ML20236Y419
| ML20236Y419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1987 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Sylvia B DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712110310 | |
| Download: ML20236Y419 (13) | |
Text
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DEC 0 5 1987 1
Docket No. 50-341 Detroit Edison Company ATTN: Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia l
Group Vice President Nuclear 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166
Dear Mr. Sylvia:
On February 16, 1987, Region III authorized operation of the Fermi 2 facility
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at power levels up to and including 50 percent power.
This authorization permitted you to proceed with the startup testing program as outlined in Test a
Condition 2.
Throughout the test program to date, the NRC has continued its evaluation of overall operations at the Fermi 2 facility.
On March 27, 1987, you initially requested NRC concurrence to exceed 50 percent power and we initiated an evaluation of your progress.
In the interim, you continued to encounter a number of plant equipment problems coupled with evidence cf declining performance.
Following a reactor scram on July 31, 1987, the plant entered an extended outage and ultimately on August 4,1987, you withdrew your request due to the need to further improve plant material : ondition and operational performance. On August 14, 1987, we further advised you that a number of issues required evaluation prior to any plant restart.
In response, you submitted a letter dated October 3, 1987, which described the current plant material condition and the corrective actions you had taken to demonstrate your readiness for restart. We then met with you on October 5-6, 1987, to discuss your evaluation and resolution i
cf those issues and concurred that your resolution of these matters was C
acceptable.
Our October 9, 1987 letter which authorized restart and resumption of 50 percent operation acknowledged the overall improvements made particularly in the maintenance backlog and CRIS dot area and in plant material condition.
We also outlined additional items requiring action on your part, in order to permit NRC to further measure objectively, the results of your management chances, the improved operation practices, and to permit close monitoring of the various improvement programs in place.
One of these items, implementation of the Control Room Evolution Evaluation Program, required completion prior to exceeding 50 percent power.
You presented the results of this program in a meeting on November 18, 1987. We have evaluated the implementation of your program including the results and find it to be acceptable with the understanding that this program conceptually will be continued throughcut the remainder of the startup test program.
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-2 DEC 05 19W As you know a major reason for operating at 50 percent power for some period of time was to observe, through demonstrated performance, that improvements were effective.
Based on our evaluation of the results of your program we agree with your conclusions that improvements are evident but still needed in following procedures, maintenance scheduling, procedural reviews and other areas where weaknesses were identified.
I note there have been few reportable events, including none during the entire month of November and December to date. This trend is encouraging especially when coupled with the fact that you have performed a number of evolutions successfully and experienced no reactor scrams.
The Restart Team has also advised me that noticeable improvements continue to be evident.
We have also reviewed your submittal regarding the remaining three items discussed in our October 9th letter related to the Preventative Maintenance Program status, Technical Specification improvement plans and schedules, and the commitment report. While this review identified no restraints to exceeding 50 percent power, we note that with respect to Technical Specification improvements and the commitment report the documentation you 4
provided was not all inclusive in describing the actions you are taking.
Based on our on-site review, we find your approach to be acceptable, but expect further clarification as to how you will validate that the Technical Specifications are consistent with the as-built design and add additional operational personnel with an SR0 knowledge to the Technical Specification Improvement Group.
In addition, consistent with our October 9,1987 letter, we request that you supplement your November 29, 1987 submittal to include all additional NRC commitments including projected licensing submittals, outstanding items and commitments related to licensee event reports, enforcement, and other issues.
You should submit this material prior to our montbly meeting in January, which will be scheduled shortly. Additionally, in the area of justification for postponed PM tasks, we expect the evaluation documented on the " Incomplete PM Form" to be based on defined engineering criteria. The evaluation should include the affect on the operability and reliability of the component and associated systems.
On November 20, 1987, I received your request for NRC concurrence to exceed 50 percent power.
I have also reviewed the Independent Overview Committee's (IOC) concurrence with proceeding to 75 percent power and have discussed the basis for their conclusion with the IOC Chairman.
On November 30 - December 2, 1987, the NRC Restart Staff conducted a Regulatory Assessment to evaluate your readiness to exceed 50 percent power.
A copy of the assessment is enclosed.
In summation, since October 10, 1987, you have operated Fermi 2 continuously at 50 percent power with few major problems.
Based on your demonstrated performance overall and the NRC's Restart Director's recommendation, concurred in by the NRC Staff, you are authorized to exceed 50 percent power and proceed with your testing program, up to and including 75 percent power consistent I
with your schedule.
1 t-DEC 0 5 m'T The Detroit Edison Company If you have any questions I will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, A. Bert Davis Rgi nal Administrator i
Enclosure:
Regulatory Assessment cc w/ enclosure:
V. J. Stello, Jr., EDO T. E. Murley, NRR Lewis P. Bregni, Licensing P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department DCD/DCB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspecter RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Harry H. Voight, Esq.
Michigan Department of Public Health
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Monroe County Office of Civil Preparedness Richard Petticrew, Chairman j
Monroe County Board of
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Commissioners F. Ali, Emergency Planning, l
Ontario Canada j
G. Desbien, Canadian Consulate General-K. Shikaze, Environment Canada H. Sampson, Emergency Preparedness Canada T. Diamantstein, AECB I
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Enclosure ASSESSMENT OF DETROIT EDIS0N COMPANY Readiness.To Proceed Beyond 50% Power.-
l 1.
Inspection Coverage Throughout Test Condition 2, from February 24, 1987, to March 17, 1987,
-the NRC Restart Team continued to provide augmented inspection coverage for Fermi 2.
Members of the team evaluated control room operations, major test performance, and major maintenance activities.
Limited reactor operations occurred during the period March 17 to July 31, 1987, because of equipment problems.
During the period from-July 31 to October 10, 1987, the plant was in an extended maintenance outage. The reactor was restarted on October 10, 1987, and has operated' continuously since that time at or below 50 percent power.. Normal resident and regional based inspection coverage was maintained from March 17, 1987.to present. Additionally, several significant inspections were conducted during the period, including review of the implementation.
of the licensed operator requalification program (April 6-24), review of:
the unplanned mode change (July 1-10), followup of the NRC Maintenance Survey (July 13 - August 7), and the Operational Safety Team Inspection (July 27 - August 7).
Cn November 30 - December 2, 1987, the NRC restart team was reconvened onsite to complete a final evaluation of the licensee's readiness to exceed 50 percent power. The team included the Deputy Director (DRP),
Region III, Resident Inspectors, Project Inspector, NRR Project Manager, and the NRR OSTI Team Leader.
2.
Startup Testing Program During Test Condition 2, the licensee conducted testing to calibrate nuclear instruments, assess core performance, and verify proper operation of the pressure regulator, safety relief valves, feedwater control system, reactor recirculation flow control system, and turbine bypass system.
The most significant test conducted during this phase was the Loss of Turbine-Generator and Offsite Power test on March 16, 1987. This test involved a trip of the turbine-generator and offsite power feeds and resulted in a reactor scram, main steam isolation valve closure, the starting of all four emergency diesel generators, and engineered safety features actuation. The operators and test personnel were especially well prepared for this test. A specific crew was identified and spent approximately one month preparing for the test.
Equipment locations were reviewed, the procedure was walked through several times, test engineers and operators met to discuss the procedure and its intent, and contingency plans were developed in case of abnormal occurrences.
In addition, two Senior Reactor Operators and the lead Startup Phase Test Engineer visited the Hope Creek plant to review the problems encountered when the test was
4 first attempted there in October 1986. The intensive preparation resulted in a' test that was well planned and conducted, from both an operator standpoint and equipment performance perspective.
'The restart team witnessed key startup tests and concluded they were satisfactorily conducted. The Test Programs Section has reviewed the results of Test Condition 2 testing and has also concluded that the required acceptance criteria have been met. While some equipment problems were identified, these have been adequately addressed and accepted.
Subsequent to Test Condition 2, the HPCI System Hot Vessel Injection and Cold Vessel Injection tests were reperformed on October 14 and 18, 1987, l
respectively, to demonstrate proper system operation after undergoing repair and modification to correct previous problems.
Cold Vessel Injection Second Run and 1000 psig Cold CST Injection tests have also been completed on October 21 and 24, 1987, respectively. These tests l
were performed successfully and are considered to be acceptable.
3.
Plant Status / Equipment Operability The plant has been operating at approximately 50% power for the past 57 j
days since receiving authorization to restart on October 9,1987. This
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is the longest continuous operational run at the Fermi plant since initial licensing. The licensee has cu41eted testing at the 50% power level and is currently awaitin'g release from the NRC's 50% hold point to continue with Test Condition 3, operation up to 75% power.
Since the last Regulatory Assessment was completed in February 1987, a number of equipment problems have been noted which were recognized by both the NRC and the licensee resulting in the licensee formally withdrawing their request of March 27, 1987, to exceed 50% power. The request was withdrawn on August 4, 1987. The Independent Overview Committee also withdrew its concurrence. The licensee has experienced some operational problems since the plant startup on October 10, 1987, the most notable of which were feedwater equipment problems and a condenser tube leak. These were both subsequently resolved. The licensee also identified and is in the process of resolving a problem related to containment isolation.
Currently, the licensee is taking steps to flush the heater _ drains in preparation for increased power levels when the pump forward drain system will be placed into service.
The Restart Staff believes that operational conditions above 50% power will require further licensee attention to the feedwater system and in the area of reactor chemistry control. Such problems should not be unexpected, including the potential for power reduction to resolve problems and balance systems.
During tours of the plant and control room the Restart Staff observed that overall improvement in the material condition of the plant had continued since October. The resident inspectors and the Restart Staff have observed a positive trend in the licensee's performance in reducing the backlog of corrective maintenance work orders.
The licensee has also taken the necessary steps to reduce the Control Room Information System (CRIS) dots and annunciators in the Control Room. As of December'2, 1987, 2
the CRIS dots had been reduced to 65 and illuminated annunciators to 14.
While the CRIS dots and annunciators have been reduced and the current number is acceptable for continued operation, the licensee is encouraged 3
i to maintain a continual vigilance in this area to ensure that improving trends are continued. Attention to these matters, including the corrective maintenance backlog, and meeting the preventative maintenance program commitments is required for the success of the power ascension program.
The NRC Restart Staff as of December 4,1987, has reviewed equipment out-of-service listings and outstanding maintenance work orders, toured j
i the plant, and concluded that plant systems are ready to support continued power escalation.
4.
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Operability During Test Condition 2, a post-licensing implementation audit of the SPDS was performed by the NRC and its consultant based on the licensee's December 1985 declaration that the SPDS was installed in the plant and operational. The audit determined that the SPDS was not fully operational in that it did not provide reliable information on the status of the critical plant parameters for abnormal conditions.
The audit report was transmitted to the licensee by NRC letter dated July 29, 1987.
A meeting was held with the licensee on November 17, 1987, to discuss corrective actions being tak6n toward resolving the SPDS deficiencies.
The licensee described the corrective action program for making the SPDS fully meet NRC requirements. The licensee committed to submit this program to the NRC by December 31, 1987.
In addition to responding to the audit report findings, the licensee's corrective action program submittal will provide information to:
(1) confirm that the SPDS set points are valid for all critical safety functions; (2) confirm mechanisms have been established to alert plant operators if the information for critical safety parameters is incomplete; and (3) confirm that the plant mode displayed by the SPDS is the actual plant operating mode.
Since the SPDS is used as a backup system to required control room instruments for monitoring safe operation, to monitor and trend plant critical parameters during normal and abnormal conditions, and since the licensee has committed to and is in the process of taking corrective actions which are expected to result in the resolution of SPDS operability deficiencies, the current status of the SPDS is not considered a constraint for plant operation. The licensee has evaluated those instances where SPDS displays provided questionable information and disabled them to assure that information available is reliable.
- Further, normal operating and emergency procedures are structured such that operators are required to use plant primary and redundant instrumentation in decisions related to existing plant conditions.
The SPDS is not a part of nor is it used in the operator's decision making process.
In the event there is reason to question the validity and reliability of any displayed SPDS parameter, the accuracy of the information provided is verified through use of all necessary and required information in the control room.
The NRC's regulatory process is considered sufficient to resolve this outstanding issue.
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5.
Current Operator Performance The present status of Fermi 2's operational performance is best understood by comparing the performance observed during July-August 1987 by the OSTI team with that performance observed by the resident inspectors and the restart team ' luring October and November 1987.
Facility performance has dramatically improved, and t~nis improvement can be attrit;uted to two facts.
During &n outage in August and September 1987, many material problems contributing to poor operational performance were corrected.
In addition, facility management instituted new controls that set basic standards for acceptable operational performance by the shift crews. These standards were developed, presented to the crews, and then reinforced by direct observation. The operating practices that resulted included more deliberate performance of evolutions and were preceded by specific pre-planning of even relhtively minor tasks. The results were acceptable. The Cor. trol Room Evolution Evaluation Program has identified strengths and weaknesses. This is an effective tool for immediate corrective action when problems are identified.
During the OSTI in July and August 1987, the staff observed performance problems such as failure to follow procedures, failure to correct procedure errors, poor understanding of system interactions, and an inability te use the Technical Specifications as a working document when confronted with a variety of plant problems. These and other pa-t problems observed by the OSTI,have been diminished by the actioat instituted by Fermi 2 management.
Some of the new actions that have enhanced perfonr.ance include movement of the operations engineer's office to a space next to the control room to be ciaser to plant activities and management developnient, distribution, and emphasis of the operational performance standards. These same managers conducted a series of meetings with all l
shifts to discuss these standards and describe examples of how the i
standards could be either satisfied or micsed, Case studies a~nd lessons learned were developed from past problems and are being incorporated into the training cycle to reinforce methods of avoiding future problems. The shift supervisor has been given the lead spot durir.g dcily plant meetings to ensure that supporting depari.ments respond to the immediate needs of the shift crew. The staff has been instrycted to i
process needed procedure changes more rapidly. Near-term pricrities have been clarified and emphasized by senior management through their direct daily involvement. The training department has begun to evolve
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its program from an emphasis on initial licensing to a recognition of j
maintaining adeouate technical competence for an operating facility.
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These and other actions described elsewhere in this assessment and undertaken by the licensee should result in conti6ued improved performance.
The Restart Staff concludn that these inoividual actions have collectively contributed to the recent positive performance at l
Fermi 2.
l The Restart Staff believes that continued reinforcement of these standards is needed during the remainder of the testing program and throughout the plant's operating cycle in order to prevent a recurrence of past problems.
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On October 26, 1987, the licensee implemented the Control Room Evolution Evaluation Program in response to NRC Region III's October 9, 1937, letter. As of November 14, 1987, a total of 43 evaluations had been completed. The licensee presented the results of the program in a meeting with the NRC on November 18, 1987. The licensee concluded that operator performance was adequate with some room for improvement. As part of this program and at the end of each evolution strengths and weaknesses were immediately discussed with each shift.
The standards are Safety Standards, Operation Standards and Operational Excellence Standards. As part of a longer term approach, all strengths and weaknesses will be compared with the standards of excellence and standardized against the operational standards and discussed with each shift crew in seminar fashion, prior to December 31, 1987. The results of the program will also be incorporated into the licensee's Nuclear Training program.
The licensee is formally tracking all corrective actions to be taken as a l
result of the 2 valuations and has committed to continue this program and to conduct two evaluations per week throughout the remainder of the l
startup test program.
The NRC staff has reviewed the program implementation, completed evaluator checklists, and summary results and concluded that it is acceptcble.
Since starting up in October, an event involving operator performance was a reactor recirculation pump speed increase event on November lith.
This event resulted in reactor power spiking from 40 to 70 percent and then stabilizing at 50 percent, The duration of this perturbation was less than one second and the signal was not present long enough to cause an automatic reactor scram.
Nonetheless, the event was attributed both to design and to operator performance problems.
Operator performance-related problems included failure to conduct a shift briefing prior to performing an evolution, operators not knowing the current settings of recirculation pump speed limiters, failure to follow procedures, and the need for additional training in certain areas.
The Restart Staff reviewed the licensee's corrective actions regarding this event and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate and are being aggressively pursued.
6.
Management Effectiveness The Restart Staff evaluated the licensee's management effectiveness in dealing wits both long-standing and emergent issues.
Since the last assessment dated February 16, 1987, several key management changes have been made.
W. Orser was assigned as Vice President of Nuclear Operations and F. Agosti was assigned as Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Services effective August 1, 1987.
W. Orser also assumed the responsibility of Plant Manager, which was held by R. Lenart who was appointed as General Director, Nuclear Engineering.
In October, D. Gipson was named as the new Plant Manager.
The Restart Staff believes that these changes are positive and have contributed to operational performance improvements.
The NRC will continue to assess management performance to assure the present positive trends continue.
The Restart Staff believes that the transition between the new plant manager and the vice president of Nuclear Operations should be done in a slow controlled manner.
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Anotherkeyelemen)tofDetroitEdisonmanagement'sapproachtodealing withQssuesis.1thhFermiBusinessPlan.
In addition to providing goals aidtbjecti,ves M Fermi 2, the Susiness Plan incorporates continuing actindand o'ut l'anding goals from the Nclear Operations Improvement t
R$%(which was the key element of the licensee's response to the 10 CFR 59 54 f) letter of December 24,, M85. The Business Plan not only provides tite gehls, but als'o provides the strategies and actions necessary to
.lj accomplish ther, The plan appears to be " comprehensive and if aggressively j
pplemented gld also result in improved regulatory and operational
- performance.
owever, implementation of this'. plan is a key to meeting previous regu atory commitments in the Nuclear Operations Improvement t, Plan. NRC d! O. continue to monitor implementation of the Butiness Plan b odements of'thh NOIP.
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7.
Pending E.n.:,o. cement issues 7
s potential forcement" action iS hending for the following issues:
l Prior deficiencies in thelptrator licensing requalification ' program.
t Operation of the plant in u)nanalyzed conditions in that the.
feedwater heaters were removed from service while at 50 percent reactor power; and operation of the plant at approximately 30 percent power with the Mo,isture Separator Reheaters nnt in service, contrary to the analys,is for generation of.the Technical i
SpecificationynimumCriticalPowerRatio(MCPR) curves.
Design error in' N ich 30ss of DC control power resulted in the loss ofpowersupplpto'theLPCIswingbusandthustotheLPCILoop.
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i /s SPDS operabiliQ wI'h resp'ect to providing reliable critical plant i
t parameter information foF abnormal conditions.
SeveralsurveW1pnceyrogramdeficienciesincludingLC0 violations.
p W he violation of GDC 56.
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De Wrrog which resulted t
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Eqtl pmeb E{yironmental Omlification Issues, j
The li[eM/e}s initial Technical Spe'cification certification program.
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, the Mcense; has already implemented appropriate corrective actions and tir. efore, onese issues are not considered a restraint to further power Escaletion.,
The NRC's ongoing enforcement process is considered surficient to resolve tilese issues.
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8.
Technical Specifications Improvement Program A portion of the last Regulatory' Assessment authorizing operation above 20 percent power addressed: licensee inadequacies in'the Technical Specifications surveillance area. The assessment concluded that these inadequacies could be dealt with through the normal regulatory process and did not prohibit-power ascension. Since that assessment, NRC has issued a $100,000' civil penalty and broad-based corrective action has been developed by the licensee.- Also, the scope of this issue has broadered to r. include the accuracy of the Technical Specifications to reflect the as-built plant.
Similar deficiencies were identified after the corrective actions were taken in the original areas of concern.
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corrective action has'been developed.
Because of continued concerns, on October 9,1987, NRC req'uested the licensee to submit within 45 days detailed plans and schedules for
. Technical Specification improvements' The licensee's response was q
submitted to the NRC on November 23, 1987.
This submittal addressed the areas of concern but was not all inclusive. The Restart Staff identified q
particular problem areas as stated below:
a.
With regard to the Technical Specification surveillance procedure review effort, the program does not:
1 Provide. sufficient SR0 operational. experience.in the review j
committee.
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Assure independence is maintained between this review effort d
and the original procedure creators.
Assure that the final review of the I&C procedure rewrite is 3
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done in a controlled manner.
l The licensee committed to address these concerns in finalizing the program review effort in this area.
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- b.
In the area of operator knowledge of Technical Specifications, concerns were raised as to whether the new training would be incorporated into the initial operator training program. The licensee committed that this will be done.
Another area of concern was that the proposed Technical c.
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Specification improvement program was not sufficiently comprehensive to verify that the Technical Specifications conform with plant system and component design described in the FSAR and/or installed e' in the as-built plant. This concern was based on the existence of
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several Technical Specification change proposals submitted to the NRC by the licensee, during the period of Test Condition 2 involving differences between the Technical Specifications, the FSAR, and the t
as-built plant. Examples include a Technical Specification revision to correct errors between the Technical Specifications regarding containment isolation valve leak rate tests required by the regulation and the need to add or delete components in the Technical 7
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Specifications to" reflect the as-built plant. TheteWst$essed-9 that the improvement program should be expanded to identifj and resolve suche discrepancies and that, as a part of that expanded effort, theDliccawe review the accuracy of LCOs, conduct' plant
> system waMdowns, and review I&C and Technical Specification related
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" plant systew drawings. The_ licensee agreed to expdnd the Techerical
' Specification improvement program to address thisf concern.
Where problems have already been identified, requiring Technical Specification changes, the liccnsee has provided schedules and resources for.'submittfrW those changes.to the NRC. The licensee also assured the Restart Stsff that any new Technical Specification changes s
will be handled in a tidely manner, i
The exceeding of a Limiting Condition for. 0peration during instrunient f
testing on October 24,19iG, further emphasized the need for this improvement program. Given the Ikensee's past performance in this area,.,
it is essential that the corrective actions be long-lasting.
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Toassureaproperoverviewandappropriakeresolutionoftheseconcerns, monthly meetings will be held fieteen the NRC and the licensee to review
- i and discuss the status of these issues. Given thtpreviously accomplished
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corrective actions and the.ijcensec's commitments to expand the ' Technical Specification improvement program, the Restart Staff concluded that the oormal regulatory process will, provide adequate resolution of these concerns ' To date, no' issues have been identified that have impactedton i
- e safety of operation!and dliis brea is not considered to be a restraint td further powcr.ascention.'
7 9.
Al@.ations and Office of Investigations (0I) Issues A review of open allegations.and Office of Investigations (0I) cases indicates there oree no outstanding allegations or OI issues which would impacV.Spower ascerition up tp 75 percent power. On February 15, 1987, Region III received a letter from Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan (SECOM) which essentially took issue with the adequacy of the Fermi SAFETEAM. Subsequen?ly, the NRC recelMdia Petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 dated May 7,1987 from the, G6vernment Accountability Project (GAP). The NRC response is expected to be 4 sned in December. The Restart Staff plans to take no further action 'with respect to thir, matter. On December 2, 1987, Regies III received an allegation relating to SPDS, the Primary Containment Monitoring System, the OSTI Report, maintenance backlog, od plant equipent prMemsr The alleger identified these isst.es through a review of some 20W pages of NRC documents hi the NRC t'ublic Document Room.
These' issues are discussed in other Sections of;this assessment.
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10.
Restart Conditions All' requirements for exceeding 50 percent power have been met.
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. Test Condition 2 testing has been' completed, the Onsite Review Committee has reviewed the results of the testing and has recommended power escalation.
The IOC provided concurrence to resume power testing to the 75 percent power level in a letter to the licensee dated November 20 1987.
The material condition of the plant has been determined by the restart team to be acceptable for power escalation.
The IOC and NRC have discussed respective concerns prior to completion of this assessment.
- 11. Conclusions The licensee's testing program for.TC-2 was completed on March 17, 1987, in conformance with their commitments and regulatory requirements. This is supported by restart team and resident inspector test wMnessing and the test results evaluations conducted by the Region III, Division of Reactor Safety, Test Programs,Section. Subsequent to completion of TC-2,-
the licensee completed a maintenance outage and then after startup encountered further equipment" problems including most notably, steam leaks from welds on main steam line instrument taps and from a piping connection on the bypass valve. This necessitated repair, replacement of instrument taps, weld inspection, and installation of instrument tubing supports.
Following resolution of those problems, the reactor was again restarted and encountered excessive vibration on the south reactor feed pump requiring a further' shutdown and repairs. After resolution, the plant was placed back on-line and operated until June 25, 1987, when a shutdown was required due to problems with an RCS recirculation loop.
On June 26, 1987, an unmonitored heatup occurred indicating some similarities to earlier Fermi problems with overall management control of licensee activities. Enforcement action in the form of a civil penalty was levied e. gainst the licensee and letters of reprimand to each licensed operator involved resulted from this event. The licensee's corrective actions and response have been evaluated and found acceptable.
Following this event, the licensee withdrew its request to operate up to 75 percent i
power, the IOC withdrew its recommendation, and the licensee was not authorized to restart the plant until October 9, 1987. The plant has operated continuously since that date, the longest successful operating run since initial licensing. The licensee has completed the first phase of the Control Room Evolution Evaluation Program, and the plant has operated relatively well.
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Overall operator performance has been evaluated during both routine and l
off-normal conditions.
Based on these reviews and the current regulatory assessment, the restart team has concluded that the recent satisfactory performance, coupled with the successful completion of the Control Room Evolution Evaluation Program, provides sufficient assurance that operator performance will be satisfactory during opr'ations up to 75 percent power.
The management team is making progress in dealing with some of the long standing deficiencies in Fermi 2's performance. These deficiencies will require further management effort for full resolution.
Based on the above information and demonstrated success in operational performance from October 10, 1987 to present, the restart team concludes that the plant can be safely operated and recommends that Fermi 2 be given approval to operate up to 75 percent power.
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