Text

Forwards marked-up Pages from Fsar,Per Tech Spec 861020-24 Meetings
	ML20214J073
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/17/1986
From:	Bailey J; GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	Youngblood B; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	GN-1189, NUDOCS 8612010141
	Download: ML20214J073 (196)
	v • d • e

l Georgia Powsr Company i

Post Offica Box 282 l

Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554-9%1 404 724-8114 Southern Company Services inc.

Post Office Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 VOgtie Project November 17, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X7N16 Attention:

Mr. B. J. Youngblood Log:

GN-1189 PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC DOCKET NUMBER 50-424 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBER CPPR-108 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT - UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Dear Mr. Denton:

Enclosed for your staff's review are marked-up pages from the VEGP FSAR.

Theen revisions are being made in response to discussions with the staff during the October 20-24 Technical Specifications meeting in Bethesda and are intended to reflect agreement reached during that meeting concerning the Technical Specifications.

If your staff requires any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me,

cerely, e., ~

J... Bailey Prc,ect Licensing Manager JAP /caa Attachment xc:

R. E. Conway NRC Regional Administrator R. A. Thomas NRC Resident Inspector J. E. Joiner, Esquire D. Feig B. W. Churchill, Esquire R. W. McManus (w/o encl.)

M. A. Miller (2)

L. T. Gucwa B. Jones, Esquire Vogtle Project File G. Bockhold, Jr.

\\

i8k"i8be? 8gsssw

~

Y y

PDR

,1 :

16.3 Technical Specification Imprev: ment Program The Technical Specification Improvement Program for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant resulted in the inclusion of certain technical requirements into the FSAR.

These improvements are provided below.

Changes to these requirements shall be reviewed and approved in accordance with Vogtle filectric Generating Plant administrative procedures.

Requirement 1 - Reacter Trip System Response Times The response time of each Reactor Trip function shown in Technical Specification Table 3.3-1 shall be as shown in FSAR Table 16.3-1 Requirement 2 - Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Response Times The response time of each Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System Function shown in Technical Specification Table 3.3-2 shall be shown in FSAR Table 16.3-2.

Requirement 3 - Loose Part Detection System When the reactor is in MODES 1 and 2, the Loose Part Detection System shall be OPERABLE.

With one or more of the Loose Part Detection System channel (s) inoperable for more than 30 days a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission within the next 10 days.

This report. shall outline the cause of the malfunction and shall describe the actions required to restore the channel (s) to OPERABLE status.

Each channel of the Loose Part Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following:

1.

A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2.

An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days 3.

A CHANNEL CAllBRATION at least once per 18 months Requirement 4 - Reactor Vessel Material Irradiation Specimens The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H in accordance with the schedule in FSAR Table 16.3-3.

The results of these examinations shall be used to update Technical Specification Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3.

DRAFT

~

Requirement 5 - Containment Isolation Valves Containment isolation valves required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.6.3 shall be demonstrated operable with isclation times as shown in FSAR Table 16.3-4.

Requirement 6 - Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection The containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices required by Technical Specification 3.8.4.1 shall be as shown in FSAR Table 16.3-5.

t DRAFT

O O

o- ~

sc,. 3-(

TABLE-3.3 2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES Ei FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIME U

1.

Manual Reactor Trip N.A.

i T0.53)second*

i

~

2.

Power Range, Neutron Flux (W-on 4 i, N oo 4 z, M-co e 3, At-oo -r 4 )

3.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A.

High Positive Rate

( Ar-co 4 t, M-ootz., M-oo +3, M-oo s v )

4.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, j

j High Negative Rate 5J0.5psecond*

[N-oo 41, W-0 0 4 Z, N-oO4.4 N-co 4 4 )

5.

Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux N.A.

(N-oo3S, N-co 3c )

l 6.

Source Range, Neutron Flux M 4 0 6,se.c.ond*

( M-co3t, M-oo3 2 )

[

7.

Overtemperature AT

$4fsecands*

re -o + 21, 7r-o + <t, in-o n-i )

}

[ rc-o s si, AT

~f4 seconds" d

8.

Overpower

( TE-04tl 7f-o+21,1T- 09 31, rf - 04 41 )

9.

Pressurize,r Pressure--Low

$f2fseconds (PI-o454 PI-c4 SL PX-o + Sy, Pf- 0 4 S f )

s j

10. Pressurizer, Pressure,-High

$J27 seconds Pressurizer Water Level--High, er -o ess )

(f.r-o + ss, rz-ce n., pr-oss1 N.A.

11.

i LZ 0 4C9, L I^- 0 4 G o, L T-o 4 G I )

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

(This provision is not applicable to cps docketed after January 1,1978. See Regulatory Guide 1.118, November 1977.)

O O

O' Loop 1 Locp 2 Loopi Lo op.s i.z-oit+

fr-orzo rz-onsa cr-o p yv

/ -o4/6 FT-o 4 z s fr-o+ss' sT-o4oc r:- o416 (7-o

z &

sz-o + n cr-o w4 Il** 3-1

~~

TABLE -3-2-(Conti nued) b REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES e

DRAFT FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIME 9

12.

Reactor Coolant Flow--Low E'

/

a.

Single Loop (Above P-8) second

$ T[1 b.

Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8) 1 second J

13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Lowd 5 f2 seconds

14. Steam Generator Water Level-Low Coincident with Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch N-A.

5f.5[ seconds g#15 Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps l

/5 16. Underfrequency - Reactor Ccolant Pumps 5f0.6fsecond 0

a,17.

Turbine Trip 4

L Low Fluid Oil Pressure (FI-6/6/, FJ-6/62, PI-6/45)

N.A.

a.

b.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure N.A.

/718. Safety' Injection Input from ESF N.A.

/ f l9. Reactor Trip Systen Interlocks N.A.

// 20.

Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.

e-p 20 M.

Automatic Tripland Interloc Logic N.A.

icef> /

!Cef' 2 lcof> $

lcof) 4 if o c/9 tr- 0 62 9 LT-oS39 LI-eS99 47-05/7 ZZ-oGz t Lf-OS58 Lf-C641 t r-c Gi 7 tr-o cz 1 L T-osS 7 L1-oS47

~1er also Sp ~c o Ac'a -No r, 4

3. 3. (,.

Ly -o c</

L]* c GS2.27-066.3 Lf-oSS4

-. k

.s

... - ~

+

g e

6 4

i J

1 1

TAbk

& 3-Z REspour6 77453 EA)Cr/AlffREa 34fE7f fE472/2f3

~

ce1x/GE A>aricE 408)

See 54L 1

E4 4

4 a

VEON FSAR=Q-TABLE it' JG.3-3 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE pproximate Withdrawal Capsule Capsule Vessel Leadca>

Time luence Number Location Factor EFPY

( /cm2)

U 58.5*

4.00 First 4.5 refueling Y

241 3.69 5

1.67 x 101s

V 61 3.69 9

3.

x 10 scc >

l X

238.5 4.00 Standby

.44 x 10 I

W 121.5*

4.00 Standby Z

301.5 4.00 Standby

/

Factor by which the capsule fluence leads the vessel maximum a.

inner wall fluence.

th Appre.ximate fluence Ot-enc fourth wcil thickness at-cod vf-life.

c Arr"avia't: fluencc ct ecccal inncr well et end ef-life.

? cnd. 5 4/04 "Q251.1-4

? cnd. 13 1/85

L

,,,Le 4

mw>+-

m---4 W

4 a

6, 4J A

4

---2

~

+-

.a.

A-.u 2

3+e b6 MA-O m

I O

~

r J

4 l

e J

l

/

k a mms suur Isom m conre 3 70 AJO77c2 S42 CJMW62 fee 1

1 t

i I

4 l

i t

i 1

I I

A i

I

7;6k is,s-s cosraucrok COMTA/AIMENTPiniiT///TroAl f E E D atz g tzg 4 g stzs AAJD OviRCUR12EA1T DiVfCE,5 SETWEEkl To isola TIDA 7RA9]SFORMERSA/0Al GWTf2 4Ald fBoV CU11r 14 6Qu#MLAlf (562 sng CWSI6E AldTKEYOY) m

,y--

.p-.m

.-.a

,---r-4,

--y

~

- r s;=,a,~,g- = =

sAR CHANGE NOTICE 1.

PS AR CH ANGE NOT6CE

2. DesCIPLlr4E N, << /Fo P
3. NO. 40R FS AR CH ANGE NOTICE OTHER 4.
Y!/ 7!&6 IM D b /# P 5.DATE ORIGIN ATOR 6.
REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR Acce,J,,
Ib A 7., DEScRIPT 6k Or CH ANGE
}
dpgl ta }/e f
( ? A-- F fn 3 n < ere d sday feaf,,eg i
r <sp us e./,
ATT ACHM ENTS [g[/ g gh
%. 3 -2.
8.
REFERENCED SPECiflCATIONS OR DR AWINGS C-h we nt sp rey s ych -
Hy dro ul,2 7ansie,d A,,al,s.s c4 4h
x+ LI2.0 2 s a I
) y 5 0 - A A-K O sL A 10
r U '* /**
Ayggd:s is A -f "! A A., c h-p te r is 9.
JUSTI FIC ATION BELOW ATTACHED
& P c, requesf- +o movr
+
e h a icel sp< ei{te a f. a a,g +a b l,,
+O fs A fl.
L S v - N S-17 3 5 defed 9/1o/ 86
10. DISTRIBUTION (INITI A L-D ATE)
19. CLOSEOUT ACTION YES NO l
6...... 6sfEZ6h A SER NPACT v'
i,tL.,MA'l'f;A w' l
a ss yM bC Ars no.:
B. TS/4AR IMPACT
/
~
t s Lsev' f l
.cfAn yn/m_,......A.
C. TS CERT PKG AFFECTED
...A.
j1.
If.
l13.
7 14
"^"
"^" ' "
^"
s!" '".' ", ' i iAri" : v"'
i o".".. c"",11 L....
i,TJ".*c'ai,'L....
/.
Y / G N /A NrY,.o...,sabA tJo + A env.<*d Noi R en s, ul y.
/ sf.
f
1y t
i 18.
.PPROVED 5 DATE D CURRENCE DATE CON RREN E DATg DA,E L A O-0 7 7'S 3 /8 3
I G. 0 ~ 3.
t 1( A 1-r w r\\
l TABLE tee 4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES PESPONSE TIMES INITIATION SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 1.
Manual Initiation
's a.
Safety Injection (ECCS)
N.A.
Feedwater Isolation N.A.
Component Cooling Water N.A.
Containment Cooling Fans N.A.
Nuclear Service Cooling Water N.A.
Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.
b.
Containment Spra/
N.A.
c.
Phase "A" Isolation N.A.
d.
Auxiliary Feedwater N.A.
e.
Steam Line Isolation N.A.
f.
Control Room Yu.t.ilation Emergency Mode Actuation N.A.
g.
Reactor Trip H.A.
h.
Start Diesel Generators N.A.
2.
Containment Pressure--High-1 a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 29II)/12(5) b.
Reactor Trip (from SI) 12 Feedwater, Isolation
< 7(3) c.
d.
[
nt Isolation 2(6)
)
e.
Containment Ventilation Isolation i ts 1. 5 f.
Auxiliary Feedwater 1 60 g.
Nuclear Service and Component i 100(1)/ K(2)
Cooling Water
6 h.
Containment Cooling Fans 1NQk1)/28(2) 1.
Control Room Ventilation Emergency N. A.D N3 Mode Actuation J.
Start Diesel Generators 1 % /3,5 a sn:
=:: :/: :-2: 2 i
l
s 63.1 TABLE 3 1-4 (Continued) e ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES
=.
INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 3.
Pressurizer Pressure--Low a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) i 29(1)/12(5) b.
Reector Trip (from SI)
<2 C'
Feedwater Isolation
< 7(3) d.
Phase "A" Isolation 2( )
e.
Containment Ventilation Isolation i tF!!r i. 5 f.
Auxiliary Feedwater
< 60 C.
Nuclear Service and Component Cooling Water i 100(1378L(2)g7 S II
<M )/1Nf 2) h.
Containment Cooling Fans 1.
Control Room Ventilation Emergency Mode 49 10 5 Actuation N.A.
j.
Start Diesel Generators i TMQ / 3.5 4.
Steam Lire Pressure--Low a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) i 12(5)/24(4) b.
Reactor Trip (from SI)
<2 c.
Feedwater Isolation
< 7(3) d.
Phase "A" Isolation i 2(6)
,5 h 15(6) e.
Containment Ventilation Isolation f.
Auxiliary Feedwater
_ 60 g.
Nuclear Service and Component g
Cooling Water
<100(1) A )
2 h.
Containment Cooling Fans
<p(1)/Nd2) f.
Control Room Ventilation Emergency Mode Actuation N.A.
D) j.
Start Diesel Generators ft03 / f 6 1f7f3) k.
Steam Line Isolation i
5.
Containment Pressure--High-3 Containment Spray 1-46-(2)/400-(1) 6.
Containment Pressure--High-2
_ 7(3)
Steam Line Isolation 7.
Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High Steam Line Isolation 7(3) i
,.?^"LE - tm!T-1 t/c 3-3* -
Alls o 4 agg
--.,--n.
n.~
L.3-1 TABLE J E-(Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME !N SECONDS 8.
Steam Generator Water Level--High-High a.
Turbine Trip i 2.5 I3) b.
Feedwater Isolation 17 9.
Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low a.
Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
< 60 b.
Turbine-Oriven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump i 60 10.
Loss of or Degraded 4.16 kV ESF Bus Voltage Auxiliary Feedwater 1 60 11.
Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps Motor Driven Pumps N.A.
Auxiliary Feedwater N.A 12.
RwST Level--l.ow-Lowf.
Ig ncident with Safety In M 2;;
N.A.
h.9 Semi-Automatic Switchover to Containment Emergency Sump
- M " ' O h f, O h
.1f 13.
Loss of Power a.
4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage-12.0*
Loss of Voltage; Start Signal to Diesel Generator b.
4.16 kV ESF Bus 1 21.2'*
Undervoltage - Grid Degraded Voltage; Start Signal to Diesel Generator 14 Control Room Intake Radiogas Control Room Ventilation
-f g p Emergency Mode Actuation 1 1^W i :- -t e
15.
Containment Radioactivity a.
Area Radiation Low Range-1-M -9 E (/.,)
Containment Ventilation Isolation b.
Containment Ventilation Radiation-((,)
Containment Ventilation Isolation 1 -M-9 5
c.
Area Radiation High Range-Containment Isolation Phase A g
Q 1 M 4 Jgg.5 lb. fuel Hudtig Bridig Exluvrf bud AadMint IEIIi$dmg/}chenbfBsk$$%AcatA&
mum l
1%fW4NM J
l(v3-2.
7 TABLE 4.3-5-(Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS (1) Signal sensing diesel generator startingt, and sequencerloading delays included.
I (2) Diesel generator starting-rd :::; ;nce 1:: ding. delay not inciuded.
Offsite power available.
(3) Electrohydraulic valves.
(4) Signal sensing, Diesel generator startingt, and sequence loading delay included.
RHR pumps not included.
(5) Diesel generator starting 4Ws-; :t- >=?rg -delay 4 not included.
RMR pumps ny included.
(6) Does not include valve closure time.
"The response time shall include the time delay associated with the loss of voltage relays as determined in Table 3.3-4 plus an additional 1.2 seconds associated with interposing relay and circuit operation.
""The response time shall include the time delay associated with the undervoltage relay as determined in Table 3.3-4 plus an additional 1.2 seconds associated with interposing relay and circuit generation.
S gr>nl <en %,g % <i 3 ~, s e, go,s.
,j
' ' 6 n E r a },,- ),,.
d,f
,,) c ug eh
, Mhll;p.
t i
~
J onse time shall include the time delay associated with the loss of voltage relays as datermined in Table 3.3-4 plus an additional 1.2 seconds g
associated with interposing relay and circuit operation.
i
"The response time shall include the time delay assor.iated with the under-
\\
voltage relay as detemined in Table 3.3-4 plus an additional 1.2 seconds
\\
associated with interposing relay and circuit operation.
ww i u - UNIT-1 %
4 /4 3-36 ~
AUG 0 4 806
a s s;t a,;40,*s a SAR CHANGE NOTICE y
i.
PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. otsCIPl.INE 1/ f !#a r*
3. NO I7 g FS An CH ANGE NOTICE OTHEn 4.
9/27/94
< Ma h le r s.oATE oniGiN Avon T~ ntrEnENCEo SECTIONS OF 5An j)
6. '3. 4 t
Tabl+
n?
7.
oE5calPTION OF CH ANGE A + v is <.
6.2.4 +o
< < fle e + tvrDs a r,/ inove
+<e.h n :ca I.sfwY;c-too.
-to bl<
3. L - I
+o FShK.
4 -), (,.14 - 3, G 2 A -4, 6. 2 4-4 q, 4 1 q p, 4 2 4 - 9 ' % 4 'I G 2:
.l - I 3-
)
ATTACHMENTS h.2.4 * $p h*2*
Wf
2*
'J J
J'
~
3Y Table G.2.4-l (10 sk<els) r ble ;;. A-s (ss koels) e s
nErEnENcEn sPECiFsCA{lg ggnjwgNGs MDS fil 4vH W88NAd MC s.
PC.Ds 2,3 4 a., h
,ss.3 s,,,3 59
,,,g,,,5
, gy g g, gg.3 A, s?
47f A408110 Acv 9 X + 0 0 12, Re v 17 g (9, g3 gi4-4 A4 < l5 18 2. Le v IQ 82.2 Af v 'T le 3 At W l '
t r7 Ae v 85 g,e ;4 152. Adv #
g4, l 84 Att10 g 3 o Rese 19 g,, g g ety-l A4V lb I+
IT 6-2. MV i5 b 12.0 R f v 11 1
138 A,< s 5 y
e g <r. i t, v ;5 igo.2 Acv i ?
r 9.
JusTIFIC ATIO N 3
ATTACHED
(, P C ' *9 d es 4 + ' o.v a m y ;En.Ow,,s,p,,;;,.,a.,,9 7,, 40 pgy,
Lf v - N s-I 13 5 Ja /og 9/jo {gg 1 o. oisTaleUT!ON (IMITI AL-D ATE)
19. CLOSSOUT ACTION EE (o v..v.r.
A B IMPW v'
a.C.
<~ a -(V/A'E$4b5(~
=<-
B. BASIMPET
/
~
ELECT '
^M No. 2 A,e S
IC aP 7oM Y n.
i..
i i, ij.
ingsu.c It.
d# p.,
jg n=
co=,::n
.I r.:::.a,:n.o.,
JMLuu 6 Lsu u. + a...:,.s
u. + a ~ ~;, s t
G n].
se.
I 1sg
(
/ sf.
a,Pggso av gon g asaca V oava oguggg oars oars cara 0
lYlh 6.ao.o7(e ase t
r
~
VEGP-FSAR-6 requirements for a closed system as defined in item F below, except instrument sensing lines, is provided with containment isolation valves in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 55 and 56.
?
Each line which penetrates the containment and is I
neither part of the RCPB nor connected directly to the atmosphere of the containment and which satisfies the requirements of a closed system is provided a containment isolation valve in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 5.7.
A closed system is not a part of the RCPB nor connected directly to the atmosphere of the containment and meets the following add 3tional requirements:
1.
The system is protected against missiles and the effects of high energy line break.
2.
The system is designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements.
3.
The system is designed to American Society of Mechanical EnginearsSection III, Class 2 requirements.
4.
The system is designed to withstand temperaturer at least equal to the containment design temperature.
5.
The system is designed to withstand the externa pressure from the containment structural acceptance test.
6.
The system is designed to withstand the design l
basis accident transient and environ.nent.
G.
Instrument lines penetrating the containment are provided with isolation valves in accordance with [;
110 CFR 50. Ana-adix A, General Design Criteria 55 land 56.f'the containment pressure transmitters and reactor vessel level instrumentation system (RVLIS) are designed in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.141.
Six containment pressure sensors are provided as sealed systems with bollow seals inside the containment, 14 liquid filled capillaries between the seals, and the sensing element outside containment.
RVLIS consists of six level sensors and has bellow seals inside the containment, liquid filled capillaries between the seals, and a secondary isolator seal outside the 6.2.4-2 Amend. 14 2/85 l
i VEGP-FSAR-6 6.2.'4.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis
^
i Th'e containment isolation system as a whole has no power generation design basis.
Power generation design bases l
associated with individual components of the containment isolation system are discussed in the section describing the system of which they are an integral part.
t 6.2.4.2
System Description
6.2.4.2.1 General Description l
Each piping system which penetrates the containment is provided with containment isolation features which se~ve to minimize the r
release of fission products following a design basis accident.
Provisions are made to allow for passage of emergency fluid through the boundary following a postulated accident.
Figure 6.2.4-1 provides the arrangement for each piping penetration.
NRC Standard Review Plan 6.3.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.141 provide acceptable alternative arrangements to the explicit arrangements given in General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57.
Each penetration is designed so that in the event that a single failure is postulated, the containment integrity is maintained.
Table 6.2.4-1 lists each penetration and provides
" d
=ni' a summary of the containment.i- ' ti-fey 80 valve ( N *'* W.
ForthosesystemswhichH(...automaticisolationvalvesorfor which remote-manual isolation is provided, paragraph 6.2.4.5 describes the power supply and associated actuation system.
Power-operated (air, motor, electrohydraulic, or, solenoid) containment isolation valves have position indi' cation in the control room.
Two modes of valve actuation are considered in table 6.2.4-1.
The actuation signal which occurs directly as a result of the event initiating containment isolation is designated as the i
primary actuation signal.
The post-accident valve position is a consequence of the primary actuation signal.
If a change in valve position is required at any time following primary actuation, a secondary actuation signal is generated which places the valve in an alternative position.
The closure times for automatic containment isolation valves are provided in table 6.2.4-1.
The containment purge system is designed,in accordance with Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 as described in table 9.4.6-4.
As described in subsection 9.4.6; the 14-in. minipurge lines may be open during normal plant operation and are provided with isolation valves capable of 5-s closure against 6.2.4-3
=
r VEGP-ESAR-6 the peak calculated containment pressure following a LOCA.
The 24-in. purge lines are open only during a cold shutdewn condition and are provided with an isolation valve capable of 10-s closure.
An analysis of the radiological consequences and the effect on the containment backpressure due to the release of l20 containment atmosphere are discussed in chapter 15 and paragraph 6.2.1.5, respectively.
In the event of a LOCA, the secondary shield wall and other protective features prevent any missiles or high energy line break effects from damaging or degrading the performance capability oi the containment isolation system.
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 discuss in detail the missiles and pipe break effects, and section 3.8 discusses the internal structures, including the secondary shield wall.
The actuators for power-operated containment isolation valves inside the containment are located above the maximum anticipated containment water level.
In.
addition, lines associated with those penetrations which are considered closed systems inside the containment are protected from the effects of a LOCA.
Provisions are made to ensure that closure of the containment isolation valves is not inhibited by entrapped debris in the valve body.
For the majority of the systems, the fluid is domineralized water; thus, process fluid quality does not affect valve operation.
For containment purge lines, screens are provided in the lines inboard of the isolation valves.
For the containment sump lines, including the containment emergency sump, screens are provided to prevent large debris from entering the system.
Other defined bases for containment isolation are provided l20 in NRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.141.
Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.141 is provided to the extent specified in this section and in sections 6.2.5 and g 20 6.2.6.
For the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and a
containment spray system penetrations, the acceptability of the alternative arrangement relies upon provisions for the detection of possible leakage from these lines outside the containment.
Subsectionr 9.3.3 describes the leak detection provisior.s that have been made in the plant drainage system.
Other provisions, such as containment water level and system flow, temperature, and pressure instrumentation may be used by the operator.
The containment penetrations associated with the secondary side of the steam generators are not subject to General Design Criterion 57.
The valves associated with these penetrations the p
-not-: :::irr 2 :::tcir_- It irrirti...b.._'
_.2 are not credited Amend. 5 4/84 6.2.4-4 Amend. 20 12/85
~
4 VEGP-ESAR-6 with effecting containment isolation in the safety analyses.
The barriers against fission product release to the environment are the steam generator tubes and the piping associated with the steam generators.
gg, in addition to containment, isolation, table 6.2.4-1 also contains systems which are required for post-LOCA mitigation.
Since these systems, such as the ECCS, perform additional l
6.2.4-4a Amend. 5 4/84 I
1 l
r VEGP-FSAR-6
):
which are not regaired to mitigate or limit an accident and which< if required at all, would be required for long term recovery only, e.g.,
days or weeks following an accident.
CI Lines which are required to mitigate an accident or which, if unavailable, could increase the magnitude of the event,are designated as essential linst.
Table 6.2.4-1 identifies the associated line as essential or nonessential and shows the automatic isolation signal for each penetration, if applicable.
ll The containment isolation system utilizes diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation.
The two redundant train-oriented containment isolation phase A signals (CIA-A, CIA-B) are initiated on receipt of any of the following signals:
1.
Any signal initiating a safety injection:
e Manual safety injection actuation.
e High containment pressure (high-1).
e Low steam line pressure.
e Low pressurizer pressure.
2.
Containment high radiation.
3.
Manual containment isolation actuation.
\\-3rm-+=4nmen* 4--i-tic ph;;; ; ( :-) i; i ;;;; -a wu_
---fri est. tie.. I the h.=_trir.;;;;..; high" prre cura a-p w ntaie===t :pr;y., eta, j
B.
Upon failure of a main steam line, the steam 3
generators are isolated to prevent excessive cooldown 5
of the RCS or overpressurization of the containment.
The two redundant train-oriented steam line isolation signals (SLI-A, SLI-B) are initiated upon receipt of any of the following signals:
1.
High steam line pressure rate.
2.
Low steam line pressure.
3.
Containment high-2 pressure.
6.2.4-6
VEGP-FSAR-6 4.
Manual actuation.
For main steam line breaks resulting in a high steam j
line pressure. rate or containment high-2 pressure i
signal, only the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs), MSIV bypass valves, -rir fr-1"r*:: 1;;1etien 14 valves, 2nd
k-
--i-fre ::ter.. 1 i.vu L,yed; V:lv::
i are shut to' prevent excessive cooldown of the RCS.
When the main steam line break causes a low steam line pressure signal, a safety injection signal (followed by containment isolation) is generated as well as the steam line isolation signal.
and piping are desi'qned to prevent uncontrolled gly4 The main steam line isolation valvss, MSIV bypass
valves, blowdown from more than one steam generator.
The main steam line isolation valves and MSIV bypass valves will l14 shut fully within 5 s after SLI is initiated.
The blowdown rate is restricted by steam flow restrictors located within the steam generator outlet steam nozzles l14 in each blowdown path.
For main steam line breaks upstream of an isolation valve, uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator is prevented by the isolation valves in the unaffected steam lines and by the isolation valve in the affected line.
For main steam line breaks downstream of an isolation valve, blowdown from more than one steam gene: ator is prevented by the main steam isolation valves on each main steam line.
Failure of any one of the above components relied upon to prevent uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator will not permit a second steam generator blowdown to occur.
Piping restraints and pipe whip barriers between the main steam lines prevent a rupture in one line from causing a blowdown from more than one steam generator.
No single active component failure will result in the failure of more than one main steam isolation valve to operate.
Redundant main steam isolation signtis, described in anction-7. 3, are fed to redundant parallel activation cylinder vent valves and redundant series actuation cylinder air supply valves to ensure isolation valve closure in the event of a single isolation signal failure.
The effect on the RCS after a steam line break 1
resulting in single. steam generator blowdown and the offsite radiation exposure after a steam line break outside containment are discussed in detail in l
6.2.4-7 Amend. 14 2/85
VEGP-ESAR-6 i
C.
The containment purge system is automatically isolated following an abnormal release of radioactivity in the containment by either of two redundant train-oriented containment ventilation isolation signals (CVI-A, CVI-B) generated upon receipt of any of the following:
1.
Any signal resulting in a safety injection.
2.
Containment high area radiation.
3.
Cor.tainment high radioactive air particulate.-
4.
Containment high radioactive gas.
5.
Containment high iodine concentration.
6.
Manual actuation of either containment spray or containment isolation phase A.
The preaccess purge supply and exhaust valves in the 24-in. lines, which are only open in the cold shutdown condition, are designed to shut in less than 10 s.
The minipurge line isolation valves, which may be open during normal operation, shut in less than 5 s.
D.
The containment isolation system is designed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 54.
Leakage detection capabilities and the leakage detection test program are discussed in subsection 6.2.6.
Valve operability tests are also discussed in subsection 3.9.6.
Redundancy of valves
'and reliability of the isolation system are ensured by conformance with the other safety design bases stated in section 6.2.
Redundancy and reliability of the actuation system are covered in section 7.3.
r: --i----
s4-a in + 'i; c,2.; -
g,__
ey
- _1._ r..iti_.. 2; n : 1::: rf retr:ti...
y....
.4 1;; et;d Or ---"-!
rilrer tint i_ _ _ r rrrrrily -
. 1 ;: ;: e M eerr The use of motor-operated dem,
.c e valves which fail as is upon loss of actuating power in lines penetrating the containment is based upon the consideration of what valve position ensures the greatest plant safety.
Furthermore, each of these valves that fails as is is provided with redundant backup valves to ensure that no single failure will prevent the system as a whole from performing its isolation function, e.g.,
a check valve inside the containment and motor-operated valve outside the 6.2.4-8
~
t VEGP-FSAR-6 containment or two motor-operated valves in series, each powered from a separate ESF bus.
E.
Lines which penetrate the containment and which either are part of the RCPB, connect directly to the containment atmosphere, or do not meet the requirements for a closed system, except instrument sensing lines, are provided with one of the following valve arrangements conforming to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 55 and 56, as follows:
1.
One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment.
2.
One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment.
3.
One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment.
(A simple check valve is not used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.)
4.
One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment.
(A simple check valve is not used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.)
Isolation valves outside containment are located as close to the containment as practical, and upon loss of actuating power, air-operated automatic isolation talves fail closed.
F.
Each line which penetrates the containment and is neither part of the RCPB nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere and satisfies the requirements of a closed system has at least one containment isolation valve which is either automatic, locked closed, or capable of remote-manual operation.
The unive is outside the containment and located as close ir.e-the containment as practical.
A simple check valve is not used as the automatic isolation valve.
This design is in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, i
General Design Criterion 57.
G.
instrument lines penetrating the containment w e
__1 i::' 2:1 - *
- rrr"-:: "
and the containment pressure instrument lines are designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide W. f.lQf lNN) 6.2.4-9
T VEGP-FSAR-6 h.
1he containment isolation system is designed in accordance with Seismic Category 1 requirements as specified in section 3.2.
The componente (and supporting structures) of any system, equipment, or structure which is non-Seismic Category 1 and whose
{.
collapse could result in loss of a required function of the containment isolation system through either impact or flooding are analytically checked to determine that they will not collapse when subjected to seismic loading resulting from an SSE.
Air-operated isolation valves fail in the shut position upon loss of air if they are not required to operate after a design basis accident.
Containment isolation system valves required to be operated.sfter a design basis accident are powered by the Class lE electric power system.
6.2.4.4 Tests and Inspections Preoperational testing is described in chapter 14.
The containment isolation system is testabic through the operational sequence that is postulated to take place.following an accident, including operation of applicsble portions of the
(
protection system and the transfer between normal and standby power sources.
q The piping and valves associated with the containment penetration are designed and located to permit preservice and inservice inspection in accordance with ASME Section XI, as discussed in section 6.6.
Each line penetrating the containment is provided with testing features to allow containment leak rate tests in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as discussed in subsection 6.2.6.
1 6.2.4.5 Instrumentation Application s
The generation of CIA, m ;usett, or CVI signals which-automatically isolate the appropriate containment isolation valves is described in section 7.3.
h!b i
For those valves for which automatic closure is not desired,
~'
based on the system safety function, remote-manual cperation is available from the control room.
containment isolation valves which are equippes with power operators and which are automatically actuated'may also be controlled individually by positioning hand switches in the
(
6.2.4-10
~
...m.
N
{
y 5 5
~ '
e "z
l g 2 C
y
!}14 o
k5 E 5 3 3
i i
7 2
g 8
~5 S 8s ll'..J a..... :.;........ s. *..... a s... a s.. s..... :....... m s...... t...... s... s.. s... { *:. * *. s.. =
eO 2 I
I N l5;
.s..s m.........:
m.....s mm....m.mm...
iii i
....m m m..
t m =cm.-
113 a e!
2 !s v.
thininth, uitwtka.ciakh>zi ' tith:thn.shnittw ' n...,....,
a.
Ildll unuminuunaunum.uuumennun.nuuuanuun.nuun n..n....s
, Nm! :
Mmrittr MMartifiM a!,it-H!,,3!,,!!:
!l Ii
=
z 1
z 1H:;
J U1,
-:.... g
. 4.g
..g
..:.q$s3 ni =
i I
. I
. I
.I 11 11 1
l'i l.i'it
.i
.i I 1
.i 4
i.I
!!i.I I
(1 i
I i!
in
'a lq 4
c.
aL '
c 2
e lj n
!lt s
..P" s
s s
a s
s s
e e i y
g
=
g II's... :... =.. t n. \\.n... n.
.n gu.u. \\....
n
.!.*~~
e g
3 8
1
???
s
!!!5,.u.n...a
..... 333
na can en suust run en n.
u..
3 I
il 11 I
il il 11....s..=1.,ill., silo lo ill....sil.,u.u.
1 o a.. a a j
i j
... = n. : r.. nru nra n. ann.=nru n.
n.
n n a n n
'11 n
ij...............................
u n........
l...
o........
I I
I I
I I
II il i I I I i lim lii=iii 1111: lisii ni liiiii=liisi lli 11:.
11 1.1.l.1.
I il il i
II 11 Iilll=ill=lil 11111 11111 lil 111111 11111 illill 11 il il il il i
.I.....>..3......................,.........
, lilll ilital I.11.Ili al.l111= l.11.1 l}l 11 si si :) il 1
11111=!!!=111 !!!Il !!!!! 111 111!!!= !!!!! !!! !!!.
n il !! 11 !!
1.,I;1>..... >...... >> > > >
x. s. >> >>
...s.....> > > >
=.
II.
!!blls,nssnssu sus, sus, s,.1, ann,,s, a su u nnnn i
1 1
ill ill ill il *
1. I 1. i ilm!Luam u.u mu In inn!bi11.n al b 1 u
1 I
u it if it if a
.ip
.u.
i i,
14:
,I i
i, !
i, i i i, I.!!.
Ill.
...iis i
ul. q =! =! ::: = :,.
... I I I I I
!Ll l.I l
'l Il
'l
.l 1
d1 I
I 11 }[l I
l
'l
'i
'l
'l i!d i lj l
i i
i It I
IL 1
il li lll Il M
l {l }1 l1 I
j.
1 t
t i
i t
i
~ i 1ll1.ill; l.
l M
h...!
'3 s
't 5
,.1iii e
Id.
I i
i i
i!
ii i
i
-y.
?
J.,
O I!I,
EEE 3
s e
lE li il,,ss f
us.....
..a
.nus.uunsusu,
..u u u u s
....u
..uusu.us.us.
L
??ll
~
S
?
! si 3
r.;
8 ' asas ass ste se ass sassssessansassaan sesusssssa ssasses scanuss seu sus s i
n s;
.i.l il i
.I I
y
~
2 II n us u!Illls linuisunnunu j!nuuns uutu hunau sus kj ii u
us v
b. -
i ssu su ses !! ils isusususususus issususu !! sun fruusu !su tsu !
k l jI
..... I................. i...........
..s.... i....... b....... f.
i s.
I s..
i gls...
s..
................ ~........................................
a a I
s...
s..
.a
..s....
II Ill....
.I il i
.I I
I I
I 1 lill 111 lll 11 ill 11111111111111111111 11111111111 1111111 111111111 Illililli S~
.. lll..... i..
1.....
i II il I Ilill lil til 11 lh Innlilil...llillll julill....
. l. lullllll Ull Ull I f
lill Ulil i v
i
!........ <I.

2z 1111 1 1
11 1
I i
1 3'
I lini hlbl u in muhlililllillll) imllilill uhill !milill all all !
i!!!! 11! !!! !! !!! 11111!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1!!!!!!!!!! n!!!!! !!ll!!!!! 11!! 11!! I h
1 M} } v
}s!s 5 5
.5 5..
u..
n....,
u - 5 >
> 5> >w>
.o
...u.....
ll.
2 Ysus in la a as twununnuun tununn msnt tunun 2,n tsu a b,.
!] sl@!
tu asj :it 66. !umlmmuu.m.mu li..nnn l'i..irli u..n i I.. i e
u :n mu 6aumm uun u!n a sur au e a
![l: :
1
'a e
a a
a a
!.!ji i i. i i i.
i.
i.
i.
lils a
a a a
!!} ~.- :::
n:
5:55....! lll5..... 5..! S!*. '. !,
M n
II,14 1Il 11 11 ll Ilu llu llu lil
.i s
I 11 s,
g g
i j
l 1
i; i
l' l'I ril l I hr
! is hr 11 11 it li I
l l
h i
11 I ni i i
i 1
8 8
8 8 2
3 S
S 2
3 3
,,g 3 2
8 8 8 3
3 3
3 A
3 3
1 l
7.
r O
a.
O if O
e o ij!
p:R
-=
I 1
si i
I g
jl'i'.
h
n... ass
.n
.ssuussussut.asssansanssas.nsasuusuunsun I 6
222 s
!l!?,
unsuunsunusu ; Q os en unus an uunuusun.uuusunun 1
1 3
.l.it, hs
.i In !!!su tu g
unnuusuunannunun unuunuuusuas ;
}l !
k su
na us iussiussanis=!ssusssisun issunnussusuun $ %,
4 la.
3 3
.......................... ~................................ a-
> l.
.......................~.
i I
,a A.
I Ill i
I I
I i l1 1
I
!!! lilH1 ln IH1HHHHH1*llHHHHHH IHHHulHHHIUH i l
i 1
1 I
3
' !i l
i H1 inill HI Hi!Illlillllli'11111111111111111111111111111111111 s 4
11
.................................................. 2 s
I I
I i
1
-}
i !!
2ilsiill)2:1 n1111111111111'!!11111111111111111111111111111 8
. Ii i
111 !!!!!! !!! il!!!!!!!!!!!!!'i!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
2
}i.g=h.
.....w...s..
.n...
s uw.5. >
av
[ll!!It 3gggg in nun in suunununannunini, inuu.. uni,,ui,
!n !!!i!! !;; !il!!!!i in lI
!!siil!!!!!!!!snIsy3M$
ifil
' 11, I:
I 1
I I
I
!. I I:
t i
y P
s
[J
.f
fy a
i a
e n
p
!*!!..:.:..=........::."
...J'...:.:5E:.......
k 4 4 4 %
!!i, t
-~
l!!!!
!!!! kJLll lil lit lil i
r l [!, l [!, l('I 11
.I
!!,s - h'[
2[
l[sj
!, j i
I J
}
I l
, i a
i it i
1 i s ill lli lill Sa.
t t
2 i
s 1
2 3
3 6 2 a!
i!
2 e
3 a
I 3
a f
.a
.a a
4 a
.nj e
lj, s s s s 1 1 r
a m
E E
ll;..u.u.u une......n
.n.n
.u.......u
.u..... R...
.n i
u 8
d 5
,i
,!l!j......uuu.u.
33I
.m
,,,, a in.u u. u..u.o nu, uu.. uo n tu..
j 4
i i
i i
i i
i i i 3
!y! unnouun.=n n.
u. lu l..lula 1.au lua lua l. l. n
n..
i 15 inuununnea n. su in su in in nuan inn 1.uu u 1.
,u u
, i l...
................ s..
s.... t...........
Il..............................................
l............................................
I ll li i I
I I
il i
1 l lillliitilllill:ll lli Ill 111 III Ill Ill Illlit lilli Illill 11 11 Il lli 11 1
I I
I I
I i
i i I 1111111111Ill1I: 11111 Ill lil lil III lil 111111 lilli lilill 1111 !! Ill I.
.f................,... 4. v......
1 I
11 1 I
I I
I I
I i
i i j !llllllilllill): si !!! til !il !il !il 111 !ilill ! ills !illil !i !i :
ill I.
i' i !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'11 til 111 !!! 111 !!! 111 Ill!!! 11111 ill!!! il 11 n 111 !!
I bli w..
t...
5>
s...
11.
lhlll nun,u,,,,n.sasu su su su un su suan s,u, su,n,,,, s,
1,,,,
!! !!i!!!!IuI,5!!! !!. l la lo !n la In!! Iml !mli il Il !!
!n 1 ifs :
s s
. s a
s s
I I ;
I I I I
I I I I I
IX :
Olf) s s
s s
s s
s s s.
w
!!]
d d d d. :".
9.
I i hi il !! !I !! !I !! !! li li li il !! if li l' I
! 1 In I. I in 1
I t i/
II is 14 E E 14 il I
I I} i
.I.
y i
g g-g g*
i i
i ir ir lll I li l!
I I
I I1 sr ir
u 1.'s il !!!
. i.:
l a
s s a
a s
a s
3 a
s a s s s
s s s 2
s 3
a s
.s s
I
0 E
6.
O r
y g
ll1 1 1 s
s I
s 1
J E
E y
jl,p.4
~
as....
is iss ass
.s e
.n s
.ss 3
',,i 5
s.i I
i m
as se ce as saa saa ass ass sss ses ess J
s s
3 1
I Ill I lil I Isalas 111 las 111 !ss g
!! ss aa is ins il as as,ss.ss
,,,,is
.... n s
.ss i l....
. s.
1 I
t u.
i j
.s.
I.. a. a
,, w..........
......s.
li Il I
Iln1111 n in in. In in 11: lil. In i
lit i Ill I i la na la lil lil 111 1.1. 111 lil.ill sii I
aa le ill ill. [
lil
!,il. ill l is i
n i !! !! !!. !! !!! 111 111 111
!!! 111 I!*l5 v v
v.. v.
v..
v
.v......
v
- v 6
6..
.6.
i$......
!!allt lissan ss is si ss its ha Ins Iss sis Iss sin i
au i
18 8
!!i!
I dis u u I is su in I in ha ! isl ist 1 ist
!A
' ll s
s s 1.0 :
Bl a a e, a a
, i i
,,,,a w
ui t = = l :. = = l ::: ::: I ::: ::: l :::
I
'i
'Il
'Ii 11 ll ll !! !'
l !!!!
l ;jl l I
. I l a,{ l. I l
. a, i
l lI l-l lI s
!d ll Il !.I l,
1, il il 1 il.I i i!:
!s
!s
!s
!s s a a
a a
a lIl t ! ! 1 s i a
i s i !
I a y,
E l
g O
II
.!s b
l!* I J
I i
i I s
a a
I i
8 hN dE o l%
{
ll'Is.ss.ns.ns..s:::
!ssa :ss....:
....a
..a
..a as as g4
=ce N
it.,,ss 111 a:
m,as masas m
,a sans,ss
....a s...s us m as as 3
1 2
ii l' !ss !ss !sa !! sass !! !! !ssa fas !!!is !!!!s
!!: !!s as as i}i :ss ess ss t sass er tv essa ass !! :s fit s t:s ta as as i l
, i a....
.s.
1 l........................,.
a.
! )...........................r..
r
g. n...
.I i
l ll 11 11 1 I
lill lill Il 11 i lin in in ihni 1111 lui lu lilh lilli. ih lli n n
lill ill ill ulll! !! 11 nllill1111] Hill Ul11]ls al El i
i:.
lIll jll ;all nlll) u u iill ill un. Ilunl 1.1.1 la al 11
>~
i
.i a
! I111 !!! !!! ull!! n u ill! 111 !!!!! !!!!1 i,d..>.
a>. > >
.. r u.
.u.-a
. s. u-.
11.
I sis ds ris Isass Id ids las sisu siell Is a ss as I
i i
I I
III III II II
!1 til 6H sH 444ml'nu H !!
8 44 66 t!H en 646H 64:si ! is! e6.f Is I I
I 31
!fii..a s
s a
s s a
i
I :
J,1: : : =
=
lils a
a a
a a a
a a
a I a a
a i
i a
ni - = =...p ::..::
sm:..s: I ::3... :. I I I at
[
.1 [
l I!
111 11 11 il I
-i I
l
.i f
II i
1 i
l l l'l i I
3 li t
I, Ir I.
I I
3 I
i I le l il l
il I
If if II 1
it il 1 1
i i al h;r i1 11 lli
}ll 11 11 il li !l.
111 11 1 11 8
1
i. s iii as s
s a s s
s a
n s
s I
1
=
s e a
a a
I i I
I I
i a
g 8
!!,'t,
i m
3
=
?
!l'..st.umnumunum.nuunmunun.umuununun.umuumum,
~
8 E
~
]
I!!i numunuunmu
.1' e
un uuuuumu unnumuumu u,u,unnuum
>l ummmmmm.,
l c
ummmmmm umm. mumm u m u m. m.. m lb sunnunuunum smuumumuu sunnununum sunuuumum jl.......
.. 9 9
s.. _........s.. _......
l 3
1
s............s.
i' I._ -.
3,....._..3
=
g _...................
I I
lIll111111111111!!111!!11 llilllifilillilillil l1111111111 1 1111111111111111111111 !!!11111111111111!!! 11:111111111111 i
1 I
I I
j 11:1111111lll:11111111 111:1111111111111111 !!i11111111111111111 !!i11
,i 1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i In l:,s..,..................................................
11.
4
'$Ylbsaummm,mm smsuummmu summmmum su,wmum,,u
!! !k!!!!!!!!
11!!!!
11431193 It!!!!!!!l
!!I 1 !!!!!!! insi 113 a
1
, s$.
4 I.
'l IN!
Ill, i
!!i. '..=.= !........
..=..=...... :.= =.:
.=..=......
1Ill lil lil lil I
.I
.I
.I I,li 11 i
il ll 11 I
ll ih 2
c
=-
6 ll3 3~
y g
41 1
1 1
I a
m e
e lh..i.mm..mm.m..m.m.mm.m.
.. m m. m.... m:..my m:m..p 6
E 21 W
.i,
.!lJj mmm.m...mm.mm 3*I
.. m m. m mmmm n.
m..w.o mmmy s
y I
i i
15 m.mmum m.mm.
un mmluks mmluu u m m.m u..m m m. smm.mun in.mmm. summm
1. m. m m na.mmah.mmap il.......................
....... y I ...... y........,. l ..s.... q ..s......g. gl I I i 11 1 I 1111111111111111 11111111111111 111111111111 111111111111 Il i i i I l111111111111111 11111111111111 111111111111 111111111 iiiiiilli1 I !...........................................................49.____1 I I i i l i ]!!!111111111111 !!11111111111111111111 inihillll i li!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ill!!!!11!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!n linilll!jl iln!1!!!}i lill!) n M ""tt!!il.!!20!!). 11. lIllllnummmu umum.m smmmu smmmu..n.unnub.unun\\. Ri i IE3 1,,25 i SE l 3 il!!s!!!'W r 6hhin$mt mInnue 6mkuun l6m mi!!!!h.. i!!!!!h tm L k r ~ !.[1: 1 S T" 1.95 5 5 5 I ds a i a !!i
.4 I
}lil lil lil lil 1 .l l i ll! I lil!! 11 11 l l i 1111 11 11 1 1l 1 it. l!l. i i l
e = 2 "o C GR 2 .sg 1 tl !!i n i Il,s..i su:sub so n$ s
a y
b 222 III !!N usuul: unuijn 3 v. I I !!...u.lj...... 1.... 6 Ilu.....i....... +, ,k..s....,. ..s... 4.. 'I..s....+. j ..t. ..s....{. ..s ..g. i i g l 11111111111111111l11 1 I 111111ll1111111ll11 1 I i!........,......).. l111i115)) lililiall I 1 I i1111!!!!! Il!!!!!)1 1 I I li!! Oll. 921)... s ,y i 11. Y Ity U l13:1asIJJillis n1111114: s s a I f l I t lI *1 a tII i a s s ![1 I8 'I E f ( 'd ' ' = i I l}li;j!j qJ IH! l h,.,, !,i .!, J .. a 'Il ll, l'. I ! iI l'l + i N -Ja i I a a s ifl!Ii [ I: I., I p 0 k ,i !d A. l lil l l :: $
4. i e s ff l
} i I,,8 l 'I l' k ' S f lll 11! 5 I 1.1 11 111 5 fl l l d$ l Igl.,,l'l11-l lit s '. .I gb I li li il !E aJ 1ii iliiil
1.Edl!! I,Ili iiI.114.
1 i i Ji i i( l p.11, e. i? 1 ih i a a a f,i.d ui.i lllli sll all! 8 i li -ai 4e 1ji ....... i.t 11 i
V A t.V E pgNg ARRANGE. INSIDE CONTAINMENT OUT58DE CONT AIN64ENT T R A TION WENT No NO U V V 424 212 a97 c.&j ___- - : p;-
';.1..,
c di FC FC 212 424 l ?. ....u + c o + n.- _ _ u.. 'F C' TC '*e. TC ~ 425 _212 ~ ~ R. 5.t R. J-> 62 2 ,e - r ,,3 y FC FC 212 313 s .J. -U * - i.*. TC TC I.. - TV V (1 t Ap r- -T (12A) '*?, g gia 12A .Tm .e----- 7 --- - M. a 1 .a--.. 69A ],. 3 698
e..,o.
pg 42 212_ 424 e ^ 212 424 826 (42) = TC Tc 428 i'212 ,* * *g, TC NN y '.,9.[Y -g - t b H M. 0 7, -A-- i, ; 'i;. 4 = 3 l
*h 111 212 111 212
.e.
212 111 I
-e ,,t. o ..e. J.. ry ens ' 212 j r: 212Is2s l. .......,.--- M .l * ; ai s
f FC 5*
a k TC Amend. 5 4/84 .vaive listed on taue 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 i vonTLE VALVE ARRANGEMENT ELECTRIC OENERATING PLANT GeorgiaPower u.eir i A o u Nir 2 FIGURE 6. 2.4 -1 (SHEET 1 OF 12) !? *.
e VALVE PENE ARRANGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT ouTSIDE CONTAINMENT TR ATION MENT No NO 013 212 TC 3 212 16_267 1 P . b _4, J L' _ _...,. - Q 80 7 ] - .L 6 FC ,8 ~ 167Ali6751 Yb IVf.) Cr tr7'T WO (*76 212_ l424 o g closuf.
o. *e.
ner. u e . _.J __6 ett y . s FC FC 678 (67Al f*. * - 1678) . ~. 1 TC D TC .[ yy g W. I Y v ,i f-s': ___ _ _:._ u n,c g. t ao 212 g 313 212 TC
f.
Tv y .;.l -v: 4 $.i 94 9 .se._...I. f._f.*.; g__d 79 FC FC 427 212 212 417 ' 'c,. ' o; Iq Tvy E3. EB- . 1_ _ __ _.c,c g_._.i... \\ u FC FC

d-424 212

i. /..
212 424
b*
I 1 Amend. 5 4/84 avaive usted on table 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 voGTLs VALVE ARRANGEMENT ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT GeorgiaPower uNir i ANo uNir 2 FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 2 OF 12) '~ \\ .n. 9193 l ?
o s VALVE pgNg ARRANGE INSIDE CONTAINIdENT OUTSIDE CONTAspee8ENT TAATIOst 44ENT peo. 80 0 .i l ,1 f ~-- FC P 212 424 \\'
e e e e
~~ M , V' r.WWM sg. e 4 h 4 6 pl .:/ il e9 =f ( e,wof '. b ' ' T 'o = " "'3-)j " 900 1 D (1.2 ?.. t. i e.. ,e,
.lt
?. t .....i 13' m,,. g ,= ..c A 18 FC 19 12 20 s.*M.'. 21 q pe ,.,f... 4 L
.,r; s
D -Q. l t l IDOUSLE O RING SE ALI '?'... "T, " TEST $- 'i **'----- -. - -g E9 ' t' AINGS ,'., T7, i
l. *;.
eVafve listed on table 6.2.41 4 VOoTLE VALVE ARRANGEMENT ELEcTalcoENEnarlssoetawr GeorgiaPower u,7 i AN. u,,,7 : FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 3 OF 12) 9t$4
\\ VALVE PENE 1 A mm A s,GE INSIDE CONTAlpeMENT OUTSIDE COeITAINMENT TNA ION g r o \\ TV Tv 5 5 - - -:j
:, 1.
u FC b 14 yy 3 70A M ~=' 2g l poA k %ej(h m 313} FC212 .[,. g S26 _ 212 u Td N C,' N f*7;-C{lrc J W i i FEf 'S 1
t:
s2 $7 8 J W l'c e 8. N yg +.T*** '. 7. '. tc 4W pc ,e v 212. _ 414 p, S,. v y
1,
] 212_ _ 313 4o Is.. '.. 6 T* h N i 13 C. v.

*e=

97 e I gg let i, tes) i f D L1J 0 o TC 9 ' f.'
+.,!'
tesi .,,A '(' ' s - ~ m I \\ .y' ';.$s 3 43 17 o 45 3;< 14) ) c.- i 4s f 21 33 - ) g y ,,;e - g: ( ,, m g m = _424 @ f*h 2'dat
@ toove a Nc SE Au t,
4 5 TEST l., .l- ;......A -...g.g y er 4 "0" RINGS 2 ,e *:. 1 Amend. 5 4/84 + valve mt e on tese s.2.41 l 4 Amend. 13 1/85 VALVE ARRANGEMENT meC oEssERATING PLANT GeogiaNuer on,1 1 A N o veN,, FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 4 OF 12) Us*:
i s VALVE PENE ARRANGE gN9tDE CONTAINMENT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TRAfloN WENT NC i NO +--VWn2 5 .g; rv i i i h. . ~. h .? ~ ~ 30 19 +- h i E o..,: i ag
. l.
o l 9, = +. i> a v pg ,ao TC TV T I.* ; O w e e e ..p +--V* ,5, ?,5 ~ 8 111 _ 212 (31)
31), ;,*,'_
-2 .A___. OM 31 20 33 g p,. 5 p ,g f... 4., { Its J ( 424 212 9-mi ~ *
=
'p c'e O 4; .e -. -. - yc ... ) ; Tv "F C'
r 7,* *.'
'P 7 424_j;212 e i.. 2, ss O= .... --. M ~ m _I_mi2 ..c J1 1 , q, _,, _, + - - ---- M* ~f$ 5 s _, v =, wo ., {.'. 5, t Ic sze at ic 23: eis r F' T 1 r* 1 r ,"hi ' 'j '.E o F7, n - 5~ -~~ 'i f ~
y L 2 ~ ~ ~ ;' * -

22 c
500 1 r '.'4.. 1 r n ~ n ---* -- - f 4 ;.. ,cC u rc Pf* i.* '," TV
a-d REMOVAELE TE51 FLANGE a.-,-nl-c,i.
,. u a 22 1 F 1 l I J L _212 ?i,*. j l Pom TasT pumposas oNt.Y ,.:+l*l. W ,_= D Amend. 5 4/84
valve listed on tale 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 voorts VALVE ARRANGEMENT sLacrRic ceNERATINo PLANT Georg. Power ia uNir i ANo uNir 2 FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 5 OF 12) 9tG8
l VALVE PENE. I ARRANGE INSIDE CONTAINedENT OuTSIDE CONT AIN#8E NT TR A flON MENT NO. I 4 7' 4 i g M No* N O g h - -. -. --.J --. -.es. 29 --- ' - g - - - 24 g I I L~~~ 212 415 ..g. = l. 212 C..- 415 ' 'E M TV TC =ume .aJ e III_ _212 [.;! ; r,' r.., ?,i l 424_ 22 f. f,....l.---- ,-...- M * ' I'),', y 32 2s n h--l Q 5'14 h,'. )^ l0 ') 12 , FC ....a 1 ...a i jL I j e LO ,e LC,* y -.Q Q..L-m ,, ',{ M fM-4TC UNir 1 0VL1 I ' TV TC I.*. h. V V =l, - 12 M e e 7 26
4. - -
A. -. .A ,a?, TC ,., ;,q g g Asp TEST W CONN ,,?.'. 9C yy REMOVABLE
g=
TEST FLANGE 4 9 T. [.,...jl
.1,1
((- 7 7-M -.c y 27 a-e. ,,4* 'l 212 _414 5 W
l.....W-...... ' r
'.'.?.' 9**' PCR TEST PuttpOSES ONLY TC ~. ' '. ' - w 212 '.? ;.. LC 72A i n' i 2s -u---:
,[
FC e.~.. 73s .. T- .*c. ; _L O Arr.end. 5 4/84
valve i,sted on tante 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 vooTLE VALVE ARRANGEMtNT ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT GeorgiaPower uNTiANouif2 FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 6 OF 12) 9/08
o VALVE PENE A R R ANG E-INSIDE CONTAINMENT OUTSIDE CONT AINMENT TR ATION MENT No NO ..l TV TC = 427 _212 g,Y f F ~ = Y L c5 W 29 ...,J A .A 4 77 l r--------' 54. FC l l "o! . ?"; - LQ 9 & 2' e v y'o y,g j,,,' 2i2 .n f. Tvv! _ 212 _____ y -
e 111 212 (g7}
.._____ u ' te. NF g TC /... Tv 9 Y ...A._____.3 s' 9 g.___*.a. t 1, si 4, b m;,. e L_______ W ,. 4.- '_^ , j' TC ' t,NN; TV ap 9: i.2. si n -- _u .,r - y a.. u .s-u.:,r.. TC ,4*, ',e; M.. rv TC p, g r 33 + -,_ M 9.i J _. so i
v..,.
.7, s .u-TC ,o.*.,. i Amend. 5 4/84 . veve sisted on tese 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 l MUMMMM Crnic oswanArimo rLAwr Gmg. Nur ia unir i a.o u.12 FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 7 OF 12) .9. 9108
t I VALVE PENE ARRANGE. ItsSIDE COedTAlpeteENT OUTSIOf C00eTAlesesENT TRATION MENT ugg 7 NO NO. e C 1 i .p? tv d C' s ->*m
~1EA'~
d9f. t-l M Cl --(FuTu EE
C
] { Tcats\\ s y JW$-$ 7c .r (tt$ y N.en M ~ co Yv J i Y ,.;, a .t i sc (g gg FC 11e ( 11C 35 o l 212 427 12e e 12C C4446 * ', *, N
C w c,uiu4 Tc
,? * < Tv
O TV
.? [ t 4 U.* ' i 13A 13 as ~1-- ,j?! -- 1--e. (~ C* 212 313 31J 212
t f

E
~*/.
qm t
sd M*.< 4, l LC LC i - -- -- --.t- -- R, !..y,~. et, - l----- 27 1 424_ _ 212
g 212
_ 424 .,,. y .:? : 4.I..'. Tv
r. r, -
9 +-h,:. 1;a (
;,f;-
4 .LCf. -- a .ee.--- y Q ,x----- 22 1s B \\ .7*:.. _ 33 ?.,*. 22 _ess .3. s TC 4,.j. ,e Amend. 5 4/84
varve imee on tante 4.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 voGvtB VALVE ARRANGEMENT ELECTRIC GENERATI.eG PLANT Gmgiahr us. T, A unit 2 FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 8 OF 12) 9$ 8 N
I l ~ 1 VALVE PENE. ARRANGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT OUTSIDF CONT AINMENT TR A TION MENT No NO TC TC TV 1 .1
k. !
____ u __u __u____ ).' FC a e Ie 4-212 _424 o 39 ll ,~ 63 Ji d;..'.. 3 le 425 ' 212 s i a c,.ac g m..; .i '.T. Te '(... Tv ..i.L. P .2 o. e _______.L__q;N ; lp______1.___. 2s 4o 13 Y_.'. mm w m A,. .i i. a. m , i ' '- Q __ _ _7_ _ _ _.tA U.'. M -- r----- ao FC 1 I J c. T. 1 F* ..l..* *; I 7 g d k .,;g-212_ _ 429 j g sg s Te TC Tv TEST %.l.? '. CONNECTION
i * *.
'. '.(;. Ir ,8 i '.= ;:.
sp SEAL p..a

m. *:.
vaive listed on tsoie 6.2.41 Amend. 5 4/84 Amend. 13 1/85 VOoTLE Georgia Power a_k VALVE ARRANGEMENT eLeCTnic osmanATimo ptAwr n
unir i Ano unir FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 9 OF 12) .s. 9/08
m.'
VALVE """A I' ItalOC CONTAINMENT OUTS 80E CO80T AlesetENT TRATIO80 ggg esO C' NO TEST CONNECTION '""'"9 7" r 'c' 43 5 ..r. : I*'*a SE AL ./,' r-g D ':g.7[_[ '[ un-e j 4,,,,%, g= M
c. :
..,,, h-gu 3 i = i T. a T.: ^. kmg. i ..,'c zia mis O O w u no 4.nm..:,:, e it,. ( a.3. ) 45 .e-- L--- - - l '.'- u _. \\.' N j'ji2 ,,ua., 0 m. -< un cf.a 313 035)
*. h.
s. S i 44 I e h! b M 313 J. { t, i..) o
3-c.h
-m .' C.: u le l se fT.---+ye i ' I . : 1 P 2 M1 e4 47 l. J k "'"E; .1 l
F.
1a Igg.,___. fc - 'FC &f > N,*.'. ye Amend. 5 4/84 Amend. 20 12/85~ .veeve swted on tanu 4.2.41 ( Amend. 13 1/85 VOevLE VALVE'ARRANdEMENT A eLectnic oseenatino etANT GeorgiaPbwer ma u. v i a = O u =,7 : FIGJRE 6.2.4 1 (SHEET 10 OF 12) N.*
VALVg PENE. ARRANGE. INet0E CONTAINestNT 0973004 CONTAINedENT TRAfloes assNTS NO. 80 0. C 11J 212
I **
III - - IIJ ,,C w/ k',i',5 b u u w w w w w v q ^ ( J" 7tc anc enom .x ,.,,J,: t v O
(*
O O\\ ,,,, to e .\\ W.---- 3 t -;. J. ,o, ( pl3C ILCMOVCD )
I ;
g{.... ,.y,; w ,.e C:; Hnom ris _ w s ' ;, s e f~~~ g:' @p. ,u (oovets v niNo'saALI 12_ 424 . l. ', g} r. o as yggy ;; . 5 m ,9;f y_ \\,J) no 2.7
aiNo.
i ee m
a. T i
Tv %ife m; ps apf e e vv"* 24 s2 m 4,4
...c
.?..*, / WilTc if.*. O L r ;., -- e -e ,..n.. ..I c.;:. te ( '.i.t 5?h* t i .. va e ustes en tames 6.2.41 Amend. 5 4/84 Amend. 20 12/85 ( Amend. 13 1/85 VOGTLE T ELSCTAIC GENERATless PLANT %. NWCT la ueNT 1 Asso vent s FIGURd'6.II.4-1 (5EdET'll Di' lI) ,es eies l
l t PE NE-AR 8t A,VE INSIOG CONTAINesENT OUTSIDE CONTAINt4ENT TRATION l VAL 80 3 No. asawTs No. N.- E . t::.) -r' em m a g -,. y jy.f. f*:, _ L.--.. .n L n.3 y ' :i. 5 Y w 14 esA @@@w t.
x.,.
.n.. a % % (-4H ',* ',;+)%%%%%% M h X X% ses n... = . n .,A t.?. W Mtjf h ~ ~~ i / M.... 9 95) e' *.. M [..; itil 212_]_313 y
^
jih s'ame a 2:2-l. 'e ! s. $ *r i.*;': ..c '.?..;* 'Y.;,i i . s *- t l
.s.

i, :.'
r. 1
?. 'a 8
1 ; s. AJnend. 5 4/84 Amend. 20 12/85 've6ve uned on tame 6.2.41 Amend. 13 1/85 vosvi.E VALVE'ARRANG M T Ei.scTnse osNenAriNo PLAmr GeorgiaPower uNn i a=O uun ~ FIGURE 6.2.4-1 (SHEET 12 OF 12) 1
a lb,3 - 4. s TABLE / @ CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(l) -1 u i Dfainaten} binfior1 Valve Valve Closure Number Function Time (s) 1. Phase 'A" \\ HV-3502 Hot Leg sample line and gross failed fuel detector 115 j HV-3548 Hot leg sample line and gross failed fuel detector ch 2.0 HV-8220 Hot leg sample line and gross failed fuel detector <15 l pw p doscharge ~ HV-8823 Safety injectionAto cold leg <15 l p=p di5ebarge ~ HV-8824 Safety injectiorQto hot leg 115 HV-8843 Boron injection line to cold leg <15 ~ pu=p discheqe HV-8881 Safety injectionato hot leg 115 HV-27091 Fire protection water 120 HV-8871 Accumulator test and drain line 115 HV-4 Accumulator test and drain line 115 fill HV-8888 Accumulator test and d e s line 115 'HV-8880 Nitrogen supply to accumulator 115 HV-8160 Normal letdown line 115 HV-8152 Normal letdown line 115 HV-8100 Excess letdown and seal water leakoff 115 HV-8112 Excess letdown and seal water leakoff <15 ~ lo HV-8825 RHR pump dischargalhot leg (15 ~ R** d N RHR. _ _ / ' i^"l'd leg t: col <15 HV-8890A RHR @:?.': hl g 115 .HV-88908 HV-8033' Pressurizer relief tank sample to waste gas 115 compressor suction - HV-8047 Pressurizer relief tank sample to waste gas $15 compressor suction i ) -1. .n l y =g--
N~
3 [ M.
h 16 3-4 l s g,y 1 TA8LE Sve=&.(Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES es.-a,.e.~ y Valve Closure Number Function Time (s) 1. Phase 'A" h: t:S (continued) HV-8028 Pressurizer relief tank makeup rater supply $15 HV-3514 Pressurizer staan sample line $15 HV-3513' Pressurizer steam sample line $15 1 HV-3507-Pressurizer liquid sample line 115 HV-3508 Pressurizer liquid sample Ifne 115 HV-10950 Accumulator sample line 115 HV-10952 Accumulator sample.line 115 HV-10951 Accumulator sample line 115 HV-10953 Accumulator sample line $15 HV-7699 Reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge $15 HV-7136 Reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge 115 e HV-780 Norsal containment sump pumps discharge 115 HV-781 Normal containment sump pumps discharge 115 HV-7126 Reactor coolant drain tank went and H supp y 115 2 HV-7150 Reactor coolant drain tank went and H supply $15 2 HV-9385 Service air and post-LOCA purge air supply $20 MV-9378 Instrument air 115 HV-8211 Post-accident sampling 115 . HV-8212 Post-accident sampling 115 HV-8208 Post-accident sampling 115 HV-8209' Post-accident sampling 115 Sh**i.A. --. M
s.3-9 TABLE ( ontinted) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Valve Valve Closuae Number Function Time (sj 2. Ventilation Isolation HV-12975 Containment air radioactivity monitor inlet 115 HV-12976 Containment air radioactivity monitor inlet 115 HV-12977 Containment air radioactivity monitor outlet 115 dV-12978 Containment air radioactivity monitor outlet 115 HV-2626A' Containment pre-access purge supply and equalizing $10 /,iV-2627A Containment pre-access purge supply and equalizing 110 ,HV-26268' Containment mini-purge supply and equalizing 15 ~ JHV-26278 Containment mini purge supply and equa1xing 15 4 HV-2628A Containment pre-access purge exhaust and equalizing $10
NV-2629A Containment pre-access purge exhaust and equalizing 110 HV-2628W Containment mini purge exhaust and equalizing 15 s

HV-2629B' Containment mini-purge exhaust at>d equalizing 15 HV-2624A Post-accident air exhaust
@AI J HV-2624B Post-accident air exfiaust g Al4-3. Manual Val M b. c. 4. TMiets-Operate & valves $ hc4f 3 e 0 p =yM A w,- - ' M 'La - rI
%lre TA%L fun ~c?f; O*UM*0 0 Sh,,4 4 ya; y g _ $,,5, r a. ur, 7:, DRAN ~ 2. .5 die.}, Lject:. - dt, ',.: A Sz..., Q ~ :,.. :n. ; '. ' = :. '9 _ :_: y H V-7 9 II B R. W R e-< r; <e en Ssy .s a e -l. a o. ti A H V - 1r8'll A t{f l4 V Al 3 4 yseu s.yp, +, re, da, ce,. I cooler c 4O t y H V - 2. I 3 9 Ns c w r <ne f<o n r<< d.c esv;1y co a te r s A 'D H Y-.3.l35 tYs c u.s ayp Iy to r z a ci.c ca vlty e colerJ A 'O H V - 113 9 flS c a re ben tC o n ree ebe c
v +y e c o lo rs 4D WV-S to 5 N o <n al c h e ry in g L i n -<.
I5 HV-I%O4 tJS c 4 l Io Co n-ta; >,r f t o o lets IVf ~ sapp y It V - I y O }- Nsc.v sspyIy +o Con +< :n m en + coole e s H V - 19'O b Ns c v sspply to c.o n t e i n - e n t r o l< r t H V - IVC 4 Nsc w.s apply /. L.., hin n e.,t c. le e s IN V-I T b l NSC W r< tarn N* m-t on f*In = end f o oler S k N V-19".1 3 I l4 V-173 C. \\/ h V I4 Y ~ l T2. 2 N5 C W r4 fvr,, from e,a n I < l n m d to oler r WA o HY-91roIA Ibo ra n 2,,4 e e, }.:,, g.;n,, 4. t. Ia t.9 hlA li v Tir o l # yf o a A CA -<. c A win s 9 14st-v4- 0 3 o (* h<m :ee i A c!A. W o,,. NA Tr 14lI-VA- 0 ;t.9 C.h em it e I A ddl+;on 14lt-ut-o 3 *i. Deesteor. lie <d Veter Supply .2 fol / q t $reafhing A' e Sepp I 1187-U 4 Il 3 A cc w R.e+ve n / o4-Uh 143 Sq-fef 1 '4,c./ t o,, -fa Gold %. R 9 y I2.04 U 144 \\ I Y. h l.a.o't v' i I+5 1/ I;3.o4 U k 14b 6 s fe4, 19'
c f.' o n lo c aid J.,.e3 Ia C 4 - V 1)L 't.
Sef~ely.Inj eci; o Fo Ho t-l-y n 1104-l/ fI 2.,3 Ik04'.L!C Cl3-Baron 2nj ecit on += C o lel L-t i 3 l 2. 04 y k I 3. 0 $ -f (-f ,~ nj echic., -l a $$ctl 1-e g 9 3 l 2.0 A VA -t i S s-fe. +n T of e cHon 4o Ho-l I-e9 I I ko b ut a l b ton +a t a m e n -f Sp rey Svpply (Qo 6 U(, o) 5
c.,,4,1e,,.a,rf Sp % y+er.s ply up
(:e< Pca+ e c.4: n .yo1 v4 0 3 s. J
Velve.- Is.,ef:=n sk ee+ 5 Valve Nv A<< Tabte. II,.3-9 (.consnued )... dosure T.wp 4 M .v k (c.-O) 2401 V+ D17 Ni4 rag e n Supp ly lo Acca-ala+ee YA I1.o la U$ 0x! Wxcess lefdown anc!,seeI wefee lee k a f f \\ l 2. 0 G V b O h **- Notmal Chsq np l;n < i lD.DfaUA3SS Re a e-t o r C. t.. I pvnp s e.1 we fe, sepp Iy 12.o.404334 l f I / 2.o 6 v 4 35 3 V y/ /2.0Ld$004 Re aefoe C==la.f pu,.y s*=' w - +< < 1 s.<pf, I 2 04 V G I 2.** itit A pv,p d:s eMay < lo ks+ 1s $ 12o 4-M6 /29 w u la.04. U fa I+7 QHK t oof :n4 e s. lel ItS tso4 U4 l+1 S +1 12.0 4 V l 110 4 U$ 15 0 l'XOI-V h l % Pr t u ur: Bee te lls { +<r, h u e ke vy w + t. ssp f yl lAll-v4 - 0 4 3 Ckemlc I Add:41. - l+ 18-v4 -0 4 + t kern ; e a l A llI tt. u l5 I3-09 0 0 l C.sn+a;neen l. H. Man l+or ();.s c.h a r$ e. z 1513-U$ 0 0 2. w 2 4 0 I d4 0 3 + S<<ute.e Air <,J P.s4 j oes Pa r3 < A; r-supply V .2.+ o s us 044 .In s +r., n ea + Ric VA s Gm o-te. aval H v 51s o (:N_ uemte I A dd ;+;. n WA g v 5 2.5 i c a e m ;c a.4 2 d l4; c. &A n " 155 S A _. R v,oa 4 Hy J979 A C.'c W-Sappl. k,4 y HV 1979 hccw S app.l. VA y HV 8974 Ac c w. A -< f a cn NA H Y I9 75 h C c. W. R.<. fern Wh HV %835 .Se fe.4 y Ige.< } e a do Celd La3 WA H V 9 % o 2. A S<fe+y I y ee.+io" lo het Les al A H V '3 9 0 3. A S de+ 3 L j se.L c fo ho+ Leg NA z @% 4 QOA B Can +,;e,,e,4_$p,9 f,,,y ne,3,,,, pa./;.n W4 l-l V 'I o O ;t.-A c-o n f<l n e,r} Spr*y frne$en4 sey Sv f;en IV,4 r l9 \\r lI Ob,03 P eacfa c,a o le,,4 Pmp s a. / +fer Sipply N4 l)f ) D WA 8< v.ax es
~\\ Table, it,4-k ( cenRoued ) Yo lv e (snc.4:o Thea + 1 V< he e.
*Nymht' Clos Jr e I, m f,
's ORAFT 7 5 /te n o+< ti, va / Len '+ ) a f+ V S S'4 o K H R. P.<-p a:s ek.<p +o ko+ leg ti A It-v % % oi A R H R, I..p :,,1, cold leg AI A NA H J 9( T 09 3 HV T 70I A K W 8, s v e f;. -fro m hot le gA HV 9 7 0 a. A Rnk HA ~ 0 HV 5 2.7 g C hem:c e l Add l1:an f(A HV 51-79 Chem.'e I Add,$on W A l} V 2.'7 4 : A ( o e+, n,.s e a, t ilz tton:9 e S o c-H o rs WA Iq v A71oA NA NA Y HV 279o/3 HV 2793A Conk,ane,,f k M a,, j f a e D is ch <ry < WA t l+ V 19918 C.o r< +s i n n e rt + k. Man: tor'$'cilan N4 z 14 V ) ] 41 0 \\ NA HV A 741 A 4 o M4 i I4 V 2 9 9 3 13 fon 4a ; e m u+ ll t1an l } o - D;s charg < W4 G,. Manati Ls) IAJ 3 V 4 O5o Pv c..(: e.4 ;. wa+,, s.,py/y +, Ae La t:,,, t.< +y NA 12.l3 V4 o5I (3) w u \\' U 1+l q U 4 006 D e m; n t e lited V <for SLpf ly 2.+ o l t/ 4 21 3 Beva n lng 4b Supply g la.o A v 4 007 6 o r o n Lj a ct o. t ;n e -t C a l d f,* A 4 0"'ula for Ss, ple f.;ase. 12.04 VA 159 I204 v4 I I, I heco mvla lar S a mple L;n *, 3 I1 o + LI A 'G*- As cu -v la f or Sw /* Une .e U) 12.0 4 V T I L,L A c e.a ul a t a r .Sa,.4,lt L;n g, 12o 2. V 4 col I Sqq, + o lon+ % n4 Coolers H5cw l I2.o 2. V 4 0 0 5 ) ti " W S.spf y F o C*n+<;,. mon + Coolers l ISO 9 OAoI & Pos+ Acc % & hi < bh us 4-x MA
?.
C o n 4A: m e,,+.Spr<y. NA HV 9cotk lon4aine'es4 Spra y, S/pply V 'A ' H V R oo l 1% C o n ta.n een4 Sp ra y $spply t s t' \\ .h ,~ e-
~ ~ TaHe' it,.S-4 (con +in ned) fa,, ed : e n shee.f 7 Va lse .1a lv s & (!as are- ' & m b <,_ N DRAFI ,. er. m,. u.< v e Nb f5 V - l 7 5 9 9 fSV lib 7 3 US LV Supply Io Acad-r du,Vy Co o lers f f5v AJ3 b from PS V 2.13 } sappl f a y PSV 8877% v -ko m PSV 97osA PA R sse+;an fran, k o-f te9 PS V 920Vb kHA.sve+.a., hem k.1 l < 3 Io C o-te l., n o ss+ ca. terr PSV I%I1 W 5 t-w s vpply I P5v 11774 PsV IT IS { PS V Is I4 PS V ll67 L \\/ Psv I98L J PS V l l G,7 ) NA Psv 11773 / k-A/M A-4e= 4 w 9 h -e MW*-H 4 e ee - e Mee mM e m m- --e-p w, am
l l Tab \\e l(o.3-4 (con +inu e d ) ( d. Set f5 A R..s < e4;o n c.2.4 fo r d ue. ass i.~ of + h e e e n h..* s - <. + is ate +. a 8 Sys+<+. h;r sspp ly valve s c las
J and encles#d le lo c.k a ble b oa r.s d o peav:d < s o s ta c. l u -d barr; e e hocked C lo.s e d l
T m e -e p i . -.. - < - -. - + _ _.. -.. J i i i 1 \\ f e-o 6 6 e e m e oa we..- e e e6.- e e ] e q W .p. e w < &*a' 9 I i
./
lJ;;;;;p,;'"
S AR CH ANGE NOTICE 1. j PS A R CH A NGE NOTICE 2 DISCIPLIN E __ h ' C f e'f f r~
3. CN NO FS AR CH ANGE NOTICE OTHER 4.
ORIGIN ATOR c,4 le r 5.DATE Il IA bb 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF S AR
7. 2.
7. DESCRIPTION OF CH 4 NGE Add <Iar:f p s Mc.~ J Jo Saf< yarEl ac k 1 On \\ y S., <. t e.- di a.y +o ^ 1 . t c s p la;,, ihad VicP hss r, +w o 54 e_ 1;n < sy sh > s per IMf l ATT ACHM ENTS : I f.' o r e 2, 2. f -j {s h e e t 5 o f 2-8. REFERENCED SPECaFIC ATIONS OR DR AWINGS }5 4 D G l.5 9 - :2-9. J USTIFIC ATioN BELow ATTACHED Pt r NM * *cg v M at % I,,,. a..; ,,, 4,,, /, o,,,,,,,, 4 ;,, ,,y 3( S,) r e v. a,rr. I o. DISTRIBUTION (INITI A L-D ATE) 19. Ar.T.IQN. CARCN. Ed. sy sT.R //h L $N%Q /' o C,, r, A,.E s,., g n.n..' e B. TS/9RR IMPACT l b ELECT. D AFE No. %p C. TS CERT PKG _ _/ o -EC. o,. A < C N A,..., o ~,. 7, AFFECTED o L ANT oES. o,.,, C N A,..,,
NLT, 11.
12. 13. 14. fG5 PO. (Yu c'.'G.'EuYs ve v.i l o'Is. C ISF ENG.) (MSI CNB 4 %o Affna F E G.) ~ f [ 16. ~ I I 17. 18. ou y,,.,.. 7 ,c,ogg, ~ c. ,c,o,~ c g ; g g, ou ..u on 46tbn/p/a
f CN No, b '$$ FSAR CHANGE NOTICE JUSTIFICATION 1. Brief Description of Change: __(.lst r,[ c <1 f - nf <h.a f. -S ef I:g ! < 73.l-I M n s.,, s*.-
1. n,
_ n A rt i n.. VE_f, P d ofL1 a l n L ~ c, des:e n J 2. All impacted sections have been identified and revised as b required. bs '3. Categorize change (check one): Correction of previously submitted inf ormation. Describe below how inaccuracy originated. New information based on design or criteria change. Describe j reason for change below. = Clarification to existing FSAR section. Describe below why change is necessary. La r S:e s er. p si of NR( re v ie we r b Jvporf I l' feJ /n m /~IL. ute 3,3 - z. Ah.J <:eJ ta. i. t 4. Determine impact (Y/N): This change is consistent with the NRC's Safety Evaluation g Report y (SER) / Nlh This change does not deviate from VEGP Reg. Applicable Regulatory Guides Guide positions. Nlb Applicable standard review plan sections
7. 2.
This change does not deviate from VEGP SRP positions., Applicable Technical Specifications This change does not impact the Tech. Specs. kIk Other applicable criteria This change does not deviate from VEGP positions. Justify all "NO" answers. Provide licensing precedent on NTOL's. i 1
T kk 5 b 0% as u wl r g!s Jit.is -ag e 7"lin !a u i s -.. h ; ', !ii I f I $- !! l m g 3 'O' i v-. Bony: 1
ijg, ie is
,e? w7 .c t-i AI E in lYli b ( l Ni jf !! E sa v 13 13 II l j,h : D l]llf-O l{" IF -lJ II Il! l! Vi 'I llIj 3IG 11 3g" j e a .1 i, p 4 llij!!!!!h;! fl j -ilhi !!! r;iing -
s y
i I ~IM 6 is d r li I I> r$j0 lll!jlII 41W 6 i
lllgll;3
M2 lii I
!!i is ! ! ! p !!!!!!I[INI!!$i i1 i M; .!l5j. s.w j,8{:El-r.m !!
I sers

s-1
$,d I II U NT3}}[ 6 g g g g;;y. b <f I I I 35 2!' kd' 4 lll-il S ! E $ i-I jajll,aistii Oy $_E 66. - JN:%& ly .?.!j [i = Y9 iIiihi!ill qliji;wD,1,j!Il l j!i 1.a-0 i!!1 t i ~ ijk 1
in Iltl.!;i;'gh l

j ---
__t $fi b: - -] #1 d g g hE I fr/ illl! 3II'If h l0 ll i
sim

-, iine si e
h c,ijt; 6 o a ; hil Ig; 5 n-gm.... g g L
s. ( lifAW m v FIESSLRNR CONTA!NAAENT PRESS #it _me. - o_w sir . "Q,'" l @f "@f Dy "@j. )T)f h L, (S.ett T 7) 194IT 73 g g, Beast &4,&A&4, &4,&4,&4, e { .L a. . se "f &4 ( .=,
a. -n.,...
e) + <,c,.. S 6, L-Qg 4
m..so r"
-~ 1, O 9@ ~ ,=. - l., @ =~ a i gg, - s.... = w. = ( , =,, L_ (. _., eco (*** I. m g I c. im ' age 'y 'mu' ' ass )g () <w. Y. o o,o, - <.cs,. cu m,.in e... .c.o.. = g STtast,aK STIsst ret aftJstiet guastieg ec mi mi wi mi i ovi uggguwinggu im.pm..g.=g c eCTts. t. Tic soccAPP CDmtLs as w corML uwe. (Potatus t M31 CDetL ? J..cTu.TE ( l'_Te peac <Dett.s as m liaLLYasCULF, ll. 84D' .. = -.s..ew. w m. . con..c= .a oco,. x.
= = = = = = ~
.. g.ogggy.m , ~1.<,, =. 1: < .,m.n. . yjimn , o== = -.a or T,. w .. h d- !.3,tWatuP.u,,m. m m.e,Iff,,,8vh,.Wsin.h. A-a .'m.%1.N. a====a c - io.. =.cw,. w 7. ElrvtG.stm fr$'De ISLAflee IS LEED OLT #F 8E3JiRS. Dehte %CO*E C g. M e arm sesta4. EET cas.4TS r Te apofuur tamELS EDs M CDmtL SDee. OE PW East 1.nm ens Tiert albeesET f
e. saart, inser:oe mance==,imecs air arascas is mim we.uirie se@mse. eser 3 5"DS.
18 The VEBP desion includes t.3 stesa!ine i sistens pr locs. fi steas line asalatio:. s.stC consists of a stean line isolatios salve an.1 itc associated b,cass valve. llanual isolati:t of a steas line loop sav be accomplished bv sawal actuation of either isolation systes, u. m m.. _. .a y 1 ~ g n-n _-ly., 1 - 433 9
SC AI 't Y l l l l ~ * * *
S' acte a
g mu cama.eone amm 4~ ~. _ w a3_r D_q,b, _r=k)r W""P %P k.kk
(4
I* M ~~~~ ~~ v u .s ~. L -..,{)4.~ V 4 b '#'=E" wm ..L
W
.Cw7. L/5l WIWI m g. y. g -4 o . ~ = 3 ;y-A>AoA& A U 'y) 1.i Q errass emas ,,,,.< a, t; -> ) b;,,e,
== 4 L, vua carrect ':t L T _. I l e .,I r,0,<?i nr., p' W ~ ..aw m m,n .i t. .i s 8 TI gE,. APERTURE c'" ") 4 E CARD e m= o m e w[ Fev assw movics me summer outra, mot .m.serr .riatuert b ="""g*? O _Q ' J" 'T 'M7 "J" 'E JR Uso Available On g i Aperture Card sa
== m.ein .3 O peas.Lt siis w seri.e sisAn Lisa simp 'Aug. itThe aattf os 4 COucies assanory auc*ee*Lorm C att tmPLtCATED a
TYN'?N'iet *m,,llM3.t'; ^#.?"4*Me 3,n,==,.=.= =.=..t= === ===
iMM.niaPs" = '"' " *"*" *** * **" m.,, .m. 'ir'#,.M,2,m",.?J",,it"' a '"
E' "M'Wam,'*"4 $"^'a'#iEg'M??'adb&.%
NI"* I'*8 M #LL N-1ptA e i wme* gggeRED (F T 106 b 'a*&#9% Finactisses am. esov esmew %E meincteetAL, 3r.pinL smTLE. ..7 IDe hE / anasaJ Rt At C .a w adY t ch.ai 33 ' s~teethead ena Tt44% taE&T st WM tws08L%AYto.4 OWLT. 86/26/ O/N-Ol THIS FISURE HAS BEEN MDDIFIED Amend. 11 11/84 FM USE IN THE FSAR xsAActaar12 Amend. 24 6/86 Georg. Powerd umr nsCGENERATINGPLANT ci ia o u=i12 ( FIGURE 7.2.1-1 (SHEET 8 OF 20) __m -)
SAR CHANGE NOTICE j a ssj,'f,",gwan j 2 a ' '* ' a = ***c "
a.. 3s, t.
O **^=c"^"a="an** @ rsAn ci<Anos wov:Cs O ava== 2. Sd 2. KIM 5.DATE oniolN ATOR
s. naransucso sactions or san 9.S.*-\\
7., otsca:PTsoM OF CM ANS smw.x vocre s r.sov/c.u om sese w w%w. V ie6.2.4/eAytaqr.y. Ano DMTTass =0 2u,Akug VOLTA 6s. *F McA tit %, A c k M N S v.p e 4 T s M aap %gg mur. AE c. RQkA) op 1h6 KE*@AG% TN\\M 79p, Mopg,yg. C 3,gK g gQ ATTACMMENTS Ms.W+ oV-PM M
6. 9. iH h*4.o d.5.R-1._
S. REFERENCED SPECIFIC ATIONS OR DRAWINGS cAue wwa m r.o g, 4r.a num.a mvo g C.4Lc.u.a.Jrnoe4 X9 CF* 1,. 48*701r wg,(s, y%p eH 6 4 .. au.viric Ario" O=='a= R'"'**'" i.. =i.-uv A=via- , o.,,,,...o r,. ~ i..... A. Av n YES NO A. SER IMPACT .x WS-II*h 4" "* ' r - B. TS/SAR IMPACT L = < - e.4.3 C. TS CERT PKG E EC, m.........., AFFECTED rs A ex, r ..n...,,.., 11. 11. 13. Id. ra=mn =. a, n.., c ::. a, n.., ~ } ~$~h $ WU!A00 N O T $ 6'd l!!X E C \\ t 7. t 8. 15. f6[
TE e.ve a,penogs gv om g nemes amyg oats o
o.vs w h? /$ $7" & Utt@ 4..d=477 6 3/03
h6.LTiv\\OTe d t 80 WLTs/ce<L Q Src uidino m est-yy vel 7A6e oF OR ) o b. 2 s)Ot,T5/ BATT t-4.'T H% ssEdl Gfc-(.t Fts-D ks A pe+i64 umn v o r.i r s a. Hmoevj uTmet MH1RPAcTa.(t.th'2. j C. ( p S AW) e-5, {efyoIZMs-p skrTve< pu. te#o-s e-res a v s e s a eATTscy. 5%1E-9 o A BA TT 6t!.T LCA-O DOTj C.1 CL.E $>. 'fM& 465T %EsuL-T5 %ou') ine LOOF',T BA'TTEFT VoLTMEs (,, L A5'T MtH.TE Vo L'ru, E of. BATrsity p# % toAO Du 7 3 C.$ LL.Y-) o F ~l.85 9/ceu Fot. r 494-0 4 At M9 B y /.8 2c il 4s<.t 7e9 "'TW-N A C. A. sof F9 l.8 0 V/c M-v M A 9W 5j(C. REF. M X%poH 6 6). 6 st_h -rge-m u4ig u.m emxsq_N Room rs-M9eFATiARE \\5.fhFj- -fe,e56 t.M1 Mt 4-T e 4os. TME-S DV-BAmt \\E-5 ch eE. cace445-9 To /. 46 d/ctu e!t io9.N/%wA'1 R% l.SWN/cet.d'59-.Io&.3v['DWway if A\\4(> h-hAo D. M P w tma. c - As ,o
v e%v3 oc Yaomt Aw guc,
-fnAd 9 Revisew NT
l. 8e s)/cc-u. OIL. 10 6. 2. V/8Anw'f.
Tane-tas r w gate et-rs# AT 7e* v k w + end 93 w w c.uaue-mwd ca t e r d.x3ccos. y-r w. .e w-s --,w-%v--wm-w-
go(g ) SkTT59-T CMt'itkt46 vot-rM e-o F t 4-o.4-v' tJ A+ c wN%C-P To 140 V B h i.E T M E i M Ar i M. W Vol-TM E Wi4t d.M \\%r. l' O C. WTK1r-AT l i .. _ CAA cWM-T \\5 l + 0' Y m l O e 8 e
e
- ~....... .eee e e-e a w-ee em.,,..,, a, y p-g ee 9- .9 g a ee e a
=_ VEGP-FSAR-8 ( 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.2.1 Description (__ The de systems provide a reliable source of continuous power for control, instrumentation, and de motors. There are four 125-V de safety features systens per unit, four 125-V de nonsafety systems per unit, and seven 125-V de nonsafety sys-tems common to both units. 8.3.2.1.1 The 125-V de Safety Features Systems There are four safety features 125-V de systems (identified A, B, C, and D) per unit. Each system has a 59-cell lead-calciun battery, switchgear (electrically operated drawout circuit breakers), two redundant battery chargers, inverter (A and B l19 have two), and 125-V de distribution panels (nolded case circuit breakers). Systems A, 3, and C each have a 125-V de motor control center for motor-operated valves. There is no capability to connect the de systems between themselves, between Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, or between the safety features + systems and the nonanfety features systems. (,. The 125-V de systems A, B, C, and D supply de power to channels 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, and are designated as Class 1E i equipment in accordance with the applicable sections of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 308. They are designed so that no single failure in any 125-V de system will result in conditions that will prevent I the safe shutdown of the reactor plant. The plant design and circuit layout from these de systems provide physical separatfen of equipment, cabling, and instrumentation essential to plant safety. Each system is located in an area separated physically from other systems. All the componer.ts of the 125-V de C3 ass IE systems are housed in Category 1 structures. Each 125-V de battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its chargers and distribution equipment, Batteries are sized in accordance with IEEE 485 to have sufficient capacity to supply the required loads for 2 3/4 h. They are __6lhil sized at a minimum temperature of 55'F; their4 capacity :ss increared by 10 percent for load gro'th and 25 percent for w aging. "c.: -i" ="- "a
e ^ -ira 14 =4 t i

1. 00 "/'-=11 eL
- 10 5. 2 ",^- - + + = r v1) gwp Battery sizes are: e A and B: 1947 Ah at 3-h rate; 2960 A for 1 min. I Amend. 9 8/84 8.3.2-1 Amend. 19 8/85 ....3.....,.... =.
~' ~f%g.<,yk-hY-9a_g<
8. 5. R 1
7ld-t M lo 4Er$ c 4 4\\ v o ( % -e.5 fr _a o..c_ k locI growf d a. w).-. Au/J 3 ed. _ Wo b4.<.% U_e_~ E s', W d -4. M o d-c_yd4 [o' k 4 $~ 3kWC -70 -cu n- \\ e e -M. -vLe-4% ty d 4 p m w.a d. b i s -=. 4. sw_ 9 o l %.4.5 ujLa c 4. Wr3 %+%w-m -t + v h a of 7o' E ' 'Tr Av A /. 86 V / cell
cje%7V/dgw.yg
~ n 0134l6kq . 6to ' .6 i, 8) ~ lc.c.tl n o T'r n'~ C.- /. S3 rd c:e.(( av Iof,3. V b o.ZtTm 3 /,, kY %s 0
l. OfY,/b 1OhA.V'f'".L{be$ltrj y-9
..ep= -4 e6. ee-e e N e e
,g.* s.I VEGP-FSAR-8 i ') o C: 983 Ah at 3-h rate; 1400 A for 1 min. ? o D: 650 Ah at 3-h rate; 1123 A for 1 min. Each 125-V de battery is provided with two battery charger.s, each of which is sized to supply the continuous (long term) demand on its associated de system while providing sufficient power to replace 110 percent of the equivalent ampere-hours i removed from the battery during a design basis battery discharge cycle (as indicated by the load requirements in tables 8.3.2-1 through 8.3.2-4) within a 12-h period after charger input power is restored. A battery fully charged condition is defined as the condition where there is sufficient charge to allow a complete battery discharge cycle upon loss of charger power. The batteries are normally float charged at 2.20- to 2.25-V/ cell. The sizing of each battery charger meets the requirements of IEEE 308 and Regulatory Guide 1.32. Normally, both battery chargers are on line. Load sharing circuitry is provided to ensure that the de load is properly shared between the two chargers. The battery chargers are each provided with an equalizing timer and a manual bypass toggle switch permitting periodic equalizing charges at 2.33 to 2.38 /4J3 a/ cell _or l37. 5 to V ?!O.t"V/ battery. Equalizing battery charges 4 9 re performed as required after a deep discharge or semiannually. Each charger is provided with automatic .3 current-limiting control which can be adjusted over the range of ')' 100 to 125 percent of rated current. The battery chargers are specified to maintain an output voltage regulation of +1 percent from no load to full load output over the entire input voltage range expected on the 480-V ac system. The output is filtered to limit the ripple voltage to a maximum of 3 percent rms with the battery disconnected. If a de overvoltage condition is sensed by a battery charger, the battery charger input circuit breaker is automatically tripped and a battery charger trouble alarm is annunciated in i the main control room. All equipment connected to the de power system has been specified to operate continuously at 140 V de which exista during the 12-h period that the batteries are 3 being equalized. All equipment is also specified to operate at W 100 V de with the exception of the vital ac buses inverter systems which are capable of operation at 104 V de minimum and ( the reactor trip switchgear which are specified to operate at l 105 V de minimum. The de feeder cables are sized to maintain a li minimum of 104 V de at the inverter input over the entire battery load profile. The reactor trip switchgear is required I to operate only in the first minute of the battery discharge load profile when the battery voltage is such that the voltage provided to the switchgear will not-be lower than 105 V de. Amend. 9 8/84 8.3.2-2 Amend. 19 8/85 e e m... e e e -,----_..-..-e
e 9 s' i
E S;E a,",g* * "
SAR CHANGE NOTICE y 1. PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE L N f 4 /> r'

3. NO.
b $ rsAR CsANoE NOTICE OTHER 4. .s M o h le e
s. O ArE_9h e /e c.
,,,,, NATO, (. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR 25% h oovnd is Ih A 7. DESCRIPTION bF CH ANGE ,3 -f kicl -fa ble M a$ ".- A [: f,^ h y p e:n d ; > I(,A 163-5 //es )%1/ 44/es ,'d.,f=? l! y'. /!,1-h ""*C""'" ,,3 6 ('fj [+
3 '" [
8. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DR AWING 5 ~ (Ce4-3 Sev St>9c %w W C. e- .)% -l 'f' %"1
r'~ ;.mi ^.a.,
Tu

f 1'" m: a w;w !?A 'r ra', e m,vo u y-a^- <C:':' f ll ? ') m s,m
,y 9.
J USTIFIC ATION gsLOW ATrACHED t, pc. r9 ao F +. mova -t <.< %.'<. I s p e.; fi a. 4 : o., + osse s + fs A R.. LSV-N S-17 3 5 dahd 9/IO/f4
10. DISTRIBUTION (INITI AL-D ATE)
'. 9. CLOSEOUT ACTioa Tt3 NU A. SER IMPACT AmCM. CONT. S Y ST. A ' A C/S P "O I 6 v.,.C,yA-p -L ( P0,,t " # E s.<.- a &, 9 C. TS L ECH. =e Ar ICH AP. 87 ONLvl R PLANT oES. ICH A P.17 ONLVI 11. 12. 13. 14. ) i I t sush,tTTso av OATE maveawso y o7 APPeoveo av DATE Aspeevro av cATE l tem P SUPv.) (NUC.G f UPV.) gg y% loISP. CMIE F ENS.) ( M,C. C M B E F E N C.I l t i / 15. N / i d. j lj 17. i s. <,'.'"? UE." ' * "N "I i) El' "I ~ ' ' i.- ^
^

fi.5%E"si' i C
~ - - - ~,. p L AO-07 7 6 3/8 3
'AMO I;6EDig BREA kERS Tb TSMTibol TRA AUFCRMERS / BETWELN 980 V Ct.4n AE Bur 1Ep AWC Ned Cyrr.it f EQutPMfNr f(r 3~T _; ;,i i TABLE 3-9-t-7vpcAL CONTAINMENT PENETRAT!ON CONDUCTOR h6' / OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES 7?NI 0f 4 s.: ;;a i;rikJ ;5::ce ; y,,c-7t@ Lg ,J a cui;;; jg _wlance-sn ^ rw~s aw Protective Device Powered Number Equipment 1. 13.8 KV LOADS REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1NAA08 MOTOR #1 1AAA (1-1201-P6-001-M01) CNTRL BRKR i REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
INAB0s, MOTOR #2
~ L BRKR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP INAA07 MOTOR #3 ~ ~ CN1 L BRKR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP INAB07 MOTOR #4 01) C. L BRKR 2. 480 VAC FROM LOAD CENTERS CTB CAVITY COOLING INB0106 FAN MOTOR #1 (1-1511-87-001-M01) CTB COOLING UNIT IAB0404 MOTOR #1[HI-SPEJD]- (1-1501-A7-001- 01) 1AB0405 [LO-SPEE0] DRAFT E - ^
14,3-f TABLE 4-0 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment .CTB COOLING UNIT 1AB0408 MOTOR #2 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-002-/01) 1AB0409 [LO-SPEED] CTB COOLING UNIT 1880604 MOTOR #3 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-003-M01) 1890605 [LO-SPEED] CTS COOLING UNIT 1880608 MOTOR #4 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-004-M01) 1880609 [LO-SPEED] CTB COOLING UNIT 1AB0412 MOTOR #5 [HI-SPEE0] (1-1501-A7-005-M01) 1AB0413 [LO-SPEED] CTB COOLING UNIT 1AB0416 MOTOR #6 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-006-M01) i 1AB0417 [LO-SPEED] - 179050 460 v HCC 1A;; A M 1A00:14 46u v HCC 1AGF 100070 460 ~v~HCC 120 C {hf4 VMTLE - UNIT 3/' -?rt
o A ~ l(s3-S~ TABLE-3-8-t (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment won,n son u uee :gg7 A CTB COOLING UNIT 18B0612 MOTOR #7 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-007-M01) 18B0613 [LO-SPEED] CTB COOLING UNIT 18B0616 . MOTOR #8 [HI-SPEED] (1-1501-A7-008-M01) 1880617 [LO-SPEED] CTB HYOROGEN RECOMBINER.00WER 1AB0508 PANEL #1 (1-1513-H7-001-00&) Hot CTB HYOROGEN RECOMBINER POWER 18B0708 PANEL #2 (1-1513-H7-002-006) Hot CTB PRE-ACCESS FILTER INB0804 FAN MOTOR #1 (1-1504-N7-001-M01) CTB PRE-ACCESS FILTER INB0904 FAH MOTOR #2 (1-1504-N7-002-M01) CTB PRE-ACCESS FILTER INB0805 UNIT HEATER #1 (1-1504-N7-001-NM) &l ivuiLE udIT-t -3/' 841-- i
II,. 3 f n p n, CT TABLE 8-r (Continued) ~ l , CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB PRE-ACCESS FILTER INB0905 UNIT HEATER #2 (1-1504-N7-002-)(01) If CTB AUXILIARY COOLING INB0806 UNIT FAN MOTOR #1 (1-1515-/7-001-M01) a CTB AUXILIARY COOLING INB0906 UNIT FAN MOTOR #2 (1-1515- -002-M01) CTB CAVITY COOLING 1NB1006 UNIT FAN MOTOR #2 (1-1511-87-002-M01) INB1705 CTB POLAR CRANE (1-1201-R4-001) 3. 480 VAC FROM MCC'S CTB COOLING UNIT 1ABC07-2 A7003 1ABC07-1 (1HV-2584A) CTB COOLING UNIT 1ABC08-2 A7003 IABC08-1 (1HV-25848) CTB COOLING UNIT IBBC07-2 A7007 IBBC07-1 (1HV-2585A) POTE
t h6 C07-2 ANO gg6c 07-l lNot & E WO 6ft.e% 4 6tt S Ia S et.l ES AT A4 CC Cv6Ic L E I ABC- 07
( TYPtwL. FOll kU. 4 90 VhC pyg.o n M c C 'S ) %Tl 'JMIT 1- -3/4-6 D' R AFT ic s-r TABLE 8-i--(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB COOLING UNIT 1BBC08-2 A7008 IBBC08-1 (1HV-25858) CTB NORM PURGE 1ABC13-2 EXH ISO 1ABC13-1 (IHV-2628A) CHARGE TO REAC COOL 1ABC15-2 . SYSTEM
ISO 1ABC15-1 (IHV-8146)
CHARGE TO REAC COOL IBBC15-2 SYSTEM ISO IBBC15-1 (1HV-8147) 84CKUP MOTECrr 0^J is fwtocvs av a 60707 FOA MC FOLLOW'^!6 IABC20 ISOLATION TRANSFORMER 1ABC20X \\&6CD3 .1BBCM-ISOLATION TRANSFORMER M lASCcP34 de CK L'P pgg7z:c7;ag) (3 fAO g/to t$ gf lg 6 0 70s" fcq 7)f[ R)t to eJ'4 6 1ABGeS ISOLATION TRANSFORMER /ddC ao IACC23X /6dC404 6 13BC23 ISOLATION TRANSFORMER IBBC23X JACx v f/07Tcrtos/ tt /*A 0V'6 LM BY /660s/Y PcA IN E Foctc w W, IABF13 ISOLATION TRANSFORMER 1ABF13X 0ACCW t%'o TTC h CN ff 19edvist.% d Y /880 71St F&A 17ft' Fo L L ou'v c. IBBF13 ISOLATION TRANSFORMER 1BBF13X MLE - UNIT 1 -3/' 8-23,
t DRAFT s.z-c TABLE 4-0-1-(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment IABC19-2 ACCUMULATOR LOOP #3 1ABC19-1 (1HV-8808C) IBBC19-2 ACC!)MULATOR LOOP #2 IBBC19-1 (1HV-88088) s THERMAL BARRIER CW 1ABC32-2 RCP 003 1ABC32-1 (1HV-19,055) THERMAL BARRIER CW IABC33-2 RCP 004 1ABC33-1 (IHV-19057) RCP OIL LIFT INBE08 PUMP MOTOR #1 INBE08-1 (1-1201-P6-001-M02) RCP OIL LIFT IN3E05-2 PUMP MOTOR #2 INBE05-1 (1-1201-P6-002-M02) INBF08-2 RCP OIL LIFT INBF08-1 PUMP MOTOR #3 (1-1201-P6-003-M02) INBF05-2 RCP OIL LIFT INBF05-1 PUMP MOTOR #4 (1-1201-P6-004-M02) CTMT BLDG LWR LVL INBE06-2 AIR CIRC FAN MOT #1 INBE06-1 (1-1503-87-001-M01) - V0GTLE L'N!T 1- - 3/4 0 2t
ee DRAFT w.' ~' TABLE 0 (Conti nued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONOUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTMT BLDG LWR LVL INBE09-2 AIR CIRC FAN M0T #2 INBE09-1 (1-1503-87-002-M01) CTMT BLOG LWR LVL INBE12-2 AIR CIRC FAN M0T #3 1NBE12-1 (1-1503-B7-003-M01) CTMT BLDG LWR LVL INBE15-2 . AIR CIRC FAN MOT #4 INBE15-1 (1-1503-87-004-M01) CTB LWR LVL AIR INBF06-2 CIRC FAN MOT #5 1NBF06-1 (1-1503-87-005-M01) CTB LWR LVL AIR INBF09-2 CIRC FAN MOT #6 INBF09-1 (1-1503-87-006-M01) CTB LVR LVL AIR INBF12-2 CIRC FAN MOT #7 INBF12-1 (1-1503-87-007-M01) CTB LWR LVL AIR INBF15-2 CIRC FAN MOT #8 INBF15-1 (1-1503-B7-008-M01) 1NBE07-2 WET LAY-UP RECIRC INBE07-1 PUMP MOTOR (1-1301-P4-010-M01) INBF51-2 WET LAY-UP RECIRC INBF51-1 PUMP MOTOR { (1-1301-P4-011-M01) %TLE - UMIT 1= -3/4 6-2T
DRAFT ~ ,0.a < TABLE-3+1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONOUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment INBE43-2 WET LAY-UP RECIRC INBE43-1 PUMP MOTOR (1-1301-P4-012-M01) INBF54-2 WET LAY-UP RECIRC INBF54-1 PUMP MOTOR (1-1301-P4-013-M01) FEEDER FOR LIGHTING INBE10-2 . XFMR INBE10X (30KVA) INBE10-1 (1-1808-T3-009) LIGHTING XFMR-INBE13X INBE13-2 (45KVA) It!BE13-1 (1-1808-T3-076) CONTAINMENT SUMP INBE14-2 PUMP MOTOR INBE14-1 (1-1214-P4-013-M01) CTMT NORTH SUMP 1NBF29-2 PUMP MOTOR INBF29-1 (1-1214-P4-014-M01) CTMT NORTH SUMP 1NBF14-2 PUMP MOTOR INBF14-1 (1-1214-P4-015-M01) CONTAINMENT SUMP 1NBE29-2 PUMP MOTOR INBE29-1 (1-1214-P4-016-M01) 'NCORE DETECTOR DRIVE INBE16-2 JNIT (3HP) INBE16-1 (1-1612-M6-001) TCGTLE 'J"IT 1 - - 3/' S ~ DRAFT TABLE 8-P (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment INCORE DETECTOR DRIVE INBE17-2 UNIT (3HP) INBE17-1 (1-1612-M6-002) INCORE DETECTOR ORIVE INBE20-2 UNIT (3HP) INBE20-1 (1-1612-M6-003) INCORE DETECTOR ORIVE INBE39-2 UNIT (3HP) INBE39-1 (1-1612-M6-004) INCORE DETECTOR ORIVE INBE40-2 UNIT (3HP) INBE40-1 (1-1612-M6-005) INCORE DETECTOR ORIVE INBE34-2 UNIT (3HP) INBE34-1 (1-1612-M6-006) REACTOR CAVITY FILTER INBE19-2 SYSTEM (7.5HP) INBE19-1 (1-1213-56-001-000) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1NBE22-2 MOTOR HEATER #1 INBE22-1 (1-1201-P6-001-H01) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1NBE26-2 MOTOR HEATER #2 INBE26-1 (1-1201-P6-002-H01) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1NBF22-2 MOTOR HEATER #3 1NBF22-1 (1-1201-P6-003-H01) VGGTLE - UNIT-1 -3/4 0--27=
DRAFT ,5 3-" TABLE 8+(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment REACTOR COOLANT PUMP INBF26-2 MOTOR HEATER #4 INBF26-1 (1-1201-P6-004-H01) INBE28-2 POWER RECEPTACLES INBE28-1 (1-1805-R3-E12) (1-1805-R3-E10) 1NBE46-2 POWER RECEPTACLES INBE46-1 . (1-1805-R3-E08) (1-1805-R3-G13) INBF27-2 POWER RECEPTACLES INBF27-1 (1-1805-R3-E09) INBF36-2 POWER RECEPTACLES INBF36-1 (1-1805-R3-G11) (1-1805-R3-E11) REAC COOL DRAIN TANK INBE30-2 PUMP MOTOR #1 INBE30-1 (1-1901-P6-001-M01) REAC COOL DRAIN TANK INBF30-2 PUMP MOTOR #2 INBF30-1 (1-1901-P6-002-M01) Ren9c ND c4scr nesy' 1NBE23-2 uwc//ef.JIGH95 (2 9 20HP) INBE23-1 (1-2101-R4-007/010-M01) ema ns cMee hew 1NBE75-2 u/NC//6SH088M-(2 9 20HP) INBE75-1 (1-2101-R4-008/009-M01) EC# J/d @c-INBE54-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBE54-1 (1-2101-R4-003-M01,2) -V00TLE " UNIT 1- -3/4 2-?A..
DRAFT ic., TABLE -h8 (Conti nued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONOUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Ee_uipment f(P 7td CwE INBE60-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBE60-1 (1-2101-R4-004-M01,2) CMT* Fde~t. XFoe Itire y INBF38-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBF38-1 (1-2101-R4-011-M01,2) cwr succ. xpex qired INBF39-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBF39-1 (1-2101-R4-012-M01,2) INBF45-2 POWER RECEPTACLES INBF45-1 (1-1805-R3-G14) (1-1805-R3-G15) INBF69-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBF69-1 (1-2101-R4-005-M01,2) INBF70-2 HOIST / TROLLEY INBF70-1 (1-2101-R4-006-M01,2) REAC CAVITY SUMP INBE33-2 PUMP MOTOR INBE33-1 (1-1214-P4-017-M01) REAC CAVITY SUMP INBF33-2 PUMP MOTOR INBF33-1 (1-1214-PA-013-M01) EQPT. HATCH & ASSY INBE37-2 (14.9KW) INBE37-1 (1-2101-R2-016) 1NBE62-2 FDR TO LGJ XFMR INBE62-1 INBE62X (30rr4 ) (1-1808-T3-068) 10uTLE - JNIT 1- --3/4 3 su.3 -c DRAFT TABLE 4,4 4-(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered i Number Equipment INBE73-2 FOR TO LGT XFMR INBE73-1 INBE7h ly'SKV4) (1-1808-T3-074) INBF61 2 FOR TO LGT XFMR INBF62 1 IN3F62X [JoRv4) (1-1808-T3-066) i IN8F78-2 FDRTOLGTXFNR) INBF78X[3-072) VJX Vf INBF78-1 (1-1808-T INBF79-2 FDR TO LGT XFMR INBF79-1 INBF79X[VSKva) (1-1808-7 3-075) LIGHTING XFMR INBF10-2 INBF10X (30KVA) INBF10-1 (1-1808-T3-012) CTB WALKWAY INBF11-2 CIRCULATION MOT INEF11-1 (1-1503-87-010-M01) LIGHTING XFMR INBF13-2 INBF13X (30KVA) INBF13-1 (1-1808-T3-010) REACTOR VESSEL DISC PLATE ASSEMBLY, p 1NBF16-2 ,20WER RECEPTACLF 3 INBF16-1 ((1-2203-S6-001-R02) Q (1-1805-KJ-511)
~ u-c 9ggyz TABLE-s-e-t-(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment INBF17-2 REFUELING M/C INBF17-1 (1-2101-R6-003) REFUELING E & H IN5F19-2 CTL CONSOLE #1 INBF19-1 (1-2203-P5-REI)/ {t.w3 -na -cot-n o o ) CONTAINMENT BLOG INBF23-2 ELEVATOR (7.5HP) INBF23-1 . (1-2101-P1-001) 1ABD29-2 CONTAINMENT SUMP ISO 1ABD29-1 (IHV-8811A) CTMT SPRAY PMP 1ABD44-2 P6002 SUCT 1ABD44-1 (1HV-9002A) ISBD29-2 CTMT SUMP ISO 188D29-1 (1HV-88118) CTMT SPRAY PMP 188044-2 P6002 SUCT 18B044-1 (1HV-9002B) INBPC01-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPC01-1 HEATER GROUP A INBPC02-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPCO2-1 HEATER GROUP 8 'iOGTLE -tMT 4/4-8-31
F1 D % f.,'*g" 4 3-f TABLE-3:8 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment INBPC03-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPC03-1 HEATER GROUP C INBPC04-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPC04-1 HEATER GROUP O INBPC05-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPC05-1 HEATER GROUP E INBPC06-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL INBPC06-1 HEATER GROUP F INBPB101-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB101-1 HEATER GROUP 1A INBPBIO2-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB102-1 HEATER GROUP IB INBPB103-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB103-1 HEATER GROUP IC INBPB104-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB104-1 HEATER GROUP 10 INBPB105-2 PRESSURIZER BACK "P INBPB105-1 HEATER GROUP IE INBPB106-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB106-1 HEATER GROUP 1F INBPB107-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB107-1 HEATER GROUP IG l -VGGTLE - UNIT 1 -3/4 6,
ORAFT ~ ns< TABLE 4.G-11 Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment 1NBPB201-2 PRESSJRIZER BACK-UF INBPB201-1 HEATER GROUP 2A INBPB202-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB202-1 HEATER GROUP 2B INBPB203-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB203-1 HEATER GROUP 2C INBPB204-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB204-1 HEATER GROUP 2D INBPB205-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB205-1 HEATER GROUP 2E INBPB206-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB206-1 HEATER GROUP 2F INBPB207-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB207-1 HEATER GROUP 2G INBPB301-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB301-1 HEATER GROUP 3A INBPB302-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB302-1 HEATER GROUP 3B 1HBPB303-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP IN5FB303-1 HEATER GROUP 3C INBPB304-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB304-1 HEATER GROUP 3D ' i
DRAFT m.3 - s-TABLE-3.0 1 1 Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment IMBPB305-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP INBPB305-1 HEATER GROUP 3E INBPB306-2 PRESSURIZER BACK-UP 1NBPB306-1 HEATER GROUP 3F THERM BARRIER CW IABE10-2 RCP 001 VALVE 1ABE10-1 (IHV-19051) THERM BARRIER CW 1ABE11-2 RCP 002 VALVE 1ABE11-1 (1HV-19053) PRESSURIZER POWER 1ABE13-2 RELIEF ISO VLV 1ABE13-1 (1HV-8000A) PRESSURIZER POWER IBBE15-2 RELIEF ISO V t. V IBBE15-1 (1HV-80008) l CTB POST LOCA PURGE 1ABE14-2 EXH ISO VLV IABE14-1 (1HV-2624A) Cr8 1!919:UEB8 POST LOCA IBBE14-2 PURGE EXH ISO V4. V 1BBE14-1 (1HV-2624B) i RHR LOOP 1 INLET 1ABE15-2 ISO VALVE 1ABE15-1 (1HV-8701A) Arneron. cceuwrsyarM /66 60 7-L M' r LEG S A dL 6~ o 188 Ec 7- / ( / M V-3S48) MLE UNIT 4 -3/4 0-M
TABLE Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 1ABE16-2 SEAL WTR ISO VALVE 1ABE16-1 (IHV-8112) CTMT ATM UNIT IABE17-2 SERVICE AIR VLV 1ABE17-1 (1HV-9380A) CTMT ATM UNIT IBBE17-2 , SERVICE AIR VLV IBBE17-1 (IHV-93808) ACCUMULATOR ISO 1ABE19-2 LOOP #1 VLV 1ABE19-1 (1HV-8808A) ACCUMULATOR ISO IBBE19-2 LOOP #4 VLV \\ IBBE19-1 (1HV-88080) CTB NORM PURGE SPLY 1ABE24-2 ISO VALVE 1ABE24-1 (IHV-2626A) 1ABE26-2 CTB CLG UNIT A7001 VLV 1ABE26-1 (1HV-2582A) 1ABE27-2 CTB CLG UNIT A7002 VLV 1ABE27-1 (IHV-25828) CTMT BLDG CLG IBGE26-2 UNIT A7003 JL V. 1BBE26-1 (1HV-2583A) -VGGTLE - UNIT 1 -4/4-0.
~ pgAVT ,u.s-s-TABLE W (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTMT BLDG CLG 1BBE27-2 UNIT A7004 VLV IBBE27-1 (1HV-25838) CTB POST LOCA CAV 1ABE29-2 PUMP UNIT MOTOR #1 1ABE29-1 (1-1516-B7-001-M01) CTB BLDG POST LOCA CAV PURGE UNIT 1BBE29-2 ' MOTOR #2 0 1BBE29-1 (1-1516-B7-002-M01) RHR LOOP 2 INLET IBBE13-2 ISO VALVE ISBE13-1 (1HV-87028) AUX COMP CW RETURN 1BBE24-2 ISO VLV 1BBE24-1 (IHV-1974) IBBE25-2 AUX COMP CW SPLY ISO VL V 1BBE25-1 (1HV-1978) THERMAL BARRIER CW IBBE37-2 RETURN VALVE 1BBE37-1 (IHV-2041) CTB CRDM CLG UNIT INBR05-2 FAN OQf,1 INBR05-1 (1-1509-87-002-M01) CTB CRfi4 CLG UNIT INBS05-2 FAN 00/I INBS05-1 (1-1509-B7-001-M01) INBRc4-l e.C S hot Leca IN6M A SWt. c V L 1/ v0uTL6 - OiitT7 - 3/4 6 (ISV.3700)
~ ,c.3-r DRA?T TABLE 6-P (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB CRDM CLG UNIT INBS06-2 FAN 003 INBS06-1 (1-1509-87-003-M01) CTB CRDM CLG UNIT INBR06-2 FAN 004 INBR06-1 (1-1509-87-004-M01) Suppogr g c Lc, CTB REAC SUPP Ca^L INBR13-2 , UNIT 6 700A 'INBR13-1 (1HV-12645) .S offoAT' CLG CTB REAC Sepp = COOL INBR16-2 UNIT 87009' INBR16-1 (1HV-12647) CTB REAC SUPPORT CLG INBS07-2 UNIT B7003 1NBS07-1 (1HV-12646) suffoAr CTB REAC CLG INBS13-2 UNIT B7001 INBS13-1 (IHV-12644) CTMT LEV 1 LTG XFMR INBR14-2 INBR14X (45KVA) INBR14-1 (1-1808-T3-026) LTG XFMR INBS23X INBS23-2 (45KVA) INBS23-1 (1-1808-T3-069) CTB REAC SUPPORT INBS17-2 CLG UNIT NOTOR 4- [ j INBS17-1 (1-1512-87-001-M01) YP-40uiLE -wPW 2/4-s-27---
TABLE Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB REAC SUPPORT INBR17-2 CLG UNIT MOTOR dg INBR17-1 (1-1512-87-002-M01) CTB REAC SUPPORT CLG INBS19-2 UNIT MOTOR *- 5 1NBS19-1 (1-1512-B7-003-M01) CTB REAC SUPPORT INBR19-2 CLG UNIT MOTOR S '/ INBR19-1 (1-1512-87-004-M01) EXCESS LETDOWN HEXCH INBS41-2 INLET VLV INBS41-1 (1HV-8098) ICD 1ISN RHR ISO VLV (1HV-87018) 1D0116N RHR ISO VLV (1HV-8702A) rJl" "ExCll Tra: A - - TO Cll0 PU"" --' (luy-ggnaa) R;;R llCXC;; Ta'? B - - TO Cll0 PU"" = (1!4V 000'") VCGTLC W
3/4 0-36
l l
s. w DRA?T TABLE t1r T (Continued)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment 4. 125 VDC CIRCUITS IAD1M04-2 PRESSURIZER PORV (9A) 1AD1M04-1 (IPV-455A) IBDIM04-2 PRESSURIZER PORV (9A) IB01M04-1 (IPV-456A) 5. 120 VAC CIRCUITS ROD POSITION INDICA-TION CONTAINMENT INYC203-2 CABINET PWR #1 ~ INYC203-1 (1-1608-P5-RPA) ROD POSITION INDICA-TION CONTAINMENT INYC204-2 CABINET PWR #2 INYC204-1 (1-1608-PS-RPB) Ba.cxup Pri n ry Protection is provided by 1ABC44 for the following f "0" 1llV 2554A ~ f -1AYC103 - -SPACC llTRu ( ( W i 1HV-25843 - 1 -- 1AYC104 -- T ACE MTo h erf { l' - MV 1"V 2020A - I AYC107 -:- - SP^.CE HTR-l l EV 1liV-8146 ^- -1AYC10 W SP*.CE u_To__- "GGTLE ""IT 1 -3/4 6 -.
zbrsee-t 1 For Table Ilv 3 -C E CA,, :.-Y;L / ll V- / 2 -i 4 2 /,"lY :i & $ M e,' 2 n i 27 Ae 4 '4YC.':C T 1,Q,'G S;',% < c& E*LfCX ffA/ FAM MO roll H r/L / A f c. / /4 ( t-if42-4 7-o c / -Ho r) Y a dA5 AilX. A?d' lay As?? A/c Atoroll N77L / A Y C / /8 ( / -/S3 T-A 7-oo / - Ho / ] CA Sf" 8A 77' A'/12. EfH. FAM MC76/2 HYr2S / A y c / -t 4 (. / - /632 00/ -No t ] (/-/S52.-d7-co3-No/) /4 yC / 3 / rnoAftYOA USH7" /30Y 7'/2A / A' A [ny. CMS /AC f r 3) c / A Y C / 33 rn o N/7' Ort. L/GH7~/ bot 77u9/N A (% CAG iac ??"O 7) t /A yc/ 3S 197oNiTDrL LIGHT" 18cy 7'/2 alm /t (TDev) c40 /4C P7-//) /#YC/3(p /Ho Al/TC /2-LaGHY / boy 712s41al A (& CAA fi9C Pr/5 ) la YCl3 a plowi ros us 47-dox h6%^' i ~- (7m c+s actr a 7 IM et39 case etec ewuip m +ca nor#\\ ( t - In;l - A 7- 00/ - tfDI)
6 b DRAF_1 TABLE B (Conti nued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equioment -"V ',MV CC00C IAYC11~, - -SPACE "TR ~ "0V 1""-19055 + rnge,.-f 1. -4AYC-Hfr " '"^re uro,, co n H, u e d-MGV IHV-19057 ~ - ( -1AYC117 v - SPACE HTR "- Primary Protection is provided by IBBC43 for the following "0" 1HV 2000A '- -laYC103" ~ SP."CE u7a _ _ MCV 1HV-25555 " ISYC104 - SPACE "TR v D seet L -"0V IHV-514 W f - 10YC105 - .SPAGE "TR - MGV 1HV-55055 - ISYC113 4 PAC "TR - - Ba.9 - PrL;;ry Protection is provided by INBE71 for the following CTMT BLOG LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN MOT HTR 1NYE103 (1-1503-87-001-H01) CTMT BLDG LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN M0T HTR INYE104 (1-1503-87-002-H01) / o l 7Ubi Lt. - UiiM ~3/4 8 4C - I
RAFT i
"E"m' 2
For Ta ble n,. 3 - s-Mnv r u st i z -r v v _g /A V C/ W- $ pp i # u -r n ) ,41C'! / l l V -- 2 f L 9 A 2. /A y r i n Su ni",^ C 5 /,',M L kio v' i;; v' l27 4 9 P ! 8 )! r ! 0% $ 7,^ = f , f r,2 CB E2.6c7*. /EAl FLX s'4Al Mc ror7 H772. (/ - / 5 4 2 - A f-cor - Mc / 5 /8YC//4 l C8s F ELfckfGu/P NM A/c Mercrz-8772. I B y' C /.a.;2. ( /-/S3 2 -A 1-ooz - Mc / ] C6Sf 6AW RM. EYN FAAI M&YCri H7K /8 y C/.2 4 ( ) -/15 2. -8 7-ooz.-M0/ ] (/-/63 2 604 - Ho /
3 RAFT ,c.3-r TABLE-3+1 (Continued) CCNTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES 1 Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTMT BLDG LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN MOT HTR INYE105 (1-1503-87-003-h01) CTMT BLDG LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN MOT HTR INYE106 (1-1503-87-004-H01) CTMT BLOG AUX CLG ' UNIT FAN M0T //M INYE109 (1-1515-B7-001-H01) /N YG/ 4 EsenPl~ NArtM(1.210/-4-cd) HOIST CONTROL SP HTRS s uvei t L' (1-2101-R4-007/010-H01) 1M HM / N Y E et A u,,g 7 u py. a p A sctR C M v H,_yg j. f4. c/t - _,3 g_ p, _ o, g,pg7,,. -HCI5T CGHTROL 5r hTR5 "- 4pve119v (1-2101-R4-006/00^ "01) = HOIST CON'P.0L SD UTD INYE12^v (1-2101-R4 00P"01)'- HOIOT CONTROL SP "TR - INYE131 = -(1-2101-R4 004 "01) ^- Baetu,o "r b.cy7 rotection is provided by INBF65 for the following CTB AUX CLG UNIT FAN M0T //-M INYF101 (1-1515-87-002-H01) CTB LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN MOT HTR INYF103 (1-1503-87-005-H01) VOUILE - UM M -3/4 0- 4
B e Sa-s-JRAFT TABLE-3.S-1-(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN M0T HTR 1NYF104 (1-1503-87-006-H01) CTB WALKWAY CIRC MOT HTR INYF105 (1-1503-B7-010-H01) CTB LWR LVL AIR CIRC . FAN MOT HTR 1NYF106 (1-1503-87-007-H01) CTB LWR LVL AIR CIRC FAN M0T HTR INYF107 (1-1503-B7-008-H01) CTMT PREACCESS FILTER FAN MOT HTR 1NYF109 (1-1504-N7-001-H02) RFL E&H CSL #1 INYF113 CONT PWR Il-Dao)-f'S-ASI) PERSONNEL LOCK 000R MOTOR INYF114 (1-2101-R2-014) Ca# cwsoc.e-REFUELINGMACHINE(HTR INYF116 (1-2101-R6-003-H01) ( CONT PREACCESS FILTER UNIT MTR HTR INYF121 (1-1504-N7-002-H02) i ~ lN YP/2 O WET y f-go gCC/dC AW ^107' HM -V0aiLE - =Ii s -3/4 5-st- ( t - 130/ -p y - o tt - Vo r ) 3 01 - P 'l
013 - f{0 i i
[3 lD rk y>- -l Ile 5 - S
- ; j.
TABLE -3,8 (Conti nued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment ,,n,,,,,an.... ,m u,, i nvuc i Lum -SP-lit" - - -l e (1-2101-R4-005/01t-tt0 F +015T/ TROLLEY CONT' - -5P HTR ~ s u,v e s w /1_ o i_ n. t_ _ D A _ n_ n_ s_,/n 19.yn 1 ). - .s si 4co s_ 84 CM.Rg - "ri.ary-Protection is provided by 1ABE52 for the following -1Ae -mv-=cA SPACE nTR 1A arasa
^*'*-"h sy,Vr9e' =
. i n,t s i. 4 v u ass c y c =en arMLC MIM 4AYE107 ^ - 1HV-8701A 5 PACE HTR ^ -- AM"I C" A" U" O" _a ^ M i i,i_ e t t.o
tn
.,nAere, ow n. w uTn _ - v4. iii n $ATb10h 1bv-5360A 3 PACE HT" ' - a pve,,, s.uu eamma en36444 . y wwwwn.7Fnwh GlM _4 M"I E A 4 J i,. u u,_ c o t. i. r i c D A.P.C. UTD __ a ww 1^YE110 - - -1 P.' 2525.8 SDACE W CTB COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR 1AYE118 (1-1501-A7-001-H01) _unawa s= TUUILL - a mef y j p f3 o _ m ay bei e. -- wp T w 7J e
d DRAFT is.s < TABLE 8+( Con ti nued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTB COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR 1AYE119 (1-1591-A7-002-H01) CTB COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR 1AYE120 (1-1501-A7-005-H01) CTB COOLING UNIT . MOTOR HTR 1AYE121 (1-1501-A7-006-H01) 1AYE125 - -1"" 19051 3 FACE HTR " -1AYE124 * -1llV 19053 3 FACE hiR ' ' -1AYE127 -- 1H"-2502A SPACC llTW 4AYE120 '- -1l-!V--20020 SP^CE urq u
Ay

:a _s sou nanei cou e uro CTB POST LOCA CAVITY PURGE UNIT MOT HTR 1AYE132 (1-1516-87-001-H01) 3
) Primary protection is provided by 1BBE55 for the following 10YE103 v - 1llV 00115 SPACE HTR -- 1",YCICS -1ll"-070G& 5"ACEiiR ^ ^ % TLC -U"IT 1- -3/4 0-??-
.r n.s e r +~ 3 For Tabte IG 5-S~ A L/X FD W PM P M 07~072-H T12. /Ay E t t.t. ( i - i s c 2: - P4-- c o 3 - H o t ] 4HR PM P M orofL H 172. i- / 2 o4 - P& - c o l-Ho l ] / A Y E} A f / 1 S.E fM 10 M o rott t-/ 7 7 L / A YE,3 / ( / - l 2.c4 - P & - o 03 - H o / ) / C3 PM P M oron-- HT7L / A Y E,34 ( 1 - l 2.0 6 - PC - oc 1 - Hol ) 4 / um[< HG PM P McTc(T.. Hr(c c k.s iAYE3G ( /- i 2.c e - p c -c o 2. - No / ) 4 / i 4 ) i i ll .s m ,, -. ~. - -, - -
DRAFT is.3-, TABLE 3.0-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment -18YC100 -1!!V-262?C SIAC[ HTR ^- ~ -10YC107 -1!;V 00003 3 FACE HTR -1SYE100 - -1HV-93605 5 FACE nTR ~~ C Ibitilu _ t u. u_ e n. a,. >. m nuc nin 10Yb111 -1llV 00000 5 FACE HTR ' ~ -levE11: - 1Hv-1 m sFACE HTR - -iBYEli7 - - - ^ -1llV 1^70 SPACE HTR s -10YC110 -1llV--2003A SPAC: HTR ~15YElli ^ ' 1HV-25535 5 FACE llT". ~ CTMT BLOG COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR lbYE120 (1-1501-A7-003-H01) CTMT BLOG COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR 18YE121 (1-1501-A7-004-H01) ~ CTMT BLDG COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR IBYE122 (1-1501-A7-007-H01)
~ ,s.3, DRAFT TABLE e (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment CTMT BLOG COOLING UNIT MOTOR HTR 18YE123 (1-1501-A7-008-H01) -16YE127 s 1""'9000C S MCE HTR ^s CTMT BLDG POST LOCA CAV PURGE UNIT M0T HTR IBYE132 g (1-1516-87-002-H01) 4 D-Nry protection is provided by INBR43 for the following k up CTB CRDM CLG UNIT FAN MOT HTR INYR102 (1-1509-B7-002-H01) CTB CRDM CLG UNIT FAN MOT HTR INYR103 (1-1509-B7-004-H01) CTMT CAVITY CLG UNIT FAN MOT HTR INYR104 (1-1511-87-002-H01) CTB REAC SUPP COOL UNIT MOT HTR l INYR105 (1-1512-87-002-H01) CTB REAC SUPP COOL UNIT MOT HTR INYR106 (1-1512-87-004-H01) vuuiLE - UNIT 1~ -3/' S-L ,q s w
DRAFT r-, e - 4 & rae
m. 2-r s
A': V '? J-S ': - / & 'C,' = v& =a ;,; C c-- Hr 4 : '"V-?'e C l8y '.~ ' 7-v$ fspe# a -,.--n g FA : V
2. ', z.
& & y' C, &W" csocy pm x d.S F/71P W o7'O r2. H772. /8YE/26 ( /-/ 2-o fa - P& - co 2. - Ho / ) O /8YE/Z6 ( / - / 2.o.6 - f 6 - c o g_ -p o ; ) C VCS c CHS Or?/ n'o7cri. Hr7C /AYE/36 ( / - / 2.o e - FG-ces -No / ) S 9 9
m.er DRAFT ~ TABLE 3.0-1-(Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment MOV IHV-12647 1NYR107 M0T HTR MOV 1HV-12645 1NYR108 M0T HTR tFYAMT
$r'W$
Primary protection is provided by INB 3 for the following . CTB CRDM CLG UNIT FAN M0T HTR 1NYS102 (1-1509-87-001-H01) CTB CRDM CLG UNIT FAN M0T HTR INYS103 (1-1509-87-003-H01) CTB REAC SUPP CLG UNIT MOT HTR INYS104 (1-1512-87-001-H01) CTB REAC SUPP CLG UNIT MOT H1R INYS105 (1-1512-B7-003-H01) MOV IHV-12646 INYS106 MOT HTR MOV IHV-12644 1NYS107 MOT HTR CTB CAVITY CLG UNIT FAN MOT HTR INYS116 (1-1511-87-001-H01) -V0GTLE - UNIT _4 -t/4-8-e
m.s < DRAFT TABLE 9-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Protective Device Powered Number Equipment .l MOV IHV-8098 INYS131 SPACE HTR Z n s co-t 6 4 0047v 4 vuuTLE - UNIT + -3/4 ;-4;
b Z so -t-S For Table ko.3-C <,~) DRAFT ~ ,>. n - o. <.u
a. -a kvarber saw*cment 8utup pro-keNon is pro vioG 4 by / A8 D.54 for +h e.
So//owiny XH/2 fint M/r1 cut MorcrL H rr2 iA y D/ C3 ( t -- /6SS-A T-e c 7 - H 0/ ] > o v - y;; c ,4 f _me s W iAyD':c k s sA cc iered ' av-e:1c m,c k ut v n i > g
/,4 w a
,-m n '!v-aszid i 55,4 $ LAyni g.sp e c, _i1R c> ff aw v i s 'T v'w, pJp l^Y& %* #9 CF "M R E~oy +: ;'
.: : 7,f Q
'1'Cii& = ^,^C E
!,,^, A sr.s &?# M/r1 cut /rx7 Nr72 e cHG
/ A-YDI.3 / Firip Rrr! cut rncron Hr72 ( i-isS S - A *t-c ts-po t) C 1 - 1665-A t-oss-Ho i ) w
ws r.-roue m.3-r DRAFT EtEc SWC-r? /2m CcoL. noeni2 WL3 /A y o s 34 f s./SGS-A '1- 0 o /- H o / ) (s-/SGC-A 7-oo 9-Ho/ ] ELEC $wG./2. M/77 Ccot. mo ron HY/2-14 y O I 3 la ( i- /516-A Y-ce3 -Ho ! ] /Aukup prelee+ien th pre vi ed. by / 6 8 O S 6 lcr th e be//cu>iraf AMIL 90/779 Atr7 Cat.6/2 mo YoM M772 - /8 y O /o3 (/-1556 - A1-co 8 -Ho / ) p+;; n' s u V -en e >R / 6-?/ D /e f DN A~ M suv'- 3:a " w $ m o v' mox w ee un g / :: n e,/ / g r~ : k n ',^ c e umf 125 y^ D : ll ,r: & > a v - e -, is y = in / W }' D ' I 3 f ~.4f5G A'W-f m a
~-eg-,
a g .i6yutid Q S/ne' u rn
~ anse,-+ s sc we ic a-s-DRA:T trin V / H V-A A C - l3jD//?- M eso e s a p?: o' > u V-or i ~r / A V D / LG -E doprc N& R Co NT'SPGA y /?m C e o L. fnoTon M7(7- /8 y0 / 2 9 (/ - IssG-A 7-o t o - Ho i ) msv i H e c 4 /_? }' D '.' ; A AMg ,k-- CMG pr779 /&n Coet-sr7erar?- Hrr2.s ( t -/666 -8 7-o /+ - H e / /8)/D 132 ( / -/ 6 5 6 - A "/ - o /4 -No/) ELEC. sWcr /2 /Em coct.- srporen Hrn- /ByO /3L ( / -/3SS-A 7-oo z - H C/, /-/ssS -A7-ees - Mo / h 4
I n.sec+ 5-For Table. It, 3-r - ~ A F ;- .i A ~ ca. @c-thp pcdediotQ is prods cle.M b \\ A b6@ b 3 %o 4'o1\\ od o g '- ^^ C V IHV-350 W ALy A > e 2 g SPRCC iITOs R c moV \\ M -V ' 8 6b8 H /M A / 60A ^.C H7 m a'l i\\\\N ',G' S h u /AY2!v S?"c2 HW mCc Rm c, col m cTCR. HTR. /MV6/0 7 ( \\ - 1555 - A 9 - o05-H o I) 'P 19 tN6 PEM. FLTR mbTcR. ' HR l AYS/ /o ( l-15 61-N4 - col-Hoa.) re as ec.ecr nwpec. (p16 l'll W *
o'~ 'M
(/-/no - e7-oo.r-No/) G.c,W 9e'P Rm cool msrci2 ++Tl2. / A V6/ /f (1 - 15Es - A 1-Oli - Hot ) SF P eme FA Coot motor HTR IM6l16 C 1 ~ ISGS-A ~1-OI7 - H of) NSctQ NnP motor. RTE. / AV6/ / 5' (.1 - lacas - P4 -008 - Hol) CL6 'TleR. FAN moTOP_14TR. / Af&// 5 (l - 190a-Loq -oo 1 - Hol)
L,a y & reue to 3 < -~ DRAFT C16 Ttdl FAN (noro72. HTR l A 6Y 8) &O C l - 1303 - N4 603) GL6 itcR. r-AN moItit. rtTR. I fr6Y /a1a ( ( 1 - 1 aca-104 -001-HO3) CLC, Tb32. FAN N\\GCQ. tfTE, 1 AGY 8 I 3 A (. l-1909 - Lc4 - CDl-Ho4 ) mov tev m.o s e I M V B!.ao ( 4ee.t.E
iT V- <-
,m,,_ u,.> i w vw gi4 O__ - ~ Q.@f \\LN - \\%n g } Mb%\\ A Q $Pfl^J 'diCN PDd 1 HV - MO 9 AN IR49S!33( @Ccx 'r'nt_.T - mov tev - race + meegia ; I A o'i G 1 3 o f SFt,G.E 'MS ( ^ i ASCb3 M. (L4%lE 'TlA.l\\0EL l N)Gt0T FAQ 0\\cT62. tTTR- .1489 IL 134 C i - 1540 - En - co3 - +tol ) i
ima s s>< rave S.er DRAFT bock.up podedtoc is promciejl b3 (66645- -fi r + h a -ful'ious, q : (Te4 iM - it,090, d 16YG ! $4 spAes wrD4-C roer QIn CtoLG(2 mm2. Wrfc 1 8 Y 6 1 o '7 (, t - 16ss - Aq - Ccto -Ho i ) '*'-?tc M i m #.. - smeE M Pipit 06 PEr0 Fl LTEyt n3itt tf7 16961to ( l-1561 - Mn - boa - hoa) W.0 9 , au _ )! L;R I Bj _S M - 599rs 4-FrP Q CLcu.c em.P en co0L mctd2. R i f6'9 &\\\\5 (1 -1 sss - Arj _ og a _ go,j H5Cid P/nP /nJroe. HTE. \\ 69 S11, 3 (1-19aa-pq _ ooq - tfo I) OL& 'Il0R. 'FPrN ffVrCCL 44T2. I 69 fbi) 9 (_i - I ao a-W4 -co D. - Wol ) C.L6 TbT2-Pf0D MCCCCL 4WE 169 8 tGO (_ \\ ~ 1309 - u 4 - co a - H CC t g.
Insec+ s-ac m k w s-s~ DRAFT C1(y pr W /2. F A W M 0 Y o /2. H *T'72. 1 8 Y 6 l 2. I c i i zo z. - w4 - o o 2 - H e 3 ) ci c,- raie n d m s ron-nra / 8 V 8 / 2 2-( / - / 2 0 2. - WW- 00 2. - NO 4 h V n ie a' l Fe'
C fi A ?
S '&c s M / /5- /8l 0 P Ar #c/rr7P /r?s 7 ort M 772. /LS Y 6 / 24 (/ -/ zo 4 - #G - 00 4 - Ho / mn v i u v-g kno A d ius-23: 7,_; 4 / AV 3rrZw m rL / S f~f 0/71f & CC OL. /Md TC/2. M772 # /8Y6l28 (i-/. css - A r-o/ g nci ) . m i,,/ io/-;,':v, R I6y8l3L 15 pac c HW
&W eJ
'"Y j 2 V 8_W <ssec H-rn O NSc sJ YOsdEf2. ert&L~ ruus/EL ves/ 7-IBy6I36 fA-At,norest-arv2.- ( /-/f+c -B Y-co + -Mc / ) --n-.,-
gsia e i a uo.a-r DRAFT /~3r e A;-up fro-hec 74en is pro vided by /A 8 A 2 9 !o e +he So//c +J iru FHB Pr9 F/L7~6/2. EyH me rc/?. H r/? ( A -lS A2.- A y-co/-h ez ) l i / A y A / o.3 /290 V i H V - i 2./ % h?Y,A 'C'A 5 AtA r C MM~ $ CB Esf O/L.LE/2 tvY/2. /"ini' /Mc7CA HT1 /A yk /06 ( t-tsrz-p7 -coi-p oj) /9H V ' u nl-- !z ?: vR , ' "2. ( / - 4 DP c f sga n n/ i n ns /, i i c R 7it yd i o i <wArf um ?
L.
R ~,m : " ,'"Y L ILYA loQ psm x -~ C2 AhturWL A/c t/w'/7~ f;4A! Afe rcrL H772 IA YA >to (i-isse-A 7 - ce s -r+o t) i CA C 12.- c H/LLf/2. /?srt VE^rrFAA/ Afercre.M77 l A YA / / 2. ( i-i.s3 l-8 7 -coz -Ho/ ) c8 C2 A?EY Ai17. fasl Adercn a w<-- l l A 't' A I I 3 ( i-iss i-2 7-cos -H o / )
\\p a + c roc w e w.s-s-DRAFT AIN cc W pmp m eroi2. nrr2.- /AyA / / T ( t - 12 17 -P4 -oo I - Ho I b T'8 A8 l~/ FC7 YUA/A/8/- V6NT c> W ll7 FA d rrio7z/L "%g f '- !S 4C'&-ces Ho ! C c W PmP m o r c 12. H 772- / A y A / 2. 6 ( i - t ~2-c 5 .P4 - 0 0 5 - H o / ) Lc W Pmp morerL H772 /AVA I 27 L i-12.c 3 - P4 - col - Ho / ) C.cW PmP morarL H 77L / A y A / 2-9 ( i-17.o3 - pn-co 5 - H o f) Alsc & Pm P meTorL H 772. /AYAt3l ( i - i 2.o 2. - p+ - o c i -a c i ) NSCW Pmp rro r or2-H r72 IAYA133 ( i -i2-o 2 - en-- o o s - n o i ) NS c,W pmp morerz. H7-r2. I A YA 135 C1-i? o z -P4 co s -Ho I ]
tosic+ s rer rmz S.3-r DRAFT is - u, ,,, w.- ,a,,. - a s, - n, b//o wi nJ 16 r fhe fHd Pr? f/trG/2. f./Nir trasrort H 77L / 6 J'A / 03 (A - /s4 2.-Nr-oo 2. -No z ) (M[ J / L/ t/ - J ) / / //$-Y ! ' A ;^, ' [ t r i r i-- ^ ESF CN/LLED /drr2.- Prr/P rr?o7 tit Mrri. /6 Y A /0 6 ( / - /S9 L 'P 7- 06 2 - Ho / 41e V /HL/ /2 l0)/ l 'C ?^Pc? rsac V / H V- / 2 / / ? g ,A le 4PM E i-- W O +e a i u J-i t _s,; Q /r3 }',1 < (Gh / 'm Q dB At/X 126/.AY r2tri A/c trio rcre t-l Tri.. /8 Y A / /0 ( t - /f31 - A 1-c o 2 -Mc I ) t C6 Cfl. (?-T'Al A I (2. l~ft Al MdTc G HTT7. I r3 f A / / l (. / - IS3 / - 8 7-c o &- He / ) C6 ELGC EQU/P An1. E S F A /c ins re/ / 0 Y A l l 2. H rrL (_ /- !f39 - A 7-8 0 6 -No /
}.r) h r f I b r-Table. Ib,3 d ('. 6 C 12. C.H/ LLE/2 /2m VEAt7~ FA A/ /8yA//4 n, o r o/7. H7T. l i 53 l-8 7- 0 o 4-- H e/ A/S C.W Pr!?P />1 o 7 D t?- H77L- /8 Y A / /4 ( / - t 2.o z. - P+ - 00 2. - H o / } A/Sc W Pm P rr? o 7a rL. H-772- /8y A / A / ( / - t 2-o z. - p4 - o o + - H o / ) A/ScW Pmp r>io ror2. H r7L / 6)/ A I 2 3 h - t 2 e 2 - f4 - oo Q -Ho / ) AVY ccW Pmp p1o rvr2. H T~f2. I 6 YA-l 2. 5 (. t - r 2 t 7 - P4- - e o 2. - H o l ) CC t4/
M F At o ro /7 H 772 I 6 YA IR 6
( t - 17. 0 5 - P+ - c o z. - H o t ) cc w pm p vvtorv rL HTTL I 6 y A I.1 ? ( 1 - 1 a a 3 - P4 - o o + - H c I) C C t^) PM P M o 70 (L I-FTTL I 6YA 130 (. l -I 2 o S - P 4 -co G - H o I ) / 8yA- / 2.1 o s// 7 017. L / G-H 7~ LS o y' n M rp+r70M C48. o e' /6CP TM )
/ 8 Y A / 3 /
o nt t 7~D /2. LIG.H 7-- A5e y' m(/ 6 Co* r0 4 b i 8 y A-l 3.3 m oA/i TDrt. Lt G-H r /$o >f fIOl/ P/9
lnse d I b r M le 636 e
\\ C Y(k()(9 NOPI'Old C.t (s lltT
/Soi{ T l 'Tb b t N 4 J'To N p c4g, jq = / C C #7 / 9 / 8 y A- ! 5 S srio si 7~0r? LJG-/+ 7~ 8 og i 8o.c k up jo re -fe cho >, th fre Vid ed by / A 6 P 2.9 hr +he fo //s winy rho v^ i ii v' i4 / g y l-l W~ <y" l?r;C S DG8 VE^/ Y )'A A/ ir)07~orL H-772-. / A- )( F / l l [ t -is & & - S.7 - o o1 -H e / ) p7tc-V 'W f'$w R /,4Y'~ll 6 f,ALC l ' r -: DG6 VGAiY fp Al mera rt. H772_ I A-Y l= l I 4-(/ - lS4 /8 7-Do 3 -Ho /) Av)( F W prriP H s E FA A/ more12. p r t?-- lAYVII& ( i -is 9 3 -is 1 -o ci -t+oi) lTrv'r' l H v., -i 2.o.o % i Af "W ~ $ F r< di H < ii- < e D/ Fs EL 7 ~U A/ ^ l E /- / 7~4 A-VE^rr FAA/ /A Y F II 7 m or crt i+7~r7-. C i-1.s40- B 7 - oc i-Ho N r710 ' l ll ' t o C,R v /AYr i IW 5Pr^r c c= Hi iL L .-...----,--c
insec+ s & ma u, 3-r DRAFT x < una m ,. ~ - - inyr: =v S p s,., -
1x 9
4 0 9 e 4
i'g i . ise a-r rw Tobie i v 3-s-DRAFT B crXu-9 prehehoc is ecc6sded b 1 (S B F A :q 3 -Por % 40 \\\\odeg-rrcN i m - ! acos-A le h' P ' # SFr,C MC Aw)C. Flc Pine m3R2. HTR )C69 C-10 9 (1 - laba - Po - 003. - tioC r friOy
I'! -5!5 %
I C'l F i i A 90CE l ! r(2_( D6Po WOT PAC m0 TOR. tFre. 1 G8 Fl 13 (.) - 15(o 4 co A - H o Q osrb WNT FAta mcTDE MTE 169 P M O - Is(o lo 004-H ot } A%)C. FW fY ffE FStd MDTt2. HT9 1 en Pt \\ S~ O -15brG - 6n- 009 - hod /593 rec'! 'M ',Decr F 169 eof',CE H s \\N D f 6TeL Mtht0EL )T48 v6Mr FAO MccW l89 G 1 \\ 7 C - Isso-Pfl - cc.>- 901)
-- ra r-g , llopeF 6 Foe MIe is, 3-g pdh,t4P 1 N I M U - i aosg 1 p,g e,, SPn w g u o rrTuv iiiv i #v% s g aa c, v wnct
a.,,- o, -
o x 4 9 J j
P O. LL - Fsa n, I o"'1
* *;" "" pll,"' "
SAR CHANGE NOTICE 1. ] PsAR CHANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE A/ur Ian e 3.NO.
230 @ FSAR CHANGE NOTICE OTHER 4. ORIGIN ATOR *Ina n Po, m, k#, 5,o,7E_7/g4/yf,, 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR
7. co l, 7.
DESCRIPTION Or CH ANGE ] Q Aga Jesur:g+io n e G s+ ram trenor kr Bis ~down and c ve s Lt + dows, L *n,r. break is o ta han :n ++e lasks. & Rt Vis e d e st rip +** o n o f Eled, tr. s to,,,, g,;lr Inle4;eo, +. o e (IM o t ures nt desig n. feg t $ T G = b
C, ~7. b. (p

4,

S. 0

h

J D ; *1* b

b

0# ) l' $

b

l 3,

), G, (,. j g 4 ATTACHMENTS (w:% **nsert A and g)
Ret:s*J f:m are
7. (r. to G sheris /.../1 Wen f. s vros 8.
REFERENCED SPECIFIC ATIO'NS OR DR AWINGS 7 L L-7 ( 7 6.g - 9 tv10 It 408 s'**l L eP - 0 $ o f 9 0 3 (Eleele is S+rw Boiler.) is 400151-1 ,y ag g59 3 449 - (C A + 353 ( C VC S l-* Id.~n L.o, e) 114 08 I l$ A35$ 9. JUSTIFIC ATION gELOW ATTACHED Adel aos < r.~el. oo s. f so + a,1 aa i:, s.-.., + - < t< < s a staa h..te, d.'s t es s e d s f o a h n,../ sp e s.' /. e c, /. o., r. TUlf C H4^!trt' /1 g e~tWe M 6" e 1D fM'of f f & hett. pr ec. Cw om eNP t O. DISTRiguTION (INITI A L-D ATE)
19. CLOSEOUT ACTION l
ft#EShA A. SER R M CT -f e,, /-- = =.. _ fti -isc g, y v c% ~ e l JWNhnh r ,7 , AJ w .A...... gg y PLA NT DE S. PM (C. AP.,, O N LVI i i. i 2. i 3. 34. '# ra"' 'I "'J; !v",'. ...I io74*c"Ai";... a "".*c"'?,";.. ^" ^ i i h $1lrkti h$W2r/n AlOT ocatutAcc /@T REG vtACv3 ' 15.
/
/ 1'6. @/ 17. 18. .,Pa p o g gon g nanca un gN y cars DATs on E DAfg OATE hf oS $tc,>lrt A z-T- ~
o OP 19 VEGP-FSAR-7 -( 7.6.6.2.9 Actuated Devices The actuated devices are two solenoid valves (HY-10957 and HY 10958) controlling the air supply tc the pneumatic actuators ( of the gate-type isolation valves (HV-10957 and HV-10958, respectively). 7.6.6.2.10 Supporting Systems ( The following systems support the RWST isolation equipment: o Class 1E, 125-V de power supply. e Instrument air systems. Failure of either or both systems will cause immediate closure of the isolation valves and will not degrade the isolation function. 7.6.6.2.11 Analysis i Analysisisprovidedinparagraph7.6.6.\\. 7.6.6.2.12 Periodic Testing Provisions for the periodic go testing of the actuation system 15 l16 at full power are discussed in the Technical Specifications. l 7.6.6.3 This paragraph had been deleted. 16 ( ( Amend. 15 3/85 7.6.6-5 Amend. 16 4/85
.5 OC f f VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.4.6 Sequencing The isolation ~ valve motor is sequenced on the first (0.5-s) step of load sequencing. 7.6.6.4.7 Redundancy Valve HV-2041 is not redundant; however, upstream from that valve, each of the ACCW discharge lines from the individual (, reactor coolant pumps have isolation valves powered and actuated by safety train A. Since valve HV-2041 is powered and actuated by train B, the functional redundance is maintained. 7.6.6.4.8 Diversity The reactor coolant pumps' thermal barrier ACCW isolation valve closes automatically upon receiving either of the high-pressure or high-flow signals, providing actuation diversity. Functional diversity exists in the capability for manual actuation provided as a backup for the automatic mode. 7.6.6.4.9 Actuated Devices The actuated device is the valve's 480-V motor starter. 7.6.6.4.10 Supporting Systems The isolation function relies on the operability of the safety-related, 480-V ac power supply system, train B. 7.6.6.4.11 Analysis 3 ( Analysisisprovidedinparagraph7.6.6.k. 7.6.6.4.12 Instrumentation Annunciator windows are provided in the control room to alert ( the operator on a high flow or high pressure signal from the reactor coolant thermal barrier and auxiliary component cooling 15 water interface system. Separate annunciator windows for high flow are provided to distinguish between which reactor coolant pump thermal barrier has failed. Isolation valve status is provided in the control room by indicating lights. k 7.6.6-9 Amend. 15 3/85
P %.x 1cM s ej,sf e.3'iII, suppAcl se e);~ f,%d w,+ h %. s ate +,.,,, U"* I VEGP-FSAR-7 (connected to the radiation monitor) are separated by a nonsafety-related, seismically qualified isolation valve (PV-2072). This valve is an air-operated, gate-type valve and fails closed upon a loss of instrument air and/or control f power. It closes automatically upon a low-pressure signal ( generated by a pressure switch in the ACCW return line from the radiation monitor coolers. This signal is indicative of a leakage in the nonseismic portion of the piping. The isolation can also be performed manually from the miscellaneous equipment panel in the control room. The status of the isolation valve is displayed on the panel by the indicating lights. There is no separate bypass indication. The automatic actuation signal can be overridden by holding the handswitch handle in the open position. When released, the handle will return to the neutral l position and the valve will close, unless the actuating signal has actually cleared. The actuated device is the solenoid valve controlling the air supply to the isolation valve's pneumatic actuator. } The control logic and isolation interlocks for valve PV-2072 j are shown in figure 7.6.6-5. i, i 7.6.6.6 Electric Steam Boiler Isolation l l 7.6.6.6.1 Description The heating steam for the boric acid batching tank, boron recycle evaporator, and radwaste evaporator is supplied by two electric steam boilers housed in a structure separate from the auxiliary building. The line supplying steam to the auxiliary uilding is designed as nonseismic and nonsafety related, excep .nc saf:ty-related r--H cn fitt:d with-tve train-oriented isolation valves in series. The valves are interlocked in such a way as to shut off the steam supply, should a steam line break occur in the auxiliary building l( downstream of the isolation valves. Each of the two valves (in series) is powered from a different safety train and is automatically actuated by the signals generated by separate instrumentation channels. The isolation fEb valves (HV-19722 and HV-19723) are air-operated, gate-type valves and fail closed upon a loss of instrument air and/or control power. The capability for remote-manual isolation is provided in the control room as a backup for automatic mode. Attempts to manually open either valve will not succeed, unless all actuating signals have cleared. The status of the isolation valves is displayed in the control room by the ( indicating lights. 7.6.6-10
0 b sensers Iseo+cd so 4:<c J;44rran-f 'T k a h y h-h -p o'=f' '* s i n
l' *'* 3 " * ~ ta) 3 y
, S a fe 43 re la+od o g v :p *~.* n+ '* O ms w% % cevilierj bdidiny wh*ea #
s f r e -.
l ffy The<e. aro N vo +< =f etc4ar s.s en s ors c.,) one L qr.-,.s . r,, ra ArJ. % ass ae; + e) J +h each va% VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.6.2 Initiating Circuits i' Each isolation valve will automatically e when d steam k signala au receivedline high-flow signal or any@:- - f th-k. (The W M w,a i.uic_ __ high-temperature
1~r = 1-ar -
A L A u s w a a m m.,. _,,_,_ f,, _ _,, 4 ~_ =.. _.. t b _,.,, a w,, _ _ _ - - .2 __..wwu Avva uwu A 44 raame 1;;ei.wd etkin tha ="~iliar, uildi.g, th: :le c t ri-e hniler ste ; piping 4= rnuted thanunk +'--- rm-c ) The automatic actuation signals "are trein d, wher..c h :cd, and i.' tron a M - derived fron4 safety-related flow transmitters and resistance / temperature detectors; these signals are indicative of a steam [ pipe break downstream of the isolation valves. thmnMd Each valve can be manually actuated from the control room by the handswitch mounted on the miscellaneous equipment panel. 'T.6.6.6.3 Logic The isolation logic is shown in figure 7.6.6-6. ( 7.6.6.6.4 Bypass Neither bypass indication nor manual override of the automatic actuation are provided for the electric steam boiler isolation valves. 7.6.6.6.5 Interlocks The interlocks are shown in figure 7.6.6-6. 7.6.6.6.6 Sequencing The solenoid valves controlling the pneumatic isolation valves are powered from a safety-related, 125-V de, battery-backed power supply and'are not sequenced. (See section 8.3.) 7.6.6.6.7 Redundancy All isolation valves, logic, instrumentatiora, controls, and power supplies are fully redundant and arrat.ged in two completely independent trains, A and B. Each train is capable of providing 100-percent isolation of the electric boiler steam line. The signals actuating train A and B isolation valves are ( generated by the redundant sensors and processed by redundant circuitry in two independent channels (3 and 4, respectively) in the balance of plant process instrumentation. 7.6.6-11 Amend. 11 11/84
& :p ! $ VEGP-FSAR-7 ( 7.6.6.6.8 Diversity Isolation can be initiated cr. either high line flow or high temperature, providing actuation diversity function. Manual isolation capability is provided as a backup for the automatic ( ~ mode. which provides functional diversity. 7.6.G.6.9 Actuated Devices lll The actuated devices are two solenoid valves (HY-19722 and HY-19723) controlling the air supply to the pneumatic actuators of the gate-type isolatien valves (HV-19722 and HV-19723, respe:tively). 7.6.6.6.10 Supporting Systems The following systems supp rt the electric boiler steam isolation equipment: o Class lE, 125-V de power supply, o Instrument air system. ( Failure of either er both Of these systems will cause immediate clerure of the isciation valves and will not degrade the isclation function. 7.6.6.6.11 Analysis Analysis is provided in paragraph 7.6.6. 7.6.6.6.12 Instrumentati:n A ccmmon annunciator window is provided in the co trol room to g alert the operator of high temperature in any of equipment rooms. The specific room may be identified by means of redundant temperature indicators with a selector switch in the control room. Ar. annunci:ter "4ndnu 4a m1aa previded ir. the centrol ccm tv indicete uign Ilow in the electric team Lualet, imme. Isolation valve status is provided in the control room by 15 g indicating lights. \\ 7.6.6.6.13 Periodic Testing Provisions for the periodic go testing of the actuation system lp, y at full power are discussed in the Technical Specifications. Amend. 15 3/85 7.6.6-12 Amend. 16 4/85
7. q. g.7 S+e s m h c " e rado r 6 lowdown 5 e s ic.4;.
7 of if sca
,, s o, + A L s ~ls4 o s

9. 6. 6. cg C4 c.S L e4 d = ""
.nser+ 8 3,., VEGP-FSAR-7 ,( 7, 6, g, g -- 7.G.-0 ' ? Analysis A. Conformance to Nu: lear Regulatory Commission ~ ( Regulatory Guides 1. Regulatory Guide 1.22 Isolation controls and interlocks can be tested periodically. ,(.' U 2. Regulatory Gu;de 1.29 I sc l ation equ'.p.m.ent, circuitry, and
nstrumentat::n are designed to withstand the effects of an earthquake without loss of function.
O > O. ( \\> o 7.6.6-12a Amend. 15 3/85
4 VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.7 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation 7.6.6.7.1 Description As dis u e in - 10.4. 8.1, the steam generator blowdown system is designed to maintain optimum secondary side water chemistry during normal operation and during anticipated opera-tional occurrences of main condenser inleakag or primary to secondary leakage. Because portions of the S are classified as high energy lines, design features are provided to rapidly isolate the blowdown path should a rupture occur in the system piping outside of the containment. C.los ed The two isolation valves in series) per blowdown line are located inside containmen powered from different safety trains and are automatically e-ttated by the signals generated by separate instrumentation channels. The isolation valves (HV 15212A /kg7ho and 15216A through D) are air-operated, globe valves and fail closed upon loss of instrument air and/or control power. The capability for remote-manual isolation is provided in the control room as a backup for the automatic mode. Attempts to manually open either valve will not succeed, unless all actuating signals jg have cleared. The status of the isolation valves is displayed is the control room by the indicating lights. 7.6.6.7.2 Initiating Circuits Each isolation valve in any given steam generator blowdown line will utomatically cloce when a high-flow signal or any one of the high-temperature signals are received. The high temperature signals are generated by sensors located in four different safety-related equipment rooms within the auxiliary building. There are four temperature sensors and one flow transmitter associated with each valve. The automatic actuation signals are trained, channelized and derived from safety-related flow transmitters and resistance temperature detectors. The signals generated are indicative of a steam generator blowdown line break outside of containment. Each valve can be manually actuated from the control room by the handswitch mounted on the miscellaneous equipment panel. g system / 7.6.6.7.3 Logic The isolation logic is shown in figure 7.6.6-7. 7.6.6.7.4 Bypass Neither bypass indication nor manual override of the automatic actuation are provided for the steam generator blowdown isolation valves.
o 9 of // VEGP-FSAR-7 6.7.4 Neither bypass indication nor manual override of the automatic actuation are.provided for the steam generator blowdown isolation valves. 7.6.6.7.5 Interlocks The interlocks are shown in figure 7.6.6-7. 7.6.6.7.6 Sequencing The solenoid valves controlling the pneumatic isolation valves are powered from a safety-related, 125-V de, battery-backed power supply and are not sequenced. (See section 8.3). 7.6.6.7.7 Redundancy All isolation valves, logic, instrumentation, controls, and power supplies are fully redundant and arranged in two completely independent trains, A and B. Each train is capable of providing 100-percent isolation of the appropriate steam generator blow-down line. The signals actuating train A and B isolation valves are generated by the redundant sensors and processed by redundant circuitry in two independent channels (3 and 4, respectively) in the balance of power process instrumentation. 7.6.6.7.8 Diversity Isolation can be initiated on either high line flow or high temperature, providing actuation diversity function. Manual isolation capability is provided as a backup for the automatic mode, which provides functional diversity. 7.6.6.7.9 Actuated Devices ,A thefh D The actuated devices aro two lenoid valves per steam generator blowdown line (HY-15212gand 1 15216A through D) controlling the air supply to t.he pneumatic tuators of the globe-type isola-tion valves (HV-15212 and HV-15216A through D respectively). y h A 4M D
(O of If VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.7.10 Supporting Systems The following systems support the steam generator blowdown line isolation equipment: o Class lE, 125-V de power supply, o Instrument air system. Failure of either or both of those systems will cause immediate closure of the isolation valves and will not degrade the isola-tion function. 7.6.6.7.11 Analysis 1 Analysis is provided in paragraph 7.6.6 ?f p 7.6.6.7.12 Instrumentation A common annunciator window is provided in the control room to alert the operator of high temperature in any of four equipment The specific room may be identified by means of redun-rooms. dant temperature indicators with a selector switch in the cc trol room. Isolation valve status is provided in the control room by indicating lights. 7.6.6.7.13 Periodic Testing Provisions for the periodic go testing of the actuation system at full power are discussed in the Technical Specifications. / r L
N d* g,7 ll 05 / f VEGP-FSAR-7 7.6.6.8 CVCS Letdown Line Isolation 7.6.6.8.1 Description As described in _/:*:Y:r 9.3.4.1.2.1,' the CVCS letdown line functions to maintain a programmed water level in the RCS pressurizer, thus maintaining proper reactor coolant inventory. Because the CVCS letdown line is classified as high energy, design features are provided to rapidly isolate the letdown path should a rupture occur in the system piping outside of the containment. The two isolation valves (in series) are located inside contain-ment, powered from different safety trains and are automatically c\\ sed ::tu;ted by the signals generated by separate instrumentation channels. The isolation valves (HV-15214 and HV-8160) are air-operated globe valvgvand fail closed upon loss of instrument air and/or control power. The capability for remote-manual isolation is provided in the control room as a backup for the automatic mode. Attempts to manually open either valve will not succeed, unless all actuating signals have cleared. The status of the isolation upp valves is displayed in the control room by the indicating ligh ~[p letio n veln. HV 9 ill alt 0 cJo.s
vf *n ne si + of eu4emattully t
7.6.6.8.2 Initiating Circuits , g,;,, a :... yc. n 4 9 n.f(g,, g, Each isolation valve iLthe CVCS letdown will automatically close
8sflo, when en any one of the W high temperature signals is received.
The high temperature signals are generated by sensors located in three
6. s,Y )
different safety-related equipment rooms within the auxiliary building. There are three temperature sensors associated with each valve. The automatic actuation signals are trained, chan-nelized and derived from safety-related resistance temperature detectors. The signals generated are indicative of a CVCS let-down line break outside of containment. Each valve can be manually actuated from the control room by the handswitch mounted " sacrt par. 1. on the -i-c-lisa^^"- c,vf e.r 'Yoerc/ I ma i n 7.6.6.8.3 Logic 0 The ijfation logic is shown in figure 7.6.6-8. 7.6.6.8.4 Bypass Neither bypass indication nor manual override of the automatic actuation are provided for the CVCS letdown line isolation valves.
/d oc / f VEGP-FSAR-7 .( N .6.6.6.2 Initiating Circuits Each ' solation-valve will automatically close when the steam line hl h-fle'w signal or any one of the six high-temperatur'e (. signals a e received. (The six high-temperature signa (y'are generated sensors located in six different safety uipment rooms locate within the auxiliary building; the el ctric boiler steam p ing is routed through these room. These automatic actuat' n signals are trained, chann ized, and (~) derived from safet -related flow transmitter and resistance (_j temperature detector these signals are i icative of a steam pipe break downstream the isolation v ves. Each valve can be manually ctuate-rem the control room by the handswitch mounted on th ellaneous equipment panel. 7.6.6.6.3 Logic The isolation logic 's shown in figure 6.6-6. 7.6.6.6.4 B ass Neither ypass indication nor manual override of t automatic actu ton are provided for the electric steam boiler olation v /es. S' 7.6.6.6.5 Interlocks s Theinterlocksareshowninfigure7.6.6-\\. 7.6.6. .6 Sequencing The solenoid valves controlling the pneumatic isolation valves 7-) are powered from a safety-related, 125-V de, battery-backed (') power supply and are not sequenced. (See section 8.3.) 3 7.6.6.'(.7 Redundancy fEb All isolation valves, logic, instrumentation, controls, and power supplies are fully redundant and arranged in two completely independent trains, A and B. Each train is capable of providing 100-percent isolation of the electrie heile eteirGVC5 l<tdeu line. The signals actuating train A and B isolation valves are generated by the redundant sensors and processed by redundant ( circuitry in two independent channels (3 and 4, respectively) in 11 the balance of plant process instrumentation. 7.4.0 ;r Amend. 11 11/84
/3 of f 9 VEGP-FSAR-7 5 -{>< voI n H v IS 2 l 4,,a e yp e, y;g h +,npan,.f,, e )
d M3 n* l for 4 ( SIGo.
7.6.6.h.8 Diversity 0" Isolation ce.h-itiated on e-it... hi;;h lin: fl:. :: high temperature, r.._J...,Je'-- " "cr ity functLen. Manual isolation capability is provided as a backup for the automatic ) mode, which provides functional diversity. i 7.6.6M.9 Actuated Devices 15 a/4 /gQ t U M ac uated device 4 awe _he solenoid valvear (HY-l'??22 and. ) 7 controlling the air supply to the pneumatic actuators of the pe isolation valve 4.fHV-19fs2 ..m .... ~, r= *p tC t t ' ~ r,,.ylobe. a,J s. te,, o ;g e, \\ q,, l5 21% %~t-4 H v~ H Y % I N O ud H V 8 5 a s 5 f o r-Ve lv e t 9 I (,,3 V 7.6.6.5.10 Supporting Systems Cve.1 le 4 A w yt The following systems support the electds L. l e,. e i...m ' - isolation equipment: o Class 1E, 125-V de power supply, e Instr 2 ment air system. Failure of either or both of those systems will cause immediate closure of the isolation valves and will not degrade the isolation function. 7 7.6.6.%.11 Analysis 9 Analysis is provided in paragraph 7.6.6 M V 7.6.6.h,12 Instrumentation A common annunciator window is provided in the control room to T alert the operator of high temperature in any of $Mfequipment ./ rooms. The specific room may be identified by means of redundant temperature indicators with a selector switch in the control room. An =""""ciatar vinda 1. al v p. : / i d-'i 4a the electrir
t--- h;ile-.
contr-1 m-1: indic:te ki~k
1---
MTHh Isolation valve status is provided in the control roo'm by 15 3 indicating lights. / N 7.6.6.A13 Periodic Testing Provisions for the periodic go testing of the actuation system gt, ) at full power are discussed in the Technical Specifications. Amend. 15 3/85 7c m Amend. 16 4/85
.. ~ .s e ~ A O/YN M)TE 1 opty. A.ns-19122A OPEN 190 ' (g gg my g ENERG
rugo, octu mvl
~ a 3OL VALVE a. gy.gg722 ELECTRK. ATEAF' BorLEC A-ny 19122 MP i riow ow.* A-Tv 19122A N*$ ^ 'Ef7 .y g Asp a sz mreo* (m3 'O"""' A. TV-19122 E A AR.tn C-4 mc,a TEs4P A TY-4G122f NOTES. f NAMt15wtTCH snea BE **Cib ON 00fM no Rn C Gir Mo* *[f6' O (y e m ps g fta$stoON tantTil VALVEl$ ALL1 OPEN 1 V a py. ompggs I to allow csRctar rosEM on rostov6h 4A, #M c-&& ee" ff/'" (massorth sontvt onsoro:3M,sanrcoo. a.yy. 0722 u 2. itAss a to:. ors'.sur4ty, AA,RM C.M Msu TEM ,,,,;,,3 m yl,, 5 Mas i E g A TY.K722M
g. uy. styygg pr 4k wgm o, O
ja '3 l CiO.5E l cxy,A g,< ID122A Cio;f VJ ALAE!1 Rff Dw&5' A A, RM WD
0 '5'
(nr.Ansar2W, PflD Ax* DIS /Cl ** A - t c. f)122 J c' D-AfS'dC~K0E0 ,..a.., e + - :e n tsvP D A., A n. bt2 TJ ~D 2 /& A - TY-4 l:Ent Y.fy'I $72Ef # ("**"'"3 O 4... NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED "Q* u.a,, e.a,an re - wm a. A vv.197: P AA a7M C-StT Nefod !!W (wgQ A iv-o.a o , pf oc p B i aig ~
v. A -za 4;i L'
pcx + 4%J ELEX'TRIC STEAM HOILI R l INSTRUMFNTATION IEIC ceorgianmer A t.cunerse.ssenassasor.aees g n'aca^" ...a.., s j rgctlRF' 7.6.6-6 (Sill:IT 1 OF 2) s
CVT4 g ACTE 1 QNP. A H3= f97Ej$ M(M (P) : auro ('055 CMd fNEA0 PNEu O*EN VALVE 'h', y{ utro m -J AL VALVE ELECTtsC STEAtt soitER. l A-M-19723 , _ gy_,gy,3 opgp
e flow toen A-ty-tsits s Quanussvep A MS.19723A speiya ggrygg AB.RM O $2 *W6uigM9 (M) ro Avro A-rY-19723 6 AB.RM C-4! ** M Tere
W4Y A-TY-19723 r t/OTES n
AB,RM C-64 606M TLMP C ~ V MTIOW wVill sn%LVE13 rutLY Oswn q $ MAND 5WITLH $NAtt gg mgg y om A-yy.19723G TO Altod cittuir to sgst m rymy AB, RM C-66 saw rag ( _- Valvt 'OJorrow sworen A-ty.19123 4 i DE-ENER6 g, ggary A gygg,3yppgy AB.tM C 95 te&u TEMP g, g &,~ W, SQL VALVE A Tv-1972)M v A -HV- /9723 p.uy. p9yg3 (Mar 5WAAD CLOSE QWe A-res-99723A Clost (P) Al A RP1 E!! M : AB, RM D-52 se6a Tf9 P$1D At4b6181-l
~
i A-TY -19?t3 s E D-AE S D - DC - KNA i AB. RM C-44 M6W TEM /' LOO
D'^0 AMSDV2TT TO E83 A TY-1972)x (L*MASsku$
Ab.RM 4u rfMP A - TY -,C-64 s (WW*$ O c h 9723L NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED "Q* as.ere c-ss arca rine (*eweed opc 4-7y.is7:3p AB. RM C-9S naGn rf no M daf 4, A ry- /97/Je \\TQ % W w n =. ~ t CCf BlulVo y M assomies a asv e ELECTRIC STEAtt BOILER T [,,*h,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC N %iaM DIAN I ) uomv i sono unnu a FICtIHF 7.6.6-6 (SIIEET 2 OF 2) D) s
~ i M GXP /-N3 /S2/2A otty (p) - GC2_W* i fusA cpts mor myg - k*
30. vAsvg Annfo Auro

p. ny.p:rgs
/-HV-t32/2 A A, OMP A AB Pet etWr en R. Bag radarene s-ir. Mite N"*'06 2?g$le$r 61 '# A"'# no,hju corneo4 en S-esos N#!SOVE^0 i w vise
t-TY-tsLt F
awa arts o,, a.c,sr (115&V2!! &
ancor riors s-ry.s tig S i i i
s. x s ~. err.cies
(/x$Dy22% i rosa rsas s ry. cgg,, Lf-ENEN \\. r (!15t v22E% % vez vt .__P"f u " O#' * *! ) / sci so wun goa,a , t -HY. f32G A l"NV'fSE$8 h ,Y l naa how o.sy.cgsga J ctose oser, ens-isnea csw m: MOTirb M j
g. w+4 ue /-nv-s:ftgA SMm8V ChWFdi 6
AB. PoJY JEhr~ 2*t 4-Sc4 N"AWSN 4tvf3 s.t.rrfb on 7*Mi.E i sms44 l nt&w Tono /. f r. tgip2] facept ns 146asArt) \\ As.w wr w o ; r croc 2'**'*"""**'"**"**'" o.trr,,,i.,y.is m (<<sw 2 4 -
Q wro w rasave a rmr m n
ro uo w.,,e 7. x m. u ws., As tsim anso er s-car? V c d'en ansman.wirtw ode ruie o-ry.ssen N!"SDv'" W U Aa Mo na /n At-csoa Lm + ry.sesar, Lexsavr>z, TABLE f ,i me st vrCE TR A> N .w VA:vt VA g vi dowD sw. TEr3P Jw rsw sw gsq e-;g,$. l s0 / ADWDOw94sh4f A l-HY*Mf2A 4-NV-tStdA HC*/steA /- TY-4Mt f. F.oi M Imrv. Gs2A pg 1y gy4 ksgts.t,459-9 M -3 l 2 l' A + riz a -rsera .ssnta 1stee soorm ins >vm.eso.a.w.e34 s -*sr e c -estat e -myzc -wec rs sisa-se-aca f 4 P I A P --(Sf//) U -d18ff) U =#5fG') U [ O.v58#A IK 5 DTViS2.-l STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LINE a sa ven.s em ISOLATION 14GIC DIAGRAM ggg FIGURE 7.6.6-7 (SHEET 1 OF 2) esse D i s i
1 l l 1, I i Anett t OnCP, f-A6*f0EKA OPEN 9) C40W ORV'r wm y, y, M~ s' 7 m wAsvf JWFl/ \\
g
,. n.,,n ~~~ . Lo,, A6 port PEnaGT RM R Bas 0 - **s-t6 8 4 A (O W I#7 no6mFeira (-7Y-e de-JPAsP(a As7ed# D Auto A B,Mits o uTatsa R"t 4 C/M (,ygyyg,4},,_ ac wrv t-77-e5w AB, VC57s& psf Aefn RM #C107 gg g f"\\ l Ha6N Tfd 4.rY-fSZIG G J l b l AB, 3G8 Min 24 R-CIOB (,, y ggg ~arre i-ry tsze Af-CNERG k 3G! ALO W W " W (pggg ggg y},,_,,,, set vet Vf s % QSgp
nf=4 ELO6ef FEY

G!dA
f. gy.s5ggA i
[ LOSE GPc!, +ies-cata ciosep): HOTES. A LA R M E. sest ait 4-dW-45264 S w mwe y g
0, fo!f MNf 7RM R-Bug
(!"bN W ustvis $ssign av vaggg; sosen,ag edG N T1/99 f-Ty-t$2/g f &E!T As 7A644 Arsy 2- " D5**!DV.sewt nrsonts en esty : AB,*t'st otti A,reA **rt<m6 r (fX5DV26_)- - f McTome osyst sessygr og m y g,i m e srarse s.ry.rsgyg g o *"w'T M4* on amename i c M*f M273c as+7c.a. i ne, Mt MIA in R-C901 (OSDV219}-- O Gdasp j ons4 worp p-yy.g2gg I AA, J66 Nr er A-csos {/*54 G D b ermo riese a-77.agespp TA M E t 31 A vics repon Soc vAsvg VA4.v1 resne sw IEfe'* dw. FLOW &W. ett MCaS SG r s a m ocn w ti d a t-Ny-fS2 % 4 tw-62g A nu-as-rfyss /-7Y-tRd f,fOCH M-M yg gy e p y s gy., oSs.o,,5q-3 2 B -miss -G40 -/MS 4246 s009 Dang fv5Nn7ft9,tal422! i 3 s .syde -1584 C -d3EC
ddM C E b. dr.lb-ec-o o,n f
I' 4 \\r \\> B l' -tSF/Sp I' ~ MMB 1 ' JSOED l' -'HO iv S D N 15 2 2. STEAM CENERATOR BLOC OWN LINE 7S casiisaatsass em ISOLATION LOGIC DIAC AM DEMU c unmetamousata j FIGtRE 7.t.6-7 (SEZET 2 OF 2) j en. N 'h l s
-~ i aree C402 anwa s e, M j geCB, H6-aza anck (!) : ~ NN q J-My &
f. p6-LEr264 pgwry
&PR 804Ce SRTUAbi '. y le Hf= DAM Mb TO ALITO SIO AB,CW4.LETDoww Ms RMkACT NGn TEW 4 TY t32MD (ta3bv2G2}- AB Cc wv GALLERY Rn R-4 4 rise t TT-dateF (aggfag }_ n A6 ?sPE PfmCT Rn t A09 V j sydstw o-Ty IS2t+G (tsSJW204}- m M WD M - taiUk1 Cwse west gg, c 4 /m'* O > = - < <-Hv-ala r-ur-IS2A caost QMCB, /-N3-ASEM CtDsE I!) NOTES. 8 004aD$mitrCM Jn444 at otib ov porn wo. T/&v intros weLm!E 43 rettY open To Aleth1 Assowo%nTTO. set av smease ave Mrov Jw'TCd AB, CVCS LGTDowN M5 RM Q A01 t TAAIN & PowtA turtry. l MiGM TEMP l-T Y-t$ 214) (fx5Dv2ath-- AS, CVCS VLV GALLE AY AM K-M NIGH TEMP s-Tv-ISted aC QSav203)- QPcP A S, PoPG PENET AM R-AO9 EEF modes I* 4 Z b I A4 bb fi4 l HrGH TKup l-TY-Is to4 L (tsSpV20Q%-
c. s tusa:so-
.s FL R Os, I k SDNis! - 1 av4Y CVCS LETDOWN LINE l m, a sam matusse m ISOLATION LOGIC DIAGRAM hphg FIGURE 7.6.6-8 (SHEET 1 Or 2) i uM s
j _ j I i i l MING SKAnu f A B, CVCG LETDonod M AM R-A01 l NIGN T&MP I-Ti-s5:s5 D (exSDyng } i A Q, CWS VLV G4LLERY RM R-A08 E H G ot TEM P t-T Y= 15ttS C l!'Shv/91)-- -% y gyg my p "Yy*g i I-NY-15315 "f"l I Mt-stGO A E, PIPS PfniCT R M R-A09 Nt4H TCr2D t-T Y-IS2tSG (tr2V Ab DE-E NE A4. ' CLOGE VLV c i y mna f 60' V^lve "" t-a v. 8:4 0 4-NY-tK2tf g ,34 /gg v ttO TG 6 ALARH l. A NO TM nL GOL G NOIO VA L VE A S* CYCS LG TDOW ni NK R M R-A01 4-NY~ 8960 GMALL Sg GutAGilfD TO OPEM VALVt I-M V BIGO MIGH TEMP I-T Y-151I53 (tsspVfMb AMD DE-EMEnLGitED To Ciost, ' "# ' I Aa,cvCs vs.v qAusAY nn R Ae
t. TAAIM A eOws A tstPPLY, HIGMTLNP I. Y f-13 316 K (/gfpyj97 p n J
C avcp A S, Ps9E PENET RM R-A09 NIGH TEMP I Y y.tS216 L (tKSbv/98)- j aEr onss e t to it4Da t:4- + fcg a a. aas-aa-core. 8g l l \\ f Y S D N 151-1 << v 2 i CVCS LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION IDGIC DI4 GRAM g gg a a narmc. euwe, TIGURE 7.6.6-8 (SHEET 2 OT 2) g 4 one o 4
* *f 'y","f3?,* ' "
SAR CHANGE NOTICE 1. PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE & ISOLS

3. NO.
h FSAR CH ANGE NOTICE ISG C.OWbE$ kN(T S h T M FSAR. R.6 VIN EPPOS-T OTHER 4. Il hbN 10 - D - 86 5.DATE ORIGIN ATOR 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR 7. DESCRIPTION OF CH ANGE , _ ~ ~, At o,.,, -m_ pnrie - .,,. j,q 3 yc "'1 G c " "S '-c 4 ,2 cR AH 6E Ft ko RE
7. (. 6
?. To suoW Rev&od 2 09 tokic t%5DNtW-4 CRAN 45 EskoP.c r.r. 6 -6 Tb 5.t%w p.tvistou I c P 1.0 hic AF.5 b tJ 155-1 ANb A F 5DN 155 -2. ATT ACHM ENTS .a' a d v n, 0,", ' n
7. 0 0 ?, ' ' ' ;
$ "i. e. ' - i lo ki c > A BRA *A S I X5b N il4-4 REv Z d AxC DW 155-1 AND (SC-2 4EV l S. REFERE.NCED SPECIFIC AllONS OR DR AWINGS Fi&.u ne s s l.6.6-Z.
1. 6. 6 - 6
% Cs t h,7. riv.rnevnew?~ u u?ran & <4 f JXSbS3 %r-/ seCV 3 )
L -t sa y e t -/
Ake.r- .72703 3 8or-t erv 3 9. JUSTIFIC ATION g Low ATTACHED
f. p.tournaro ent.ver TO MI'c To Q. Eft.Ec.T AS Pho:LT-DEQ W.
rm.e-cwce rw-AA+rcft /AUTMeint%s?~ ,,z ttm 401. c wecs to / ACrvAL s.ac4 7 to n a n naacN s. Cwfts uM rty/
10. OlSTRIBU TION (INITI A L-D ATE)

19. CLOSEQUT ACTION
/ -(.,..... de-a A. SER IMPACT .m c. 4 Ne M"'"'* B. TS/SAR IMPACT / c,. /
0. TS CERT PKG E 'u, A E ~. =
AFFECTED -Ece. .. A. l c A. " "'" PL ANT DES. - -- PM ( C H A P 17 ON LYi ip 13. i4. r@~'"':Lg,"k,::c%:%..., u'f8 =~" ~ = ::.:::~,, ,::~. e":, ::,.., s_,n ,, an iy (/ y () i 7. i s. DATE ON U R R E #e E D A T *. DATE .PPROV E D sv OATE O CumRENCE s l f/Esrnbl% ar meen 1 u.a.E n. > n /I l k
CN NO.,_ _N_ Q _ _ _ FSAR CHANGE NOTICE JUSTIFICATION 1. E<r i e f Description of Change: _ [Cl /F LC6(( b/46 #A2,7f _ .7D AWL tcr CDMec 7'. 44.La rtQ" of /%* r dA Nw f - _ MMS 2. All impacted sections have been identified and revised as required. 3. Categori s:e change (check one): Correction of previously submitted information. Describe below how inaccuracy originated. New information based on design or criteria change. Describe reason for change below. Clarification to existing FSAR section. Describe below why change is necessary. 200kl A/t/M6 6W /* Aladcs 63 TC 1606) CoftSC7 ~ /Nf?)G UM l.M/ fOCA7'7CA/S. /t d Uf4 % FCf CdA/.f/f7-GWC 7 tJ/7% WCH tY EC C d[jf. 4. Determine impact (Y/N): j This change is consistent with the NRC's Saf ety Evaluation Report (SER) Applicable Regulatory Guides This change does not deviate from VEGP Reg. Guide positions. Applicable standard review plan sections This change does not deviate from VEGP SRP positions. Applicable Technical Specifications This change does not impact the Tech. Specs. Other applicable criteria This change does not deviate from VEGP positions. Justify all "NO" answers. Provide licensing precedent on NTOL*s. " 8 y c y
3 b i 4 l e_ :j 1i 2 oz "A l = 33 % de -E r 0 Uo
4. gi,3sE I
f I. E I 3 5t*2 s4 g gp g =4 = eo s .s r a 3 o a [ I t!~i!o
a[,$!$t!
2;g$ %[5l 30 g ! 5 S
!; g. ara.d
-E .u w g a E= $e 5 26rl5 jl g e m 3 5
'i # }38t j".5 h*!
3 E 3, E y = We+4s>i"3 g==g 4 E W g i 4. > g e_ a 3jg g = 1 g2 3I sW ') u e s.o I a E k t '6 Y<V,. o ,g' y, nn \\
tu y
% Rf d .XVd; 4 v 9y ( ; ; C A r } 12 S 'thh lI $1 5 E 34 E LkE 8 CCy 3 2 $3 f } s ~ t + f. + l !5 h! 5 f E I !si si* f i t r y L i c 4 *4: e f'l O a ~ = ,. e 8 e e
a. e.
W o o 1 e l 1 1 .~ o 2 1 y h h?. =I v v g
e. e i
3 I E 2 i 8 l? E o 9 2 u O i t r g 3 1 3 2 j'1 l i 8 jk, ! N n o = s ? 5
I 5
e 4 14 ! i 1 e : g i r Ia:v.;r s o i e [ a l 3 d o 444G f ..,-..s. -1 -== - i
fi y,w 'e o n l wo u ,v yag r p t c ra g ,g n a N o g g vt O ar g ag p oP MET RI 1 t ns A 2 a r r r, E. ~ s N v rn RLC 5 oi 5 sa EIOT A' E g' e euT
L r
er L ar 1 zo ot I BO g', s r s. N v ro 7, i En cc D R ,. o t D o y ' r, e m y rg 5 e D Tnu o CMP ,a s$ yl s A X o s N vs n - s E a A E **c.*wa GTOEM 3 %' ,, c s T ~ i e I S CA n R >. ~ ,an A o OSO C'PnL i ir I s 4 a L R ,a 9 r M A '" a Cr E EL e C O dn " ,r s B t o R ao LI K re s t s w n di s,An Y s v ORA o c RTE o a T e. .ao L ewTCR ac, s E t NEB ~ l r L w F t OL sNo Av ' " D,, a. e l s AwOMs r,rt L A sa CEE g o u S w P u i a 7 - s r T v o t I P ~ e R S ga ni r A o E n Q LC e t U E m 1 N, p g y, x q C E A ? e ( (, MP t l 'g; m2 27 4 x e l 0 0 l N96 C ~ tf Yte f z taA c; (y n F e E ~, f ~ y j wE g(g g u m p i / h t'., xX E g V P G g U R. 7, >/ S 2,. w f K f CP L y Q 4 IM N ";o. Av 7 C E g A c r R d D o pf e f A o D t [ nV /~ 1 ~ E T O M ]0 c C p' Q g j ]* ~ ^ g 2 e y e V g ^' E s U n s A g (B w 'o e n a g, C* O (* a h c (P l se 09 A o g-s s ) 1 2 t N M, 2 b v I 1 e s R i E9 t ~ o f / ww_ t O L - M s e ir H@f I V o Or ' P e r r s r a M E r T r A B-T c r e T A ' t a w 2 r s mT r A 2 M! o m a E r 2 A N r .v* u v V 1 9 A4
6 M
~ 2 a f s Q-1 u, #2 w2 W T N ; Hr q 1 t o c s 2
s. t wll,]ho&9 i
J z 3Y2 2 qz 2 e l 3 s 2 r c7 s a i H M-ee e e s C r f 1 n O r P I D, i n-A RL c 9 a.
n. n s.
a 8 - ~, W,y a. i m. v F n r - aY T n-M v 9.,_ t*r ,v oe M n',. y a iv Wv r .s r C .r v (e _4Q 4 a e t-E K s 6 t a
y. rAa A A L
t 4 AA Ma We 3 i#e E O (Q / ~ T 0 M t. C A AiA sm e hj s, 4 I l l
l s I l g
g1l g
l ]*

jl i
gslsyg 6 ^ g1 al * - l .Ia1Ig l .j
e T + s 1 2 ACTE J s secr. A ns-tert 2A twn IM ' q' clost , opeu susao y esto opsu vava y v^ LLECrRJC STEAM DOJL GM. A *NY'lS'AO Ey A y.j QPCP s /"40W hn0N A-fY-lor &CA W8W , g3,97,3, f7 ? ^^ ^3% TO AU T MW 3 l2 ^*e M
IE/9*
5._. a l A -7Y-10 8F yoyg$ g AB, RM C 64 MGM tim n i MANO$dlTCH $NALL et oogg ON O .__a l A-TY.90r23(e " -~ V motoON UNiel Myl13 full y OtwM \\ gj
48. 4M c 44 ese rum Y j ff,j',7 ',',,, g " '"' "
( 5 4-7Y-/M8 4 3R 'y"l,Yg 46.*M & 96 *6" 'E M
" ^ *

w ciou m w,,,aar3 m
4 '_TY-/9'!3 " _ -J A-HV !9At3 u,_ fgygg g ( b J 1I Clo.sf 4 on o. A-us-19713A ctosa (P) II ALA RM g1 err am - l1 AB. An D-9 m 11AF (me,,,g pgio A,4pe18y-l t A - n -!*^t3 A e o. Auso-ac-kozA AO' g y 400* D'A6 AMSDv2Tr TOR $J ae. en c-so use reno lg A-TY-MPEGL ( E* 4a.4n e-as uma riae Cv IluCLEAR SAFETY REIN ED "0" gl A.ry. Isras p g_.- n QPCP sI As. nn c-es usu rr#* 4-Tv /srese N "'-_-_, B EECEiEL "d' - ___8 W toi aarrus SE0064A POWER COGAPAuf a ALven w. v0erLE mucLEAa ptant lj COIITROL LOGIC DIA6 RAM l g ELECTRIC STEAM B0llER i A PIPE BREAK ROOM PROTECTioll ll A X a A r,. oc., g A a.<= sue covsraverm
m. er x y
/x w scau= uo~e
==
cv mm kir re. X M7bf% At > 30,
o.,,,
AX5Dll155-2' l na stvssiont DAff DA Cast SUPW gGL Eat Cef E. P. E. 4 A t. } f] (,, gyp [ 7,(,( 7,
" m *Vic Rev o. Dck !
- _ - - - _Q'_ye- _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ H
f
ef""",',,g" SAR CHANGE NOTICE c
1. 6 j PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DisCtPLINE
'e l#' r
3. CN NO.
FSAR CH ANGE NOTIC'T OTHER 4. I' 4 Il b/' / O /3 j / 6 / ORIGIN ATOR 5.DATE 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR 62.I n n./ % 3 7. DESCRIPTION OF CH ANGE Add cter.4.'c<d:o., c.,, d ie.s, I M a,1 l.. ~ csw a.1/ it' 5 ? / *' 4 c,.c / 3 /a y ATTACHMENTS; F, q u..e S. 3. l - z si, n f, G 1. l - 1 (, o,d 8. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DR AWINGS TsA R.se c +/o,, /r o.g 9. JUSTIFIC ATION gggow ATTACHED In respons e to NR A re a d ca+ 4 tch n h */ s ee.'/. c al.~De m h dVT *5 An* % ec/c o f lo}.20lS 6 lo e.le rify des f ru vs.se h analsis d % e l.s hrf
f. we.s y

10. DISTRIBUTION (INITI A L-D ATE)

19. CLOSEOUT ACTION YES NO g
i S WPM - / O ARCN. OCONST. Sv5T ' / OC/S IAPE NO. i,et_b "a "A ggg ggg g @ ELECT. W O APE NO. OMECN. OPQ AE (CH AP.17 ONLY) gg y gg / u. m m O PL ANT DES. OPM (CH AP.17 ONLY) ty 1p 13. 14. (USMITTED SY DATE REVt ED gy D TE APPROYEDSY DATE APPROVED av DATF (G R UPV (NUC UPSU .) (DISP. CMEF ENG.) (NUC. CHIE F ENG.l ,s or 7 hn yly/d f'N W6T AFRufRt2 ^/0T AGdO/A & { t / y. Vs f i [g ty 1 s. APPROV ED ev DATE CONCURRENGC DATE CONCURRENCE DATg DATE (Pros. ENG (C u R NT) (,4555 5UPPUE R) ll / 6 Ao-ofr e eie. '
r- - CN NO. _ Q f_ _ _ _ _ s FSAR CHANGE NOTICE JUS'IFICATION 1. Brief Description of Change: _f-j '%Wi ch'7' D . C.Lg4 0; v' 77Mr La JKar2 2_C-X__ _.' Wer VM1 F /J _AffL+103 /Ai 7>t r J F E f' f 2-f:. iWS 2. All impacted sections have been identified and revised as required. 3. Categori:e change (check one): Correction of previously submitted inf ormation. Describe below how inaccuracy originated. New information based on design ce criteria change. Describe reason for change below. Clarification to existing FSAR section. Describe below why change is necessary. (L Ald/P/CA7/DA/ M& OrfM BY RfC M PMY OF 7%CH f/Gi-
'd i' / Z W /dA.
y7/f f fN NOR P 6770Al Ad O M /I ( VLECW I'L. Y A &'A L VCI'E23 /A/ 67'7/ &Y2 Ff/)Le 1 E'C7'ICM-pf 4. Determine impact (Y/N): This change is consistent with the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Applicable Regulatory Guides This change does not deviate from VEGP Reg. Guide ptaitions. Applicable standard review plan sections
This change does not deviate from VEGP SRP positions.

Applicable Technical Specifications
'This change does not impact the Tech. Specs, e Dther applicable criteria T.his change does not deviate from VEGP positions. Justify all "NO" answers. Provide licensing precedent on NTOL 's. ? o A O
r I VEGP-FSAR-6 () 4. A break representing the largest double-ended rupture for which only dry stear blewdown occurs need not be presented. Studies (reference 6) have shown that this break size is typically smaller {l than the largest split break (no entrainment) for which blowdown for the split rupture will be more severe than the no-entrainment double-ended i rupture at any given power level. C. Postulated Break Location Break location affects steam line blowdowns by virtue of the pressure losses which would occur in the length of piping between the steam generator and the break. The effect of the pressure loss is to reduce the effective break area seen by the steam generator. Although this would reduce the rate of blowdown, it would not significantly change the total release of energy to the containment. Therefore, piping loss effects have been conservatively ignored in all blowdown results, except in the small double-ended The ruptures in which moisture entrairment occurs. effects of pipe friction are conservatively assumed to be sufficiently large in this case to prevent moisture entrainment in the reverse flow, thus minimizing water (, relief to the containment. 6.2.1.4.1.5 Availability of Offsite Power. The effects of the assumption of the availability of offsite power has been enveloped in the analysis. LOSP has been assumed where it delays the actuation of the containment heat removal systems (i.e., containment sprays and containment air coolers) due to the time required to start the emergency diesel generators. Offsite power has been assumed to be available where it maximizes the mass and energy released from the break due to: A. The continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps, which maximizes the energy transferred from the RCS to the steam generator. B. Continued operation of the feedwater pumps and actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, which maximizes the steam generator inventories available for release. wwt -w n% u., ~ G Au dm-n:u J 'u - l 4x % W m u d q ~ >26 ~ L w,, 4 .A 6.2.1-
r_ e l _~ , 11.. l j __u e.. .g m.. ? ..I5 i r. St I..g l f *:.*?
==. d.5II
f
? m 6 - = 1 7 i 3.r. .d g- , j.. M. r 33 i t 1 1,'t ; ; 4 s t-9 s,e a t P i
,go.

i. + = =.
a;; i.,, s; ,.r8 ,8, 3; _a.. 4. t ,a i.=#' . p. 3 _..i 6 +
2..
i-. a y. p .I i .-.s.
^

u 8
_I-i i __.a- .'m. ... =. s -~,, i,... s. u r-f f I . i i,.f.4 w. 4 i i . i qm-
= =.
...:u i .i g ,i !. r t . *. ~ 1 .a s .c
=..
s 3 ._"_ l 3.. i _. a i 5 f ._~ . i I ' i,.. -i i a .' '- f. I r 4 =.* i y., 's
i T
~. e u r f i r i 1 I* .. i '1 a. .i 4 l l I .4 ..e a I .l [ e e i .q . } 1 .*t**- 8 s i f 2 jr i L'- 4 f = 1- , t. m ..=.. <,1 m ' ' -i Ie:. J .Io i ' i .e t-. j
i. :== ;.,.
i . i..,, .i j =- .s ir, i u ' m' i an. m I 1 I
I 1
I 1 f 1 m.:.. m.. <-~ .a s r ......c F
e. u..s..s..s........u
.=..<c.e......8.
. :.e e
.so. ' C' .. u. :.
y'.!. * ".W.;.Q.t" * "".* *'
(EDTI. This is the design basis case .t__ '.!VN-2; '. ! T;. aC* 12 see.=da As diaa.-=.d la section 15.0.8 , 4. . ' / ,' : * ?, ?,,:..".m,. ;r..;, la assumed in the safa y .-w.....:,.a...u... analysia.) .m... i - 4 ...i.....:........ ......,..:y .e. m
9..s
.u.., ...n..,. n.,: e....,... c...u
o......:
L ..w.. ....r..,.m.ce........ .~4 i .w. ....c.,.s..... r w .,,..ee. ......c e c.. u..,.e.... v..
e. -e :--..

u. n
,u .,......c.....u..:..r..,, w .a.. x, . -.c.v.... =..,...... - =.. w.. ,..c 1' m :..a.,......, q ~ ... u. . v....y..
.,.

.....ow...S*.*
m [ - O'. - I ,.,.s..,. e 1.. ...c.......... t' ~ . s i i [. j ,,,,,,,,,,, se atned f or use in i. en F53. 1X30-AA MO2A REV 1 VOGTLE SAFETY LOAD SEQUENCING TABLE E LECTRIC GENERATING PLANT Georgia Power (TRAIN A, UNIT 1) unit i 4=o umT 2 FIGURE 8.3.1-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2) p 1 i i (
= < 5;fy,",' "'" SAR CH ANGE NOTICE i. PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE ! W

3. NO.
FSAR CH ANGE NOTICE OTHER 4 JNM/ytl / NL E/9 Il/6I/p 5,DATE ORIGIN ATOR 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR 3 7. Y 7. DESCRIPTION OF CH ANGE AEFL EC7' del E r/Osl OF AUo/8LE OL44A DAl SE/SA1/ C JW ITC//ES ATTACHMENTS AG E$ 3.7. tf-/, ~ 3, -9', d @O 788LE 3. 7.tf-f t/frJ / h 8. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DR AWINGS LDO /// JA~c XsdC,03 MV E 7US CN1N4[ NOTICt fWEACEoES CN ]M' ~ 9. JUSTIFIC ATIO N l l
10. DISTRIBUTION (INITI A L-D ATE)

19. CLOSEOUT ACTION ics NO

41..... 2
>[,I f, 6 A. StH liviFieT / g:,?, fG % wa B. TS/SAR IMPACT
ELEC, APE NO. 2 C. TS CERT PKG
/ ..c.. ... E l c........, AFFECTED ..l........L., 1 lp 13. 14. G" P { (N OUP UP .) ( Dt.P. C N, F NG.l (NUC. C.4 F N C.) II,Ill8/ \\ f trA.w Aior A e&uitevJ por xEduwe6va \\I ' 1 I 7. I 6. ^" " ^ " =^" rit fna r fc ";=l"'~c' re,"it", ", ', lll // bib N o 7* A G 12 u / A C VJ LAO-O'774 3/s 2
CN No.___ ff/ FSAR CHANGE NOTICE JUSTIFICATION 1. E<r i e f Description of Change: /f EAC 6'Cr _ 77/E 4dleWCC of __ j?QOrdL E.Al ALM S ON STffA4L( S W i rC H TS (LAttf f b ESCL / fri cit / OF VEG/' /N S7>f O.AA C4 M 7'/cA/ 2. All impacted sections have been identified and revised as required. 3. Categorize change (check one): Correction of previously submitted information. Describe below how inaccuracy originated. New information based on design or criteria change. Describe reason for change below. y Clarification to existing FSAR section. Describe below why I1 change is necessary. 1 PCAA /AlC OMEc VL y' s7y17tVJ 77/47 /(J/ PC / ' /49o +Vo /& E 4L.44^1 t 77/E SLMA1. 4)lt6W god CD, 6 >t+S GooED 7v 7ME 7>et6C. D e. .?. U/Ill0Ur 7?/F cue /StM7'tCA!, t7' Af/O44f' 77/47 LD9dov7 /J Dit Ec t. c m o r u >c w c rf i?M P M <> MM mt!' dE F6M rN70 PL+v44cc 4. Determine impact (Y/N): This change is consistent with the NRC's Safety Evaluation 1 Report (SER) Applicable Regulatory Guides / /d I This change does not deviate from VEGP Reg. Guide positions. Applicable standard review plan sections 32Y This change does not deviate from VEGP SRP positions. Applicable Technical Specifications This change does not impact the Tech. Specs. Other applicable criteria ANJZ A//8 f I This change does not deviate from VEGP positions. Justify all "NO" answers. Provide licensing precedent on NTOL
s.
77/c t/E& s' bEf/4,N / M s s e~E w! Dttet/rs m ist/ 77/ f s n s?- o tJ t Trf NaC se6 tt/ EtJ6'>tS 7;b erf C 4'4st& C.9 4);e L AO7 t ImMCr 7VE waC} l/NdDe J?&o && cf 7?P-E //6 4 /* DVJbd
9 Per drawing CX5DT101-123, Rev 1, the seismic triggers and switches have the following setpoints: TAG NO. SETPOIlff AXSH-FUNCTION HORIZ. VERT. 19,922 TRIGGER 0.015 0.015 19,923 TRIGGER 0.015 0.015 19,920 SWITCH 0.170 0.230 19,921 Sh' ITCH 0.230 0.320 The triggers serve to initiate recorder start and also initiate audible and visual alarms at the Seismic Monitoring Panel in the Main Control Room. The switches provide a visual alarm at the panel which serves as an immediate indication to the operator as to the order of magnitude of the event. This indication may be used by the operator to quickly differentiate between an actual event and a spurious impact load (such as a load dropped from a crane). This can be done since the switches have higher setpoints than do the triggers. The triggers alarm (both visual and audible) and initiate the recorder start at lower setpoints than the switches. Thus, when the switches have actuated, an audible alarm is already present at the panel and an additional audible alarm would be confusing and unwarranted. Intynf T* The system as configured meets the requir_nc.m of R.G.1.12 in that alarms (both visual and audible) actuate upon recorder start to advise the operator that an event is in progress. The O g rster mesi Limu Loke the- ___ _., %i.icn: at tha canel m At:-rmine if 000 limits-have Men
c'*d*d Th e.s e ss m :c. swhks providez v isva l e n n en e ss -},.,,
In ft ), j, e e, ir Sh1 Con $rel w k,, -}-), e ;,. Sa c +p), e roo m t %cdea'. 7k ts is s cufhb}, Qg o,, -ph 4 ,,t of e rde r ~:li know a <ven+ is e c.ur,i,,3 4ran +1, e a v dio s d vyn j c la <n ass o c :n +o d *IO 1h' +" '55 < a seJ cn loo K f,, t h e ds J= 1 a s s* 'I"h d "'Sh
he s v,' M -
J0786007/JRB
VEGF-FSAR-3 ( 3.7.4 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 3.7.4.1 Comparison with Regulatory Guide 1.12 Seismic monitoring instrumentation for VEG2 consists of time-history accelerographs, peak recording'accelerographs, response-spectrum analyzer. and seismic switches meeting the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.12, with the exception that response spectrum recorders are not supplied as discrete instruments. A spectrum analyzer permanently installed in the ( _/ control room presents more information than that presented by \\-) response spectrum recorders. Data from the strong motion accelerometers are fed into the spectrum analyzer to produce earthquake spectra immediately folicwing an earthquake. All locations where response spectrum recorders are required by the regulatory guide are monitored by strong motion accelerometers. This system achieves the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1. Table 3.7.4-1 prov2 des a comparison between the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.12 and the VEGP installation. Since both units-share common buildings and the expected seismic response is the same for beth containments, only one complete set of seismic instrumentation is provided for the f t site in conformance with American National Standards Institute Standard N18.5, Section 4.4. Additional seismic instrumentation is installed to better evaluate the effect of an earthquake on building structures. 3.~.4.2 Location and Lescription cf Instrumentation The fellowing instrumentation and associated equipment are used to measure plant response to earthquake motion: nine triaxial /hh tim?-history strong motion accelerometers (SMA) with two hf seismic triggers, four peak recording accelerographs (PRA), two l19 e seismic switches, a response spectrum analyzer, and a system d% entrol panel with recording and playback equipment. (See figure 3.7.4-1.) The seis=le instrumentation is normally c_: pared from the ncn-Class lE, uninterruptible 120-V ac powdr supply. The system also has a self-contained power supply with a 30-min capacity for those cases where normal power is lost. Inservice surveillance is addressed in the Technical gg Specifications. \\ 3.7.4-1 Amend. 19 9/85
VEGF-FSAF-3 One PRA is mounted on the reactor ccolant pump motor at el 210 ft. A second PRA is located on the steam generator at el 185 ft. The third PRA is on a residual heat removal (RHR) pump in the auxiliary building. The fourth PRA is mounted on the nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) piping outside the lyg ( auxiliary building at el 220 ft. Data from the PRA must be 5 ( manually retrieved following an earthquake and are used in the detailed investigations for particular structures, systems, and equipment. (' ') 3.7.4.2.3 Seismic Switches O One triaxial seismic switch, with a her: ental serpoint of 0.17 g, is installed adjacent to the SMA in the containment tendon gallery on the basemat. The second seismic switch is located on the containment operating floor at el 220 ft and has ~ht@. a vertical setpoint of 0.32 g. ar: b::h p devices ehich-actuate visual and audible annunci tors in the control room. 7kse 3.7.4.2.4 Response Spectrum Analyzer A triaxial response spectrum analyzer is used to analyze all the SMAs once a seismic event has occurred. It will also initiate an alarm if an operating basis earthquake (OBE) limit has been exceeded. The response spectrum analyzer consists of a microprocessor-based computational unit and a printer unit. The computational unit is operated in conjunction with a tape playback system. The analyzer computes the response spectrum from the recorded dat? The alphanumeric printer unit prints response acceleration versus frequency in a hard copy form. 3.7.4.2.5 System Control Panel A panel located in the control room houses tne recording, playback, and calibration units which are used in conjunction SMA sensors to produce a time-history record of the w e ( -tn ak t also contains signal conditioning and display equipment ass (ciatedwiththe response spectrum analyzer, audib1: n d-v2 ual annunciators associated with the seismic switches an esponse spectrum recorder, audible and visual an unc ~ s wired to display initiation of the SMA recorder, and .e power supply components for the equipment contained within the panel. 3.7.4-3 Amend. 19 9/85 l l
VEGF-FSAR-3 ( 3.7.4.3 Control Room Operator Netification Activation of the sei smic 6bLt-:r,- ..es causes an audible and visual annunciation in the control roc.T fo'al$rt the plant operator that an earthquake has occurred. (W-3 7 ?d 4Trds i"4"nci = H en i; set-t cccur :t ?M -am ey eiven /eismic b r triggers initiate the SMA recording system at acceleration levels which are slightly higher than the expected background level, including induced vibratiens from sources such as traffic, elevators, people, and machinery. These initial set-points are based on experience in ex: sting plants and may be changed once significant plant operating data have been obtained which indicate that a d:fferent setpoint would provide a better SMA system operation. The peak acceleration level experienced on the containment tendon gallery is available immediately following the earth-quake. This is obtained by playing back the recorded SMA data from this location and reading the peak value for this data from the printer unit. Response spectra from the free field tendon gallery and the operating floor are available in the control room, following an earthquake, on readout equipment suitable for comparing the measured response spectra with the OBE and safe shutdown ( earthquake (SSE) response spectra. \\.. Gs d's ~ s ed :s
S M b ' ' S ' '
pa rag rq i, 3 7 4 p. 3 v,, sa l, c. d. a 1, o., a 3.vs e 3.7.4.4 Comparison of Measured and Predicted Responses 5 " Y' h ##Y "af> P have f.en The plan for utilization cf the seismic data includes both the ex c e e4 - function of the operator and engineer ng to evaluate the effects of an earthquake on the plant. For a detailed description of the data flow refer to figure 3.7.4-2. Initial determina' tion of the earthquake level is performed immediately after the earthquake by comparing the measured response spectra from the containment tendon gallery with the OBE and SSE response spectra for the corresponding location. l[ If the measured spectra exceed the OBE response spectra, the plant will be shut down and a detailed analysis of the earthquake motion will be undertaken. After an earthquake, the data frer the se:smic recorders and fEL recording instruments are reviewed. See fi gure 3. 7. 4-2. The data from these instruments are analyzed to obtain the seismic accelerations experienced at the location of ma2:r Category 1 structures and equipment. The measured responses from the SMAs, the FRAs, and the response spectrur analyzer are used to determine the respense spectra at the locatien cf each Seismic 3.7.4-4
e p g p m LJ ^ ~ TABLE 3.7.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2) SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMEt3TS Tramwlal T i mo-H i s to ry Triaxial Response irlaxial Peak Triasial Seismic Instrumentation _(oca_glon Acce l e rog raph Spec _t_r_um Reco rde r Acic l e r_og raph Switch Sessmic Ireqqrr RG 1.12 SRP RC 1.12 SRP RG 1.12 SRP RG 1.17 SRP RG 1.1P ? Itl' _.R_en R m yIGP._ Re a._
R_e_L, VEGP A%_ R_eA VEGP Re g R e_%,
yJ_G P At Heq. V t Gl' l. Free Fleid Requirement - Location '*I 1. Free field - 500 ft 1 1(1) f rom structure
11. Inside Containment
[ Requirament - Iocatinn [a,,) [4) I *I 1(2f k Yl81g) ,A O *I 1 1"' ' $17) I I 1 Hasemat - Tendon 1 1 o n (g ) l 0) i hl, s' 9
I I * 'Y
] kjl 2. Structure - Operating 1 1 1(3) o o ig ir ) o n i s, y floor 3 u)' 3. Reacto-equip. - Reactor coolant pump g, motor 1 1 1(81 14. Reactor piping - 1 1 1(9) Steam gen. [ 5. Reactor equip. or piping support - Pressuri2er support ha) 1 1 O *I I til. Outside Containment Requirement - Location 1. Seismic Cat. 1 Equip. - RHR pump c c 1(10) 2. Seismic Cat. 1 piping - NSCW piping c c 1(11) 3. Seismic Cat. 1 equip. t g support or floor-gb) Control bldg. slab (
S.. '.1 O ' I 1 n >> T I w O } t ( ? I' t G r c 'e I q V oe q s a nn 1' *q e 4 r o l 15H c ic ? o-m 1 s cs i 1 q o e e o n S GR re R cb cef c fi o l' s c G e, e a e f m V g s e 7 f nh e S s: Pq i htf mey t He tav oL s S '. t )y s 1 a eY E L q e 4" e 1 r e lG H_ r A T t c4 o p I' u G v o *M k h, I e s ar V o s ) ea u P g_ 2 ex c o Pq cJ 7) l F ar Re C C O ie SR aE c r nl s t 'N ae ? e d s 2 e c l r rc o s A q I 1 T c ecC e E G R_ e w1~J m r H E gf f o s H ,d d o m aG 1 r u - WP S P f(, ( r 4 ( er G 0 0 l t f. me J se t o c 7 nd V r nRS . 1 or e t p 3 po A n s sc h / o - e x 4 ee Pc 1 c e r C RR Re s u 4 0^ mf SR e n g 7 l m d^ h o i au ? t p f A 3 ir 1 mt s oA n e n ac q 1 L / i r i P? E ie e 1 L rp G f_ i o n s a? t H ) ) l f s h TS B e A [ad t o %[1) 3 c m, d i o b a T P 1 ) a t i C 6 7 o o e a ro ) /1 So l o t c h I ( n l r< d f t l i mw/ yp V ( 1 1 1 r s o ra d l or at g 7 u9 u o t i s o_ Pt 0 O 3 o r d n 7 t xir Re /; d t e e ev6 3 aHe il SR a n r m i rWe W e o r u h E aP C. ree 2 c c e r p Tmc 1 r f t a ic e C. m e s r o t s p i g E TA 1 q z o h . r n L e 0 O o Y C G R_ ly rA n r n l o r w e L. C R a n a oLi i e o le r
t. 4 ws t
z h e ROM c y s c a u g g m t l c o 4 n d u nU o a s a n sww o i c g l r nfi a e y o l n r an p-imsl d c V c o b r ed g b t C/ A > t i iprr snb l r e e n w m m o e t / s a ou b o p v u t u u t ie c I oo et t s hW s a n r n i o li San g a n r t t .f r di n r e l a o c l h qC t n ar. tnA i e s e a - nu l n n l d e p c e o i Cogt eo-dt et o he a n n s i m of df nf gf p a o - t i t_ ctl n h0 l O e a s sl e e t a irb0 eI t s rA s s h mo 2 t 2 p e 6 e? r / e n t s n sp e. ib l1 s? oO-- t o n t e ipn m e t tl dtra e e A s d o p e r L e e natl ul il nV n s r a c SsAe ICss F e De e A"c e e a t r S D R P S t e sn t I is 5 (. 7 o . b c d e f o N a g@h H@ Wy*
bl t. "Eo0 0 f"E-SAR CHANGE NOTICE I ] PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE N E

3. CN NO.
FS AR CH ANGE NOTICE pff ( g g\\ Af p,(g fyggyg(gggf 0 *'"** CH406 E Ao?Cf / YO l 4. 5.DATE lO b / I O ORIGIN ATCR 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR co. r. i 73.i.7 7 3.13 9 Y / 9. k a 9 y r is. 7. Y 7. DESCRIPTION O'F CH ANGE k(V//E" & AVACCC? /W V CVNW? O SlY O O CS/GN 8kS VS fW N E" /*/ f A/(o f W l W Y/oAl S/C?CW Cx/M UCT-J Yt%, hf6 poet. ' 44vouac, ,d u rco s ac, ps.tr RC/0 Cw 7" cX 44 t/S 7~ f Yt*7'Gy AA'a in f E t c c h st C4 C. .s evus.vAHLrs w Ex M v/ ~ JY/7-m. ' \\ fit 7t.W / ATT ACHMENTS : l d6 MCY' d/2D .. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DRAWINGS Lho 099 Oc - 1000 - A x' 'la 704, x yt9 710, Xyt+ 7t.2, xMziV, x yi92/ s' 9. JUSTIFICATION ED lNCOA W i"e LOD Cff NNl[ll $$$ Ol W )>C'f/48 AA SlS NW fxest upc" 70 %euy.,,r., ope.,,,a e " Yq ie. u.g. geyri,,e
10. OlsTRisuTION (INITI AL-D ATE, 19.
e* -aUT ACTION YES N0 c ARCO. a CO = v..v v. / A. SER IMPACT aCi. s A= NO. iNM B. TS/SAR IMPACT X ati.ECr. a Aes =0. 3 s ECs.r. W e T u A <C A u O <,, C. TS CERT PKG a 'ANr DE.. " o ~<C A.nO i.,, AFFECTED f.y.,.,a - n. ,ym, ,y n t@"p.ti /g., re s : .t ~., =^ J. c.= 2. n r.:::.,3:n..., =^" = ^ " AVtkt1 Os t -wor sewa eo so7 A'en m cw 1 iy - g iy g i 7. i.. =^" =^" ="" (t::r::.r ft=r,-~~/ ter.=::, f' h - y/WK Ator xe&cieec l
}., S$ C//AV66 Alor/Cc~ YS/ Mecr6M fMSS -3, - Y, - 5, -4
4. 3, / - 1,
.2 TedLC 4.S./ -/ .rretrs l-f 7y14c e 4 c.1-3 sycers
-y 7 3./2 -f,
,2 ?. 3. /3 - / 7194 L E ?. Y l-) .t#enrrt /-J 9.Y2-3,-t
1. Y 5 -l
-J - J -r -4 -f / / / / / /y. ?. </ -C -7 g / / 8 7%dL C /3 7.Y-/ stee'rs //2 h96cc /S. ?. V - 2 1 etirre J/ 74d CC /S.1. 4 - 3 h S mh
( .) g' l /f A H\\KFA / f VEGP-FSAR-6 [ g [/ f6 6.5 FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEMS Several plant features serve to reduce or limit the release of ( fission products following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or fuel handling accident. This section provides a discussion of the function of the emergency filter systems (sabsection 6.5.1) and the containment spray system (subsection 6.5.2) to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The design of each of these engineered safety features (EST) is discussed in other referenced sections. Chapter 15 addresses the radiological consequences of postulated accidents and demonstrates the adequacy of the fission product removal and control systems. Other sections provide the design bases and safety evaluations which demonstrate that the design and construction of these systems is commensurate with acceptable practices for ESF. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring redundancy, isolation from nonsafety-related portions, seismic classi-fication, conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (section 1.9), suitability of material for the intended service, Class 1E power supply from onsite or offsite sources, qualification testing, and capability for inspection and testing. ( 6.5.1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES FILTER SYSTEMS l The ESF filter systems include the control room heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system discussed in y section 6.4 and subsection 9.4.1, p.; 21.;t;i :1 ;.--trrtirn
:t-- dir::: -f i rd :::ti:2 0.1.5,'the fuel filt:; :;ix::
handling building post-accident exhaust system disEussed in subsection 9.4.2, and the piping penetration filter exhaust system discussed in subsection 9.4.3. The performance of the systems under postulated accident conditions is discussed in sections 15.6 and 15.7. The post-LOCA purge exhaust system is nonsafety related; it is discussed in subsection 6.2.5. 6.5.1.1 Desian Bases The ESF filter systems are designed to accomplish the following: A. The control room HVAC system ensures that the radiation exposures to operating personnel in the control room resulting from a design basis accident, as discussed in chapter 15, are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Dedign \\. Criterion (GDC) 19. l 6.5.1-1
ff3 g/f,,f oo, n'f roses d ~ % I* " WlO racpeb 4o Ems pkcre. wkt k use.s M A-r =hh are s a.re. ~t A to) A ^ h*qaiide pressure d teg=k f. 7 3py B. The piping penetration filter exhaust system is designed to maintain the pipi..g pcnctratien cre et 2 preeeure of at le2et 0.25 in "C helet adjacent areas to prevent uncontrolled exfiltration of potentially contaminated air and to minimize release of airborne radioactivity to the outside atmosphere resulting from containment and penetration area leakage under accident conditions. The piping penetration filter exhaust system ensures that the offsite radiation exposures resulting from the postulated post-LOCA leakage in recirculation piping, as discussed in sub-section 15.6.5, are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100. It also ensures that the emergency core ,8 9 cooling system and containment spray pump rooms can be purged to allow access for repair and maintenance of the equipment. C. The fuel handling building post-accident exhaust system is designed to maintain - a -ini="= ef 0 25 in et sligkN -+ -WG-negative pressure within the fuel handling building Y following a fuel handling accident to minimize release of airborne radioactivity to the outside atmosphere. The post-accident exhaust system ensures that the offsite radiation exposures and exposures to operating personnel in the control room resulting from a postulated fuel handling accident in the fuel handling i building, as discussed in subsection 15.7.4, are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, respectively. bl. e electrical penetration filter exhaust syste ensur ~ at release to the outside atmos e of airborne ra 1 vity resulting fr ontainment leakage under acci e ndit to the electrical penetration room is min e. he electrical filter exhaust system ma' ns the electr enetration area at a pr re of 0.125 in. WG below a t areas l20 to pre-uncontrolled exfiltration of potential aminated air. /7 EI The failuro of any active component in a filtration system, assuming loss of offsite power, cannot impair the ability of the system to perform its safety function. JF/. The ESF filter systems are designed to remain intact and functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake. 6.5.1-2 Amend. 20 12/85
VEGP-FSAR-6 ( G. The ESF filter systems are designed to be consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9. ( The design bases for sizing the filters, fans, and associated ductwork are discussed in subsections 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3, and 9.4.5. AWWT /) 6.5.1.2
System Design
D & dA y 6.5.1.2.1 General System Description The control room emergency ventilation and air-conditioning system is described in section 6.4 and subsection 9.4.1. The piping penetration filter exhaust system is described in subsection 9.4.3. The fuel handling building post-accident cleanup system is described in subsection 9.4.2. [_Ti._ ^= 3,_ ' :trir:1 ;rrrtriti:n fil;e. .. de e..L.; in rub:::tir: ^ t.qf" Flow diagrams for each system are shown in the appropriate subsections. 6.5.1.2.2 component Description Each ESF filter train consists of a moisture separator, a heating coil, an upstream high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, a charcoal adsorber with fire detection temperature sensors, and a downstream HEPA filter. The filtration trains are connected to fans with direct drive motors, associated ductwork, and controls. Specific component design parameters are provided in table 6.5.1-1. The filter housing design provides adequate space for filter maintenance and inspection. The housing is fitted with the necessary ports for testing. Pipe, cable, and conduit lh penetrations are sealed to minimize leakage. Access doors are marine-type, bulkhead doors with gas-tight seals and double-pin hinges. The charcoal adsorber portion of each filter train is provided with a fire detection system and a water spray system to allow deb flooding of the charcoal bed to prevent bed ignition from radioactivity-induced heat. Fire protection systems for the carbon adsorbers are discussed in subsection 9.5.1. The electric heaters provided for air filtration units are designed to reduce the relative humidity of the entering air stream mixture to 70 percent from as high as 100 percent. 6.5.1-3
l VEGF-FSAR-6 ClMe bo E[C3 /32$1b/bbk lu ode.omPoaeaf leolca92. 6.5.1.2.3 System Operation In the event of a LOCA, the piping, penetration 2nd electrie:1 penetratien filter exhaust systemf function 5to limit and reduce the potential release of fission products fren the penetratien WHMMW Specific details of system operation following a LOCA are provided in subsections 9.4.3 and 9.4.5. In the event of a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building, the emergency exhaust system functions to reduce the fission product release from that building. Specific details of system operation following a fuel handling accident are M provided in subsection 9.4.2. In the event of high radiation levels in the control room outside air intake, the control. room emergency HVAC systems provide the control room with a filtered supply of air. Specific details of system operation following a LOCA are dis-cussed in section 6.4 and subsection 9.4.1. 6.5.1.3 Design Evaluation A. The performance capability of the control room a emergency filters and the design of individual components which ensure the capability to perform the safety function are discussed in section 6.4. Control room doses resulting from postulated radiological accidents are given in section 15.6. "hese doses are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19. B. Component descriptions and safety evaluation for the piping penetration exhaust filters are provided in subsection 9.4.3. Dose analyses of post-LOCA leakage in recirculation piping is discussed in subsection 15.6.5. Offsite radiation exposures and control room doses resulting from this leakage are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, respectively. C. Component descriptions and safety evaluation for the fuel handling building post-accident erhaust system are provided in subsection 9.4.2. Dost analyses of postulated fuel handling accidents are discussed in subsection 15.7.4. Offsite radiation exposures and control room doses resulting from these accidents are within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GD; 19, respectively. 6.5.1-4
l l ) VEOP-FSAR-6 6-D. m onent descriptions and safety evaluation for th elec - al penetration exhaust filters are pr ed in subsection .5. Dose analysis of po ed post-LOCA containment kage to the rical penetration area is discussed in s n 15.6.5. offsite radiation exposures cont room doses resulting from these ac ts are shown to ithin the guideli a ues of 10 CFR 100 and 10 C A ix A, GDC 19, respectively. O g. The control room HVAC system, the electrical pon.evo*4nn c41*or avkn"et eyeta=
the piping penetration filter exhaust system, and the fuel hancling building post-accident exhaust system each consist of two independent and redundant filtration trains with respect to active components.
Should any active component in one train fail, filtration can be performed by the other train, which is powered from a separate Class 1E electrical bus. Failure modes and effects analyses are provided in section 6.4 and ,~ a d.4.3, and ^.';.5#' subsections 9.4.2,4 9 AFJ'. The ESF filter systems are designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements. The components and supporting structures of any system, piece of equipment, or structure that is not Seismic Category 1, and whose collapse could result in loss of safety function of the ESF filter systems through either impact or flooding, have been :nclytic:lly 63# cheched to determine that they will not collapse when subjected to seismic loading. F)I. The ESF filter systems are designed and constructed to be consistent with the recomrendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52 as discussed in section 1.9. 6.5.1.4 Tests and Inspections 6.5.1.4.1 Preoperational Testing The HEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to - installation in accordance with MIL-F-51068C,22 mcdified by Mucicar Regulatcry Commission Mcalth and Safety Infermation Issue 300. The HEPA filter banks are tested in place prior to operation to verify efficiency of at least 99.97 percent with a cold-generated, polydispersed, 0.7-um mean diameter dioctyl phthalate aerosol in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N510 and conforms with Position C5.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9. 6.5.1-5 e
A R pnF T/ VEGP-FSAR-6 AT ( The original and replacement batches of impregnated, activated carbon are batch tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9, prior to loading into the adsorber section. Tests include particle size distribution, hardness, density, moisture content, impregnant content, ash content, impregnant leachout, and elemental iodine and methyl iodine removal efficiencies at postulated accident conditions. The charcoal adsorber is freon leak tested prior to operation to verify less than 0.05-percent bypass. In addition, a laboratory test of a representative sample of the impregnated, activated charcoal is performed to verify iodine removal efficiencies in accordance with Position C6 and Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9. Air filtration units are tested in accordance with ANSI N510, as discussed in section 1.9. Design and tasting of ESF filtration systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guida 1.52, as discussed in section 1.9. Fans are tested in accordance with standards of the Air Moving and Conditioning Association Standard 210.sa Moisture separators are tested in accordance with ANSI N509, ( paragraph 5.4, as discussed in subsection 1.9.52, and are capable of removing at least 99 percent of tha entrained mois-i ture in an airstream. The drain design and the accessibility of components and provisions for maintenance are in accordance with ANSI N509, as discussed in section 1.9. t l 6.5.1.4.2 Inservice Testing i l Inservice testing of the ESF filtration systems is conducted in accordance with the surveillance requirements given in the g Technical Specifications. i l t 6.5.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements j Controls and instrumentation for th cm trol room HVAC, piping '--4a4eer penetration filter ":t.., and fuel handling luilding post-accident exhaust systems are discussed in section 7.3 and subsections 9.4.1,
9. 4. 2, #9. 4. 3,
" !. ^.. Instrumentation is summarized in table 6.5.1-2. Each system is designed to function automatically upon receipt of an ESF actuation system signal. Fans can also be controlled from the I control room. The status of the ESF filter systems equipment 6.5.1-6
l i i -T VEGP-FSAR-6 ~ gR/Af)T /' 3g ~ / TABLE 6.5.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF f) J' h' g ESF FILTER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS (FOR UNIT 1 OR 2) b Control Room Emergency Filter System Quantity 2 (one on standby) 3 Capacity (ft / min) 25,000 HEPA Filters () Number of stages 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal filter) Cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in. Pressure drop Clean (in. WG) 1.0 Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for 0.3-um particles Charcoal Filter Bed depth (in.) 4 Face velocity (ft/ min) 40 Average residence time (s) 0.25 per 2-in. bed depth Filter media Impregnated coconut shell Decontamination efficiency 99% at 70% relative humidity (for elemental and organic iodines) Filter capacity 2.5 mg of total iodine per gram of activated carbon Moisture Eliminator Eliminator media Spun glass fiber Maximum pressure drop 1.0 (in. WG) Efficiency 99.7% for 2-um and larger particles Heating coil Heating capacity (!cW) 118 Heating element Finned tubular Heating coil 80% Ni/20% Cr Fan Quantity 1 Type Centrifugal deb Static press (in. WG) 14 Motor (hp) 125 Cooling Coils Cooling capacity (Btu /h) 1.09 x los Air entering temperature 82 dry bulb, 65 wet bulb (*F) Air exiting temperature 50.5 dry bulb, 50 wet bulb (*F)
l A VEGP-FSAR-6 [ Dgg-y/# '/ L i 3 TABLE 6.5.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF ) g Water entering temperature 44 r (*F). 6 Water exiting temperature 56 (*F) Piping Penetration Filter System Quantity 2 (one on standby) Capacity (fta/ min) 16,000 S HEPA Filters Number of stages 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal filter) Cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in. Pressure drop Clean (in. WG) 1.0 Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for 0.3-um particles Charcoal Filter / Bed depth (in.) 4 Face velocity (ft/ min) 40 - Average residence time (s) 0.25 per 2-in. bed depth Filter media Impregnated coconut'shell Decontamination efficiency 99% at 70% relative .~ humidity (for elemental and organic iodines) Filter capacity 2.5 mg of total iodine per gram of activated carbon Moisture Eliminator Eliminator media Spun glass fiber Maximum pressure drop 1.0, (in. WG) Efficiency 99.7% for 2-um and larger particles Heating coil Heating capacity (kW) 80 Heating element Finned' tubular Heating material 80% Ni/20% Cr Fan g Quantity 1 Type Vane axial Static pressure (in. WG) 15 Motor (hp) 75 Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Filter System (shared by both units) Quantity 2 (one on standhy)
p f[ VEGP-FSAR-6 wpr./hoh/ l LU TABLE 6.5.1-1 (SHEET 3 0F g)V - v v 8 Capacity (ft / min) 5000 HEPA Filters Number of stages 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal filter) Cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in. Resistance Clean (in. WG) 1.0 Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for O.3-um particles Charcoal Filters Bed depth (in.) 4.0 Face velocity (ft/ min) 40 Average residence time (s) 0.25 per 2-in. bed depth Filter media Impregnated coconut shell Decontamination efficiency 99% at 70% relative humidity (for elemental and organic iodines) Filter capacity 2.5 mg of total iodine per gram of activated carbon Moisture Eliminator Eliminator media Spun glass fiber Maximum pressure drop 1.0 (in. WG) Efficiency 99.7% for 2-um and larger particles Heating coil Heating capacity (kW) 20 Heating element Finned tubular Heating coil material 80% Ni, 20% Cr Fan l Quantity 1 h Type Vane axial Static pressure (in. WG) 14 Motor (hp) 40 D e l
^r j / I[ ~ VEGF-FS$R-6 pW M yk/ ~ ~ / T LE 6.5.1-1 (SHEET.4 AF 4) j 7 Electrical Penetration 11ter System (' Quantity (one on standby) 8 Capacity (ft / min) 6000 NEPA Filters Number of stages 2 (one upstream and one downstream of charcoal filtar) Cell size 24 in. x 24 in. x 12 in. Pressure drop Clean (in. WG) l.0 , Loaded (in. WG) 2.0 Efficiency 99.97% for O.3-um particles Charcoal Filter Bed depth (in.) 4 Face velocity (fts/mi 40 g.25 per 2-in. bed depth Average residence tim (s) 0 apregnated coconut shell Filter media Decontamination effi ioney % at 70% relative humidity (for elemental organic iodines) Filter capacity 2.ksgoftotaliodine N r gram of activated caVbon Spun \\ Moisture Eliminator less fiber Eliminator media Maximum pressure drop 1.0 (in. WG) Efficiency 99.7% Ior 2-um and largeF Heating Coil \\ l Heating capacity i kW) 20 Heating element Finned dubular I Heating coil material 80% Ni, 20% Cr Fan i Quantity 1 Type Centrifugal Static pressure (i. WG) 10.25 Motor (hp) 20 l ~.. l \\ _r
T[ VEGP-FSAR-6 ( ir g J/ ( TABLE 6.5.1-3(SHEET 1OFp%) DATE: m F ESF FILTER SYSTEM MATERIALS Control Room Emergency Air-Conditioning Unita Estimated Material / Quantity per Chemical Housing Component Composition (lb) Filter housing ASTM A-36 Moisture eliminators Eliminator medium Spun fiberglass 6 Holding frame 304 SS 445 Total assembly 304 SS 1004 HEPA filters Filter medium Glass fiber with 5% 48 total binder Separator Aluminum foil 83 total Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 829 total Charcoal filters Filter media Impregnated, acti-8905 vated coconut shell charcoal Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 9364 Electric heater Element 304 SS; ASTM A-240 252 Casing 304 SS; ASTM A-240 283 Cooling coils 4625 dry; 5208 wet Coils Copper; ASTM B-152; 2950 UNS-C11000 g Fins and header Copper-nickel ASME 92; 1086 s 58-111; UNS-C70600 Casing 304 SS; ASTM A-240 497 l l l
~ o VEGP-FEAR-6 k fY 0 r u-j / TABLE 6.5.1-3 (SHEET 2 OF y ~ ~ DA, Estimated Material / Quantity per Chemical Housing Component Composition (1b) Exhaust fans Housing carbon steel; ASTM 610 '** A-36 Blades Ex-Ten 50; ASTM A-607 60 e S e-e a L t
VEGP-FSAR-6 f y)(/AM// taste 6.5.1-3 (SHEER 3 Or /Pj. ping Penetration Room Filtration Units Estimated Material / Quantity per Chemical Housing i Component Composition (lb) 1 Filter housing ASTM A-36 O Moisture eliminators Eliminator medium Spun fiberglass 5 Holding frame 304 SS 254 Total assembly ASTM A-240 1127 HEPA filters Filter medium Glass fiber with 5% 128 total binder Separator Aluminum foil 221 total Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 2211 total Charcoal filters Filter media Impregnated, acti-5446 vated coconut shall charcoal Hol61ng frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 5408 Electric heater Element 304 SS; ASTM A-240 210 Casing 304 SS; ASTM A-240 200 Exhaust fans Housing ASTM A-283 grade D 294tb Blades Aluminum, ASTM B-108 21 totalics 8
s VEGP-FSAR-6 [ Y l , h, f% TABLE 6.5.1-3 (SHEET 4 OF Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Cleanup Units ( Estimated Material / Quantity per Chemical Eousing Component Composition flb) l Filter housing ASTM A-36 a l Moisture eliminators Eliminator medium Spun fiberglass 3 Holding frame 304 SS 114 Total assambly 304 SS 592 HEPA filters Filter medium Glass fiber with 5% 48 total binder Separators Aluminum foil 83 total Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 829 total Charcoal filters Filter media Impregnated, acti-1918 vated coconut shall charcoal Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 3019 Electric heater Element 304 SS; ASTM A-240 63 Casing 304 SS; ASTM A-240 187 Exhaust fans Housing ASTM A-283 grade D 148cb> Blades Aluminum; ASTM B-108 5 totalici Sk. l t l
VEOP-FSAR-6 gJA V / f: TABLE 6.5.1-3 (SHEET 5 of 5) y 7 r Electri 1 Penatration Room Filtration Units / / Estimated b Material / Quantity per Chemical Housing Component _ompositi n (lb) Filter housing ASTM A 6 ob Moisture eliminators / Eliminator medium Spun fibd:gl as 3 Holding frame 304 SS 114 Total assembly 304 SS / 393 HEPA filters Filter medium Glassfiber with 5 200 total binder separators Aluminum foil 345 total Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 3455 total Charcoal filters Filter media Impregnated, acti-2355 vated coconut shel charcoal i Holding frames 304 SS; ASTM A-240 2630 Electric heater Element 304 SS; ASTM A-240 68 Casing 304 SS; ASTM A-240 175 / Exhaust fans I b Housing Carbon steel; ASTM A-36 110can Blades Ex-ten 50 ASTM A-607 15 Housing weights cons % of ps11 material only and do not a. include stiffening or roll sEEjFes. b. Housing weights consist of outer casing and flanges. Blade weight includes only blades and no studs. c. 1 i i -, _ _ - - _.
VEGP-FSAR-7 7.3.12 CONTROL BUILDING ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES HEATING, VENTILATION,,AND AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM 7.3.12.1 Description The control building engineered safety features (EST) heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system provides a proper environment and temperature for the Class IE electrical O under postulated accident conditions. equipment and personnel, both during normal ope It also serves to reduce or limit the release of fission products to the control building following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident or fuel handling accident. Except for the control room essential HVAC system described in detail in section 6.4 and subsection 7.3.6, the other subsystems of the control building ESF HVAC system are as follows: 1 A. Control building safety feature electrical equipment I l rooms HVAC system. B. Control building HVAC equipment rooms ESF ventilation i system (level 3), b l ..... _,. u. u a w m.. _..:..... l C Control building auxiliary relay rooms ESF air-l conditioning units. i l A detailed description of these systems is given in subsection l 9.4.5. M W itten, ::...l.;t.-~ir:1 p:n;t atien fili...i.-.. g.o m
^="=e nya *-e 21 -w aiiciran +1
$: -~10 5. 5. -l. w 7.3.12.1.1
System Description
A. Actuating Circuits 1. Control building safety feature electrical equipment rooms HVAC system components (air-conditioning units, exhaust fans, and ascociated dampers) are actuated upon: h Safety injection (signal A and aignal B). a. b. Manual initiation. 2. Control building HVAC equipment rooms ESF ventilation system components (control room ESF (. chiller rooms exhaust fans) are actuated upon: 7.3.12-1
VEGP-FSAR-7 a. Control room ESF chiller room high temperature. b. Manual actuation. Aslah Electrical penetration filter and exhaust syst omponents (filtering exhaust units and the a ciated dampers and heaters) are actu ed upon: a. Con inment ventilation isolati (signal A and si al B) 4 b. Loss of of te power. c. Manual initiatio The electrical p etration ooms isolation dampers are actuated on: a. Cont nment ventilation isolat n (signal A a signal B). Manual initiation. J Jf. Control building auxiliary relay rooms ESF air-l conditioning units are actuated upon: a. Safety injection (signal A and signal B). b. Manual initiation. B. Logic The control building ESF HVAC system logic is shown in figure 7.3.12-1. Logic is designed in such a manner that a momentary loss of the control power will not prevent or reverse the safety actuation of any equipment and the reset of the safety injection signal will not trip the actuated equipment without deliberate subsequent operator action. C. Bypass Bypass of each subsystem (except the. auxiliary relay rooms ESF air-conditioning) comprising the control building ESF HVAC system is indicated in the control room. Such bypass may result from either control power failure, system component failure, manual override at the component level, or transfer to local control. The bypass indication logic is shown in figure 7.3.12-1. The manual override capability is 7.3.12-2 i
ASW T/. VEGP-FSAR-7 7.3.13 AUXILIARY BUILDING ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES HEATING, VENTILATION, AND AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM 7.3.13.1 Description The auxiliary building engineered safety features (ESF) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system performs the following safety functions: O e Maintains proper temperatures in safety-related switchgear, motor control center (MCC), pump and heat exchanger rooms during postulated accident conditions, station blackout, and manual conditions. Mimimizes the release of airborne radioactivity to th r e 3 outside atmosphere resulting from
-tai._.... le;;_ J g
/ f " Fcondition.r r' 212:-=into the piping penetration areapilter: uring an acciaent yj M MG O
11.,. t
--f
_; 1...
Aces =4
l

.t r;i

:ti"- 14 -4 d 1-The system maint ins a negative pressure in the piping penetration area and filters the exhaust from the negttive
,(, pressure boundary. The auxiliary building EST HVAC system is comprised of the following two systems: e Auxiliary building ESF room coolers. Piping penetration area filtration and exhaust system. e Both systems are described in detail in subsection 9.4.3. 7.3.13.1.1
System Description
l A. Activity Circuits 1. The ESF room coolers are actuated upon: tabs O e Safety injection signal (signal A and signal B) or an automatic actuation signal generated by actuation of the corresponding equipment (pump or heat exchanger). fEb e Room temperature high signal, o Manual actuation. For details see figure 7.3.13-1. e 7.3.13-1
VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4.1-2 (SHEET 1 OF 3) deide. NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CONDITIONS j' Space Temperatures Relative-Buildi:1g/ Room Building / Maximum Minimum Humidity Pres sureca> Area ( F) ( F) (%) (in. WG) Control Building / !9 Control room 80 70 50' +0. L25 Computer room 80 70 50'l +0. L25 Battery room 80 70 50'l -0. L25 M(50 < b> 10 Offices 80 70 Electrical 100 g -0. L25 penetration Y# W areas Central alarm 80 70 50cb> station All other areas 100 65 60cb> Containment Lower containment 120'd* 60 50'I 60 50'D*' Upper containment 120'C Main steam and main 126'h' 17 (g) feedwater valve e area Fuel Handling Building Fuel pool area 104'd 40 50' * -0. 25 All other areas 104'S' 40 60' * -0. 25 Auxiliary Building Piping penetration 100 40 / 60' ' -0. 25 All other areas 100 40 60'r' -0. 125 Onsite Technical I Support Center CRT display, 80 70 5G - 10" +0. 25 computer, and communications h Work area and 80 70 (g) +0. 25 conference room Battery room 80 70 ( ) +0. 125 Toilet and corridor 80 68 ( ) +0. 125 All other areas 85 68 ( +0. 125 Amend. 9 8/84 Amend. 10 9/84
VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4.1-2 (SHEET 2 OF 3) Space Temperatures Relative Buildi ng/ Room Building / Maximum Minimum Humidity Pres sure'
Area
( F) ( F) (%) (in. WG) b Turbine Building 104 40 (p1 Radwaste Solidification Building Control room 80 70 50' ' +0. 25 Corridors 80 60 60'P' -0. 125 Polymer storage and 75 50 (q b) -0. 125 drumming area Mechanical equipment 104 60 (f) -0. 125 room 6 All other areas 104 40 (p) -0. 25 Radwaste Transfer Building Corridors 80 60 60 dd -0, 125 All other areas 104 40 (p) -0, 25 Radwaste Health Physics Building All areas 80 70 SO VI +0 125 b Radwaste Transfer (A) 40 (p) -O 125 Tunnel C-b Equipment Building 120 40 (,p1 b Auxiliary Feedwater 120 40 (p1 Pumphouse NSCW Chemical Control Building Office 104 60 ( ) All other areas 104 40 (; ) Amend. 10 9/84 1 1
VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4.1-2 (SHEET 3 OF 3) Space Temperatures Relative Buildi r.g/ Room Building / Maximum Minimum Humidity Pressure ta> Area (*F) ( F) (%) (in. WG) Diesel Generator Building 120 50 (e) Plant Entry and Security 80 70 50' 8 +0. 25 2. Building er recr preccure ic in refcrance to the at=^ephere_ Blank cpaccc arc at atacapheric pressure. b. Manimum relative humidity. c. Temperature is not centrolled du ing accidente er emergency _. -conditiens. d. Relativc humidity will reach 100 percent during a lecc-ef-coolant accident er main cteam line break, e. Relative humidity ic net centrclled. Q,)$' Tank areas containing boric acid shall be 65 F minimum design. 6,j/h Relative humidity is not controlled during accidente er crergency ccnditienc. C. /' Space temperature to be designed to a 10* rise based on the 5-percent outdoor air ambient temperature recommended by ASHRAE.
1 vet,r-rSAR-9 AT /v / 7 C. During fuel hand l,ing operations, the ventilation system maintains the fuel handling area at SO'F. All other areas are maintained baiow 104'F. The FHB is maintained at a..,.' 3*Ne. passm M ne D. . 0.5 E T with r g respect to atmosphere. E. Redundant radiation monitors are provided in the exhaust ductwork to detect high radiation levels. If high radiation levels are detected, a signal isolates the normal exhaust system and initiates the post-accident exhaust system. (See section 11.5.) F. The normal subsystems function only during normal operational modes. The normal supply and exhaust units are isolated in the event of accident conditions. G. The ductwork is arranged so that short circuiting of input air to exhaust does not occur. 9.4.2.1.1.3 Codes and Standards. Conformance to Regulatory (,.* Guide 1.140 is described in subsection 1.9.140. 9.4.2.1.2
System Description
9.4.2.1.2.1 General Description. The normal FHB ventilation subsystems are shown in figure 9.4.2-1. Flow diagrams are given in figure 9.4.2-2. Component data is provided in table 9.4.2-1. The subsystems consist of two LOO-percent-capacity supply air handling units, reheat coils, two 100-percent-capacity exhaust units, two recirculating air units serving the spent fuel pool area, one recirculating air unit . serving the railroad corridor, and associated piping, ductwork, dampers, registers, and controls. The seismic and quality classifications of components, instrumentation, and ducting are given in table 3.2.2-1. The components are connected to the normal 480-V ac system. 9.4.2.1.2.2 Component Description. l A. Supply Air Handling Units Each supply air handling unit consists of a filter, heating coils, a cooling coil, and a fan. Each unit { 9.4.2-2
/L 1 ( VEGP-FSAR-9 ( ~ e Alarm on low airflow. e Position indication for isolation dampers between the normal'and emergency systems. I e Indication of the operational status of the fans, e Indication of radioactive concentrations in the exhaust ducting. 1 9.4.2.2 Post-Accident or Emergency Operation of the FEB Ventilation system The FEB ventilation subsystems described in this subsection include those which function during emergency or post-accident conditions. 9.4.2.2.1 Design Bases Q.. 9.4.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases. A. The FHB post-accident ventilation system is designed to prevent exfiltration of contaminated air by filtering and exhausting air from the area after the area has been isolated from the normal ventilation subsystem. A single failure will not prevent the system from operating as designed. B. The post ceident veitilation subsystem is designed to maintaiK _/0 L.. ".- iogative pressure within the area followi $ a fuel ling. accident. ) C. The FEB post-accident ventilation system is powered so that the failure of one class 1E power supply cannot j impair the function of both ESF trains. D. The FEB post-accident ventilation system is protected from the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and external missiles. The subsystem is designed to perform its intended function following a hazard such n' t as fire, internal missiles, or pipe break. F. 9.4.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Desien Bases. The post-accident / ventilation subsystem does not operate during normal modes of \\ plant operation and so has no power generation design bases. 9.4.2-4 1 _... ~ _....., _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _
~. f [ / ( VEGP-FSAR-9 9.4.5 CONTROL BUILDING ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (EST) VENTILATION SYSTEMS several features serve to reduce or limit the role ase of { fission products to the control building following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or fuel handling accident. Among them are control room habitability systems discussed in section 6.4 and EST filtration systems discussed in sub-section 6.5.1. Section 6.4 provides a discussion of the control room heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) O system operation upon detection of high radiation, high toxic gas, and smoke. Subsection 6.5.1 provides only discussion of the function of the emergency filter systems to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This subsection nrovides the design bases and safety evaluation fodFghe control buildina electrical penetration filter exhaust sys % wns also discussed the control building safety feature electrical equipment uvac systems and control building HVAC equipment rcom ESF venti-atiott.. system for level 3j 9.4.5.1 Desian Bases 9.4.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4.5.1.1.1 Control Buildina Safety Feature Electrical Equipment Room HVAC System. A. The control building safety feature electrical equipment room HVAC system provides a proper environ-ment and temperature for electrical equipment and maintenance personnel during normal conditions and postulated accident conditions. i B. The safety features electrical equipment room HVAC O system shall remain functional during a safe shutdown i earthquake (SSE), design basis tornado, LOCA, major pipe rupture of main steam or feedwater line, or j single failure of any component of the system. j C. Each train of the safety features electrical equipment room HVAC system is powered from a separate and independent Class 1E power system. D. The system minimizes the accumulation of hydrogen gas within the battery rooms. 9.4.5-1
/ t 1/ /4 // ) e vEcP-FSAR-9 ~ ( DAW W U" 9.4.5.1.1.2 El trical Penetr n Fi1Mr Exhaust System. A. Th electrical pe tration ilter exhau system shall raain function follow' g an SSE, d ign basis ( tornado, LOCA major p e rupture o main steam t' feedwater 1 e, or a gle failure f any comp ent of the syste l B. The el trical p netration f ter exhaus system is { desi ed to mi mize relea of airborn radioactivity I to .e outsi atmosphere resulting om containmen 1 kage und r an accide condition, y processing ecircula d and exha t air throu 4-in.-deep rbon l filters. e The ectrical pe otration fil r exhaust intai the electrical natration a a at a pres re of a roximately .25 in. WG ow adjacen areas tp pre-, ont uncontr led exfiltr ion of pot tially on-taminated r. D. Each t n of the elee rical pe ration fi e exhaust system is powered from separate an independent Class lE power supply. 9.4.5.1.1.[tControl Building ESF HVAC Equipment / Room Ventilation System. i A. The safety feature control building ESF HVAC equipmunt' room system provides a proper environment and temper-ature for ESF HVAC equipment during normal operation and postulated accident conditions. B. The safety feature HVAC equipment room level 3 system remains functional during an SSE, design basis tor-nado, or LOCA along with a single failure of any com-ponent of the system. 9.4.5.1.2 Power Generation Bases l 9.4.5.1.2.1 Control Building Safety Feature Electrical p Equipment Roca HVAC System. A. The safety feature electrical equipment room HVAC l systems are designed to maintain space temperatures between 65'T and LOO'F. ( 9.4.5-2 l r
VEGP-FSAR-9 Switchgear and 100 F DB (summer) inverter rooms 65 F DB (winter) Battery rooms 7C*F DB (summer) 80*F DB (winter) Auxiliary relay 100 F DB (summer) room 65 F DB (winter) B. The battery room exhaust fan maintains the hydrogen concentration below 2 percent, which is less than the lower flammability level of 4 percent. 9.4.5.1.2.2 Electrical Penetration Filter Exhaust System. A. The electrical penetration filter exhaust system has no power generation design bases. B. Normal ventilation of the penetration areas is accom-plished by the control building normal HVAC system. (See subsection 9.4.1.) E mgu an.y v ent'la.4'sn J Ac re.ne.frahim m44, 'is cae.c.ovwplishe.d c. by fk t Confrol Rulldias e.Indesa.al panskes+1on-Cliker ="z:f ex hau<+ 9.4.5.1.2.3 Control Building ESF HVAC Equipment Room s ym f am c a.+ o wiced a d "" S P). Ventilation System. The ESF HVAC equipment room ventilation system is designed to provide the proper environment and temperature for ESF HVAC equipment. 9.4.5.1.3 Codes and Standards Conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.140 (Normal Ventilation Systems) and 1.52 (Post-Accident Systems) is described in subsections 1.9.140 and 1.9.52, respectively. 9.4.5.2
System Description
Classifications of equipment and applicable codes and standards are listed in table 3.2.2-1. 9.4.5.2.1 Control Building Safety Feature Electrical Equipment Room HVAC System The ESF switchgear rooms, battery rooms, and auxiliary relay rt ma for train A are located at el 200 ft 0 in. and 180 ft O in. Auxiliary relay rooms for train B are located at el 240 f t 0 in. The essential HVAC units are located at el 180 ft 0 in, and el 240 ft 0 in. of the control building. 9.4.5-3
b fd/,oW I/ \\ VEGP-FSAR-9 ( ~ q 9.4.5.2.2 Electrical Penetration Room Filter Exhaust System The electrical penetration filter exhaust system consists of ( two filtration-subsystems, trains A and B. Each subsystem's fan is powered from a separate Class lE power supply and ener-gized automatically by the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) signal. Each filtration subsystem has sufficient capacity to exhaust both train A and B penetration rooms. The system is shown in figure 9.4.5-3 and the flow diagram is shown () in figure 9.4.5-4. Each exhaust filtration unit consists of a moisture eliminator, a heating coil, two high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) fil-dL__ i ter banks, a charcoal filter, and a fan. II
....e ;...... e
-:f EEF filtr_ tie..... i.... J.;;;: red ir. ;;5ee.ti.. 0.0.1. kl_ 9.4.5.2.3 Control Building ESF HVAC Equipment Room Ventilation System The control building ESF HVAC equipment room ventilation system for level 3 is shown in figure 9.4.1-5. Two common Antake ducts provide air to the filter and chiller rooms for each ( train associated with the two units. Each room contains a nonsafety-related electric heater unit. A safety-related exhaust fan is located in each of the four chiller rooms. The fans exhaust the air from the chiller room and the associated filter room directly to the atmosphere. One intake duct supplies air for the filter rooms; the other duct supplies air for the chiller rooms. 9.4.5.3 System operation 9.4.5.3.1 Control Building Safety Feature Electrical Equipment Room HVAC System Upon receipt of a train-related safety injection (SI) signal, the essential ESF switchgear, ESF equipment, battery room, and auxiliary relay rooms HVAC system is automatically put into operation. Transfer to the essential system may also be (Eb initiated manually from the control room. The following actions take place automatically when transferring to the essential system: Stopping the normal air handling unit. l e Stopping the normal outside air supply air handling e unit. 9.4.5-5
..o h l /' VEGP-FSAR-9 M /A// u/ c, o Stopping the normal chilled water system. ~ e Activating both essential HVAC trains and their asso-ciated essential chilled water systems. After activation of both safety trains, one train may be taken out of service manually. The recirculation fans draw outside and recirculated air through profilters and the chilled water coils and discharge the air into the ESF switchgear rooms and the battery rooms. lll : The supply air temperature is controllet by a room thermostat which controls the modulation of the chilled water flow through the cooling coil. For maximum cooling the air leaves the cooling coil at 56'T and maintains the rooms at the design maximum temperature of LOO *F. Battery rooms are provided with electric reheat coils to maintain a room design temperature range of 70*F to 80'F. Outside air from the intake plenum at el 280 ft 6 in. is brought in to make up for the battery room air exhausted to the atmosphere at el 280 ft 6 in. 9.4.5.3.2 Electrical Penetration Room Filtration and Exhaust System n-A r :::r;:ncy crnditi:= p on receipt of a train-related containment ventilation isolation (CVI) signal, the normal ventilation system is isolated from the electrical penetration area. The exhaust filtration units are activated to exhaust JE{3g, tha. ere; a..dez u.v Li.. es....;; cf air zuffi.a u. iv n.e

-^ '

of posuntially 0.25 in "C te prer:r.: Air 1. exh-se;;i to the atmosphere through .21. the plant vent. STCT' 9.4.5.3.[jffVentilationSystem Control Building ESF HVAC Equipment Roon l Air is supplied from the air intake plenum at el 291 ft 4 in. r and exhausted at el 302 ft 0 in. The system is started automatically by a space thermostat whenever the high preset limit of 90*F is reached. The vent system may also be started manually from the control room. An electric unit heater with an integral temperature controller, preset at 65*F, cycles the heater to meet the minimum space design condition. Each ESF equipment room is provided with a temperature switch which provides a high or low alarm in the control room when the \\ temperature is 105'E or 50'F, respectively. 9.4.5-6
i %/4 F T/ 3 -~ ~VECP-FSA[ /,4 g / //I t.JP/V, f - W1 \\ !9.4.5. Elect cal Penetr elon Room - iltration/ nd Exhaust /' Sys m / ,/ A. Th system is esigned t Seismic,CategoryIrequipehI I ments. The ystem is cated in/the control bul, Wing, ( /which is signed to ithstand,the,, effects of j/ j/ / earthqua s, tornad es, hurri,(ane s, floods, exteynal missil and oth appropr' ete natural phen 6me a. / Sectie'ns 3.3, 3. 3.5, 3. and 3.8 prov)de t a basis for/headequayofthe ructural desi of e l cot. trol buil ng. The sultp' of the ailur modes d effects analysis e su arized tabl 9.4.5-3. B The sys m utilize an ESF filtr ion tra'n confor - g to the idelines/of Re atory uide 1. 2 as clari ied in/s W eetion .9.5 and subs etion 6 / / C. recircu,l tion and xha at fans ar sized uc that / negative assure o a ut 1/4 in. ca he attained d maintal ed following a uat n of he systemt l I D. Eac ain of the ectric penetr t n filte ex et sys m is connec d to a separat lass IE po r ( supply. \\, \\s 9.4.5.4.[,ControlBuildingESFHVACEquipmentRoom Ventilation System A. The control building HVAC equipment room level 3 ventilation system is capable of providing ventilation and exhaust for HVAC equipment rooms and of main-taining the room's air temperature within the specified limits given in table 9.4.1-2. B. A single active failure in the HVAC equipment room level 3 ventilation system does not impair its capa-bility to perform the system's safety function. The results of the failure modes and effects analysis are provided in table 6.4.4-1. fl t 9.4.5-8 .,-,,--c---
~ ' A R)]Ff / i VEGP-FSAR-15 AT ( D. Only that fraction of the fission products which migrates from the fuel matrix to the gap and plenum regions during normal operation is assumed to be available for immediate release to the water following ( clad damage. E. The gap activity released to the fuel pool from the damaged fuel rods consists of 10 percent of the total noble gases and iodines, other than Kr-85, I-127, and i I-129, which are 30 percent. F. The pool decontamination factor is 1.0 for noble gases. G. The effective pool decontamination factor is 100 for iodine. H. The iodine above the fuel pool is assumed to be composed of 75-percent inorganic and 25-percent organic species. I. The activity which escapes from the pool is assumed to be available for release to the environment in a time period of 2 h. \\* J. No credit for decay or depletion during transit to the exclusion area boundary or the outer boundary of the low population zone is assumed. K. No credit is taken foc_ mixing or holdup in the fuel building atmosphere. L;h; filt;; cf fici...., f;; th; ~"- 07 filt--*4aa --l-* r-i r 2:rur :f..
" ;;;;;;t...
OL. .m=4v.u 7-;;d: fer til r;:-t-cf 1: din {} > L. For the case inside the reactor containment bulding, conservative credit is taken for mixing of the radioactivity released from the refueling pool with a minimum of the containment building free volume. [ The mixing volume of 25 percent is assumed and is based on the normal airflow rate of four fan coolers. M. The containment purge rate is 15,000 fts/ min. N N. The containment purge is isolated within 10 s from the time the containment isolation signal is generated, and a 5-s signal generation time is assumed. I 15.7.4-5

w----

---,_,-w
of VEGP-FSAR-15 ~ assumed that the core has been operating at 100 percent for the entire burnup period. The gap inventories are listed in table 15A-3. The noble gas f and iodine inventories released as a result of a fuel ( handling accident are listed in table 15A-4. 1 C. Iodine removal from the released fission product gas takes place as the gas rises to the pool surface through the body of liquid in the spent fuel pool. I O The extent of iodine removal is determined by mass transfer from the gas phase to the surrounding liquid and is controlled by the bubble diameter and contact time of the bubble in the solution. The values used in the analysis result in a release of activity approximately a factor of 5 greater than anticipated. The release of activity from the pool to the containment atmosphere is time dependent, and, consequently, there would be sufficient time for this activity to mix homogeneously in a significantly greater percent of the containment volume than assumed in the analysis. I D. The EST emergency filtration system charcoal filters are known to operate with at leas,1,a 99-percent t. \\" efficiency. This means a !...:... reduction in the iodine concentrations and thus a reduction in the l thyroid doses at the exclusion area boundary and the I outer boundary of the low population zone. 1 E. The containment purge exhaust system has charcoal adsorber units which filter any containment purge release. However, no credit has been taken for its capability (90-percent efficiency, minimum) since these units are not specifically designed to seismic Category 1 criteria. It is expected that for any event which would produce a catastrophic failure of the charcoal adsorber unit to the extent that its l filtering capability would be negated would also result in the purge exhaust fan becoming inoperable. Therefore, failure within the purge exhaust system would terminate any high-volume release from the containment. In fact, the purge exhaust fan is I considerably more likely to be inoperable following ([) any postulated event than the failure of a passive charcoal adsorber unit. Thus, although no credit in the analysis has been given for the normal purge exhaust filters, any release prior to containment isolation would be filtered, reducing the calculated releases by another factor of 10. 15.7.4-7 -,-r--- ..-..,v.,-r--,.-y_.--- -,,...--,. ,---.r.---,-.---,.-c, -.-------m--.-.,.,,,,m-,_m w. -.,--m--y.~---.,-.-.,---m -y-,-----,--
- ll / h VEGP-FSAR-15 F. There is also conservatism in the time to first fuel transfer. Despite the fact that fuel could be transferred at 100 h, it is probable that fuel handling will begin sometime later. G. The meteorological conditions which may be present at the site during the course of the accident are uncertain. However, it is highly unlikely that meteorological conditions assumed will be present during the course of the accident for any extended period of time. Therefore, the radiological consequences evaluated, based on the meterological conditions assumed, are conservative. f -' 15.7.4.5.2.1 Filter Loadings. The filtration system hich functions to limit the consequences of a fuel handling accident in the fuel building er; O.; 4uel buildin; ;;;;;;n;, f i 1 * - - ti.an_ =y-*- rid the control room filtration system. The activity loadings on the contrci room charcoal adsorbers as a function of time have been evaluated for the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), as described in subsection 15.6.5. Since these filters are capable of accommodating the design basis LOCA fission product iodine loadings, more than adequate design margin is available with respect to postulated fuel handling accident releases. The activity loadings on the ESF filtration system charcoal adsorbers have been evaluated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, which limits the maximum loading to 2.5 mq iodine /g activated charcoal. l 15.7.4.5.2.2 Doses to Receptor at the Exclusion Area Boundary and Low Population Zone outer Soundary. The potential radiological consequences resulting from the occurrence of a postulated fuel handling accident occurring in the fuel building and in the reactor building have been conservatively analyzed, using assumptions and models described in previous sections. The total-body dose due to immersion from direct radiation and the thyroid dose due to inhalation have been analyzed for the O-to 2-h dose at the exclusion area boundary and for the duration of the accident (O to 2 h) at the low population zone outer boundary. The results are listed in table 15.7.4-3. The resultant doses are well within the guideline values of 10 CFR 100. 15.7.4-8
-9 9 6 e A p / VEGP-FSAR-15 / C gl/V4 e TABLE 15.7.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2) PARAMETERS USED IN EVALUATING THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF (, A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT In Fuel Building In Containment Source Data Core power level 3665 3565 (MWt) Radial peaking factor 1.65 1.65 Decay time (h) 100 100 Number of fuel assem-1.2 1.2 blies affected Fraction of fission RG 1.25 RG 1.25 product gases
con-tained in the gap region of the fuel assenbly Atmospheric Dispersion Table 15A-2 Table 15A-2 Factors Activity Release Data Percent of affected 100 100 fuel assemblies gap-activity released Pool decontamination factors Iodine 100 100 Noble gas 1
1 O Filter efficiency (%) O Building mixing vol-0 25 umes assumed (% total volume) HVAC exhaust rate 5000 15,000 (fta/ min) O n n, n. c._-.,- ,.,,,-.,--..g., n
e+. A VEGP-FSAR-15 fIf' ~ TABLE 15.7.4-1 (SHEET 2 of 2) In Fuel Building In Containment ( No / W ~ ~~~. Building isolation -ECT fil;..., uw 10+5 time (s) i;;l i vu ztT2 ired g-Activity release 2 Release termina-i period (h) ted 10 s after containment isolation signal with 5 s allowed for signal generation Activity released to the environment Isotope O to 2 h (ci) O to 2 h (C1) I-131 4.4E+1 4.4E+0 1-132 3.7E+1 3.7E+0 I-133 4.5E+0 4.5E-1 s Xe-131m 6.5E+2 3.9E+0-Xe-133m 1.2E+4 7.2E+1 Xe-133 1.5E+5 9.0E+2 Xe-135 2.6E+2 1.6E+0 Kr-85 2.8E+3 1.7E+1 lL a -ge f me-
l b N Q D m 3 4 o l e ? TABLE 15.7.4-2 (SHEET 3 OF 13) C w i 4 N i Cese 2 mogusatory Cuide s.25 Case 1 (sn Containe.nt i fenitioa Lin_fue Lpulldinal euledinsi y \\ Ir et een be shown that the ^;.
_ _ _ ;- v --
10 0 credit is tehen for e - " - - - - ^ k p bu6lding atmosphere is exhausted y;;;... ;.;. - m i-..w. the norma l pu rge fi l te rs, e through edserhers designed to j i
-P 'M,o;_ i ^ ;. s e
~ reeeve ladine, ti.e resevel ft/s y b. erriciency is,.901 for inorganic sp.ci.s esed i fo,er nic 4,,_4 spec ie s.888 the effluent f ree the fi l te r Conferos. Confe ries. systes passes directly to the neet mixing #4 in the surrounding d gg /f2 # emergency enheest system with-basiIding atesepteere end Ia then M s M 791-2.
g resees.d (as en eseveted povos toe these recilities with a
o stocks 49 ).
E M 1 M The esseseptions for steespheric Short-tere steospheric dispersion rectors ( corresponding to grotend level release and derruseon for: eccidont conditlens were besed on ahe estooreIogicei esesesreeents proesroe described t-* Creund Ieve8 reIcesea ut in section 2.3. The dispersion rectors are The hesic egesation for ateo-in compliance with the methodology described openeric dif feselon free e in Regeslatory Guide 3.145 and represent groesad level point seesrce is: the worst er the 55 overall site meteorology efed the 0.55 worst sector esteorology. j IN
nuo o, wisere:
X time short-tere = everage ces0ter-18ste weltee of the ground level con-centretiese (Ci/m ). enount or meterieI G = seteased (C8/s). windspeed (m/s). u = 1 I l I
0 s VEGP-FSAR-15 i TABLE 15.7.4-3 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT Doses (rem) Fuel Building Exclusion area k boundary (0 to 2 h) 7.tE+1 1 Thyroid t.25:0+ Whole body 2.7E-1 Low population zone outer boundary (0 to 2 h) 2 9 E t1 Thyroid -1.7 ^0^ Whole body 1.1E-1 Containment Exclusion area boundary (0 to 2 h) Thyroid 4.2E-1 Whole body 1.6E-3 Low population zone outer boundary (O to 2 h) Thyroid 1.7E-1 Whole body 6.5E-4 S f e 6 4 ) O m.
y. g-::,~,,"" SAR CHANGE NOTICE OM[f0h PS AR CH ANGE NOTICE
2. DISCIPLINE 3, no.
pSAR CNANGE NOTIC. OTHER 4 // o3hh ORIGIN ATOR 5.DATE 6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR R raes t for) 430 73 7. DESCRIPTION OF CH ANGE Dele de Me ducequon & % paser tou<wf or Hv-2F0E A e4 /tt/-1903R m jage. R 43o. 73-g, ccP AtoLb4J has Voi ec/ rse e/c m utfany ct,ograw c for av-st'o3 A/s. ATTACHMENTS Anno /ahd FU A - R. Pap. a2 #20 73-1, S. Li-38 .. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DRAWINGS cer a w.zMJ revision o 9. JUSTIFIC ATION Prqjeed FrAR rEViek) ' " " " " " ' " " " " ' ^ ' - ^ " ' YES NO .:o~,....M / A. SER IMPACT / 4 o../f M '"' B. TS/SAR IMPACT c,./ ChN 2.h(byns "/, t/S.ol.",,,,'..,,.,,, C. TS CERT PKG ^ AFFECTED PLA9.,o.S. PM(C-AP 1,.NLYl 11. 12, 13. 14. ISEu' " 'u"c' ' en $r svev"k"N/f A'b2.
'surv!s
' o's's"' cYiS I. h o l I N u'E. cYeE[."n o. N ad wor aes uem e iecw u se r u ,a i o... o... .,...,o;.u. 7,og g,.. c. 7,o,,=.g,;.,,, W lib b b por 12EGU/At*U
6. o:.,,. > p
7 CN NO. FSAR CHANGE NOTICE JUSTIFICATION 1. Brief Description of Change: SCC FfT D FrC4//7/dM 4M / fos)C)e L ockour Fe,e d/7 /Mt Cr V4&VCS 2. All impacted sections have been identified and revised as required. 3. Categorize change (check one): Correction of previously submitted information. Describe below how inaccuracy originated. J New information based on design or criteria change. Describe reason for change below.' h-y Clarification to existing FSAR section. Describe below why c change is necessary. 7NE frAR WAf 22v/Jed c19 eLisW 7Z).tHOLJ w?' docos/ (N I Ccl~t o^/ 7>9^/K ff/r f/VL W /l'0LArfo^/ c'41 ^/07 A6W U4t &3/ ,WO feU6Y_70 ThLEfr VAL VVS fffV-ff0.T A / e,) unt Dr f ca,vst&Y 7}m, 7dit CH M art brtever 7Ws bercep-rred se ive-roajew Loe,esur-p,e 6~ Vto urc y' f40 VfDCvJ l'ut 7'?iLC~ wt-L *'b'f. 4. Determine impact (Y/N): _g F-Thii. change is consistent with the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Applicable Regulatory Guides This change does not deviate from VEGP Reg. Guide positions. Applicable standard review plan sections This' change does not deviate from VEGP SRP positions. Applicable Technical Specifications This, change does not impact the Tech. Specs. s Other' applicable criteria This change does not deviate from VEGP positions. Justify all "NO" answers. Provide licensing precedent on NTOL's. 7%E V4L yF.f Lit'X'f CA 14rA/ALL Y /dOV/06"O 6/!7/f / 0 s) C:;<* LOCKOUT ~ Tp f p E c t u s p- ,pti A 6 si sv2 W 7-C &of cueC 9vo ALCC C4G E of 80//777 od ,c LocJ 70 7?/t~ AC E. t3EC,'fulC 77fE~ t/A L V cf 4,ee-had At 4,0 u k L A^' d LOcKGD ofM yij-,0,e&76Cr/ 0N H/l C GrE/ W - -a --e-- +-w ew -

5

ve

-g-w

u--s-,-y-----w.--w.

m
VEGP-FSAR-Q Redundant indication is provided at indicator light boxes ZLB6 and ZLB7 which are mounted on the main control board. The power supplies for these light boxes are from termination cabinets which are supplied power from 120-V distribution panels located in Class ( IE motor control centers (one per train). The termination cabinet is not powered from a motor control center providing main power to any valve listed above. The second position indication is powered from the motor-operated valve control circuit. ObJbd i Valves HV-8803A and B are two new valves identified in paragraph 8.3.1.1.11 which will also have power lockout ' using locked open breakers. The circuit breakers for , these valves will be _ padlocked in the open position during reactor power operation, after the valves have been aligned to the required position. The monitor light box for valve HV-8803A is MLB05, which is powered l from distribution panel 1AYC1 (MCC 1ABC). Valve HV-8803A is powered from MCC 1ABD. The monitor light 16 box for valve HV-8803B is MLB06, which is powered from i distribution panel IBYA1 (MCC IBBA). Valve HV-8803B is powered from MCC IBBD. Light box ZLB6 is powered from distribution panel ( IAYC131 (MCC1ABC), with the valve position indicating lights for valves HV-8802A, HV-8809A, and HV-8835. None of these valves are powered from MCC 1ABC. Light box ZLB7 is powered from distribution panel 13 IBYA131 (MCC IBBA), with the valve position indicating lights for valves HV-8802B, HV-8809B, HV-8806, HV-8813, and HV-8840. None of these valves are powered from MCC IBBA. The correct position of the lockout switch contacts is monitored by a white light on the main control board. When the lockout switch is on the " lockout" position, g two contacts from the switch will disable the control circuitry. One of the switch contacts will disable the hot leg of the circuitry and at the same time will deenergize the white light. The other switch contact will disable the neutral leg of the circuitry. A deenergized white light when the lockout switch is on g, the " lockout" position reans the control circuitry is \\ inoperable. In the event that the switch contacts on either the hot leg or the neutral leg of the circuitry 16 fail to open (undetected failure), the control circuit Amend. 7 5/84 Amend. 13 1/85 Q430.73-2 Amend. 16 4/85
VEGP-FSAR-Q normal charging and ECCS injection paths by the BIT solution and also preventing inadvertent boration of the RCS. Recently, analyses have shown that the high boric acid concentration is not needed for a safe shutdown after a LOCA, and the decision was made to lower the concentration in the BIT solution to 2000 ppm boric acid, which is the normal concentration of the 16 ECCS water. As a result of this change, the requirement for having the BIT inlet and outlet isolated was eliminated. To minimize changes to VEGP while still maintaining an increased operability factor for the BIT system, the inlet isolation valves HV-8803A and B will be locked in the open position, and electrical power will not be connected to the valve motors. tai Ou t T* f vat-vu fso.ua Po Stolo N+et-dew pq Redundant indication and power supply provided to the position indicators of valves are: 1. Motor-operated valve control handswitch indication light, fejdfromcontrolcircuit. 2. Monitor light (on main lih ing board), fed from termination cabinet. 3. Critical function alarm (periodic reflash), fed from annunciator panel (de and diesel generator-backed ac powered). 1 Amend. 7 5/84 Q430.73-4 Amend. 16 4/85 1 i l l o
VEGP-FSAR-8 .) 8.3.1.1.11 Motor-Cperated Valves with Power Lockout The motor-operated velves that require power lockout to meet BTP ICSB 18 and that have the means to accomplish power lockout are listed and outlined as follows: A. The following motor-operated valves power lockcut and restoration capability is accomplished at the main control board: HV-8806 Safety injection pump suction from refueling water storage tank HV-8835 Safety injection pump cold leg injection HV-8802A, B Safety injection pump hot leg injection HV-8840 Residual heat removal pump hot leg injection HV-8809A, B Residual heat removal pump cold leg injection HV-8813 Safety injection pump miniflow isolation B. The following motor-operated valve power lockout is y accomplished by padlocking the circuit breaker at the p* motor control center during startup and maintained in thel7 locked open position during reactor power operation: E HV-8808A, B,, C, D Accumulator isolation valves in1-9903?., W u.m ifu;=1 r-harging pump O .-dhchcrge vcivc to bs c i lyg g einn en g In addition, the emergency core cooling system motor-operated valves (item A) are provided with valve position-indicating light boxes to provide a continuous indication of valve position. The Technical Specifications list these valves and their required positions. 8.3.1.1.12 Containment Building Electrical Penetrations The electrical penetrations are protected from damage resulting from overcarrent conditions through the use of redundant overcurrent protective devices as indicated in paragraph 1.9.63.2. l24 Amend. 3 1/84 ) Amend. 7 5/84 Amend. 13 1/85 Amend. 16 4/85 8.3.1-28 Amend. 24 6/86
m-VEGP-FSAR-7 Increases in A( beyond a predefined deadband results in a decrease in trip setpoint. (Refer to figure 7.2.1-2.) The required one pressurizer pressure parameter per loop is obtained from separate sensors connectedtothreepressuretapsatthetopofthel11 pressurizer. Four pressurizer pressure signals are obtained from the three taps by connecting one of the taps to two pressure transmitters. Refer to paragraph 7.2.2.3.3 for an analysis of this arrangement. Figure 7.2.1-1 (sheet 5) shows the logic for overtemperature AT trip function. 2. Overpower AT Trip This trip protects against excessive power (fuel rod rating protection) and trips the reactor on coincidence as listed in table 7.2.1-1, with one set of temperature measurements per loop. The setpoint for each channel is continuously calculated using the following equation: j 1 IET6 ) 5 I s A setpoint = AT, K - Ks (1 + T s) T,yg 4 7 - ". iT Abg-) -- f ' N ayg ff7[3 dj dh where: L u indicated AT rated thermal AT = power. f (Ac) = a function of the neutron flux difference between upper and lower long ion chamber section. a preset bias. K = 4 5 a constant which compensates for ( K = piping and instrument time delay. a constant which compensates for the Ks = change in density flow and heat capacity of the water with temperature. 7.2.1-6 Amend. 11 11/84 I
.M V VEGP-FSAR-7 B. Core Thermal Overpower Trips The specific trip functions generated are described below. b(N 1. Overtemperature AT Trip This trip protects the core against low DNBR and trips the reactor on coincidence, as listed in /~ table 7.2.1-1, with one set of temperature (_T) measurements per loop. The setpoint for this trip is continuously calculated by analog circuitry for each loop by solving the following equation- ,m NJ 1+ s (1 + T s) ' avg - avg' AT = AT K K 2 1 setpoint o ~ + Ka (P - 2235) - f (49) where: AT = indicated AT at rated thermal power. C T = average reactor coolant temperature (*F). avg T = indicated T at rated thermal power. avg avg P = pressurizer pressure (psig). K = preset bias. 2 Ka = preset gain which compensates for effects of temperature on the DNB limits. Ka = preset gain which compensate for effect of pressure on the DNB limits.
O t
ry 7 E5 = preset constants which compensate for piping and instrument time delay Q - p"rbie-/ c04Sl4rtf trN//teg-GrmMsvrr$ Nj R.rpoostc = lYpNceN ra$sform operator (s~l). s
O f (a0)
= function of the neutron flux difference between upper and lower long ion chambers. (Refer to figure 7.2.1-2.)
(-
A separate long ion chamber unit supplies the flux signal for each overtemperature AT channel. 7.2.1-5
VEGP-FSAR-7 ( To = indicated T at rated thermal avg power ( F) avg T" 9 = average reactor coolant temperature f} (*F). tg7 = preset time constant (s). s = laplace transform operator (s-1). '[& = jortMl cots % W f rrfilifre! Sr* M O J WrW h Vf rerfonyc cotDarsn/iM The source of temperaturd and flux information is identical to that of the overtemperature AT trip, and the resultant AT setpoint is compared to the same AT. Figure 7.2.1-1 (sheet 5) shows the logic for this trip function. C. Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Pressure and Water Level Trips The specific trip functions generated are described below. 1. Pressurizer Low-Pressure Trip L The purpose of this trip is to protect against low pressure which could lead to DNB. The parameter being sensed is reactor coolant pressure, as measured in the pressurizer. Above P-7 the reactor is tripped when the pressurizer pressure measurements (compensated for rate of change) fall below preset limits. This trip is blocked below P-7 to permit startup. The trip logic and interlocks are given in table 7.2.1-1. The trip logic is shown in figure 7.2.1-1 (sheet 6). 2. Pressurizer High-Pressure Trip The purpose of this trip is to protect the reactor coolant system against system overpressure. The same sensors and transmitters used for the (~ pressurizer low-pressure trip are used for the v high-pressure trip, except that separate bistables are used for trip. These bistables trip when uncompensated pressurizer pressure signals exceed preset limits on coincidence, as listed in table 7.2.1-1. There are no interlocks or permissives associated with this trip function. 7.2.1-7}}

ML20214J073

Contents

Text

Dear Mr. Denton:

System Description

W

TYN'?N'iet m,,llM3.t'; ^#.?"4Me 3,n,==,.=.= =.=..t= === ===

3/4 0-36

==

System Design

^="=e nya *-e 21 -w aiiciran +1

System Description

System Description

System Description

System Description

Navigation menu

ML20214J073

Text

Dear Mr. Denton:

System Description

W

TYN'?N'iet *m,,llM3.t'; ^#.?"4*Me 3,n,==,.=.= =.=..t= === ===

3/4 0-36

==

System Design

^="=e nya *-e 21 -w aiiciran +1

System Description

System Description

System Description

System Description

Navigation menu

Search

TYN'?N'iet m,,llM3.t'; ^#.?"4Me 3,n,==,.=.= =.=..t= === ===