ML20238A307
| ML20238A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-068, OL-5-I-SC-68, NUDOCS 8708310017 | |
| Download: ML20238A307 (68) | |
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- POST EXERC'SE ASSESSME.NT (q
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j May 24,1983 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency
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Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities
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for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION a,
September 16,1983 a
4 Fe'deral Emefgency Management Agency f
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[k"kOcc[00o0322 PDR FRANK P. PETRON5' 28 FEDERAL PLAZA Regional Director
,New York, N.Y.10278
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POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT May 24, 1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County Municipalities for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Ser cember 16, 1983 Federal Emergency Managetnent Agency Region II I
Frank P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza Regional Director.
New York, N.Y.
10278
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CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................
v
SUMMARY
.................................................................. vii 1
INTRODUCTION...........................................................
I 1.1 Ex e r ci s e Ba ckg r o un d...............................................
I 1.2 Fe d e r al O b s e rv e rs.................................................
2 1.3 Evaluation Criteria...............................................
4 1.4 Ex e r cise O bj e c tives...............................................
4 1.5 Ex e r ci s e Sc e na ri o.................................................
6 1,5.1 Maj or Sequence of Events on Site...........................
6 1.5.2 Scenario Summary...........................................
7 1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources...................
9 2
EVALUATIONS............................................................
16 2.1 State of New Jersey...............................................
16 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.............
16 2.1.2 Ale rting and M:)bilization o f Of ficials and S t af f..........
17 2.1.3 Emergency Operstions Management...........................
18 2.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification..........................
18 2.1.5 Pu blic and Me dia Re lat ions................................
19 2.1.6 Ac cident As s e s sme nt.......................................
20 2.1.7 Ac tions to Pro t e ct the Pu b11 c.............................
21 2.1.8 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures............
21 l
2.1.9 Re cove ry and Ra est ry Op erations...........................
22 2.1.10 Relevance of the Exe r cise Expe rience......................
22 2.2 Oc e a n Co un t y......................................................
22 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.............
22 2.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and St af f..........
24 2.2.3 Energency Operations Management...........................
26 2.2.4 Public Ale rting and No tification..........................
28 2.2.5 Public and Media Relations................................
28 d
2.2.6 Ac cid en t As s e s smen t.......................................
28 2.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public.............................
29 2.2.8 Realth, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures............
30 2.2.9 Re cove ry and Reentry Ope rations...........................
31 2.2.10 Re levance of the Exe rcise Experience..............
31 2.3 Ocean County Municipalities....................
4.................
31 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources..............
32 2.2.2 Alerting and Mo bilization of of ficials and S t'aff...........
33 2.3.3 Emergency Ope rations Management............................
34 2.3.4 Public Alerting and Notification...........................
35 2.3.5 Ac t ions to Pr o t e ct the Pu blic..............................
35 2.3.6 Hesich,' Medical, and Exposure Control Measures.............
36 2.3.7 Re e n t ry and Re cove ry Op e ra tions............................
36 2.3.8 Relevance of the Er.ercise Experience.......................
'36 o
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CONTENTS (Cont'd) 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES TRA'T WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS............
38 4 OTHER DEFICIENCIES.....................................................
39 4.1 State of New Jersey...............................................
39 4.1.1 Emergency Operations Fac111 tics and Resources..............
3?
4.1.2 Public and Media Relations.................................
39 4.1.3 Ac cident As s es sme n t........................................ 10 4.1.4 Recovery and Reentry Operations............................ 40 4. 2 - Oc ean Co un ty...................................................... 40 4.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources..............
40 4.2.2 Alerting and Mo bilization of Of ficials and Staf f...........
41' 4.2.3 Emergency Operations Management..e.........................
41 4.2.4 Public Alerting and No tification........................... 41 j
4.2.5 Public and Media Relations................................ 42 1
4.2.6 Ac cide n t As s e s sme n t........................................ 42 4.2.7 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures.............
43 4.3 Oc ean Coun ty Municipalities....................................... 43
)
4.3.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.............. 43 l
4.3.2 Alerting and Mo bili zatien 'of Of ficials and Staf f........... 44 4.3.3 Emergency Operations Management........................... 44 i
4.3.4 Actions to Protect the Public..............................
44
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4.3.5 Heelch, Medical, and Exposure Contrcl Measures.............
44 5 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES................................ 45 I
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ABBREVIATIONS ANL Argonne National Laboratory BERC N.J. Department of Environment.1 Protection, Bureau of Emergency Response Coordination BRP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection DOA N.J. Department of Agricultut.e L
DEP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection 00E U.S. Department of Energy DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOH N.J. Department of Health DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD N.J. Emergency Management Radio EMS emergency medical system EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone FCP Forward Command Post FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GFU General Public Utilities HHS U.S. Depart'.nent of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JMC joint media center KI potassitus iodide NAWAS National Warning System NJSP New Jersey Division of State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station OCSCD Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division CEM NJSP Office of Emergency Management PAG protective action guide PIO public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES radio amateur civil emergency service RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan S0P standard operating procedure TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of. Agriculture v
SLMMARY
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State of New Jersev
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The State of New Jersey demonstrated compe tence in directing and controlling the emergency response activities during the exercise. All levels of management demonstrated strong leadership capabilities throughout the j
exercise.
The various state facilities and the emergency operations center (EOC) in particular were effectively utilized and fully staffed throughout the exercise.
All emerg 'ncy operations were conducted in a professional manner The Covernor and th e Commissioner of Environmental Protection personally participated in the* e cercise at the EOC.
This level of support by an elected of ficial is a good example of the state 's commitment to emergency prepared-
)
ness.
The oublic was proepely notified by sirens, and the emergency broadcast f
system (EBS) was subsequently activated.
In general, the sounding of the j
sirens at 9:30 a.m.
was well coordinated with the airing of an EBS test message by radio stations.
The state EOC demonstrated a very good capability to promp tly identify critical information to be used in EBS messages.
However, coordinated arrangements for rumor control still need to be reviewed.
Staffing at the joint media center (JMC) included the Ocean County Public Informeion Officer (PIO),
State of New Jersey Office of Emergency a
Management PIO, a PIO from the Covernor's office, and the utility'c PIO.
'"h is level of staffing ensured that professionals would provide information to the media, orimarily through press briefings, and answer questions from the media.
The participation of f.he Ocean County PIO and the PIO from the Covernor 's office greatly increased the effectiveness of JMC operations.
- However, coordir.ation among Pios at the State and County EOCs and the JMC should be icceoved to ensure a timely and accurate flow of information.
Ihere was no telecopier at the JMC for the state and county FIos, and the JMC staff had no hard copies of EBS messages for thems elves or for distribution to the media.
Other equipment, including wall maps and a television for monitoring public information, should be obtained.
New Jersey's capability to perform accident assessment functions was clearly shown.
The state demonstrated a good capability to implement effective emergency management procedures.
These procedures included the simulated evacuation of four emergency planning areas affected by the plume i
and sheltering of four others.
The simulation of recoven and reentry demonstrated that the present state platwincludes two inconsistent criteria for reentry that could possibly impede the decision making process.
This inconsistency exemplifies the need i
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e for periodic exercises and for scace personnel to updace the plan as needed.
It is evident chac the state has continued to develop and refine its planning capabilities.
Scean County, New Jersev Overall, Ocean County 's performance was good.
Ma nagement capability and leadership were well demonstrated at the county emergency operacions cencer.
Commnicacions, command and control, and message flow we re all imnroved since the 1982 exercise.
The alerting and mobilization of emergency workers was both efficient and timely.
'l The congregate care center at Cecrgian Court was very good.
Evacuees were ef fectively monitored, registered, and deconcaminaced as necessary and provisions for their care we re well established.
These actions we re significantly impreved from the 1982 exeref.se.
The decontaminacioh* center for emergency wo rke rs in Manahawkin was recently established and functioned well overall.
Howeve r, additional craining is needed in procedures for the radiological monitoring of emergency workers.
~
Most people interviewed on the day of the exercise had heard the sirens and received public education brochures.
However, some were unaware of the emergency procedures which they are to follow.
Tederal observers were advised that publ'ic education information vill be placed in free newspapers during the summr season.
This effect, and cencinuing brochure distribution, should provide the sumner population with adequate information.
Ocean County 's field monitoring team performed very well.
Although one of the radiological monitoring instruments. used to detect radiotodine mal-functioned, che training, equipment, and personal dosimetry sere ic:p roved since the 1982 exercise.
The Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division, which is the primary communication link between the Ocean County ECC and mnicipal warning points,
functioned well.
However, emergenev resconse personnel need to receive additional training in procedures, checklists, and the use of forms.
Ocean County Municipalities Federal observers reviewed emergency response activities at seventeen township and borough EOCs.
The mobilization of local officials and staff was generally timely and the participation by emergency response personnel at the municipal EOCs was commendable.
The capability for continuous 24-hour viii
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emergency response was good in most communities.
Local emergency response workers and emergency mahagement personnel were generally knowledgeable about their responsibilities and their roles ih :he plan.
In addition, most personnel had received training in radiological emergency response.
Some workers had attended courses sponsored by the state and Ocean County.
Substantial progress was evident in resoonse to the recommendations for remedial actions based on last year's exercise.
Improved areas include the following:
e Dosimetry equipment and exposure control; e EOC maps and displays; e Message handling and internal communications; and e Mobile communications with first aid units.
Several recommendations are offered with respect to the municipal EOCs.
Consideration should be given to establishing an alternate EOC outside the 2-mile area to coordinate Ocean Township's emergency response activities if evacuation becomes necessary. The communications system used for notifying the mue icipal EOCs was acceptable.
However, some messages between the Ocean County EOC and municipal ECCs were delayed due to the system overloading. To avoid overloading this system, additional training is needed in proper use of the N.J. Energency Management Radio (EMRAD) network.
The volunteer emergency workers in all the municipalities are to be complimented on. chair efforts and dedication in preparing for attd participating in the exarcise.
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1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,
19iy, the. President-directed the Federal. Emergency Management Agency (Fl!MA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
F1MA's. responsibil'icies ' in. radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency responst plans developed by state and local governments; e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the-basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments; and e Cocedinating the activities of fedaral agencies, with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC),
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
- U.S. Environmental 'Totection Agency (EPA),
- U.S. Departtaent.of Energy (DOE),
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
- U.S. Departw nt of Agriculture (USDA), and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Representatives of these agencies. serve as members of the Regional
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Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
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Annex 5 to the State o f ' New. Jersey Radiological Emergency Re sponse Plan (RERP) for Nuclear Power Plants is the RERP for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS).
It includes detailed state, county and annicipal i
plans pertaining to that site.
This plan was evaluated, and an exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was then held on March 16, 1982.
A second exercise of the RERP for OCNCS was conducted on May 24, 1983, between the-hours - of 5:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., to assess the capabilities of i
che state and local emergency preparedness organizations to (1) implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures and (2) protect the public in a radiological-emergency involving the OCNCS.
2 A team of 22 observers evaluated the May 24 exercise.
Team leaders coordinated the operations of the teams of observers assigned to evaluate the activities of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County taunicipalities.
Following that exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations.
Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and te.us leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members.
A public critiqu4 of the exercise, for exercise participants and the general pubLie was hold at 7:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 25, 1983, in the Lacey Municipal Building in Lacey, New Jersey.
The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of federal observers, which were reviewed by FEMA Region II.
FEMA requests that state and local juri.sdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting thr. deficiencies discussed in this report.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
- t. hat all negative findings observed during the exarcise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and lo, cal plans, as appropriate.
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-two federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions.
These individus1s, their affiliations, and their e:teredse assign-ments are given below.
- Observer, Agency Exercise Location /? unction P. McIntire FEMA FEMA Command Pos;/Ceneral Observation (Division Chief, Natural and Technological Hazards Division)
R. Kowieski FEMA Exercise Overview /RAC Chairman and Branch Chief, Technological Razards Branch R. Reynolds FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader T. Klein ANL State EOC/Communicatic s J. Keller INEL N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of l
Radiation Protection (BRP); and State EOC/ Accident l
Assessment 1
M. Jackson FEMA State EOC; Joint Media Center /Public Information Officer (PIO)
3 Obse rver Agency Exercise Location / Function T. Jackson VRC OCNCS near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/
Liaison A. Mojica FE4A Joint Media Center /PIO; Ocean County / Alert and Notification, Public Information J. Opelka ANL BRP Forward Command Post (FCP)/ Accident Assessment r
P. Lutz DOT Manchester, New Jersey / Evacuation Bus Route; Garden State Parkway / Access Control; I
Ocean County Local EOCs/ Surf City Borough, Ship Bottom Burough L. Hoffman INEL State Vanguare: Team / Radiological Monitoring; Lanoka Harbor, New Jersey / State Decontamination Center; Ocean County Local EOC/ Lacey Township R. Conley USDA BRP FCP/ Water 3ampling Team, Recovery Reentry Team; Ocean County Local EOC/ Berkeley Township R. Honkus INEL BRP FCP/ Recovery-Reentry Team; Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring R. Care 11k FEHA Ocean County EOC/ Team Leader
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- d. Fish DOE Ocean County EOC/ Communications A. Smith ANL Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division (OCSCD)/
Communications; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Infor:sation R. Bernacki FDA Lacey Township / Bus Evacuation Routa; Lakewood, New Jersey / Congregate Care Shelter; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Information N. Chipman INEL Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring; Stafford, New Jers ey/ Ocean County Decontamination Center; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Inf o rmation F. Fishman FUtA 0cean County Local EOCs/ Team Leader; Dover Township / Impediment to Evacuation; Ocean County Local EOCs/ Ocean Cate Borough Seaside Heights Borough, Seaside Park Borough
4 Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function D. Newscee ANL Ocean County Local EOCs/ Dover Township,
Island Reights Borough, Pine Beach Borough J. Tatar ANL Ocean County Local EOCs/Beachwood' Borough, Barnegat Light Borough, Harvey Cadars Borough T. Baldwin ANL Ocean County Local EOCa/ Ocean Township, Barnegat Light Borough, Staf ford Township, Long Beach Township L.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA Radiological eme rgency response activities were evaluated by federal observers in accordance with the following scheme:
o Capability outstanding:
no deficiencies noted, no improve-ments necessary.
o Capability good:
only crinor deficiencies noted.
s o Capability acceocable:
deficiencies noted that limit ef-fective performances.
Capability M: significant deficiencies noted.
o o Capability lackin e :
response called for but net demon-strated.
i. !.
EXERCISE 0!LIECTIVES The objectives of state and local jurisdictions in this exercise were to demonstrate (1) the adequacy of radiological emergency response plans, (2) the capability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment, and (3) f ar:iliarity with procedures required to cope with an emergency at the Ovster Creek Nuclear Sower Station, which is operated by General Public Utilities (GPi;)-Nuclear Corp.
The New Jersey Division of Scace Police (NJSP) and the New Jerrey Dooartment, of Environmental Protection (DEP) developed the f ollow-ing sta e, county and cunicipal of f-site emergency preparedness objectives for this exercises i
a.
Demonstrate the prompt notification and mobilization of i
emergency personnel at the state, county, and nunicipal levels.
b.
Demonstrate. the capability to. promptly activate warning sirens.
c.
Demonstrate the_ activation and functioning. of che Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).
d.
Evaluate state,' county, and municipal EOC operations, in particular the effectiveness of the new message format and procedures.
e.
Evalusts' the operation of the rumor control system.
f.
Demonstrate adequate communications ' between field teams and command locations.
g.
Demonst. rate appropriate communication and coordination between tho' licenste and federal, state, county, and' municipal agencies-.
h.
Demonstrate a coordinated system of emergency facility displays, maps, and security at the state, county and municips1 levels.
- i. Evaluate the operation of the joint met.ia center for effective information
- access, coordinatica,.
and dissemination.
J.
Evaluate the effectiveness of new '. radiological training programs for decontamination, monitoring, dose reporting and record keeping, and personnel protection.
k.
Demonstrate that all response personnel are adequately equipped with equivalent dosimetry, monitoring equipment, '
and protective clothing.
1.
Demonstrate a
simulated limited evacuation with its attendant evacuse reception, congregate
- care, and subsequent reentry.
m.
Test the recovery and reentry procedures at the state, county, and municipal levels; these procedures are.co include decision making, dose commitment, area monitoring, decontamination, and public information.
n.
Demonstrate accident assessment - and evaluation, - including the calculation of off-site radiation dose.
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6 o.
Demonstrate the capability of the. state to make protective action decisions and the capability of the
- state, counties, and municipalities to implement those decisions.
p.
Demonstrate the efficient establishment of access control points.
1.5 PLANNED EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Maior Planned Secuence of Events on Site Approximate Time Event 5:00 a.m.
Unidentified leak to the drywell exceeds 10 gal / min; Notification of Unusual Ivent essergency classifica <: ion.
5:45 a.m.
Leak rate increases to more than 50 gal / min; Alert emergency classification.
6:45 a.m.
Technical Support Center staffed.
8:30 a.m.
Severed recirculation line (Design Basic Accident) mandaces escalacion to $_neral Emergenev emergency classification.
Improper distribution of core spray leads to fuel damage.
8:45 a.m.
Pressure has peaked; one loop of containment spray is operable.
Other loop tagged out for maintenance.
9:30 a.m.
Fire reported on site.
9:45 a.m.
Pressure rises again, torus water temperature rises, due to cisms blocking heat exchanger intake.
10:00 a.m.
Increased pressure is released to reactor building through vessel head seal. Atmospheric release through blowout panel. Torus weld cracks, releasing radioactive water to reactor building.
11:00 a.m.
Continuing puff releases.
12:00 noon Continuous release through blowout panel.
12:15 p.m.
Repairs to containment spray initiated.
12:45 p.m.
Containment spray repairs compIete; release terminates.
e
7 Approximate Time Event 1:15 p.m.
Plant declared under control.'
1:45 p.m.
Exercise cicek is stopped to orepare to time jump.
2:00 p.m.
Exercise play resumes. Time is 2:00 p.m.,
exercise day plus three.
Off-site reentry and recovery operations begin.
4:00-5:00 Exercise ends.
p.m.
1.5.2 Scenario Summary The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) has been operating for 42 days and is currently operating at full power, 640 We.
All safety systems are operable.
An unidentified drywell leak is measured at approximately 10 gal / min +
The group shif t supervisor declares an unusual event and begins a controlled shutdown.
Pressure in the drywell measures 1.2 lb/in (psig) and the temperature is 120*F.
Unknown to the operators, the leak consists of 5 gal / min of reactor-building closed cooling water (RSCCW) from the drywell cooler and 5 gal / min from the reactor coolant system (RCS).
Shutdown is slow due to core limit problemat. Operators continue to be unable to determine that the leak is from the RBCCW system.
Drywell pressure rises to 1.23 psig and the temperature to 123*F.
The operators may speculate that the drywell cooler is leaking.
The operators receive another sump integrator reading which is now greater than 50 gal /nin.
The group shift supervisor should declare an Alert, resulting in activation of the initial response team.
Drywell temperature is now 123*F and pressure is 1.4 psig.
Ite leak consists of 40 gal / min RBCCW and 10 gal / sin RCS, but the operators are still not aware of this.
Subsequent sump readings remain at 50 gal / min.
The drywell pressure rises to 1.6 psig and the dryvell temperature to 135'F. Reactor power drooped -
to 93::. Sump samples are inconclusive in identifying the bource of the leak.
Just bnfore the break, the sump reading increases to 130 gal / min.
Drvwell temperature is 160*F and pressure is 1.85 psig.
A guillotine break occurs in a recirculation line between the vessel wall and the discharge valva (not isolatable), which is a design basis accident.
A level loss occurs in the core, causing core spray to initiate.
Area radiation monitors in the resceor building climb steadily and the drywell equipment drain tank monitor is pegged off-scale high, an indication of fuel
8 failure.
At this time, the emergency duty officer should declare a General Emergency.
Operators miy mitigate the inventory loss by closing suction or discharge valves on the pumps.
Improper distribution of flow through the sparger causes some fuel to melt and he released into the drywell through the leak.
Isolation condensers are useless because pressure is being relieved directly to the drywell through the eccirculation line shear.
The following events occur shortly af ter the guillotine break:
e The A & B containment spray loop initiates and immediately trips off.
The C & D loop should be manually activated by the control room operator.
e The Control Room receives indication of a smoke and fire alarm from the 4807 room.
e The Fire Brigade is dispatched.
e The Control Room receives actuation signal for Raion discharge into the 480V room.
1 e Pressure in the drywell and torus peaks and begins to drop due to containment spray.
The containment spray loop heat exchangers, however, are plugged with clams and their heat transfer capability is severely reduced.
e the Fire Brigade leader reports that the fire was in the insulation for power cable to the breakers for the A & 3 containment spray pcapo. The breakers are damaged.
These events culminate in a recommendation for evacuation of the public in the vicinity of the plant and in some portion of the northern sector.
It has become clear that strong efforts must be mado ra get the second containment spray loop into service.
Damage control teams are sent to the 480Y room to repair the fire-damaged breakers for the A & B containment spray pumps.
Pressure in the drywell and torus, which has been dropping as per the FDSAR curve, now starts rapidly increasing as torus water temperature increases.
TheA&B loop of containment spray is still inoperable due to fire damage in the 480V room.
The drywell pressure peaks at approximately 47' psig and then suddenly drops.
Fission products are released through the drywell head
- seal.
The pressure builds up again and then drops due to another release.
The first of these pressure releases causes a seal between two reactor building 119' elevation panels to fail.
The panels stay in place, but each subsequent relief of pressure and fission products causes more of a direct release to the environment.
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The Control Room receives a call from Security stating that one of the guards passing by the north side of the reactor building heard a loud. noise from the north side top of the reactor building. The guard then observed what appeared to be an opening between two of the wall panels on the 119' j
elevation.
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The damage control team leader reports an estimated 6-8 hours -will be l
necessary to repair the damage.
The pressure releases from the. drywell occur more rapidly, indicating-that the pressure rise inside the drywell is increasing.
The heat source is.
still significant.
Water level in the drywell has risen to the approximate level of the core in the reactor.
There are indications of high humidity in the drywell bu t decreases in pressure in the drywell are due to releases through the drywell head to the 119' elevation, reactor building.
The damage control team finishes repairs to the breakers for the A & B containment spray pumps.
The pumps start almost immediately and drywell pressure and temperature drop.
The ' plant is stabilized and releases are stopped.
The 119' panels reseal due to equalized pressure.
SBGT ' system begins to regain negative pressure in the reactor building.
At this point the plant is under control.,
The reactor vessel and drywell are depressurized.
Releases of radioactive material are controlled and not expected to exceed 15 mRea beyond the site boundary. The plant is in the recovery phase.
On-site personnel continue to aosess the situation and develop alternatives for the long-term recovery of the plant. A time break is introduced for off-site agencias to demonstrate reentry and recovery.
1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources Conceot of Ooerations and Control of the Exercise The licensee and the State of New Jersey were to supply official referees or observers for each location where an emergency response is being demonstrated for the exercise.
Before the exercise, the referees and observers were to be provided with the appropriate locations,. maps, time
- periods, guidelines, and an' evaluation checklist for-chair exercise assignments.
i The exercise initiating events were to be controlled by the lead j
referee at OCNCS.
Hypothesized initiating events consisted of four' types. of
{
information:
(1) data provided to control room personnel by the lead referee
]
or his designee, (2) data provided to OCNCS personnel concerning environmental
{
(e.g., area, air, primary coolant, surf aces) and plant systems radioactivity, -
j (3) on-site and off-site dose rate data (simulated gamma and iodine dose race 1
t measurements) provided to the site, state, and county. monitoring teams by l
u.
10 referees, _ and (4) initiating events for off-site participants, supplied by referees or observers.
The lead referee had the authority to determine' the time sequence of these initiating events to ensure an orderly and' logical flow of exercise events.
All other actions during the exercise were to occur as free play responses by the licensee, state,. county, and municipal participants to the initiating events.
As the initiating events were provided to :the deation staff, they were -
to determine the nature of the emer;;ency and implement the appropriate station emergency. plan procedures.
These procedures were expected.. to include ' a determination of the emergency classification in accordance with NUREG-0654,
~
Fl!MA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
Af ter the emergency classification had been determined, the appropriate federal, state, county, and municipal authorities were to be notified in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.
Upon notification. of the' hypothesized emergency at OCNGS, the state, county, and municipalities were to complete their initial notifications and activation of emergency facilitics in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures.
The hypothesized emergency was to continue to develop as data. were provided to the control room personnel by the lead referee., As the situation developed, follow-up information was to be forwarded to the New Jersey State EOC and the BRP. The BRP was to analyze the inforestion and' recommend protec-tive action as they would in an actual emergency.
Where information would normally have been confirmed by an independent sourco, such as National Weather Service for weather data, the confirmation data were to be obtained.
If the confirmation data conflicted with the hypothesized data provided by the
~
site, the hypothesized data were to be used for accident assessment.
Any inconsistencies in the initiating events..wers to be questioned by the stata accident assessment team as they would be in a real emergency.
Cartain inconsistencies, such as plume width, release duration, the technical reason for the ' simulated r.alease, may have been recuired to test the capabilities of the licensee, state, county, and municipalities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time frame.
If an Inconsistency. was known.or determined to be intentional, then the accident assessmerte group was to nota che inconsistency and ignore it.
The lead referee' had the authority to
. resolve or explain any inconsistencies or problems that any have occurred during the exercise.
With the exception of the aforementioned inconsistencies and the end of the emergency, which is discussed later, the internal operations ' of the licensee, state, county, and municipal command centers were to be identical with their intended operation in a real emergency.
4
11 l
~
Emergenev Resoonse Implementation' and Ooeratiens Inicial Notification.
Initial notification was to be performed in accordance with the procedures of the radiological emergency' plans.
Activation of Facilities.
Activation of state,, county, and municipal EOCs and staf fing of the EOCs by emergency response personnel were to occur in j
accordance with the emergency plans.
i Activation of the EOF.
GPU ' Nuclear Corp. personnel were to activate the EOF. Activation and-operation of.the EOF was to be in accordance with the I
emergency plan procedures.
Normal travel times to the EOF by its staff may.
have been compressed. and staffing may have besa permitted one-half - hour af ter the decision to activate.
i Public Notification.
The first request to the EBS was to be the test message of the Oyster Creek Radiological Emergency Broadcast System, which was to be broadcast to the public.
All messages during the exercise.were to be prepared and forwarded to the EBS gateway station, WADB, in accordance with standard procedures.
Excape for the test message, all exercise EBS. messages were to be prefaced by explicit instructions not to broadcast, but to log the message content and time of receipe..
The procedures for' public alerting were to be demonstrated by activa-tion of the siren system in conjunction with the. broadcast of the EBS message.
,P_ublic Information.
Press. releases to the media were to be made in u
accordance with the respective emergency plans, via che normal press release methods.
The press releases were to contain all nsessaary information on the current starus of the exercise.
Communications.
Communications between th6 exercise participants were to occur fa accordance with the procedures of the emergency response plan.
Should any primary communication path become inoperative or prove inadequate, backup means of' communication were to be used as appropriate.
Mobilization of Emergenev Workers.
All emergency respense agencies were responsible for ensuring that their. resources were actually deployed: in adequate numbers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications capabilities.~ Except as noted below, all state, county, and municipal agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their.
12 resources, consistent with this intent. The decision to actually deploy resources may have been made at the time of the exercise.
When the use of an agency 's resources was simulated, the agency was responsible for ensuring that all. steps necessary to use the resources were demonstrated.
Fo r example, for an agency to demonstrate the activation of additional personnel, it was necessary to locate the required call list and to either complete or simulate the calls.
Then the mobilization time had to be realistically estimated and this estimate forwarded to the appropriate agencies.
Use of a resource was to have been demonstrated only after the estimated mobilization time had elapsed.
In addition, when a resource was demonstrated, the commend and control was also to have been demonstrated.
All demonstrations were to be carried out to the greatest excent possible, thus determining the need for additional resources such as those used for command, control, and dose record maintenance.
Total counts of emergency wo rkers deployed and those that we re hypothesized. to have been deployed were to be maintained.
Information regarding which personnel movements were real and which were hypothesized was to be readily available at all times.
The following provides, a minimum list of personnel and resources that j
were to be deployed by the state and local governments to demonstrate their capabilities.
Also provided are specific demonstration objectives for hypothesized emergency responses.
1 Access Co n t ro l,.
New Jersey was to deploy all the cecessary personnel required to man five access control points.
Road blocks were not to be set up on the road, but the necessary cau1went was to be deployed along the road side.
The access cont'rol points were to be secured after one hour.
Fo r i
training, the access control personnel we re to report to decontamination j
centers af ter they were secured f rom their access control duties.
Decontamination Center.
New Jersey was to set up tuo decontamination During the exercise, emergency workers were to check out through the cancers.
centers after they had completed their exercise participation.
.At the decontamination centers, any actions that may have damaged procerty were to be avoided.
All necessary equipment was to be assembled at the decontamination center and its use was to be demonstrated.
Detailed demonserttion actions were to be implemented at the center by the decontamination center leader.
Congregat e Care Shelter / Decontamination Cen t e r s.
One congregate care / decontamination center was to be opened and staffed in accordance with the emergency plans. Supplies required for long-term mass care, such as cots, blankets, and food, need not have been acquired or brought to the shelter.
o 13 However, the shelter and registration personnel were to obtain estimates on how' many evacuees would be arriving had. the exercise been a real emergency.
The shelter and registration personnel were then to estimate supplies required for the potential evacuees, locate sources for the required supplies, and determine the means for transporting the supplies.
Monitoring Teams.
The State of New Jersey was to field.three radiological monitoring teams and Ocean County was to field.three teams.
Each of the teams were to be supplied with a referee, who would provide simulated field data for determining local dose rate readings.
These teams however, were to be equipped for determining actual area gamma dose races and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
Data for the environmental samples and dosimeter readings were to be supplied by a referee at the appropriate time.
Me monitoring teams were not to he suited up in anticontamination clothing, but were to have such equipment at their disposal.
Volunteer Organizations. The members of volunteer organizations, 'e.g.,
firemen and rescue squads, have responsibilities such as work that take precedence over their participation in an exercise.
Therefore, these volunteer organizations were to participate in their emergency responsibili-ties on an as-available basis.
Because the exercise plume was to affect specific areas, volunteer personnel in that area were to be notified in advance of their special role in this exercise, in order to maximize their participation.
_Revnerv and Recover,v.
At a designated time, an announcement was to be made ac each emergency facility that the scenario had stopped for 15 minutes.
This 15-minuta period was to be used to conclete the ongoing response, after which the exercise was to resume and scenario time was to be clock time plus three days.
h results of sample analyses. were to be presented immediately to the BRP accident assessment team at the state EOC. At the same time, field demonstrations of the sampling techaf gues were to begin. The decision making, planning, and implementation for reentry and recovery were to be -demonstrated dr simulated as appropriate.
3 l
Closeout of the Exercise.
The exercise was to end with the following i
actions:
I e Emergency workers were to be secured as soon as possible after they had demonstrate'd their capabilicios.
The decision to secure them was to be made at their controlling EOCs, with concurrence from the state EOC, if applicable.-
j
14 Emergency workers were to be directed to check out through decontamination centers.
Radiological exoosure records were to be completed for each emergency wo rker in accordance with the standard operating procedures.
Evacuee radiation dose records were to be completed for 15 random volunteers.
The completed dose record forms were to be clearly ma rked "For Demonstration Only" and we re to be forwarded to the responsible state agency for teview.
The decontamination center and the congregate care shelter e
center were to be recurnd as soon as all emergency workers and volunteers had checked out through these centers.
Participation of nonessential state, county, and trunicipal e
EOC personnel was to be ended as soon as their emergency response had been essentially co mpleted.
Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long-term planning and recovery was to have the concurrence of the state EOC director or designee.
e The remaining staff were to close out the exercise by
[
developing a course of action for the reentry and recovery period.
This course of action was to be a coordinated effort between the state and the licensee and was to include:
a.
Identification of any further samoles in the 50-mile inges tit.n exposure pathway EPZ zone that need to be taken.
1,ocations to be sampled were to be identified.
Staff needed to conduct 'the necessary sarpling and to transport the samples to the laboratoride were to be identified.
These requirements were to be mate.hed against peraonnel availability.
b.
Development of 24-hour personnel ro ta tion schedules.
These schedules were to include requirements for access
- control, decontamination, record
- keeping, and EOC staffing.
c.
Planning for requirements to control the 50-m11e ingestion exposure pathway E PZ, suen as food inter-diction.
This planning was to include comparisons of personnel requirements with available personnel.
d.
Planning for crime prevention measures in the evacuated areas.
15 e Wen the scace, the counties, che n.tnicipalities, and the licensee were satisfied that the necessary lon g -c e r.n procective, parallel, and other actions required by the plan could be implemented, che participants were to reach a joint conclusion to terminate the exercise.
A final press release was to be issued signifying the termination of the exercise.
16 2 EVALUATIONS 2.1 STATE OF NEW JERSEY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources The following facilities were observed:
the state EOC in West Trenton, the BRP forward command post (FCP)'in Bayville, the joint media center in Toms River, and the licensee near-site EOF in Forked River. Each location had good to out: standing facilities, displays, security, and both internal and external communications, with the exception of several minor deficiencies noted below.
The overall adequacy of the state EOC was good to outstanding. The EOC
)'
was partitioned into the following roomst. the executive room, an operations room, a support agency room, a dose assessment room, and three communications and message-handling rooms.
Each room had adequate space, equipment, and amenities for the function assigned to-it.
The current emergency classification was posted in each room. Status boards were posted in both the operations and support agency rooms and updated as significant events occurred.
Maps of the 109aile plume exposure pathway EPZ were posted in the operations, support, and dose assessment rooms, correcting a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
The deficiency in establishing EOC security noted at the 1982 exercise has been corrected; EOC security was established at 7:45 a.m., during the Alert stage, and maintained throughout the exercise.
Internal message-handling procedures in the state EOC were effective.
Incoming and outgoing telephone and radio messages were passed by celephone and radio operators in the message tentrer to the center supervisor, a massage log was kept, and a hard copy of each message was filed.
Messages were the~n relayed to the controller in the operations room.
The controller directed copies to staff in the operations and support agency room for appropriate action.
Staff members routed their responses back to the communications center for transmission to the requesting agency, typically the Ocean County EOC.
On the whole, internal message-handling procedures were executed in an effective, timely manner.
The facilities at the BRP FCP were good, although minor deficiencies were noted.
No separate status board was maintained to track changes in emergency status, meteorological conditions, or protective action recom-mandations.
The status board used to record the location of field monitoring teams was not easily understood by staff at the BRP. FCP.
Considerable confusion existed about the location of monitoring teams and whether a team was out to lunch.
We recommend that BRP staff receive _ additional training in procedures for internal consunications, especially the effective use of status boards. One Crocper was assigned to the BRP FCP to establish security.
In an actual emergency, more troopers would be assigned to control the entire cordoned area.
___.i-
17 External communications involving the several state facilities were good to outstanding.
Communications be c'veen the state EOC and the Ocean County EOC were outstanding.
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Se rvice (RACES) radios and commercial celephones were used as primary systems, with NJSP radio, Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD) and National Warning System (NAWAS) available as backup.
A dedicated telephone line to the Ocean County EOC was available in the operations room.
The NJSP established three communications systems between the EOC and the NJSP FCP in Lakewood - commercial telephone, dedicated telephone, and NJSP radio.
Communications between the EOC dose assessment room and the EOF were good.
Primary systems were commercial celephone and dedicated celephone; DtRAD radio was available as backup.
Communications between the BRP FCP and field monitoring teams were 3
acceptable.
A ainor deficiency was noted:
Middlesex County communications were on the same radio frequency as the monitoring teams and we re an occasional sour:e of interference. A radio frequency should be set aside for the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staf,f, 1
The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good.
Co mmu-nications procedures and equipment used for 24-hour initial response were outstanding. The NJSP Communications Division maintains a state warning point on a 24-hour basis.
The exercise started during the midnight-8 a.m.
- shift, and a shif t change was implemented on a normal basis at 8 a.m.
The communica-tions systems available at the NJSP Communications Division to receive initial notification from the OCNGS ipelude dedicated telephone line, commercial telephone line, and EMRAD radio.
The following procedure was observed:
the Notification of Unusual Event call was received at the NJSP Com:sinications Division at 5:10 a.m.
from the OCNGS control room via dedicated telephone.
The call was verified by commercial celephone; the officer at the NJSP Communications Division verified the caller, the message, and its status as a
" drill."
Communications equipment and procedures used for alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response personnel were good.
Initial notifications to several key personnel at the BRP and NJSP Office of Emergency Management (CEM) were carried out from the NJSP Conurunications Division using commercial celephone; radio and pager systems were available for backup.
All other ODi and Bkt staff, including field monitoring teams, staff at the BRP TCP, and state. BRP staff assigned to the OCNGS near-site EOF, were notified through a telephone fan-out procedure, which was not directly observed.
However, the effectiveness of the notification process can be inferred from the timely activation of all emergency response facilities.
Key staff arrived at the state EOC, EOF, and BRP FCP by 7:30 a.m.
during the Alert stage; all j
f acilities were fully staffed by 9 a.m.
18 i
The process of transferring communications functions from the NJSP Communications Division to the operations -M communications staff of the EOC was handle.d smoothly and effectively.
Minor deficiencies in alerting, notifying, and mobilizing response personnel and in promptly activating emergency response communications noted at the 1982 exercise have been corrected.
In general, a good capability for 24-hour continuous emergency response operations was demonstrated. Most state functions at the EOC and the BRP FC?
were double-staffed for training purposes.
Shift changas at these facilities were used to demonstrate the state's capability of mobilizing staff for continuous 24-hr emergency operations.
2 1.3 Emergency Ooerations Management Emergency operations management was good.
The Om Deputy Director demonstrated effective leadership at the state EOC, periodic' ally briefing all staff over the public address system.
In addition, EOC staff conducted periodic briefings in the support agency, dose assessment, and communications rooms.
The Covernor, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, and the OEM Director each actively participated in the exercise.
All agencies designated in the plan were represented at the EOC, BRP FCP, and EOF.
All agency staff members were aware of their functions and consulted their plans and procedures as needed.
The emergency classification system was effectively and consistently used at all facilities.
In the 1982 post-exercise assessment, FMA recommended personnel training to alleviate the confusion cver nomenclature, which could hamper effective communication.
Consistent terminology was used by field teams and by BRP staff in the BRP FCP and EOC, indicating that the recommended training has been successfully performed.
2.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification The capability demonstrated at the state EOC for public alerting and notification was good. The system for disseminating information to the public via EBS was effective. The PIO activated the EBS by calling WADB, the primary EBS station, by telephone.
The PIO and the EBS station had a book of prewritten EBS messages that included numerically-coded descriptions of evacuation areas within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Using this system, the primary EBS station formulated EBS messages for broadcast.
The primary EBS station, WADB, automatically activated five other radio stations and the cable television system for the simultaneous broadcast of EBS messages. The EOC received timely confirmation of both the siren sounding and
19 EBS system activation.
This orompt confirmation corrects a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
2.1.5 Public and w dia Pelations e
Overall, public and media relations are acceocable.
The cubite information officers (PI0s) were professional and e xpe rienced.
Howeve r,
coordination between the PIO at the state EOC and state and county PI0s at the joint media center can be icproved.
A joint media center was established at the Elks Club in Toms Rive r, N.J.,
wi ~ h facilities for federal, state, and local PI0s, and the news media.
The news media were briefed upon arrival, and periodically throughout the exercise.
However, vall maps of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ were not available for briefings or individual study.
It is recommended that maps be available in the joint media center for the use of both PI0s and the news media.
At the joint media center, state and county Pios handled inquiries in a professional manne r.
PIDs at the joint media center were in contact with their respective EOCs to obtain necessarv information.
However, PIDs at the joint media center did not have hard cooy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media.
The state EOC should transmic hard copy of EBS messages to the joint media center to assure the availability of complete, accurate information.
On one occasion the PI0s at the joint media center obtained erroneous infora tion about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC.
This information was announced to the news media at a briefing without being verified with the PIO at the state EOC.
All information about cetions by the state should be coordinated wich ' the PIOS at the state EOC to assure the accuracy of information before it is provided to the media.
The public information program is acceptable.
A brochure has been distributed to residents within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
The transient population, primarily summer vacationers, will receive information vis sds to be placed in free newspapers.
The brochure will be distributed to real estate offices, libraries, banks, and other locations frequented by vacationers.
The rumor control system ves staffed, and the rumor control 300 telephone number publicized.
Spot checks by observers showed that the rumor control staff members were very helpful and courteous, although they did not always have correct information.
In any case, it is questionable whether the five rumor control lines that were available would be adequate, given the population within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Coordinated arrangements for rumor control should be reviewed.
No television was
7
.,f a
t i
o
_\\
l 20
/
6 a kilable at the JMC for monitoring public inforaOion.
- t. television should bdavailable to enable Ptos to evaluate the accuracy of public information.
2.1.6 Accidene Assessment _
1 The state demonstrated good capabi;ities for accident assessment at the Toc, BRP FCP, EOF anc 11 the field, with one minor deficiency noted below.
three secte field monitoring' ceams we re mobilized from the BRP FCP.
The team that was observed demonstrated a good capability to monitor the whole-body radiation component of the plume.
Proper instruments were used, j
and readings were taken corrt.ctly and recorded in the proper units.
Radio transmission of data to the BRP FCP was handled smoothly. Rowever, the field monitoring team.did noe have an adequate capability to measure radiciodine in
)
the plume. Thefirpump flow race for collection of iodine on silver reolice, the simulated sample medium, was tou high, and no correction f actor was used to compensate for the decreased re':ention factor of the absorption medius.
)
The state is aware of this problem and has place:d an order for the instru-mentation required to more acurately detect radioiodine in the plume.
It is recommended that the BRTi review its procedures for measuring radioiodine; a j
particulate filter should be placed upstrean of the absorber, and a lowe r l
sample flow rate should be used.
Filver zeolite shoulo be added to the sampling kits for use as a collection uudium, he water sampling teams were1 32bilized from the BRP FCP to samole water in Oyster Creek.
They demonstrated outstanding capabilities; equip-ment ant supplies were excellent, c he, teams had written procedures to follow, 3
and they were knowledgeable and experienced in sample collection.
I l
The BRP FCP functionec well a.s the central point for the receipt and analysis of field monitoring data and sample media.
Data from the field monitorit.g teams were relayed by the BRP FCP to the BRP dos'e assessment room j
in the EC C.
Sample media were returned to the mobile laboratory at the 3RP FCP for initial analysis.
This faciliev. had a good capability to handle the j
expected types and volumes of samples.
blieving initial processing at the I
mobile lab, sample media were transported to the BRP laboratory in Trenton for copulate analysis.
l The 3RP dose assessment staff at the EOC demonstrated a good capability to recommend protective actions before any release occurred; their i
recommendations were baseu on plant status and on meteorological conditions and forecasts.
Once releases occurred, BRP personnel were able to cuickly the magnitude and location of the release and verify the adecuacy of assess protective actions already taken.
I i
l I
1 l
21 2.1.7 Actions to protect the Public New Jersey demonstrated a good capability to protect the public.
We demonstration of bus evacuacion was outstanding.
The state EOC dispatched an evacuacion bus to the Lakehurst Nas al Station and transmitted the route astignment to the bus coordinator by radio at 9:30 a.m.
The coordinar.or and driver then reviewed the written instructions and deca 11ed route map which were prepared in pamphlet form for that particular route.
(The pamphlet was exceptionally well done.) The bus was led along the evacuation route and then to the congregate care center by a NJSP patrol car.
The state EOC demonstrated a good capability to help Ocean County and local jurisdictions coordinate the evacuation of transit-dependent populations and cope with 1 mediments to evacuation.
Requests for assistance from local jurisdictions were relayed to the state EOC by the Ocean County EOC.
The stana EOC procedures for mobilizing the resources of various state and federal agencies were very effective.
For example, at one point a request from Toms River was relayed by the Ocean County EOC for 25 school buses.
The EOC message controller forwarded the request to the higher education desk in the suppo rt agency room.
Staff at that desk contacted three school districts in Monmouth County and instructed the school bus coordinators at each district to simulate sending buses to a school in Toms River.
A contact person at that school was identified.
Af ter arrangements were made to supp ly the needed buses, a confirmatory message was sent to the Ocean County EOC.
Several additional requests were handled effectively during the day.
2.1.8 Health, Medical, and Excosure Control Measures Demonstration of health, medical, and exposure control measures was goad.
Emergency workers personnel at the ERP FCP, the bus driver, field monitoring team members, and the NJSP trooper at the access contro1*poinc -
had low-range and high-range self-reading dosimeters and film badges.
Oost-meters were of appropriate ranges and were read and recorded periodically, correcting a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
The BRP emergency wo rke rs had potassium iodide (KI) in their field kits.
The 3RP consulted with the N.J. Department of Health (DOH) on the use
{
of KI.
On the basis of dose projections, 00H authorized KI use for emergency workers and this use was simlated.
The 3RP is empowered to authorize exposure of emergency wo rkers to radiation levels in excess of protective action guides (PAGs).
In this scenario, however, thyroid doses were controlled by the simlated use of KI and respirators.
Ihus, no exposures in excess of emergency worker PACS would -have been incurred.
The decontamination facility" for state emergency wo rkers was out-standing.
Incoming vehicles were monitored and directed to clean or I
contaminated areas, and procedures for their decontamination were demon-strated.
Record keeping, decontaminar'.on, and the availability of ecuipment
=<.
22 and procedures for personnel monitoring we re very good.
Clean and contaminated areas were separated ~ and clearly designated.
Procedures for control of contaminated clothing and waste were demonstrated.
Security at the facility was excellent.
The BRP demonstrated a good capability to estimate total copulation exoosure on the basis of evacuation times, plume travel times, and pluma exposure rates.
2.1.9 Recoverv and Reenerv Goerations Recovery and reentry operations we re acceptable, although one minor deficiency was noted. The state mobilized two recovery and reentry teams from
)
the BRP FCP.
The teams were briefad and dissacched at 2:30 p.e. to collect air, soil, water, and vegetation samples.
.The teams were well-equipped, knowledgeable of procedures, and performed their tasks effectively.
They returned sample media to the mobile laboratory at the BRP FCP for analysis.
At the state EOC, representatives from the DOR and the N.J. Department-of Agriculture (DOA) discussed measures t o. be accomplished before reentry.
]
The BRP advised the Deputy State Director, OEM, on the establishment of areas i
for restricted and unrestricted reentry.
The BRP planned to continue contre-gate care, nonitoring, and decontamination until reentry was unrestricted in all sectors.
The demonstration of reentry planning was acceptable.
Howeve r, the state RERP contains two conflicting criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period.
The plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve these conflicts.
2.1.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise was beneficial to all participants.
The scenario allowed adecuate time for reentry and recovery activities, a significant iemrovement over the 1982 exercise.
The hypothesized release adequately tested the capabilities of field monitoring and recovery and reentry teams.
2.2 OCEAN COUNTY 2.2.1 Emereenev Overations Facilities and-Resources Overall, county emergency operations f acilities were good.
All neces-sary systems were in place and functioning.
Consunications systess were properly staffed ~and, for the most part, functioned well.
Excellent progress has been made in completing the EOC, where security and displays were very good.
Ventilation equipment will be available at the EOC soon.
Security and displays couId be enhanced st the Ocean County Sherif f 's Communication 4
9 9
m
l 23 Division (OCSCD).
The OCSCD is currently in temoorary cuarters; the minor problems with its facilities should be solved when the new quarters are occupied.
Communications systems at both the EOC and OCSCD were good.
The EOC had dedicated telephone lines to the state EOC and the OCMGS near-site EOF.
The sheriff's radio provided comm nications with local EOCs.
Secondary communication links were available through Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Se rvice (RACES),
- EMRAD, and the fire marshal's radio.
The emergency management radio was available for contact with field monitoring te a ms, and the emergency medical system (EMS) radio provided contact with ambulances and hospitals. The communications systems supported a large flow of messages that were handled efficiently.
Communications between the EOC and the congregate care center encountered some minor difficulties.
The OCSCD had two dedicated j
lines to the utility. EMRAD and the other radio systems described above could be monitored at OCSCD and used as necessary.
OCSCD could also act as a liaison between the EOC and cha NJSP. This function was observed when the EOC asked the state police to set up access control points.
Working space and amenities were good at the EOC and acceptable at the OCSCD, which is currently in temporary quarters. The EOC had accentable space and the movement of personnel did not impede operations.
Liaison personnel were provided with adequate operating space and agency' representatives had their own desks.
Internal communications ' at the ROC were good.
Telephones were kept in a separate communications room to control noise in the operations room.
Runners were available to relay messages between the operations room and the communications room.
Although the ventilation was inadequate, air-handling equipment was to be installed soon.
l The OCSCD facility, which is housed in a building under construction, had limited space for the three operators, two observers, and a clerk who recorded exercise-related events.
The clerk did not have enough space for a desk.
The crowding did not hamoer the efficiency of operations, and the new quarters will have sufficient space even for expanded operations, including observers and extra desks.
The EOC kept adecuate information displayed on status boards that were clearly visible and updated as appropriate.
Separate status boards were.
available for weather information, for radiological data, and for each participating organization.
An emergency log was also kept but it was somewhat incomolete and could be confusing to the operations staff.
The access control point map and traffic control point map should be clearly labeled to prevent confusion between the two.
Other maps showed evacuation l
routes, radiological monitoring points, current population by evacuation area, and relocation and shelter areas.
Radiological data were displayed and updated.
The OCSCD does not' need extensive displays and maps to perform its comm nications functions.
Adequate information on the emergency classifica-i tion was kept on the checklists and entered into a separate emergency log by I
the clerk.
Visual displays of emergency status should be considered to aid I
I
24 l
newly arrived personnel and to remind operators of the emergency classifica-tion.
A map of evacuacion zones was available at the OCSCD.
A larger wall map and possibly cooies of maps for all personnel should be considered.
Security at the EOC was good.
Access control measures were used and registration was reoutred.
Badges and individual dosimeters were issued to all personnel. No security measures were used at the OCSCD; personnel did not request identification for entrance.
Overall security such as locked doors will be available when the new facility is completed.
Overall, the EOC was able to accommodate about 40 neople (15 of these are communications center personnel) with f acilities and equipment necessary
(
to carry out the emergency response.
Effective command and control were also demonstrated.
As noted above, the OCSCD was crowded but the crowding did not appear to degrade operations.
Exercise participants said that headsets might help them hear the celephone calls that were drowned out by the noise from almost continuous radio communications.
2.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good.
Ocean County demonstrated the capability to activate the EOC promptly and maintain 24-hour continuous operations.
Mo nito ring teams we re effectively mobilized j
and deployed.
l The O CT D, which was separate from the E0C, cerformed some emergency communications Lunctions. OCSCD was responsible for initial notifications and the relav of status update messages to some emergency oersonnel, local EOCs,
some fire stations, county and local police, and first aid districts.
The OCSCD also communicated deployment orders to these local support agencies as requested by the county EOC.
i Both the EOC and nCSCD demonstrated a good capability to staf f initial emergency cesponse comunnications on a 24-hour basis and to maintain these communications on a continuous basis.
At the EOC, this capabiliev was demon-strated by call-up rosters and by lists of backup personnel.
Eighteen to twentv-five people per shift woul d be available at the EOC.
The OCSCD normally operates on a continuous 24-hour basis.
Two operators are available on each of the three eight-hour shifts and two sheriff's lieutenants are present on the 8 a.m.
to 4 p.m.
shift.
One civilian is also available from noon to 8 p.m. except on Tuesday and Thursday.
In an extended emergency, three operators could be available continuous ly, and the two sheriff 's lieutenants could work 12-hour shif ts.
County monitoring teams were notified by commercial telephone; pagers were available as backups for 24-hour alerting and notification.
There were tw teams of three members each and four backup personnel.
The teams could operate continuously with two members per team.
I
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29 County procedures for notifying emergency ' response organizations and personnel wete acceptable to good.and were implemented promptly. ' At. che EOC, inicial notification was received by telechone and verified.
The call noted
.that an exercise, not a real emergency, was in progress.
The Alert call was received at 6:11 a.m.; key personnel were notified starting at 6:15 a.m. and had arrived by 7:15 a.m.
EOC ' personnel were contacted over commercial telephone 11 nest parers were available as backups.
At the 'OCSCD, emergency personnel arrived within 20 minutes of notification.
At the Alert emergency classification, OCSCD mobilized police, fire, andfirst-sid supervisors and put agency personnel on standby.
OCSCD mobilized all personnel upon declara-tion cf Site Area Emergency. Personnel were notified by commercial telephone; beepers and police car radios were available as backups. OCSCD staff included conolete instructions in each alerting and notification call, noting that the call was for an exercise, not a real emergency.
Some minor problem were noted:
e At the OCSCD, some confusion resulted when the call for the Notification of Unusual Eve:if emergency, classification was received from the County'EMC-instead of from OCNG:: or Scace Police Headquarters as spec 1fied on the Unusual Event Checklist.
Af taf - consulting with the County Emergency Management Coordinator l(EMC), 0CSCD, personnel decided to treat the call as if it had come. from OCNGS. 1CNGS. was called for. verification and alerting and notification procedures we re implemented.
It is ' recommended. that t he, NJSP OEM, OCNGS, and Ocean County coordinate. plans fo r initial notification, and revise plans and 50's-accordingly.
e OCSCD personnel notified local police ve rning points by radio and then took a roll call to verify receipt of the radio message.
At the Site Area Emergency classification, local police warning point failed to answer tho' roll i
one call.
A telephone verification was made only when the
{
omission was noted by the FEMA observer.
It=is suggested that operators be instructed and drilled to review their checklists to note and rectify any such omissions.
I i
The communications ecuipment available at both the EOC and che OCSCD i
was good.
Backuo. cosamications were available.
At OCSCD, a mobile communi-cations van was available to back up the operator's console, if the latter were disabled.
Both the EOC and the OCSCD could contact emergency personnel l
through commercial telephone, the sheriff's radio, and EMRAD.
An EMS radio for consunications with ambulances and hospital was.
operating at the EOC and OCSCD.
Ambulances 'and hospitals could also communicate or relay messages through OCSCD.
At 11:55 a.m., OCSCD was asked.
to deploy 42 ambulances to siatlate the evacuation of a nursine home.
1 1
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26 Normally, a written ambulance callout plan would be implemented. However, the
~
revised ambulance plan had not been received.
OCSCD personnel claimed that they could satisfy the request without the plan.
Nevertheless, the revised ambulance plan should be made available to OCSCD to reduce the likelihood of:
problems in a real emergency.
.)
i 2.2.3 Emergenev Ooerations Management At tha county E0C, emergency management and control were good.'
N-1 county MC and deputy MC demonstrated effective leadership duritg the exercise in their decision-making procedures and in frequent staff-briefings.
l Support organizations participateil in the exercise and performed well.
i Elected, county officials also participated in the exercise.
At the county EOC, the county MC was in charge and was assisted by the deputy BC.
Both MCs were well versed in the county RERP and related pro-cedures. h county M C held frequent briefings to keep EOC staff informed of significant developments.
Changes in. the emergency status were announced and posted on signs clearly visible throughout the EOC.
h current emergency status was reported in all communications messages transmitted to emergency response organizations; local EOCs and emergency response organizations were promptly notified of changes in status. EOC staff had check-sheets indicating the actions to be taken at each emergency classification.
All organizations participated in the exercise and had representatives in the EOC.
h se representatives made appropriate contacts with.-their respective agencias and were aware of their responsibilities.
Local elected officials came to the E0C.
Initially, representatives of the freeholders were present.
Later, the freeholders themselves arrived and coordinated activities.
OCSCD staff were aware of their responsibilities for radiological emergencies.
This group continued to perform its regular emergency communi-cations functions in addition to those connected with the exercise.
Communi-cations for actual emergencies were distinguished by appending a scacement
~
such as "this is not part of the drill" to the message.
Written procedures at the OCSCD vere acceptable.
Eowever, some minor differences with the plan were noted:
e h OCSCD used a " Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Checklist for Nuclear Accident" form specific to each emergency classification.
h plan calls for completing an
" Initial Contact Messare" form ' at ' each emergency action level;- the Checklist calls for completing the Initial Contact Message form only at the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classifications.
' Questions on 1
9
27 the Initial Contact Message form should be included on the SOP and Cnecklist for Nuclear Accident forms for the Notification of Unusual Event and A12rt emergency classifications, as is currently the case for the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications.
The plan should be revised to reflect the procedure actually used.
e The Ocean County RERP appears to require that OEM notify OCSCD of the emergency action level, with an additional notification by OCNGS at the General Emergency clas-sification.
The checklists used by OCSCD indicate that either State Police Headquarters or OCNGS will inform OCSCD of the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classifications and the state EOC will inform OCSCD of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifi-cations.
During the
- exercise, the OCSCD's initial notification of emergency action level was received from the county EMC at the Notification of Unusual Event status, from the stata OEM at the Alert status, from the County Sheriff's Departments' Casinunications Officer (at the county EOC) at the Site Area Emergency ecatus, and from OCNGS at General Emergency.
The OCSCD performed effectively but the plan, checklists, and practice should bs consistent.
Alternative notification routes should also be considered to avoid the possibility of confusion on the part of operators.
e The SOP and Checklist for Nuclear Accident forms for the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications should have a space es log the verification calls to OEM and OCNGS.
Verification calls were made; the checklists should provide space to log these calls.
A page was. missing from one eiert checklist.
This problem e
was noted and rectified by the sheriff's lieutenant in charge but not by the comm:2nications operator.
Personnel should be trained to check that all sheets in a set are present.
The lieutenant was clearly in charge at the OCSCD and told both operators when the emergency classification changed. A posted sign would be a helpful reminder, especially when the OCSCD moves to its new, larger facility.
{
Ouring the shift change, new operators were not formally briefed on the status of the exercise.
Although lack of briefing did not impede their ability to function during this sxercise, such briefing should be considered.
29 2.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification The public alert and notification systata and procedures in Ocean County have improved since the 1932 exere:t se end were reliable and adequate for notifying and~ instructing the public.
Sirens were sounded promptly at 9:30 a.m.
to alert the general'public.
However, no procedure had been established to verify that the sirens had sounded. The siren system was activated from the OCSCD af ter the county EOC's i
request at 9:25 a.m.
The EOC requested a 5 minute delay to ensure that the sirens would sound before the EBS system was activated. A vehicle was used to alert the crea covered by one siren that failed.
About 75% of the people interviewed in spot checks on the day of the exercise said they had heard the sirens.
The superintendent at Stafford Elementary School said that the schools under his jurisdiction had not yet received tone alert radios but soon would.
According to tha principal, a tone alert radio was available at the Ethel A.
Jacobson Elemet
.ry School.
The EBS system was promptly activated from the state EOC af ter the sirens had sounded.
2.2.5 Public and Media Relations Efforts to inform the public were acceptable and showed a definite improvement since the 1982 exercise.
About two-thirds of the people inter-viewed on the day of the exercise had received the public information brochure within the past few months.
Far fewer people wore familiar with the brochure contents.
On the basis of-limit.ed spot checks, no placards displaying radio-logical emergency information were found in public f acilities such as motels; restaurants, real estate offices, and service stations.
Two real estate offices did not have copies of the brochure available for reuters. One motel owner acknowledged receipt of the brochure but could not find it; a recreat house owner int. ended to use the material when sutuner guests arrive. The three schools queried had plans and officials knew what to do in the event of a radiological emergency ac OCNGS.
Additional public information programs are warranted, particularly for the transient population.
The county PIO at the joint media center handled media briefings and inquiriac in a professional manner.
Communication between the joint media center and the county EOC was good.
29 2.2.6 Accident Assessment County field monitoring ceans performed acceptably, although minor deficiencies were noted. Deficiencies in training and communications at the 1982 exercise havs been largely corrected.
- eams were well equipped and had been trained in snapling procrdures and field communications..
State procedures were followed.
Radiciodine monitoring by county field monitoring teams is not required.
However, the procedure for sampling radioiodine needs to be improved 1f the county elects to socitor for this species. Ocean County needs monitoring equipment and improved procedures for calibration and main-tenance.
Equipment for the county, identical to that used by the state, had been ordered and was expected to arrive about two taeks af ter the exercise.
The county monitoring taans unre capable of determining the dose race from iodine in the field.
Sample media were bagged and labeled for later identification and recounting.
A mobile laboraccry was available at the BRP FCP for-receipt and analysis of sample media.
All samples were ' saved.
Several counting instruments in different ranges were available on loan from the state and were overdue for annual calibration, having last been calibrated in February 1982.
All equipment except one pump had calibration labels; a check source was available for counters. The SAM-II counting instrument broke after the first air sample ses taken and counted.
The county's field i
monitoring capability could be strengthened with county-owned equipment and backup, and a more thorough program of calibration and maintenance.
Two county monitoring teams were available.
As the plume was defined, movements were coordinated by the BRP FCP, which also received data from the
)
teams.- Readings were accurate and were ~ recorded and communicated to the BRP l
FCP in the proper units.
However, radio transmissions were sometimes broken 1
up and messages had to be repeated. These problems should be investigated and corrected if feasible.
The field monitoring ceans did oot have an adequate capability to sessure radioiodine in the plume.
The air pump flow rate for collection of iodine on silver zeolite, the staulated sample medium, was too high, cnd no correction factor was used to compensate for the decreased retention factor for the absorption medium.
The state is aware of this probles and has placed an order for the county for the instrumentation required to more accurately detect radioiodine in 'the plume.
Since the county follows state procedures, it is recommended that the BRP review its procedures for measuring radio-iodine; a particulate filter should be placed upstrema of the absorber, and a j
lower sample flow race should be used.
Silver zeolite should be added to the j
sampling kits for use as a collection medium.
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30 2.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were good.
The exercise called for the evacuacion of two Ocean County schools and the staffing of a congregate care j
eenter.
Ocean Councy demonstrated its capability to implement proreceive mecsures, obtaining resources from outside the county as needed to provide ambulances and care for mobility-impaired oersons.
)
Resources, procedures, and personnel at the congregate care center at
]
Georgian Court Collerw in Lakewood, New Jersey, were good.
Deficiencies noted ac the 1982 exercise have been corrected.
The cencer was more than 15 miles from the plant, outside the IO-mile plume exposure pechway EPZ. The building and personnel mobilized for the exercise could accommodate and care for abouc f
I 270 people; a total of 1500, the expected number of potential evacuees, could be cared for on the campes.
Shelter personnel were well-trained.
They used good registration and radiological monitoring procedures to process about 20 people.
A swimming pool area with cile floor drains and separate showers for
{
men and wo men was available for decontamination.
An American Red Cross stacion and an ambulance were available for health emergencies.
Sanitation f acilities were adequate but more toilets are desirable.
nrinking water was plentiful.
Security was good, with guards at all entrances and exits.
Parking space and communications we re tvailable and the center was kept informed of the exercise progress.
The school evacuacion was good and followed the plan.
Both schools were notified promptly and relocation procedures were implemented promptly.
At I.acey Elementary School, the bus arrived only seven minutes af ter it was called.
Although no actual evacuation was carried out, a previous drill had indicated that 425 children could be evacuated from the school in 9 minutes.
The bus departad five minutes af ter arriving and the trip, to the recepcion center at I.akeview Naval Air Station took 30 min %.
The principal of I.aeey Elementary School had radio communication available.
One observer noted signs on side roads indicating the direccion people should take in an emergency.
Such signs should be an effective aid for evacuacion.
l 2.2.8 Stealth, v dienl. and Excesure Control Measures e
Radiciotical exposure control procedures at the county level we re acceptable.
Emergency workers had received training in reading and recording doses to correct a deficiency noted in the previous exercise.
- ilowever, procedures could still be upgraded by additional training and equipment.
The exercise called for the use of KI, which was available to the j
county radiological monitoring teams and at the decontamination center.
Instructions were provided for using KI.
Its use was simulated by the tuo e
31 radiological monitoring teams.
U wa s not required at the decontamination center, since it did not lie in the plume EPZ.
Emergency wo rke rs we re provided wi th both low-and high-range gelf-reading cencil dosimeters and a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badge, and knew of the procedures for their use.
Monitoring teams read And recorded doses at frequent incervals and radioed the results to the BRP FCP. Dosime t e r readings we re recorded hourly at the decontaminatiert center.
Oosimeter readings of field workers passing through the center were also read and recorded.
A new decontamination center has been established outside the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Although monitoring equipment was available, the county should consider obtaining backup monitors.
Contaminated clothing was sealed in plastic bags and water from contaminated vehicles can be held or released.
The manager and personnel of the decontamination center had received only 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of training.
Although they knew how to decontaminate personnel and eauipment, they did not know when to stop decontamination procedures.
Additional formal and on-the-job training of current personnel, and training of additional corsonnel to provide for 24-hour continuous operations vould upgrade the decontamination center.
\\
The congregate care center had action levels for the decontamination of people and vehicles.
Even though the county EOC was not in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ, workers in the center had dosimeters.
Local EOCs were also contacted for exposure control data but. not all of the local EOCs responded.
The county EOC reouested access control assistance from the NJSP through the OCSCD, which forwarded the request immediately.
1 2.2.9 Recoverv and Reentrv Ooerations Reentry operations were tested in the scenario and adequate time was provided for them.
The county EOC communicated with the state and followed the dirnecives for reencrv issued by the state OEM as called for in the plan.
2.2.10 Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience The exercise adequately tested basic emergenev response functions and required coordination between agencies at various levels of government.
County oersonnel participated fully in the exercise and the scenario kept the county players active.
Little " dead time" was noticed during this exercise, which was a problem in the 1982 exercise.
The exercise thoroughly tested the capability of county field monitoring teams, the County Sheriff 's Comrunica-tion Division, and county EOC personnel.
32 The playe rs had no orior knowledge of the scenario.
Overall, the exercise experience benefited both trainir.g and testing.
2.3 OCEAN COUNTY SfUNICIPALITIES Federal observers were assigned to the following township and borough EOCs durir.g the exercise:
Barnegat Township Ocean Township Barnegat Light Borough Ocean Cate Borough l
3eachwood Borough Pine Bench Morough Berkeley Township Seaside Reights Borough Dover Township Seaside Park Borough Harvey Cedars Borough Shipbottom Borough Island Heights Borough 9outh Tons River Borough I.acey Township Stafford Township Long Beach Township Surf City Borough An additional observer was stationed in Dover Township to review the town-ship's response to an impediment to evacuation.
Surf City Borough did not participate in the exercise.
Island Heights Borough and South Tome ~ River Borough participated in the exercise only to the extent that they recetved and dispatched communications to the Ocean County EOC.
2.3.1
'mergenev Neerations Facilities and Resources Overall, the emergency f acilities and ecuiement at the municipalities were good except at Beachwood Borough, Ocean Township, and Stafford Township.
Both the Stafford Township and Peachwood Bo~ rough EOCs lacked potable water and sewage connections.
Both EOCs have limited working space so conducting emergency management operations 10 difficult.
The Ocean Township EOC is located within two miles of the Oyster Creek plant and no alternate facility is available outside the tuo-mile area for use in coordinating Ocean Township's emergency activities if evacuation of the two-mile keyhole area becomes necessary.
All the municionlities observed had ' MRAD radios for communications with the Ocaan County EOC during the exercise.
Initial notification through the County theriff's radio net was good, but comm2nications over the backun EMRAD system experienced some problems.
Delays of 10 to 40 minutes were observed between notification at the local warning points via che Sheriff's radio and notification at the municipal EOCs via EMRAD.
Although the EMRAD system did perfor:r acceptably, the following specific improvements could be incorporated in either the system itself or handling:
33 e speed up message handling of CONGS plant status updates and protective action recoenuendations by Ocean County; e train radio operators to keep call-backs to the county EOC,
via M RAD to a minimum; e train radio operators to reduce message length to a minimum; and e reduce the number of ' units in the network or. open up a new channel on the network.
Most of the a:nicipal emergency management organizations that had to coordinate emergency response and help impicment protective actions in their township or borough performed adequately.
The DICs for South Toms River and Island Heights were not able to participate in the exercise.
The deputy M Cs at both EOCs were not fully aware of their responsibilities according to the plan.
Beachwood Borough and Berkeley Township both displayed a very good ability to coordinate their emergency response for protective actions.
Most municipal EOCs had good working space, amenities, and equipment.
In South Toms River, Berkeley Township, Island Heights, Pine Beach, and Harvey Cedars, the EOCs were acceptable. Both South Toms River and Berkeley Township could improve their EOCs by organizing their working area more efficiently.
The EOCs for Beachwood Borough, Ocean Township, and Stafford Township were inadequate for the reasons cited above.
All local EOCs had good to adequate internal communications, message handling, display maps, and status boards.
Local EOCs displayed good to adequate security during the initial stages of the exercise except those at South Toms River, Seaside Heights, Seaside Park, and Ocean Gate, where no security sign-in was provided, and Berkeley Township, where security was not initiated until 9:30 a.m.
2.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff Mobilization and alerting officials was good to outstanding in most municipalities where this portion of the exercise was observed.
There were two exceptions:
j J
e Upon receiving the Alert status message from the Ocean County Sheriff's Office, the Beachwood Police Department dispatcher did not begin calling the emergency management officials of the borough.
Thus full activation of the Beachwood EOC was delayed 45 minutes to 8:15 a.m.; and l
1 34 e The Long Peach Township Police Deoa rtmeent 's discaccher failed to properly call Barnagat iight and Ship bottom i
emergency management officials after receiving the Alert status message f rom the Ocean County Sheriff's Office.
All local police department dispatchers should receive training in the proper procedures for notifying response organizations upon receipt of emergency 3
sestus messages from Ocean County.
All municipalities displayed a good to a.cceptable 24-hour capabilfcy to handle connunications and emergency response.
However, nome municipalities-closed their EOC f acilities after 4:00 p.m. and therefore, received dispatches via the Ocean County Sherif f's radio at the local warning points.
Neve rt he-less,,they displayed' an acceocable 24-hour comm nicacicu and emergency resoonse capability given the objectives of the exercise.
All municipalities that we re properly notified followed correct proceduras in mobilizing their own emergency response personnel.
Although initial notification of Meachwood and Barnegat Light was delayed, both EOCs were fully activated by A:15 a.m.
In most municipalities. connunicetion to first-sid sauads was accow-olished via direct radio contact with ths EOC.
In the remaining mnicipal-icies connunication with these squads was accomplished via Ocean County. The local EOCs demonstrated good to acceptable capabilities - to communicate with mobile medical support taass.
2.3.3 Emergency Ooerations Management Most pa'rticipating municipalities established good emergency operations management in their respective communities.
Emergency operations management in Lacey Township, Harvey Cedars, and Shipbottom were not observed. Thus none of the following comments apply to those municipalities.
In general, the emergency response organizations identified in each of che plans participated actively in the exercise. De exceptions were i
e Surf City did not participate in the exercise.
e There was no evidence that the South Toms River Borough i
of fice of Emereen.cy Management participated.
Veicher the
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l Manitou Par lt Fire Company or the Borough First-Aid Squad j
participated at the EOC.
l e In Island Heights Bo rough, only the police departm'ent participated in the exercise.
35 Mo st municipalities demonstrated that specific responsibilities had been assigned for communications, fire and rescue, craf fic control, emergency medical
- service, law enforcement, orotective
- response, alertine and notification, and operacions management.
South Toms River and Island w ights e
demonstrated that responsibilities were assigned in communications, alerting and notification, and law enforcement.
All local !OCs used a conaiscent classification system for indicating the status of the emergency exercise. The new message forms developed during the last year were used in nearly all the local EOCs.
These new forms were shown to be an effective tool in the handling and control of the messages.
Copies of each municipality's RERP were available at each EOC.
Fow-ever, emergency management personnel as a number of muicipal EOCs found the plan cumbersome and difficult to consult during the exercise, oartly because the local EOCs had just recently received their plans.
A checklist of pro-cedures under each emergency action level would belo emerzency management personnel.
Emergency management was effectively coordinated at all of the local EOCs, except South Toms River and Island Reights, via status boards, periodic briefings, and informal commnicacion.
In general, the participation by mayo rs, council members, anJ other municipal officials was outstanding.
A number of borough ad cownship of ficials were present at many of the EOCs and actively participated in the exercise.
2.3.4
'ublic Alertine and Notification One siren in Be achwood Borough did not operace during the exercise.
Route alerting was simlaced by chose municipalities that fully participated in the exercise and these activities were good overall.
2.3.5 Actions to Procect the Public The capability of the mnicioalities to implement protective actions (e.g.,
route alerting, access control, pickup of mobiliev-impaired oersons),
was observed at Beachwood and South Toms River Boroughn.
Peachwood Borough had sufficient resources to implement protective actions. South Toms River has two oolice patrol cars at its disposal and two officers per shift; these resources may need to, be supplemented by Ocean County.
i Federal observers saw lists of noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons in the IOCs at Dover Township and Beachwood, Pine Beach, Seaside Reights, Seaside Park, and Ocean Cate Boroughs.
Island Reights did not have a list of noninstitutions11:ed, mobility-impaired pe rs on s.
Lists of
36 noninscitucionalized, mo biliev-imp aired persons should be available to each municipal EOC.
In Dover Town ship, federal observers evaluated the resonnse to a simulated traffic incident on an evacuacion route. Dover officials at the EOC initiated a timely and appropriate response and kept close track of available eouipment and personnel when some of these resources were occupied with the imoediment.
Police and first-aid souads from Dover we re at the scene quickly.
The municipal response to the evacuation route impediment in Dover Township was good.
2.3.6 Realth, u dical, and Exoosure Control Measures _
n Most of the local EOCs have received CDV-730, 0-20 R,
self-reading dosimecers, as well as permanent record dosimeters and KI; the capability to monitor and control the radiological exposure of local emergency workers was acceptable overall, and represents an improvement over the 1962 exercise.
However, many of the personnel were unfamiliar with the proper use of either the dosimeters or KI, and additional training is reoutred.
In many cases these dosimeters and radioprotective drugs and protective clothing we re received at the local EOCs only a day or two before the exercise.
The following deficiencies were noted at the local EOCs:
Etny of the municipal emergency response managers who are e
responsible for distributing dosimeters, protective
- clothing, and eculpment to emergency workers need additional training on the, proper use and distribution, of that ecuipmen t, as well as the periodic checking and recording of dosimeter readings.
e When protective accions are implemented in sectors around OCNGS, cunicipal EOCs in those sectors should implement procedures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access to the EOCs.
At a number of municipal EOCs, the person responsible for emergency orotection was very knowledgeable about exposure control (e.g.,
Barnega t,
- Rerkeley, 3e achwood, Lacey, and Ocean), but overall the ability to properly handle emergency worker exposure concrol varies widely.
At the federally initiated test of an impediment to evacuacion in Dover Township, the first-sid sound had personal dosimetry and were trained in dosimeter use, calibration, and reco:
keeping, while the police responding to the incident had no dosimeters.
m S
I 37 2.3.7 Reencev and Recovery noerations All municipalities demonstrated the capability to coordinate reentry sccions with Ocean County.
2.1.8 Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise was a very good test of the promot notification and mobilization of locsi emergency personnel by municipalities, communication between Ocean County and the municipalities during a radiological emergency, the availability of protective equipment and dosimetry for enerrency workers, and the capability of municipalities to inclement; protective actions.
All municipal EOCs were activated. (except Surf Ci ty) and emergency resoc,ns e personnel we re afforded the opportunity to respond to a radiological emergency, except for Island Reights and South Toms Rive r, where the EOCs participated only to the excent that incoming messages were received.
The exercise was also a good test of the coordination of efforts between Ocean j
County and the municipalities.
The exercise was good training for the l
emergency organizations and workers at snicipal EOCs that fully participated in the exercise.
4 6
9 9
4 6
4
38 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS No deficiencies were observed at the state,-county, or municipal level that would cause a finding. that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
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4 39 4 OTHER DEFICIENCIES 4.1, STATE OF NEW JERSEY Deficiencies identified at the state level have led to the following.
recommendations.
-4.1.1 Emergenev Operations Facilities and Resources a.
Minor deficiencies were noted in internal communications at the BRP FCP.
We recommend that the BRP staff receive additional training in proceduros for intamal message handling, especially the effective ~
of status boards.
use Additional status ~ boards should be maintained to track changes in emergency status, meteorological conditions, and protective action recommendations.
b.
Communications between the BRP FCP and field monitoring teams share a radio frequency with Middlesex County. This caused occasional interference.
A radio frequency should be set aside for the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
4.1.2 Public and Media Relations a.
Wall seps of the 10-mi plume exposure pathway EPZ were not available at the joint media center ter briefings or individual study. Haps should be provided for use by P10s and the news media.
b.
PI0s at the joint media center did not have hard copy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media.
.The state EOC should transmit. hard copy of E3S messages to the joint media center to assure the availability of complete, accurate information.
c.
On one occasion the PIDs at the JMC obtained erroneous information about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC.
This information was, announced to the news media without being verified with the PIO at the state EOC.
All information about actions to protect the public should be coordinated with PIDs at the state EOC_to assure the accuracy of information before it is provided to the media.
r 60-d.
No television was available at the ' JMC for : monitoring public information.
A television should be available to enable Pios to evaluate the accuracy of public information.
a.
Coordinated arrangements 'for rumor control should-be reviewed.
4.1.3 Accident Assessment a.
The field monitoring team's capability to measure radio-iodine in the plume was inadequate.
The state-procedure needs to be corrected with respect ' to the air flow rate and the activity calculation.
The state 'is aware of this problem and has ordered the instrumentation required 'to more accurately detect radiciodine in the plume.
The BRP should review its procedures for measuring radiciodine.
I 4.1.4-Recoverv and Reentry Operations a.
The state -RERP contains. two conflicting criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period..The plan should be '
reviewed and revised to resolve chase conflicts.
4.2 OCEAN COUNTY l
Deficiencies identified at the county level have led to the following, recommendations.
4.2.1 Emergenev Operations Facilities and Resources l
l j
a.
The emergency log should be improved, and the access control point. map and craffic ' control point map clearly.
labelled.
l b.
Observers at OCSCD were not asked for identification.
When the new facility -is completed, security will-be upgraded and registration and identification should be required.
l
61 4.2.2 Alerting and ' mobilization of Officials and Staff a.
The OCSCD :nissed one verification call during a verifica-tion roll call to local warning points at Site - Area Eme rgency classification.
OCSCD personnel should be instructed and drilled to review their checklists for skipped contacts and omitted verifications.
- b. 'Part of the revised - ambulance plan had not been received by OCSCD. - The complace, revised ambulance plan should be ande availabla co OCSCD.
c.
At the OCSCD, confusion resulted when the call for-notification of unusual' event emergency classification was received from che county EMC instead of from OCNGS or State Police lleadquarters as specified on the Unusual Event Checklist.
The NJSP OEM,. OCNGS, and Ocean County should coordinate plans 'for-initial notification, and revise plans and SOPS accordingly.
4.2.3 Emergency Operations Management a.
During the exercise, the.0CSCD did not fill out an Initial Con:act Message form at Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications as called for in the county.
RERP.
Infornecion' on OCSCD 's Initial Contact Massage forms for Unusual Event and Alert should be included on -
the corresponding checklists.
The plan should be revised to reflect the procedure actually used.
b.
The county RERP, che OCSCD 's checklists, and practice should be consistent regarding who. initially notifies OCSCD of changes in the emergency action level.
Although effective action by OCSCD was not imoaired, inconsistent-cies among the RERP, the checklists, and practice were noted during the exercise.
Consistency would remove the possibility of confusion on the part of ' communications operacors.
c.
OCSCD checklists should provide for all required verification calls.
4.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification a.
Schools under the jurisdiction of the superintendent at the Stafford Elementary School should be issued tone alert
.n
42 radios as soon as possible. Acquisition of radios by these schools should be verified.
b.
Procedures for verification of siren sounding should be established.
4.2.5 Public and Media Rnlations
\\
a.
Limited spot checks failed to find placards displaying radiological emergency information in public facilities.
Additional efforts to ' distribute such materials are required.
b.
Limited spot checks revealed that about one-third of the people interviewed on the day of the exercise had not received the public information brochure.
Additional mailings might increase coverage and public familiarity with the brochure's contents.
4.2.6 Accident Assessment a.
Monitoring instruments had not been calibrated within the past year. Calibration should be done yearly.
b.
The county field monitoring could be improved by upgrading maintenance procedures to reduce the likelihood of equipment failure.
County-owned equipment should be available.
Although Ocean County is not required to have a capability to monitor radioiodine, if it elects to do so the following should be addressed:
e The county followed the state air sampling procedure for radioiodine.
However, the state procedure needs to be corrected with respect to air flow rate and the activity calculation.
New pumps to correct the air flow problem have been ordered; their receipt should be verified.
Particulate filters should be used in. front of the sample.
e Sampling kits did not contain silver zeolite, which would be needed in a real emergency.
The kits should be completed.
43 4.2.7 He alth, % dical, and Exoosure Control Measures a.
The manager and workers at the decontamination center did not know when to stop decontaminating persons or equip-ment. Additional training is needed.
4.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES Deficiencies identified at the municipal level have led to the following recommendations.
4.3.1 Eme rgency Doerations Facilities and' Raseurces f
'f i a.
Emergency Operations Centers at Beachwood Borough and Ocean and Stafford Townships are inadequate.
The Beachwood and Stafford EOCs both lack potable water and sewaga connections and have crauped working areas.
The Ocean Township EOC is within the two-mile EPZ.
Ocean Township should select an alternate f acility outside the two-sile area for coordinating the township's emergency
, j response if evacuation of the primary facility becomes necessary.
b.
Communication via EMRAD is adequate, but both the system and operator training should be improved to prevent the 10 to 40-minute delays that were experienced in communica-
,tions between the municipalities and Ocean County during the exercise.
c.
Deputy EMCs in Island Heights and South Toms River are not familiar enough with their responsibilities during radiological emergencies to perform adequace'ly in the abeence of the EMC; they should receive additional training in radiological emergency management.
d.
The EOC working areas at Berkeley Township and South Toms River Borough should be better organized for emergency management operations.
a.
Security at South Toms River, Seaside Heights, Seaside Park, Ocean Gate, and Berkeley should be implemented once the EOC is activated.
4 e
44 i
4.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f a.
Police dispatchers at Beachwood and tong Beach failed to -
properly follow notification procedures af ter receiving an Alert status :nessage from Ocean County.
Dispatchers should be trained in notification procedures.
4.3.3 _ Emergency Ooerations Manskement a.
Surf City did not participate in the exercise.
South Toms River and Island Heights had very limited partici-pation.
All asnicipall' ies should fully participate in exercises and drills.
1 b.
A checklist of procedurts under each emergency action level would, help emergency management personnel.
4.3.4 Actions to Protect the Public a.
Island Heights does not have a lis t of noninstitution-alized, mobility-impaired persons in the EOC; such a list l
should be developed.
4.3.5 Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures l
a.
Emergency workers need training in the proper use and distribution of doeinsters and in checking and recording j
information from dosimeters.
l l
b.
Municipal EOCs within emargency protection sectors should l
implement procedures to ensure that contaminated I
individuals are not allowed access to the EOCs.
l 1
1 l
l m__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ___.__.-___._._ _ _ _. _ _ - _. _. _. - _ _ _. _
45 5 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES Section 4 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recornmendations of the federal observers at the May 24, 1983 exercise of OCNGS.
These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980) and objectives agreed upon for the exercise.
The attached table summarizes recom-mandations to correct those deficiencies that were identified as requiring l
corrective actions based on this exercise.
For purposes of verification, the l
attached table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based I
on the March 16, 1982, exercise.
The present status is indicated for all recommendations.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA
{
Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or intended to take to cortect these deficiencies.
FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately.
\\
46 Table 1 Recommendations to Ramedy Deficiencies in Radiological Emergency Preparedness Identified at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station of May 24, 1983, and March 16, 1982 NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Statusa I
Emergency Operations Facilities and Rasources jitate (1)
The BRP staff at the FCP should re-H.3 I
N ceive additional training in pro-cedures for internal message handling, especially the effective use of status boards.
Additional status boards should be saiaLained to track changes in emergency status, meteorological conditions, and protective action recommendations.
(2)
A security system was implemented at H.3 X
C the BRP Forward Conumand Post.
(3)
A radio frequency should be set aside F.1.d X
N for the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
(4)
Consideration may be given to in-H.3 X
C creasing the available space allotted to dose assessment operations.
(5) on-the-j ob training should be imple-0.1 I
C manced to smooth out the procedure of initially setting up security at the EOC.
(6)
More space should be alictced for maps H.3 I
C and displays.
- I.egend:
New deficiency; observed at the 1983 exsreise.
_Tncomplete; a deficiency observed at the 1982 exercise was repeated in 1983.
,C_omplace; a deficiency observed in 1982 has been remedied.
loc Observed; this item was not observed during the 1983 exercise.
O
47
~ Table 1 (Cont 'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action 9tandard 1983 1982 Status (7)
Consideration should be given to J.10.a X
C assigning a separate coding system to the EPZ maps, to avoid confusion with the number designation system given on the sector maps.
I (8)
At the NJSP forward command oost, the F.3 X
40 State Police and EOF perso'nnel should be physically located together rather than on separate floors to improve internal communications and logistics.
Ocean County (9)
Emergency logs should be improved.
R.3 X
N (10)
OCSCD security should be upgraded.
X N
(11)
State OEM maps should be obtained by J.10.a X
X I
the county so that designation of such areas as access control points will be consistent with the State.
Ocean Counev Municipalities (123 Emergency operations Centers at Be ach-H.3 X
N wood and South Toms River Boroughs and Serkeley, Ocean, and Stafford Town-ships need improvement.
The Beachwood and Stafford EOCs both lack ootable water and sewage connections and have crartoed wo rking areas.
The Ocean Township EOC is within the evo-mile EPZ and there is no alternate f acility for the township outside the two-mile area.
We EOC wo rking area in
%rkeley and South Toms River should be better organi:ed for emergency management operations.
1.
.q 48 l
Ta ble 1,(Cont 'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Ctandard 1983 1982 Status (13)
Communication via EMRAD ' is adequate, F.1.b X
y but improvements should be incorpor-aced into both the system and' operator training to prevent the 10- co 40-min-ute delays which were experienced in consunicacion between the mnicipal-ities and Ocean i'.ounty.
(14)
Training is needed fot Deputy Emer-0.1 X:
N gency Management Coordinators ac Island Meights and-South Tous River to familiarize chem with their responsi-bilities should the Emergency Manate-ment Coordinator be absent during an amsegency.
j (15)
Security at Berkeley, Ocean Cate, Sea-N.3 X
N side Heights, Seaside Park, and South Tons River EOCs should be improved.
(L6)
A formal sysees for message handling R.3 X
C and inttrnal communications should be isiemenced.
This would assist in accurate and timely dissemination of information.
(17)
Imorove communications systeine so that T.2 X
C local police do not lose contact wi:5 first-sid facilities.
(18)
Displays and maos should be. imoroved J.10.a X
C and provided for all EO Cs.
Maos J.10.b should show populacion distribution, evacuation
- routes, and relocation
. centers.
i 1
S
-1 4
..__--_-_.___._:_s
o.
49 Table 1 (Cont'd)
NUREG-0654 Deftetency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status II Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff State (1)
It is suggested that manoower planning A.1.e,
X C
be reviewed to insure that sufficient C.2.a personnel are available to sustain a 24-hour continuous emergency response and that personnel can be dispacebed to the licensee's near-site EOF.
(2)
On-the-job training should be consid-E.2 X
C ered to enhance the operations of F.1.a
- alerting, notifying, and mobilizing response personnel and prompt activa-tion of emergency response comunanica-tions.
Ocean County (3)
OCSCD personnel should be instructed E.1 X
N to review their checklists for skipped contacts and-omieted verifications during roll-call verification.
One verification call was missed at " site area emergenev."
(4)
Part of the revised ambulance plan had L.4 X
N not yet been received by OCSCD.
The
- complete, revised ambulance olan should be made available to OCSCD.
(3)
At the OSCSD, confusion restticed when F.1.4 X
N the call for notification of " unusual event" emergency classification was received from.tne county EMC instead of from OCNCS or State Police Read-quarters as specified on the Unusual Event Checklist.
The NJSP OEM, OCNGS, and Ocean County should coordinate plans for initial notification, and revise plans and SOPS accordingly.
t
.. a 50
~
Table 1 (Cont'd)
NUR EG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Ramedial Action Standard 19A3 1992 Status (6)
The caoability for fixed and mobile F.2 X
No medical support f acilities to comanni-cace with each other should be re-viewed and upgraded.
This was deft-cient during the exercise and such communication should be available.
Ocean County Municipalities (7)
Training in staff notifie.ation and Es.
X N
activation procedures is needed at E.2, Se achwo od and 1.ong Beach:
oolice 0.1 l
dispatchers did not follow nianned notification procedures after receiv-ing an " alert" status message from Ocean County.
III Emereenev ooerations Management State l
(1)
It is recommended that training of 0.1 X
C personnel be conducted to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature which could hamper and delay effective com-32nication.
Ocean County (2)
Information from the Initial Contact E.1, X
N Message Form should be included on the E.2 OCSCD checklists for " unusual event" and " alert," as is currently done on the checklists for "s it e area emer-gency* and " general e me rgen cv."
Use of the Initial Co ntact %ssage Fo rm could then be dropped, so that opera-cors fill out only one forts (i.e., the checklist) for each emergency action level.
The plan should also be re-vised to reflect this change.
l
I 4...
51 l
Taele 1 (Cont'd)
'NUREG-0654 Deficiency D1anning Identified
- Present 1983 1982 Status Recommended Remedial Action Standard (3)
The county plan, OCSCD. checklists, and E.1, X
N actual practice should be consistent.
E.2 (4)
Checklists should orovide space for E.1 X
N recoeding all required verification calls.
Ocean County Municipalities (5)
Full participation in the exercise is N.I.a X
N necessary to, develop and demonstrate emergency operations management skills.
Full participation is sus-gested for Surf Ci ty,
South Toms River, and Island Heights.
(6)
Nnicipal procedures should be D.4 I
X I
developed, includint a checklist for each emergency classification.
(7)
Training and planning should include A.I.d X
C
.more effective use of staff briefings
~l to coordinate emergency response activities.
IV Public Alerting and Motifiestion State (1)
The overall reliability of the system E.5, X
C used to alert the public and provide E.6 eme r;tency public. information mst be j
revised and improved.
It is suggested i
that a system for verification of siren activation be included within the capabilities of the State. Eq uip-ment should. be ungraded to avoid delays in sounding sirens such at chat which occurred in the exercise.
(2)
A permanent EMS systes should be out E.5, X
C in place.
The local radio stat' ions E.6 should have this systes as part of their basic operations and FCC approv-al should be obtained.
m
._mm_m.--
m _____
52 j
Table 1 (Cont'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency
?lanning Identi fied Present-Recommended Ramedial Action Scandard 1983 1082 Stacus Ocean County (3)
It - should be verified chat all schools E.5, t
N under the jurisdiction of the super-E.6 incendent ac che Stafford Elementary School have received cone alert eadios.
(4)
The county should establish procedures E.5, K
X I
to verify siren sounding.
E.6, J.10.c (5)
The siren soutpoent and system should E.5 x
C be upgraded to insure that it can be activated in a timel'y menner.
V Public and Media Relations Scace (1) fJa11 mang of the 10-mile alume expo-C.3.a X
Y sure eachway F.PZ were not available at the joint media ' center for briefings or individual study.
Maps should be provided for use by PIDs and c5e cows media.
(2)
Pios ac the jotne media center did not G.4.4 N
have hard copy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media.
'the scace EOC should cransmic hard copy of E3S messages to che joinc media center to assure che availability of com-piece, accurace information.
i e.
I i
i
r i...
53 i
Table 1 (Cont'd) l l
i NUREG-0654 Deficiency Elanning Identified Present
[
Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 L982 Status i
t l
(3)
On one occasion, the PI0s at the joint G.4.a X
N l
media center obtained erroneous C.4.b l-information about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC.
This information was announced to the news media without being verified with the PIO at the State EOC. All information about actions to protect the public l
should be coordinated with PIDs at the state EOC to assure the accaracy of l
information before it is orovided to the sedia.
(4)
No television was available at the G.4.c X
N l
joint media canter for monitoring public information.
A television should be available to enable Pios to l
evaluate the accuracy of public infor-motion.
(5)
Coordinated arrangements for rumor G.4.c X
X I
control should be reviewed.
(6)
Public information pamohlets giving G.1 X
X I
informatioti and instructions for use I
during an emergency should be printed and distributed to all members of the public.
(7)
A public information program should be G.1 X
X-I l
iniciated within the 10-m11e EPZ.
G.2 Posted. notices should be placed in
- hotels, motels, and other places frequented by transient persons.
(8)
The State PIO should have access to G.4.a X
C all pertinent information so that f actual information will be given the public and the media.
l c.
- i..
54 Tablo 1 (Cont 'd)
NUREC-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status Ocean County (9)
A comprehensive public education pro-J.10.c X
X I
gram should be conducted, especially in light of the large transient population.
Emergency procedures should be posted in motel rooms and in public facilities.
A program should be instituted to insure that both full-time and transient residents receive emergency information.
VI Accident Assessment State (1)
Procedures for measuring radioiodine I.9 N
in the plume should be reviewed and required instrumentation obtained.
(2)
The instrumentation issued to field H.7, X
C monitoring teams should te reviewed, I.8, so that each team will have the capa-I.11 bility to measure the air and ground for contamination.
Uniformity in the issuance of protective clothing, espe, etc., should also be reviewed.
(3)
All personnel assigned to o f f-s i te I.7, X
C monitoring should receive identical I.8, training.
The training level of I.9 personnel should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary.
Ocean County (4)
Calibration of monitoring instruments R.10 X
N had not been done within the past year.
Calibration should be done yearly.
(5)
The county should upgrade maintenance H.10 X
N procedures to reduce the likelihood of equipment failure.
~
i
?
...r, i
55 Table 1 (Cont'd)
NtTREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status (6)
County-ownad field monitoring equip-H.7 N
ment should be obtained.
(7)
The county monitoring teams should I.7, X
C have the capability to monitor for I.8, radiation contamination.
I.9 (8)
Communications sys cens -between the H.12 C
. county monitoring teams and the county EOC should be reviewed and upgraded.as necessary.
This was deficient during the exercise.-
(9)
Although Ocean County is not required to have a
capability to monitor radioiodine, if it elects to do so the following should be addressed:
e The county followed the state air I.9 N
sampling procedure for radicio-dine.
- However, the state pro-cedure needs to be corrected with respect to air flow race and the calculation of activity.
New pumps to correct the air flow problem have been ordered; their receipt should be verified.
e Sampling kits should contain I.9 N
silver zoolice cartridges.
VII Actions to Protect the Publig Ocean County (1)
It is suggested that the systes and J.12 C
j orocedures for processing evacuees be reviewed.
Plans should include facil-ities for the decontamination of per-sonnel and
- vehicles, and security should be considered for the congre-gate care centers.
e
-_____-----______..__-_._-_~-_-_..._..__--.-__.c
.N 56 Table 1 (Cont'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status ocean County Municipalities (2)
Lists of noninstitutionalized, mobili-J.10.d X
N tv-imoaired persons should be avail-able at each municioal EOC.
VIII Realth, Medical, and Exoosure Control Measure _s State (1)
Training should be initiated for work-K.3.b C
ers in the area of reporting radiation dosages received.
This procedure, in-ciuding reporting intervals, should be included in the training as well as part of the overall plan.
Ocean County (2)
The manager and workers at the decon-K.5.6 X
N camination center did not know when to stoo decontamination efforts on per-tons or equipment.
Additional train ~
ing is needed.
(3)
Training regarding the recorting and K.3.a X
C maintenance of doses received by K.3.b emergency wo rke rs should be reviewed and upgraded to insure proper dose monitoring.
(4)
Location and facilities for the de-R.5.b X
C contamination center should be re-viewed.
Consideration should be riven to relocating the decontamination center outside the 10-mile EPZ.
Facilities should be improved for containment of runoff decontamination of vehicles, and improved personnel facilities such as more showers should be considered.
$7 Table 1 (Cont'd)
)
)
NtJREG-0654 Deficiency I
Planning Identified Presenc Recommended Remedial Action -
Standard 1983 1982 Status ocean County Municioelities (5)
Training of emergency workers in the K.3.b t
X I
proper use, distribution, checking and encording of information from dosi-meters is needed.
(6)
Municipal EOCs within orotective R.5.a X
X I
accion areas should implement proce-dures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access into the EOCs.
IX Recoverv and Reentry Ooerations State (1)
The Scace RERP contains two conflict-M.1 X
N ing criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reencry; this inconsistency delayed reencry for a short period.
The plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve this conflict.
(2)
Recovery and reentry should be
~ M.1, K
C included and fully demonstrated as M.3, part of the overall activity.
M.4 X
Relevance of Exercise E'cerience x
Ocean Councv (1)
Occional events should be olanned into N. L.a X
C the scenario to avoid too rmch " dead time" during the day.
-________._.___.w