ML20237D463
| ML20237D463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1998 |
| From: | Bill Dean NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237D464 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9808260208 | |
| Download: ML20237D463 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES g
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20086 0001 l
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- s * *,o NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY l
l THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY l
THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 219 License No. DPR-65 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.
(the licensee) dated April 6,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; l
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
1 9808260208 980821 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
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I 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 219, are hereby incorporated in the license.
l The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the l
Technical Specifications.
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3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within i
60 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION YWilliam M. Dean Deputy Director for Licensing Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:
August 21, 1998 l
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines indicating the areas of change.
Remove insert 3/4 4-4 3/4 4-4 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-9 3/4 7-9 3/4 7-9 8 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 7-3 8 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7 3a
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURilEB LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
A water volume greater than or equal to 525 cubic feed (35%) but less than or equal to 1050 cubic feet (70%), and b.
At least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 130 kW capable of being supplied by emergency power.
APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With only one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6
hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its l limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.4.4.2 Verify at least two groups of pressurizer heaters, which are supplied by emergency power, each have a capacity of at least 130 kW at least once per 92 days.
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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4-4 Amendment No. JJ, 7J, 77, pp, 219 0365
l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120*F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With the containment average air temperature > 120*F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be determined to be 5 120*F at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6 9 Amendment No. 219 0356 L--
D PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
MODE 1 With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable I
valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next l
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
i MODES 2 With one or more main steam line isolation valves and 3 inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may
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continue provided the inoperable valve (s) is(are) i restored to OPERABLE status or the isolation valve (s) j is(are) closed
- within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and verified closed at least once per 7 days; otherwise, be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDBY, with T, 1 515'F duringeachplantstartupexceptthatverificationof7ull closure within 6 seconds need not be determined more often than once per 92 days. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.4 do not apply for entry into MODE 3.
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- The main steam line isolation valves may be opened to perform Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.5.
4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-9 Amendment No. 219 l
0357 a
CONTAINMENT SYSTEtt BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the contain-ment. peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during MSLB or LOCA conditions.
The maximum peak pressure is obtained from a MSLB event. The limit of 1.0 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.
-3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment' air temperature ensures that the contain-ment air temperature does not exceed the worst case combined LOCA/MSLB air temperature profile and the liner temperature of 289'F. The containment air and liner temperature limits.are consistent with the accidant analyses.
The temperature detectors used to monitor primary containment air temperature are located on the 38 ft. 6 in. floor elevation in containment.
The detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor, on the southeast and southwest containment walls.
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3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the design pressure of 54 psig in the event of a LOCA or MSLB.
The measurement of containment tendon lift off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchorages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's struc-tural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 " Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures."
P NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. #p, 77, J #, Jpf, one Jpp 219
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued) of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture.
The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VAlyJJ The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture.
This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The ability of the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) to close is verified after the plant has been heated up.
Since it is necessary to establish a high Reactor Coolant System temperature before the surveillance test can be performed, on exception to Technical Specification 4.0.4 has been added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into MODE 3.
This is necessary to allow plant startup to proceed with equipment that is believed to be OPERABLE, but that cannot be verified by. performance of the surveillance test until the appropriate plant conditions have been established. After entering MODE 3 and establishing the necessary plant conditions (T,1515'F), the MSIVs will be declared inoperable if SR 4.7.1.5 has not been performed within the required frequency, plus 25%, in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.2 and 4.0.3.
The action statement for MODES 2 and 3 would then be entered.
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However, the required actions can be deferred for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Technical Specification 4.0.3) to allow performance of SR 4.7.1.5.
If the surveillance j
test is not performed within this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time period, the requirements of the action statement for MODES 2 and 3 apply, and the MSIV(s) must be either restored to OPERABLE status or closed.
Closing the MSIV(s) put the valve (s) l in the required accident condition.
However, the HSIV(s) may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5.
If the MSIV(s) cannot be closed, the plant must be shut down to MODE 4.
3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs)
Tecdwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke.
Feed line block valves also receive MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 77, J77, 219 0369
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES I
a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases.
Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to l
operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all
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valves are specified.
Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an l
MSI signal.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitations of 70*F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RTuor of 50*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED C00LIhG WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a singlo failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
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i NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-3a Amendment No. 219 one L_________________----------------
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