ML20214K754
| ML20214K754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1986 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-1178, NUDOCS 8608220079 | |
| Download: ML20214K754 (2) | |
Text
,
SEABROOK STATION Enginnring Offico Putsc Service of New Hampshire August 19, 1986 SBN-1178 T.F. # Q2.2.2, B7.1.3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5 Ref e rences:
(a)
Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b)
PSNH Letter (SBN-1162), dated July 18, 1986,
" Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report" Emergency Code Cooling Design Deficiency (CDR-86-00-07)",
J. DeVincentis to R. W. Starostecki Subj ect :
Emergency Core Cooling Design
Dear Sir:
In Reference (b), we submitted a final 10CFR50.55(e) Report regarding the valve alignment of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) at Seabrook Station during the cold leg recirculation phase of post-LOCA ECCS operation. Additionally, in that letter we transmitted the appropriate FSAR changes to reflect our response.
While in our reference letter we apprised NRR of the FSAR changes, your Staff has instructed us to send, under separate cover, those changes made as a result of our resolution to the final 10CFR50.55(e) report.
We trust that by copy of this letter, we have conformed to your Staff's request.
Very truly ours, A
)
John DeVincentis Director of Engineering cc Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 2[
[A 2
9 860019
~r S
K 05000443
/Vjp/
A PDR el1 Seabrook Station Construction Field Office. P.O. Box 700
- Seabrook, NH O3874
r
Dicno currcn, Esquiro Fater J. Mathews, Mayor Harmon & We1C3 City Hall 2001 S. Stroot N.W.
Nzwburyport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Jud;th H. Mizner Silvergate, Gertner, Baker, Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Fine, Good & Mizner Office of the Executive Legal Director 88 Broad Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Robert A. Backus, Esquire City Hall 116 Lowell Street 126 Daniel Street P.O. Box 516 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Manchester, NH 03105 Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire Philip Ahrens, Esquire Attorney General Assistant Attorney General George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Department of The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Statehouse Station #6 Office of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. J. P. Nadeau RfD 1 - Box 1154 Selectmen's Office Kenosington, NH 03827 10 central Road 4
Rye, NH 03870 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire l
Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros j
Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Cordon J. Humphrey Mr. William S. Lord U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 Town Hall - Friend Street (ATTN:
Tom Burack)
Amesbury, MA 01913 Richard A. Haspe Esq.
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Hampe and McNicholas 1 Pillsbury Street 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Concord, NH 03301 (ATTN Herb Boynton) i t
Thomas F. Powers, III H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Town Manager Office of General Counsel Town of Eseter Federal Energency Management Agency 10 Front Street 500 C Street, SW l
Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20472 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esquire RFD Dalton Rnad Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Brentwood, NH 03833 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
P.O. Bos 360 Holmes & Ells Portsmouth, NH 03801 47 Winnacunnet Ro'ad Hampton, NH 03842 Robert Carrigg Town Office Mr. Ed Thomas Atlantic Avenue FEMA Region I North Hampton, NH 03862 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109
ocannovs s.Aiiv:.
Engine ring Offica a
P j
July 18, 1986 Pub 5c SoMce of New Hampshire SBN-1162 T.F.
Q2.2.2 NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION United States Nuclear Regalatory' Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention:
t. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) Telecon of June 6,1986, W. J. Daley (YAEC), M. A.
Chiasson (NKY), R. W. Gregory (YAEC) to Rick Urban (NRC - Region I)
Subject:
Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report:
Emergency Core Cooling System Design Deficiency (CDR-86-00-07)
Dear Sir:
In Reference (b), we reported a 10CFR50.55(e) deficiency regarding the valve alignment of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) at Seabrook Station during the cold leg recirculation phase of post-LOCA ECCS operation.
Description of Deficiency During the cold leg recirculation phase of post-LOCA ECCS operation, each Low Head Safety Injection (RHR) pump takes suction from the containment sump and discharges directly to two Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold legs and to a suction header common to both High Head Safety Injection (SI) pumps and both High Head Centrifugal Charging (CS) pumps.
In the event that one of the f ully redundant RHR pumps failed, the remaining active RHR pump would discharge directly to two RCS cold legs, to the common suction header, and to the alternate two RCS cold legs via the discharge line of the failed pump.
The availability of the latter flowpath, which was previously unaccounted for in system design analyses or testing, would reduce the NPSH provided to the CS pumps below the required NPSH.
l a
- gwvum.NJQ RPf c Seabrock Station Construction Field Office. P.O Box 700. Seobrook,NH 03874
United Sectcs Nuclocr R:gulctory Commissicn SSN-1162 Attenticn Mr. Richard W. Stcreatccki P:33 2 i
Safety implications o
Failure of an RHR pump during the cold leg recirculation phase of Post-LOCA ECCS operation could result in damage to both high head CS pumps.
This in turn would reduce the long tern core cooling capabilities of the ECCS.
Corrective Action A low head safety injection systen valve alignment will be used which is different than that provided in the FSAR for the cold leg recircu-lation mode. This alignment will provide acceptable system hydraulic characteristics and still meet core cooling requirements. The FSAR changes reflecting the new alignment are provided herewith in Attachment 1.
In addition the new alignment has already been incorporated in Seabrook Station's emergency operating procedures.
The above referenced FSAR change will be incorporated into the FSAR by a future amendment.
In this regard it should be noted that we are also sending a copy of this letter to NRR to apprise them of these FSAR changes.
This letter is being filed as a final 10CFR50 55(e) report.
Very truly y urs, John DeVincentis Director of Engineering Attachment cc Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
4e.c.
Dicco Curecn, Esquire City Hall Harmon & Weico
- 2001 S. Strcot, N.W.
Nesb:ryport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Judith H. Minner
$11vergate, Gertner, Baker, Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Fine, Good & Misner t
Office of the Executive Legal Director 88 Broad Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Robert A. Backus, Esquire City Hall 126 Daniel Street 116 Lowell Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 P.O. Bos 516 Manchester, NH 03105 Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire Philip Ahrens, Esquire Attorney General Assistant Attorney General George Dana 81sbee, Esquire Department of The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Statehouse Station #6 Office of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. J. P. Nadeau RFD 1 - Box 1154 Selectmen's Office Kannoington, NH 03827 10 central Road Rye, NH 03870 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Soard of Selectmen one Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury toaton, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. William S. Lord Board of Selectmen U.S. Senate Washington, DC 20510 Town Hall - Friend Street (ATTN Tom Burack)
Asesbury, MA 01913 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Richard A. Hespe Eng.
1 Pillsbury Street Hampe and McNicholas 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Concord, NH 03301 (ATTN Herb Boynton)
Thomas F. Powers, Ill H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Office of General Counsel Town Manager Federal Energency Management Agency Town of Ezeter 500 C Street, SW l
10 Front Street l
Eseter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20472 l-Paul McEachern, Esquire Brentwood Board of Selectmen i
RfD Deltoo Road Matthew T. Brock, Esquire 1
Brentwood, NH 03833 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
P.O. Son 360 Holmes & Ells Portsmouth, NH 03801 47 Winnacunnet Road l
Hampton, NH 03842 Robert Carrigg i h Town Office l
Mr. Ed Thomas Atlantic Avenue l
FEMA Region 1 North Harpton, NH 03862 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109
SS 'l & 2 A se nee.g t.
FSAR NJvenber l ht TL.JCh the automatic and manual switchover sequence, the two residual heat removal pumps would take suction from the containment susp and
~
4 l
deliver borated water directly to RCS cold legs. A portion of the Number 1 residual heat remova pump discharge flow would be used i
to provide suction to the two charging pumps which would also deliver i
directly to the RCS cold legs. A portion of the discharge flow from the Number 2 residual heat removal pump would be used to provide suction to the two safety injection pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. As part of the annus1 switchover procedure (see Table 6.3-7, Step 4), the suctions of the safety injection and charging pumps are cross connected so that one residual l
heat removat pump can deliver flow to the RCS and both safety injection and charging pumps, in the event of the failure of the second residual heat removal pump.
Af ter approxiestely 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, cold les recirculation is terminated and hot les recirculation is initiated. This is done to terminate any boiling in the core should the break be in one of the RCS cold l
j lege. During this phare of recirculation, the $1p's discharge is aligned to supply water to all four RCS hot lege and the RNRp's discharge is aligned to supply water to RCS hot legs 1 and 4.
The CCp's do not have the capability to feed the hot legs and continue i
i to supply the cold legs.
i j
6.3.2.2 Equipment and Copponent Descriptions The component design and operating conditions listed in Table 6.3-1 are
- I.
specified as the east severe conditions to which each respective component is exposed during either normal plant operation, or during operation of j
the ECCS. For eacit component, these conditions are considered in relation l
to the code to which it is designed. By designing the components in accordance l
l with applicable codes, and with due consideration for the design and operating conditions, the fundamental assurance of structural integrity of the ECCS l
components is esintained.
Components of the ECCS are designed to withstand f
the appropriate seismic loadings in accordance with their safety class as j
I given in Table 3.2-2.
Descriptions of the major sechanical components of the gCCS follows
.a.
Accuens ta tors I
The accumuistors are pressure vessels partially filled with borated j
water and pressurised with nitrogen gas. During normal operation, 1
each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in
- l series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumuistor pressure, 4
the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. One i
accumulator is attached to each of the cold lege of the RCS.
Mechanical operation of the swing disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accueistors to the core via the cold leg.
i
}
l 6.3-5
=
Sg '1 & 2 FSAR b.
Passi-re Fail,ure Criteria f
The following design philosophy assures the necessary redundancy in component and system arrangement in order to meet the intout of the General Design Criteria on single failure as it specifically applies j _
to failure of passive components in the ECCS. Thus, for the long j
ters, the system design is based on accepting either a passive or an active failure.
h 1.
Redundancy of Flow Paths and Components for Long Tern Emergency Core Coolina In design of the ECCS, Westinghouse utilises the following r
criteria:
(a)
During the long term cooling period following a loss of coolant, the emergency core cooling flow paths shall be separable into two subsystems, either of which can provide 1
minimum core cooling functions and return spilled water from.the floor of the containment back to the RCS.
(b) Elther of the two subsystems can be isolated and removed from service in the event of a leak ou side the containment. A 4 - L # m.d e op W
- JJa.a.
- n m al.*m j
s.eie,s era. proJ.',.Losfa,e +,:a. he Sete% Q4h.
l (c) Adequate redundancy of check valves is provided to tolerate failure of a check valve during the long term as a passive i
component.
t I
(d), Should one of these two subsystems be isolated in this long term period, the other subsystem remains operable.
l (e)
Frovisions are also made in the design to detect leakage j
from components outside the containment, to collect this leakage, and to provide for maintenance of the af fected equipment.
A single passive failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-6.
It demonstrates that the gCCS can sustain a single passive i
l failure during the long term phase and still retain an intact flow path to the core to supply sufficient flow to maintain l
the core covered and af feet the removal of decay heat. The i
procedure fo11 owed to establish the alternate flow path also isolates,the component which failed.
i Thus, for the long term emergency core cooling function.
l adequate core cooling capacity exists with one flow path removed from service.
i l
\\
6.3-15 l
- ,,r, mv,,wg3-----m---,wf.~.,m,,,m_.
n.-%
_mr-
,=,m-,.--e...,----,.m
,...,.%~
w m
Amend en:.~ i 53142 FSAR Apr.*. ;?io t
to actuate the spray, but not high enough to seat the check valves referenced above. This would result in a continued high flow rate from the tank until
[
the RWST isolation valves (Cas-V2, V5) are closed (approximately 75 seconds after "lo-to-1" signal by Table 6.3-10.
From this point there is at least 5.1 minutes of operation at 1,800 spe, for a total of 6.4 minutes before the "ampty" alarm sounds. There is at least 31.0 minutes of operation between the "lo-to-1" and possible vortex'ing in this case.
g ;+'
The 11 siting s[ngle failure
- for the design is-the failere of one of the RWST Laoistion valves (Cgg-V2, -VS) to close.
If one of these valves does not close, the flow rate drops from 16,400 to 9,100 spa (not 1,800). At this high flow rate, the " empty" alarm will sound, alerting the operator to immediately shut off any pumps still taking suction from the tank. There is sufficient volume between the " empty" alarm and the calculated vortexing level for at least 1.9 minutes of operation for shutting off the pumps.
i M
AS 55 Following the automatic and manu switchover sequence, the two residual 53 heat renovat pumps would tak ction from the containment sump and deliver berated water directly to RCS cold less.
A portion of the Number i residual heat removat pump ischarge flow would be used to provide suction to the two charging pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold less.
A portion of the discharge flow from the Number 2 residual heat re-movat pump would be used to provide auction to the two safety injection pumps
' which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs.
As part of the manual switchover procedure (see Table 6.3-7, Step 4), the suctions of the safety injection and charging pumps are cross-connected so that one residual heat removat pump can deliver flow to the RCS and both safety injection and charging pumps, in the event of the failure of the second residual heat removat pump.
See Section 7.5 for process information available to the operator in the control room fo11owing an accident.
45 i
l 1
i.
e l
l I
i l
l l
6.3-18b l
SB 1 & 2
,t= enc =en.
y 4
FSAR llovembor tht I
6.3.3 Performance Evaluation a
Chapter 15 accidents that result in ECCS operation are as follows:
Inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve (see a.
Sec tion 15.1.4).
1 b.
Small break LOCA (see Section.,15.6.5).
Large b'reak LOCA (see Section 15.6.5).
c.
[
d.
Major secondary system pipe failure (see Section 15.1.5).
Steam generator tube failure (see Section 15.6.3).
e.
Safety injection is actuated from any of the followings i
I a.
14w pressuriser pressure.
b.
Low steamline pressure.
t l
c.
High containment pressure.
l d.
Manual initiation.
(
l A safety injection signal will rapidly trip the main turbine, close all feedwater control valves, trip the main feedwater pumps, and close the feed-water isolation valves.
l Following the actuation signal, the suction of the centrifuga1' charging pumps r
is diverted from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage tank.
Simultaneously, the valves isolating the charging pumps from the injection header automatically open. The safety injection pumps also start automatically but operate at shut off head when the BCS is at normal pressure. The passive N
l injection system (a'ecumulators) and the low head system (residual heat removal
{
pumps) also provide no flow at normal RCS pressure.
i l
Figure 6.3-2 is a simplified illustration of the ECCS.
We notes provided with l
Figure 6.3-2 contain information relative to the operation of the ECCS in its various modes. De modes of operation illustrated are full operation of all 4
ECCS components, cold les recirculation with residual heat removal pump Number 2 operating, and hot les rg esidual heat removat pump Number 1 l*
operatina.l" esf ar/ rep [qirculation withehnta[iv%E h/op/a/on/f /h'[f{fS d f
gyMo itfons/
1 Lag times for initiation and operation of the 3CCS are limited by pump startup l
l time and consequential loading sequence of these motors onto the safeguard 1
6.3-19 i
I
.m
-1 s
's r' h.M NOTES TO FIGURF. ' o.1-2 (sheet 1 of 19) l!ODESOFOPERATION 1
MODE A - INJECTION 1
This mode presents the process conditions' for the case of maximum safeguards, j
i.e., all pumps operating, following accumulator delivery. Two residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, two safety injection (SI) pumps, and two centrifugal charging (CC) pumps operate, taking suction from the refueling water storage 4
tank and delivering to the reactor through the cold les connections.
Note that the flow from each pump is less than its maximum runout 'since the pump discharge piping is shared by the two pumps of each subsystem. Note also 3
that the SI pump branch c'onnections to the residual lines are close to their i
discharge into the accumulator lines. thereby minimizing any increase in-the RHR branch line head loss due to the combined flows of the RHR and SI i
pumps.
5 MODE B - COLD-LEG RECIRCULATION I
This mode presents the process conditions for the case of cold-leg recirculation assuming residual heat removal (RHR) pump No. 2 operating, safety injection pumps 1 and 2 operating, and centrifugal ' charging (CC) pumps 1 and 2 operating.
It is assumed that the spray pumps have emptied the RWST at this time.
In this mode the safeguards pumps operate in series, with only the RHR pump capable of taking suction from the contair. ment senp.
The recirculated coolant i
is then delivered by the RHR pump to both of the SI pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections and to both of the CC j]
pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections.
~
l The RHR pum also elivers flow direct 1,y_to the reactor through two cold _
er m
t MODE C - HOT-LEG, RECIRCULATION, This mode presents the process conditions for the case of hot-les recirculation, assuming residual heat removal (RHR) pump No. 1 operating, centrifugal charging (CC) pumps 1 and 2 operating, and safety injection (SI) pumps 1 and 2 operating.
i In this mode, the safeguards pumps again operate in series with only the RHR pump taking suction from the containment sump. The recirculated coolant is then delivered by the RHR pump to both of the CC pumps which continue to deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections and to both of the $1 pumps which deliver to the reactor through their hot-leg connections.
The RHR pump also delivers directly to the reactor through two hot-leg connection."
i i
4 f
1 l
'e
. 3..
- D1 e
NOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-2
~
(Sheet 3 of 19)
VALVE A1.IGNMENT CHART (Cont'd)
OPERATIONAL MODES 3
C VALVE Nt.MER A
21 C
0 0
22
,0
$C 0
23 0
hHC 0
24 0
O C
t 25 C
C 0
% -C C
26 0
27 C
C C
28 0
C C
29 C
0 0
30 C
C C
31 C
C C
l 35 0
0 0
3,
\\
3 O = OPEN C = CLOSED s
o
+
--m
--,--~-- -
. -,,,-an 7,,,
n.
.v.
---,--,-e--,
---v
--g ng--,
enw-,-----e.- -,
nn-v.-,--
,. etM,,acda.L Gls $= J so andW.c. c s.L pyiue.i s...-= re h b.j g%,.,yy j gj g*.
d gy J pc_ sp.
ed prenA.9 un*/saAR. pm h
y s Jal.ra.
<m M S'" itw &
a, b
o-vs./
K sa k ara 3 < 4 % ssa p n:tk i A ; m 1% alk sys, of Rc5. al e>4ect er. M 4y s>e 41a.m & :,.,.
AhWe hel.1== Mve. st,4-v.%
s.a. e s 6 eies< L *- la,et.J c-
~
es*wnede. (u4a r :Vh -rm **Id
%s.
TAsix 6.3-5 (Sheet 5 of 10)
Component Fallseee Mode ECCS Operation phase eEffect on System Operation
- Failure Detectica nethod ) Remarks
- 11. Motor Falls to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces reduadancy Same method of detectise Valve is electrica!!y l
operated on demand.
lege of RC loops, of providing flow teolation as that stated for itee #4.
interlocked with iso-N sate valve of Costainment Sump from lation vales CSS-VS CBS-V2 RWST. Ito effect on safety and RF-V35 and any not (CBS-v5 for system operation.
be opened unless thee analogous)
Alternate check isolattoa valves are cicsed for valve CSS-V55 provides manual eseration free backup isolettoa.
mata cactrol board.
. Valve opens automat t-
,. cally on **S" alsnel, r#
of}eteji4.
l reflatph-folf Fall er oc e re a y sa me
- 12. LMot rai e of6 ne ter fop 1 3
op rat d ga o de
./
ssAfRjrloop.[
of ovi n 1JtS1 a
e v 1 RN-V tr ao er tion for RH 21 r tre a on o flu d to an osou Id og of S.
m effe t saf ty f r ey t os 3
o at Ite to so 1 1 val 21 p ov dee M
c le ett for 1/
N R
pump rat sepa at on.
- 13. Motor operated Falls to close Recirculatise - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection Valve is elettrica11y l globe valve om densad.
lege of RC Loops.
of providing toelation of' as that stated for item U..
interlocked with 1so-N SI-V93 letSI/$1 per's mialflow isttoa valves SH-VIS line isolation from RWST.
end kM-V36 and say No effect on safety for est be opened entesa tie w *alves are system operation. Alter-nate isolatloa valvee $1-V89 clooed.
and $1-V90 in each pump's
.,'.i sintflow line provide back-up isolation.
- 14. Motor operated Falls to close Recirculattun - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same mathed of detection Same remark as tnt l
globe valve on demand.
lege of RC toops.
of providing isolation of as that stated for itse #4.
states for itse alb.
g 2 y
51-V90 HMSI/S1 oump St-F-6A mint-analogous)
No effect on softty for
.'/ -
(S1-V99 flow teolation free RWST.
$J system operatioss. Alter-a
nate teolation valve j
SI-V93 in main eintflow
..e.
line provides backup y
1sulation.
b~
3 w
w-e TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 6 of 10)
Component Failure Mode ECCS Operation phase aEffect on System Operation a* Failure Detection Method RemarL6 1
- l$. Motor operated Fails to opes Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detect 1 Valve is electrically {
gate valve on deasad.
lege of RC loops.
of providtag MpSM to suc-as that etsted for ites
, interlocked with tao-a.
s staties valses SI-WVO, tion of HMSI/CN pumpe from jY-
{SI-409, SI-VS3, RC-V23 ai. /25 1JtSI/RME pumpe. No safety
.*RC-V22 aos CSS-VS.
etfact on system operation.
Minimum MySN to letSI/CE
. Valve can not be opened oump suction will be met by
_imlese valve SI-V93 or
' flow f rom 1JISI/km ;me
$$1-V90 and 51-V89 5velves are cleoed; RM-F-8B via cross-tie line s-4 opeatna of isolation
- valve RCS-V23 or valve CS-V450 or CS-V461
!.RCS-V22 is closed, and teolatica valve RM-V36.
. and ChS-trS le open.
- 16. Mator operated Fails to opea hecirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detect!
fValve As electrically l gate volve on demand.
legs of DC looos.
- f providing NPSN to suc-as that stated for itse interlocked with too- %
latice valves, SI-V90, y.
tica of MetSI/S1 pumpo from jY-51-v89. SI-V93. Cas-Vie, m
RN-V36 LMS7/RNR peps. Iso effect EC-V84 end atC-VO7:
2-on s'afety for system opera-tion. Minimas NFSM to IMSI/
Valve-cesnot be opened unlese valve SI-V93 SI pump suction will be met or SI-V90 and 51-V89 by flow from IJtSI/RHR peep valves are closed; RM-p-SA via crose-tie line valve RC-V88 or and opeatng of isolation l
valve CS-V460 or CS-V461 AC-VSF is clor.ed and and isolattoa valve RN-V35.
valve Ces-V14 is open.
l
- 17. Motor operated Falle to open Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Sees method of deteeri l
3 ate valve on demand.
leg;s of DC loops.
of providing fluid flow as stated for it g.
through cross-tie between g*
CS-v460 suction of MHSI/CM pumpa (CS-V461 and NHS1/SI pumpe. No analogous) effect on safety of f
system operation. Alter-nate isolation oralve i
2 j
(CS-V461 opens to provide gg backup flow path through
,t crose-tie line.
aa EI
- 18. Motor operated Falle to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection gate valve on demand.
lege of RC loops.
of providing flow isolation as that stated for itee f4.
of itHSI/SI pump suction n
g, CBS-V47 froe RUST. No effect on (C35-v51 w#
eafety for system operation.
analogous)
Alternate check toolatica valve (CBS-V48) provides baclup toolation.
l
.)
4 TAB 1.E 6.3-$
(Sheet 7 of 10)
Component Failure Mode ICCS operation Phase
- Effeet on System Operation
- Failure Detection N thod R_ema rk s e
l
- 19. Motor operated ra11. to close Recirculation - cold ratture reduces redundancy Same method of detectice.
gate valve os deemed.
lege of RC loops, of providing flow leolation
- a. that stated previously g
trV-Il2D of suction of NHSI/CH pumpe for failure of ites datring (14V-112E from RWST. No effect ce fajecties phase of ECCS eafety for system operation.
operation.
anslogous)
Alternate check teclattos valve (CBS-VSS) provides backup toelation.
l
- 20. Residual ratte to Recirculation - cold reilure reduces redundancy Same method of detection heat deliver work-lege of RC loops, of providias recirculation as that stated previos41y g
pump RM-P-SA ing fluid.
of coolant to the RCS f ree for failure of ites during (pump RN-F-83 the Containment Sump.
injection phase of ECCS Fluid flow from 1JtS1/RMR operation.
analogous)
I pump RM-F-SA will be loot.
Minleum recirculation i
flow requiremente for IJtSI t
flow will be met by LMSI/
E RAR pump RN-P-SS deliver-ym*
ing fluid.
l
- o.
- 21. Safnty Falle to Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection i
inpction deliver work-or hot lege of RC of providing recirculation as that stated previously pump St-F-6A ing fluid.
loops.
of coolaat to the RCS from for failure of ites during (pump SI-P-6B the Containment Sump to injectios phase to ECCS analogous) cold lege of RC loope vts operettoa.
RNR and SI pumpe. Fluid flow from INISI/SI puer SI-P-6A will be loet.
Minimum recirculation flow requiremente for letSI flow will be met by NNSI/SI pump SI-P-65 delivering working fluid.
l
- 22. Motor operated ratie to close Rectreulation - het railure reduces redundancy Same method of detection gate valve on demand.
legs of RC loops, of providing recirculation as that stated fur itee #4.
c, u
RN-V16 of coolmat to the RCS from O
the Containment Sump to hot less of RC toops. Fluid flow f rom IJtSI/RNR pump Q
RH-P-8A will continue to d'
C flow to cold lege of RC
8*
N5 A *".I# '$
loo a
re r -
M
- N # "
('im qi r~muif $ % t:st I ou re ui t
le iJt'slq:
e o
i p fCJrA. p.
e t y 5 /n of S C $ o o p s i.a boa & b l
2n P-% O ru'or-44.wd(.kr.',& & gc p,, y J.
P U '~
r ci eu en
- * ~
- -...I
/,.
e
- Ja i
m.
1 TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 8 of 10) i Componeet Fa119te 9tode ECCS Operatton phase
- Effect on System Operettom a* Failure Detectton Method Remarks t.d
- r. at Se unat on -
rau e re d
.c, V.i
- ion
.d.
t, g
G.
,2 I
of p
of evid to 1rce tion (c1 d
it
}
(
te a 2
of ool c to R
fr e
e) at al j
1 t
at tS to ose 1 on as or osous) leg of R loo lig and la a 19C.
Flu flow rom 1/
In ddi MR p
RN-P w 1 be oct d)me e p/es re FI-4)
M imue cir lat. f1 al quir to o le Mr RC oops ill b
IJtS1 HR p
-P-g rec cul ing luid a j
ho les dir t1y la
/
~
M 1/S1 pump.
/
Motor operated Fails to open Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same mathod of detection as y
gate valve os deeend.
lege of RC loops, of providing recirculation that stated for ites $
ars M.
M RM-V32 of coolant to the RCS from
- n e (RM-V70 the containment sump to the analogous) hot lege of RC loops. No effect on safety for systee operation. Alternate isola-tion valve (RM-V70) opens to provide flow path to RCS hot legs via IJtSI/RIIR pumps.
Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redi.adaacy Same method of detection I
gate valve os demand.
lege of RC loops.
of providing recirculation as that stated for itee #4.
RN-V26 of coolant to the BCS f rom the Containment Sump to hot lege of RC loops. Fluid flow from 1JtSI/RNR pump RM-P-8B will continam to flow to cold lens of RC 2
loops.
1
' eerire afton
/f rq r a o t/
='"C b3 A g h 3-Q Ud*
Ca5 *g kh Jee f a il pgg
,43 m,'4.tsg.we. rwa.-j g
% (h %JMMh E$
,,,3 g g og g, 3 k5 OI % N a % bb M b)F t
go by 1
p
-P B ec r -
d5#hdir,,, Pfj y f-F A,es.fr u b 4., w" c
1 1 f id o he t
b
.[
)
as vi MitS /
p A do MHS s.:SI pu.m5.
s
. - ~
4 TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 9 of 10) l l
Component Failure Mode ECCS Operation phase
- Effect on Systes Operat M M a11ere Detectica Method Pesarke l
Motor operated Falle to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection sate valve om demand.
lege of RC loops.
of providtag flou toolation as that stated for item #4.
3 JS SI-vliz of unsr/S:,, fiow to cold (SI-V111 lege of RC loops. He effect analogous) on safety for system opera-backup isolattos agatast tion valve St-V114 provides flow to cold lege of RC loops.
Motor operated Falle to open Becirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detect 1oa as sate valve on demand.
lege of RC loops.
of providtag recirculation that stated for itea #6.
g
.2[>
SI-V102 of coolant to the hot lege In addition. SK pump dio-(SI-V11 of RCS from the Contaissect chstge pressure (p1-919) analogous)
Susp via IstSI/SI pumpe, and flow (FI-915) at MCB.
m M1nteum recirculation flow cu requirements to hot lege of RC toops will be met by IJtSI/RNE pump RN-p-gA and N
RM-p-88 recireviating fluid from Costalement Susp to hot lege of RC loops and 10851/S1 pump SI-p-65 recirculating fluid to hot lege 2 and 3,ef RC loops through the open-tag of toelation valve
$1-V11.
Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redusdancy Some method of detection gate valve on deoend.
lege of RC toops.
of providtag flow toolation as that stated for itee f4.
((
SI-Vil4 of 80851/S1 pump flow to cold lete of RC loops. No sffect l
os safety for eyeten opera-tion. Alterneta isolation 2
1 valvee $1-V112 and SI-Vill o>
in crose-tie line between j3 3 a IntSI/S1 pumps provides back-up isolation ageinet flow
$ ?,*
to cold lege of RC loops.
1
TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 10 of 10)
Component Failure b de ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection hethod Remarks Residual Falls to Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detectim l
heat deliver lege of RC loops.
of providing recirculation as that stated previously g.
8 removal
- working fluid.
of coolant to the RCS free for failure of itas during the Containment Sump to injection phase of ECCS pump RH-P-SA the hot lege of RC loops.
operation.
(Pump Fluid flow from LHSI/RNR RH-r-8B analogous) pump RH-r-8A vill be lost.
Minteum flow requirements to hot lege of RC loop will be met by 1JESI/kam pump RM-P-8B recirculating fluid to RC hot lege directly and via 1A851/S1 in pumps.
p sn e Po e' N
List of abbreviations and acronyma CH, CS - Charging RC
- Reactor Coolant HHS1
- High Head Safety Injection RCS
- Reactor Coolant System IJISI
- Low Head Safety injection RHR, RH - Residual Heat Removal IACA
- less of Coolant Accident RWST
- Refueltog Water Storage Tank p.,
MCB
- Main Control Roard SI
- Safety injection NPSH
- Net Positive Suction Head VCT
- Volume Control Tank b
- Containment Spray uu i
i a
- rs
- O LAs w
& 41
S3152 FSAR TABLE 6.3-7 (Sheet 1 of 3)
SEQUEHCE OF SWITCHOVER OPERATIONS (BASED ON NO SINGLE FAILURES)
)
The following manual operator, actions are required to complete the switchover from the injection mode to the recirculation mode. During the injection mode, the operator verifies that all ECCS pumps are operating and monitors the RWST and reactor building recirculation sump levels in anticipstion of switchover.
Component cooling water flow to the essidual heat removal heat exchangers is automatically initiated on a 'T' signal. The operator verifies that the component' cooling water inlet isolation valves to the residual heat removal i
i heat exchangers are open prier to switchover initiation. McCor control centers E522 and E622 are energized and the engineered safeguards signal is reset prior to switchover.
The following manual actions must be cor.pleted in a timely manner followir.g switchover initiation to align the charging pump and safety injection pumps suction to the residual heat removal pumps discharge.
t SWITCHOVER STEPS The RWST " low-low" level signal in conjunction with an 'S' signal automatically initiates the opening of the containsent sump isolation valves (CBS-V8/V14).
STEP 1 When each sump isolation valve (CBS-V8/V14) has reached the full open position, take inssediate action to close the corresponding RWST/RHR pump suction isolation valve (CBS-V2/V5).
STEP 2 Close the three safety injection pump miniflow isolation valves (SI-V89/V90/V93).
STEP 3 C
o v
th R /r/s/ofey' }4r}( 46wdsgreyfn c/ tXe J01 i
STEP 4 Open the two parkliel valves in the common suction line between the charging pump suction and the safety injection pump suction (CS-V460/V461).
STEP 5 Open each valve from each RHR pump discharge line to the charging pump suction and to the safety injection pump suctiott (RH-V35/V36).
STEP 6 All ECCS pumps are now aligned with suction flow from the containment sump. Verify proper operation and alignment of all ECCS components and proceed to complete the following manual actions to provide redundant. isolation of the RWST from the recirculation fluid.
J<a M s4 m ca
- m. a sk se.a Qu:t:.,
,,.h ;a.I.+;es c4 na e. M ca. % <r s (n-v'n
,- n.n-VM).
-e
,__._--___-._.._._-.,_____._..,,-_--m,
,,,r__,,,,__...m.,
,m
%-,w.,.w-,,7,-
. - - - + --,.-., - _ -
SB1&2 FSAR>
TABLE 6.3-7 (Sheet 2 of 3)
STEP 7 Close the valves in the lines from the RWST to the safety injection pump suction (CBS-V47/V51).
STEP 8 Close the valves in the lines from the RWST to the charging pump
~ suction (1.CV-112 D and E).
The ECCS is now aligned for cold leg reci.rculation as follows:
1 a.
Both residual heat removal pumps are delivering from the centainment sump directly to RCS cold legs and are also delivering to the xuction of the safet snjection and charging pumps.
TOC) b.
Both safety injection and charging pumps are delivering to the RCS cold legs.
SWITCHOVER FROM COLD LEG RECIRCULATION TO HOT LEC RECIRCtfLATION At approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the accident, hot les recirculation shall be initiated.
The following manual operator actions are required to perform the switchover operation from the cold leg recirculation mode to the hot leg recirculation mode.
SWITCHOVER STEPS STEP 1 Close the residual heat removal-pump discharge cold leg header isolation valveg (RH-V14/V26)f t.Ad w'ne.ck opw hing ca t.L ng rsc
- rr o.l.: tion.
A 0
t u
h t pyvp ptjep psparge cyospovgr spot STEP Y). Open the residual heat removal pump discharge hot leg header isolation valves (RH-V32/V70).
STEP Y,3 Stop safety injection pump No. 1.
STEP D/ Close the corresponding safety injection pump discharge crossover header isolat, ion valve (SI-V112).
i STEP X5 open the corresponding safety injection pump discharge hot les header isolation valve (SI-V102).
STEP 8 Restart safety injection pump No. 1.
STEP I 7 Stop sa'fety' injection pump No. 2.
I STEP D* Close the corresponding safety injection pump discharge crossover isolation valve (SI-Vill).
4 e
m-a.e---,.-.
-..,.,,,,-,----,-,-.,-m-,
SB 1 5 2 FSAR TABLE 6.3-7 (Sheet'3 of 3) 4 STEP hI')Close the safety injection pump discharg,e cold leg header isolatton valv.e (SI-V114).
STEP )[AD0 pen the corresponding safety injection pump discharge hot leg header isolation valve (SI-V7.7).
$TEP )(/I Restart safety injection pump No. 2.
The ECCS is now aligned for hot leg recirculation as follows:
a.
Both residual heat removal pumps are delivering from the containment sump directly to the RCS hot legs and are also delivering to the suction of the safety injection and charging pumps.
b.
Both safety injection pumps are delivering to the RCS hot legs.
c.
Both charging pucps ar4 delivering to the RCS cold legs.
Y a
l-O e
\\
,.e r-a n :.
FSMt Juno '992 l
TABLE 6.3-10 e
MANUAL SWITCHOVER SEQUENCE
{inximum t's e i'mItEd RWST Time.. (Esc)...
Du ra t ion, Outflow From_. Tp.a
_ _,,.. - Ac t io n.
(Secf;,
(CPM)
Start RWST lo-lo-1 signal 0-29 CBS-V8, -V14 opening 29 16,400 30-60 Locate CBS-V2, -V5 switches" 30
.16,400 60-75 CBS-V2, -V5 closing 15 16,400 75-105 Locate SI-V89, -V90, -V93 30 1,800 swi'cches 105-115 SI-V89, -V90, -V93 closing Ib 1,800 T-4 Lo at V2,
-5 2
ite)(p 3
1 b-5
- 21, -V 2 e osi n t*>=t$$
Locate CS-V460, -V461 switches 30 1,.800 iso ric>
nA*:AIE CS-V460, -V461 opening 10 1,800 ib.?c==
.,, _;3 Locate RH-V35, -V36 switches 30 1,800
.2co-2 3cm
.555335P5*
RH-V35, -V36 opening h- /5 1,800 23o.245 4'5 L
T IIS-14S I -
ke-AH-V14 sa.'4ck
.3c>
I, Cac>
cl.us,' ny j$
g, g c.<:>
NS -isc>
AH-/14 9
"(.
- .