ML20216G516

Insp Repts 50-498/87-21 & 50-499/87-21 on 870413-0501. Violation Noted:Failure to Adequately Control Installation of Valve Operators.No Insp of Unit 2 Conducted

ML20216G516
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/17/1987
From:	Ireland R, Norman D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216G362	List: ML20216G356 ML20216G441 ML20216G516
References
50-498-87-21, 50-499-87-21, IEB-72-03, IEB-72-3, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEC-77-01, IEC-77-1, IEC-78-16, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, IEIN-87-029, IEIN-87-29, NUDOCS 8707010106
Download: ML20216G516 (8)

See also: IR 05000498/1987021

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/87-21 Construction Permit: CPPR-128

Docket: 50-498

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Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P. O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001 i

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Unit 1

Inspection At: Bay City, Texas

Inspection Conducted: April 13 through May 1,1987

Inspector: [, Wpm- 6/7/4'7

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D. E. Norman, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Date i

Section, Reactor Safety Branch l

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Approved: /b 77/fbM-

R. E. Ireland, Chief, Engineering Section

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j Reactor Safety Branch

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted April 13 through May 1,1987 (Report 50-498/87-21) l

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of actions relative to IE

Bulletins (IEBs) 72-03 and 85-03, IE Circulars (IECs) 77-01 and 78-16, and IE

Notices (IENs) 86-03 and 86-29.

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Results: Within the area inspected, one violation was identified (failure to l

adequately control the installation of valve operators, paragraph 2.b(3)(e)).  !

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Inspection Conducted April 13 through May 1,1987 (Report 50-499/87-21) {

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Areas Inspected: No inspection of Unit 2 was conducted.-

Results: Not Applicable.  !

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

• W. P. Evans, Project Compliance Engineer

• D. W. Bohner, Operations QA

• E. Nichols, Jr., NP0D/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

• D. R. Nester, NP00 Lead Engineer

• H. Vann Weldon, Training

• J. E. Geiger, General Manager Nuclear Assurance

• S. Head, Licensing

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• R. W. Miller, Deputy Project QA Manager  !

• R. H. Medina, QA Supervisor

• M. Mills, Startup Engineer

• R. J. Daly, Startup Manager

• D. L. Long, Management

D. Parker, Startup Engineer

NRC

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• D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector

• J. F. Lara, Resident Inspector

D. R. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector

C. E. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector

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• Denotes those present at the exit. interview on May 1, 1987. l

2. Inspection Summary

a. IEB 85-03 (Closed)

IEB 85-03, " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failure During Plant

Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," was issued as a result of

several events during which motor operated valves (MOVs) failed on

demand due to improper switch settings. The Bulletin requested that

MOVs in certain systems be tested for operational ' readiness, and that

licensees develop and implement a. program to ensure that valve

operator switches are selected, set,'and maintained properly to

accommodate maximum differential pressure expected during both opening

and closing of the valve for both normal and abnormal events within >

the design basis. The licensee made a submittal requested by the l

Bulletin to the NRC on June 2,1986, and an additional submittal of i

information requested by the NRC was made on February 27, 1987.

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This inspection was performed to followup on the licensee's activities

taken in response to IEB 85-03 and. commitments made by the licensee in  ;

submittals regarding the Bulletin. The inspection scope included the

following:

(1)- Procedures Review - The IEB 85-03 program, which includes

23 valves in the safety injection (SI) and auxiliary

feedwater (AFW) system, is implemented by procedures, elementary

diagrams, and documentation from valve and valve operator

vendors. A brief explanation of the program is as follows:

Initially, the operator switches were adjusted statically

according to instructions presented in Procedure'SG-E-09,' 'l

Revision 3, " Generic Prerequisite Test Procedure for Motor-  !

Operated Valves and Dampers" as' modified by Startup Field

Report (SFR) 086-0744. Opening and closing torque switch

settings were adjusted to the index setting provided by the ,

operator and valve manufacturers, which is related.to thrust i

required to close or open the respective valves.at'the design

basis pressure. The torque switch is-bypassed by.the torque

switch bypass during opening for 95 percent of the valve travel.

Valve opening is controlled by the.open limit switch'which is' set'

at approximately 95 percent open. . A check for excessive valve.  ;

backseating is~made after the valve completes its coast toward  !

the open direction.

During preoperational tests, the valves were checked again at, or

near the design basis pressure'to ensure openin'g under those

conditions. If necessary, the' torque switch settings were'

increased to prevent premature tripping of' the torque' switch.

The valves are included in the plant periodic maintenance (PM)

program and are programmed to.hav'e switch testing performed each

78 weeks (nearest outage) per Station Procedure'0PMP05-ZE-0300 to

ensure proper continued settings of the switches to ensure valve

operability.

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(2) Data Review.- Test documentation for the static and flow tests

were reviewed by the NRC. inspector and results were found to be.

in compliance with the' procedures and. instructions discussed'

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above.

It was- found during ~ the inspection that the applicant"had

documented and~ implemented la' program to adjust Limitorque valve. j

operator switches and to retest.theLoperators each'78' weeks!(or-  ;

nearest outage')'to ensure continued' valve. operability.' Region IV'

effort concerning IEB 85-03 is considered closed;;however, the

Bulletin requires the applicant to submit = a fina.1 report;of the

completed program to NRC. headquarters.

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During the inspection, it was found that gate valves, which'are

not a part'of the IEB 85-03 program, in the following systems had

been set to close on limit switch actuation rather than torqua

switch actuation.

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Reactor Coolant System - two valves

, Safety Injection System - one. valve

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. Chemical and Volume Control System - nine valves

Residual Heat Removal System - eight valves

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The limit switches are set to actuate just.as the gate makes

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contact with the seat.' The' torque switch is set-at a minimal

. setting, predetermined for~each valve, and will actuate should

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the limit switch fail to actuate. By setting the valves to~close

by this method,'it appears that there is.a possibility that

, valves will not close sufficiently to prevent leakage between the

gate and' seat. The valves had been tested during preoperational

tests; however, information could not be provided dur.ing the

inspection to show if leakage'did exist.~ The applicant is to

evaluate whether leakage is permitted and whether leakage did

occur. during hot functional' or other tests. This is considered 1

an open item (498/8721-01).

b. IfN86-03(Cloud)

IEN 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies in EQ of Limitorque MOV Operator

Wiring," was issued to alert recipients of a potential EQ problem with

operator control wiring-and to consider actions to preclude a similar

problem at their facilities. No specific action or. written response

was required. ,

This inspection was conducted by the NRC to. determine what wiring was

installed in Limitorque valve operators, to-review the' applicant's EQ

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documentation to ensure that wiring qualification was adequately

established, to review the applicant's action relative to IEN 86-03,

and to review the status of Limitorque' operator qualification with

respect to issues other than control wiring. The inspection scope.

included the following:

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(1) Procedures Review - Construction Inspection' Planning (CIP) 2.2-62

provides instructions for performing inspections and rework

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necessary to identify and correct deficiencies in 'Limitorque

valve operators at STP. The procedures include a comprehensive-

checklist of previously identified Limitorque problems, which

includes wiring, for the operators. All wiring which_was..not '

either Raychem Flamtrol or Rockbestos.Firewall III was required

to be replaced.

Paragraphs 9.0 and 14.0 of CIP 2.2-62 require verification.that

bearing lock nuts for SMB operators 'and lock' nuts' for operators I

-with' ACME stem nuts have been staked. The procedure does not

require that the nuts be checked for tightness prior to staking.

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Since assembly, these operators have experienced movement due to

shipment, storage, and operation which could result in loosening

of the lock nut, if not staked. If the lock nuts are loose, the

operator may not function properly and could eventually result

in operator failure. Pending' verification by the applicant that

the nuts had been checked for tightness prior to staking, this

is considered an open item (498/8721-02).

'(2) Data Review - The NRC inspector reviewed several' checklists

completed as a result of the applicant walkdown inspections. The

walkdown appeared to be comprehensive and several problems had I

been identified and corrected.

(3) Walkdown Inspection - STP, Unit 1, has 178 safety-related

Limotorque valve operators, of which approximately 140 are _

located in a harsh environment. A sample of 10 operators was

selected by the NRC inspector for the walkdown. inspection. One

of the ten was later found to be in a mild environment; therefore,

the walkdown sample consisted of nine harsh environment and~one

mild environment operator. The result of the walkdown are as- i

follows:

(a) All wiring was found.to be either Raychem or Rockbestos- J

which was determined to be qualified. The applicant's  !

action, relative to'IEN 86-03, was therefore, determined to  !

be acceptable and the IEN is considered closed.

(b) EQ documentation requires two motor T-drains for operators

inside containment and either one or no T-drains (depends on

test report used to document qualification) for operators

outside containment. CIP 2.2-62 requires two T-drains in

all motors. T-drains are to be located at the lowest point <

in the motor. Contrary to the requirements, the following

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conditions were observed:

T-drains had been painted over and plugged in-

operators CC-132 and CC-52.  ;

T-drains were not at the lowest point in CC-204 and

SI-14A. Several others which were not included on the

walkdown sample were observed to not be at the lowest

point.

SI-18B had only one T-drain. i

Theseconditionsareconsideredunresolved(498/8721-03)'.

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The applicant should correct CIP 2.2-62~to-reflect-

requirements of qualification test' reports, and T-drain

installation should comply with those requirements.

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(c) EQ documentation requires a gear box relief valve for ,

certain operators. The relief, valve is not addressed in  !

CIP 2.2-62; therefore, the presence of the caps was not

identified during the applicants walkdown inspections and

the operators had been turned over to operations with caps

in place. All operators inspected -during the walkdown had a

relief valve; however, a shipping cap installed over the l

valve had not been removed on SI-39B, SI-18B, SI-04A, SI-14A, l

CV-8377A, CC-52, and RA-04. ' The applicant is to verify that

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all shipping caps have been removed from relief valves on

installed operators. This is considered an open item

(498/8721-04).

(d) SI-18B was found to have either pitted or dirty limit switch

contacts and limit switch gear grease had been leaking into

the limit switch housing. The operator was considered

operable, but could have experienced an early failure of the

contacts. This was considered an isolated incident and

pending correction by the applicant, this is. considered an

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open item (498/8721-05).

(e) SI-188, CV-8377A, and CV-25 which had dual voltage motors,

had motor leads spliced with blind barrel crimp splices.

Documentation used to substantiate qualification of the-

operators made no mention of the splices, nor had the

splices been tested'and qualified separate from the

operators. This is considered a' violation of NRC

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requirements (498/8721-06).

(f) The limit switch material in CV-8377A and both the limit and

torque switches in CV-25 were Durez which has not been

qualified for use in harsh environments. CV-25 was

subsequently replaced with another operator since it had

previously been identified by the' applicant on.an NCR as

being unqualified. CV-8377A plus seven other operators in

the chemical and volume control. system (CVCS) have been

determined by the applicant to perform no essential safe

shutdown nor post accident functions; therefore, it was -

stated by the applicant that the operators were not required

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Memo. (qualified. .This rationale .is discussed in InterofficeIOM) 42

ComponentEvaluationWorksheet-(SCEW). Additional

information:is required in this matter. The licensee.should

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remove the CVCS operators'from the EQ master equipment list

if they do not need to be quali_fied.to the rules of

110 CFR 50.49. This item is considered unresolved pending

the review (498/8721-07).

(g) The nameplate data for Reliance motors for in containment

operators RH-60A.and SI-39B. indicated Class F type.RCP-318.

LR insulation. Documentation indicated that traceability.of

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production units to EQ test reports was established by

Limitorque specification No. RCP-318. Westinghouse EQ Data

Package H01A and EQ Test Report WCAP-8687 documented J

qualification for the operators for 5 years at which time J

they must be replaced unless additional tests or analysis j

are performed to extend the qualification. )

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c. IEB 72-03 (Closed)

IEB 72-03, "Limitorque Valve Operator Failures," was a notification of j

{ a malfunction of torque switches in SMB-00 and SMB-000 operators  !

manufactured between 1969 and mid-1971. The applicant determined that l

no operators manufactured during_this period were installed or in

storage at STP. Procedures are also in place to review additional

operators which may be received at the site for applicability of the

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IEB. No response was required to this Bulletin unless applicable l

operators were identified. This item is closed.

d. IEC 77-01 (Closed)

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IEC 77-01, " Malfunctions of Limitorque Valve Operators," was a. j

notification that valves had failed to open because of a premature 1

opening of the torque switch bypass. This same condition was I

addressed in IEB 85-03 which has been previously discussed in this

s report. This item is closed, j

e. IEC 78-16 (Closed)

IEC 78-16, "Limitorque Valve Actuators," discusses a clutch failure in

Type SMB-0, 1, 2, and 3 operators equipped with 3600 RPM motors. The

failure resulted from clutch wear which was due to manual operation of

the valve and improper heat treatment of the clutch material. The

applicant has implemented in CIP 2.2-62 the requirement to verify that

the clutch for applicable operators has been heat treated and then an

operability check is required to be performed in accordance with

Station Procedure OPMP05-ZE-0300 at each periodic maintenance. This

item is closed.

f. IEN 86-29 (0 pen)

IEN 86-29, " Effects of Changing Valve Motor Operator Switch Settings,"

was provided as an alert that setting torque bypass switch to meet

requirements of IEB 85-03 could effect valve position indication and

signals such as "permissives" to other equipment. The problem occurs

when the torque bypass switch and valve position indicators share the

same limit switch rotor. Therefore,'when the position of.the rotor is

changed to extend the range of the torque bypass switch,.the closed

position indication is also changed. The applicant has not completed

the review of this item; therefore, it will remain open.

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3. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with the applicant representatives denoted in

paragraph 1 on May 1, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the

inspection.

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