ML20235V459
| ML20235V459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1987 |
| From: | Nauman D SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707230184 | |
| Download: ML20235V459 (4) | |
Text
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W ey gugg.g29218 Nuclear Operations SCE&G.
- " *r July'14, 1987 g } j l}l. l g P l?. : 55 Dr. J. Nelson Grace Region Administrator-i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323
SUBJECT:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 NRC Inspection Report 87-14
Dear Dr. Grace:
Enclosed are the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) responses to the violations addressed in Enclosure 1 of NRC Inspection Report 50-395/87-14.
SCE&G is in agreement with the alleged violations, and the enclosed responses address.the reasons for the violation and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.
If you should have any questions, please advise.
1 trulfyours, N
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NWY 4
0 ian MDB: DAN /bjh Enclosure cc:
- 0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.
G. O. Percival E. C. Roberts R. L. Prevatte
- 0. S. Bradham J. B. Knotts, Jr.
J. G. Connelly, Jr.
M. D. Blue D. R. Moore Marsh & McLennan W. A. Williams, Jr.
I&E Washington Group Managers Document Management W. R. Baehr Branch W. T. Frady INP0 Records Center C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
ANI Library R. M. Campbell, Jr.
NPCF
-K. E. Nodland File J. C. Snelson hkND
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l ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION VIOLATION N0. 50-395/87-14-02 I.
ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is in agreement with the alleged violation.
II.
REASON FOR THE VIOLATION On May 26, 1987, plant personnel, after initially discovering a leak in the vicinity of C reactor coolant pump at approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, spent a considerable amount of time attempting to identify the exact location of the leak. At 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br /> after several reactor building entries, operations and maintenance personnel determined the leakage to be in the area of the seal injection line on C reactor coolant pump and appropriately entered this suspected pressure boundary leakage in the Removal and Restoration log. At this point, however, since the exact location of the leakage was still unknown, operations personnel and station. management did not consider it reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage and therefore did not consider it necessary to declare the Notification of Unusual Event (N00E). At approximately 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br />, the leak was determined not to be isolatable and confirmed as pressure boundary leakage exceeding the limiting conditions for operations specified in Technical Specifications Section 3.4.6.2, " Operational Leakage." At 1820 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.9251e-4 months <br /> the Licensee declared the NOUE.
The cause of this violation has been attributed to personnel error.
Operations personnel and station management were not sensitive enough I
to rapidly classify the leakage as RCS pressure boundary leakage and declaring a NOUE in accordance with the station's Emergency Plan.
III.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TAXEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED None taken.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION This event will be included in Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) training with emphasis on the timely recognition of RCS pressure boundary leakage and the need for timely declaration of the appropriate emergency classification.
Station management will also review the details of this event as a part of emergency plan recurring training with the emphasis on timely recognition of events which require appropriate emergency classification.
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, s' ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION VIOLATION NO. 50-395/87-14-01 V.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE For licensed operators, the training addressed in Section IV will begin with requalification class LOR 87-04 starting August 24, 1987.
Special emergency plan training for station management will be completed by October 30, 1987.
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ENCLOSURE 2 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION VIOLATION N0. 50-395/87-14-02 I.
ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is in agreement with the alleged violation.
II.
REASON FOR THE VIOLATION The cause of this violation is considered to be a design deficiency.
On May 8, 1987 with the plant in Mode 6 for the third refueling outage, the Licensee performed Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 125.009, "B Diesel Generator Refueling Operability Test." This test requires a simulated station blackout and a degraded voltage condition test after a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> diesel operability test. During performance of the station blackout section of the STP, the B service water booster pump (SWBP) started and then tripped on low suction pressure.
After engineering evaluation, the Licensee determined that a design deficiency existed which resulted in a SWBP trip due to a transient low suction pressure condition.
As this design deficiency had not been previously recognized, the emergency operating procedures did not include restarting of the SWBPs to restore reactor building cooling unit operability after a SWBP trip.
III.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The Licensee removed the low suction pressure trip from the auto start trip circuits of the SWBPs and retested the SWBPs satisfactorily per STP 125.009 on May 17, 1987.
Low syction pressure to the SWBPs is identified by an alarm on the main control board.
In addition, the Licensee has reviewed the plant design to ensure low suction pressure trip features on other pumps required for plant safety do not prohibit the pumps from performing their safety function.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION In addition to the immediate corrective action taken, the Licensee will remove the low suction pressure trip from the SWBP manual start circuits.
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V.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE The Licensee will be in full compliance with the preceding corrective action by August 30, 1987.
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