ML20215G486
| ML20215G486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1986 |
| From: | Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR JPN-81-82, JPN-86-46, NUDOCS 8610200389 | |
| Download: ML20215G486 (7) | |
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October 9, 1986 JPN-86-46 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. Daniel R. Muller, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of BWR Licensing
Subject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Control of Heavy Load Lifts
References:
1.
NRC Generic Letter, D.
G.
Eisenhut.to all Operating Reactors, dated December 22, 1980.
2.
PASNY letter, J.
P.
Bayne to T.
A.
- Ippolito, dated October 15, 1981 (JPN-81-82).
3.
NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power _ Plants", July 1980.
Dear Sir:
Reference 1 requested that the Authority review heavy load-handling operations and subnit evaluations of the FitzPatrick Plant's conformance to the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
In Reference 2,
the Authority submitted a report containing the results of this review and information regarding the use of heavy load-handling devices at the FitzPatrick plant.
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of a change te this report concerning the use of the recirculation pump motor-genarator (M-G) set crane.
The M-G set crane was originally excluded from the scope of NUREG-0612 in Reference 2.
This exclusion was based on the fact that no safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel is located in close proximity to the crane which was to be used only during cold shutdown.
However, it is now necessary to use the M-G set crane to lift main steam tunnel shield plugs during plant operation.
This procedure will provide personnel with a quick access path to the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).
This will facilitate testing and maintenance of the MSIVs and reduce personnel exposure to high radiation.
This lift was reviewed against the criteria of NUREG-0612 and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Attached, for your information, is a summary of the safety-evaluation.
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s In the future, the Authority may make other heavy load. lifts which could require analysis in accordance with NUREG-0612 but which were not previously evaluated in Reference 2.
However, as discussed with your staff, the NRC will be notified of these lifts through the annual report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact Mr. J. A.
Gray, Jr. of my staff.
Very-truly yours, 1
IW o $E C.
Brons
!Lenior Vice President Nuclear Generation d
cc!
Office of the Resident Inspector U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 136 Lycoming, New York 13093
e ATTACHMENT 1 TO.JPN-86-46
SUMMARY
OF THE SAFETY-EVALUATION REGARDING THE USE OF THE M-G SET CRANE 4
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59
I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The recirculation pump motor-generator (M-G) set crane is a 20-ton crane used for servicing the recirculation pump motor generator sets at Elevation 300' of the Reactor Building.
It is also used to remove main steam tunnel shield plugs to allow access to the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).
.In Reference 2, the Authority excluded the M-G set crane from the scope of NUREG-0612.
This exclusion was based on the fact that no safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel is located in close proximity to the crane which is be used only during cold shutdown.
However, it is now necessary to use the M-G set crane to lift main steam tunnel shield plugs for a quick' access path to the MSIVs
~during plant operation.
The MSIVs require testing and occasional minor maintenance and during plant operations.
Plant personnel must travel through the main steam tunnel to I ach the MSIVs.
This unnecessarily exposes plant personnel to high radiation from the main steam lines.
By lifting the main steam tunnel shield plugs, located in the M-G set room, operators are provided with quick access to the MSIVs and personnel exposures are reduced.
. CRITERIA NUREG-0612 establishes criteria for the evaluation of load handling systems that could' lift heavy loads over fuel in the core, fuel in the spent fuel pool, or safe shutdown equipment.
Lifting of the main steam tunnel shield plugs during plant operation was evaluated using the criteria in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.
These criteria assure that either (1) the potential for a load drop is extremely small, or (2) for each area addressed, the following conditions are satisfied:
I.
Releases of radioactive material that may result from damage to spent' fuel based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses that are well within 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 25 rem whole body (analyses should show that doses are equal to or less than 1/4 of Part 100 limits);
II.
Damage to fuel and fuel storage racks based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load does not result in_a configuration of the fuel such that Kegg is larger than 0.95;
- i I I III.
Damage to the reactor vessel or the spent fuel pool based on i
calculations of damage following accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load is limited so as not to result in water i
leakage that could uncover the fuel, (makeup water provided to i
overcome leakage should be from a borated source of adequate concentration if the water being lost is borated); and i
IV.
Damage to equipment in redundant or dual safe shutdown paths,
!i based on calculations assuming the accidental dropping of a i,
postulated heavy load, will be limited so as not to result'in l
loss of required safe shutdown functions.
_t-
s a
ANALYSIS The main steam tunnel shield plugs are located in the floor of the M-G set room at the 300' Elevation of the Reactor Building.
The dimensions of the largest plug are 4' by 5'2" by 4' (thick).
Assuming a concrete density of 150 pounds per cubic foot gives a maximum shield plug weight of 6.2 tons.
The drop height is 16.5 feet which is based on the maximum hook limit and a 2 foot sling length.
The floor of the M-G set room is 4 feet thick.
The worst case postulated drop onto the floor slab at Elevation 300' was evaluated.
The only equipment at the 300' Elevation are the recirculation pump motor generator sets and their associated support equipment.
The operation of the recirculation pumps is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, a postulated drop on the 300' Elevation will not damage equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
The impact of a load drop on lower elevations was evaluated.
A load drop on the 300' Elevation is postulated for the following locations:
- 1. At the center of the slab; 2.
At the edge of the hatch opening:
3.
Close to a' floor support wall; and 4.
Directly onto the shield plug support lip.
Cases 1.2 & 3 In cases 1,2, and 3, the floor slab is able to absorb the drop energy.
The load drop would not perforate the floor and scabbing would not occur on the underside of the slab.
Case 4 Plant procedures limit the lift height to 30-inches above the floor.
This restriction would prevent any penetration of the shield plug to the next floor in the event the plug was dropped.
- However, in case 4, the drop height was evaluated at 54-inches or 6-inches above the 300' Elevation floor.
If the shield plug was dropped back into its original location from this height, the 4-inch support lip would be sheared off.
Assuming that the shield plug penetrates the hatch, an equipment evaluation was performed for the room below, which is the main steam tunnel.
Two sections of pipe in safety-related systems, which can be used for safe shutdown, are in the postulated load drop region.
These sections of pipe are:
o 14"-W25-902D-3A HPCI pump discharge line to the feedwater line.
o 4"-W22-902A-4A RCIC pump discharge line to the feedwater line.
Although it is highly unlikely that both lines would be damaged by a load drop, such damage was assumed in this evaluation.
Damage to this piping would preclude reliance on High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling for safe shutdown. _-
s Safe shutdown, specifically the initial core cooling function, could still be accomplished by depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System through the Automatic Depressurization System and supplying make-up and core cooling through the Core Spray or Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems.
These systems are not affected by the postulated drop.
However, by limiting the drop height to 30 inches through plant
' procedures, the support lip can sustain a shield plug drop.
These procedures specify that after the shield plug is' lifted at least 24 inches and less than 30 inches, it is then moved horizontally at least 3 inches.
The horizontal move locates the lip of the shield plug over the top of the floor and the bottom of the shield plug over the lip in the hatch, thus limiting the drop height.
Then, the.
plug is lifted to no more than 6 inches above the El. 300' slab.
At this point, the bottom of the shield plug is moved clear of the hatch opening.
(Figure 1 illustrates this shield plug _ lift.)
CONCLUSIONS Evaluation criteria I and II of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, require that there be.no damage to spent fuel from a heavy load drop that could release large amounts of radioactive material or reconfigure the fuel / fuel storage racks.
The main steam tunnel shield plugs are located in the M-G set room.
Evaluation criteria I and II are satisfied since-reactor fuel is not kept in or transferred through the M-G set room.
Evaluation criterion III of NUREG-0612 requires that a heavy load drop not cause damage to the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool that would result in a water leakage which could uncover the fuel, Since the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool are not in the proximity of the M-G set room, there could not be any damage to the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
Thus, evaluation criterion III is also satisfied.
Evaluation criterion IV of NUREG-0612 requires that safe shutdown capability be maintained.
Thus, a-heavy load drop must not cause any equipment or structural damage that could impair safe shutdown of the reactor.
Based on the implementation of plant procedures and limiting the drop height to 30 inches while the shield. plug is over the hatch opening, criterion IV of NUREG-0612 is satisfied.
REFERENCES 1.
NRC Generic Letter, D.
G.
Eisenhut to all Operating Reactors, dated December 22, 1980.
2.
PASNY letter, J.
P.
Bayne to T. A.
- Ippolito, dated October 15, 1981 (JPN-81-82).
3.
NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at
' Nuclear Power Plants", July 1980.
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