ML20236B096
| ML20236B096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Brach E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B042 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8903200338 | |
| Download: ML20236B096 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGUI. ATORY COMMISSION
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REGIONI j
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MING OF PRUSSI A. PEENNSYLVANI A 19406 27 FEB 1987 l
1 MEMORANDUM FOR:
E. William Brach, Executive Coordinator for Regional l
Operations, DEDR0GR FROM:
William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects Region 1
SUBJECT:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PILGRIM
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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FOR CHAIRMAN ZECH Attached is the background information paper for Chairman Zech's visit to Pilgrim on March 10-11, 1987.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
W 111am Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Attachment:
a.
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As stated bec w/ attachment T. E. Murley M. H. McBride J. T. Wiggins DRS Section Chiefs DRSS Section Chiefs DRP file 1.22 8903200338 890310
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BACKGRDUND INFORMATION ON PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Utility:
Boston Edison Location:
4 Mi SE of Plymouth, Massachusetts County:
Plymouth County, Massachusetts Docket No.:
50-293 CP Issued:
8/26/68 s
Operating License Issued:
9/15/72 Initial Criticality:
6/16/72 (Baced on a 20% power license issued 6/9/72)
Elec. Ener. Ist Gener:
7/19/72 Commercial Operation:
12/1/72 Reactor Type:
BWR 3/4 Containment GE MKI Power Level:
670 MWe; 1998 MWt Architect / Engineer:
Bechtel NSSS Vendor:
General Electric Constructor:
Bechtel Turbine Supplier:
General Electric Condenser Cooling Method:
Once Thru Condenser Cooling Water:
Cape Cod Bay K'. 4. L,,4 wt,n-u G17 Licensing Project Manager:
hj=d;.
~,,;h (Tel:
492-N96)
NRC Responsible Region:
Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania s,t,, ty. a ThomasMr4+y, Regional Administrator James M. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator Div. of Reactor Projects:
William F. Kane, Div. Director (Tel: 8-488-1229)
(Region I)
Samuel J. Collins, Deputy Division Director (Tel:
8-488-1126)
James T. Wiggins, Section Chief (Tel: 8-488-1128)
Larry Doerflein, Project Engineer (Tel:
8-488-1132)
Senior Resident Inspector:
Martin McBride, (Tel: 8-617-747-0565)
Resident Inspector:
Jeffrey Lyash, (Tel:
same )
Tae Kim, (Tel:
same )
Management personnel (Boston Edison)
Senior Corporate Steven Sweeney Chief Executive Officer Ralph Bird Senior Vice President, Nuclear Corporate E. Howard Vice President Nuclear Engineering and QA H. Brannan Quality Assurance Manager R. Swanson Nuclear Engineering Department Manager D. Cronin Nuclear Management Services Department Manager 2/25/87
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i Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant i'
- i Management Personnel Boston Edison (Continued)
Site
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^~:1' Vice President Nuclear Operations X. Roberts Nuclear Operations Department Manager (Plant Manager)-
J. Seery Technical Section Manager N. Brosee Maintenance Section Manager
.J S. Hudson Operations Section Manager l
T. Sowdon Radiological Section Manager E. Ziemianski Training Manager Workforce Boston Edison Personnel On-Site 3'60 l
Training 59 Engineering and Corporate QA 126 ST5 Total Site Contractor Support Normal Refuel Outage 7 Maintenance and Modifications 160 815-Security 156'.
174 Radiological Control 48 211 Miscellaneous 10 74 i
Total 374 1274 Workshifts Five Operating Shifts (including a training shift) are manned.
During plant operations, two SR0s, two licensed R0s, two unlicensed operators, and one STA man each shift. The STAS work eight to twelve-hour shifts and are usually stationed adjacent to the control room.
Reactor Operators Total Licensed Operators:
33 Total number of SR0s:
16 SR0s in plant operations and 08 staff SR0s Total number of R0s:
9 R0s in plant operations. 1 is on medical restriction and has been temporarily assigned to training.
, 2/25/87 l
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- Pilerim" Nuclear' Power Plant"
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. m 3g TV ReactorOperatorExamsAdministeredbytheRedion l
, Exam Date-No. Applied
~ Pass Fail 1
l December 10, 1984~
'7 SR0s-4 3* -
3 R0s 2
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'May'5,~1986 2 SR0s.
2.
0 5 R0s.
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" Passed make up. exam on May 14', 1985'
'.*.[Date'ofnextscheduledexam: Mai1987
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Number of Applicants: '
9 R0s* (No SR0s are curren,tly in training)
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- These will be granted a:1imited license.until the candiffates meet the NRC
-time-on-shift and reactivity manipulation requirements.
P_1_ ant ' Simulator -
A' plant-specific simulator has been built by CAE Electronics in Canada.
Simulator installation in the licensee's training facility is< scheduled for the end of'1987. The installation was delayed to' allow operators to train on the Pilgrim simulator (in Canada) prior to plant startup.
jq Systematic ~ Assessment of, Licensee Performance (SALP)
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i A SALE,aview was conducted for the period of October 1, 1984 through October 31 j
- 1985 andLa report issued on May 23, 1986. A copy of the report is attached.
t The'most recent SALP period ended January 31, 1987, and the report is currently.
under preparation.
~ Escalated Enforcement Actions No escalated enforcement actions are pending, proposed, or under consideration.
j The licensee has agreed to seek the Region I Administrator's approval orior to startup from the current outage. (Confirmatory Action Letter 86-10). The confirmatory action letter addressed three hardware problems:
(1) repeated
. inadvertent: pressurization of the residual heat removal system, (2) spurious closures of the main steam line isolation valves, and (3) the inability to I
open the outboard main steam line isolation valves after the isolations. Two I
of the..three issues have largely been resolved. The third issue will be
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resolved following startup testing from this outage. A copy of CAL 86-10 is attached.
.. 2/25/87 1
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1 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant I
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. Escalated Enforcement Actions (continued)
The CAL 86-10 agreement was extended in August 1986 to address issues that snvolve both nardware and management concerns. The licensee will submit a
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detailed assessment of startup readiness to NRC Region I at least 45 days prior to startup.
The Regional Administrator will review this assessment and perform a special readiness inspection prior to recommending approval for restart.
A petition to shutdown Pilgrim under 10 CFR 2.206 was filed on July 15, 1986 by State Senator William Golden and others. This petition seeks a hearing to suspend the Pilgrim license until deficiencies in plant management, containment I
design and offsite emergency planning are resolved. The petitio.. is being reviewed.by the NRC IE:HQ staff.
A cl'os Yrou*g.eoutinspectionafaFadiationImrrever*~ ;- eram mandated upon BEco
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h an NRC Orderidd
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-Em'eroency Prepa rednes s
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Pilgrim' was rated as SALP Category 3 in the area of Emergency Preparedness during th.e previous SALP period.
Significant improvement has been noted during the SALP period just ended.
Improvements have been evident by demonstrated high level management attention and support to the program.
The EP corporate staff has been increased from 1 to 8, with 2 more positions approved but not yet filled.
HRC Region I played in the off year exercise conducted on December 10, 1986.
This exercise utilized the new near-site EOF.
The state and local governments declined to participate in this exercise; this has raised some concerns with certain state and local political figures. No significant deficiencies were identified during the exercise.
Significant improvement over the previous exercise was noted.
The state Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Pilgrim has not received final FEMA approval under 44CFR350.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has not been responsive to FEMA Region I requests for action to resolve identified plan deficiencies.
FEMA made an interim finding of reasonable assurance based on its observations during exercises.
The Secretary of Public Safety for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Charles V.
Barry) has submitted a report to the Governor assessing the status of emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim station. The report raises several issues with regard to the RERP and recommends that the state create a Technological Hazards Divisien funded by the state's nuclear utilities and staffed by personnel capab'te of monitoring plant operations. Also, the report recommends extending the EPZ to 20 miles.
NRC Region I is committed to review this report prior to restart and consider its findings in the restart decision.
FEMA has co.hmitted to perform a self-initiated review of the Pilgrim RERP, however, the schedule for this review has not yet been developed.
The aspects of Senator Golden's 2.206 petition which involves emergency planning are being reviewed by NRC and FEMA (Region and Headquarters).
, 2/25/87
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i Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant 1
I Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) l Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - This facility was made operational in June 1986 and is located within five miles of the site.
It was used during the annual exercise in December 1986.
It is designed to meet NUREG-0737 criteria.
i Technical Support Center (TSC) - This facility is designed to meet NUREG-0737 criteria and was tested during the last annual emergency exercise.
Operational Support Center (OSC) - This facility is designed to meet NUREG-0737 criteria and was tested during the Itst emergency preparedness exercise.
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plant Status (Pilgrim - Unit j';.
Recent Outages - Refueling:
December, 1983 - Recirculation pipe replacement and refueling no. 6 outage -
(13 months)
July 1986 - Refueling no. 7 outage - ongoing (estimated about fif teen months)
Recent Outages - Maintenance:
January 1986 Turbine generator and MSIV maintenance (3 days)
March 1986 Repaired water hammer damage to RHR head spray piping and MSIV maintenance (4 days)
March 1986 Repaired cracked weld in reactor vessel instrument line (16 days)
April 1986 Repaired leaking RHR valve and MSIV maintenance (4 days)
April 1986 Investigated the cause of: (1) inadvertent pressurization of RHR piping, (2) spurious MSIV isolations, and (3) the inability to open the outboard MSIV's following the isola-tions. Subsequently, the licensee extended the outage to implement management program improvements. The out6ge was further extended to inspect RHR pumps for impeller wear ring damage and to conduct containment leakage testing. On July 25, 1986, the licensee announced that the outage would be extended until early 1987 for three major tasks: (1) completion of fire protection modifications required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R (2) impleme.ttation of certain containment I
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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
' enhancements, and (3) plant refueling. Other planned outage modifications include installation of a feedwater hydrogen addition system, installation of new secondary containment dampers, in:ta11ation of a new plant computer, replacement of reactor instrumentation with analog-trip instrumentation, and. relocation of reactor vessel water level instrumentation (reference legs) outside primary containment. (10 months -
expected duration from April, 1986).
Plant Operations - Pilgrim.is currently shut down for an extended refueling and maintenance outage.
-The Chairman should be aware that:
A new Plant Manager (K. Roberts) was appointed on February 4',1987 (Mr. Roberts had formerly been Director of Outage Management). The previous plant manager had only been.in place for nine months.
A new Senior Vice President - Nuclear (Ralph G. Bird) was appointed on January 7, 1987, to take effect February 20, 1987.
.In contrast with 1986, 1985 was the best operating year in the history of the plant.
Pilgrim has historically had a high level of worker radiation exposures due to excessive plant contamination.
High-radiation plant areas are due to poor radiological practices and operating with defective fuel during a cycle 'in 1975. Some progress has been made'in reducing plant contamination in recent years. The licensee intends to extensively decontaminate the plant during the current outage.
Some of the current licensed operator (RO) candidates have expressed i
interest in transferring to other jobs.
If these people do not sit for the license exam in May 1987, RO shortage could extend until 1988.
. ?/25/87
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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
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'AEOD Analysis of Operationa'l l
j Experience.at oilgrim
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n The following. summarizes AE00's review of the Pilgrim operating experience i
since January 1,1986.
j
'E Significant Events / Abnormal Occurrences
.Dur.ing this period, there were several-significant events reported by the licensee, either under 10 CFR 50.73 or 10 CFR 21.21. These are summarized.
below.
l (2) On April 4 and 12, 1986, the Pilgrim reactor scrammed from. low power during routine reactor shutdowns. Both. scrams were caused by unexpected group I primary containment isolations.
In both cases, l
the isolation signal was promptly reset, but the four outboard main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) could not be promptly reopened.
As a result, the main condenser was not available as a heat sink during a portion of the reactor cooldown. A shutdown on April 11 was-initiated because the residual heat removal (RHR). system had been pressurized by leakage of reactor coolant past a check valve and two closed injection valves in the "B".RHR loop. An Unusual Event was declared because of the RHR valve. leakage.
Because of concerns about the recurring isolation and RHR valve i
leakage problems, an NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was sent to inspect and evaluate the events. The AITs report was issued on a
May 16,~1986 by Region I as Inspection Report No. 50-293/86-17.
Region I is following the licensees corrective actions. As of March 24, 1986, the plant remained shutdown under the mandate of a Confirmatory Action Letter issued by Region I on April 12, 1986.
The above event was reported in Appendix C ("Other Events of Interest") in NUREG-0090, Vol. 9, No. 2 (" Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences: April-June 1986").
(2) During May 1986, the licensee notified the NRC under the provisions of 10 CFR 21.21 that a significant design deficiency had been 1
discovereo in the residual flow protection logic at Pilgrim. A postulated single failure of a flow sensing instrument could result in all RHR pumps running without flow.
If not detected in time, pump damage could occur and systems designed to_ remove decay heat under both normal and accident conditions could be severely degraded.
The licensee is evaluating both short-term and long-term corrective actions. The licensee committed to implementing short-term modi-fications prior to restart from the current outage desertbed in Item (1) above. 2/25/87 4
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I Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant This item was reported as an abnormal occurrence (A0 86-9, " Boiling Water Reactor Emergency Core Cooling System Design Deficiency") in NUREG-0090, Vol. 9, No. 2 referenced In Items (1) above. As dis-cussed in the report, it was found that the same design deficiency existed in Dresden Units 2 and 3, and Quad Cities 1 and 2.
(3) During August 1986, the licensee reported that the plant's Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) was susceptible to single failures that could result in exceeding the 10 CFR Part 100 design basis offsite accident dose criteria. This determination was made while the licensee was addressing resolution of a 1983 event associated with water saturation of one bank of charcoal filters in the SGTS due to actuation of the water deluge system. The licensee a'nalyses of the SGTS single failure modes identified three subsystems associated with the water deluge system's active components that could lead to failure to the SGTS to perform its design function due to a single active failure.
The licensee is performing detailed, systematic analysis of single failure vulnerabilities of the SGTS and will ensure that the system's design basis will be met before reactor startup from the current outage described in Item (1) above.
Other Operational Data (1) Reactor Trips - As discussed previously, the plant has been shutdown since April 12, 1986.
From January 1,' 1986 through April 12, 1986, there were four reactor protection sys, tem actuations.(RPSs) which involved control rod motion. These occurred on January 6 and 16, 1986 (both due to personnel error) and on April 4, and 12, 1986 (both due to equipment problems).
(2) ESF Actuations - During 1986, Pilgrim experienced eight non-RPS emergency safety feature (ESF) actuations. No direct comparison to an industry average can be made since the plant was shutdown most of the year, even though some actuations can occur whether the plant is shut down or not. Of the eight actuations, two resulted in activa-tions of safety equipment, five resulted in an isolation of equipment /
systems, and one resulted in both. Two of the equipment activations involved the emergency diesel generators in response to loss of offsite power and the third involved activation of the SGTS.
Systems involved in the isolations included the containment system, main steam system, RHR/LPCI system, and RWCU system.
Causes of the ESF actuations were due to various reasons including spurious actuations, weather related, equipment problems, and personnel errors.
(3) NPRDS Data - NPRDS component failure reports were made most frequently on components in three systems - Main Steam-(MS), Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR). Overall, main steam system MSIVs dominatec as the primary component experiencing problems.
RPS reports were primarily associated with calibration problems.
RHR, plus feedwater and HPCI system, reports were primarily valve leakage and flow indication problems. 2/25/87
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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant i
Summary:
3 The. licensee has; experienced numerous problems during 1986 and has remained shutdown since April 12, 1986, in order to take the corrective actions
- necessary to receive NRC permission to restart the plant.'
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- NRR Operating Reactor Assessment Several deficiencies in the Fire Protection Program have been identified,
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as a result of NRC's review of the program and inspections. These are in the areas of maintenance, degraded fire barriers, excessive use of fire-watches as compensatory measures and inadequate training. Staff is also-reviewing the requested exemptions from Appendix R.
BEco has committed.
to resolve all open items pMor to restart from the present ' refueling.
.., outage (RO'7). The NRC fire prote;: tion audit is seneduled for May 1987.
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As a result of NRC's review of the Control Room Design Review report, BECo-has informed the staf.f (1/20/87) of its intention to re-screen the Human Engineering Discrepancies using a more detailed process than previously used. The ' schedule for the supplementary summary report is 4 months following the end of RO 7.
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On' July 13,'1984, the NRC staff, by Amendment No. 75 to the license, approved BEco's Plan for an integrated program for scheduling safety modifications at the Pilgrim Station. The program integrates the engineering,' procurement and installation of planned NRC-required 1
modifications.with BEco's own.~ requirements for plant modifications, maintenance, refueling, and operations.
The, semi-annual update to this Plan,.however, is overdue.
BECo is one of the first facilities to install a permanent hydrogen water chemistry process. This will be completed prior to restart from RO 7.
The system will inject hydrogen into the reactor coolant-via the feedwater system to reduce the dissolved oxygen concentration. Reducing the dissolved oxygen concentration and maintaining high purity in the reactor coolant should reduce the susceptibility of reactor piping and materials to intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
NRR Operating Reactor Assessment BECo is planning several enhancements to its Mark I containment including modifications that would permit direct venting from the torus to the main stack, a modification to the containment spray nozzles, installation of a fire-water intertie to RHR system, and the addition of a third diesel generator.
These will be completed before restart from RO 7.
Over the last few years, the licensee has requested many TS changes which should be either withdrawn or modified to reflect the current plant design.
BECo was informed and is currently reviewing all the previous TS change requests. 2/25/87
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Public Issues l
Deficiencies in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts emergency plan have beer, alleged by various citizen groups, and in a report prepared for Governor Dukakis by the Massachusetts Secretary of Public Safety (Barry). Area
.esidents have criticized the offsite plan at public meetings and expressed
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concern that FEMA has not fully approved it.
BECo management problems have been highlighted in the press.
NRC l
statements that Pilgrim is one of the worst plants in the country caused significant public concern.
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- Reg. ion I nanagement and the Senior Resident Inspector have participated in numerous public meetings and interacted with the state legislature at l
,... hearjngs.
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.s for interested parties and the pubTic.
These haw-eeen weil received.
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A report of increased cancer rates around the plant by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health has raised local public interest regarding alleged unmonitored releases from the plant.
The state has not ruled out Pilgrim releases as the cause of the increased cancer rate.
The Boston Globe (and other press) has indicated that Pilgrim's Mark I containment is similar to Chernobyl, and has a high probability of failure in the event of a serious accident.
A local public interest group is alleging that Pilgrim had a significant offsite release of radioactive materials in 1982. Although radioactive resin beads were inadvertently released from the reacter building stack at that time, an NRC inspection team found no evidence that the material went offsite.
The 2.206 petition has received press attention due to the involvement of state legislators.
State hearings are being held on Pilgrim.
Attachments:
1.
BECo. Organizational Chart 2.
Confirmatory Action Letter 86-10, dated 4/12/86, and the August 27, 1986 followup letter.
3.
SALP Report dated 5/23/86 4.
Site Location and Area Maps 5.
NRC IE Safety System Functional Inspection report 50-293/85 2/25/87 l
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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY n:
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PILGRIM I
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND.
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER i
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E. Howard W bb6 I
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D.Cronin H. Bra nnan D.Swanson
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TECHNICAL-MAINTENANCE PERATIONS RADIOLOGICAL SECTION SECTION ECTION SECTION J. Seery N. Brosee.
S. Hudson T. Sowdon L,c h A n \\, k it. n Tt. L., L, a i
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