ML20215K425
| ML20215K425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1976 |
| From: | Anders W NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Richmond F HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215K418 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-666 NUDOCS 8610280166 | |
| Download: ML20215K425 (5) | |
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HonorablebedRichmond U. S. House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Richmond:
This responds to your December 17, 1975 letter requesting information concerning nuclear safeguards measures and nuclear activities within New York State. Your questions and answers to them, prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, are contained in the enclosure.
I regret the delay in responding; collecting the data you requested required extensive staff work, and both your questions and the responses to them received careful study by the Commissioners.
The questions you asked regarding nuclear safeguards are being addressed in studies NRC has had underway during the past year. One of these, the Security Agency Study, was mandated by the Congress in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to assess the need for, and the feasibility of establishing a security agency within the NRC for the performance of safeguards functions. A report of the results of this study will be submitted to the Congress in the near future. Much of the information being gathered in an additional study, the Special Safeguards Study to which you refer, will be published in the draf t Safeguards supplement to the Ceneric Environmental Statement on the Use of Mixed-Oxide Fuel in Light Water' Reactors. The draf t Safeguards suppicment will be issued as soon as possible in order that it may receive public review and comment prior to being put in final form. Your questions will be dealt with comprehensively in these reports, and we will forward copies to you as soon as they become available.
I would point out that, since the Special Safeguards Study is still under-way and will initially be made available in draft form, the enclosed answers to some of your qu'estions'are interin in nature.
However, even though. considerable review and analysis remainr, I believe the answers provided are likely to remain substantially unchanged.
Your interest and concern in these important issues are appreciated, and I hope that the enclosed information will satisfactorily answer your questions.
8610280166 861021 Sincerely, Ref: SECY-76-50 PDR FOIA Revised based on Commissa DESIMON86-666 PDR
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Qudstion 1:
How does the NRC expect to protect the public against diversion, and '
what restrictions will there be on those who protect us?
Answer _:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the authority and responsibility to establish c'ontrols and procedures to protect against the diversion or thef t of special nuclear material associated with U.f licensed nuclear operations by requiring licensees to establish and maintain levels of physical protection and material control and accounting which should detect any attempt to divert, and prevent itsl success.
Procedural and physical controls utilized to. carry out this responsibility are included,in the NRC's safeguards program.
Safeguards regulations are developed to be cost-effective with due consideration given to social as well as economic costs.
The industry's continuing adherence to these regulations is_ enforced through a program of inspection and enforcement carried out by NRC officials.
The NRC restricts its er.ployees, and those of industry who are charged with carrying out ar. effective safeguards program to those actions authorized by law.
In addition, please see answers to questions 5, 6, and 7 below, concerning security clearances for i
industry employees.
I Question 2:
What infringements on individual liberties will be required in order I
to assure safe operation of breeder reactors and safe transportation of plutonium fuel?
Answer:
The NRC has undertaken several studies which consider the civil liberties impact of an expanded nuclear power program, principally la the context of the question of whether to allow wide-scale use of mixed oxide fuel (using plutonium recycled from spent fuel) in light 1
I water reactors.
Under Commission auspices, a conference held at 1
Stanford University last year, and attended by experts on constituti@
law, civil liberties, and safeguards, studied the problem in depth.
A careful examination of possible civil liberties impacts of any.
Commission decision to authorize the use of mixed oxide fuel will be included in the draf t safeguards statement currently being prepared.
The commission is keenly sensitive to the importance of these valuesp ar,the discussion of alternative safeguards measures in that docume6 which we will be pleased to forward to you when it is completed --
will eflect.
Public comment will, of course, be welcomed on this as on other aspects of the draft safeguards statement.
6 9
Question 3:
How many individuals will be involved in' safeguards, operations?
Answer:
If the Commission's decision on the use of mixed oxide fuel in LWR's is favorable, the number of persons involved in safeguards operations would depend heavily on two factors:
the extent to which industry decides to proceed with the use of mixed oxide fuel, and the specific safeguards requirements set by NRC.
As a result, any figures we mighG supply at this time should be considered highly speculative and conjectural.
We would mention, however, that one estimate is that if the use of mixed oxide fuel is approved, by 1990, the safeguards forcG at each reactor site employing mixed oxide fuel might total 30 to 35 individuals; at each reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication site, from 75 to 100 persons, depending on the size and nature of the facilityi and that some 300 to 400 persons'might be engaged in transportation-related safeguards activities nationwide.
Question 4:
How many will be involved in all phases of the nuclear cycle?
Answer:
Any projections of the future growth of the nuclear industry contain, of course, a large element of conjecture.
(It should be noted as well that NRC has no promotional responsibilities with regard to the development of nuclear power.)
The Energy Research and Development Administration currently estimates that by the year 1990 there will be from 230 to 340 nuclear power plants in the U.S.
Question 5:
What security clearance measures will be needed for these people?
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Answer:
g The Congress granted the NRC specific statutory authority to establish clearances for individuals in the commercial sector working in activities involving quantities of special nuclear materials.
The staff is developing alternatives and recommendations for future consideration by the Commission as to the desirability of' such a program and the form it might take.
The details of these recommendations are by no means firm but the staff's current view is that any clearance program should be carefully designed so as to match clearance requirements with the degree of job sensitivity.
For some individuals with ready access to strategic quantities of special nuclear materials full background investigation might be appropriate; for those in less sensitive positions, the equivalent.of a "Nafional Agency Check" might be appropriate; and for the great majobity of g-,-y-w.-g---m-
Answer : (Con ' t) nuclear industry employees who hold non-sensitive jobs, no special clearance procedures would be necessary.
Question 6:
Who will conduct such security checks?
Answer:
If a clearance program like that described above were determined to b necessary, and were approved by the Commission, it could be administe by the NRC.
National Agency Checks, if required, could be performed the NRC by the Civil Service Commission.
Background investigations, required, could also be conducted for the NRC by an appropriate Feder investigative organization.
s Question 7:
How large a force will be needed for these people?
Answer:
Should such a program as that described above be established within NRC, it is estimated that approximately 11 full-time staff members would be required to administer it.
Based on an anticipated 5,000 cases per year beginning in about 1980, it is believed that any increase in the inv,estigative staff of other agencies from this cause would be negligible, considering the vast number of National Agency Checks and Background Investigations performed each year by the Federe Government.
(In 1970-72, the Civil Service Commission processed 4.2 million National Agency Checks; various federal investigative agencie conducted 670,000 Background Investig&tions.)
Question 8:
Is,the NRC contemplating creation of any form of a nuclear police for Answer:
This question will be addressed fully in the report of the NRC's Security Agency Study which will be presented to the Congress soon.
A copy of this report will be provided to you as soon as possible.
Question 9:
In addition to the above, I refer to still earlier correspondence whi requested information as to the number of shipments of plutonium whi@
have been licenred for entry into New York State, and the number of applications for such shipments.
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Answer:
As I noted to you in my October 16, 1975 letter, the NRC does not license individual shipments of plutonium within the borders of the United States nor does it regulate specific shipping routes.
These matters remain within the discretion of the individual licensee.
My October 16 letter also enumerated the various sources from which shipments of plutonium could enter New York State.
As a matter of general information, in 1975 there were about 425 shipments of plutonium in the United States in the commercial sectora About 90% of these shipments involved small quantities of plutonium, i.e.,
less than 2 kilograms.
Question 10:
Again referring to earlier correspondence, I am interested in knowing whether a company such as the Rochester Gas & Electric Company could legally use a mixed oxide fuel in their GINNA Reactor, even experimentally, without supplying an environmental impact statement.
Your response noting that they are not authorized to use mixed-oxide fuels in the use of the GINNA Reactor is indeed interesting, but I as still interested in my earlier question.,
i Answer:
As was the case at the time of the previous NRC response, the Roches Gas & Electric Company has not applied to use mixed oxide fuel in th GINNA reactor.
If such an application were received, the determinat of whether an environmental impact statement should be prepared woul be made on the basis of a set of guidelines adopted by the NRC staff These guidelines were set out in a letter, dated January 30, 1976, from Mr. Ben Rusche, Director of NRC's office of Nuclear Reactor l
Regulation, to Mr. Anthony V. Roisman, in connection with pending litigation challenging NRC's policies and procedures, announced in i
November 1975, for reaching a decision on the widescale use of mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors.
A copy of that letter is attach 9 and should prove fully responsive to the hypothetical question which you pose.
Attachment:
As stated 9
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