ML20214S169
| ML20214S169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1987 |
| From: | George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NYN-87075, NUDOCS 8706090163 | |
| Download: ML20214S169 (11) | |
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George S. Thomas vice Proddent Huclect Producson Pub 5c Service of New HampeNro N:w Hampshire Yankee Division NYN-87075 June 1, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
' Attention: Document Control Desk
References:
(a) Facility Operating License No. NPF-56 Docket No. 50-443 (b) PSNH Letter (SBN-1211) dated October 9, 1986, "10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations" G. S. Thomas to V. S. Noonan Subj ect:
10 CFR 50.59 Quarterly Report Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find the Quarterly Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Seabrook Station. This report covers the period of January 1, 1987 to March 31, 1987 and is being submitted pursuant to the reporting requirements outlined in Reference (b).
Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Warren J. Hall at (603) 474-9574, extension 4046.
Very truly yours,
/
eor S. Thomas Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator USNRC Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. A. C. Cerne NRC Senior Resident Inspector Seabrook Station Seabrook, NH 03874 4
8706090163 870601 DR ADOCK 0500 3
I P.O. Box 300. Seabrook, NH 03874. Telephone (603) 474-9574
ENCLOSURE TO NYN-87075 SEABROOK STATION 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS QUARTERLY REPORT January 1,1987 to March 31, 1987 1.
Design Changes The below listed design changes have been made at Seabrook Station and evaluations have been performed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-118 TITLE: Water Treatment - Acid Injection Line
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DESCRIPTION:
This Design Coordination Report was issued to document an as-installed temporary modification to the Demineralized Water Makeup System. This change was implemented to correct chemical attack on the victaulic fittings in the Water Treatment Neutralization Tank (WT-TK-32) recirculation line and chemical attack to the internals of check valve, CK-17, in the acid injection line. A portion of the recirculation line from the Neutralizer Recirculation Pumps, P-48A and P-48B, to WT-TK-32 was changed to Schedule 80 PVC.
Schedule 80 PVC is acceptable for the expected pH range in this line and is of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum expected pressure anticipated by the shutoff head from Neutralizer Recirculation Pumps P-48A and P-48B.
As a result of rerouting the acid injection line, a high point loop was created, eliminating the potential for backflow and the need for check valve CK-17.
Visual inspection of the temporary modification shows no deterioration after approximately nine months of service.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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Design Coordination Report: Number 86-564 TITLE: Primary Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust System DESCRIPTION:
This Design Coordination Report was initiated to provide sufficient air face velocities for the sampling hood (SS-CP-166A) located in the Sampling Room of the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB).
For the exhaust hood to function properly and to increase the capability to remove contaminated air from the sample room, the exhaust air flow rate from the hood was increased from 300cfm to 800cfm by increasing the exhaust hood duct size. The air flow rate from the single exhaust register in the sample room was decreased from 900cfm to 400cfm. The total exhaust air flow from the sample room remained unchanged.
The change in the duct size has been reviewed to satisfy the following requirements:
1)
A minimum face velocity of 100fpm at the sampling hood has been established.
2)
The overall return air flow from the Sampling Room is maintained at the original design value of 1200cfm.
3)
Non-ducted air flow in the Sampling Room area is in compliance with the FSAR requirement for air flow direction to be from areas of lesser potential radiological contamination to areas of greater potential contamination.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-686 TITLE: Revised Waste Process Building HVAC System Air Flow Rates DESCRIPTION:
This design change was initiated to document the as-tested air flowrates in the Waste Process Building HVAC System. The Waste Process Building ventilation system is non-safety & non-seismic.
This design change request does not change the design intent of the system as described in the FSAR, but will result in a revision to localized air flow rates as diagrammed and described in the FSAR.
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CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-722 TITLE: Deletion of MR4 Relay from Watt / Watthour Transducer on Erergency Bus E5 and E6 DESCRIPTION:
This Dasign Coordination Report was originated to eliminate the use of MR4 relays from the watthour counter circuit for Emergency Buses E5 and E6.
In the original design, MR4 relays installed on Buses E5 and E6 were provided with watthour. transducers in order to have watthour input to the computer and the watthour counter on the Diesel Generator Panel. However, the present design for Emergency Buses E5 and E6 does not require watthour input to the computer; therefore, only one output is required and the need for the MR4 relays is eliminated. The watthour counter circuit that used the MR4 relays is not classified as Nuclear Safety related.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 87-013 TITLE: Drain Pots for Hydrogenated Vents DESCRIPTION:
Several traps in the Vent Gas System discharge to an open-ended drain. To eliminate the potential for discharging hydrogen into an unmonitored area in the event that a condensate trap sticks open, drain pots have replaced the condensate traps. Condensate level in the drain pots is visually monitored and periodically drained. This design change does not change the operational characteristics of the Vent Gas System.
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CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 87-074 TITLE: Restricting Orifices for RTD Cold Leg Manifold Supply Lines DESCRIPTION:
This design change documents the installation of the permanent restricting flow orifices for the Reactor Coolant System RTD cold leg manifold supply lines. The size of the orifices was changed during initial startup testing. Westinghouse concurrence was obtained for the flow rates established with the new flow restrictive orifices installed. This change also supplies instrument identification numbers for the new orifices.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 87-096 TITLE:
Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Admission Time Delay DESCRIPTION:
During startup testing of the turbine driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump, P-37A, design modifications to the steam supply line for the turbine driven pump were initiated. These modifications were necessary in order for the turbine driven EFW pump to obtain full rated flow in less than 60 seconds.
This design change documents changes in the stroke times for three valves in the supply line and a time delay relay used in the opening sequence for these valves. The response time for the mechanical hydraulic turbine governor valve will be reduced from approximately 35 seconds to 30 seconds.
An analysis was performed on the effects of the decreased opening time for the valves to verify that there is no impact on the system loads assumed for the most limiting transient conditions.
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CONCLUSION:
A A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and-it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Changes to the Final 4
Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
2.
' The below listed temporary modifications have been made at Seabrook Station and evaluations have been performed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Temporary Modification Requests: Number 84-005 Number 84-010 Number 85-034 Number 85-036 l
Number 85-037 i
TITLE:
Relay Modifications for Generator and GSU Relay System DESCRIPTION:
The above referenced Temporary Modification Requests were all performed to provide relay protection for and prevent incorrect relay operation of the 25 KV Generator Breaker and the Generator Step-up Transformer (GSU).
These temporary modifications of the relay system are required during initial plant startup until load testing has been completed. The temporary relay protection modifications have been tested to ensure they provide adequate j
relay protection while reducing the chance of a loss of offsite power due to incorrect operation.
I Approximately 30% power will be required to determine proper relay operation. Restoration of the relay system will be completed upon completion of load tests of the relays.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for this temporary modification and it has been determined that the change will not 4
create any unreviewed safety concerns.
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Temporary Modification Request: Number 87-007 TITLE:
Power Supply Modification for Diesel Generator B Local Alarm Panel CP-76 DESCRIPTION:
As a result of a faulty relay in the inverter that provides DC power to the B Diesel Generator local alarm panel, CP-76, fuses FU-5 and FU-6 at CP-76 were removed and leads PF were lif ted.
This temporary modification will ensure positive isolation from class 1E circuits and affects only the Control Power Loss alarm. Secondary power ( A.C. power) will still be available for alarm operation and will not prevent proper operation of the Emergency Diesel. Restoration of the system will be accomplished upon receipt of a replacement relay.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for this temporary modification and it has been determined that the change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Temporary Modification Request: Number 87-013 TITLE:
Temporary Tie-In From RDMS to SPDS DESCRIPTION:
A temporary modification to tie-in the Radiation Data Management System (RDMS) to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was performed. The tie-in required digital input (dry contact) from each Post LOCA radiation monitor RM-80 to Intelligent Remote Terminal Units (IRTU). This modification is isolated from 1E circuits by the relay contacts. The modification provides additional information on Containment conditions for the SPDS and does not modify existing control or indications of RDMS.
Restoration of this modification to original design will be made prior to entry into MODE 2.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for this temporary modification and it has been determined that the change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
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Temporary Modification Request: Number 87-026 TITLE:
Temporary Modification to Battery 1-ED-B-2B DESCRIPTION:
The Seabrook Station FSAR describes the Station batteries as consisting of 59 cells with an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> discharge capacity of 2250 amp-hours. This temporary modification eliminates one defective cell from the battery system until a replacement battery cell can be installed. As a result of only having 58 cells, the battery voltage during discharge will be 1.76 volts below design specification and the discharge capacity will be slightly reduced. The remaining battery capacity will be greater than the total connected load and the decreased voltage will be above that necessary for system performance.-
Although the battery configuration will be different than that described in the FSAR, this will not significantly affect the non safety connected loads nor will it jeopardize any plant safety system.
The jumpering out of cell 34 in battery 1-ED-B-2B will not increase the probability of an accident es evaluated in the FSAR. Upon receipt of the new cell, Battery 2B will be restored to its designed configuration.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for this temporary modification and it has been determined that the change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Temporary Modification Requests: Number 87-029 Number 87-030 TITLE:
Temporary Removal of Relays 27RB-1 and 27RB-2 from Emergency Bus E5 and E6 DESCRIPTION:
This temporary modification removes defective Bus Undervoltage Relays 27RB-1 and 27RB-2 from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) transfer circuit for Emergency Bus E5 and E6.
This modification renders the 25%
decayed voltage automatic transfer feature from the UAT to the RAT inoperable.
The automatic synchronism feature between the UAT and RAT and manual closing of the RAT breaker are still operational. The removal of the defective relays was performed to ensure the failed relays did not adversely affect the Page 7 of 10
synchronized automatic transfer or manual RAT breaker closing until new relays could be installed. New relays have been installed and the circuits returned to full operational status.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was perf'ormed for this temporary modification and it has been determined that the change did not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
3.
Technical Requirements Manual No changes have been made to the Technical Requirements Manual during this reporting period.
4.
Final Safety Analysis Report No revisions have been submitted for the Final Safety Analysis Report during this reporting period.
5.
Procedure Changes Procedure changes that require review and approval by the Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) have been subjected to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
No procedure changes have been made at Seabrook Station during this reporting period that would require a change to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
6.
Tests and Experiments The following tests were performed at Seabrook Station and evaluations 1
have been performed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Special Test Procedure: Number ES 87-1-3 TITLE:
CBA Make-Up Air System Special Test DESCRIPTION:
In response to a proposed change to the Control Room Area Ventilation System, a special test procedure, ES 87-1-3, was developed to obtain additional system test data. The test data compiled by this procedure is required to establish the operating conditions for the Control Room Make-up Air Subsystem.
Restoration of the Control Room Make-up Air Subsystem was performed upon completion of the test.
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CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was' performed for this special test and it has been determined that this test did not create an unreviewed safety concern.
Special Test Procedure: Number ES 87-1-32 TITLE:
Performance Testing of Uninterruptible Power Supply 1E DESCRIPTION:
A special test procciure was initiated as a result of an unexpected UPS output interruption. The interruption occurred coincident with a 480V supply bus ground alarm. The purpose of the special test was to duplicate (to the extent practicable) all known conditions which were present at the time of the interruption to determine the cause(s). Testing involved placement of an intentional ground on the 480 volt supply bua and verifying proper UPS operation under load. The electrical distribution system is designed to withstand a single ground.
Performance of this test did not place the plant equipment into an unanalyzed degraded condition.
System restoration was completed at the end of the test.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for this special test and it has been determined that this test did not create an unreviewed safety concern.
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-Temporary Setpoint Request: Number 87-004 TITLE:
Test to Establish Proper Relief Valve Setting.
DESCRIPTION:
Steam Generator sample relief valves, SS-V-790, -791, -792, -793 have lifted on several occasions. The cause of the relief valves lifting was attributed to back pressure in the radiation monitoring skids RM-SKD-83 through RM-SKD-86 and the Steam Generator Demineralizer Tank. To provide proper flow through the radiation monitoring skids, the upstream pressure control valves were adjusted near the relief valve settings of-75psig. This temporary setpoint change was initiated to determine if a new relief valve setting of 95psig would be adequate. The change was performed only on relief valve SS-V-790.
This modification does not ~ compromiso plant safety since the protection provided by the relief valve is still available. The affected radiation monitoring skid it protects is certified to 100 psig.
Upon completion of testing, a Design Coordination Report' will be issued to document a permanent system change.
CONCLUSION:
A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation was performed for the temporary setpoint change and it has been determined that this change will.
not create an unreviewed safety concern.
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