ML20213G079

Insp Rept 50-312/87-14 on 870323-0403.Violations Noted: Capscrew for Bearing Positioner on Reactor Coolant Pump Found Broken.Deviation Noted:Essential Air Filtration Sys Had Silicone Sealants Applied to Housing,Mounting & Frames

ML20213G079
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/24/1987
From:	Miller L, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213G063	List: ML20213G061 ML20213G065 ML20213G071 ML20213G079
References
50-312-87-14, NUDOCS 8705180113
Download: ML20213G079 (7)

See also: IR 05000312/1987014

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fSISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/87-14

Docket No. 50-312

License No. DPR-54

Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

P.-0. Box 15830

Sacramento, California 95813

Facility Name: Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

Inspection Conducted: March 23, 1987 to April 3, 1987

Inspected by:

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1. k NI~

r Inspector

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Date Signed

Approved by:

LWlrer, Chief. Project Section 2

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Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on March 23, 1987 to April 3, 1987 (Report No. 50-312/87-14)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection by a region based inspector of

licensee action on previously identified follow-up items and review of the

control room emergency ventilation system. Inspection procedures 30703,

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92700, 92701, and 92702 were covered during this inspection.

Results: In the two areas inspected, one violation of an NRC requirement to-

repair nonconformances in accordance with documented procedures and one

deviation from a licensee commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.52, which prohibits ,

the use of silicone sealants to the essential air filtration system were

identified (paragraph 3.D and 4 respectively).

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DETAILS

'1. Personnel Contacted

• W. Bibb, Restart Implementation Manager

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• B. Croley,' Plant Manager

t' *B. Day, Deputy Plant Manager

.*S. Knight, QA Manager

D. Army, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

, *R. Ashley, Licensing Manager.

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• R. Little, Licensing Supervisor

• T. Shewski, Quality Engineer-

• T. Martin; HVAC Engineer

. *J. Janus, HVAC Engineer-

p *G. Blackburn, SRTP Engineer

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• J. Robertson. Nuclear Licensing Engineer

L J. Field, SRTP Director

, R. Colombo, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance

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B. Kumar.. Environmental Qualification Engineer

'R. Wise, Electrical Engineer

-W. Fargo, Electrical Engineer

C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance

D. Johnson, TMI~ Coordinator-

R. Thomas, HVAC Engineer

'G. Clefton,' Maintenance Supe'rvisor

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lL.'Beltracchi,-NRR SPDS examiner

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- * Attended-the exit meetings.

The ~ inspector also held discussions with other licensee.and contract

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personnel during the inspection. This included plant staff engineers,

-technicians, administrative and clerical assistants.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

A. -(Closed) Violation 84-19-03, Code Safety Testing -

In the original inspection report this item was incorrectly

identified as 84-19-01. This issue concerned a pressurizer code

i safety. valve which lifted at too low a pressure. This-valve was-

determined to have been incorrectly calibrated by the licensee, in

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that a. maintenance calibration procedure to thermally stabilize the .

valve had not been followed.

The-licensee replaced this valve, PSV-21507 (serial # BR 09499),

with a spare (serial # BM 09648), on January 17, 1985. The

licensee's response to the-Notice of Violation stated that: "This

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' valve which had failed, would be removed and examined during the

j next refueling outage" (this refers to the March-June 1985 outage).

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- The inspector reviewed the licensee's files to verify this

commitment. This valve (BR 09499) was to be reworked via

Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 96496 issued 3-18-85. This MWR was

c voided because it was a duplicate of MWR 96522. This MWR was also

voided and MWR 115414 was issued June 10, 1986, so that the work

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would document the valve as found condition. This valve was

determined to'have excessive seat leakage. This work was completed

February 6, 1987,-and this valve was put in spare status.

Valve BM 09648 was also tested, on 12-16-86, and failed once at 2800

psig and twice at 2460 psig. Subsequent testing identified

. excessive seat leakage, which was repaired and returned to service.

This item is closed.

B. (Closed) Violation 86-07-05, CR HVAC Excessive Flow

This violation (issued in report 50-312/87-01) concerned an

excessive air flow condition in the Emergency Ventilation System.

This condition was identified by the licensee during surveillance

testing, but the licensee failed to take take appropriate

corrective action.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of .

Violation, which concluded that, based on the excess flow rate, the

total dose to personnel would not have exceeded design base limits.

These calculations are expected to be reviewed in a subsequent

uspection. The licensee has instituted the following additional

corrective action: The system engineer now reviews the results of

all surveillances, a surveillance procedure results review ~ guide is

being written, and training for personnel reviewing surveillance

tests'is to be provided. Based on the licensee's response to the

Notice of Violation, this item is closed. Open item RY-0-13

remains open pending a flow / dose. calculation review.

3. Licensee Action on Inspector Identified Items

A. (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-19-10, Turbine Bypass Valve Malfunction

This item was in regard to a turbine bypass valve (TBV), which stuck

open causing an overcooling condition. The adequacy of the

licensee's program to determine the cause of the failure was

questioned by the origional inspection report.

The licensee has manually stroked the valve and electrically tested

and cycled the valve. This valve has operated successfully several

times since this occurrence.

Subsequent inspections have identified to the licensee, the

importance of a deliberate and thorough trouble-shooting program to

evaluate system and/or equipment problems.

The licensee has committed (in report 50-312/86-30, item 01) to

develop a routine trouble-shooting program, which will be in place

prior to restart. This item is closed based upon this commitment.

B. (Closed) Follow-up Item 86-06-06, HVAC Noise Level

This item was in regard to excess noise in the control room caused

by the operation of the control room emergency ventilation system.

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The' licensee' reduced the system supply. fan speed by 20%,. and opened

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the system dampers.to maintain the original flow.' This change

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resulted in.a reduction in noise ~ level from approximately 66 DB to

e approximately 58 DB, which is well within the NUREG 0700

recommendation of less than 65 DB.- This item is' closed. This issue

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was also identified. originally as RV-0-13 in report 86-07. RV-0-13

remains open pending the inspection discussed in Paragraph 2.B

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above.

C. (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-07-04', HVAC Availability

This unresolved item concerned the operability status for the "A"

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and "B" trains of the control room Emergency Ventilation System.

. during the December 26, 1985 event. During the event: the emergency

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/entilation system was turned off because of high noise, the "B"

crain.would not control automatically because it was inadvertently

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disarmed by operators.who failed to recognize that the "B" train

could not be reset while a Safety Features Actuation signal was

still present, and the "A" train was enabled but would not come on

4 until temperature in the control room reached the design setpoint of

80 degrees.

The licensee tested the system in accordance with test procedure STP

198-in May, 1986. .From this test, the licensee determined that the

system was operable during the event. In this test, the licensee *

confirmed, that the setpoint of the thermostat for the "B" train was

set at'75 degrees, and the "A" train was set at 80 degrees. The

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licensee has since changed the system design so that both systems

. operate to maintain 75 degrees. Based on the licensee's testing and

evaluation, this item is closed.

I D. (Closed) Unresolved Item 85-25-02, Broken RCP Capscrews

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i This issue concerns the licensee's failure to generate a

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Nonconformance Report (NCR) for eleven of sixteen bearing cap screws.

which were discovered broken (April 15,1985). The licensee was

, working on the. pump (P-2108) to replace a leaking seal, and during

I' . this period decided to perform a Ten Year Inservice Inspection. ,

During the ISI, these broken capscrews were discovered. The licensee

L and the Bingham-Willamette (BWC) representative who was onsite for-

( the maintenance and ISI work, contacted BWC in the corporate office,

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and resolve this issue. The disposition was to increase the torque

i value of these capscrews to 40 foot-pounds (G. Parks, BWC to SMUD,

April 23, 1985.

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L The inspector's review of this issue identified that neither an NCR

or an Operational Deficiency Report (ODR) had been generated upon

! identification of the broken cap screws. After the inspector

identified this issue to the licensee, on September 4, 1985, the .

licensee generated an ODR (# 285). The RCS system and Reactor

L Coolant Pump are identified in the master equipment List as, Class 1,

l and as such, any nonconformances would require an NCR to be

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processed. The inspector expressed concern that, since the licensee

i -- had resolved and corrected the nonconformance so soon, the

l documentation process may have been circumvented.

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These circumstances become more significant in light of the

following events:

A licensee office memorandum to G. Coward from G. Clefton,

- dated September 5,1985, identified that: in August 1985, the

Oconee Nuclear Facility, which has identical Bingham-Willamette

-(BWC) pumps, discovered six of the same 16 capscrews with

their' heads broken off. In addition to these broken 1.5 inch

cap screws, Oconee's pump had all.16 of 16 3.5 inch bearing

assembly capscrews with there heads broken off. On Drawing

J-256 of the pump, these 3.5 inch capscrews would be

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.imediately to the right and up from the other 1.5 inch

capscrews, and are identified as part # 37.3.

v The inspector discussed the Rancho Seco and Oconee pump

capscrew problems with Mr. Gordon Parks of BWC, in an effort to

clarify the significance of this issue. Oconee had identified

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that, with the 3.5 inch capscrew heads broken off at the

stem / head joint, the upper bearing support half could have

axial motion. The flow induced motion, created by the

recirculation impeller, allowed the loose heads to gouge the

stuffing box walls at Oconee and eroded the loose parts to a

size which allowed them to escape (into the small shaft

impeller imediately above the bearing halves).

Oconee increased the bearing assembly (part No. 37.3) torque,

capscrew bolt size and material strength. SMUD is obtaining

details from BWC for upgrade plans to the bearing assembly,

such as larger bolts of higher strength materials.

The inspector observed that these issues should be tracked or

dispositioned, within the licensee's system, on an NCR as per

licensee Quality Assurance Procedure 17, " Nonconforming

Material Control" Revision 4, which defines a Nonconformance as

"a deficiency in characteristic, documentation, or procedure

which renders the quality of an item unacceptable or

indeterminate."

QAP 17, Revision 1, effective March 20, 1985, which was in

effect at the time of the discovery of the broken cap screws,

states that: " Systems, equipment and appurtenances,

components, parts, or material which do not meet the specified

requirements of purchase orders, design drawings,

operational / test documents, or construction documents shall be

considered nonconforming." This procedure goes on to define

" Repair" as: "A disposition which permits the reprocessing of

material or change to the system to bring it into an acceptable

condition (in this case, increased torquing of the capscrews

was decided upon with BWC, to prevent cycling fatigue),

although still departing from established requirements. This

disposition requires Engineering Review Board approval." This

procedure specifies that the Engineering Review Board must

approve all " Accept" or " Repair" dispositions of nonconforming

material or systems. "The Board is composed of the managers of

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Quality Assurance, Nuclear Engineering, and Nuclear Operations

or their designated representatives...."

This procedure, QAP 17, goes on to say that: "When operational systems or

components are not performing their intended function or are not installed

in accordance with design specifications:

"A. An NCR shall be initiated and processed unless it is determined

that the component, structure, or system can be returned to a

functional or operational status through rework or

replacement...."

"B. A serialized work request shall be utilized to provide audit

capability whenever rework / replacement is required to return a

Class 1 system to functional or operational status if an NCR is

not initiated."

The inspector concluded that these two provisions did not apply in this

case since this disposition involved a change to the system torquing

requirements.

Therefore, this is an apparent violation (87-14-01).

4. Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (RV-0-13, Open)

The inspector and two NRC contract personnel from Argonne National

Laboratories (ANL), " walked-down" the control room and technical support

center normal and emergency ventilation systems. This system inspection

was to determine if adequate test port locations were available for

determining system flows and balances. In addition, this inspection was

a familiarization and inspection of the system construction and layout.

Currently, the ifcensee is finishing upgrades and modifications made

during this outage, and is scheduled to verify system performance by the

later part of April 1987. Many of the the licensee's system, maintenance

and surveillance procedures are in draft, awaiting final verification

during system testing. The NRC presently intends to confirm the

licensee's system performance, by a flow balance, once the system has

been declared operational by SMUD, and maintenance and surveillance

procedures are finialized. This issue previously identified as RV-0-13,

remains open pending completion of this NRC review.

During the system walkdown, the inspector identified silicone sealing

compound applied to the duct and components of the Emergency ventilation

system. The inspector informed the licensee that this is specifically

prohibited by Regulatory Guide 1.52, March 1978, Section 5 paragraph 4;

"The use of silicone sealants or any other temporary patching material on

filters, housing, mounting frames or ducts should not be allowed." The

licensee is comitted to this Guide, by Section 9.7.3.6 " Codes,

Standards, Tests", of the FSAR, Paragraph 4; "The essential air

filtration unit is designed and constructed in accordance with the

requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.52." The use of silicone sealant is

an apparent Deviation to the licensee's comitments (87-14-02).

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5. Follow-up of NUREG-0737 Issues

Item I.D.2.3 (0 pen) This item concerns upgrading of the Safety Parameter

Display System (SPDS). NRR completed an audit of the SPDS, in October

1986, and identified many incomplete issues such as: . cluttered-

alphanumeric displays, adequacy of radiation data a*d adequacy of

isolation devices used to prevent electrical interference. NRR.is

evaluating the licensee's schedule for responding to these issues.

A NRR inspection at Rancho Seco (April 7, 1987), identified that the

display format and radiation data issues have been resolved based on

licensee's commitments and a preliminary design review, but that the

software validation and qualification of electrical isolators are

critical path activities for the upgraded SPDS (Regulatory Guide 1.97

requirements) and NRR considers these issues a restraint to restart.

This item will remain open pending NRR's review and resolution of these

issues. This item was previously reviewed in report 86-39.

Item'II.K.3 (0 pen) This item concerns the licensee's method of tripping

the Reactor Coolant Pumps during a loss of coolant accident. The

licensee has obtained an extension to reply to this issue, which was due

December 31, 1986, until March 31, 1987. This issue will be closed

following NRR's review and approval.

6. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 27, 1987, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described

the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. A

licensee representative acknowledged the inspectors findings. The

following new items were identified during this inspection:

Violation 50-312/87-14-01

Deviation 50-312/87-13-02