility, to the state, and to the county.
Ja. An additional person should be trained A.4 I
Oswego C
so that sufficient backup is available to ansutt the capability to asintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day operation.
L 1
1
gy e >
s Table 4.1 (Cont'd) s o*
Deficiency NCREG-0654 Tdentified i
FEMA-REF-1 l
Rev. 1. D Previous Exercisg Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercises
- 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 35. Dose assessment procedures should td I.8 I
Oswego C
revised to ensure deployment of the field monitoring tasms as early sa possible in order to obtain an early confirmation of the magnitude of the release.
Procedures in deployment of and data taking by the field monitoring j
teams should be designed to maximize I
the amount of data obtained during the early part of the release of radio-activity from the plant in order to provide adequate data to confire the magnitude of the release.
- 36. Impreved direct cesseunications between F.1.d 1
Devego C
the field monitoring teams and the E0C are needed.
Procedures for trans-mitting data between the field team.
the EOC. the 20F, and the utility should include procedures for confirming that the date are correct.
l that the units are cortwet. and that the location of the sampling point is j
correctly recorded.
r
- 37. An taproved communications system for F.1 1
Oswego C
the county E0C base station should be implemented.
- 38. Although 15 buses were on hand at J.2 1
cowego N/0bj Mexico School district and 58 buses were available frou Oswego, it was not possible to detsrsf ne whether resources were adequate for evacuation. The plan should clearly specify bus requirements free all facilities.
- 30. The plans should be changed to state K.3.a K
Oswego C
that film badges will be used.
Actual practice should be consistent with the plan.
40.
Procedures should be used that prevent L.!
1 Os
,g, y/ogy the contaminattun of energency workers L.4 and ensure that contamination f rom the victia is not spread in an uncontrolled I
manner.
l 41.
Additional training in the requirements K.3 I
Cevego C
for reporting doces received by field 01 workers should be given.
0.4.c i
1 I
i e.
86 i
Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
I Deficiency NUREC-0654 tdentified j
FEMA-RZF-!
Rev. 1. b Previous Ese rcisg Presen}
No.
Recossended Corrective Action Reference Esercises*
9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 42. The dose projection status board and D.4 1
Oswego I
the field tese statue board in the J.10.a Oswego County dose assessment room were not updated throughout the course of the entire exercise. The dose assess-eens staff et the Gewego County EOC sheuld be trained to updata the does pre.jection status board and the field tese status board as soon as updated information becomes available.
These l
status boards should be updated as soon 4
l as possible to facilitate the coordina-tion of intertti communications among I
the dose assessment staff at the EOC.
- 43. The Oswego County Sheriff's coordina-J.10.k 1
Cowego I
j tore did not consider the possible need 1
to reroute traf fic or the need to keep
{
l the public informed of congestion or blockages to evacuation in response to 1
either of the two evacuation route tapediment probless introduced at the EOC during the exercise. The sheriff's coordinators at the OCE0C should be C
trained to consider alternate avecuation routes in case a primary evacuation route may become congested or blocked for estended pe riods of time.
The ehtriff's coordinators should also be trained to coordinate with the public information of ficer at the EOC to develop public instruction I
concerning the recouting of evacuation traffic and the broadcast of information to assure the public that the authorities are svare of the problem and are acting to remedy it.
44 A RfCS message notifying county E.1 1
Oswego I
officials of the deescalation free general eergency to the alert energency classification level was not received at the Oswego County EOC prior to the discussion of recovery and reentry considerations inittsted by officials at the state EOC in Albany. This error resulted in confusion among staff in the command and control room of the County EOC concetting what energency classification was in ef f acc.,
The
- stsce, enuncy, and utility should review the esoteise proesciures for advaccing +1ee and deescalating emer-gency c. classification levels. The 1eeene for verificatico of the soorgency classification level contained in messages that are verbally transmitted over the RICS systes should siso be
/
included in this review $f procedures.
a
i S
87 e 4a l
l Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
Deficiency NUREG-0654 toenetfied FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, b Previous Exercisg Preseng No.
recommended corrective action Reference g,,,,g,,,e 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- Status
- 45. The two oewego County field monitoring 13 1
Oswego I
tease varied in their technical 0.1.b knowledge of monitoring procedures and 0.4.c in the use of their equipment.
Both tease were able to perform their responsibilities and one team was very well trained.
The technical depth of the other team should be taproved through more training in basic radio-logical field monitoring procedures.
All county field monitoring pe rsonnel should nave equally good knowledge of monitoring procedures and equally good skilla in the use of their equipment.
This le important to insure unif oralty and reliability of the data that are reported from different locations throughout the county and to insure unifore backup arsitoring capability.
- 46. Sons field monitoring data were not 1.8 I
Cowego I
cosomanicated to the Oevego County EOC in the proper units for ready use by the dose assessment staff. An several occasions, the county field tease had to be recontracted to verify specif1c readings or to have an entire series of data retransmitted.
The data forms that are presently in use should be revised and etapitfied to inaute that data communicated from the county field monitoring teena are reported to the EOC in the same units as those used by the does as seeement staff.
The field monitoring pe rsonnel should also receive more training in radio comeu-nication procedures to insure that das recorded on forma in the field are communicated to the EOC in the proper unite.
47.
Neither of the two Cowego County field 1.8 1
gev,g, g
monitoring teens vos briefed on plant conditione prior to their deployment or while they were carrying out their monitoring responsibilittaa in the field.
Consequently, the field monitoring teens did not know what readings they could orpect to find during their field survers. The field l
team coordinator. should be trained to provide more inf ormation to the monitoring tesse.
including the emergency cisesification level acd the I
time at which a telease has occurred.
i 4+
/
!s s
.e 88 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
Deficiency NUREC-0654 Tdentified FEMA-REF-1 Rev. 1. b Previous Exercisg Preseng No.
Recommended Corrective Action Reference g,,,gg,,,c 9/28/83 Jurisdiction" Status 48.
Th6 ambulance used to Atsulate the K.3.s Oswego-I evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons was not deployed from the garage until approxi-sately one hour after the volunteer ambulance company was notified to mobilise its personnel and dispatch the vehicle. This delay was primarily due to two reasons. First, it took several calls to locate and activate the sobulance driver and the radiological emergencies.
Second, the radiological technician took en additional 30 minutes to check and issue the ambu-lance crew's radiological exposure control equipment af ter this individual had arrived at the garage. The county should provide additional training to volunteer ambulance personnel to
+
increase the numbe r of staff who are j
qualified to respond to radiological emergencies and to increase the number of staf f who are trained to check and issue tediolog'ical exposure control
(
equipment to emergency workers.
- 49. The U.S.
Coast Guard in Lovego. New C.4 I
Orwego I
York, was not involved in the alerting E.6 of the boating public on Lake Ont a ri o.
The state and county should meet with the U.S.
Coast Guard to discuss arrangements for coordinating the alerting of the boating public on Lake Ontario.
- 50. The three Oswego County Sheriff's unica J.10.j x
Oswego I
that staffed traffic control points were unaware of the location of the reception centers to which evacuees would be routed.
Two of the three units did not have maps of the primary i
evacuation routes not did they know
]
which roads were to be used as the primary evacuation routes.
The i
sheriff's personnel who any be called j
upon to staff traffic control pointa thould be trained in how to locate the 4
reception centers and in the primary evacustica routes that would be used in s radiological emergency.
O ee4
$9 k
i Table 4.1 (Cont'd) l
~
/
Deficiency WREC-0654 tdentified FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 b Previous Exercisg Premng l
No.
Reconnended Corrective Action taference Exercises
- 9/28/83 Jurisdiction
- fe St. Incorrect information concerning F.1.b 1
Jefferson i
evacuation instructions in ERFAe 26 and F.1.d j
27 and school evacuations in ERFAs 1-5 vas initially tranesitted to the Jefferson County EOC.
In addition, j
there was at least a one-hour delay in receiving notification that a
l radioactive release had occurred at the plant.
Procedures to verify the accuracy of and insure the timeliness of sessages between the Oswego County EOC and the Jefferson County EOC should be developed and implemented.
- 52. Additional traf fic control support may 8.4 1
Jefferson I
be required to handle the numbe r of J.12 l
evacuees expected at the reception j
eenter. The county should review staf f 1
requirements to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees through the l
arrival, monitoring, decontamination.
I registration, and departing stations.
- 53. Additional radiological monitoring a4 1
Jefferson I
teems ar. the Jefferson County reception J.12 l
center would be required to monitor the expected evacuees within the prescribed q
12-hour time limit. The ecunty should train additional staff to ensure that all of the evacuees and vehicles expected at the reception center could be handled.
54 At least one acaber of the regiological J.12 1
Jefferson I
monitoring tsaa demonstrated poor O.4.c monitoring technique at the Jefferson County reception center.
A more intensive training program is suggested to ensure competency in radiological sonitoring of individuals.
- 55. Sanitary f acilities within the congre-J.10.h 1
Jefferson I
gate care facility were inadequate to accotraodate the shelter capacity.
Arrangtaents should bu made to er. quire accets to rest room facilities on other floors of the building. Some coordina-tion and planning vill be rett' ired to direct evacuees to appropriate facilities.
4
- e a 90 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
Deficiency NUREC-0654 toentified FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, b Previous Exercing Preseng No.
Raconsended Correctf.ve Action Raference g,,,gg,,,c 9/28/83 Jurisdiction' Status
- 56. Staffing at the Genesee Righ School was B.4 x
Onondaga I
not adequate to perform all the J.12 fmcticos at the Onondaga County congregate care cent e r.
Ra s ponsia-bilities of organizations and staff I
requirement s should be reevaluted to ensure adequate support for evacues entry and control, communications, and radiological monitoring.
- 57. Documentation of evacues radiological J.10 K
onondaga 1
monitoring and registration has 0.4.a apparently not be,en coordinated between P.3 agencies. The problem was not resolved P.4 during the exercise.
In a real emer-gency, evacuees might have been densed access to the congregate care center either because the sopropriate form vcs not used or be cause the volunteers at the center had not been trained to recognize the form that was in use.
Since the reception and congregate care centers are physically separated and ar aged by different organizations, it L'
iggested that the directors of each f ar-
.t y agree on autually acceptable forsa and procedures.
Alt e rna tively,
(
volunteers at the congregate care center may need to be trained to recog-nise the approved form that would be issued to evacuees at the reception center.
- 58. There was no evidence of a capability L.4 1
Onondaga 1
to provide quick access to hospital care at the Genessee Righ School congreste care facility.
Provisione should be made to ensure rapid transportation to hospital facilities.
och the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and the James A. Fitzpatrieb Nuclear Power Plant att located on the Nine Mile Point site.
bMR: No Ntl REC-0654 reference.
" Previous exercises were held on September 16, 1981, for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and en August 11, 1982, for the James A. yttspatrick Nucitar Power Plant.
d Including the October 12, 1983, medical drill.
' State: Primarily or wholly reisted to state or SE0C (Albany) functions.
State-CD = Primarily or wholly related to the Central District EOC in Oneida.
State-ECF = Primarily or wholly related to EOF or KF0 functions.
Orvego
- rimarily or whollt related to Oswego County functions.
Jefferson: Prietarily or vnolly related to Jefferson County fucetions.
Onondage: Primarily or wholly related to Onondags County functions.
I Corrective action complete.
C Is Corrective action 13co.4plete.
M/0bs: Not observed during 1983 exercise.
M/Obj Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
8 1ncomplete for wind direction only; wind speed variations during the l983 axercise adequately tested the
(
response :spect11ty.
et
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