ML20236E649
| ML20236E649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1986 |
| From: | Damon D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E191 | List: |
| References | |
| 232.9(B), 232.9(B)-R, 232.9(B)-R00, NUDOCS 8710290295 | |
| Download: ML20236E649 (16) | |
Text
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 232.9(3)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT' TYPE: SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER: 0 '
(' l TITLE: PIPING AND VALVE DESIGN Freezing of Condensate Lines PAGE 1 0F 9 REASON FOR REVISION:
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
M t? l0 t w o iF//E'/Vb
/ '- SIGNATURE 'DATE l
REVIEWS _
M REVIEW C MMI TEE
~
//h}$V' W/flf4 DATE SIGNATURE C/ /
TAS: l SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCE 5 fM M d 8710290295 h023 oo327 PDR ADOCK PDR CEG-H: [ d d M 2 im d 1-30-8b P
SRP:
SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE DATE APPROVED BY:
ECSP MANAGER DALE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
t c ,
p TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS' REPORT NUMBER:- 232.9(B) t 'SPECIAL PROGRAM i- REVISION NUMBER: 0
( PAGE 2 0F 9
- l. CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES:
Concern: Issue:
IN-85-772-005 .
Proximity of cold glycol lines to ice
" Condensate line.and glycol line condenser air handling units (AHus) ,
running next to each other is' can cause freezing of condensate not.a good design. Air water drain lines from the AHUs, handlersin July / August '84 thus preventing drainage and
.were filled with ice, causing causing clogging of AHUs.
icing.of drains and clogging.
Locationi Ice Condensers (32
~
air handlers) located at the
~ Head 2 circular stairway up '
from elev. 755'-0" in Reactor Building both units."
-l
.2. -HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN Ah0THER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X f40
.f Date 11/20/86 Documentation Identifiers:
Sequoyah Element Non-Restart Justification Summary, Report No.
232.9(B), Freezing of Condensate Lines, Prepared by. Paul R.
-Simmons, Mechanical Engineer, DNE, DSC-H17, SQNP
- 3. DOCUMENT NOS., TAG f405., LOCATIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT:
Ice condenser AHUs at WBN above elevation 755' in the Reactor Building.
- 4. INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
File IN-85-772 was reviewed on 6/18/86, and only the EC itself was found.
- 5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
See Appendix A.
0596D - 12/19/86
-___.-..-_m_ . . _
J j .- TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 232.9(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 3 0F 9
[ . t.
6., WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
- 7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See. Appendix A. l
- 8. EVALUATION PROCESS:
- a. Reviewea general arrangement drawings for hBN and SQh to' t ascertain location and environment'of ice condenser AHUs.
- b. Reviewed system flow diagrams and related text in WBN and SQh FSARs to determine systems' functional requirements and design parameters'.
- c. Reviewed Nuclear Power Experience reports on ice condenser AHU icing problems at $4N and other ice condenser plants for generic problems.
- d. Reviewed SQN piping arrangement drawings for AHU drains and glycol piping for physical proximity.
- e. Reviewed the SQN report, identified in Section.2, concerning the applicability of the EC to SQN, and compared result.s with this evaluation.
- f. Evaluated the specifics and the generic implications of the EC as they relate to SQN.
.9. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS:
Chronology:
07-08/64: Tirre period cited in concern c I
08/85: WBN concern submitted to TVA l' l.
11/18/86: TVA field inspection at SQN f !
11/20/06: TVA investigation report issued 0596D - 12/19/66
4 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:- 232.9(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 4 0F 9
.[
Discussion:
SQN and WBN incorporate the Westinghouse. ice condenser containment concept in their design. This concept utilizes a large bed of ice chips to absorb-the t.nergy release of a large pipe break, in a 1 manner analogous to that used in the BWR pressure suppression.
containment concept. The ice bed is located in'the annular space between the " crane wall" (the structure surrounding the primary coolant system components) and the steel primary containment ~
shell. The ice bed is at the level of the upper portion of the-steam. generators.
To minimize loss.of ice, this annular area is separated from the
" warm pricary containment atmosphere by ventilation barriers. There-are also wall units, inside the containment.shell and outside the cranewall,throughwhichcoldairisforcedtomaintainanicebedAir cooling temperature of 10 to 15 F during plant operation.
occurs in 30 air handling units (AHus) in two rows adjacent to the containment.shell and crane wall, immediately above the ice bed.
It should be noted that the quantity of 32 AHUs, as stated in the j
EC, is incorrect. The correct quantity for WBN (and for-SQN) is 30.
Coolant, consisting of a water / ethylene glycol (" antifreeze")
solution referred to as " glycol," is supplied at -5 F to cool-the' air in the AHUs. The glycol, in turn, is cooled in chiller units outside containment. None of this air and glycol cooling equipment' is required to perform during or following an accident; therefore, it'is not " safety-related."
Because of the very low temperature invo'lved and the presence of moisture in the air cooling the ice bed, frost continually develops 4 on the AHU surfaces. To counter this frost buildup, an automatic {
timed defrosting system is incorporated in each AHU. This system j terminates glycol flow, and initiates heaters on the cooling coil i surface and on the drip pan which collects the condensate from the i AHU and directs the condensate to the drain lines.
The EC was initiated at WBN and describes a condition of freezing-of the condensate drain lines which connect to the AHU drip pans, 1 apparently resulting in clogging of the AHUs with frost buildup, d j
According to the EC, this resulted from proximity of the AHU glycol supply lines to the condensate drain lines. Because of the ']
similarity of the WBN and SQN ice condenser designs, the EC was considered potentially applicable to SQN.
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05960 - 12/19/86
h
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.TV'A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 232.9(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 3 PAGE 5 0F 9
(
Examination of the SQN drawing of the-ice condenser AHU. glycol lines and condensate drain lines (47W462-9, Rev. 8) shows that, in the AHU' area, all of the glycol lines are above-the AHUs and all of the~condens' ate' drains are below the AHUs.. The minimum distance' between glycol and drain piping is.more than 6 feet. Also, both the glycol arid drain piping are. insulated. For SQN, therefore, .
' freezing of condensate drain lines resulting from proximity of the cold glycol lines is not a-credible event. . j Review of the event reports in Nuclear Power Experience (App. A, 5.k) indicates that there have been recurrent problems with ice. condenser AHU condensate drains. Examples of such ever. s are as follows:
a .- Sequoyah '1, October, 1980. Water in the drain'line froze due to a heat tracing tape failure. From subsequent defrost cycles, water overflowed the drain system.
- b. Sequoyah 1, December,1980. A flange gasket in a drain line leaked. Also a flow blockage was caused by freezing, rupturing the drain pipe.
.f.
- c. Sequoyah 1, January, 1981. A flange joint in a drain line leaked due to loose flange bolts. Also a drain line rupture ,
was caused by freezing of the drains, resulting from a failure of power to the heat tracing tape.
- d. Donald C. Cook 2, August, 1981. A drain line ruptured apparently due to freezing of the drains.
- e. Sequoyah 2, July, 1982. A drain line ruptured due to freezing, caused by a heat tracing tape failure.
It appears that all of the above failures of the AHU condensate drain lines either were attributed to, or could have been caused by, freezing of the condensate due to heat tracing failures. The possibility of such occurrences is better understood when examining the detail drawings of the SQN drainage piping, 47W462-9 R8 and 47W462-59 R1 ( App. A, 5.h and 1). These show that each AHU drain has an individual loop seal immediately below the flanged drain l connection to the AHU. This is necessary to prevent flow of hot L air from the primary containment to the AHU area. These individual lines terminate in lengthy, semicircular headers, all of which are contained in the AHU area which is permanently maintained at 10 to 15'F. Even with the drain lines insulated, loss of heat tracing for any length of time is very likely to result in AHU condensate drainage freezing. This necessary piping and equipment arrangement 0596b - 12/19/86
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:. 232.9(B)-
'SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 6 0F 9
-[
-of the ice condenser system is the potential-cause of drain line freezing at SQN; not their proximity to glycol lines, as . indicated
-in the WBN EC. Therefore, while the general subject of drain line freezing may be generic to SQN, the WBN cause identified is not.
In parallel with the investigation described above, TVA performed an evaluation of the EC as.it potentially applied to SQN, identified-in-Section 2 above. The resultant report confirms'the information above. The report adds information on the current
. status of the physical condition of the condensate drain line insulation at SQN. It states that portions of the insulation are "either missing or severely degraded." This is contained in a ,
listing of icing problems experienced at SQN around and beneath the AHUs. The report recommends that "this insulation should be replaced with a new insulation compatible with subfreezing temperatures."
An area of conflicting information was encountered in this evaluation. This area was also discussed in the TVA report described in the previous paragraph. The SQN FSAR, and the WBN FSAR as well, in paragraphs 6.5.5.2 and 6.7.6.2 respectively, 7
describe the AHU defrosting system. Both references state that the defrosting system includes heaters for the AHU coils and drip pans, but also-lists "a condenute drain heater," all of which are controlled by the defre 4 iImer. The condensate drain heater could be interpreted to include all, or a portion of, the condensate-drain piping. This was assumed in the TVA report (App. A, 5.j).
However, review of SQN drawing 47W462-59 shows that the condensate drain lines are heat traced from the point of connection to the AHU. As indicated earlier, the drain lines contain a loop seal immediately below this flange. This loop seal cannot be allowed to remain unheated for more than a few minutes. Power and control for the heat tracing are independent of the AHU defrost cycle .
controls. It is unclear what was meant by the term " condensate drain heater" in the FSARs, and there is no mention of the drainage piping heat tracing. It appears that the FSARs should be revised l to clarify these points.
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0596D - 12/19/86 j 1
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 232.9(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 7 0F 9
('
Findings:
l The alphabetic identifiers below correspond to the list of issues l
in Section 1.
l
- a. The ice condenser AHU glycol and condensate drain lines are l
l insulated, and the latter are heat traced. Proximity of the glycol and condensate drain lines is not the cause of condensate drain line freezing. Furthermore, at SQN the minimum distance between the glycol and condensate drain lines is more than 6 feet, which cannot be considered as
" running next to each other" as stated in the WBN EC. The identified problems do not involve safety-related components.
- b. The most probable cause of condensate drain line freezing would be related to the extensive amount of piping surrounded by a 10 to 15 F environment. Actual experience indicates that the most frequent airect cause of such freezing has been heat tracing failure. SQN has experienced a number of occurrences of freezing of AHU condensate drain lines, has
, identified specific causes for recent occurrences, and
' recommended corrective action accordingly.
- c. The SQN FSAR is unclear in regard to freeze prevention provisions for the condensate drain lines.
Conclusions:
- a. EC IN-85-772-005 is not a valid concern for SQN.
- b. The EC describes a problem that has occurred at SQN from
- causes other than those noted in the EC. The problem occurring at SQN does not involve safety-related components.
Any corrective action will be for the purposes of ensuring more efficient plant operation or elimination of maintenance prrblems.
- 10. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(Later) k OE960 - 12/19/86
1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT' NUMBER- 232.9(B)-
p SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:- 0 PAGE 8 0F 9 APPENDIX A
- 5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
-[' h. SQN Drawing 47W462-9, Rev. 8, " Reactor Building, Ice Condenser System"
- i. SQN Drawing 47W462-59, Rev. 1, " Reactor Building, Ice Condenser System, Heat Traced Process Piping"
- j. TVA Report 232.9(B), Sequoyah Element Non-Restart Justification Summary, Freezing of Condensate Lines, P. R.
Simmons,(11/20/86)
- k. Nuclear Power Experience, Volume PWR-2, Book 2, Section Vll.B, Pressure Suppression Containment, through October, 1986, updates
- 6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY UK CONTROL IN IHIS AREA 7 l)
- 7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER l
DISCUSSION 5 RELATED TO ELEMENT.
None.
05960 - 12/19/86
. h..'
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:. 232.9(B). '
8 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 9 0F 9-CATD LIST The following CATD form is included as part of this report.
232.09(B) SQN 01 )
u i
05960 - 12/19/86
~ . - . - . _ . . - _ _ . -
L Jo i1
' ECTG C.3 l
Attachment A {
Page 1 of 1 )
Revision 2 - A j l(' .
- 4 I' ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tracting Document 1 (CATD)
INITIATION
- 1. Irmediate Corrective Action Required: 0 Yes 15 No
- 2. Stop Wort Recorznended: 0 Yes R No / /- /
- 3. CATD No. ,;232.o9-sew-o1 (G)
DM6 INI)'IATIONDATE / t//9 Ih6 4.
- 5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: / 099S
- 6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: O QR O NQR Po e.Tsou 5 oG TH 6 I o t=
coa OEMSe t2, AHU CoM DGAISWTE DRh sM LINGS Mh Y WAVE IDsoL A Yt o M M f S3Ir1G- OR IN Poo ft. cO M D ITl oU. ~T*M e T'r*PL= of I M 9 ut ft 1"l opJ UA & O Mh Y MOT ~ RG SUIT'A BL E FOR. TMG G NUI R.o M M G UT*AL Co M O ITlos) $ PR.G$ e Al r Doll.t M 6 OP& E h 71br]. ,
F~ v AL U A-Y10d A U D PJ=PAIft. o 9, RE-PLACEM EAIT MhY RE UGC ES5h A.Y. At.so TM E F5 A R MA Y A)eED REV1S 100 YD C Lht2. I P Y
- 7. PREPARED BY: NAME Co 0 /(4) Wd h a W d DATE: 12 - t 9 - PL.
- 8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H '2'#/M Gf-tV/4/d//w ~'
DATE: 12. so - %
- 9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM'MGR. DATE:
l
'g'0RRECTIVEACTION
- 10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
1
~
l O ATTACHMENTS
- 11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR /MGR: DATE:
- 12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H: DATE:
SRP: DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: ,,, DATE:
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT
- 13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisf actorill
( h ireplenen ted .
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE
V g
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is m:D.TATI'FGMIIIS ENT d
cn10 f d11 dlI111 TENNESSEE VALLEY :AUTH0TMTY-
- H. L. Abercromble,; Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ONP
.TO> .
V, R. Brown. Jr.. Program Manager. Employee Concerns Task Group.
-FROM.
' Watts Bar' Nuclear Plant ONP DATE :
MAY 2 M9BT
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG).-
ELEMENT REPORTS'- ENGINEERING CATEGORY ' CONCURRENCE WITH CORRECTIVE' ACTION PLAN'(CAP)-
The category evaluation group leader. Engineering, concurs with the CAPS' presented'in the attached. reports. -
Report No. -Transmittal RIMS No. ~
~ ~ ~
223.02 SQN -S03 870326 810 229.01-SQN S03 870316 801 232.09 SQN 'S03.870226 802
.235,08 SQN S03 B70403 852 235.11 SQN- 303 870320 851 238.01 SQN SO2 870416 802 241.01 SQN- S03 870320 851 -
242.00 sQN S03 870320 851 -
W .6. Jh%
@ W R. Brown, Jr.
96 GRM:XDH
- Attachments cc -(Attachments):
RIMS MR 4N 72A-C R. C. Denney, DSC-P, Sequoyah 51817.
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l h MernOTdMd MM TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY E To : ~ __ ;
- Q Lh HcAnally, Correc'tive , Action e Pr'otram'Hanager. ONP, A108-I0B '
rnoM: :
Watts Bar' Nuclear Plant )
H. L.'Abercrombie, Site Director, O&PS-4 Segttoyah Nuclear Plant i J
urs : i FEB 27198L
SUBJECT:
, SEQUOYAHNUCLEARPLANT(SQN)-EMPLOYEECONCERNST1SKGROUP-(ECTG ELEMENT REPORT 232.09 SQN PLAN (CAP) - ENGINEERING CATEGORY - CORRECTIVE ACTION a
Reference:
W. R. Brown, Jr.'s memorandum to me dated February 13, 1987,
" Transmittal of ECSP Element Report and Corrective Action Tracking Documents (CATDs)" (T25 870213 927) -
- 1 I acknowledge ' receipt of the subject ECIG element report -and in accordance -
with the reference memorandum, Element Report 232.09 SQN has been reviewed for been applicable justified as corrective action. Please note this report has previously a nonrestart-evaluation.
By way of this memorandum I am endorsing the site line organization CAP, returning the ECTG CATD No. 232.09-SQN-01(B), and attaching.the CAP for
% your review / concurrence. This CAP is not a restart requirement. -
,)
If ECTG agrees with the proposed CAP, please have ECTG sign the ECTG concurrence the CAP tracking spacechecklist.
below item 9 on the CAP tracking checklist and return O:idual Signed'By E. 3. F. .n!cin H. L. Abercrombie RCD:JDS:JB:PW .
Attachments ~.
cc: RIMS, MR 4N 721-C (B25 '870225 002) '3 '.~ ~.T : v i D W. R. Brown, Jr.. ONP Vatts Bar (Attachments) i - Q g.g V, /
T. C. Price, S-212 SB-K (Attachments) '
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Standard Practice Page 8 i
SQA166 '
Revision 8 Attachment A Page 1 of 2 CorrectiveActionPlanofEmploheeConcernInvestigation Tracking Checklist .
ECTG Report /CATD Number 3 3 ~2., C'9 "60A/ Q'Ub# ~23 ~2 O S - TW - d b Lead Organization Responsible for Corrective Action Plan &~N de Initiation Date 7 */ 7' ? 7 CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP) '
- 1. Does this report require corrective action? Yes y No
.Ec4 (If yes, L6449 WILT describe corrective action to be'taken, if no, provide justification)
ADD IMSO': ATtW BEutMD VE4T* (*tvrAiMS. AWb PCAcE rdsoi,.ATrodoW TME R Abi AL B FAMS #M *N E' O PP E R A Av ' oF "i"F M P.
fM *r4E (SerEt BAY add RED 0cE r4 Its .c64t>E45ER . McD#tcATroM WILL HELP MAt rc9 Uc%e, RA9--Arro msorn vf* rs.N C04DEdsATrod Wue4 f e41R150fE5 to per 1r,oicDUP, sc9rboLEB por rMPr_EmeaTATeow Pest 02.Er47Aca l4 Nt Abb hJ Li,JE tf re Wd uitA "fDRLtACS . Won' RFcoeSTS wiLL. BE PLMEb e4 PbtTmN W'do) c' E.
w pecned NEW N SutAvie rJ. $1 ios.) p. ree. :t Reoo,c'.E5 wffRLY
- 2. M EC tti God)P ad 'WF OPPEE 6AV . AWY f t E FenM EutJb 15 Identify MoA/E any similar item / instances and corrective action taken.EEMtWEh,[tealfr.J.).
.n
- 3. Will corrective action preclude recurrence of findings? @ Mfe? no
- 4. Does as defined this report contain by AI-12 or NEPfindings 9.1? that are conditions adverse to cualiev (CAQ)
. YES N: y
W/k
- 6. Which MEe.g. sii:e MTW.seption/organica: /DAoto LeVF. ion is responsible for corrective action? l
- 7. Is corrective action required for restart? Yes i
(This determination is to be made using Attachment C cf SQA166.) No 1
- 8. P2 cone nut.ber for restart corrective action? Ecne rd/A '
- 9. Estimate completion date for correction action. _ DEC.EMGER. 31 19 6~1 i
Completed Ey Approved By Od dh Date _ w No 87 A P,9E % Date ECTG Concurrence _ h i, he s%kk __24 #Cb #7 0 Date _ .5 P7 l
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Standard Practice Page 9 SQA166 (s
Revicion B AITAC E C .*T A Page 2 of 2 CAP CLOSURE
- 10. Was your corrective action initiated ande complet d i
- 11. If step 10 is no. describe the correctivea action er..
Yes t kn accordan No _ _ _ _ _ _
- 13. Is the corrective action documentation e? Yes' closed?No _
14.Completed What documents By: were used to' implement c the correYes ti - No Verified By:
_ Date ve action? [ ~
ECTG Closure: Date Date __ ~
(Sten No.)
Descrictica
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< SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT j l
BET-755 Date: May 1,.1987 q Mr. George R. McNutt Engineering CEG-H Tennessee Valley A'athority-Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 .
Subject:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant ~
Employee Concern 5 Evaluation Program _
Tennessee Valley Authority
.l Job No. 3 985-026
.SE000YAH NUCLEAR PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN 232.09(B) SON 01
Dear Mr. McNutt:
The subject CAP as transmitted by TCAB-086 dated 04/12/87 responds to u,
Corrective Action Tracking Document 232.09(B) SQN 01 and commits TVA to the following actions:
- a. Add insulation behind vent curtains and place insulation on the radial beams in the upper bay of the ice condenser (ECN'L6468)
- b. Issue work requests which will add new insulation to portions of the condensate drain line (SI-108.1 and 108.2)
- c. Perform weekly inspection of ice build up in the upper bay. Any ice buildup found is to be removed.
The proposed CAP will significantly reduce the amount of ice buildup found in the upper bay of the ice condenser. However, because of the ,
subfreezing environment in the upper bay, this area will continue to serve as a condensing medium for warm moist air in upper containment. If any significant frost or ice buildup should occur after the CAP is implemented, then 51-108.1 and 108.2 will provide a suitable method for removing the same.
The aforementioned CAP is acceptable to the Evaluation Team and will be incorporated into the subcategory report.
Very truly yours, .
[G.L. Parkinson Project Manager GLP/g' 2094D .
803 86121s*802
......e..4.,
t niTen suTes covens"cs' Memoyandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY O -
W. R. Brown, Jr., Program Manager Employee Concerns Task Group, ONP, r To :
i Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FROM t }{ . L. Abercrombie, Site Director, ONP, O&PS-4, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant DATE : December 19, 1986 4
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASX GROUP ;
ENGINEERING CATEGORY REPORTS - NONRESTART JUSTIFICATION CONCURREN Rhferences: 1. Your memorandum to me dated December 4, 1986, " Watts Bar RECEIVED Nuclear Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group -
Engineering Category Concerns - Review of Elements to-Determine if They are Restart Items" (T25 861204 942)
DEC17 86
- 2. Your memorandum to me dated De.cember 5, 1986, " Watts Bar
- 5#To$(NI"5 ;
Nuclear Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group -
<wn A .m' Reoir l@udy hupn.Quen - hdW d Umuu N .
Determine if They are Restart Items" (T25 861205 954) g ---' --
MA ~
Your memorandum to me dated December 8, 1986, " Watts Bar 5.s
~l~~ 3.
Nuclear Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group -
O -- -
- Engineering Category Concerna - Review of Elements to i
~,) Determine if They are Restart Items" (T25 861208 970) h'
. g..
s - -r ~~
3 ~~
- 4. Your memorandum to me dated December 8, 1986, " Watts Bar d
l Nuclear-Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group -
Engineering Category Concerns - Review of Elements to
[L
'E Determine if They are Restart Items" (T25 861208 972)
Sb I I
m I FN (pc., in ILIn response to your requests (see above references),
the following element report nonrestart justifications have been reviewed. I concur that these reports are not required for restart:
204.5 204.8 201.6 R1 207.3 R1 241.3 204.2 207.4 R1 204.3 204.6 204.9 203.2 R2 232.9 205.3 R1 229.5 R3 204.1 204.4 204.7 204.11
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g H. L. Abercrombie RCD:JDS:JB:CS cc: RIMS' MR 4N 72A-C (B25 '861211 001, B25 '861211 004, B25 '861215 020, B25 '861215 021, B25 '861215 025, B25 '861216 021)
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T. C. Price 75'-212 SB;K 0471T t . -