ML20217P042
| ML20217P042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/02/1997 |
| From: | Mallett B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217N558 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-246 NUDOCS 9708260422 | |
| Download: ML20217P042 (23) | |
Text
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May 2, 1997 NOTE 10:
Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator l FROM:
Bruce S. Hallett, Director Division of Nuclear Materials safety
SUBJECT:
ONE LINERS AND WEEXLY REPORTS I
The attached one liners and weekly reports discuss activities occurring within the Division week were: of Nuclear Materials Safety. Key activities accomplished this transmitting (1) held enforcement confetunce with the Navy, (2) placed lett performance review results to B&W NNFO in final concurrence,er (3) inspection of functional tests for new dry conversion project at and Electric. General Key activities we will be performing next week are as follows:
4.
Followup inspection for misplaced fuel rods at Westinghouse.
Continue operational readiness inspections for dry conversion at General Electric. .
inspection in Virginia. at Interstate Nuclear Services nuclear laundry facility Hold enforcement conference with Isomedix.
Issue performance review letter to B&W NNFO.
Attachments:
- 1. One Liners
- 2. Branch Chiefs Weekly Reports cc w/attaens:
H. Bermudez D. Collins C. Hosey E. McAlpine J. Potter T, Decker R. Woodruff s:\drss\ wkly.rpt b
9708260422 PDR f 0IA 970819 li"4 NICHOLS97-246 PDR fa a ~!a h L t. e 9 a s
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DNE tlNERS FOR MAY 02. 1997 1.-
Research Reactor Status a.
Georgia Institute of Technology No operations involving the reactor are 'being performed at the fscility and thnre continues to be no fuel on site. No reportable events have occurred during the past two weeks.
The Atomic Safety and licensing Board reached an initial decision regarding the facility license renewal on April 3, 1997. The ASLB decided that there are no issues that would ' preclude the renewal of license renewal.the facility license and authorized the NRC to proceed with th administration concerning receiving new fuel and resuming op of the reactor.
NRR' is process. awaiting a decision HRR is also by athe licensee to start the licensing generating petition that was awaiting the results of the ASLB decision. final response Commissioner Diaz was on campus on April 29 and provided a talk on luncheon in the Manufacturing Research Center Auditorium
- b. North Carolina State University l
On April 30, 1997, NRC renewed the facility license. The licensee continues to operate on a routine schedule of 3 to 4 days per week in support of research and experiments.
There was one reportable event at the facility during the past two-weeks.- On Monday, April 28, the licensee discovered that they had made a mistake in calculating the concentration of tritium in the liquid effluents discharged from the facility and had underestimated the amount discharged for the past 4 years. However, when the licensee recalculated the concentrations, they found -that the concentrations, and therefore the amount of tritium discharged, were still well of a factor below 100. the limits established in 10 CFR Part 20 by about problem was _ failure to follow procedure.The licensee also determined that th A procedure revision, with mnre specific steps for preparing and counting an effluent sample, will futurc.be reviewed and approved to prevent this type of probicm-in the
- c. University of Florida The-licensee about 10-12 hours continues limited. routine operation of the reactor of projects. per week to support course / lab work and research during the past two weeks.There have been no reportable events at the- facility
1 One Liners 2 L
- d. University.gf Virginia l The 4 reactor days continues to be operated on a routine schedule of 3 to per week.
for c1_ tents such as irradiation of topaz and iridium No seeds.The reportable events have occurred during the'past two weeks.
The licensee continues to experience a small leak of pool water. No changes have been noted in the pool leak rate over the past two weeks. The leakage rate remains at approximately 20-40 gallons / day, which is well below makeup capacity.
leak Due to the continuation of the the r,eactor pool and the pond near the reactor Work on building.th the wells is scheduled to be completed by the end of May. A ground-water sampling plan will be developed by the Office of Environmental Health and Safety, the group that provides the health physics support for the reactor facility, t 2. Westinahouse Electric Corporation As a followup to the recently reported inadvertent loss of control of two fuel rods containing 57 grams each of U-235, a team inspection will be performed at the facility during the week of May 5.
of representatives from Headquarters and Region 11.CraigThe team willwill Bassett consist be
- , the team leader.
On April 18 and 19, 1997, fuel assemblies Czech Repubile. (used for training purposes) in the Temelin reactor in Since the discovery, the licensee investigation team reviewing the root causes of the has had an inadvertent misplacement of the fuel rods into the assemblies.
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1somedix. Ooerations Inc. - Predecisional Enforcement Conference-On May 8,. representatives from Isomedix Operations Inc., will attend an Predecisional Enforcement Conference ' tri th'e ' Region 11 Office
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Conference- Room) at 1:00 p.m. The issue to be reviewed during(DNHS the conference concerns the operation of the Isomedix megacurie pool irradiator for a period of three hours without an authorized operator onsite. This meeting is closed to the public.
- 4. Kentucky Electric Steel On April 30, a representative from Region 11 spoke with personnel from the Commonwealth of Kentucky Control, to receive an u,pdate on the Kentucky Electric Steel incidentan A reported to the Operations Center on April 29, 1997. Materials inspection / Licensing Branch 2 is monitoring the Commonwealth of Kentucky's Tentucky Electric Steel plant in Ashland,(See Report.)
Kentucky. response to a repo attached Morning
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one Liners 3
5.- Federal Exoress Event Haterials Inspection / Licensing Branch 2 is monitoring the State of Tennessee's response to a reported missing vial millicuries of chromium-51 after its container was found ocontaining 1.23 damaged at a Federal attached Horning Report.)Express distribution center in Memphis, TN. pened and (See
- 6. Navy Enforcement Conference On May 1 PredecisIonalEnforcementConference.1997, tho Department of the Navy wa The purpose of the conference was to discuss during the ap)arent violation associated with the- Navy'simproper reagent. ted quantity package containing an iodine-125 Texas, twoWhen the package was delivered to Brooks Air Force Base. in of the- iodine-125 reagent radioactive liquid contents leaked out of the package. bottles were broken and th NRC and licensee the leakage was lowrepresentatives agreed that the radiological significance resulting licensee's - training; and radiation safety management in the oversighth
. packaging and transportation of radioactive materials.
The licensee the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence in any ty of radioactive materials.
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MAY 1, 1997 Licensee /Facilitvi Notification:
Kentucky Electric Steel MR Number: 2-97-0032 Ashland, Kentucky Date: 05/01/97 Subicets_ KENTUCKY ELECTRIC STEEL E1 portable Event Numbert 32239 Discussient On April 30, from theControl, Radiation Commonwealth of Kentucky, an Agreement State,1997 a re Department of incident Report No.reported 32239). to the Operations Center on April 29,to receive an upd 1997 contaminated material was identified as cesium-137 Commonwealth person contractor from Oak Ridge is handling the clean up o(Cs-137) and a melt shop has been closed down and the rail car isolated. Thef the facility. The commonwealth's Department of Radiation Control will review and approve clean-up procedures before any clean-up activities can begin.
On April 30, 1997, to the to perform confirmatory surveys and to collectKentucky office, samples.
sent two of their staff mem to determine how big the source of the contamination The wasthe samples Commonwealth will continue to update RII as new information becomes available.
Contact:
H. BERMUDEZ (404)562 4734 e
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PRIORITY ATTEWION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MAY 2, 1997 kicenses/Pscility:
Hotification_t Federal Express ,
MR Number: 2-97-0033 ;
Memphis, Tennessee Date: 05/02/97 j
Lybiect: MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Discussiont The State of Tennessee informed the NRC (May 1, 1997) 1 1997 a one milliliter volume glass vial containing 1.23 millicuriesthat on April 30, (mci of chromium-51 was identified as missing at ,
in Memphis, vial TN. The shield (lead pig) FedEx RSO indicated that the event was noted when 1 was found during proce. sing, and later the container that housed the shield was located and noted ope '
to the University of Texas, M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas. FedEx continues the search for the vial. As of the May 2, 1997 10:00 am all efforts to locate the vial have been unsuccessful. !
Reaional Action:
The Region will continue to follow the event.
Contact J. POTTER (404)562-4731 4
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ONE LINERS FOR HAY 9. Q2].
- 1. Lugl Facilities St'atus a.
General Electric _(R On May 5, there was a small UF, leak from a hydrolysis receiver tank on Line 1.
The leak resulted from a small hole in the side of the <
tanks. The hole was believed to have been caused by erosion from a tilted dip tube that introduced UF, into the tank. ADV line I was !
returned to operation on May 7 followine replacement of the hydrolysis receiver tank and installation of a dip tube guide. Line 2 is down due to production schedules. The dip tube guide will be l installed prior to starting up. Lines 3 and 4 are operating normally. When line 4 shuts down over the weekend, the dip tube l
l guide will be installed. Line 3 is continuing to operate; the guide l is already in place. Line 5 is operating processing feed from uranium recovery. Over the week end, lines 3 and 5 will operate.
The incinerator has been down part of the week for inventory and clean-out, it will be back in service next week. Urtnium Recovery is operating normally. Rod production and bundle assembly are starting on 6 day weeks for the next few weeks to meet shipping schedules.
Dedication ceremonies for the Dry Conversion Facility (OCF) were held on April 28. This coincided with the meeting of the board of directors of Japan Nuclear fuel, which is a minority owner of the facility.
Regarding license renewal, ONMSS informed the licensee t,iat the Finding of No Significant impact (FONSI) had been signed on May 6 and forwarded for publication in the Federal Register. After the F0151 is published, there is a 30 day public comment period. After the comment period ends, the license renewal can be issued. A meeting will be held on May 20 with GNHSS and GE to discuss the latest set of questions regarding the license renewal application.
Preoperational testing of the OCF process line 1 and the Hydrofluoric Acid recovery facility are continuing. Testing is going siswer than anticipated, in part due to process control sof tware problems. Introduction of natural uranium could begin the week of May 12 but correction nf test deficiencies :nd repairs to the ventilation system could move this back to the week of May 19.
Operations with natural uranium will be under the State of North Carolina license. The introduction of enriched uranium will require issuance of the NRC license renewal, which cannet occur befoie June 9, (30 days af ter publication of the FONSI-see above). In anticipation of start-up, the DCF was declared a radiological controlled area on April 28, although there is no radioactive material in the f acil ity. This is to get the operators and
- maintenance personnel acclimated to working in antics with the new facility.
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a one Liners 2 PSE&G announced that a contract had been awarded to ABB/CE for th reloads of fuel for the lope Creek facility. This only the second U S. BWR reactor that ABB/CE will provide fuel for. GE had provided all of the fuel for Hope Creek until this order.
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Nuclear Fuel Services. Inc.
The licensee continues to receive about one shipment per week of UF, cylinders Plant from the U.Ohio.
in Portsmouth, S. Enrichment Corporation Gaseous Diffusion the snipments thus far. He problems have been encountered during The licensee also continues to receive about one shipment of U Al material (which will be processed after the UF, cylinder wash contract).
The licensee completed processing the HEU material shipped from the DOE facility in Rocky flats on April 28, 1997. -Inventor cleanout was completed on May 2, '997. The licensee is ystill and working on finalizing the inventory.
Facility preparation activities and equipment installation for the UF, cylinder wash contract were started- this week. Operator
-training is scheduled to begin in early June 1997 and operation is scheduled to begin in late June 1997.
scheduled to begin- after the UF, cylinderThe washU Al contract was contract ends.
Facility preparation activities in the 300 Complex for the new naval fuel contract will begin next week, including the repair of the scrubbers incineratorand fireduct work1996.
in April that were damaged during the Building 302 ;
repair or use the incinerator. At present, there are no plans to i The in the.licensee North Site continues burial area.excavation activities for source term removal encountered, No significant problems have been
- c. Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) NNFO Routine manufacturing and maintenance activities are being conducted #
in the Modified Fuel Process HFP . Advanced Fuel Process (AFP , and Research and Test Reactor F(uel ) Elements (RTRFE) portions plant. o)f the A routine Naval Reactor recovery campaign is being conducted in the Uranium Recovery facility.
conversion process is operating normally,The uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH activities are being conducted in the CRF facility. Routine fuel development Project for system Sapphire downblending activities are temporarily shut down modifications. A Confirmatory Action letter 1 September 96) preventing the dissolution of Uranium Beryllium scrap materials remains in effect.
One Liners 3
Routine rod loading operations are being conducted on one shift.
Routine decontamination and refurbishment activities are being conducted in the SERF facilities.
Downloading of the second shipment of NUKEM fuel assereblies is continuing.
- e. Westinahouse Electric Corporation This week Conversion Lines 3 and 4 were being used to process UF, gas while Line I was used to process uranyl nitrate recycle mattrial and Line 2 was processing off specification material. Line 5, which has been idle for about ten weeks, remains shutdown due to the lack of work. The pellet lines, rod loading, the recovery operation, and IFBA are reported. all operating on a normal schedule with no problems As a follow up to the recently reported inadvertent loss of control
! of two fuel rods containing 57 grams each of U-235, an NRC team insaection (lead by HMSS) and including Craig Bassett as a team mem)er was performed at the facility during May 5 7. The team noted five apparent violations during the inspection. The violations
' included: 1 failure to follow procedure by a worker who did not inform manage) ment of the missing rods and this led to failure t notify the in personnel NRC whatin a timely manner, 2) failure to propurly train material, 3) failure to do in case they could not locata missing to comply with various transportation regulations due to the inadvertent shipment of fuel in the replica or " dummy" astablies, 4) failure to have adequate procedures for handling the replica rods that were fabricated that led to the co-mingling of the fuel rods with the replica rods, and 5) MC&A issues dealing with failure to fill out a 741 form for the " fuel shipment" and loss of item control.
Last week the week of April 28, licensee management held an "All Employees" meeting and announced another Reduction in Force (Rif).
(The last, RIF was at the end of October in 1996.) It was announced that 70 to 90 personnel will be Rif-ed.
The cutback will come mostly from the ranks of the production workers because two UF6 conversion lines and one pellet production line are to be shut down.
Management also mentioned that new fuel orders are down and there is the possibility that furloughs of up to several weeks could be necessary in the future during periods when new fuel production is not needed.- About four years ago, the total output at the facility was approximately 1,000 metric tons of material a year. The output s
this year is estimated to be 650 metric tons. The licensee indicated that their " break even" point is somewhere between 600 and 650 metric tons.
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- 2. Isomedix. Operations Inc.
Predecisional Enforcement Conference Representatives from Isomedix attended a Predecisional Enforcement Conference to discuss _the operation of the megacurie pool irradiator for a period of three hours without -an authorized operator onsite. Also attending were representatives of Abbott Health Products,-Inc. (AHPI) The I license had been held by AHPI at the time of the event, but has transferred to Isomedix on March 19, 1997. The licensee discussed the circumstances surrounding the event, causes, and corrective actions.
- 3. Department of the Navy I
A Severity Level lil' violation was issued to the Department of the Navy as a result of improper shipment of a package containing iodine 125 from the Navy Drug Screening Laboratory in Jacksonville, Florida. Two improperly packaged vlais containing a total of 250 microcuries broke during the shipment resulting in contamination of the outside surface of the package.
A Civil Penalty was not issued because of the Drug Screening Laboratory's prior good performance and prompt and comprehensive corrective actions.
- 4. FrankW.HakeAssociates(Tennesseej.
On May 6,1997, officials from the State of Tennessee informed Region !! I of a minor fire at the Frank W. Hake Associates decontamination facility in Memphis. The fire ignited in a dust collector.- Off site- fire authorities extinguished the fire. There was minor contamination in the '
area of the fire, on selected fire responders' gloves, and on fire hoses.
There was local media interest.
inspectors to review the situation. The State of Tennessee sent two
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c May 16, 1997 General Electric Company l ATTN: Mr. C. P. Kip), General Hanager
!- GE Nuclear Energy Production I P. O. Box 780 L
Wilmington, NC 28402
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70 1113/97 05
Dear Mr.-Kipp:
This refers to the inspection conducted on April 14 18, 1997, at the Wilmington facility. The )urpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by tie license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the-findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records. interviews with personnel, and observation of
, activities in_ progress.
Within the scope of the inspection, :1olations or deviations were not l identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790. of. the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. 1 Should you have-any questions concerning this-letter, please contact us. j Sincerely,
/s/
Edward J. McAlpine, Chiet' Fuel-Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Mcket-No. 70 1113
' License No. SNM 1097
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/ encl:- (See page 2)
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GE 2
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Dr. Ralph Reda. Manager i Fuels and Facility Licensing '
General Electric Company 3 P. 0. Box 780. Hail Code J26 Wilmington, NC 28402 :
Dayne H. Brown. Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment.
Health & Natural Resources P. O. Box 27687 Raleigh. NC -27611 7687 Distribution w/ encl:
E. McAlpine. RII G. Troup; ;
G. Shear. RIII i
~C. Cain. RIV i F. Wenslawski, RIV -
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II i
Docket No.: 70 1113 License No.: SNH 1097 Report No.: 70 1113/97 05 Licensee: General Electric Company Facility: Nuclear Energy Production 4
Location: Wilmington, North Carolina Date: April 14 18. 1997 Inspectors: A. Goriden. Radiation Specialist W. J. Tobin, Senior Safeguards Inspector Approved by: E. J. McAlpine. Chief Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Enclosure v>oju -
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O EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
General Electric Nuclear Energy Production NRC Inspection Report 70 1113/97 05 The primary focus of this routine announced inspection was the observation and evaluation programs.
of the licensee's radiation arotection and fire protection In addition, the status of t1e new Ory Conversion Facility (DCF) was reviewed with respect to radiation protection and fire protection. The report covered a one week period and included the results of inspection efforts of two regional fuel facility inspectors. The inspection identified the following aspects of the licensee programs as discussed below:
@ E PROIECTLQN The licensee's Fire Protecti:n Program was well managed, and meeting the intent and goals of the NRC's criteria and technical position. Specifically:
Positive measures such as redundant pumps and water supplies, various kinds of detectors and fire extinguishers. and several response vehicles were noted for the fire detection and .ri suppression systems located throughout the site, as well as, the trainnig and organization of the licensee's Fire Brigade, e
Fire load remains as a challenge to the licensee specifically in the FH0X Building where debris was observ?d in the hallway near electric heaters. Host construction residue has been removed from the Dry Conversion Facility, e
Although the licensee does not have a formalized Pre Fire Plan nor a Fire Hazard Analysis, other documents, reports and drawings largely meet the intent of the Plan and Analysis.
RADIATION PROTECTION A non cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedures governing controlled area activities.
The installation of stationary air sampling equipment within the DCF had been completed and the licensee's schedule for conducting an air sampling representativeness study indicated late May 1997.
Although radiation warning signs were not posted. a map indicating the aroposed locations for posting warning signs had been completed for the XF.
- Requirements for aersonnel monitoring and bioassay associated with the DCF had been esta)lished and documented procedurally.
Contamination survey maps depicting the DCF layout were developed and awaiting-implementation.
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An inspector followup item (IFI) was identified due to the myriad use of blue warning lights plant wide.
e The performance of the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) was effective in trending and maintaining awareness of projects te ensure exposures are maintained as low as is reasonably echievable (ALARA). i I
e The radiation safety assessments incorporated into nuclear safety requirements (NSR/Rs) associated with the DCF appeared to be detailed and technically sound.
The licensee had developed and effectively implemented a DCP Startup-Radiological Punchlist as a mechanism for tracking each item to closure.
Attachments:
Partial List of Pe sons Contacted Inspection Procedures Used :
List of items Opened, Closed, and Discussed :
List of Acronyms i i
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l REPORT DETAILS I. Introduction A. Inspection Overview 1
i 1. Purpose This inspection was conducted to determine the adequacy of the licensee's radiation protection and fire protection programs, and was conducted through a review of selected records, interviews with personnel, and direct observation of work activities.
- 2. Haior Areas of Emohasis Areas inspected included: I e Radiation Protection Program Implementation e Fire Protection Program
- DCF Operational Readiness in the areas of Radiological Protection and Fire Protection. .
B. Sumary of Plant Status This report covered a one week period. There were no unusual plant operational occurrences during the onsite inspection. Construction and testing activities for the DCF were progressing.
II. SAFETY OPERATIQ G
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A. Fire Safety (88055) j 1, Fire Prevention. Detection. and Sucoression a' . Insoection Sqqng The inspection was conducted to review the licensee's program for fire prevention, detection, and suppression. Specifically, the Dry Conversion Process facility was inspected for the provisions of fire safety. License Condition 4.2.13, " Criteria for Fire
-Protection and Areas Containing Fissile Haterial " (Revision 29.
dated February 14, 1992), commits the licensee to provide equipment, processes, and facilities with protection from fire while minimizing the use of water in moderation control areas.
The License Condition was the performance standard of this ins >ection: other criteria utilized included the NRC Branch Tecinical Position or Fire Protection for Fuel Facilities, published in the Federal Reaistet dated August 10, 1992.
Additional criteria was found in the NRC's Generic Letter 95 01, '
'NRC Staff _ Technical Position on Fire Protection for Fuel Cycle Facilities," and the licensee response of March 14, 1995.
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- b. Observations and Findinas (1) Fire Prevention The licensee uses the WSRC to perform the duties of a fire and safety review committee. The WSRC consists of a least five senior managers from the scientific and engineering i
disciplines, it reports to the Facility Manager. There are -
at least quarterly meetings concerning such issues as radiation safety, personnel exposures, environmental monitoring industrial safety, major changes in plant activities, cnd criticality safety. The inspector reviewed the 1996 records of the WSRC meetings and noted several
- meetings lasted two hours, to include a special meeting
', which reviewed the fire in an incinerator at another NRC licensee.
The WSRC had institutionalized the Pre operational Readiness Review effort of the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) facility.
this effort utilized ti.e services of two contract members of the Wilmington, North Carolina Fire Department who were '
tasked specifically with evaluating the DCP i-ire protection system. Several recommendations relative to additional extinguishers of different capabilities and relocation of
- - existing extinguishers were made by these contractors and have been acted upon by the licensee.
The WSRC had also sponsored an Integrated Safety Analysis-(ISA) of the DCP facility. This ISA analyzed criticality, fire safety, chemical and radiation hazards, industrial and
' environmental safety. The " configuration management"
' discipline was utilized by the licensee to ensure changes to 4
structures or processes were well prepared and coordinated throughout the many departments and levels of management.
The WSRC-is formalized via Procedure No. 48 01 "Wilmington Safety Review Committee," Revision 12, issued October 27, 1997.
In the response to Generic Letter.95 01, the licensee referred to its ISA, configuration management Radiological Contingency and Emergency Programs and inspections performed by the insurer. The inspector reviewed all of these elements and also the April 1992. Halobertan Hazard Study, a "HAZ0PS" analysis of the processes, facilities and protection strategies using national standards. This study, while not reviewed every two years as recommended in Position 10 of the NRC Branch Technical Position, does meet the intent-of a Fire Hazards Analysis in that it was a systematic study of " fire areas" throughout the facility-relative to construction, operations, storage, transfer, and fire protection equipment.
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Also addressed in the response to NRC Gerieric Letter 97 05 is the licensee's position that while it does not have a Pre. Fire Plan (Position 9 of the NRC Branch Technical Position) it relies on drawings of buildings and rooms which are kept at the Emergency Control Center (ECC) in addition to its Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP) which has been coordinated with offsite responders and instructs fire fighters to minimize water used in moderation control areas. The ins)ector reviewed training and procedures based upon t11s RC&EP and, as recommended by the NRC Branch Technical Position, noted that each building in the Control Access Area (CAA) is assigned to a " Building Engineer" who responds to the ECC in the event of a fire alarm where offsite and onsite res building and process instructions. ponders are given current '
Work Permits are issued in accordance with Procedure 503,
" Cutting and Welding Permits
- which requires a Building-Engineer to authorize each fire watch as necessary to be posted during and after such activities.
(2) Fire Detection The inspector toured the facility and noted the presence of smoke and heat detectors which annunciate in the ECC. The l '
inspector was present in the ECC and witnessed the audio-visual annunciation of such detectors being tested by technicians in the DCP fac"ity. Also annunciating in the ECC were " tamper" alarms on the Position Indicating Valves (PIVs) and flow alarms from the wet sprinkler systems. It is the duty of the security officer posted in the-ECC to call for offsite assistance. Pull boxes alarm at the ECC and also locally. The inspector reviewed the report of the contractor who annually inspects and re) airs the smoke detectors located inside the ducts of t1e uranium recovery facility. Four of the 23 detectors failed the ionization test; two were repaired and two were replaced in a timely manner.
While not " detectors,'.the inspector noted that closed circuit televisions were inside the DCP facility at several-elevations overlooking the kiln operations, which would allow operators to remotely detect fires or smoke.
The inspector discovered a housekeeping problem in the hallway of the FH0X facility where the 14:ensee was storing books-and numerous documents on shelves. The inspector noted many shelves had collapsed resulting in general clutter in the hallway. This housekeeping issue was brought to the attention of the licensee at several stages of management, and also discussed during the Exit Meeting. The licensee reacted positively to the inspector's comments.
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The inspector also brought to the attention of the licensee that in its correspondence of February 19, 1997, to the NRC from the Manager of Fuels and Facility Licensing regarding the ISA of the DCP, the licensee states that, " Alarm signals are relayed to both the DCP control room and the Site Emergency Control Center." In fact, the inspector determined that the alarm signals for the hydrogen and
- - hydrogen fluoride detectors in the DCP facility are relayed only to the DCP control room and not to the ECC, It is the licensee's intent to correct this correspondence.
(3) Fire Suppression The licensee has a wet sprinkler fire suppression system fed from a 150,000 gallon (reserved) tank and from a 300,000 gallon (minimum) pond. An electrical pun) is dedicated to the tank, a diesel pump 1; dedicated to t1e mnd. At the
,. pond there is also a gravity flow valve whic1 can be used by
- fire trucks for refill purposes.
!. The inspector brought to the attention of the licensee that n a letter from Fluor Daniels, dated May 30, 1996, to Factory Hutuc1 Engineering states that no pond water source is used for the sprinkler system, when in fact a pond source is used, The licensee intends to correct this correspondence.
All four kinds of fire extinguishers were available at appropriate locations throughout the CAA. this included the availability of " met 1 x" extinguishers near zirconium areas. The PIVs were found to be locked "open," except for PIV #33 which had a broken lock attached to it. This condition was fixed immediately by the licensee upon
- notification from the inspector.
Also corrected immediately were the following:
The false ceiling of the Incinerator 011 Room had been disrupted such that several sprinkler heads were obstructed by tiles, which were immediately removed by the licensee.
The " retard chamber bypass" valve of the sprinkler header along the north wall of the FH0X Warehouse (Zone #3490) was mismsitioned r,uch that the exterior gong bell would not lave sounded had the sprinkler flowed water. This valve had been turned at 90 degrees and was inmediately correctly repositioned to be inline with the pipe by the-licensee.
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The inspector toured the kitchen area of the cafeteria in the-FHO Building and found the halon system to be correctly '
. charged and positioned _ appropriately over the gas fired burners, Hoderation control areas were well marked as to preclude the use of water, Elsewhere, hose stations were well identified and adequate in-number and length of hoses, A fire station is exterior to the CAA, inside is a Haz Mat vehicle, an ambulance, and a 280 gallon fire truck. These vehicles were adequately equipped with protective clothing, axes, portable lights, breathing apparatus, fans, radios, spill containment kits, and other gear.
The 64 numbers of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) adequately staff the fire brigade on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis,- they receive four hours of training per month. Annually, the ERT completes 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of fire su hazardous material training, ppression and 24agreement It is licensee's hours of with the New Hanover County volunteer. response department that any fire alarms from the facility will automatically be responded to by four volunteer fire companies, This-allows for special vehicler (such as an aerial truck) to be called upon for responses.
- c. Conclusion There were no violations nor deviations identified. The licensee will correct two documents that contain inaccuracies relative to the source of water for it's fire sprinkler sysum and relative to ,
alarm annunciation from the OCP facility, Through the interaction.
of the Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan, Haloberten Hazard Study, the Wilmington Safety Review Committee, the DCP Startup Integrated Safety Analysis, numerous fire detection and '
suppression systems. -the availability of the ERT end the assistance offsite responders the license is adequately meeting the intent and goal of the NRC Branch Technical Position.
III. Radiolooical Controls A. ' Radiation Protection (83822)
- 1, Radiation Protection Prooram Procedures-(R1.02) a, insoection Scoce-
-The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for the development and implementation of Nuclear Safety Release / Requirements (NSR/Rs) and Radiation Work Permits (RWPs). License Condition 9 of
e 6
SNM 1097 requires the licensee to comply with the statements, rep esentations, and conditions contained in Part I of the application dated October 23, 1987; cnd supplements thereto.
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1 of the License Application specifies the conditions for issuing a RWP. Specific requirements for the RWP 3rogram were documented in Procedures NSI 0 9,0 (Radiation Work
?ermits, Revision 29, issue date November 8, '996), and P/P 40 09, (Service Work on Contaminated Equipment, Rev .c.a 12, issue date June 4, 1996).
Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1 of the License Applicatica states that
" Area Managers shall assure preparation of written operating procedures incoraorating nuclear safety control limitations established by tie criticality and radiation safety functions."
- b. Observations and Findinas
~
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for issuing RWPs and examined the RWP requirements and workers performance in compl.ying with the associated RWP. The inspector reviewed three RWPs. Two of the three RWPs were closed and one was considered opened. The requirements for protective equipment, air monitoring, work hazard, and special instructions were clearly delineated. In response to the open RWP, the inspector interviewed the licensee contact with RWP responsibility and discussed training and bioassay requirements associated with the opened RWP. Names of workers who acknowledged having reviewed the RWP were selected at random to determine if appropriate training was provided. No problems were noted.
The inspector reviewed the status of selected procedures and NSR/Rs for startup of the DCF to process natural uranium. The NSR/Rs were referred to as Revision 0 with the emphasis placed on radiolacical safety requiremants. According to a licensee contact, all subsequent DCP NSR/Rs (Rev -1) will be specific to the enriched operations and emphasis on criticality safety requirements. The inspector also reviewed the status of procedural develowent and approval for the bioassay program. No problems 3
were caserved. Regarding the bioassay program Procedure NSI 0 2.0
" Bioassay (Excreta) Program, was revised to incorporate the details and requirements for individuals assigned to the DCP. In addition, Practices and Procedures (P/P) 40 19
- Bioassay Program" was modified to reflect the more conservative values of Uranium for work restrictions. Regarding procedural changes to reflect the external dosimetry program for DCP, the licensee had not completed the procedural details but was aware of the necessary changes as evidenced by the discussion of external exposure assessment addressed in the rad safety analysis associated with the i vaporization area.
I
3-
- c. Conclusions Based on the review of documentation and tours of the controlled area, the inspector determined that the RWPs were requested and generated in accordance with procedures and Chapter 3 of the license application. The appropriate reviews, check lists, and forms were executed by radiation protection personnel.-The radiation safety assessments requested for input to NSR/Rs were very detailed and appeared to be technically sound and in some cases incorporated lessons learned from existing owrations involving Ammonium Diuranate and a DCF located in Trance.
Documentation indicated that the licensee's actions in the developmert and issuance of RWPs and NSR/Rs were consistent with the license commitment and procedures.
2.
i Radiation Protection Prooram Eouioment (R1.03)
- a. Insoection Scoce Equipment was examined at various locations to verify that radiation protection equipment and controlled area survey equipment was calibrated and operational in accordance with NSI 0-4.0 " Nuclear Safety Instrumentation." Included was the stationary air sampling system and other radiation protection equipment necessary to support operations in the new DCF,
- b. Observations and Findinos The inspector toured the chemical product line, pellet production and rod load areas, DCF. and the laundry area. Instruments used for frisking were checked-at step off pads and exiting locations for operability and a current calibration sticker. The inspector observed a Radiation Protection Monitor performing a daily check on equipment used for detecting the presence of contamination prior to counting samples. Selected instruments were examined and determined to be operational and within calibration dates.
Selected stationary air samplers (SASS) were observed to be operational and sample flow rates were within procedural setpoint.
During tours of the DCF, the inspector noted that most of the SASS had been installed and had current calibration stickers affixed to the rotameter. The inspector also noted during the tours the myriad use of blue warning lights plant wide, and depending on the location the significance as evidenced by the following:
- DCP flashing light indicates a hydrofluoric acid release in progress (in vaporization area), or criticality accident (grit / sand blasting facility).
- FHO flashing light indicates excess weight (chemical area) or an opened door (gadolinia shop).
.- .- -.. . - - - . - -- . - - ~ - - . - - - - _ . - -
4 r
In light of the above observations, the inspector discussed with licensee contacts the confusion which resulted during the tour
' regarding the need to evacuate as a result of the blue light that was indicating. In response to the inspector's comments and human.
i
! factors concerns associated with the use of blue lights, the-licensee stated they would perform a review and evaluation of the site wide use of warning lights for making improvements. A licensee contact indicated that the review and evaluation would be completed in 60 days. The inspector informed the licensee that the review and evaluation of warning. lights from a human factors standpoint was considered an inspector followup item (IFI 70 1113/97 05 01).
The inspector also noted during the review of the licensee's DCP Startup Radiological Punchlist that certain equipment items must be resolved before DCF startup (e.g., operation of air samplers).
- c. Conclusions Based on the response of instruments and calibration dates, instruments were operable and calibrated at the required frequency in accordance with license requirements and procedures. The licensee's radiological punchlist provided an effective administrative control for tracking equipment installation and functional testing to sup mrt DCF startup and operations. At the time of the inspection, tie licensee had not completed an air sampling representativeness study for DCP.
- 3. Postinos (RI 07)
- a. Insnection Scoce The inspector examined DCF to determine if adequate postings were in place to support operations in the new DCF.
- b. Observations and Findinos-
= During tours of the DCF, the inspector noted that the facility was in the final construction stages and the necessary radiation protection postings had not been-. installed. The inspector reviewed this matter with the licensee contact assigned responsibility for msting. In response, the' licensee contact provided a map whic1 displayed the proposed locations for posting the radiation warning signs. In addition, the inspector was shown exam)les of the signs that were ordered. and the installation of the aforementioned signs were included on the pre operational
. checklist for DCP.
The inspector also reviewed the status of evacuation routes and posting of evacuation signs during the DCF tours. A map showing
-the evacuation routes had been completed, but the evacuation Plan for DCF was incomplete at the time of the inspection. The
5 evacuation signs appeared to direct workers to the nearest exit in the event of an accident or emergency. The inspector noted that l signs were a combination of permanent (which according to the licensee contact illuminated in the dark) and temporary. The '
inspector was informed that the temporary signs were-installed as interim measures until the inventory of permanent signs ordered were received,
- c. Conclusions l Although the necessary radiation protection posting and evacuation plan had not been completed, the licensee was tracking these items for completion before DCT startup.
- 4. Surveys (RI.08)
- a. Insoection Scoce The licensee's contamination control survey program was reviewed to determine if-the arogram was adequate and implemented in accordance with 10 C:R Part 20, license conditions, and procedures,
- b. Observations and Findinas The inspector accompanied a Radiation Protection Monitor during the performance of contamination surveys, and observed the collection of smear samples from locations within the Process Technology Lab (PTL), can' storage, and fuel preparation room. The performance of the Monitor in conducting surveys and attention to details associated with sound health physics practices was good.
Personnel demonstrated excellent familiarity with procedures. When visible contamination (powder) was found, the contact took prompt actions in accordance with procedural requirements to prevent airborne exposure and/or spread of contamination.
In addition to the above observations, documentation in support of periodic surveys were reviewed for the January 1997, covering Bundle Assembly, FH0period December Calciners/ Sluggers,1996 thru URU HVAC, and the URU Control Room and Laboratory. The documentation for randomly selected areas disclosed that the surveys were performed at the required frequency in accordance with procedure NSI 0 6.0 (Contamination Heasurement and Control, Rev. 32, Issue Date February 24, 1997).
During the performance of surveys discussed above, the inspector did not identify-any significant weaknesses in the licensee's program to maintain and control radioactive materials. However, the inspector observed examples where licensee 3ersonnel failed to follow general rules associated with food, drints, gum or tobacco in the controlled area. Discarded candy wrappers were found in three different locations within the controlled area: blender-
6 warehouse,-Chemical Foreman's air lock area, and the low enriched blending and powder storage area. Actual consumption or chewing was not observed..
required that accessSection 3.2.1 of the license a through change rooms, points to controlled areas are established The instructions controlling entry and exit pplic from controlled areas are posted at the entry aoints. The 4
referenced instructions are implemented via NS1/R CHANGER 00H PROD 6- No. 85.04 entitled CONTROLLED AREA GENERAL RULES. -NSR/R-CHANGdROOH PROD No. 85.04 (CONTROLLED AREA GENERAL RULES, Rev. 10, 4 DATE ISSUED September 23, 1992) states that "No food, drinks, gum t or tobacco are permitted in the Controlled Area." In response,
- the following actions were taken by the licensee immediately after the inspector's discovery:
c o Training was conducted on all shifts regarding the site 4
policy on candy, gum, and any other substance placed in the mouth while in the controlled area. Training, according to documentation, emphasized that actions would be swift and severe (including possible termination) if an employee was found with anything in their mouth while inside the controlled area. .
o Handatory reading was required by all shifts emphasizing that food in the controlled area was a violation of the radiation safety >olicy. In addition, the required reading discussed the rist and hazard associated with violating the policy. All emalnyees were required to sign a training sheet '
acknowledging laving read and understood the rule regarding food in the controlled area.
o- A Heeting Notice (referred to as "ll Minute Heeting") with plant wide distribution was planned for issuance on Monday, April 21, 1997, to further emphasize issue regarding 4
-housekeeping requirements for controlled and non controlled areas.
o A status summary was compiled of self identified findings involving gum, candy, etc., in the controlled area since -the last NRC inspection of this area-(August 1996). The summary disclosed that in mid October and November 1996, findings were identified and corrective actions were implemented during November and December 1996. The corrective actions appeared to be effective in that no repeat findings were made'until February 1997. The February 1997 finding was-attributed to windy conditions transporting material' from outside during construction / repairs in vicinity, o During weekly safety training, the policy regarding. gum, foods, etc., will be included in discussion.
j l
7 The licensee was informed that the examples of candy wrappers <
found in the controlled area was a violation for failure to follow !
controlled area requirements in NSR/R CHANGER 00H PROD No. 65.04, '
However, in light of the above actions, this NRC identified violation is not being cited because the violation met the '
criteria specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee was informed that this finding was considered a Non cited Violation-(NCV 70 1113/97 05 02),
- c. Conclusions Although a NCV was identified for failure to follow procedures i
governing controlled area activities, no concerns were noted with the licensee's surveys, Smears were effective in contamination 3
control. The program was implemented in accordance with procedures, license conditions, and requirements in 10 CFR 20.1501.
- 5. Imolementation of ALARA Proaram (R1.10) a,- Insoection Scoce .
The licer.see's ALARA program was reviewed to determine if the program and ALARA goals were being developed and implemented in accordance with Section 3.1.2 of the license.
- b. Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed selected aspects of- the licensee's training program associated with radiation workers refresher. training, to ascertain if ALARA concepts and or company policy associated with ALARA was clearly communicated.-No problems were noted. The refresher training for 1996 was effective in combining both instructions and class participation in the identification of poor health physics practices in maintaining ex osures ALARA. During a previous review of the training program (11701113/96 07), the-
-inspector noticed the lack of variability in the exam questions for the initial training provided to radiation workers. In response, the inspector was informed that the Nuclear Safety training program was under review for making improvements.
Consequently, during the review of the annual refresher training the status of the Nuclear Safety training review was discussed.~
The licensee contact indicated that the program changes were incomplete at this time. However, a commitment tracking number was assigned to the licensee's internal tracking system (NRC C0H 97 03) to complete the evaluation of Nuclear-Safety training (NS 203) and develop new course outline and exam.
The inspector attended the April 16, 1997 RSC meeting and noted that attendees provided status updates regarding progress in meeting milestones for exposure reductions, UIRs, audit results, etc. --In addition, the inspector reviewed RSC meeting minutes
8 covering the period September 1996 thru December 1996, and determined that the RSC was effectively tracking, updating, and prioritizing ALARA goals and commitments.
In accordance with the license application and procedures, the inspector noted that the annual review of the ALAM arogram was )erformed by the Wilmington 4 Safety Review Committee (WSRC) on Decem)er 19, 1996.
The inspector reviewed meeting minutes which disclosed that the WSRC discussed the ALARA accomplishments in 1996 by the RSC and reviewed challenges for 1997. Selected sections of the document used to compile the annual ALARA report were reviewed and the following accomplishments were noted for 1996: a significant reduction was made in the number of missed bioassay samples; most of the ALARA projects for 1996 were completed: and the average total dose to workers was reduced 20% from the previous year (1995). In addition, goals and objectives for 1997 were established including the assignment of responsibility for projects. The inspector noted that many of the )rojects for 1997 involved contamination control and reducing air >orne concerns in certain areas of production. Further, as challenges in 1997, the WSRC included the smooth transition to full scale DCP operations; and new process startup which included Decontamination and Volume Reduction Facility (DVRF), and the Uranium Recover Sludge (URLS) Non Leach and New Product Warehouse.y from Lagoon According to I the ALARA report reviewed by the WSRC, the projected exposures for 1996 were: Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) was projected to be less than five percent of the NRC limit: Skin Dose Equivalent (SDE) was Dose Equivalent (DDE) projected to be less than 0.1 percent: Deep projection was 0.5 percent of NRC limit; and the Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) projection was less than 5 percent of the Ni ' limit.
- c. Conclusions The RSC was conducting frequent and effective meetings to maintain an awareness of projects to ensure exposures are maintained ALARA.
The WSRC evaluated the ALARA program as required by license and procedures. Based on projected exposure results, it appears as though the ALARA program was effective in reducing exposure and improving plant conditions.
- 6. Management Oversight of Prcgram (R1.11)
- a. Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the adequacy of management controls for ensuring the investigation and followup of events or activities resulting from significant elevated airborne concentrations.
criticality alarms, or acute internal exposures to personnel.
9
- b. Observations and Findinos i
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Unusual Incident Reports (UIRs). Randomly selected incidents were reviewed for the period Seatember through December 1996 to determine if the licensee was ta(ing actions in response to incidents consistent with procedural requirements. Based on documentation resulting from UIRs, the licensee was properly documenting and responding to VIRs in a timely manner.
- c. Conclusions The inspector determined that the UIR system appeared to be working in providing a mechanism for followup on events resulting from elevated airborne concentrations and internal exposures, j 7. Information Notices (92701)
- a. Inspection Scoce-The inspector reviewed the following Informaticn Notice (IN) to determine if the information had been received by the licensee:
1
- IN 96 57: Incident Reporting Recuirements. Involving Intakes, During A 24 four Period That May Cause A Total Effective Dose Equivalent In Excess Of 0.05 Sv (5 rem), dated October 30, 1996.
- b. Observations and Findinas The inspector determined that IN 96 57 had been received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability distributed to appropriate personnel, and that action, as approp,riate, was taken or scheduled,
- c. Conclusion The licensee's actions were appropriate.
IV. Facility Sucoort A. Emergency Preparedness
- 1. Drills and Exercises (F3.05)
- a. Insoection Scoce The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for scenario development and planning to verify that scenario response details included provisions for participation by offsite response organizations.
10
- b. Observations and Findinos i
The-inspector was informed by the licensee contact that offsite response organizations (State, local, and NRC) were invited to participate. j In response to NRC participation, the licensee contact discussed aspects of the scenario details that would afford the op wrtunity for testing the interface between the licensee and NRC accident assessment personnel,
- c. Conclusions
! Based on the discussion with the licensee contact essigned responsibility for exercise development and planning, the i inspector determined that coordination had been completed for
! participation by offsite agencies.in the June 1997 exercise.
L Manaaement Meetinos A. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 18, 1997, with those persons indicated in the Attachment. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including the violation in the area of access control, and the likely informational
- content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection. Although proprietary documents and processes were occasionally reviewed during this-inspection, the proprietary nature of these documents or processes has been deleted from this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The inspector informed the licensee that notification regarding the categorization of the violation as cited or non cited would be provided via telephone following additional review by regional management. The licensee was contacted telephonically on April 22, 1997, and informed that based on the additional review of details and subsequent actions by the licensee, the failure to follow access control procedures associated with food, drinks, gum, or tobacco in the controlled area met the criteria specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy for a NCV, N *s'~ m
11 ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS COWACTED Licensee Personnel
- D. Barbour, Radiation Team Leader
- D. Brown, Environmental Projects
- S. Dale, Auditor
- R. Foleck, Senior Licensing Specialist
- D. Godwin, Fire Chief L. Gutermuth, Manager, Industrial Safety
- R. Keenen, Site Emergency Manager
- J. Kline, Manager, Powder Product Line
- A. Habry, Program Manager, Radiological Safety
- R. Martyn, Manager, Haterial Control and Accountability
- C, Monetta, Manager, GE NE Environment, Health & Safety
- S. Hurray, Team Leader U0 Production Team
- L. Paulson, Manager, Nucle,ar Safety
- L. Quintana, Mana
- R. Reda, Hanager,ger, FuelsFabrication Product and Facility Line Licensing i
- B. Robinson, Principal Nuclear Safety Engineer E. Rouse, Monitor, Radiation Protection
- H. Shaver, Nuclear Safety Engineer
- G. Shrow, Environmental Engineer
- G. Smith, Team Leader FHO Haintenance Support
- C, Tarrer, Team Leader, Configuration Hanagement & ISA C. Vaughan, Project Manager, EH&S New Facility Licensing / Safety D. Whaley, Monitor, Radiation Protection Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production staff, security, and office personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on April 18, 1997 Other Personnel G. Bryan, Wilmington, NC Fire Department J. Green, Wilmington, NC Fire Department J. Griffin, Fluor Daniel, Project Engineer INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88055 Fire Protection IP 83822 Radiation Protection m
12 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i
Item Number Status Descriotion
{
70 1113/97 0S 01 Open IFI verify that the licensee review and l evaluate warning-lights from a human factors standpoint.
-70 1113/97 0S 02 Closed NCV Failure to follow access control requirements in NSR/R CHANGER 00H PROD No, 8S.04.
LIST OF ACRONYMS '
AC Area Coordinator
-AEC Active Engineered Control-ALARA- As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable CAA Controlled Access Area .
CFR Code of Federal Regulations DCF. Dry Conversion Facility DCP Dry Conversion Project DVRF Decontamination and Volume Reduction Facility ECC Emergency Control Center EH&S Environment, Health & Safety EMT Emergency Medical Team ERT Emergency Response Team FHO Fuel Manufacturing Operation FTI Functional Test Instruction GE NEP General Electric Nuclear Energy Production HazMat Hazardous Materials-HF Hydrofluoric Acid- .
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IFI Inspector Follow up Item
'IN Information Notice-IP Inspection Procedure IR Inspection Report ISA Integrated Safety Analysis NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety NCV Non Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NSI _ Nuclear Safety Instruction-NSR/R Nuclear Safety Recuirements/ Release P/P Practices & Procecures P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PIV Position Indicating Valve PTL Process Technology Lab RP
-Radiation Protection RSC Radiation Safety Committee RWP Radiation Work Permit
~
. .- .. . _ - - _ ~ .. - . - . _ .. ..
C
, 13 SAS Stationary Air Sampler SNH Special Nuclear Material UF Uranium Hexafluoritc Ulk Unusual Incident R i. ort UR' Uranium Recovery URLS Uranium Recovery From Lagoon Sludge URU Uranium Recovery Unit w
.4 9
l k
ONE LINERS FOR MAY 23. 1997 l
l
- 1. Fuel f acilities Status
- a. Babcock and Wilcox_(B&W) - NNFD Routine manufacturing and maintenance activities are being conducted in the Modified Fuel Process (MFP), Advanced fuel Process (AFP), and Research and Test Reactor fuel Element (RTRFE) pertions of the plant.
A routine Naval Reactors recovery campaign is being conducted in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) conversion process, used to produce U308 for use as RTRFE fuel, is operating normally. Routine Sapphire downblending i
activities are being conducted, IAEA inspectors are scheduled to be on site May 24 through 27 for a routine monthly audit of Sapphire downblending activities.
i A telephone meeting was held on May 21 between the licensee,
' Region II and NMSS regarding the possible compaction of dry active wastes generated by naval activities at shipyards.
Admiral Frank Bowman was onsite May 22 for a routine visit to 7 observe quarterly core review activities,
Routine rod loading and production operations are being performed on two 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shifts. Routine decontamination and refurbishment hetivities are being conducted in the SERF facilities.
NUKEM downloading activities are continuing and are about 80 percent complete. The remaining rods will require more time to download due to increased difficulty,
- c. General Electric - NEP Steve Specker, President, GE Nuclear Energy, was in headquarters on Tuesday for the signing of the design permit for the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR). He met with the chairman on Wednesday to discuss items of mutual interest. He was at Wilmington on Thursday and Friday.
A management meeting was held on Tuesday in NMSS (Region 11 participated by telephone) to discuss the status of the license renewal application. The license renewal is required before enriched uranium can be used in the Dry Conversion Facility. GE's target was around June 20. However, NMSS told them the renewal would come "about four to six weeks" af ter they receive the 1
6 10 bt
.Or.e - Liners 2 answers to the last request for additional information, which GE said would be the week of May 26. The other major issue'is the _,
scope of documentation which NMSS wants submitted from the !
Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). NMSS stated that all of the controls identified in the ISA as necessary to prevent or mitigate an accident would be made part of the license and any_ changes would have to be submitted similar to a 50.59 change. GE took 1
exception to this. The issue was left open for further discussions since the ISA is not reqJired prior to license renewal.
Following the leak in th'e line'I hydrolysis tank on May 5, the l other three hydrolysis tanks were disassembled and inspected. All I three tanks showed minor erosion of the wall but not as severe as that found on line 1. As a precaution, new tanks v:ere installed on lines 2 and 3. The tank for 1tne 4 was reinforced with fiberglass strips. A new tank for line 4 is on order. 4 Line 1 in DCF has been heated up and started processing gas (natural uranium) to powder on May 22. About 40 kilograms of UO2 powder were produced. A number of problems with controls.and interlocks is creating delays in progress. Also, the site e deionized water system went down for a period of time, causing DCF to go to stand by. The system is still hot while these problems are resolved.
In the Chemical area, line 1 is operating but will run out of gas .
on Friday and will be down over the holiday week end. Lines 2 and 4 are down as on routine schedule. Line 3 will run through the week-end on hie and line 5 will run recycle material. Uranium Recovery is running normally and will-process both solvent extraction and direct dissolve over the week-end. The pellet, rod and bundle assembly areas will be down for the holiday but probably start six day operations next week.
A contractor will be working this week-end to remove old tile and sealant containing asbestos from the hallway that will become the transition tunnel for moving powder from the DCF to the pellet area.
- d. Nuclear- Fuel Services. Inc.
Facility preparation activities and equipment installation for the UF, cylinder wash-(Phase 1) and U-Al (Phase 2) contracts continued this week.- The licensee recalled several-operators who had been
- furloughed to support the UF./U-Al project. Operator training is scheduled to begin in early June 1997. Pending NRC: approval, the
- licensee anticipates operations to begin in late' June 1997. -The U-Al contract was scheduled to begin after the UF, cylinder wash contract ends.
Facility-preparation activities in the 300 Complex for the new
t Or.e Liners- 3
-naval. fuel contract began this week, which included removal of 1 more equipment and the repair of the scrubbers and duct work that were damaged-during the Building 302 incinerator fire in April =
1996. At present, there were no plans to repair'or use the
, incinerator.
The licensee-continues excavation activities for source term removal in the North Site burial-area. No significant problems have been encountered. The groundwater drawdown system for the Pond 4 work area became operational this week since-being shutdown in November 1996. The groundwater drawdown rate was well below i
the system's capability. The contaminated soil from the CSX soil stockpile continues to be loaded into internodal containers for shipment to Environcare of Utah. 4 The facilic will be shutdown on Monday May 26, 1997 in honor of Memorial Day.
- e. Westinohouse '
This week Conversion Lines 2, 3, and 4 were being used to-process UF, gas while Lines- 1 and 5 were shut down. The pellet lines, rod loading, the recovery operation, and IFBA are all operating on a normal schedule. No problems have been reported during the past two weeks.
The annual inspection of the facility by ANI was completed this past week. No major issues were noted and all but one issue from past inspections were closed out. The one remaining issue of concern for ANI is that ANI-feels that Westinghouse should install sprinklers over the dryers on the conversion lines. Westinghouse -
believes that, due to the training of their fire brigade and the fact that there are always personnel present during routine operations and a' skeleton crew present during weekends- and holidays, the sprinklers are not needed.
- 2. Hospital San pablo On May 14, 1997, tlie-licensee reported the loss of six sealed sources
-containing micrecurie. quantities of either cesium-137,-cobalt-60 or cobalt-57. The sources were used for -instrument calibration.1 The-sources were inadvertently transferred to a bichau rds waste company and incinerated. The licensee will perform contamination surveys of-the
-incinerator. The: licensee: representative said the ash from that burn was discarded-prior to assay, but that analysis of a subsequent batch of ash exhibited background levels of radiation. The licensee report under 10 CFR 20.2201-is expected to contain a-dose assessment from the effluent.
One Linera 4 4
- 3. Professional Service Industries. Inc.
A Severity level 111 violation was issued to PSI, Inc. for failure to effectively implement training and radiation safety programs and a lack of management oversight at the licensee's Bristol, Virginia facility. l The findings were identified during an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) '
inspection conducted on November 13 throtgh December 4, 1936, to followup on an apparent overexposure of a technician. The AIT concluded that the exposure could not have been received from the use of the licensed gauge in the manner described by the technician. A Civil Pennity was not issued because of the Bristol, Virginia facility's prior good performance and the timely and comprehensive corrective action taken by the licensee.
4 Isomedix A Severity level 111 violation was issued to Isomedix, Vega Alta, Puerto Rico, the current operator of a peol irradiator. The violation was for failure to have a qualified irradiator operator on site for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> on February 12, 1997. This resulted from a breakdown in the licensee's program to assure they'had a qualified operator on site at times when the irradiator was operated. A Civil Penalty was not issued because of the licensee's prior good performance and the timely and comprehensive corrective actions taken by the licensee.
- 5. Agreement State Notification-Contaminated lemon pulo The NRC was contacted by a representative of the State of North Carolina concerning a state licensee. The licensee, Rhone-Poulenc of Research Triangle, is an international agricultural business. One of their ventures involved lemons grown in Brazil. A shipment of the lemon pulp arrived at Dulles airport, by way of England, and was embargoed by the
'JSDA. The agricultural material is apparently not allowed to enter the country and the USDA was preparing to incinerate the shipment when they noticed radioactive material labels on the inner container. At some point, the material had been labeled with 27 microcuries of C-14. The USDA called the licensee who called the State who then called RI! to determine if the material could be incinerated. While the regulatory partners were discussing the issue, the licensee notified the State that tia shipment was to be returned to the point of origin, either England or Brazil.
- 6. Currently Available Information on a Criticality Accident in Russia There was a nuclear criticality accident on May 15 or 16,1997 (one accident but information has conflicting dates) in the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in South-Central Russia. The incident occurred in a dissolution tank for highly-enriched uranium, apparently due to uranium accumulation caused by a blocked drain. The Russian Nuclear Regulatory Authority indicates radiation levels near the tank 1.
h One Liners 5 reached 0.5 rem /hr. Shut down was achieved by injecting boric acid into the tank. The Russian Nuclear Regulatory Authority reports no radioactive discharges, no significant personnel exposures, no injuries during response, and no significant equipment deformation or destruction. The Russian media, however, reported a number of serious radiation exposures.
One report indicates the tank contained 650 liters of uranium solution and implies a maximum enrichment of 26%. Reports indicate the specific plant facility fabricates fuel pellets and seem to indicate the tank is unshielded. However, several reports indicate the facility is designed to handle and process spent nuclear fuel, i
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ONE LINERS FOR JUNE 6. 1997
- 1. Fuel Facility Status
- a. Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) - NNFD Routine fuel manufacturing, maintenance and developmental activities are being conducted in the Modified fuel Process (MFP Advanced Fuel Process (AFP), and Research and Test Reactor Fuel ),
Element (RTRFE) portions of the plant.
Routine recovery operations are being conducted in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) conversion process, used to produce U3 0,, is operating normally.
l Bill Tobin attended a meeting on June 4 with NNFD and NHSS to discuss NNFD's proposed changes in the physical security area.
NNFD is proposing to reduce physical security requirements as a cost saving. HMSS was non-committal at this time and told NNFD to formally submit the proposed changes. ,
Effective June 1, John Matheson was appointed Vice President, Operations for FCF and assumes many of the duties formally held by Charlie Carr as Plant Manager, Lynchburg Manufacturing Facility.
Mr. Carr was described as " currently seeking other opportunities within the company." Due to the extent of the changes, a license amendment will be required to implement the announced changes.
Routine rod loading and production operations are being performed.
Routine decontamination and refurbishment activities are being conducted in th.e SERF facilities.
Nukem downloading operations are continuing.
- c. General Electric - NEP ADU lines 2 and 4 are operaf.ing but both will come down over the week-end. Line 5 is operating on recycle from Uranium Recovery and will rur, through the week-end. Line 3 will start up on Sunday night and run all week. This "up and down" schedule is caused by a high powder inventory. Solvent extraction is running at 4,500-5,000 kgs/ week feed to line 5.
The ceramics area in currently running a 5-day week but will start on 6-day weeks next week to meet shipping schedules. Rod load and bundle assembly are running on 6-day schedules and will probably have some 7-day weeks until the end of July. The production schedule calls for 105 assemblies a week through July.
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One Liners g The disassembly and down loading of pellets has been completed for the last Wergassen shipment (104 assemblies). This met the commitment to the Department of Commerce. Not all of the pellets have been processed yet.
in the DCF, the second cylinder of natural uranium is being processed. Glitches, such as a broken screen in the sifter or binding of the screw drive in the homogenizer, continue to delay powder processing. The first transfer of low concentration hydrofluoric acid from the Acid Recovery to Waste Treatment probably will occur next week.
The emergency exercise scheduled for June with Region 11 observation and participation has been rescheduled to July. NMSS will change the due date in the license as part of license renewal.
- d. Nuclear Fuel Services. Inc, Facility preparation activities and equipment installation for the UF, cylinder wash (Phase 1) and U-Al (Phase 2)' contracts continued this week. The licensee does not expect to complete equipment installation until the end of June. Operator training is now scheduled to begin in late June 1997. Pending NR; approval, the licensee anticipates operations to begin mid to late July 1997.
The U-Al contract was scheduled to begin after the UF, cylinder wash contract ends.
During the week of June 9, representatives from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site and Oak Ridge /Y-12 will be on site to observe the licensee re-sample and re-package 18 bottles of material in preparation for shipment to the Y-12 facility. This process will last approximately one week. The licensee expects the shipment of the material to be completed in July 1997.
Facility preparation activities in the 300 Complex for the new naval fuel contract continued this week, which included removal of more equipment and the repair of the scrubbers and duct work that were damaged during the Building 302 incinerator fire in April 1996.
The licensee continued excavation activities for source term removal in Trench M of the North Site burial area. No significant problems have been encountered, although the rainy conditions have hamperad progress this week. The contaminated soil from the CSX soil stockpile _ continued to be loaded into intermodal containers for shipment to Envirocare of Utah,
- e. Westinghouse This week Conversion Lines 1, 2, and 4 were being used to process
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'One Liners- 3 UF, gas,- Line 3 was being used to process. scrap recycle, and Line -
5 was briefly used for incinerator ash processing. The pellet-lines, rod loading, the recovery operation and IFBA are all -i
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operating normal schedule. Production throughput will be- '
inc.reased for the next few weeks in preparation for the upcoming peak in the shipping ;chedule. No safety significant problems have been reported during_the past two weeks.
A new chief executive officer for the Industries and Technology
. Group (ITG), Dr. Ernest H. Drew, has been appointed effective July i
1, 1997. Dr. Drew was previously a senior management team member '
of Hoechst AG, and is slated to become president and chief executive officer of the Westinghouse Electric Company after the planned spin-off of the ITG businesses this fall.
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- 2. Letter to PR Secretary of Health On June 4, a letter was sent to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Secretary of Health forwarding patient information for those patients who received misadministrations and are to receive notice from the 1
Puerto Rico Health Department that they should recei've annual followup eye exams.
- 3. Steel of West Virainia See attached Preliminary Notification.
- 4. Navy Proaram Review Region II inspectors completed the Annual Review of the Navy Master
- Material License. Preliminary findings identified only one-apparent
' violation for failure to report a radiography source disconnect to the NRC and-several minor areas where the program could be improved.
Overall, the Navy continues to maintain a well managed program.
-the Envirocare facility which revealed that it was a common occurrence for Envirocare to violate its licensed possession limits, exteasive
' discussions began between neadquarters, and Regions.II and IV concerning the course of action to be taken.
$he.followingmessagewas' read-toallRegionIIFuelFacilitieson Junu~5, 1997: It has recently come to NRC's attention that the State of Utah performed an inspection at the Envirocare site. 'As a result of.the inspection a Notice of- Violation was issued for exceeding Condition 13 of State License.No. UT 2300249 which limits the amount of material that they-can possess, undisposed of, at any one time to 350 grams l' 235. .This information is being'provided to you as a customer of Envirocare so that you can take those actions necessary to assure that
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One Liners 4 shipments on a single conveyance does not place Envirocare in violation of their State license.
The following provides the individual (s) talked to and any comments they made when they were provided the above information:
Facility Person Contacted Comunents huclear fuet Services Joe Pugh, Waste Manager NFS limits its waste shipments to Envirocare to less than 350 grams U 235 per conveyance. I Westinghouse Wilbur Goodwin, Regulatory Westinghouse has not used nor Affairs Manager plans to use Envirocart in the
, inenediate future.
Frematone Cogema Fuels Cayte Ettiott, safety and Framatone has not used nor plans Licensing Manager to use Envirocare in the issnediate future.-
84W/NNFD Steve Schltthite, Manager, NNFD has shipped materiet under.
Radiation and rc iticality Safety mJltiple manifests on the same and Jack Storton, Envirorveental vehicle per Envirocare Protection Engineer and Charlie instructions.
Anderson, Manager, Accountability Operations General Electric Ralph Reda, Manager, fuel and CE has shipped using mattiple Facility Licensing, Joe Kline, manifests on the same vehicle,
- Manager, Chemical Product Line in accordance with Envirocere and Rick Foteck. $r, Licensing instructions. Howeverf the -
specialist revision to 10 CFR 71.53 timiting 400 grams per.
conveyance makes this moot.
.The bottom line is that Region II is hearing from its licensees that Envirocare-told them to use multiple manifest (each with less _than 350 ,
grams U 235) so that Envirocare could stay under their 350 gram license
-limit. It appears-that the Region-II licensee's believed that Envirocare would bring'one manifest at a tirne onsite and place it in _the burial trenches.
Following completion of a Region IV inspection _of Envirocare the week of
-June 9 13, 1997, Region II will consider taking enforcement action against Region li licensees, if appropriate, i
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, . < *I June 4, 1997 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-97-031
, preliminary' notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is knownz by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.
Fe:cility Steel Of West Virginia Licensee Emercancy Classification l_ Huntington, West Virginia Notification of Unusual Event Alert License Not N/A. Site Area Emergency l i
General-Emergency X Not Applicable
Subject:
TRUCK CONTAINING SCRAP ACTIVATED RADIATION MONITOR On June 4, 1997, Steel.of West Virginia (SWV) , a scrap smelter.in Huntington, West' Virginia, reported an alarm of the facility's radiation
_ monitor-after it was activated by a returning truckload of scrap at i Sharrington, Inc., in Oak Hill, Ohio. SWV observed a Ronan/Kay-Ray density gauge on top of the scrap. Sherrington, Inc. confirmed that the shutter was closed. They also vere able to determine that the gauge was a
'Kay-Ray Model-7050 containing 500 millicuries of Cesium-137. The-gauge has been secured from further processing by Sherington, Inc. pending disposal.- Sherrington,-Inc. believes the gauge came'from one of three r**rby coal or gravel plants. Sherrington iG working with Ronan/Kay-Ray etermine the owner of the gauge. The gauge was originally sold to
- d. 1 Enrichment Corporation, Chicago, Illinois in June 1973 as a General Licensed device. Ronan provided the electronics for the gauge but-was not
.the contractor for installation, servicing, or removal of the. gauge.
Region III, USEPA, and the State of West' Virginia-have been notified.
Contact:
John Potter (404)S62-4731-
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June 6, 1997 i
' General Electric Cocoany ATTN: Mr. C. P. Kip',-General p Manager GE Nuclear Energy. Production P. O. Box 780 l Wilmington, NC 28402
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70 1113/97 04 1
Dear Hr. Kipp:
-This refers to the ins:>ection conducted on March 26 28, April 711 and April 9 May 9,1997, at the Wilmington facility. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the report.
I Areas examined during the inspection are identified in th'e report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representativa records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
.Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC PLd,lic Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
/s/
Edward J. McAlpine, Chief Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Docket No. 70 1113
-License No. SNH-1097
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/ enc 1: (See page 2)
D%
1.3o6-}4+1dit 1 ,g ,
- g. q-l GE, 2
cc w/ enc 1f . -
Dr. Ralph Reda, Manager Fuels and Facility Licensing General' Electric Company-P. O.- Box -780, Mail Code J26 Wilmington, NC 28402- i Dayne'.'H. Brown, Director
' Division of Radiation Protection )
- N.- C.' Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources i P. O. Box 27687 ~!
Raleigh, NC 27611 7687 lijitribution w/ encl::.
E. McAlpine,:RII G..Troup G. Shear, RIII C. Cain, RIV F. Wenslawski, RIV-PUBLIC
- h. Distribution w/o ens.1:
~-License Fee Manage:nent Branch
- y. -
'crrrer ett.y St%ATURE NAnt GTrcup OATE ' 06 / ~ / 97 06'/* / 97 06 / / 97 ' 06 / '/ 97 06 / / 97 06 / - / 97 COPf? VES' NO Yt$ Yt$ -
NO - NO Yt3 - NO vt$ No Yt3 NO
.OrtiLLAt. RtLund LUPY - LXX,Wt NI NR i;\rt bil\nt.FVsib\ dis /04,GLI.
1 i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket No.: 70 1113 License No.: SNH.1097 Report No.: 70 1113/97 04 l Licensee: General Electric Company i
Facility: Nuclear Energy Production Location: Wilmington, No. .i Carolina Dates: March 26 28, 1997 A ril 7 11, 199/
A ril 29 Hay 9, 1997 Inspector: G. L. Troup Sr. Fuel Facilities Inspector Approved by: E. J. McAlpine, Chief Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials SafM,y Enclosure 00h
_ )Ohf1Mh) 19 .
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- G EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
j General Electric Nuclear Energy Production NRC Inspection Report 70 1113/97 04- i This routine, announced ins Conversion Facility (DCF), pection was focused on the status of the new Dryinc functional testing of systems and approval of various documents required for operations. Review of previously identified items and reported occurrences was also conducted. A deep back shift inspection was conducted on May 4. The -
inspection was focused on the safe operation of the facility.
Within the scope of the inspection, no violations were identified. Three new inspector follow up items (IFIs) were opened.
- Plant 00erations o Actions to resolve an improperly identified shipment of radioactive material from a foreign shipper were completed.
e Actions to identify the cause of failure in the criticality warning system in the DCF and to resolve the issue with the supplier were prompt and thorough.
e During the inspection period, a flashback fire in a sintering furnace and a leak from a chemical process tank occurred. Both events were still under investigation at the end of the inspection period.
Dry Conversion Cacility Construction e Installation of the roof, the leak detection system and the lightning i dispersion system has been completed. A final review and acceptance of
! the installation by the constructor has to be completed.
e Installation of process line 2 and acid recovery line 3 were verified to have been completed in accordance with the system drawings.
e The effluent monitoring system for the building exhaust was modified to remove sharp bends. The flow meters were replaced with meters
- compatible with the licensee's calibration equipment.
e Uranium process monitors in the acid recovery facility have been calibrated. Other process monitors for process line 1 were also calibrated.
Dry Conversion Facility Testina ;
- The vender's No Load test was conducted twice, an initial test and a conformatory test following modification of the Distributed Control System software. The Start Up test began during the inspection.
- Functional tests were conducted on Active Engineered Controls in process l line 1 and lines 1 and 2 in the acid recovery facility.
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Hanaaement Controls -!
e An extensive Readiness Review was conducted by a forty member group. !
Findings were resolved or approved by management to accept 'as is. i l e The Wilmington Safety Review Committee reviewed the findings and l resolution of findings of the Integrated Safety Analysis, the Readiness Review and other pre operational audits. Approval for operation was :
given on May 9, 1997.
! e An electronic document system has been implemented for the OCF.
l Operating procedures, technical reports and functional test instructions Were placed on the system after approval. l t
o Industrial safety and chemical safety hazards analyses were completed l l and the requirements approved.
i e The licensee has established controls for the maintenance of safety controls in the DCF.
Trainino i
e The licensee has implemented a training program for new operators in the Chemical Area and Uranium Recovery. :
Attachnents
. Partia' List of. Persons Contacted i Inspection Procedures Used .
List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed .
List of Acronyms ;
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t 8 Bff0RTDETAILS Summary of Plant Status On March 28, 1997. R. Nardelli President, GE Power Systems and S. Specker, President, GE Nuc1 car Energy (GE NE), were onsite to review the status of the Dry Conversion Facility (DCF) and to review facility operations.
On April 25, 1997. C. Reda, Product Manager, Fuel Components, was appointed the 4anager, GE NE Quality, effective April 28. The former manager was appointed to a msition with GE Hotors and Industrial Systems. A replacement as the Product .ine Hanager, fuel Components will be named later. i t
On April 28, 1997, dedication ceremonies were held for the DCF. This coincided with the meeting of the Board of Directors meeting of Japan Nuclear Fuels (JNF). JNF is a minority owner of the Joint Conversion Company (JCC),
which is the owner of the DCF. ,
Effective April 28, the DCF was designated a radiologically controlled area, ;
in preparation for start up activities with Uranium.
During the periods of inspection, normal fuel production . activities were being conducted including uranium recovery and waste processing operations. ;
] Other NRC inspections and activities during the inspection period were: !
Environmental Protection and Waste Management, W. Gloersen. Region II.
Harch 24 27, 1997, Inspection Report (IR) No. 70 1113/97 03.
]"
Radiation Protection and Fire Protection. A. Gooden and W. Tobin, Region II, April 14 18, 1997, IR 70 1113/97 05.
- 1. Review of Previous Events (88020)
- a. Improper Material Shipment (1) Inspection Sco2R The inspector reviewed the circumstances involving the receipt of improperly labeled material from a foreign shipper.
(2) Observations and Findinal On March 7,1997 while unloading a seavan shipping container which contained 150 Model BU J shipping containers, licensee employees observed that two of the BU-J Js had tampersafe seals attached to the bolting ring. These containers were supposedly empty and did not require tampersafe seals. The employees notified the cognizant personnel. Details of the licensee's actions are discussed in IR 70 1113/97 02, Paragraph 1.b. At the conclusion of l
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2 that inspection, the licensee was awaiting receipt of the investigation report from the shipper (ENUSA). Corrective actions were identified in Unusual incident Report (VIR)
DCP 9701, On March 26, 1997. ENUSA forwarded a copy of their investigation report and the corrective actions they had initiated as a result of this incident to the licensee. The licensee's review of the ENUSA report concluded that adequate corrective actions had been taken.
The licensee completed the actions identified in VIR DCP-9701, such as entering the materials received into the material accountability system. The licensee has closed the UIR.
(3) Conclusions Corrective actions regarding the improper shipment were completed.
The shipper hcs completed the investigation and initiated seceptable corrective actions,
- b. Criticality Warning System Horns (1) Inspection Scong The inspector reviewed the cause and corrective actions taken after horns in the DCF failed to activate during a test of the warning system.
(2) Observations and Findinos On March 25, during a test of the alarm horns in 1.he DCF, the horns in two sections (consisting of two loops in the circuit) of the facility did not activate and sound. When a failure like this happens, a failure alarm is supposed to sound in two offices and the circuit is sup nsed to shift to a back up board to maintain operability. T11s did not occur.
An investigation determined that the failure had occurred in an amplifier board. A contractor service representative replaced the amplifier board and the system was successfully tested.
On April 8. a licensee representative took the amplifier board to the manufacturer's facility and witnessed the investigation as to why the board did not function properly.
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3 l The manufacturer was not certain why the board had failed because it had passed two tests before being shipped: (1) a test of the individual amplifier board, and (2) a test of the assembled unit.
Under the observation of the licensee representative. the manufacturer conducted a series of tests of the board and determined that the problem was the "K2" relay. It was determined that a connector pin on the relay was broken at about half of it's length. A new relay was installed and the board was satisfactorily tested. It was not certain when the connector pin might have broken. The board was returned to the plant as a spare unit.
The licensee representative concluded that the broken pin was an isolated failure and was not indicative of a generic or design problem which would have required reporting under the requirements of 10 CFR 21.
(3) Conclusions The licensee's efforts to identify the'cause of the failure was very thorough.
The inspector concurred with the licensee's assessment that this was an isolated problem and not a generic problem.
- c. Gadolinia Furnace Fire (1) Inspection Scong The inspector reviewed the cause and corrective actions taken following a fire in a sintering furnace.
(2) Observations and Findinas On April 19, 1997, a small fire occurred at the entrance to a sintering furnace in the Gadolinia shop. An empty pellet boat had been loaded into the loading box. A flashback occurred. A pressure relief device on the top of the furnace opened, reset and then cpened again. The second time the device opened, flames erupted through the opening and set a 31astic flow meter on fire. When an operator observed tie fire, he attempted to put out the flames with his hand. During the event, the operator received a flash burn to his face and a burn on his hand from extinguishing the fire on flow meter. He was subsequently treated at an offsite medical facility and released.
Pending an investigation into the cause of the fire, the furnace was purged with nitrogen to remove the combustible atmosphere and the temperature reduced (" idled").
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4 The initial review indicated that a malfunction of a timer may have initiated the action. When a pellet boat is loaded, the outer door of the loading box opens to permit entry. then closes With both-the outer and inner doors closed, the box is purged with nitrogen for a sxcific time (controlled by the timer) to remove air in the xx. At the end of the purge, the inner door-opens to armit the boat to enter the furnace. In this instance, if tie inner door opened before the purge was complete, air in the box would react with the hydrogen in the furnace, causing the fire.
The licensee initiated a root cause investigation into the event and an VIR. At the conclusion of the inspection, this investigation had riot been completed.
(3) Conclusions The results of the investigation and completion of any corrective actions will be reviewed later. This will be tracked as Inspector Follow.up Item (IFI) 97 04 01.
- d. Hydrolysis Tank Leak -
(1) Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the cause and corrective actions taken following a leak in a chemical process tank.
(2) Observations and Findinas On May 5, 1997, an operator in the Chemical Area observed a
" cloud" adjacent to the hydrolysis receiver tank on Line 1.
He contacted the Chemical Control Room by telephone, then helped get personnel out of the area. Control Room gas to the tank, then operators pumped most stopped thetoflow of contents the aof UF, hydrolysis storage tank.
Response personnel, using respiratory protection, entered the area verified that the leak had stopped, and initiated clean up activities. The area was cleared and released for
-normal access in about an hour. Special air samples were collected and both the stationary air samplers (SASS) and the stack sampler were collected for evaluation. Personnel who had been in the area were placed on a special bioassay program and restricteC from the area. Subsequent evaluation of the samples showed that the highest exposed individual-had an intake of 3.6% of the regulatory limit based on a weekly intake and there was no potential that the Annual Limit of Intake (ALI) had been exceeded by any of the workers present. All air sample results and the stack sample were less than any regulatory limit.
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Inspection of the tank revealed a small hole in the side of !
i the tank. When the tank was removed, several depressed !
areas on the inside of the tank at approximately the same i level as the hole were noted. The evaluation was these depressions and the hole were caused by erosion produced by 4 the UF, gas coming from a misa11gned dip tube. The dip !
! . tubes them inare installed place in the holes vertically,he in t tank top, so one or bothbut the could be tilted or " cocked."
i A new tank was installed. To prevent the tilting of the dip i tubes, an alignment fixture was designed and installed. The i tank was returned to service on May 6. The alignment ,
. fixture was also installed on other process, as necessary.
lines that same week. l The licensee initiated a root cause investigation team and ,
- ' also planned to inspect the hydrolysis receiver tanks on other lines.- At the conclusion of the inspection, these activities were still being conducted, i (3) Conclusions The results of the investigation and completion of any
- corrective actions will be reviewed later. This will be
- - tracked as IFI 97 04 02,
- 2. Dry Conversion Facility Construction (88020)
- a. Roof Construction
) (1) InsoectionSecoe The inspector reviewed the status of the completion of the roof membrane and the installation of the leak detection-4 system.
(2) Observations and Findin.gs 1
The facility is designed as a " moderation exclusion" area L where no moderating materials will be permitted, except
- under specifically designated conditions, in those areas powder is produced or handled. A rincipal where feature 00,f o the " moderator exclusion" princi le is the construction of a roof which precludes any eaks of rain
- into the facility. . Details of the roof-construction are i described in JCC drawings in the A21.ARXX series of drawings and the roofing material supplier project description. The DCF roof is designed to provide multiple barriers to any leakage or seepage of external moisture into the DCF.
Details of the roof design and construction are discussed in IR 70 1113/96 02. Paragraph 4.
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6 The Engineer / Constructor (E/C) roof expert reviewed the construction of the roof for the DCF, the HF facility, the shipping container warehouse. and the FM0X mezzanine roof, all of which have been installed by the E/C. A number of problems were documented in a letter dated February 28, 1997, for correction.
The inspector toured the DCF roof with a licensee representative and observed that most of the identified problems had been corrected. However, one spot was identified where a sharp object was located under the up membrane, which could cause penetration of the membrane.per The area was marked for correction.
The licensee representative stated that the E/C's roof expert would be asked to do a final review of the roof and document its acceptability.
A system to disperse lightning has been installed around the building roof and on the ventilation exhaust stack. The inspector observed that the supports for the lightning dispersion system were connected to the building structure and did not penetrate the integrity of the membrane, As part of the DCF roof construction, a leak detection system is installed to identify leakage through the first membrane and the upper slab. The inspector observed that the drain pipes have been installed in three locations on the drain trough (IR 70 1113/97 02, Paragraph 3.a). On April 9, the inspector observed that the lower collection section (which would provide visual indication of leak detection) and isolation valve had been installed on each drain pipe. This completes the installation of the leak detection system.
(3) Conclusions The construction of the DCF roof is complete. Final inspection and acceptance following repair of any designated areas remains,
- b. Process System Installation (1) Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the installation of the process systems in the DCF to determine that the systems were in accordance with the process drawings.
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(2) Ohgervations and Findinal l The inspector selected components and instruments which had been identified by the licensee as having a safety function, i This identification was based on the Active Engineered
! Controls (AECs) list in the Technical Reports or the hazards
- analysis evaluation.
I The inspector then took the Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) for the various systems (vaporization, conversion, acid recovery, etc.) and walked down the systems for process line 2 and the HF acid recovery for process-line 3 to verify that the equipment was installed and was shown on the P&lD. The inspector also traced out flow i pathways to confirm that the process lines were as shown.
All of the valves, instruments- ed major components were ,
installed as shown. The inspector also verified that switches or contacts which are used to align moveable !
equipment and permit valves to open when the equipment is in proper alignment (11mit switches) were, installed as shown.
The inspector noted that the equipment numbers for the vaporizers in process line 2 did not agree with those shown on the P& ids. The equipment number for the vaporizer associated with number 1 vaporizer shown on the P&ID was physically on number 2 vaporizer and vice versa. Licensee representatives had previously identified this condition during system walk. downs. They are investi the nameplates can be switched or if the lD P& gating whether equipment numbers should be changed to conform to the actual installation.
(3) fanclusions The process lines were installed as shown on the P& ids.
Instrumentation and critical valves were as described in the AEC lists and the hazards analyses,
- c. Effluent Monitoring Equipment-(1) Insoection Scope-The inspector reviewed the actions taken to correct identified deficiencies in the sampling system for the DCF and HF building exhaust system.-
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8 (2) Ohsttyations and Findinas During the review of the sampling system for the building exhaust systems, the ins >ector observed that the sampling probe line had several slarp bends. This and other observations were documented in IR 70 1113/97 03, section II.C.2.
The inspector observed that the samale line from the DCF exhaust stack had been replaced wit 1 a line with a long, curved bend so there were no sharp turns and that the air flow metsurement probes had been installed. The inspector also observed that flov'eters manufactured by Wallace &
Tiernan had been installed in the DCF aM HF exhaust sampling' systems. This change was made because the licensee s calibration equipment is compatible with Wallace
& Tiernan flow meters.
On May 8, 1997, a velocity profile measurement was performed on the DCF exhaust duct. Two sets of measureinents were taken, one set about 90' around the duct from the other.
Velocity measurements showed relatively uniform flow across the duct in both directions indicating no major obstructions or conditions which would affect the sam 31e
! collection. Based on the velocity profile, flow in t1e exhaust is turbulent, confirming the licensee's assessment that only one sample probe is necessary.
(3) Conclu11pm The sampling systems have been modified to provide proper sample collection.
The air flow in the exhaust duct is uniform and turbulent,
- d. Instrument Calibrations (1) InsDection Scop _g The inspector reviewed the calibrations for selected instruments which are part of AEC circuits.
(2) Observations and Findinas Each vaporizer includes a monitoring system which includes The atmosphere in each vaporizer is an analyzermonitore continuously for UF , d during operation for the evidence of UF.,ing pip system.which would According indicate to the a leak Technical from Report thefor (TR) cylinder or the vaporization (TR 1331), the in line monitor is part of an AEC which activates certain controls automatically if the limit is exceeded. (Functional testing of the AECs is l
e s,
9 discussed in Paragraph 3.)
The inspector reviewed the calibration records for the UF, detectors for the vaporizers on Line 1 in the Haintenance Planning and Control (HPAC) computer record system. Both detectors were calibrated on April 26, 1997, and the associated Work Orders were closed in HPAC on April 27. The HPAC records did not have detailed information about the calibration but showed that the work had been completed.
Licensee management stated that the detailed information concerning the calibration of these detectors, as well as several other instruments, would be added to the MPAC record.
There are several UF detectors installed in the vaporizer rooms to detect any gas leaks from the system outside of the vaporizers. These detectors fail when detecting UF, so they cannot be ' calibrated" in the normal sense.
The HF facility system has four Uranium monitors (U-monitors) one in each process line downstream of the condenser and a common detector in the'line to the HF collection tanks. The inspector reviewed the records of the calibrations of the U monitors.
All four U monitors were calibrated on Hagh 22. 1997, using five solutions of Uranium enriched to 5% 0, the maximum enrichment authorized for DCF. Although materials received in HF from Conversion will be virgin material (no decay daughter products), the calibration was checked with aged material (that which contains the daughter products) to assure that the calibration would correctly identify such materials. The basic scale was also checked with two solutions around 4% enriched materials. Blank samples (using water) and the internal sources were also used in the calibration. Following determination of the monitor output with these solutions, set points were determined using a linear regression calculation.
Uranium concentration limits for the HF tanks were set at 100 parts per million (p>m), based on nuclear criticality safety considerations. ollowing the calibrations, it was determined that the span of associated instruments meant that the upper limit of the span was equivalent to 23 ppm Uranium. Appropriate procedures were being revised to reflect this limit.
Under normal conditions, U monitor Scale #1 is used. The monitor also has a second scale (Scale #2) which was also checked with natural Uranium and an enriched solution about 4% to verify that the monitors functioned properly on this setting.
t 10 (3) Conclusions
~
monitors for the vaporizers were calibrated but The UF tation needs to be completed.
documen The U monitors in the HF building were thoroughly calibrated and process limits were revised to reflect instrument :
limitations.
- 3. Erf poerational Testina (88020. 88025)
- a. Pre Operational Tests (1) Inspection Scong i The inspector reviewed the completion of the system pre-4 operational tests to verify that equipment check outs and system leak tests had been completed.
(2) DbservationsandFindinas The equipment contractor developed two' sets of procedures for initial testing. The vendor's procedure no. U01.1320, c j "Hanual for No Load Tests," dated August 29, 1996, was used .
for the no load tests. These tests included checks on individual pieces of equipment, such as electrical checks on motors, check for proper rotation of motors and equi ment, verification and adjustment of valve movement, thresiold measurements for measurement, interlock and alarm devices.
. No Load tests for vaporization began on March 24. Tests for conversion began on April 1. Other parts of the facility were also tested. During these tests, numerous problems werc encountered with Distributed Control System (DCS) software.
This required numerous modifications of the software code.
As a result of these numerous changes, the licensee conducted the No. Load tests a second time. After each portion of the No Load test was successfully completed the second time and the software was verified, the code was
- locked" and placed in the Configuration Management program.
After the software was " locked," functional tests were
' conducted to document that the controls furictioned, e:.
i described in Paragraph 3.b.
The vendor's procedure no. U10.1320, " Start Up Hanual,"
dated December 4,1996, was used for start up testing. As -
part of this test involves testing with licensed material (State of North Carolina license), the manual was issued as an a'tachment to Temporary Operating Instruction 501 1332.05, "DCP Start up Testing" and approved in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures.
_7
(,
6 11 i Start up testing began on April 17 with the conduct of leak tests in vaporization. The inspector observed selected tests in the Control Room and determined that the s were functioning as stated in the Start Up Hanual. ystemsStart up testing of the facility was still in progress at the end of the inspection period.
(3) Conclusions No. load testing was satisfactorily completed. Software changes necessitated that tests be conducted a second time to verify the all set points and interlocks were pro before releasing the system for functional testing. per Start Up testing started using an approved procedure,
- b. Functional Tests (1) Insoection Scooe The inspector reviewed the completion of the functional test instructions (FTIs) for AECs. and, when possible, witnessed the performance of the tests.
(2) Qbigtyltions and Findinas As discussed in IR 70 1113/97 02, Paragra)h 5. an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) was performed for t1e DCF. As a-result, a number of AECs were identified. The licensee's internal procedures require that AECs which are nuclear criticality safety controls must be periodically tested in accordance with approved FTis.
FTIs were identified for designated AECs and included in the TRs. This list was revised several times, based on the ISA and Readiness Review (Paragraph 4.a.). The FTIs also were the final tests to demonstrate that the software for the DCS functioned properly, as required by P/P 120 15.
After the DCS software was modified following completion of the No Load tests for vaproization and conversion (Paragra>h 3.a.(2)). many of the FTIs were conducted to verify 11at the systems functioned as required. The inspector observed the conduct of six of these preliminary tests on March 27. All controls functioned as required.
The inspector reviewed numerous FTIs in draft form and determined that the test sequences and actions were consistent with the requirements specified in the AEC lists.
On April 22 and 23. the license conducted the official functional tests for the AECs in process line 1 vaporization (a total of 14 tests), conversion (15 tests), powder outlet 1
i i
12 (3 tests) and the HF facility (10 tests). On April 28, the inspector reviewed the FTIs and the results for vaporization. The inspector noted that FTI 1331 8, which was a test for the cold trap, was signed off as conducted on April 23. However, the approval record for that test document showed that the test was not approved until April 29. When the inspector brought up this point to the licensee, the test was conducted satisfactorily on May 1 and was observed by the inspector.
The inspector reviewed the completed FTIs for conversion, powder outlet and HF during April 29 30. All of these FTIs were approved prior to the test. Changes to the FT! made in the field were reviewed and approved in accordance with the administrative procedure. The inspector determined that the FTI results satisfied the requireme its specified in the AEC lists.
During the conduct of FTI 1332 15, which verifies that the recycle hatch valves on the kiln operate so that only one valve is open or can be opened at a time, both hatch valves owned at the same time under one of the test sequences.
T1e interlock should have prevented one valve from opening when the other valve was open. After trouble shooting the problem and resolving the problem, tne FTI was conducted on May 8 and was observed by the inspector. The test was conducted satisfactorily. The same logic applies to the valve sequence on the powder outlet from the kiln. On May 8 FTI 1333 2 was conducted again and the interlock was found to function properly.
The inspector noted that all of the completed FTIs had changes made in the field. These FTIs will be used for the testing of the other process lines as well as for the wriodically (annual or after maintenance) required tests.
.icensee representatives stated that the FTIs would be revised to reflect the field changes and any other lessons learned during the start up testing (3) Conclusions Functional tests were performed and demonstrated proper operation of the AECs.
After a problem in an interlock sequence was identifled, the licensee retested a similar interlock was retested to check for the same problem. The other interlock functioned properly.
l g e 0
13 FTIs need to be revised to reflect lessons learned during initial testing.
The probleni with conducting a test with a draft (unapproved) procedure is addressed further in Paragraph 5.a.(2).
4, Manaaement Controls (88005)
- a. Readiness Reviews (1) Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the findings of the Readiness Review and the ISA to verify that results had been addressed and resolved.
(2) Observations and Findinos To provide an independent assessment of the facility status and readiness for operation, the licensee conducted a Readiness Review. The review was conducted by forty persons re) resenting a wide range of skills. Team members came from NE ), other GE facilities, contractors from other companies and-several former NEP employees. Three main areas were addressed: operations, maintenance, and environmental, health and safety (EH&S).
The Readiness Review was conducted March 17 21, 1997.
Approximately 290 findings were identified, although some were considered " major
- and others were of lesser significance. Each finding was assigned a priority rating and a person designated with the responsibility to resolve the finding, Several of the team members later formed a team to review the corrective actions on the identified items. Each item was tracked in a data base to assure completion or resolution.
The findings of the Readiness Review were presented for management review on April 22. 1997. All items were completed or accepted on May 9, As discussed in IR 70 1113/97 02, Paragraph 5, the licensee had conducted an ISA for the DCF, Findings were classified in three levels of risk. For those considered to present
" moderate" risk, they were further classified as "fix" or
" accept." The inspector reviewed the summaries for "high" risk items in vaporization, conversion, and acid recovery and selected various items. The inspector then determined that the actions had been completed to resolve the finding.
, d,
- I
- i. !
y j .
14
!t (3) Conclusions The Readiness Review was conducted by a team of knowledgeable individuals. It represented a very detailed and thorough review of the facility and the state of readiness to operate, Findings were tracked to assure completion, Corrective actions were inspected to verify completion. All findings were resolved,
- b. Management Review of Findings (1) Insoection Scooe lhe inspector reviewed the results of the management review of the resolution of items for readiness to operate, (2) Observations and Findinal Part I, Chapter 2, section 2,3,1 of the License Application establishes the Wilmington Safety Review Committee (WSRC),
Cae of the assigned functions of the WSRC is to review nuclear and industrial safety practices applied to major changes made or proposed in authorized plant activities.
P/P 40 1 "Wilmington Safety Review Committee" includes new facilities or major changes to existing facilities.
On April 22, 1997, the WSRC reviewed the findings of the ISA which had been classified as
- moderate risk no action,"
the findings of the Readiness Review and the findings of-several pre operational audits. The WSRC acce recommended actions for most of the actions. pted However, the WSRC disagreed with the recommended actions for seven findings.
Additional action was required for these items.
On May 5, 1997, another WSRC meeting was held to review the status, Not all actions were accepted. On May 9, 1997, another WSRC meeting was held, Corrective actions were accepted and the WSRC accepted the DCF as ready to operate.-
(3) Conclusions The audit findings and corrective actions were reviewed and accepted in accordance with the license requirements. The WSRC review was active in that recommended actions were not accepted without further action,
O
- a 15
- c. Audits (1) luingetion Scope The inspector reviewed the results of the ; ost recent Nuclear Safety audit.
(2) Observations and Findinas l Part I, Chapter 2, section 2.1.8 of the License Application states that quarterly audits of plant o conducted by the nuclear safety staff. perations The auditwill for be the first quarter,1997, was conducted during the period February 24 March 4.
l
' The inspector reviewed the audit report and determined that the audit was conducted b;r qualified auditors and was in i accordance with procedurai requirements. No items of non.
compliance were identified. Areas of concern were 4 identified to the cognizant managers and resolved. l 1
(3) Conclusiong The first quarter audit was conducted as required. No non-compliances were identified.
- 5. Procedures and Documentation (88020';
- a. Operating Procedures (1) Insoection Sggag The inspector reviewed the status of approval for operating procedures and also reviewed the contents of selected procedures.
(2) Observations and Findinas Operating procedures (designated Standard Operating Instructions 501s) for the DCF are in the electronic form.
Procedures are accessed through the electronic system rather than using paper copies. P/P 10 09, " Operating Procewres (ops) FH0" was revised to s weify that electronic
. procedures are approved for tie DCF. The format for such
)rocedures is specified in SAR 350 30
- Writing Operations
)rocedures.'
When an operator logs into the system, a dialogue box.
informs him of any procedure changes. The operator then reviews the changes, which are highlighted on the screen,
s, ,
d 16 and electronically " signs
- that the change has been read and understood. The system is monitored to assure that acknowledgments are timely.
The Configuration Hanagement Center (CHC) maintair.s control over the procedure system and maintains records of the
{
approvals. When procedures are revised, the procedure is ;
released electronically by CHC. Other documents related to l
DCF are also being placed on the electronic procedure i system, such as TRs FTIs and certain hazards analyses. '
P& ids are also being placed in the electronic system. The inspector also reviewed six TRs. which had bee;i approved and released by CHC onto the electronic procedure system, l The inspector observed that documents on the electronic system do not reflect the revision number or show the approvals. This is because the procedure is not released onto the system by CHC until all approvals are documented and placed in the CHC records. Draft procedures or draft revisions are kept in a se)arate electronic file until approved and released to t1e document file. However, there are certain documents, such as FTIs and operator logs, which must be printed in paper form for use. As identified in Paragraph 3.b.(2) a copy of an FTI was used which had not been approved was used to conduct a test. After this problem was identified licensee representatives stated that they would develop a method to assure that paper copies of documents in use in the facility were the latest, approved revision.
Six 501s were approved and released for the DCF systems.
The inspector reviewed the records in CHC and verified that all had been reviewed and approved as required by P/P 10 09 and that the revisions made were also properly reviewed and approved. One procedure was issued as a TOI to address the start up testing (section 3.a).
The procedures were reviewed and determined to contain recuirments for criticality safety, radtation safety, incustrial and chemical safety, environmental requirements, material control and accountability and quality control.
The procedure format is such that specific cautions or warnings are highlighted in the text at the appropriate position. General requirements and precautions are specified for each safety area in the beginning.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector reviewed drafts of the procedures and identified questions to the authors. In early versions, there were conflicts between procedures or with the Technical Report. These were resolved as the procedures were finalized.
O '
i
. l e- l 17
-The inspector noted that several S0ls have been revised based on changes identified during testing. The inspector verified that selected revisions had been approved at the same level as the original issue. Tas will also be revised to reflect final system changes and instrument set point revisions.
(3) Conclusions i 501s were prepared, approved and revised in accordance with administrative procedures.
S0ls contain adequate safety requirements. ,
The method to assure that only current and approved paper copies of documents are used in the facility will be tracked .
as IFI 97 04 03.
- b. Hazards Analyses (1) Insocction scope ,
The inspector reviewed the industrial safety and radiological safety analyses which had been prepared for the DCF.
(2) Qbservations and Findinas The licensee conducts a Job Hazards Analysis (JHA) for new processes and operations. The JHA evaluates industrial safety conditions, such things as weight handling, use of fork lifts, hot conditions, etc. If the process or operation involves a new chemical or chemical process, then a Chemical Job Hazard Analysis (CJHA) is performed. The CJHA addresses safety clothing and equipment, handling and storage requirements and associated items. Both JHAs and CJHAs were prepared for the DCF in addition to the ISA and the Readiness Review.
A total of thirty two JHAs were prepared and approved for ,
the DCF. All but one were approved on April 3.1997: the last one was approved on April 10. Several of these JHAs covered generic safety issues, such as use of fork-lifts and weight handling but were issued as specific JHAs for DCF -
Fourteen CJHAs were approved on April 11. 1997, for the DCF.
These included chemicals which are new to the facility, such as the refrigerant for the cold traps.
Additionally, the Radiological Safety function performed nine Radiological Safety Assessments (RSAs) addressing radiological considerations with natural Uranium. One RSA .
9a ,
d
.e 18 ;
" was a finding of no impact for the HF facility. The findings froa the RSAs were implemented by the preparation and issuance of 27 Nuclear Safety Release / Requirements 4
(NSR/Rs). The NSR/Rs were ap) roved on April 17, 1997. Both '
the RSAs and the NSR/Rs will )e revised and reissued for enriched Uranium operations.
]
The RSAs were loaded in the electronic document system and released on A)ril 29, 1997. In this form, they may be ;
a: cessed by tie operators. The inspector observed that i copies of the JHAs, CJHAs and NSR/Ss are available in the '
Control Room.
(3) Conclusions ,
i The licensee performed adequate safety reviews for the new facility and established appropriate controls. Requirements were documented and made available to operators.
- c. Maintenance Control (1) Insoection ScQC2 The inspector reviewed the controls that the licensee has established to control maintenance of safety controls in DCF.
(2) Observations and Findinas The licensee had established requirements for maintenance in the chemical and fuel fabrication areas. These controls covered the control of work orders, like kind replacement of equipment, and verification of controls after maintenance.
SAR 50 07, " Safety Controls Verification" and SAR 350 08, "Wo. Jrder and Replacement Parts / Materials Procedure for FM0' were revised and issued to make them applicable to the DCF. Controls are equivalent for all fuel operations.
(3) Conclusions The licensee has extended existing controls to the DCF so one system applies to the entire fuel manufacturing operation.
- d. Emergency Procedures (1) Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the controls to assure that the appropriate procedures and documents are available to personnel in the Emergency Control Center (ECC).
Q $ '
4 4
19 (2) Observations and Findinas In the event of an accident or condition that requires that the ECC be manned, personnel in positions to make decisions must have current documents available to them. The inspector asked what documents were being provided in the ECC concerning the DCF.
i
- Licensee representatives stated that a review had been conducted to identify the appropriate documents and provided
- 'a preliminary list of documents and drawings to be placed
- inthe ECC. On May 8, 1997, licensee representatives informed the inswetor that controlled copies hid been .
released to the CC.
The inspector noted that while the relevant documents and 3
drawings had been provided in the CCC, the remaining '
i question was how it would be assured that controlled copies t
of these documents would be maintained as changes are made !
to these documents. Licensee representatives stated that l this question was under review to assure that the appropriate documents were asa11able as needed.
(3) Conclusiom Copies of applicable documents and drawings have been 4
provided to the ECC for the DCF.
The licensee must establish a mechanism to provide controlled copies of applicable documents to the ECC as changes to these documents are made.
- 6. Facility Chances and Modifications (88020) ;
- a. Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the documentation package for a change made
- to an existing system in the facility.
3 b. Observations and Findinos Change Request (CR) 97.0134 was approved to convert #5 mill-slugger granulator (HSG) to handle materials up to 5% enriched materials (commonly referred to as " hie' materials) from the previous limit of 4% enrichment. This CR replaced the existing granulator, modified the dump station to accept only 3 gallon cans, and modified the hammermill. The CR also did a review to
- ensure that nuclear isolation existed with shared services.
The.CR was approved for installation "at risk" while the nuclear '
safety analysis was completed on March 20, 1997. Final installation approval was granted on April 1 and final approval to
o
- t a
20 operate was given on April 3. following completion of FTI 1010.50 F3. which performed checks of the physical equiment so that oly 3 gallon cans could go into the mill hood ar.d tie pre operath 1al audit. The applicable operating procedure (OP 1010.50) was revised and issued on April 2, 1997. Operator training on the new !
OP was completed on April 2.
The inspector determined that the nuclear criticality safe'.y analysis had been performed with approved calculational nudels (GEKENO) and that controls were appropriate for the system. The nuclear safety analysis was performed and reviewed by qualified personnel. Six NSR/Rs were revised to include the h gher enrichment in the HSG. SSR 8995 was approved to revise the Material Inventory Control System (HICS) to establish a new station mass limit. If the scale reading of a container is greater than the station limit. MICS will block the transfer of the material into the dump station,
- c. Conclusions _
The inspector determined that the change in the approved enrichment for 45 MSG was conducted and approved in accordance with license requirements.
- 7. Trainina (88010)
- a. Insoection Scooe The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to develop qualified oxrators in the Chemical Area (CA) the Uranium Recovery Unit (JRU) and the powder preparation area to replace those operators who transferred to the DCF.
- b. Qbservations and Findinos
. In staffing the DCF, experienced operators and maintenance personnel from other plant areas were allowed to bid on the jobs.
When these personnel were transferred to DCF, there was a need to develop operators to operate existing facilities during the transition period.
To replace the operators who transferred to DCF some operators were upgraded in position levels from 'C' to "B" or from 'B' to -
"A." Experienced operators at the Uranium Recovery from Lagoon
-Sludge (URLS) facility were transferred back to other operations because of the decreased work load at URLS. Contract workers were-also hired to fill some "C" operator positions.-
To develop qualified operators, training programs were implemented in the CA and URU, This training involved reading of ops and on-the job training (0JT) for new operators and up graded operators.
New or_up graded operators' learned their job under-the guidance of
Q 21 experienced operators. Former operators who were assigned to DCF worked overtime during their early training phases to help qualify new operators.
A number of qualification cards were developed for the new operators (five for URV floor operators, two for URU Control Room o>erators). Through reading and understanding the ops and OJT, t1e new operators learned to operate the equipment. In addition to completing the qualification cards for the floor. "A" and "B" operators had to complete the qualification cards for Control Room operators. Each qualification card was com)1eted by the trainee and signed by a qualified operator. Once t1e card was complete, the Area Coordinator (AC) had to sign the card, indicating thct the trainee was qualified to perform the functions of an operator for that position.
Several operator positions require that the incuunt be able to perform radiation measurements using a SAM II instrument.
Training in the_ operation of the SAM II was conducted and documented by the Haterial Control (HC&A) group.
c.
Conclusions Training of operators for existing operations was conducted in a prescribed manner, using a developed program. The use of former operato?s to conduct 0JT was a strong technique used by the licensee.
- 8. Information Notices (ins) (92701)
- a. IN 97 20 (1) Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to IN 97 20.
(2) Observations and Find 1091 IN 97 20 " Identification of Certain Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders That Do Not Comply with ANSI N14.1 Fabrication Standards
- was issued on April 17. 1997. This IN stated that a number of model 30 B UF. cylinders had been fabricated using a welding procedure which was not qualified to the applicable temperatore limits.
Licensee personnel reviewed their records and determined i
that they did not have cylinders from this manufacturer nor had they received any cylinders from the purchaser. No further action was considered necessary.
- q.
- i 22 ;
(3) Conclusions The licensee completed appropriate actions to determine that they did not have any of the applicable cylinders.
IFI 97 00 01 is closed.
- b. IN 97 24 (1) Inspection Scoce The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to IN 97 24.
(2) Observations and Findinoi IN 97 24, ' Failure of Packing Nuts on One inch Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Valves" was issued as a result of a notification received from the U. S. Fnrichment Corporation (USEC) on March 14, 1997.
l As the result of the initial notificatio' n, Region II l notified facilities of the )roblem. Following the ,
t notification, the licensee lad conducted an investigation-to determine if they had any of the affected valves, Corrective actions were initiated. These actions were reviewed by the inspector and documented in IR 70 1113/97 02, Subsequent to these actions, the IN was issued. '
(3) Conclusions
' The licensee had previously initiated adequate corrective actions on the cylinder va lve problem. No additional actions for the IN were necessary.
9, EreviousInsoectionFindinas(88020) l
- a. Insoection Scooe The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions relating to three violations identified in IR 70 1113/96 12.
- b. Observations and Findinas-On December 3. 1996, the licensee reported to the NRC that the tube had failed in the calciner on Line 3, resulting in the accumulation of uranium oxide in excess of nucleer safety limits in the space between the tube and the heat shield. On December 11, 1996, the Hanager, GE NEP sent a letter to the
- Director, Division of Nuclear Material Safety (DNHS), Region II,
,, . -.--, _ , ,.-. ,- _ -.,, m. . - - . , - - - - - . - - . , - - - - - - - . . . . . - . . . - - . - - . . . - - - -
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4 23 describing the immediate actions taken to resolve the failure of the tube in the calciner for Line 3. As a result of a special ins wetion (IR 70 1113/96 12) for this failure, three violations of iRC requirements were identified.
By a letter dated February 25, 1997, the licensee formally responded to these violations. The corrective actions identified by the licensee were inspected, in part, during the s weial team l inspection and as part of two routine inspections. T1e review of i
the corrective actions was documented in irs 70 1113/97 01 and 70-1113/97 02. All of the corrective actions were determined to have been completed. No further actions are necessary,
- c. Conclusions Based on the review of the licensee's corrective actions, the following violations are closed:
96 12 01 96 12 02 i 96 12 03 ,
l
- 10. Exit Interview (88020) !
During the course of the inswetion, meetings were held with cognizant managers to discuss issues w11ch had been identified and make them aware of the inspector's concerns.
On May 9,1997, the inspection scope and findings were summarized with licensee representatives. The inspector discussed in detail the areas inspected, the findings and concerns which had been identified. There were no dissenting comments expressed by licensee representatives.
pa 4
24 ATTACHHENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel
- H. Chilton, Manager,- Joint Conversion Project
- T Flaherty, Manager, DCP Operations
- R, Foleck, Sr. Licensing Specialist
- R. Keenan, Manager, Site Security & Emergency Preparedness
- C, Kipp, General Manager, GE NEP
- J. Kline, Manager, Powder Product Line A. Habry, Program Manager, Radiological Safety R. Hartyn, Hanager, Material Control and Accountability
- C. Honetta, Manager, GE NE Environment Health & Safety Production Team S. McIver, R. Hurray, TeamDCF Manager, Leader, Fac 00,ility Construction
- L. Paulson, Manager, Nuclear Safety
- L. Quintana, Manager, Fabrication Product Line
- R. Reda, Manager, Fuels and Facility Licensing
- G. Smith, Team Leader FHO Maintenance Support *
- C. Tarrer, Team Leader, Configuration Hanagement & ISA K. Theriault, Manager, Fuel Quality and ChemHet Laboratory C. Vaughan, Project Manager, EH&S New Facility Licensing / Safety
- Attended exit meeting on May 9, 1997.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88005 Hanagement Organization and Control IP 88010 Operator Training / Retraining IP 88020 Operations Review -
IP 88025 Maintenance / Surveillance Testing "
IP 92701 Follow up on Previous Items LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened IFI 97 04 01 Corrective Actions Following Fire in Gadolinia Furnace IFI 97 04 02 Corrective Actions Following Leak in Hydrolysis Tank IFI 97 04 03 Control of Electronics Documents to Assure Approval Prior to l Use j i
i L
$7, ; o )
4 I
25 C1osed I 4
IFI 97 00 01 Follow up on Information Notice IN 97 20 on UF cylinder valves VIO 96 12 01 Failure of an engineered controls being capable of performing its specified criticality safety purpose VIO 96 12 02 Failure to provide assurance of the strength of a structure upon which criticality control is ditectly dependent VIO 96 12 03 Failure to perform required measurement techniques when ;
administratively controlling mass for criticality safety purposes Discussed IFI 96 11 01 Follow up on long term corrective actions for criticality system warning horns 4
LIST OF ACRONYMS AC Area Coordinatoo
. AEC Active Engineered Control CFR Code of Federal Regulations ChPL Chemical Product Line CJHA Chemical lob Hazards Analysis CMC Configurw.; ion Management Center CR Change Request DCF Dry Conversion Facility DCP Dry Conversion Project DCS Distributed Control System E/C Engineer / Constructor ECC Emergency Control Center EH&S Environment, Health & Safety ENUSA -Empresa Nacional del Uranio, SA FHO Fuel Manufacturing Operation FTI Functional Test Instruction GE NE- General Electric Nuclear Energy GE+NEP General Electric Nuclear Energy Production HF Hydrogen Fluoride or Hydrofluoric Acid IFI Inspector Follow up Item IN- Information Notice
-IP Inspection Procedure IR Inspection Report ISA Integrated Safety Analysis JCC Joint Conversion Company JHA Job. Hazards Analysis KGS Kilograms HC&A Material Control & Accountability ,
- - - - - - ~-. -
e-, . . , ,,__-,.w.. ,-m. , , .n-w, .--
,--gu-.-r-.. v. . . . , w
_ . . . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ . _ _ . _ . . . _ . . . -
g io I
i 26 t-ii MICS. Material Inventory and Control System
- - lHPAC Maintenance Planning and Control F NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety 4
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-NSR/R Nuclear Safety Requirements / Release DJT On the Job Training 4
OP Operating Procedure P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram P/P -Practices & Procedures pxn parts gr million i R) Radiation Protection 4
RSA Radiological Safety Analysis SAR Section Administrative Routine SNM Sgcial Nuclear Material
- SSR Software Service Request
- TOI Tem >orary Operating Instruction
, .TR Tec1nical Report UF Uranium Hexafluoride J Ulk Unusual Incident Report
?
Uranium Dioxide U0[S UR tiranium Recovery from Lagoon Sludge F URV Uranium Recovery Unit USEC U. S. Enrichment Corporation i WSRC Wilmington Safety Review Committee t
l -
i t
p e
J m
i
e ONE LINERS FOR JUNE 20, 1997
- 1. Fuel Facility Status
- a. NFS F
The licensee has completed its sampling of the 18 bottles of Rocky Flats material and has shipped the samples to Oak Ridge /Y-12 facility. The results of the Y-12 analysis have not been returned. Future Rocky flats shipments require a three week lead-time, therefore, the next shipment at the earliest could occur in mid-July.
The licensee has completed the Pre 0perational Readiness Review of the UF, cylinder heels. On June 23, the licensee will " hand deliver" its Safety Analysis (S-2) Report to the NRC Headquarters.
Due to State and NRC concerns at ENVIROCARE cf Utah regarding the possession of SNM ir excess of the license, NFS has discontinued shipping waste to burial waste. Waste from onsite decommissionin work will be stored temporarily onsite,
- b. General Electric NEP The Regional Administrator, accompanied by the Fuel Facilities Branch Chief, met with licensee management and toured the facility on June 20.
Three cylinders of natural uranium have been processed in the Dry Conversion Facility line 1. The first shipment of powder from DCF was sent to a customer in Japan for powder testing on June 6.
Functional testing of line 2 started the week of June 9.
Three ADV lines and the t. cycle line are producing powder. Line 4 is down for normal production schedule. Rod fabrication and bundle assembly are working two shifts, 6 day weeks to meet schedule of 130 bundles a week. Some Sunday work may be required.
The last snipment of powder produced by ADV to Japan went this week. Future shipments will be of powder produced in DCF.
With the completion of the big powder shipments for a while, ,
personnel are being transferred back to the URLS facility to start l testing of the direct filti, tion system and also to the l Decontamination and Volume Reduction facility.
- c. Babc'ock and Wilcox (B&W) - NNFO Routine fuel manufacturing and maintenance activities are being
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L conducted in the Modified Fuel Process (MFP), Advanced fuel Process (AFP), and Research and Test Reactor Fuel Element (RTRFE) .i
- l. , portions of .the plant.
Uranium recovery operations are currently shut'down for a system cleanout between campaigns. ,
4-The summer plant shutdown is scheduled for July 4 through 12, i
The presentation of the Licensee Performance Review is scheduled 1 for July 1, 9:00 a.m. at the licensee's Lynchburg Technology j- Center.
I J. Wang, Sr. Health Physicist, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch,.
4 ONMSS, is on site this week to accompany the Sr. Resident inspector.-
As of July 1, the Security group will consist of two sections.
L. Anthony will be'Hanager of Security Operations and L. Darby
); will be Manager of Security Systems and Compliance.
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.On ' July 1, the Babcock and Wilcox Government Group will become BWX t Technologies, .Inc., pending approval- of' the submitted license
- j. amendment.
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- d. B&W Fuel Co. (Framatome Coaema Fuels) j Routine rod loading and production activities are being performed.
}_ Routine decontamins. tion and refurbishment activities are being conducted in the SERF facilities.
~ NUKEM downloading operations are continuing and should be completed within the next few weeks.
. Region II-DNMS inspectors are onsite this week for routine-4 inspection activities.
p e. Westinahouse All production. lines operating in the past-two weeks with four lines processing UF, and one-line. processing ash (line 5). No shut downs or process' upsets' occurred during the reporting period.
The Division Ge .eral Manager, Ron KogaLis retiring effective
- July 1 and -is being replaced by. Jim Fici. Mr. Fici's replacement is not yet determined.
- A layo;f was announced this week affecting 34 employees, three profersionals with 31 technicians and hourly personnel.
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- 2. federal Law Enforcement Center On June 9, Region !! was contacted by a member of the OlG staff in training at the'Faderal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glenco, GA.
The Special Agent indicated that a 1 microcurie Co 60 button source (no serial number, exempt quantity) had been discovered taped to the desk of
.one of the other students. On June 19, Region II' conducted an
-inspection. Facility security was continuing their investigation, and they had not determined how the source was placed on the desk. The facility does not use or possess sources routinely. Annually, the i
- Environmental Protection Agency provides a briefing for its law enforcement personnel, and at that time sources are brought to the
, facility. Facility personnel advised that the EPA was not missing any j_ sources.
j j 3. U.S. Navy Annual Proaram Review Exit
[ On June 19, 1997, _ Jay Henson, accompanied by D. M. Collins, presented
! the results of the annual Navy Master License program review to the Navy i
Radiation Safety Committee. The review found the program to be managed and implemented well, compatible with the NRC processes. There was one apparent violation identified for failure to report a-malfunction of a radiography exposure device (inability for a source assembly to fully retract). There was no personnel iadiation exposure as result of this
! equipment malfunction.
- 4. Western Baptist Hospital (State of KY Licenseel On June 20, 1997, Region 11 received a copy of a notification from the State of Kentucky to OSP regarding a therapeutic misadministration involving a Theratron 1000 teletherapy unit. Region 11 is drafting a PN l on the event. During the treatment, power was lost twice. After each loss of power, the technologist reset the machine-for continuation of treatment. After the treatment was completed, the technologist was alerted by the-patient to the fact-that the treatment was to a different t.rea that in the past. It appears that the power outage caused the table on which the patent was laying to move and the wrong area of the body was treated. The dose to the wrong area was 138 cGy (rads). The State is following.up. See attached facsimile notif kadon. l 4
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