ML20212J317

Amend 50 to License DPR-34,changing Tech Specs Re Steam Line Rupture Detection/Isolation Sys

ML20212J317
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	02/26/1987
From:	Berkow H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20212J298	List: ML20212J293 ML20212J317 ML20212J383
References
TAC-60421, NUDOCS 8703090007
Download: ML20212J317 (17)

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO DOCKET NO. 50-267 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STA,T, ION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 50 License No. DPR-34

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Public Servici Company of Colorado.(the licensee) dated June 4, 1986, as supplemented  ;

October 27, 1986, and partially superseded by application dated December 19, 1986, complies with the standards and requiremants of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Ch: liter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, s the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; .

C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities '

authorized by this amendment can be conduc.ted without endangering the health and safety of ti.e public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in. compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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B703090007 B70226 PDR ADOCK 05000267 P PDR

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specification; as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.D(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-34 is bgtehy amended to read as follows:

(2) Techn,1cel Specifications I

The Techn hai Specifications contained in Appendices A and 8, as ravised through /nendment No.. , are hereby incorporat4sd in the licanse. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Spe.cifications.

3. , This' license pendvset is effective as Af the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEM REbulATORY COMMISSION W

fortart N. Berkow, Of rector

. Standardization and Special Projects Directorate Divisica of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications -

Date of Issuance: February 26, 1987

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i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.50 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-34 i

DOCKET NO. 50-2671 Replace the fo'llowing pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

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Remove Insert 4.4-4 4.4-4 4.4-6a 4.4-6b 4.4'6c -

4.4-8 4.4-8 4.4-9 4.4-9

s 4.4-12 4.4-12 <

4.4-12a /

4.4-12b 4.4-13 4.4-13 5.4-2 5.4-2 5.4-6 5.4-6 5.4-7 . 5.4-7 5.4-10a l

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. - '. Fort St. Vrain #1

, , Technical Spacifications Amendment # fp Page 4.4-4 Specification LCO 4.4.1 Table 4.4-2 INSTRUMENT OPERATING REQUIREMENTS FOR PLANT PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.

LOOP SHUTDOWN

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MINIMUM DEGREE PERMIS-MINIMUM OF SIBLE TRIP OPERABLE REDUN- BYPASS NO , FUNCTIONAL UNIT SETTING CHANNELS DANCY CONDITIONS la. Deleted Ib. Deleted Ic. Deleted Id. Deleted le. Deleted .

If. Deleted 2a. Deleted 2b. Deleted 2c. Deleted

• 2d. Deleted .

3a. Loop 1 Shutdown -----------

2 1 None Logic 3b. Loop 2 Shutdown -----------

2 1 None Logic 4a. Circulator 1A and 18 C++culators 2 1 None Shutdown - Loop 1A a.nd 18 Shutdown Logic Shutdown 4b. Circulator IC and 10 Circulators 2 1 None Shutdown - Loop 1C and 10 Shutdown Logic Shutdown

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'. Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications Amendment # 50 Page 4.4-6b Specification LCO 4.4.1 Table 4.4-3 (Continued)

PLANT PROTECTIVE SYSTEM, OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS - CIRCULATOR TRIP TOTAL CHANNELS MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL NO. OF TO CHANNELS ACTION NO. UNIT CHANNELS TRIP OPERABLE APPLICABILITY (NOTE 2) 10a. Steam Leak 4 2 3 Note 1 1,2,3,4,5 Detection Turbine Butiding loop 1 10b. Steam Leak 4 2 3 Note 1 1,2,3,4,5 Detection Reactor Building loop 1 10c. Steam Leak 4 2 3 Note 1 1,2,3,4,5 Detection Turbine Building Loop 2 4

10d. Steam Leak 4 2 3 Note 1 1,2,3,4,5 Detection .

Reactor Building Loop 2 Note:

1. The reactor shall not be operated at power (above 2% rated thermal power) except as provided by these requirements and their associated ACTION statements.

2. The requirement to shutdown affected helium circulators, provided in the introducti:n to Specification 4.4.1, does not apply.

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Fort St. Vrain #1

. '. Technical Sp:cifications Amendment # 50 Page 4.4-6a i

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l Specification LCO 4.4.1 Table 4.4-3 (Continued) i PLANT PROTECTIVE SYSTEM, TRIP SETPOINTS - CIRCULATOR TRIP TRIP ALLOWABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT SETPOINT VALUE 10a. Steam Leak Detection s 52.3 degrees F s 52.8 degrees F Turbine Building per minute per minute Loop 1 rate of rise rate of rise 10b. Steam Leak Detection s 52.3 degrees F s 52.8 degrees F Reactor Building per minute per minute Loop 1 rate of rise rate of rise 10c. Steam Leak Detection s 52.3 degrees F s 52.8 degrees F Turbine Building per minute per minute Loop 2 rate of rise rate of rise 10d. Steam Leak Detection s 52.3 degrees F s 52.8 degrees F Reactor Building per minute per minute Loop 2 rate of rise rate of rise

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Fort St. Vrain #1

• Technical Specifications Amendrnent # 50 Page 4.4-6c Table 4.4-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (for 10a, 10b, 10e and 10d Only)

ACTION 1 - With only 7 OPERABLE channels in either building or in both butidings, operation at power may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in bypass within I hour or reduce power to below 2% within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status within the following 7 days.

ACTION 2 - With only 6 OPERABLE channels in either building or in both buildings, place the inoperable channels in bypass and reduce power to below 2% within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Operation at power may continue if at least 7 OPERABLE channels in both buildings are placed in i

service.

ACTION 3 - With inoperable channels or loops other than as provided in ACTION 1 and 2 above, reduce power to below 2% within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 4 - With any one valve actuated by SLRDIS or electrical wiring and circuits used to actuate that valve inoperable, restore the valve and/or associated components to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce power to below 2% within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 5 - With two or, more valves actuated by SLRDIS or electrical wiring and circuits used to actuate those valves inoperable, restore the valves and/or associated components to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or reduce power to below 2% within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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Fort St. Vrain #1

• ' Technical Specifications Amendment'# 50 Page 4.4-8 Specification LCO 4.4.1 NOTES FOR TABLES 4.4-1 THROUGH 4.4-4 (a) See Specification LSSS3.3 for trip setting.

(b) Two thermocouples from each loop, total of four, constitute one channel. For each channel, two thermocouples must be operable in at least one operating loop for that channel to be considered operable.

(c) With one prima ry coolant high level moisture monitor tripped, trips of either loop primary coolant E31sture monitors will cause full scram. Hence, number of operable channels (1) minus minimum

' number required to cause scram (0) equals one, the minimum degree of redundancy.

(d) Both 480 volt buses IA and IC loss of voltage for no longer than 35 seconds.

(e) One channel consists of one undervoltage relay from each of the two 480 voit buses (two undervoltage relays per channel). These relays fail open which is the direction required to initiate a scram.

(f) The inoperable channel must be in the tripped condition, unless the trip of the channel will cause the protective action to occur. Failure to trip the inoperable channel requires taking the appropriate corrective action as Ifsted on Pages 4.4-1 and 4.4-2 within the specified time limit.

(g) RWP bypass permitted if the' bypass also causes associated single channel scram.

(h) Permissible Bypass Conditions:

I. Any circulator buffer seal malfunction.

II. Loop hot reheat header high activity.

III. As stated in LCO 4.9.2.

(j) Deleted.

(k) One operable helium circulator inlet thermocouple in an operable loop is required for the channel to be considered operable.

(m) Low Power RWP bistable resets at 4% after reactor power initially exceeds 5%.

(n) Power range RWP bistables automatically reset at 10% after reactor power is decreased from greater than 30%. The RWP may be manually reset between 10'. and 30% power.

(p) Item 7a. must be accompanied by item 7c for loop 1 shutdown.

Item 7b. must be accompanied by item 7c for loop 2 shutdown.

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., Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications

.. '. Amendment # !In

, Page 4.4-9 NOTES FOR TABLES 4.4-1 through'4.4-4 (Continued) r) Separate instrumentation is provided on each circulator for this functional unit. Only the affected helium circulator shall be shut down within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if the indicated requirements are not met.

s) Deleted, t) A primary coolant dew point moisture monitor shall not be considered operable unless the following conditions are met:

1) Reactor power Range Minimum Sample Flow Startup to 2% 1 sec/sec.

> 2% - 5% 5 sec/sec.

> 54 - 20% 15 sec/sec.

> 20% - 35% 30 sec/sec.

> 35% -100% 50 sec/sec.

2) ' Minimum flow of item 1) is alarmed in the control room and the alarm is set in accordance with the power ranges specified.

3) The ambient temperatures indicated by both temporary thermocouples mounted on the flow sensors in penetrations B1 and B3 are less than 185"F.

4) Fixed alarms of I sec/sec and 75 sec/sec are operable.

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' " Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Sp::cifications Amendment # Ca Page 4.4-12 plant Electrical System power loss requires a scram to prevent any power-to-flow mismatches from occurring. A 30-second delay is provided following a power loss before the scram is initiated to allow the emergency diesel generator to start. If it does start, the scram is avoided.

Two-Looo Trouble. Operation on one loop at a maximum of about 50% power may continue following the shutdown of the other loop (unless preceded by scram as in the case of high moisture.)

Onset of trouble in the remaining loop (two-loop trouble) results in a scram. Trouble is defined as a signal which normally 1,nitiates a loop shutdown. Similarly, simultaneous shutdown signals to both loops result in shutdown of one of the two loops only and a reactor scram. However, actuation of both Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation System (SLRDIS) loops,,

effectively shuts down both loops because it sends an actuation logic signal to all four circulator trip logic channels. The consequences of a two-loop shutdown and subsequent loss of forced circulation have been analyzed and found to be acceptable. The consequences are bounded by an interruption of forced circulation cooling accident described in FSAR Section 14.4.2.2, Safe Shutdown Cooling.

High Temperature in the pipe cavity would indicate the presence of an undetected steam leak. A steam leak or pipe rupture under the PCRV within the support ring would also be detectable in the pipe cavity, therefore only one set of sensors and logic is required to monitor both areas. The setpoint has been set above the temperature that would be expected to occur in the pipe cavity if the steam leak were detected.

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.. Fort St. Vrain #1

" ' Technical Specifications Amendment # Bn Page 4.4-12a b) Loop Shutdown Inputs l Shutdown of Both Circulators is a loop shutdown input which is necessary to insure proper action of the reactor protective (scram) system (through the two-loop trouble scram) in the event of the loss of all circulators and low feedwater flow.

The remaining loop shutdown inputs are equipment protection items which are included because their malfunction could prevent a scram due to loss of the two-loop trouble scram input.

c) Circulator Shutdown Inputs

- Circulator Shutdown Inputs (except circulator speed high on water turbines) are equipment protection items which are tied to two loop trouble through the loop shutdown system. These items are included in Table 4.4-3 because a malfunction could prevent a scram due to loss of the two loop trouble scram input.

Circulator speed high on water turbines is included to assure continued core cooling capability on loss of steam drive.

Steam Leak Detection in the Reactor Building is required for equipment qualification of Safe Shutdown Cooling. Systems. The ALLOWABLE VALUE is set at s 52.8 degrees F per minute rate of rise in order to prevent exceeding the harsh environment temperature profile to which the safe shutdown electrical equipment is qualified, per the requirements of 10CFR50.49. A setpoint calculation analysis performed per ISA Standard 567.04 and RG1.105 results in the stated ALLOWABLE VALUE and TRIP SETPOINT as specified in the LCO and this basis. The TRIP SETPOINT has been established with sufficient margin between the technical specification limit for the process variable and the nominal TRIP SETPOINT to allow for 1) inaccuracy of the instruments; 2) uncertainties in the calibration; 3) instrument drift that could occur during the interval between calibrations; and 4) inaccuracies due to ambient temperature changes, vibration and other environmental conditions. The TRIP SETPOINT is set at s 52.3 degrees F per minute rate of rise until such time as the drift characteristics of the detection system are better understood from actual plant operating experience and the assumptions used in the setpoint analysis are verified.

SLRDIS design incorporates two panels, each with its own set of sensors for the Reactor and Turbine Buildings and dual logic trains in each panel. The SLRDIS design preserves the single failure concept. A single failure will neither cause nor prevent SLRDIS actuation in the event of a high energy line break. The probability of an inadvertent actuation is extremely small due to the matrix logic employed for circulator trip and valve actuation. The SLRDIS panels are referred to as " loops";

however, due to the way the outputs of the panels are combined to provide protective action and satisfy the single failure concept, the SLRDIS loops do not correspond to primary or secondary loops.

Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical Specifications

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Amendment # 50-Page 4.4-12b For each SLRDIS loop, the OPERABILITY requirements and their respective ACTIONS represent good operating practices and judgment for a four channel detection system with a 2 of 4 coincidence trip logic. The fourth channel may be placed in bypass for test and/or maintenance purposes, subject to the ACTION statement restrictions, while preserving a 2 of 3 coincidence logic OPERABLE. The Steam Line Rupture

- Detection / Isolation System as designed and installed has spare channels available for input. Any of the available channels may be selected for input signal processing provided the surveillances are current on the channels used. The SLRDIS is required to be OPERABLE only at power (above 2% rated thermal power). Analyses with rated reactor power at 2*; demonstrate that automatic actuation of SLRDIS is not likely to occur during a high energy line break lasting until it is manually terminated at one hour following initiation. The temperatures as analyzed in both the reactor and turbine buildings stay well below the temperature for which the equipment is qualified.

The ACTION statements for inoperable SLRDIS detection and information processing equipment allow one channel in each building to be inoperable for up to 7 days; a second inoperable channel in either building requires that power be reduced to below 2% within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The 7 day ACTION time for a single detector channel is acceptable based on preservation of a 2 out of 3 coincidence detection system still in operation. ACTION 3 is applicable to other functions within the SLRDIS instrumentation panel such as loss of power from instrument buses, or other failures in the logic trains and associated electronics. A 12 hour time period in ACTION 3 for inoperability of those associated SLRDIS functions minimizes the time that SLRDIS may operate with limited functional capability. An inoperable valve or associated equipment is allowed for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. High energy line break analysis for environmental qualification assumes the worst-case single active failure. Thus, a single valve inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is within the bounds of analysis. When two or more valves and/or associated equipment is inoperable. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed to restore the inoperable equipment. Repairs may be performed while the plant is at power, thus, minimizing thermal cycling of plant and installed equipment.

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" Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical .Sp:cifications Amendment # E0 Page 4.4-13 Steam Leak Detection in the Turbine Building is required for equipment qualification of Safe Shutdown Cooling Systems. Thus, the limits and basis are the same as discussed in the basis for steam leak detection in the reactor building, d) Rod Withdraw Prohibit Inputs Startup Channel Countrate-Low is provided to prevent control rod withdrawal and reactor startup without adequate neutron flux indication. The trip logic is selected to be above the background noise level.

Linear Channel (5% Power) directs the operator's attention to either a d'wnscale o failure of a power range channel or improper positioning of the I.S.S.

Linear Channel (30% Power) is provided to prevent control rod withdrawal if reactor power exceeds the  !.S.S. limit for the

" Low Power" position. .

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' Fort St. Vrain #1 Technical, Sp:cifications.

• Amendment #. 5 0

. Page 5.4-2 F

Calibration frequency of the instrument channels listed in Tables 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4 are divided into three categories:

passive type indicating devices that can be compared with like units on a continuous basis; semiconductor devices and detectors that may drift or lose sensitivity; and on-off sensors which must be tripped by an external source to determine their setpoint. Drift tests by GGA on transducers similar to the reactor pressure transducers (FSAR Section 7.3.3.2) indicate insignificant long term drift. Therefore a once per refueling cycle calibration was selected for passive devices (thermo-couples, pressure transducers, etc.). Devices incorporating semiconductors, particularly amplifiers, will be also calibrated on a onct per refueling cycle basis, and any drift in response or bistable setpoint will be discovered from the test program. Orfft of electronic apparatus is not the only consideration in determining a calibration frequency; for example, the change in power distribution and loss of detector chamber sensitivity require that the nuclear i

power range system be calibrated every month. On-off sensors are calibrated and tested on a once per refueling cycle basis.

The Surveillance Requirements for the Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation System instrumentation in Table 5.4-3 include provisions for CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The frequency of CHANNEL CALIBRATION, REFUELING, is consistent with the interval for testing and calibrating similar detectors (heat sensitive cabling used for fire detection). The manufacturer of the instrumentation recommends an 18 month interval for test / calibration of the electronics portion of the Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation System, thus, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is specified for that interval. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST is specified for a REFUELING interval. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST verifies proper operation of the SLRDIS i

Detection and Logic Racks from a simulated rate-of-rise input signal through and including actuation of the output logic relays. Time

' response of the SLRDIS Detection and Logic Racks is verified to be equal to or less than 7.1 seconds as assumed in the high energy line break analysis. The potential for an inadvertent actuation during testing suggests that logic testing be performed only when the plant is in SHUTOOWN. Thus, the surveillance requirements are specified for REFUELING but not to exceed 18 months. The SLRDIS control unit includes a supervision system that continuously and automatically monitors critical circuitry and internal components, and alarms SLRDIS trouble conditions to the operators.

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TABLE 5.14-2 ,

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CAllBRATIONS AND TESTING OF LOOP SHUTDOWN SYSTEM Channel Description Function {requency Method 4

1. Deleted

2. Deleted i

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Table 5.4-2 (Cont'd)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF LOOP SHUTDOWN SYSTEM Channel De sc_ rJ pt i o_n {JLn_cJ ion [_[_eguency Method

3. Ci rculator I A and a. lest M a. Pulse todt and verify proper indications.

18 tripped

b. Test R b. Trip both circulators to test loop shutdown.

4. Ci rculator 1C and a. Test M a. Pulse test and verify proper indications.

1D tripped

b. Test R b. Trip both circulators to test loop shutdown.

5. Steam Generator a. Test M a. Pressure switches actuated by pressure applied.

Penetration pressure

b. Test M b. Pulse test each channel with another channel tripped and verify proper indications,

c. Ca l i b ra te R c. known pressure applied at sensor to adjust trip.

6. Reheat Header a. Check D a. Comparison of three separate indicators in Activity each loop.

b. Test M b. Pulse test each channel with another channel tripped and verify proper indications,

c. Ca l ib ra te R c. Expose sensor to known radiation source and adjust trips and indicators.

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Fort St. Vrain #1

. Technical,Sp*cifications Amendment # 50 Page 5.4-10a Table 5.4-3 (Continued)

CIRCULATOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL ACTUATION FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CALIBRA- FUNCTIONAL LOGIC NO. UNIT CHECK TION TEST TEST APPLICABILITY I 8a. Steam Leak 0 R(a) R(a) R(b) At Power

• Detection Turbine Building Loop 1 8b. Steam Leak D R(a) R(a) R(b) At Power

• Detection Reactor Building Loop 1 8c. Steam Leak D R(a) R(a) R(b) At Power

• Detection Turbine Building Loop 2 8d. Steam Leak D R(a) R(a) R(b) At Power

• Detection Reactor Building .

Loop 2 Notes to lines 8a. through 8d. above only:

(a) The calibration / test consists of verifying the rate of rise setpoint and checking for opens and shorts in the sensor cable.

(b) The SLRDIS Detection and Logic racks shall be verified to have a response time less than or equal to 7.1 seconds when a simulated rate-of-rise trip input signal is used to actuate the output relay logic.

R - At least once per Refueling cycle, not to exceed 18 months.

Applicable only above 2*4 RATED THERMAL POWER.

D - Daily.

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