ML20212N767

Div of Compliance Insp Rept 50-323/70-04 on 700507.Major Areas Inspected:Qa Program,Test Control,Nonconforming Matl, Parts or Components & Audits

ML20212N767
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	05/13/1970
From:	Andrea Johnson, Spencer G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212N718	List: IA-86-585, Summarizes Areas to Be Inspected Per Hosgni Mods.List Tentative & Will Be Modified as Necessary Pending Completion of Licensee Sys Reviews.W/One Oversize Figure ML20212N714 ML20212N719 ML20212N735 ML20212N746 ML20212N755 ML20212N757 ML20212N760 ML20212N763 ML20212N767 ML20212N773 ML20212N777 ML20212N778 ML20212N782
References
FOIA-86-585 50-323-70-04, 50-323-70-4, NUDOCS 8608290147
Download: ML20212N767 (4)

Text

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U. 8. ATOMIC INERGY ColWISSION DIVISION OF CONFLIANCE RE0 ION V Report of Inspection o

C0 Report No. 50-323/70-4 i

\\xM Licensee Pacific Gas & Electric Company None M*

Category A 1

Date of Inapection:

May 7, 1970 Date of Previous Inspection:

W rch 26-27, 1970 Inspected by:

W g /J B A.D.Jolfdon

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Reactor Itapector p.

M Reviewed by:

p h-G. 8. SpeAcer j

Senior Reacto'r Inspector l

Proprietary Information:

None

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Tvoe of Facility:

Pressurised Water Reactor i

Power Level 3250 Hwt i

I Locatient Diablo Canyon, San Luis Obispo County, California

'l Twee of Inspectiont Routine - Announced Accompanyina Personnel C. S. Spencer, Senior Reactor Inspector scope of Inspection:

Apprise PG&E's management of the signifi-

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cant findings obtained during the i(

reinspection of the Q4 program on 0600270147 860026 PDR FOIA

,SHOLLYO6-505 PDR g4

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.e SIMMARY The Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PCAE) corporate offices in San Francisco, l

California, were visited on Msy 7, 1910, to discuss with PG&E's management i

the findinga obtained from the reinspection of the QA program related to the Diablo Canyon project. PG&E's management expressed an intention to continue the priority effort to complete and implement formal procedures to assure compliance with the QA requirements prescribed in the approved policy section g

(Volume I) of the QA manual.

The QA procedures formulated to date are in use on a trial basis, open for cosa.ent and revision prior to official approval and implementation. Two procedures (Audits and Record Control) have been officially approved and j

implemented since the reinspection of the program on March 26 and 27, 1970.

I DETAII,::

I A.

Persons Contacted

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The post-QA reinspection management meeting was held with the following r

PC&E representatives in attendances

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J. D. Worthington Vice President - Engineering

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D. V. Kalla,y Projec~t Engineer B. W. Schackelford Chief, Civil Engineering J. O. Schuyler Supervising Mechanical Engineer R. V. Bettinger Supervising civil Engineer

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W. R. Forbes Supervising Inspection Engineer G. V. Richards Director, Quality Engineering B.

Meetina Results Subsequent to opening remarks by Mr. G. S. Spencer and a general l

l discussion of the results of the reinspection of the QA program conducted on March 26-27, 1970, the following specific inspection findings were presented to which the licensee responded as indicated below.

l Quality Assurance Promram (Criterion II) 4 The detailed procedures implementing the approved section of the QA manual, although generally in use, had not been approved. Therefore, 4

compliance with the provisions of the procedures was not considered

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mandatory.

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8 PCAE's Response 1

Worthing;on expressed concern that possibly they were " overdoing" their 4

l program requirements (e.g., surveillance requirements) and were appre-l hensive that official implementation of the formulated procedures might be considered (by AEC) as irrevocable. Therefore, the procedures are g

undergoing a trial period prior to final approval.

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The inspectors explained that PCAE's internal procedures certainly are

~n subject to their revision and should be revised as the need arises, i

both in the direction of expansion and retraction.

Test Control (Criterion XI)

The policy section of the QA program charges the Startup Engineer (Construction Department) with the responsibility for determing-equipment acceptance criteria and for preparation of the appropriate

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preoperational and acceptance procedures to demonscrate that the f;,,

installed systems and components operate in accordance with the design j

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requirements...The. Engineering Department has not been delegated a

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direct responsibility for review and approval or comment of the pre-

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pared test procedures to assure that the acceptance criteria are consistent with-the designed function of any given system or component.

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Worthington explained that PCAE rt. lies on a close working relationship between the Engineering and the Construction Departments to assure i

,g that proper engineering cons'iderations are incorporated into the test d

criteria and procedures. He also pointed out that the responsible construction personnel are professional engineers and that the policy l

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manual requires that the appropriate engineering personnel be notified of any deficiency identified as a result of a component or system test. The Engineering Department also receives a copy of the completed test results and therefore has the opportunity to comment on them.

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i Nonconformina Material. parts. or Components (Criterion XV) i The draf t procedure that pertained to disposition of nonconforming l

material or work contained the provision. that items corrected "in

.i, the normal course of business" need not be handled under the formal l

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procedure. Although everyone concurned understood the term to mean that only " minor deviations" fall outside of the category reqairing formal action, the term could be interpreted to mean that any discrepancy identified and corrected in the normal course of business could be handled in an informal manner.

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PG&E's Response Mr. Richards casamented that the procedure had not been officially revised as yet because of disagreement as to how the procedure should be worded. Richards indicated that the procedure would be revised and

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promulgated in the inanediate future. He added that it has been given a

.ticgg priority status.

Audits (Criterion XVIII)

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An active audit program appears to be in effect at the site in connection with the construction activities associated with Unit No. 1.

However, audits had not been conducted concerning the design activities of the Engineering Department.

l PG&E's Response i

Mr. Richards commmented that an audit of the Civil Engineering Department has been completed and that an audit of the Mechanical Engineering

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Department was scheduled to be completed during May 1970.

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v i i U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY C0!CIISSION y, '

DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE I

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REGION V t

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' Repo::c of Inspection h,

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.. CO Report No. 50-275/70-5 ll J.,

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$NM Licensee: ".,.,

Pacific Gas & Electric. Company 9

j Diablo Canyon Unit No. 1 t

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, ' ', - fl Construction Permit No. CPPR-39 h.

Category A s

Date of Inspection:

December 1, 2 and 3, 1970;

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Date of Previous.Inspeccion:

September 15 and 15,1970

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. Inspect'ed by:

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,,,ets A. D. Johnhon Dace

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,' l Reactor Inspector 1.

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,1FCts CA

/4/7>/70 Reviewed by:

t G. S. Spot.'cer Dace-Senior Reactor Inspector

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Proprietary Information:

None s

I SCOPE _

TyneofFocIlity:

Pressurized Wacer Reaccor

• Power I.evel 3250 blue location!

Diablo Canyon, San Luis Obispo County, t-California

,.Tyne of Inancecient Roucine - Announced

',. Accomonnvine Personnet s R. W. Smith, Director and G. S. Spencor Senior Reactor Inspector accompanied the inspector on a tour of the sico and related facilicies on December 3, 1970.

f Scene of Insoeetion:

Review (1) scacus of previounty identific 5

items of concern, (2) discrepancy reporet w w p" G.J I a r(

,7 (3) QA audit activities,

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SUmARY

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', Sa fety I,t.;3ms, - None i'.

Nonconformance Items - None l-1 r

1 Status of Previousiv Reported Teems - No safeef or nonconformance items were

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reported in the previous inapection report.

Other Significant Teems -

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,' ' l. s overall completion of constructicn activities was estimated to be.18.7% on Decembei 1,1970.

(S ectica '.)

E

[2..,t!1trasonicinspectionofprimarypipingspoolpiecesinstorage f.'~f

' indicated that one identification stamping had breached the i

> b. minimum design wall thickness. Also random checks of the wall

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. thickness identified a small section of wall area on one spool.

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[.U ?' k, piece that was less than the minimum design t More t

,,. tests are planned to'be perforned by Westinghouse and PG&% to I

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. p. determine the accuracy of the UT,. test resu.Its.

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.l! 3.l1-between the wide beam flanges and the containment liner indicat An evaluati~on of the constructed mockup section of,the area l that concrete can be placed in accordance with the planned procedurea e.,

.,withot. detrimental effects to the quality of the end product.

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(Section C.2.)

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Plans are to have a procedure which will delineate the specific 93l-responsibilities (within PG&E) for verifying that all certification i

i; documents are valid and proper, approved and implemented in the l.

,(Section C 3.)

immediate future (witnin ou chfe).

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, 5.

A review of QA discrepancy reports indicated that disposition of j? -; l' items continued to be accenplished pursuant to the PG&E QA secadard

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procedure.

(Section D.)

l 6

Anchor bolts installed in the containment base mac for the steam generator supports were found by PG&E to be in nonconformance l

with the specified ASTM standard. Since the design of the supports had not been completed the designer changed the design to accomodate use of the installed bolts. Other bolts not conforming to the

specifications were rejected.

(Section E.)

7 Sea water leaked into three of the steam generators during

.. 't transporattion from Tampa Florida to the site. The generators r

have been cleaned and resealed for storage at the site.

(Section F.)

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, ' ". 8 During transfer activities associated with the reactor vessel a

i..,' wooden panel collided with several of the instrument penetration,

'1, tubes. No damage reculted.

(Section G.)

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The on-site QA engineers have been implementing an active audit program.

(Section H.)

.10.

PG&E's QA section has determined that liquid penetrant tests'are N.h being performed pursuant to the appropriate procedures.

(Section 3,

. C.4.)

11.

. Testa performed by PG&E demonstrated that arc burns on reinforcing steel may be detrimental to the, physical characteristics.

(S ection D.3.)

i Manneement Interview

'The inspet:.cor met with Mesar. Hersey, Friedrichs. Hickman, Richa'rds'an',d other members of PG&E's on-site staff. The scope and findings of the j

inspection were reviewed.

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Mr. Hickman stated that.in view of their findings concerning the wall i 7

thickness of the piping spool pieces in storage, additional tests will be h.ll' performed on all of the primary piping in storage to assure design and code requirements. are..Jatisfi.ed..

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Mr. Friedrichs stated that'their evaluation of the concrete mockup section

.,has assured PG&E that the quality of concrete placed between the wide beam f1'anges and the containment liner is adequate.

s Mr. Hersey stated that from QA audit results and their experience associated with the anchor bolts, all contractors and PG&E construction staff have been made aware of the importance of promptly submitting to PG&E a formal-report of all discrepancies identified. He also said PG&E QC personnel are to check appropriate certification documents of materials used by contractors,

at the site to assure the material conforms to the specified standards.

The inspector commented that the QA followup investigation concerning the previously. observed questionable liquid penetrant testing appeared to be comprehensive and satisfactory to indicate that the contractor is following o

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the prescribed procedures.

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DETAILS A.

Persons Contacted g.

H. R. Hersey Project Superintendent R. R. Friedrichs Resident Civil Engineer A, W. Hickman

-' Resident Mechanical Engineer s

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. f,*G. V. Richards s

Director, Quality Engineering - San Francisco

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' F. W. Brady

-QA Engineer i

• '/. P. L. Bussolini ?

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QC Coordinator

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R. W. Wood QA Engineer i,

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Good QA Engineer - San Francisco hl L. J. Garvin.

QC Engineer. San Francisco

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Constructien Sedeus

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Overall completion of construction of the Diablo No.1 project was

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estimated by PG&E's Construction Department to te approximately 18.7% on-

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h-December 1, 1970 Specifically, the containment building was shown to be i

397. complete with 347. of the liner installed.

Construction of the auxiliary

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building was censidered to be approximately 48 percent complete. Unofficial projections indicate hot functional tests will not commence until sometime j

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..after January 1973 and probably not until March 1973 or later.

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~}l C.

Resolution of Previous Tssues C..j -

1; During the previous visits several items had been brought to the

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? ' licensee's attention for evaluation and possible action. The following

,..information summarizes the disposition or status of the items.

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1 Indentation scampinn of class I Pininn PG&E's inspection finding showed that identification markings on q

the primary loop pipir.g in storage at the Pismo Beach facilities

- [~ were not in compliar.ce with the Westinghouse specifications.

Additional tests have been pe-formed to determine whether the J Q~

impression depths found to be outside of the Westinghouse speci-fications infringed on the minimum design wall thickness of the pipe. During November 1970, ultrasonic test equipment was used to measure the wall thicknens of the pipe. The test results 4

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showed that eight indentations associated with one identification marking had infringed on the minimum design wall thickness. A test of the section of the piping free from stamping was also checked. The results showed that an area of about ten square inches was slightly less than the minimum design wall thickness.

l As a result of PG&E's test data, Westinghouse personnel were scheduled to arrive on site during the week sf December 7,1970 with special optical measuring equipment.

T*. tis equipment was

~7 stated to supposedly be able to measure the wall thicknesses within an accuracy of one mil.

Mr. Hickman stated that as a result of their findings they intend to do more testing of the other spools of pipe to assure themselves that the other sections meet the minimum design requirements. Hickman showed the inspector

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4 results of measurements made by Westinghouse of the wall thickness

'..! prior to shipping the spool pieces to the site. Each spool piece

'. ' was measured at locatione of approximately one inch and two feet from the ends of each pipe. These measurements, indicated that all i

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wall thicknesser were within the minimum design limits. Hickman indicated to the inspector that he believed the ultrasonic. test technique used b'y PG&E had an accuracy value of within at least 4.fggyp

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10 mils and was probably accurate to within 2 or 3 mils. It appeared

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' from the (PG&E) UT test data that the maximum -infringement on the minimum design.thicknest was approximately.050 inches.

2... placement of Special Concrete in Area Between Wide Boom Flances To assure that the concrete placed between the wide beam flanges and the containment liner at the base of the containment soll would be of proper quality, a mockup section was poured and was later inspected by the PG&E Construction Engineers.

(Sce CO Report No. 50-275/70-4) After the normal curing period, the forms were

! stripped from the mockup. The concrete was thoroughly examined

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', b 6rr..e:in. r.um.s: n.oexamined the inockup section and concurred with the PG&E findings..~

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' 3..

Verification of Ouality Control Tr: formation on Certification Documents i

l Mr;'Richa'rds" indicated that a procedure to assign specific i.

, responsibilities pertaining to the verification of quality control in' formation o'n~ certification documents would be formalized and 8

> ' approved within 60 days.

Mr. Busso11ni, QC coordinator, said

2. ;44 that the General Construction Departnent personnel at the site had n

been reviewing all material certifications relating to materials used in the civil structurcs. Richards indicated that formulation of the proposed procedure had been delayed because of differing views concerning who exactly should be responsible for review of

.the various certifications. According to Richards, this especially

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applies for the items independently purchased by 'G&E from outside P

vendors.

8 4

Adequacy of Dve pencerant Tests During the previous inspection, Mr. William Kelley, Construction Inspector, Region II, observed a Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co.

inspector performing a dye penetrant examination on one of the liquid holdup tanks. Kelley felt that the inspector did not remove enough dye penetrant during the cleaning phase of the test and as a result there was a pinkish cast of the developer after t

it was applied. He also noticed that the developer was applied r

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it from an serosal"can 'in high winds and the inspector was shielding i

. si the work with his body, in such a way that he could not see how 3

much developer was applied.

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' Nr. Brady-lrsite Quality Assurance Engineer, investigated the facts and-circumstances surrounding the criticisms voiced by Mr. Kc11ey.

JJ Brady's report of his investigation stated that it was difficult r

wake &c to assess the criticism of PDM's procedures.. According to Brady,

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'l, the test', s8ree that the developer appeared pink in spots.

Mr.

Garvin, who is qual *fied as ASNT Level II for dye penetrant examinations, felt that Ihc test was adequate for detecting defects that would be rejected under ASLC,Section VII or AS12,Section III, y Class C. The criteria for dye penetrant removal is by its nature, r

not'very specific. ASFE,Section VIII, which is the governing code

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for this test, says..."any penetrant remaining on the surface shall

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.i be removed. Insufficient rc= oval will 1 cave a background which

. will interfere with subsequent indication of defcces. Care must t-5,J

.f,- be exercised that penocrant in any defects is'not removed.."' This (m.;ll(cn.,

seems co leave room'for judgement as to when just enough penetrant s-

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3 is ' removed.' Similarfly, there are no hard, fast rules for applying

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The test in question was performed on a particular completed wcld

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' '. seam after grinding. The liquid holdup tanks involved are fabrica-ted from t-inch to 3/16-inch stainless. steel. The seams are welded from 'two sides, typically with two or three passes on one side, followed by grinding the dxposed side of the root pass, and thcn completed with two or three passes.

The dye penetrant test is c./Ms v

performed after grinding the root pass in order to locate any defects before the weld is completed., This allows correction with j

a minimum amount of repair work.

i PDM has been advised, by letter, of the concern over their procedures. '

In answering, they observe that the cleaning phase is difficult because the work is 'in the wcld ' groove. - However, they reinstructed e

their inspectors to exercise additional care in obtaining complete excess penetrant removal.

Mr. Brady indicated that he had personally watched three PDM dye penetrant examinatioco since the previous inspection. Two of these

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vere in a weld groovo. The procedures were noted to be Iceter

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perfect. In'all of the tests, the inspector removed the pencerant by first rubbing with dry cloth and then rubbing with a cloth slightly dampened with cleaning solvent. The developer was sprayed on in one coat and any thin spots were sprayed with a second coat.

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color where the grinding marks were close together. However..he During the test in a weld groove Mr. Brady notice'l a light pink 4

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1 stated that he thought this was inherent in testing a ground l

t surface rather than a result. of imperfect cechnique.

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In conclusion Mr. Brady indicated that he could not draw any

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definite conclusions about the test that Mr. Kelley witnessed.

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There seemed to be agreement that the developer had a light pink color. It could be that this was careless procedure.

It could j

also be a reflection of the difficulty encountered in performing.

j such a tes.t in a weld groove. Or it could be a combination of the g

two.

In any case, Mr. Brady concluded that the PDM and PG&E personnel were qualified for the jobs that they were doing, and a

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that the PDM dye penetran.t procedures they were now using were acceptable.

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D.., Construction Discrepancies

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f 1.P? Deviations

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.,.. The inspector reviewed aightcon deviation reports which have been l(g

' 9,:' prepared since the previous inspection. Although several of,tho e

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- ' '3 items have.not becd fully reviewed and resolved, the inspector confirmed that the items were being processed in accordance with I

the QA discrepancy procedure. The more significant items included:

Sea water had leaked into the s' team generator during transper-a.

tation to the site.

(Sce Section F. of this report for additiont i

i detail.. )

e.kYAG b.

A wooden panel collided with the bottem instrumentation penetration tubes of the reactor vessel while unloading it from the barge at Avila Beach. ',(See Section G of this report for additional detail.)

c... Penetration alignment was inconsistant with contract specificatic Design Engineer approved change so that alignment would be consistent with requirements of Section VIII of the ASEE Boiler

'and Pressure Vessel Code.

4 d.

A penetration arrived at the site with defective welds, j

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Field repairs were made and the vendor was directed to improve inspection efforts to preclude the shipping of defective.naterials.

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A penetration sleeve was fcund slightly out of-round. The q,

Design Engineer accepted the sleeve as was since the, alight out-of-roundness'would not create future ficup problems.

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Several'11ner plates were found to exceed the plumb specifi-

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cation in the contract.

The Design Engineer accepted the f.;:

' ' ' J work as completed since his findings indicated the deviations

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'. had no effect on the engineering requirements.

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The refueling canal penceration was installed in an improper orientation;. The p,enetration was removed and was then properly

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-i installed.

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,, h.. - During rail transportation, the pressurizer vessel evidently received a strong jolt. The recording of the accelerometer '

monitoring the vessel had on one occasion exceeded the scale reading. Also a brace weld had partially ruptured.

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• ', which charred the wooden supports under the pressurizer.

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Examination of the particular portion of the vessel adjacent I

.to the wooden support showed no evidence of paint damage.

l The paint is an aluminium type and should show damage if ir

'd: 1"" were exposed to excessive heat.' Mr. Hickman believed that,,

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the vessel was undamaged by the shock since checks of the ig,,

C.,'f heaters in the, pressurizer showed no defective conditions.'

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At the time of the current inspection Westinghouse had not

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,c' as yet determined the severity of the possibly shock shown O"j by the accelerometer since the calibration data concerning -

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the monitor had not yet arrived at the site.

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Receival inspeation of one of the safety injection pumps indicated a metal to metal noise when the pump was rotated.

Plans were to inspect, repair and use if possible.

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Receival inspection of the containment spray pump, serial No. 221B175-2, disclosed a crack in the pump casing near the

'S, bearing at the drive end of the pump. Plans were to repair l

and use if possible.

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A 1007. review of the etcom generator and other anchor bolts by PG&E disclosed that all of the bolts for one reason or another failed to meet the ASTM specifications.

(See Section E of this report for details.)

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Minor variations b

The inspector confirmed from a review of the minor variation l'

los that the recorded items had been appropriately resolved at the 5,.

' field level. One interesting minor variation involved are burns f

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?i on reinforcing steel.. To determine the effect and consequences 1

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of arc burns on the' integrity of the reinforcing steel, tensile a

'U tests were performed on samples containing are burns. Significant "I

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' nformation from a report of the tests follows.

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. "Four. (4). test..sampics. of reinforcing steel, size 18. grade li 60, were procured for testing. Sample #1 was the reference standard to determine approximate values for yield strength,,

-tensile strength and elongation since the heat number was gi i,l, -

unknown.. Sample #2 had an are burn produced on it by dragging

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a weld rod across the robar. Sample #3 had an are burn created

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by touching the rebar with a weld rod and pulling it off.

Sample #4 had an are burn created by holding a weld rod in l

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one spot on the robar for a count of five (5), creating a

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molten puddle three-cighths (3/8's) of an inch in diameter, i.

,1 The results are tabulated in Table 1.

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TABLE 1 g

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YLD. STRENGE TEN. STRENGTH ELONG..

FAILURE'

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.. #1 - Ref.

P' L,,9,,63,500 psi 102,500 psi 187.

At Lower Jaw

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1. 2 - Arc Drag

',,63,500 psi 103,000 psi 15.17.

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1. 3 - Spot "6A,25Upai 103,750 pai 12.77.

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1. 4 - 3/81" Puddle: (.1.u64,000 psi.

75,500 psi 1.8L Th u Arc Burn I

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The failure of Sampic #4 occurred, throu',h the molten puddle j

created by the c.rc burn.

It can be determined from the results that the are burn did indeed cause brittleness. A stress point was created,in the area of the are burn causing failure and very little elongation or ductility. Sample #3 though catis-factory, gave ev'idence of a slight crack in the spot created j

by the are hurn..

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' This test is by no means a method of determining the degree

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of are burns that might be acceptable in the field. It was performed solely to demonstrate the fact that arc burns on reinforcing steel can be detrimental."

,Richards. indicated that.since the probicm was identified, about

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.eight defcces have been repaired by installing a cadweld splice.

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He also said that contractor personnel are exercising more care to preclude arc burns.

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'E.* Other Class I Structures (Secom Cenerator Suncres) 1,

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As a result of the inspection conducted during June 1970, the inspector j

reported in CO Report 50-275/70-3 that the mill certifications for the anchor bolts installed in the containment base slab showed the bolts to be f;

of proper quality. This conclusion war based on a sample review of tha j

ASTM A-490 Bolt certifications. Also, this was the same time that the Ag.g'"

inspector raised the question as to whether PG&E QC personnel were reviewing all documented information for conformance to code requirements. Subsequent f

to the inspectors. departure, the on-site QA staff performed a complete review of all the bolt certifications. The audit findings were as shown

.x e

in Appendix A.

The Deficiency Report submitted to PC&E by PDM stated that the REC Corporation received material for the anchor bolts from Ryerson and Crucible Steel Companies along with mill test reports. Apparently the person that has the responsibility for checking the mill test reports was on vacation.

A substitute who was not totally qualified approved the mill test reports

, f;, l as conforming to the ASTM A490 specifications. The REC Corporation proceeded with the manufacture.of the anchor bolts.

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The mill test reports were submitted to Pittsburgh-Des Moincs Ste'c1 Company's Purchasing Department which has an in-house Quality Assurance man assigned specifically to check mill test reports and materials being received.

The PDM Purchasing Department Quality Assurance person noted the discrepancy l

and notified the REC Corporation that the material was not in conformance g

with ASTM A490. The REC Corporation notified PDM's Purchasing that the bolts were in. specification and they would send proper mill test reports to show this. In the meantime, the correspondence involved took considerable

• gM time and the REC Corporation completed the manufacture of the anchor bolts

,.x.

and shipped them directly to the job site.

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On rcceiving the.porrected forihs, a discrepancy was again found since c:

they did not shw the physical properties but had given hardness equivalent-readings. T,he Purchasing Department again went back to the REC Corporation and notified them that this was not adequate. PDM was told that the bolts were adequate and REC would take carc of the situation. Because of this ensuing difficulty and paper work, the bolts were installed in concrete prior-to the correct paper work and mill test reports reaching the job site.

1 As soon as it was discovered by the (PDM) Corporate Quality Assurance Department that the above had occurred, immediate steps were taken to find out the full details.of the problem and also to survey the REC Corporation in order to determine if they had the capability of producing the above

'.,, anchor bolts.

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PDM Quality Assurance conducted an audit of the REC Corporation j

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manufacturing procedures, quality assurance, and quality control l

.e organization on August 14, 1970 and found them to be satisfactory to produce' materials for this contract. PDM felt the action they i

'i had taken was satisfactory to see that this could not occur on

- d- -

l future orders.

• 2 In addition to the above steps, PDM Quality Assurance will make certain that all materials and certifications are within the I

contractual requirements of the specification prior to permiccing shipment of any future materials, from REC Corporation.

In view of the above problems encountered with the anchor bolts, PDM ~

e

. requested specification deviation approval that the anchor bolts, (32-11AR2 l 5

64-11AR4, and 32-11AR6) which are now embedded in the concrete be lef t in position, and that PG&E consider alterncte designs as may be required to accommodate the slightly lower physical properties of the embedded anchor ',--

bolts. In addition to the above stated ASn! A490 anchor bolts, there were

' (.y anchor bolts, (32-11ARI., 64-11AR3, 32-11ARS, and 34-11AR7), that are a(bove the floor embedment liner places. These anchor bolts will be reordered as 4

soon as possible and will meet the ASn! A490 requirements, according to PDM.

Sinc ~e 't'he detaf. 'd. 'disign bf the ' supports h'ad not been completed, PG&Es le h,,esignEngineerin' corporate'dthe"a'sinstalled"boltsintothesupportdesign and PG&E accepted the'. instal. led bolts, howev.er, the remaining bolts not

'e'abedded in concre'c'e Vere re'Jected.

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[ ifN'M F.

Steam Generators Sea water entered three of the four steam generators via channel nozzles

.during their transfer 'from Tampa Florida to Avila Beach, California where s

the generators were unloaded from the barge and transported overland to the site at Diablo Canyon. The' condition was discovered during inspection on arrival at the site in Aly '1970.

tio c. Cleaning of the generators was completeckduringOctober1970. Efforts l

lean' the generators were delayed during September due to labor disputes.

A report of a meeting between Westinghouse and PG&E personnel discussed.

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the design of the shipping closure of the steam generator channel nozzles

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'and why they failed. ' (Appendix B shows a diagram of the problem area.) The

"' nozzle weld preparations were protected by an angle iron ring scal-welded

• ,., to the end of the nozzle outside 9f the veld preparations. Another ring was i tack welded to this ring, inside it and the veld preparations, for further I

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I protec: ion during manufacture. When the steam generators were prepared a

i for shipment, the tack welded inner rings were to have been removed and

,. - gasketed covers bolted to the seal welded rings. However, the inner rings l

were not removed, and the covers were prevented from seating as intended, ll resulting in leakage paths past the tack welded joints.

Plastic coatings were sprayed on.the outside,of the bolted closures, but the coating failed.

There was-no procedure requiring rcmoval of the temporary, rings, although

,g.g ch,ere was a note calling for their removal on a drawing. The procedure has now been revised to call for this step. Westinghouse stated to PC&E that they had such confidence in the closure design that they conducted l

no tests of the integrity of the shipping preparation.

l Examination of the steam generators at the site showed the followin'g:

1. 1.' Water in nozzles on both inlet and outlet sides, estimated at i

3 to 5 gallons, no evidence of water on the tube sheet.

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1. 2. t Water in nozzles and in head, estimated at 5 gallons.

• [#3.,Closureappear,ed..to.,beintact.

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1. 4 Slight., indica, tion of water at ring of one nozzle.

4-An an effort to determine whether salt water entered any tubes, j

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distilled water has been flushed thru the lowest tube of geacrator #2.

Analysis.,of.this f, lushing water showed chlorides less than 1/10 ppm which i

l in.dicated,little.or no sea water entered the tube'.

Westinghouse felt there' j

is no need to flush oth'ertu'bes in the generator. Discussion revealed that this procedure would have' detected one cubic centimeter of see water in p.T]

the tube but would not have detected one drop of sea water in the tube.

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According to the report there have been two other incidents of water

?-

entering steam generator,s during ship.nent., The Indian Point Unit 3 generators had an order of magnitude" more sea water enter than the Diablo generators.

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The Zion (Unit 17) generators had condensation resulting from air leakage, but not sea water. These steam generators for the three projects were shipped 4 il over a period of months. The failure of the closures was not detected until

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after all three units' generatore had been shipped.

In all cases the temporary shop protective rings had not been removed from the nozzlea.

g Steam generator tubes are inconel. Tube sheets are forged carbon steel with inconel explosive cladding. Channel heads are cast carbon strel

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,. (SA216WCC) with stainless steel (308L) weld clad.

Channel splitter places are inconel. The channel nozzle weld preparations are weld built up of 308L over a transition pass of 309L. The head casting is stress relieved after cladding but before the splitter plate is welded in. The head to tube sheet I

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'i weld i's strssa relieved'by local heating. The splitter plate welds are i.-

not stress relieved, i

The nozzle welds are not sensitized as defined by ASTM 393 or ASTM 262.

This,is the so-called Strauss cost and was indicated to be acceptable by the AEC,co determine sexisitization. The test was made on duplicate material, not on material from the nozzles themscivos.

9?*i I.

Inconel was considered to be immune to chloride ion stress corrosion cracking, but will pit on long exposure to sea water, especially if stagnant.

i No pitting has been seen in the steam generators, which have had a relatively short exposure.

The corrective action, proposed by Ucstinghouse was to wash the channels with deionized water until a.one ppm chloride icvel was reached in the wash i

water and then swab with alcohol to dry. They believed that this would prevent' any future damage from the sea water and was all that was required.

It was the same procedure proposed for the Indian Point generators which had "f

greater leakage.

Mr. Baulig, Westinghouse, said that 1/10 ppm chloride was g.9 relatively easy to achieve in the ficid, and it was his stated intentionlto

, wash to this level, not just to the 1 ppm level required by Tampa.

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PG&E accepted the investigation of the incident and the proposed c1 caning

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procedure. General, Construction prepared a quality control deviation report

.,,,on this incident.,,

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. Westinghouse has changed the nozzle closure design from bolted to seal velded. Al Hickman PG&E Resident Mechanical Engineer stated a preference

.,. 4,,d for the original design, if correctly executed, because access for inspection in the field is easier.

J

.d The. report,of chloride analysis e,upplied by Finalysis Inc., Paso Robles, I

California, indicated that all final rinses had chloride concentrations of 0.1 ppm or less with the exception of two samples which showed conccntrations of 0.6 and O'.7 ppm. Of interest, Mr. Good supplied the inspector a copy of

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an article titled, Application of Secois for Desalination Plant by Richard 3

T. Jones published in August 1967 in Volume 7 No. 3, Metals Engineering Quarterly (ASM). The aritcle primarily deals with corrosion of stainless l

steel exposed to salt water environments. The test durations were up to two j

years.

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corrbaion feststance of the stainicas secels (type 304 & 316), Ericacn cups were formed by depressing a hardened steel ball into each stainless 5: steel sample.

Conclusions from examination of the stress cups,under low

.e magnification and metallographically, indicated the absence of evidence of l

stress-corrosion cracking or any preferential pitting corrosion on the cups, q

(A copy,of the article is available in the Region V office.)

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Reactor Vessel T*

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1 The reactor vessel arrived at Avila Beach for unloading during Sepecmber 1970. During unloading operations Bigge, the equipment handling contractor,

!l had previously removed.the wooden panci covering the 0-Ring box on the barge y!.

voosen panel (10' x 22') that had been under the 0-Ring box a 15 to 20 mph fore-deck and relocated the 0-Ring box to a safe area. While removing the ji vind caught the panel and whipped it into the starboard mid-section of the

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'reace.or vessel botton, dragging its edge across several of the instrument fjl

" penetration tubes. After an initial inspection, a detailed inspection

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procedure formulated by Westinghouse and PG&E was implemented. Results of t,'

the inspection were reported in the deviation report as follows.

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1.

The area of impact was determined by holes and abrasions in the protective cover. This arca, in turn, was found on the reactor

,i vessel bottom by bits of wood on two (2) of the penceration tube end expandable plug bolt threads. These two tubes had been marked I

initially because their plugs had been knocked loose and Icaked i

gas. A third tubo had it.s plug end bolt bent, but wasn't leaking.

4-l J

The fabric cover was removed during this process.

t Tubes, S/N 456-09-2 and 456-15-2,, had wood chips on their'plugii I

t bcit threads and tube S/N 456-212-2 had a bent bolt.

9' 2

'Th'e burlap boots and polyethylene socks were removed from these j

three tubes and nine (9) other tubes adjacent to them. They wero l

all checked for straightness by laying a straight-edge en two (2) sides of each tube, 90 apart.

No bent tubes were found.

i'

..The socks and boots were reinstalled with new tuck-tape.

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3 All instrument penetration tube end expandable rubber plugs werc

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checked for internal gas leakage with an. " Ultra-Sonic Translator" i

(leak detector). One (1) plug was found to be leaking and was re-seated and.re-tightened. The leak was stopped.

i 4.

Each tube end plug was physically checked for seat.ing, tightness.

(soundness) and possible damage to the tube.

l l

l Loose burlap boots were removed and replaced solidly with new i

i tape. No damage was found.

I 5.

On completion of the inspection, the protective fabric weather

,I cover was replaced over the Reactor Vessel bottom.

3 The results of this inspection disclosed no physical damage to the

't bottom penetration tubes.

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15 pi NW. Brady indicated that the vessel would be transferred to the site from Avila Beach during the week of December 7, 1970 The inspector observed during a tour of the temporary storage area at Avila Beach that (1) the vessel was under surveillance by a guard (2) the vessel was covered with

' plastic and (3) the gas pressure was monitored by an installed gauge (0.5 to 1 psig of nitrogen is being amintained on the vessel).

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0A Audits The on-site QA audit program was reviewed and discussed with Mr. Brady.

The review included a reading of recent audit reports, audit schedules and plans.

Mr. Brady indicated that to perform an audit associated with a particular phase of contract work approximately 15 man days are expended in preparing, conducting and documenting a particular QA audit.

The audit reports appeared to be comprehensive in describing the scope and findings of the audits. Copics of the audit reports had been distributed.

to all interested parties and writ, ten responses of adverse findings were noted to be filed with the appropriaco audit report. Nr..Brady indicated that the need for timely filing of deviation reports had bcon highlighted,on

('b -

contractors have become more aware of the urgency for prompt submittaliof

'several occasions. However, this probicm seems to have been remedied as' formal notification whenever discrepancies are identified.

Since July 1, 1970, 15 QA audits of construction ac'tivitics have been

. -]

completed. Plans were to complete three more audits before the end of the year pursuant to the approved schedule.

t Activities audited included:

' %MM 1.

QC inspections.

2 Transporting, handling and storage of steam generators, and reactor vessel.

3..

Receival and storage 'of electrical equipment.

4.

' Installation of auxiliary salt water piping.

5.

Mechanical equipment - inspection, storage and placement.

',. 2 6

Fabrication of liquid holdup tanks.

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Containment structure.

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ASTM A-490 - Specifications p:

" - 2 " diameter

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Minimum Maxirum Tensile 150 k 180 k Yield 130 k

. Elongation in-2"-

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- 147..

Reduction in area.

40%

Hardness - Brinell 3.02 3.52 y

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ANCHOR BOLTS Pumn Supports - 64 bolts - 2 "

3, 11AR1 & 11AR2

,'141,675 5.67. low Tensile-Yield 124,815 i.,

4.07. low Elongation 19.37.

ok Red. in Area 60.6%

ok Hardness 2.86 5.3% low lt

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,. Generator supports - 128 bolts - 2" I(

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' 11AR3 & 11AR4 r

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l Tensile 139,460 6.97. low-Yield i

121,798 6.27. low-

. Elongation 28.7%

ok Red, in Area 64.5%

ok Hardness 2.69 10.97.

gg Lateral Truss - 64 bolts - 2" 11ARS & 11AR6-Tensile 158,750 ok Yield 146,000 ok Elongation 8.07.

437.

Red. in Area 37.6%

6.07. low i

Hardness 311/321 ok l

j Annulus Supports - 34 bolts h" 11AR7 Tensile 161,000 ok i

. Yield 150,000 ok Elongation 107.

28.67. low Red. in Area 36.07.

107. low Hardness 321/331 ok l

1 APPENDIX - A l

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LIQUID ENVELOPE i

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PROTECTIVE I

. NOZZLE COVER D

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. TACK WELD ( 3 PLACES }

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SEAL WELC f

TEMPORARY.!NNER RING M

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! NOZZC.E WELD PREP.

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, ti-..!.. n. :. :. p, j ' 5. TH.E SALT WATER INTRUSION OC

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,;,yl,,,1-THE SHOP FAILED TO REMOVE THE TEMPORARY INNER, RING PRIOR TO SHIPMENT OF STEAM GENERATORS.

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2-THE TACK-WELDS PROJECTED SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT -

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'..THE SHIPPING COVERS FROM SEATING ON THEIR GASKETS.. -

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"* l. I, '.. 3.THE "LIOUID ENVELOPE" FAILED DURING THE BARGE TRIP t,-

,. ALLOWING SEA WATER TO CONTACT THE METAL SURFACES.*

t i-APPENDIX - B GM167027 ATTACHMENT "B" DVR No.35 l_ A pprtOV ED OY l

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i OIABLO C ANYON PROJECT UNIT ONE I"'*"

o 1oy STEAM GENERATOR REACTOR COOLANT ' '

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ou NOZZLE SHIPPING COVER DETAIL e n.

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,1 GENCRAL. CONSTRUCTICN OCPARTMENT om =weae suussa

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