ML20236M932

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Amend 225 to License NPF-3,relocating TS Tables of Response Time Limits to Davis-Besse Technical Requirements Manual
ML20236M932
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 07/07/1998
From: Hansen A
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236M935 List:
References
NUDOCS 9807140332
Download: ML20236M932 (11)
v • d • e


Text

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

A s

e n aart,,

y i

UNITED STATES s

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Y

t WASHINGTON, D.C. 30seMo01

%... /

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY hBD THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 225 License No. NPF-3 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

i A.

The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated April 24, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission:

C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by j

this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and l

safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 9007140332 980707 h

PDR ADOCK 05000346 ?

P PDR

a

e

  • E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly. the license is amended to approve the relocation of certain

-Technical Specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents, as

' described in the licensees' application dated April 24. 1998, and evaluated in the staff's safety evaluation dated July 7, 1998. This license is also hereby amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications con??ined in Appendix A. as revised through Amendment No. 225. are hereby incorporated in the license.

The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 120 days after issuance. ' Implementation shall include the relocation of Technical Specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled documents as identified in the

licensees' submittal dated April 24. 1998, and reviewed in the staff's safety evaluation dated July 7. 1998.

i l

FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1.

L R 0.

j Allen G. Hansen. Project Manager L

I Project Directorate III-3 i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: July. 7.1998

J

's s

l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.225 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346

{

\\

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with j

the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert TS 3/4 3-1 TS 3/4 3-1 TS 3/4 3-6 TS 3/4 3-6 TS 3/4 3-9 TS 3/4 3-9 TS 3/4 3-14 TS 3/4 3-14 TS 3/4 3-15 TS 3/4 3-16 1

TS 3/4 3-17 TS 3/4 3-18 TS 3/4 3-19 1

TS 3/4 3-20 TS 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-23 i

TS 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-29 TS Bases 3/4 3-1 TS Bases 3/4 3-1 TS Bases 3/4 3-la TS Bases 3/4 3-la l

l

1 s

~

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATI0li LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Protection System instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1.shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

l ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each Reactor Protection System instrumentation channel shall be I

demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

I 4.3.1.1.2 The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing; the response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from the neutron detector output or from the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times-the REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant channels

-in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

l

  • The response times include the sensor (except for the neutron detectors),

Reactor Protection System instrument delay, and the control rod drive breaker delay. A delay time has been assumed for the Reactor Coolant Pump monitor in the determination of.the response time of the High Flux / Number of Reactor Coolant Pumps On functional unit.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M e 225 r

l l

l 0

l 0

)

l DELETED 1

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 45,140,225

,; o INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION l.

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) functional units shown in

-Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with i

the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4, with the exception of Instrument Strings Functional Units d and e and Interlock Channels Functional Unit a which shall be set consistent with the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4.

l l

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a.

With a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the functional unit inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3, until the functional unit is restored to 3

OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with Table 3.3-4.

j b.

With a SFAS functional unit inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.3.2.1.1 Each SFAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the

-performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL

~ TEST during the MODES' and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4

~

4.3.2.1.2 - The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected by bypass l

operation. -The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each functional unit affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

  • of each SFAS function shall be l

demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL.

Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that all functional units are tested at least once every N times the REFUELING 1

INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a specific SFAS function as shown in the " Total No. of Units" Column of Table 3.3-3.

  • The response times (except'for manual initiation) include diesel generator

. starting and sequence loading delays, when applicable.

The response time limit (except for manual initiation) includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. No 225 r

l l

. s TABLE 3.3-5 SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES DELETED l

a l

l l

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 40, ",112,11',125,221 225 (Next page is 3/4 3-21) l l

s INSTRUMENTATION STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~3.3.2.2 The Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-12, with the exception of the Steam Generator Level-Low Functional Unit which shall be set consistent with the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-12.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With a SFRCS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-12, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-11, until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with

- Table 3.3-12.

b.

Withla SFRCS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.3-11.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.2.1 Each SFRCS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL -TEST during' the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-11.

4.3.2.2.2 The logic for'the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during i

the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.

The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.2.3 The STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

  • of l

each SFRCS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at'least once

.per REFUELING INTERVAL.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times the

' REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific SFRCS function as shown in the " Total.No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-11.

l

is fully closed. The Turbine Stop Valves (TSVs) response time is to be the a

-time elapsed from the main steam line low pressure trip condition until the TSV is-fully closed.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. M 8r 225 l

\\

l l

DELETED 1

i l

i l

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 Amendment No. 119,125,225 l

I

.e 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 1

BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel.or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence 4

logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The response time limits for these instrumentation systems are located in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and are used to demonstrate OPERABILITY in accordance with each system's response time surveillance l

requirements.

For the RPS, SFAS Table 3.3-4 Functional Unit Instrument Strings d and e and Interlock 1

Channel a, and SFRCS Table 3.3-12 Functional Unit 2:

j l

Only the Allowable Value is specified for each Function.

Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint analysis.

The nominal trip setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints measured by CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS do not exceed the Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing are consistent with the assumptions of the specific setpoint calculations.

Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the safety analysis to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip parameter. These i

uncertainties are defined in the specific setpoint analysis.

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Setpoints must be found within the specified Allowable Values. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current specific setpoint analysis, i

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift to ensure that the instrument channel remains operational between successive tests.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find that measurement errors and bistable setpoint errors are within the assumptions of the setpoint analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint analysis.

The frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 or 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 72,125,120,211,210, 225 (Next page is B3/4 3-la)

.: o 3,

x 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION'

.-BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

.The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides I

assurance that'the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each

' channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.

l 1

Response. time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or I

total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the' total

channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2)

- utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The actuation logic for Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., and 4.c. of Table 3.3-3, Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, is designed to provide-protection and actuation of a single train of safety features equipment, essential bus or emergency diesel generator.

Collectively, Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., e.d 4.c. function to detect a degraded voltage condition on either of the two 4160 volt essential buses, shed connected loads, disconnect the affected bus (es) from the offsite power source and start the associated emergency diesel generator.

In addition, if an SFAS actuation signal is present under these conditions, the sequencer channels for the two SFAS channels which actuate the train of safety features equipment powered by the affected bus will automatically sequence these loads onto-the bus to prevent overloading of the emergency diesel generator.

Functional Unit 4.a. has a total;of four units, one associated with each SFAS channel (i.e., two for each essential bus).

Functional Units 4.b. and 4.c. each have a total of. four

. units, (two associated with each essential bus); each unit consisting of two undervoltage rslays and an auxiliary relay.

I An SFRCS' channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turbine-Trip), and 3) power sources.

The SFRCS response time for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet l:

delay for main steam line low pressure signals Liai losure time of the turbine stop valves. 'This SFRCS response time ensures thL the auxiliary feedwater to the. unaffected steam generator will not be isolat-d due to a SFRCS low pressure trip during a main steam line break N cident.

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a. turbine trip (above f

45 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump l-

. turbines.

This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the pilot operated relief valve.

This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737.

The justification for the ARTS turbine trip arming level of 45% is given in BAW-1893, October, 1985.

I

. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 72,125,128,125,211,210, 225 1

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20236M932&oldid=3935723"