ML20236F060

Insp Rept 50-302/87-30 on 870912-1009.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Items

ML20236F060
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/23/1987
From:	Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236F018	List: ML20236F016 ML20236F028 ML20236F060
References
50-302-87-30, NUDOCS 8710300118
Download: ML20236F060 (12)

See also: IR 05000302/1987030

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UNITED STATES

o f 90 .. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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<- j1 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

.E t .' ATLANTA, GEORGt A 30323  :

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Report No..: 50-302/87-30

Licensee: Florida. Power l Corporation. j

3201 34th Street,. South l

.St. Petersburg, FL ~33733

' Docket No.: .50-302. License No.: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal. River 3  ;

l Inspection. Conducted: September 12'- October 9, 1987 i

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Inspector: lm /O!2

Da'te Signed

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T.-F..Ste ,SeniorResidentInspctor

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4YE ddrow(ResidentInspector/ Date Signed ,

Approved by:

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L A. Wilson, Section Chief

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Da'te Sfgned

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Division of Reactor Projects  ;

SUMMARY

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.' Scope:' This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors'in the

areas of. plant operations, -security, radiological. controls, Licensee Event

Reports and Nonconforming. Operations Reports, facility modifications, and

licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were

conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and

observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: One Violation was identified: Failure to adhere to plant procedures,

paragraphs 5.b.(10) and 6.b (2).

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8710300118 871026 i ,

PDR ADOCK 05000302

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, REPORT DETAILS

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T 1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

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• J. Alberdi,_ Assistant.to the Director, Nuclear' Plant Operations

J. Andrews, Nuclear. Engineer II

l *G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

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• P. Breedlove, Nuclear. Records Management Supervisor-

~C.. Brown, Manager,.0utages

• W. Candy, Nuclear Results Specialist

• M. - Clary,- Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer

• J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services i

• M. Collins, Nuclear Safety'&' Reliability Superintendent

• J.. Cooper, Technical Support Superintendent

'*S. Ford, Nuclear Safety Specialist

• B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• R. Knoll, Nuclear Project Engineer

• J. Lander, Manager, Nuclear' Operations Maintenance & Outages

• M.' Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

• W. Marshall,: Nuclear Shift Supervisor.

• J. Maseda, Nuclear Engineering Supervisor i

P..McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations ,

• R.- Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent

• W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager  ;

J.. Warren, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer

D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager l

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• K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing _

• R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent j

Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering,

maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)  ;

at the conclusion of the inspection on October 9,1987. During this  !

meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection

with particular emphasis on the Violation, Unresolved Item, and Inspector

Followup Items (IFI). i

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L The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did  ;

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

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by the inspectors during this inspection.  !

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items

(Closed) IFI 302/87-01-03: The licensee has completed the failure

analysis for the "A" reactor trip breaker. This analysis has determined

that the failure was caused by a distorted mounting bracket on the

undervoltage trip device which is believed to have been caused by improper

handling of the breaker. The licensee considers this situation to be an j

isolated event and not reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. The licensee has I

further clarified the procedure for inspecting these breakers (PM-118, AC

and DC Breakers-Control Rod Drive System, revision 16 dated August 10,

1987) to provide better instructions for setting of the rivet to armature <

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gap in the undervoltage device.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-17-03: The licensee has completed troubleshooting

activities regarding the failure of the AC reactor trip breaker to close.

Inspection of the breaker in accordance with procedure PM-118 revealed

that all "as found" data was satisfactory and no additional problems were

identified. The licensee contacted the manufacturer and was informed that

no additional action was required. The breaker has subsequently been

returned to service.

(Closed) IFI 302/86-23-07: The licensee has revised procedure SP-122

(revision 10 dated July 22,1987) to include calibration instructions for

the- TSAT thermocouple amplifiers. The licensee will perform string

calibrations on this instrumentation on a refueling interval basis.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-01-07: The licensee has established a fuel oil

monitoring program that samples for biological growths. The licensee has

issued chemistry procedure CH-179, Determination of Microbes in Petroleum

Products, dated May 29, 1987, and has revised the emergency diesel

generator surveillance procedures (SP-354A, revision 19 dated August 4,

1987, and SP-3548, revision 17 dated August 4,1987) to implement this

program.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations. An unresolved item is discussed in paragraph 5.b.(8) of this

report.

5. Review of Plant Operations

This inspection period began with the plant in power operation (Mode 1).

On September 19, 1987 a plant shutdown was commenced for a scheduled

refueling outage. The plant entered hot standby (Mode 3) at 12:40 a.m. on

September 19, hot shutdown (Mode 4) at 2:04 p.m. on September 22, and cold

shutdown (Mode 5) at 5:35 a.m. on September 25. The plant remained in

cold shutdown until September 30, when reactor vessel head de-tensioning

was begun and the plant entered the refueling mode (Mode 6). The plant

remained in mode 6 for the remainder of this inspection period.

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a. Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:  ;

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment

Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building i

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Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveil-

lance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI);

Outage Shift Manager's Log; and Selected Chemistry / Radiation

Protection Logs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified equipment clearance order tagouts, i

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Facility Tours and Observations .

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee l

meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and

management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

' security perimeter -fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,

electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation

and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated

parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current

operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid

radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(2) Safety System Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of

the Emergency Diesel Generator systems to verify that the lineup

was in accordance with license requirements for system

operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly

reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

As a result of these walkdowns the following items were

identified:

(a) Diesel fuel oil gauge isolation valves DFV-49, 51, and 54 i

in the "A" fuel oil pit and valves DFV-50, 52, and 53 in

the "B" fuel oil pit were found to be open (which is the

proper position) even though the controlling procedures,

SP-354A and SP-3548, requires the valves to be closed.

Following discussion of this finding with licensee i

representatives, procedural revisions were implemented to  ;

correct the situation.

(b) The area where valves DFV-45, 46, 47, and 48 are located

was filled with debris and exhibits poor housekeeping

controls. While these valves are cycled quarterly to

insure operation, the possibility of this debris hindering

valve operation exists. l

(c) Two valves, DLV-10 and 34, and lube oil strainer, DL-25-PI,

were missing identification labels.

The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns and is taking i

action to remedy the situation. The licensee's progress in

correcting these concerns will be monitored during subsequent

plant tours and system walkdowns.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift

staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control

room operations were being conducted in an orderly and I

professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift l

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant ,

information during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified. i

(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and .

components and cleanliness conditions of various areas I

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

safety and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control

activities were observed.to verify that these activities were in

conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in

compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations

included:

- Selected licensee conducted surveys;

- Entry and exit from contaminated areas including step-off

pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

- Area postings and controls;

- Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

contaminated areas;

- Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and,

- Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,

protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the

inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed selected Radiation

Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that

the controls were adequate.

The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably i

Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel

involvement in the objectives and goals of the program.

On October 9 the inspector was notified of a potential licensee

employee overexposure event that occurred at about 12:00 a.m.

The event involved the unauthorized removal of lead shielding

blocks from the reactor vessel lower cavity area which resulted ,

in the exposure of the employee to an approximately 55 rem per j

hour field. Personal dosimetry results indicate that the l

employee received a whole body exposure of 441 millirem. l

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The licensee is investigating this event and an NRC Region II l

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Health Physics inspector has been dispatched to the site. See

NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-35 for further information on

this event.

(6) Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the

Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical (

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security program. The composition of the security organization

was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were

available and that security activities were conducted with

proper supervision. The performance of various shifts of the '

security force were observed in the conduct of daily activities

to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching

of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and

retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory

posts. In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the

operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors,

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the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary ,

alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital l

area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface

with operations and maintenance.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and l

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was l

appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, )

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency l

equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified. i

(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that

approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were

conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment

operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS

requirements were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-137, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Time

Delay Relay Calibration;

- SP-179, Containment Leakage Test- Types "B" and "C";

- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance; i

- SP-3498, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) Monthly  ;

Operability Demonstration;

- SP-397, Steam Generator Hydrostatic Test

Surveillance;

- SP-405, Core Flooding System Check Valve Operation  :

Demonstration;  :

- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance; 1

- SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine J

In;pection/ Maintenance;

- SP-701, Radiation Monitoring System Surveillance

Program; and,

- SP-722, Secondary Coolant Thrice Weekly Surveillance

Program.

While observing the performance of procedure SP-137 on

October 8, the inspector noted that a recent Interim Change (IC)

to the procedure, which was written to delete Quality Control

(QC) hold points, also deleted an additional unrelated step in

the procedure. This additional step deletion was not listed on

the Procedure Review Record (PRR) form as a part of the change.

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The inspector discussed this observation with licensee personnel

and reviewed the administrative procedure that controls  !

procedure changes, AI-401, Origination of and Revisions to P0QAM l

Procedures. From these discussions. and - review the inspector  ;

determined that this procedure change practice was not uncommon

and appeared to conform with the somewnat vague requirements of

procedure AI-401.

During further discussions with licensee management g

representatives, the inspector stated that procedure changes i

need to be clearly identified on the PRR to assure that the  !

changes receive proper review and approval and to provide  ;

traceability of the change. The licensee representatives

acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that they would i

review their procedure change practices and procedure AI-401 to

determine what corrective actions may be necessary.

Unresolved Item (302/87-30-01): Review procedure change l

practices and AI-401 to assure that change practices are f'

adequate.

(9) Maintenance Activities The inspector observed maintenance

activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in ,

effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as  !

required, were issued and being followed; quality control .j

personnel were available for inspection activities as required; g

and, TS requirements were being followed. j

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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the l

following maintenance activities:

- Removal and replacement of the motor for motor operated

valve (MOV) EFV-33 in accordance with procedures MP-402,

Maintenance of "Limitorque" Valve Controls and MP-405,

Installing, Repairing, and Terminating Control Power and

Instrumentation Cables; )

- Replacement of valve SFV-19 in accordance with Modification )

Approval Record (MAR) 85-09-04-01 and applicable welding i

procedures; and, j

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Replacement of valve SWV-10, in accordance with MAR j

83-02-10-01 and applicable welding procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and

selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify

that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release

approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

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During observation of a liquid release from. the . laundry and;

shower . monitoring . tanks- (WDT 11 A&B) on September 29, the-

• . inspector noted that the operator; failed to close a valve as

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required by the procedure. Releases . from these tanks are

controlled--by procedure OP-407-H, Operation of the Laundry an'd

Shower. Monitoring Tanks. This procedure. requires valve RWV-109

to be opened.for the release in step 3.1.1 and then to-be closed

in step 3.2.10 following completion of. the . liquid release.

Following release termination, the operator initialled . step

3.2.10 of ' the procedure ' to designate ' the completion. of all- ,

actions required by the step, however he failed to close valve l

RWV-109. ' When -the -inspector identified the error. to the. ,

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operator, the valve was immediately closed.

On . Monday, September 28 at approximately 10:00 a.m., the J

inspector had observed valve RWV-109 to be opened during 'the

course of ..the inspectorls daily plant tour. Following'the

observation of the operator's activities on September 29,- the

' inspector reviewed previous tank releases conducted in

accordance with procedure OP-407-H and determined that a tank

release was performed between the hours of 2:45 a.m. to 3:43 a.m.

on ' September 28. From this information and the lack of any

additional'information from licensee representatives supporting

the'open RWV-109, the inspector concluded that valve RWV-109 was

apparently left open as the result of this earlier tank release

conducted on . September 28. The inspector also noted that

different operators were involved in each of these events.

Failure to close valve RWV-109 following the completion of a l

laundry and shower monitoring ' tank release is contrary to the.

requirements of procedure OP-407-H and TS 6.8.1.a and- is .

considered to be a violation.

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Violation (302/87-30-02): Failure to adhere to the requirements

of procedure OP-407-H during a radioactive liquid release.

(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and

seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were i

observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no

leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate,

and that anchoring points were not binding.

No violations or deviations were identified.  ;

6. Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were

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reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.

LERs 87-18 and 87-20 were reviewed in accordance with'the current NRC

Enforcement policy and LER 87-18 is closed.

(0 pen) LER 87-20: This LER reported the finding during an NRC audit

that the Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS) temperature war in excess of the

maximum value assumed in the plant design basis. This issue was

identified as an Unresolved Item (302/87-28-04) in NRC Inspection

Report 50-302/87-28. This LER remains open pending resolution of

this issue.

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports ( NCORs) to

verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC

Enforcement Policy.

As the result of these reviews the following items were identified:

(1) NCOR 87-130 reported the failure to document the installation

and/or removal of stop blocks that are used to support piping

when lead blanket shielding is installed on the piping. This

event occurred during replacement of the letdown coolers.

Further investigation by the licensee indicates that the stop

blocks were not installed as directed by MAR 86-11-16-01.

Initial calculations performed by the licensee to determine if

the blankets overstressed the pipe and pipe hangers indicated

that they were not overstressed. To insure that the

overstressed condition did not exist, the licensee has also

requested their contracted engineer to conduct additional

calculations. The results of these calculations are expected by

the end of October 1987.

Inspector Followup Item (302/87-30-03): Review the contract

engineers calculations regarding pipe overstressing due to lead

blanket installation.

(2) NCOR 87-144 reported that on September 21, the maximum

permissible liquid release rate was exceeded while releasing the

contents of the laundry and shower monitoring tanks in

accordance with procedure OP-407-H. The maximum release rate

permitted by procedure OP-407-H and Liquid Radwaste Release

Permit (LRWRP) L-87-384 was 18 gpm, however, the release was

actually conducted at a flow rate of 30.6 gpm. Review of the

release records by the inspector indicate that no release limits

were exceeded. The licensee attributes the incorrect release

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. rate to be caused iby. the use of ' chart paper on the release

,, recorder that only indicated one' half of the actual flow. This

chart paper has been.in use for'a number of years. I

While this event was identified by the licensee, the failure of

'the licensee to' correct the chart paper scaling error in a

- timely -manner is considered to be a failure to properly

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implement. procedure ' OP-407-H. Therefore- this event is

considered to be'another example of the violation (302/87-30-02)

identified in paragraph 5.b(10)'of this report.

(3)l NCOR 87-147 reported the failure of the core flood valve CFV-5 l

"not fully open" alarm to operate during the performance of l

surveillance procedure SP-402, Core Flooding System Isolation

Valves Alarms Actuation. The licensee is investigating the

failure and will rerun .the test during plant start-up from' the

current refueling outage. I

Inspector Followup Item (302/87-30-04): Review retest of CFV-5

not fully open alarm in accordance with procedure SP-402.

. (4) NCORs87-157 and 87-158 reported degraded motor lead wires on

eight Limitorque motor operated valve (MOV) operators. The

degradation was identified during MOVATS valve testing. The 4

valves affected were ASV-5 and 204, EFV-11, 14, 32, and 33, and

MSV-55'and 56. It appears that the lead degradation is limited

to M0V's that use DC motors that were installed during the last

outage to meet environmental qualifications. The licensee had *

. determined that the lead degradation is limited to only these DC

motor' powered valves and is developing a repair method.  ;

Inspector Followup Item (302/87-30-05); Review the repairs to l

the degraded motor leads on Limitorque MOV operators.

(5) NCOR 87-160 reported the failure to establish an audible nuclear i

instrumentation source range (SR) indication prior to entering

Mode 6. TS 3.9.2 requires audible SR indication while in Mode

6. The lack of audible indication was identified by the

licensee at 7:30 a.m. on October 1. The plant entered Mode 6 at

11:55 p.m. on September 30.

The licensee investigated this occurrence and determined that

the cause of the event was an inadequate procedurc. Procedure  ;

SP-406, Revision 10, Refueling Operations Dai d Data  ;

Requirements, which is used to insure that all TS requirements i

are met prior to entering Mode 6, did not require the  !

establishment of the audible indication prior to entering Mode 1

6. Upon notification that the audible indication was required,

it was immediately established.

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To prevent recurrence of this event, all. Mode 6 requirements

were reviewed and a list for the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS)

developed to insure that all these requirements were met. This

list provided an interim control while procedure SP-406 was

revised. Procedure SP-406 was revised as revision 11 and

implemented by October 7.

This event is considered to be a licensee identified violation

'n which prompt corrective actions were taken and therefore will

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not be cited as a violation.

7. Design, Design Changes and Modifications

Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the

changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that

the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and

approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met

acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner,

and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as

necessa ry. This review included selected observations of modifications

and/or testing in progress.

The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or

associated testing observed:

- MAR 83-02-10-01, Replacement of Valve SWV-10; and,

- MAR 85-09-04-01, Replace SFV-18 and SFV-19.

No violations or deviations were identified.