ML20213F018
| ML20213F018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1984 |
| From: | Devine T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E750 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8410100409 | |
| Download: ML20213F018 (3) | |
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. GOVEIM4ENT ACCOUNTABILmf PROJECT 1555 Connecticur Avenue, N.W., Suite 202 i
W@rgs D.C. 20036 (202)232 8550 l~
September 4, 1984 L
Mr. William Dircks Executive Director for operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiorb, washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Dircks:
Thank you and the other NRC fepresentatives for taking the 3
time on August 28 to meet with Ms. Garde and me.
At the meet-ing we explained that this fall at Diablo Canyon GAP could con-centrate on attacking the NRC's performance, or on working with the staff to develop the' factual record.
I simply do not have time for both.
All of us at GAP hope that it will be possible
,p' to choose the latter course.
That is our goal in every case.
s' As promised to Mr. Rahm, enclosed are constructive suggestions b
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to help achieve that. objective.
1 of course, no solution can be effective unless it directly
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addresses the cause of a problem.
In my opinion, at Diablo Canyon there are three primary causes'for the problem of con-i flict between the NRC staff,and whistleblowers represented by GAP.
First, the burden-of-proof improperly has been shifted to allegers, under conditions that make it impossible to meet the burden.
Under the Atomic Energy Act, the burden of proving a
<j plant's safety is the licensee's, and the burden of inspection
!.7 is the staff's.
Each plays a vital role, and each has access to the necessary information to carry out its responsibilities.
~At Diablo Canyon, however, the burden de facto has been shifted to allegers to " substantiate" their chEges.
Unfortunately, g'
they have been shut out of the process after registering their initial allegations.
Without access to information or to the staff for followup interviews, for all practical purposes it is impossible for whistleblowers to fulfill any such burden of proof.
f5 Allegation management is not litigations it will not work if the staff retreats to the passive role of a judge'in an in' formal trial, where the party with the burden of proof is strip-
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pad of discovery rights.
Allegation management only will work if the staff begins a cooperative partnership with allegers.
-i-Whistleblowers are an invaluable. resource to help the staff car-f, ry out the Commission's mission, but they do not have the legal
__s to substitute for the staff.
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Page Two 3
l Second, allagers resent being subjected to " posturing" j
by the staff.
In some cases, public relations appeared mora important than substance.
For example, it was not persuasive for the whistleblowers when the staff scheduled a followup meeting on allegations for the evening of March 19, after h
the staff had already rejected the same allegations publicly to the conunission.
The staff's inability to find time for meaningful followup interviews was particularly insulting, in light of Mr. Martin's "open door" policy proclaimed the pre-j vious month in the Washington Posts' Third, and perhaps most' important, confidential allegers J
/d resent the staff's insensitivity to their anonymity.
Beyond cases of sloppiness, they resent the policy shift that insti-tutionalized threats to their anonymity -- turning their sup-porting statements over to the utility for rebuttal.
Deleting QJ the witnesses' names is an ineffective means of protecting their identities, since the staff only recognizes allegations r
as legitimate that contain full supporting details.
Protect-ing anonymity is impossible in those circumstances, because in almost every case the witnesses raised the same supporting
- l examples and details on-site.
,j It should'be obvious that all of the causes identified above are interrelated; they all complain about a lack of good faith followup efforts by the staff. ~ More specifically, in order'to restore an effective partnership between Diablo Canyon whistleblowers and the agency, GAP recommends that the NRC--
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L 1) with the exception of Mr. Yin, replace Region V and-p/
the rest of the staff in the Allegation Management Program with 4'
a new team that has not had p evious responsibliity for the record at Diablo canyon; 2) commission to work with the staff, a team of industry whistleblowers whose concerns were vindicated at Zimmer, Midland and the Three Mile Island cleanup to inspect for the U
same abuses at Diablo Canyon; ll ;
3) restore to Mr. Yin the organizational feedom to com-plate all factfinding he deems necessary and to interview all 2
relevant whistleblowers; i
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4) stop compromising the identity of confidential witnes-4 D.,
ses by turning their affidavits over to PG&E;
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If 5) institute compliance with the stated policy in the Allegation Management Program of promptly-referring all evi-Q(
dance or allegations of wrongdoing to the Office of.Investiga
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6) restore adequate staff for Mr. Meeks' oversight of the OI investigation at Diablo Canyon, with Mr. Yin assigned as technical liaison; 7) institute a program to assure that all Diabl'o Canyon allegations are classified for safety and legal significance j
n7 under standards consistent with those employed in evaluating p'
the significance of quality assurance allegations at the Zim-mer, Midland, Three Mile Island cleanup, and Waterford III pro-grams; I
8) modify the safety significance classificationi so that wrongdoing allegations have the same legal significan;n for an operating license decision as the technical allegations which.
they parallel; 9) institute compliance with the stated policy in the
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g Allegation Management Program of communications with the al-leger to confirm the charges were properly understood; and a
l 10) institute followup interviews and feedback with al-l
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legers after receiving PGEE's responses' and before publishing the staff's findings, for all allegations on safety-related -
work.
These reconssendations are offered both prospectively and
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retroactively; they should be applied to allegations already Lj
" resolved" in the absence of these measures, as well as for
! j new charges.
Supporting examples can be provided for each l-reconumendation, if the basis is unclear.
For example, there has been an inverse relationship between the number of Diablo li i
wrongdoing allegations and the size of the OI team assigned to respond.
But in an effort to maintain a constructive emphasis, only a few examples have been provided above.
For that reason, I also omitted discussion of Comunissioner Asselstine's sound proposal to reopen the review of the staff's previous perfor-mance at Diablo Canyon.
I will contact your office by the and of the week to deter-mine if there are grounds for us to work together this fall.
I sincerely hope that,_is possible.
M Respectfully submitted, Thomas Devine Legal Director t
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