ML20235F247
| ML20235F247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1987 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235F234 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707130290 | |
| Download: ML20235F247 (10) | |
Text
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A-TTACHMENT A
Revise.the Technical Specifications as follows:
Remove Page Insert Page.
3f4 7-16 3/4 7 ;.
'3/4 7-18
.3/4 7-18 L.
3/4 7-18a 3/4 7-18a 3/4 7-18b 3/4 7-18b 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-17 3/4.9-17 B 3/4 3-3 B 3/4 3-3 8707130290 870701 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P
PDR L_.__.__.._
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 The control room emergency habitability system is OPERABLE when:
a.
Two out of three emergency ventilation subsystems,
Five bottled air pressurization subsystems consisting of two bottles per subsystem are OPERABLE **, and l
c.
The series normal air intake and exhaust isolation dampers for both units are
- OPERABLE, and capable of automatic closure on a
- CIB, Control Room High Radiation and Chlorine isolation signal, or closed.
d.
The control room air temperature is maintained <88'F.
APPLICABILITY:
- a. With either unit
- in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, or
- b. During irradiated fuel movement or movement of loads over irradiated fuel at either unit and a.
above or
- c. Refer to T.S.
3.9.15 when both units are in either MODES 5 or 6 ACTION:
a.
With less than two emergency ventilation subsystems, fans, and associated filters
days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
a.1 With an emergency ventilation subsystem inlet isolation damper open and not capable of being closed, the requirements of 3.0.3 are applicable.
J b.
With one bottled air pressurization subsystem inoperable, restore five bottled air pressurization subsystems to OPERABLE within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.1 With less than four bottled air pressurization subsystems
)
- OPERABLE, the requirements of 3.0.3 are applicable and movement of irradiated fuel shall be suspended.
Emergency power for one train of dampers of the Unit in MODES 5 or 6 need not be available.
The air bottles may be isolated for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for performance of instrumentation and control systems testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 PROPOSED WORDING
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 3.
Verifying a
system ficw rate of 800 - 1000 cfm during system operation.
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined l
HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is <6 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 800 - 1000 cfm.
2.
Verifying that on a
chlorine / control room high radiation / containment phace B
isolation test signal from either
- Unit, the system automatically closes all l the series isolation ventilation system dampers which isolate the combined control room from the outside atmosphere.
3.
Verifying that one emergency ventilation subsystem maintains the combined control room at a
positive pressure of 11/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
4.
Verifying that the heaters dissipate 5 1 0.5 kw when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
4.7.7.1.2 The BV-2 emergency ventilation subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room air temperature is <88*F.
b.
At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through each HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and by verifying that each train operates for 15 minutes.
c.
At least once per 18 months, or after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation and (1) after each complete or partial replacement of a
HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber bank, or (2) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (3) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
1.
Verifying that the filtration system satisfies the in-place penetration and by-pass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1%
when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 800-1000 cfm.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 PROPOSED WORDING
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, Continued 2.
Subjecting the carbon contained in at least one test canister or at least two carbon samples removed from one of the charcoal adsorbers to a laboratory carbon sample analysis and verifying a removal efficiency of 199%
for radioactive methyl iodine at an air flow velocity of 0.70 ft/sec 120%
with an inlet methyl iodine concentration of 1.5 to 2.0 mg/m3, 170% relative
- humidity, and 30*C 11/2*C; other test conditions shall be in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
The carbon samples not obtained from test canisters shall be prepared by either:
a)
Emptying one entire bed from a removed adsorber
- tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining a
sample volume equivalent to at least two inches in diameter and with a length equal to the thickness of the bed, or b)
Removing a
longitudinal sample from an adsorber tray using a
slotted-tube
- sampler, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining a
sample volume equivalent to at least two inches in diameter and with a length equal to the thickness of the bed.
3.
Verifying a
system flow rate of 800 to 1000 cfm during system operation.
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying that the pressure drop for the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.6 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 800 to 1000 cfm.
2.
Verifying that on a
Containment Isolation Phase B/ Control Room High Radiation test signal from either
- Unit, the system automatically closes all the series I
isolation ventilation system dampers which isolate the combined control room from the outside atmosphere and the system automatically starts 60 minutes later and supplies air to the control room through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.
3.
Verifying that on a
chlorine test signal from either
- Unit, the system automatically closes all the series l
isolation ventilation system dampers which isolate the combined control room from the outside atmosphere.
BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 3/4 7-18a PROPOSED WORDING
1 l
J PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, (continued) l 4.
Verifying that one emergency ventilation subsystem maintains the control room at a positive pressure of i
>1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
5.
Verifying that the heaters-dissipate 5 1 0.5 kw when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
]
1 4.7.7.2 The bottled air pressurization system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that the system contains a
minimum of 10 bottles of air each pressurized to at least 1825 psig and by verifying that the system solenoid operated valves are powered from an operable emergency bus.
b.
At least once per 18 months be verifying that:
1.
A chlorine / control room high radiation / containment phase B
isolation test signal from cirher Unit l
will initiate system operation.
2.
Upon a
partial discharge test using four out of five bottled air subsystems the system will supply 1
1000 cfm of air and pressurize the control room to
>1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
l BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 3/4 7-18b PROPOSED WORDING
REFUELING OPERATIONS l
-3/4.9.15 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.15.1 The control room emergency habitability' system'is OPERABLE when:
a.
Two out of three emergency ventilation subsystems, fans
)
and associated filters and dampers are OPERABLE, and i
b.
Five bottled air pressurization subsystems consisting of two bottles per subsystem are OPERABLE, and c.
The series normal air intake and exhaust isolation dampers for both units are OPERABLE, and capable of automatic closure on a Control Room High Radiation and Chlorine isolation signal *, or closed.
APPLICABILITY:
When both units are in either MODE 5 or 6.
ACTION:
a.
With less than two emergency ventilation subsystems, fans and associated filters OPERABLE and irradiated fuel being moved or movement of loads over irradiated fuel, restore at least two subsystems to OPERABLE status within 7 days or close at least one series normal air intake and exhaust isolation damper on each intake and exhaust to the control room.
b.
With one bottled air pressurization subsystem inoperable, restore five bottled air pressurization subsystems to OPERABLE within 7
days or suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel or movement of loads over irradiated fuel, b.1 With less than four bottled air pressurization subsystems OPERABLE or no emergency ventilation subsystems OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel or movement of loads over irradiated fuel.
c.
With one open series normal air intake or exhaust isolation damper inoperable # and not capable of closing and irradiated fuel being moved or movement of loads over irradiated fuel, restore all series dampers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or close at least one series normal air intake and exhaust isolation damper on each intake and exhaust to the control room.
Not applicable when output relay fuses are removed to prevent inadvertent ESF actuation for a single unit.
Emergency backup power not required for any 1
of 2 series dampers.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-16 PROPOSED WORDING
REFUELING OPERATIONS l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION c.1 With both series normal air intake or exhaustLisolation i
dampers inoperable # and not capable of being closed, suspend l
all operations involving movement.of irradiated fuel or l
movement of loads over irradiated fuel.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.15.1 The emergency ventilation subsystems and the bottled air pressurization system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with specifications 4.7.7.1.1, 4.7.7.1.2 and 4.7.7.2 with the following exception:
l a.
Automatic operation upon receipt of a containment phase B isolation signal is not required.
i i
i l
1 l
Emergency backup power not required for any 1
of 2 series
- dampers, l
i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-17 PROPOSED WORDING
INSTRUMENTATION BASES l
3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire de'tection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.
This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.
Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.
In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols or in-containment air temperature monitoring in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.
f 3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS l
The OPERABILITY of the chlorine detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release.
The chlorine detection system will protect the control room operators by initiating control room isolation in a timely manner to assure the chlorine concentration in the control room does not exceed the toxicity limit of 15 ppm by volume within 2
minutes following detection.
This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release", February 1975.
3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97,
" Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident",
December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".
l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 PROPOSED WORDING
ATTACHMENT B
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 143 No Significant Hazard Evaluation Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would provide clarification of the control room habitability operability and test requirements, update the chlorine detection system bases and incorporate editorial changes. The following changes are proposed:
note has been added to clarify the 1.
Page 3/4 7-16, a
operability requirements of the Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) to reflect the Beaver Valley Unit 2 technical specifications.
The note provides for isolation of the air bottles for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to perform instrumentation and control systems testing.
This note was added to the Unit 2 technical specifications since they were required by the NRC to conduct master and slave relay testing, monthly and quarterly, respectively.
This testing will cause the CREBAPS, which is a shared system between Unit 1
and Unit 2
control rooms, to discharge and place an operating unit into TS 3.0.3 requiring it to shut down.
Since it is undesirable to operate in this manner, the NRC approved conducting these tests on Unit 2 with the CREBAPS isolated for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in order to preclude bottle discharge.
Since the Unit 1 technical specifications do not have the same footnote to permit isolating CREBAPS, every time the Unit 2
testing is conducted, Unit 1 will enter TS 3.0.3.
The purpose of this change is to permit the NRC required testing to be done once on Unit 2 without requiring Unit 1 to enter TS 3.0.3 or shutdown.
note applied to surveillance requirement 2.
Page 3/4 7-18, the 4.7.7.1.2.d.2 has been deleted.
This note only applied until prior to initial entry into MODE 4 and has thus expired and is no longer applicable.
3.
Page 3/4 7-18a, surveillance requirement 4.7.7.1.2.d.1 has been revised to correct the applicable limiting pressure drop across the Beaver Valley Unit 2
combined HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber banks.
The
- note applied to surveillance requirement 4.7.7.1.2.d.2 and 3
has been deleted.
This note only applied until prior to initial entry into MODE 4 and has thus expired and is no longer applicable.
4.
Page 3/4 7-18b, the
- note applied to surveillance requirement 4.7.7.2.b.1 has been deleted.
This note only applied until prior to initial entry into MODE 4
and has thus expired and is no longer applicable.
The
- note applied to surveillance requirement 4.7.7.2.b.2 has been deleted since the required test has been completed, therefore, this note is no longer applicable.
5.
Page 3/4 9-16 and 3/4 9-17, the section heading for this specification has been corrected to " Refueling Operations" since this specification is located with the refueling requirements.
f l
lL
l Attachment B (Continued)
Page 2 l
6.
B 3/4 3-3, the chlorine detection system bases have been revised to reflect the replacement of the chlorine detectors and revised basis for operability of the-chlorine detectors.
The revised basis for the detectors is to identify a high chlorine condition and isolate the control room so that the toxicity limit in the control room will not be exceeded within two minutes following detection.
Basis for no significant hazard determination:
Based on the criteria for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as setforth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1)
Involve a
significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated because:
The note added to page 3/4 7-16 will allow the bottled air pressurization system to be removed from service by isolating the system to perform the Unit 2 instrumentation and control system surveillance testing without requiring Unit 1 to shutdown.
In order to perform the testing required to ensure operability of the instrumentation and circuitry associated with initiating the control room bottled air pressurization system, the bottles must be isolated or the initiating instrumentation would actuate the system and the control room would be pressurized.
A bottle discharge which results in the bottle pressure dropping below the technical specification requirements forces either operating unit into Technical Specification 3.0.3.
If the bottles are isolated to prevent discharge, as permitted by the Unit 2 technical specifications, Unit 1
would be forced into Technical l
Specification 3.0.3.
In either
- case, entry into 3.0.3 may require issuing a
LER and initiating a
plant shutdown.
Therefore, this note will allow sufficient time for system testing to assure the ability of the control room habitability systems to protect the control room personnel.
The note deleted from pages 3/4 7-18, 3/4 7-18a and 3/4 7-18b is an editorial change since this note has expired and is no longer applicable and will not affect the safety of the plant.
The revision to surveillance requirement 4.7.7.1.2.d.1 on page 3/4 7-18 corrects the allowable pressure drop across the Beaver Valley Unit 2
HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber banks for consistency with that specified in Beaver Valley Unit 2
surveillance requirement 4.7.7.1.e.l.
This is consistent with the manufacturers design recommendations and system specifications and will not affect the safety of the plant.
Revising the heading from
" Plant Systems" to
" Refueling Operations" on pages 3/4 9-16 and 3/4 9-17 is an editorial change to correctly identify the applicable section of the technical specifications and will not affect the safety of the plant.
Attachment B (Continued)
Page 3 A
sentence has been added to the chlorine detection system bases on page B
3/4 3-3 to reflect the commitment specified on page 4 of the NRC safety evaluation for technical amendment No. 109.
The chlorine detectors were replaced to upgrade the system, therefore, the bases have been revised to reflect the basis for operability of the new system.
Operation of the new system will ensure the chlorine toxicity limit of 15 ppm is not exceeded within 2 minutes of detection of a high chlorine condition.
This is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.95 and will provide assurance that the control room environment will be safe for control room personnel following a chlorine release and will not affect the safety of the plant.
Therefore, these changes will not affect the probability of occurrence or the consequences of any accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2)
Create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accid 2nt previously evaluated because:
Isolating the control room air bottles for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is consistent with the Beaver Valley unit 2
technical specification and serves to provide time to perform the required surveillance testing.
Changing the pressure drop limits across the Beaver Valley Unit 2 combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks to less than 5.6 inches is consistent with the Unit 2 design and reflects the surveillance requirements contained in the Unit 2
Technical Specifications.
The change to the chlorine detection system bases is consistent with the limitations specified in Regulatory Guide 1.95 and the commitment described in the NRC safety evaluation report issued with technical specification amendment No.
109.
The other revisions are editorial changes.
These change are consistent with current accident analyses and will not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from those described in the UFSAR.
3)
Involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety because:
The proposed changes correct editorial errors and provide consistency with the Beaver Valley Unit 2
technical specifications.
Therefore, these changes will not reduce the protection afforded to control room operators, will not affect the safety of the plant and will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.
Conclusion The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident, do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident and do not adversely affect the margin of safety.
The changes are consistent with the Beaver Valley Unit 2 technical specifications and will not reduce the protection afforded to the control room operators.
These changes do not affect the UFSAR equipment, testing, accident analyses descriptions or results and no UFSAR changes are required.
Therefore, based on the
- above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.
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