ML20235L802

Summarizes Region I 840104 Response to IE 831221 Request Re Falsification of NDE Records at Plant.Ie Recommends Issuance of Info Notice to Highlight Problems of Verifying Worker Certification & Making Background Checks

ML20235L802
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/20/1984
From:	Haass W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:	Partlow J, Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20235L659	List: ML20235L655 ML20235L802 ML20235L875 ML20235L967
References
FOIA-86-188 NUDOCS 8710050604
Download: ML20235L802 (2)

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UNITED 5T ATES ISSION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM 9, ff

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) James M. Taylor, Deputy Directorof Inspection MEMORANDUM FOR: Office tr and James G. Partlow, Acting Direc oSafeguards Division of Quality Assurance, Inspection Programs- t nt f or Allegations

. i Walter P. Haass, Specialent Assis a '

and Investigations FROM: Office of Inspection andSEABROOK .

Enforcem FALSIFICATION OFT.Falsificat NDEion"RECORDS Murley, dated' AT l

SUBJECT:

1 Memorandum, R. Starostecki to"NRC '

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REFERENCES:

January 4, 1984 Murley, " Falsification 21, 1983 Memorandum, R. C. DeYoung to T." dated Dec ,

2 of NDE Records at Seabrook, d responses actionscan(Reference l

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tly to IE's three requeste The lephone /

Region I has respor.ded 4,indirec 1984 (Reference 1). Reference 1 an by a memorandum dated January summarized as follows based Program onwith Region I personnel:

discussions i E record ig Adequacy of Seabrook'st Audit duringngthe period of NDto be be consis 1.

The QA auditing program d with FSAR commitments, in effecwas determinedand to by Regio falsificationNRC guidance the licensee. and Since requirements, committed to the identification d supervisory an of effectively implementedi bynsee has falsification problem, the These l ce actions include tractor toincrea ed and improve the auditing program.and is being independent satisfactorily auditing, perfor field NDE checks activities on allk shif ts, an a:

verify that ongoing NDE wor first f@

o evaluated.

acceptable response to IE's g considered to be an ician is Acceptable I The above is 8d g

requested action. '

ed by the Offending Techn formed by the M tn Verification that Workeexamine Perform all 2399 NDE's the persuspect that ND O$ 2 The licensee has taken steps completed to ritewith thethefactresultE tha offending technician desp work is safety related. This i work has beentionsg; 7g were identifi 94 welds with rejectable ir.d ca itioned. 3 i

wil1 be appropriately dispos thMx

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The above is considerd to be an acceptable response to IE's second requested action.

3. Assurance that only Qualified Personnel are Used to Perform Safety Related Activities 1

Region _I has determined that the licensee's contractor performed a check i of the offending technician's background prior to hiring consistent with NRC guidance. This consisted of implementation of SNT-TC-1A guidance that l' involves proof of prior certification (albeit falsified) and general,

- specific and practical examinations to demonstrate ability. The contractor )

even went beyond these recommended practices by contacting the l

individual's last employer for verification, which was positive. l Despite thie above practices, an unqualified individual was accepted for employment. This event, as well as others mentioned by Region I personnel  !

in a telephone discussion, has led Region I to recommend that'further guidance be developed in the area of certification and background checks of prospective employees. The corrective action adopted by the Seabrook contractor is verification of an NDE employee's entire resume with regard to claims of prior certification. While this exceeds what may be appropriate for NRC guidance, it is recommended, at a minimum, that an Information Notice be issued highlighting this problem to other licensees

• and contractors, and suggesting the need for additional precautions including more frequent supervisory checks and independent audits (See

' Item I above) to provide greater assurance that employees are performing activities affecting safety in accordance with the licensee's policies

. and procedures.

By copy of this memorandum, it is requested that the QA Branch prepare and issue an Information Notice that reflects the above.

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. Walter P. Haass, Sp,ecial Assistant for Allegations and Investigations Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosures:

l References 1 & 2 cc: R. C. DeYoung, IE T. E. Murley, RI y

- R. W. Starostecki, RIV J. A. Axelrad, ES G. T. Ankrum, QUAB E. L. Jordan, DEPER '

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ENCLOSURE 1 / [ik JAN 0 . ;E; T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I MEMORANDUM FOR: -

• FROM:

R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs

SUBJECT:

NRC FOLLOW-UP ~ SEABROOK NDE FALSIFICATION i

On May 4,1983 Region I was notified, by Public Service Company of New Hampshire, j in accordance with 10 CFR 5D.55(e), of the questionable performance of material  ;

and weld surface nondestructive examinations (NDE) by one contractor technician.

Prior to any determination of f falsification, the licensee's internal investiga- l tion revealed that NDE procedures had been violated. This information was -l sufficient to cause the contractor to terminate the subject technician and

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place on hold all 2,399 nondestructive examinations performed by the individual, until re-examination and disposition could be performed. It is noted that ,,

although only 33% of the suspect NDE work was performed on safety-related {

i welds, the licensee decided to evaluate all 2,399 cases. As a result of this k, incident 'in May, I personally contacted the Executive Vice President of PSNH, b>

Mr. David Merrill, and emphasized to him the need for a thoroughi '

alreadf taken steps in this matter. Additional meetings were also held with l both PSNH and YAEC to discuss th6 performance in general of the subject j j j

contractor. o As part of our effort we have been reviewing a number of licensee-initiated reports as well as conducting independent inspections.' Upon completion of the 01 effort we were able to conclude that there was no management complicity. ,

However, IE staff expressed their interest' by telephant and my staff has kept them fully informed and ativised. f By memo dated December 21, 1983 IE requested certain actions relative to the Seabrook NDE falsification issue., Our prior actions appear to have adequately anticipated the IE concerns since we also had the same concerns test May.

However, it is disheartening to note that telephone discussions on this very topic were not sufficient and resources had to be, diverted to prepare additional i documentation several months after we have cor: ducted meetings with the licensee and on-site inspections on the topic. In an' environment where resources are ]

extremely strained and where the subject plant is in the midst of a volatile public hearing, I question the motivation to divert inspection resources to prepare more ' paper' in light of the fact that the information is already available and documented. More recent inspection effort will be documented shortly. .

Review, by resident and regional inspectors, independently, of the audit program, in existence at the time of the incident indiccted that the program was being conducted in accordance with NRC requirement and FSAR commitments.

The contractor NDE staff organizationally reports to the contractor Field QA Manager. Cont'ractor QA auditors, located on-site, and licensee (thru their

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agent - Yankee Atomic Electric Company, YAEC) auditors conduc4 periodic audits

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l Memo to T. E. Murley '

2 JAN 0 13S4 M' g of the contractor NDE program. A key operation in providing assurance of QC #h' b'Q,e field activities is the YAEC surveillance program. Specifically, YAEC NDE personnel had been and still do conduct 100'. review of contractor accepted i S, s radiographs. Also, YAEC QA inspectors conduct both random and scheduled sur- gM -

veillances of field NDE work. An example of this activity is appended to the ",

isiiEyect investigation report, in that a YAEC surveillance report documents an earlier identified violation of the conduct of a liquid penetrant examination by the offending NDE technician: In this case, the work was nonsafety-related and corrective action consisted of reconduct of the examination and verifica- j tion that the technician was knowledgeable of the procedural requirements. It should also be noted that the original NDE fal.sification problem was identified r g. - "/

by the contractor when another NDE technician identifi.ed a concern with the c #

of fending technician's acceptance of a weld. Followup of that concern through.

the contractor's program led to the 10 CFR 50.55(e) re' port.

1 The re-examination of previously accepted work is not considered to be required for an effective audit program. Yet in this case, which involved randnm and periodic falsification, it appears that a re-examination program may have been the only quantitative method to establish the existence of a problem. As one of f)" f '

the corrective actions, the licensee has instituted a sample NDE re-examination V' -

program. Althouah this action is bevond any regulatory requirement and beyond g (

the norm of NDE activities observed in the nuclear construction industry the "P ~

licensee did institute this effort and we strongly encouraged the initiative at senior management levels.

I I Subsequent to the identification of the NDE falsification, the licensee committed ,.. #'

to the following actions relative to oversight of NDE activities. These commitments ' '

are documented in Inspectioh Report 50-443, 444/83-06, and were discussed during a June 7,1983 meeting.

-- A sample re-inspection of other contractor NDE technician work with results confirming that the problem was restricted to the one individual.

-- Increased contractor supervisory field checks and independent auditing. h '

Increased _ licensee" surveillance of NDE activities on all j2 sliif ts.

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-- Establishment nf a 1wnua nrocram for "information only" NDE to be performed by an independent contractor to verify that ongoing NDE work has l been and is being satisfactorily performed and correctly evaluated. /

While the current NDE audit program may be rnore prescriptive and better directed to the identification of NDE problems, we do consider the former NDE audit program to have been consisten_t eith existino OA outdance and tof M Ib'

• have been effectively implemented by the licensee. ) .[ s

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Memo to T. E. Murley 3 I

The evaluation of all suspect areas was completed by.the licensee on December i 15, 1983. The rm-examinaiton process identified 94 welds with re.fectabia.

- indications. NRC Region I technicians conducted an inspection of the licensee's re examination program in November, 1983, independently examining a sample of accepted welds and evaluating the disposition of others. No adverse findings resulted from that inspection. After review of the Final 50.55(e) Report, ,

dated December.21, 1983, a further inspection is planned to evaluate, in {

detail, the status and disposition uf each.of the questioned welds. However, it appears from the information available that the licensee is adequately addressing i al.1 hardware concerns and with the final repair or replacement of the rejected 94 welds, no hardware problems will remain. .

In addition to the concerns for hardware and program adequa'cy, as discussed above, a further Region I concern regarding management know' ledge and involve-ment in this issue, particularly the f falsification aspects, was addressed by an NRC investigation conducted by 01. The final report, which has been issued to the Region and also transmitted to the Department of Justice for their review, confirms falsification by one technician, but finds no managerial wrongdoing or conspiratorial cover-up actiyities. The falsification by the technician went i beyond his conduct of certain nondestructive evaluations and involved apparently forged and false certification of past NDE employment and false statements of educational level.

@1 While it may be argued that a more thorough background check would have uncoveredT that certain of the individual's prior certification claims were false, we find b no technical or regulatory requirement for such a rigorous background check. In j this case the personnel qualification and certification practices of the /

American Society for Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-1A were followed in that the subject. technician had " proof of prior certification" (albeit falsified) and was given General, Specific and Practical Examinations at Seabrook to demonstrate his ability to perform the NDE work he would be .

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assigned. In fact, the contractor went beyond these recommended practices by

>I contacting the individual's last

• employer (US Testing working for Florida Power i#

and Light on the St. Lucie project) to verify his employment and certification, which were substantiated. It is interesting to note that had US Testing or FP&L ;

conducted a similar verification with the previous employer, they would have determined that the technician was terminated for cause at Pittsburgh Testing Labs for falsifying radiographs.

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The above discussion illustrates the lack of specific regulatory guidance in )

the area of personnel certification. Currently at Seabrook, the subject contractor [ f,,

has a program for verifying an NDE employ.ee's o entire resume with regard to \

claims of nrine certiticat%s. This program has been backfitted to all technicians. This is being accomplished because the subject problem occurred [i%.

at Seabrook, and not because of any regulatory requirement. j

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f 9:m Memo to T. E. Murley 4 i

Of the listing provided in the enclosure to the December 21, 1983 letter from <

Mr. DeYoung, Circular No. 80-22 is the most relevant IE information to this problem on the subject of Confirmation of Employee Qualifications. However,, it is silent as to what constitutes an acceptable employment policy. The appro- -

1 priate (ie: SNT-TC-1A) measures were in practice at Seabrook and employment j procedures reflected a reasonable attempt at past employment confirmation. i Based upon NRC inspections and investigation efforts and upon licensee correc-tive action programs, we conclude there is currently no known hardware or programmatic problem at Seabrook with regard to the conduct of NDE work. Based on the licensee's six supplemental and Final 50.55(c) Report, further in-

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spection will be conducted to evaluate and close this issue.

l in my view, current information indica'tes a situation which does not warrant enforcement action. The problem was licensee identified and app' ears to have been adequately corrected, both programmatic and hardware issues, by licensee initiated actions. No technical or regulatory requirement was violated by the licensee. A net positive result of the entire incident was to rid the nuclear construction effort at Seabrook of an individual of questionable integrity.

While enforcement action is not recommended, we do recognize the need to highlight the lack of NRC guidance on the subject of certification to IE Headquarters. To reinforce this need, one can postulate that the subject technician may currently be working as an NDE technician at some other nuclear site. s A copy of this letter is being provided to IE Headquarters not only to reinforce our position with regard to the counterproductive impact of enforcement action, but also to provide a background and basis for the generic review of the need for further guidance in the area of certification and background checks of professional employees. ,

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Richard . Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident ,/

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cc: .

J Axelrad Director, Enforcement Staff '

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