ML20212A408

Forwards Summary of Joint Nrc/Ts Task Force Owners Group Meeting in Rockville,Maryland on 990830-31.List of Attendees Encl

ML20212A408
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/10/1999
From:	Beckner W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Jennifer Davis NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (FORMERLY NUCLEAR MGMT &
References
PROJECT-689 NUDOCS 9909160193
Download: ML20212A408 (43)

Text

s September 10, 1999 Mr. James Davis, Director Operations Department Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 i Street, N. W.

Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708

Dear Mr. Davis:

Enclosed is a summary of ourjoint NRC/ Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)

Owners Group meeting at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Rockville, Maryland, on August 30 and 31,1999. Should the TSTF have any comments or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me on 301-415-1161 or by e-mail at wdb@nrc. gov.

Sincerely, Orlpnal M D i

William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project No. 689

Enclosure:

As stated cc: Those on enclosed Attendees List DISTRIBUTION:

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..... September 10, 1999 l

Mr. James Davis, Director

. Operations Department Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 l Street, N. W.

Suite 400 1 i Washington, DC 20006-3708 l

l

Dear Mr. Davis:

Enclosed is a summary of ourjoint NRC/ Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)

Owners Group meeting at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Rockville, Maryland, on l August 30 and 31,1999. Should the TSTF have any comments or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me on 301-415-1161 or by e-mail at wdb@nrc. gov.

Sincerely, l g b l D. b -l" William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Division of Regulatory improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project No. 689 I

Enclosure:

As stated cc: Those on enclosed Attendees List l

4

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE MEETING

SUMMARY

August 30 and 31,1999 Publication of Revision 2 to the Standard Technical Specification The Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) made a presentation to the staff, including a set of slides, showing the status of their review, comments, and suggested course of action (see Attachment 1). Some future process controls agreed to were:

post all files to be reviewed at one time e use compatible reader software a use compatible fonts beta test file access before making files accessible to group There were some format concems that need to be resolved. Those include:

items that were highlighted by graphical brackets are now highlighted with character brackets spacing between ACTIONS and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS appears to be less than in the past Reviewer's Notes and Notes are not consistent a

double lines that signified the end of a Section have been removed The NRC agreed to remove all Draft Revision 2 files from the Web page and repost once format and other concems have been addressed. NRC will also incorporate all approved traveler changes subsequent to those approved via the August 16,1999 disposition letter. At that time, one zipped file per NUREG will be posted.

The TSTF agreed to provide a detailed list of comments, as well as the comments themselves, to the NRC by Wednesday, September 1. After NRC has an opportunity to do a quick review of the comments, it was agreed that a time-line for resolution of comments would be provided to the TSTF. NRC has tentatively agreed to attempt completion by September 20,1999, if TSTF meets their obligation.

1 When the Owners Group meeting reconvened on August 31,1999, Tom Dunning made available (see Attachment 2) a hand out containing a list of NRC sources for electronic information, including a hand out containing instructions on how to subscribe to the TS-NRR List Server. Also included with the hand out were examples of a page printed from a Wordperfect Corel 8 file and one of a .PDF file, multiple examples of why NRC would like to have the double line signifying the end of a section removed (see Examples 1 through 7 in ), altematives for a Reviewer's Note that would normally be bracketed and not i used in plant technical specifications (see Altematives 1 and 2 in Attachment 2), and l attematives for the placement of brackets.

Review of Outstandina Hioh Priority Travelers Highlights of individual travMer discussion follows:

Enclosure

.TSB-020: The TSTF is proposing a modification, but will submit it as a new traveler.

TSTF-036, R.3: NRC continues to feel changes are necessary, but disagrees with justification of Bases change. The TSTF agreed to strike that piece and send a Revision.

TSTF-051, R.1: NRC has made a number of editorial comments; however, final disposition of this traveler is pending the recommendation of the Plant Systems Branch, NRR. NRC's  ;

comments will be transmitted as an attachment to the next disposition letter.  ;

l TSTFs-198 through -203 (Battery TS): Representatives from IEEE, TSTF and NRC will meet in late September to resolve open issues with regard to the proposed changes contained in these travelers. This meeting is tentatively scheduled to take place ,

September 20,1999. A public meeting notice will be dispatched. l

- TSTF-204, R.1: Comments have been received from the technical branch and a recommendation will be made.

TSTF-218, R.1: The proposed changes were approved by NRC, however a necessary editorial change was found. The TSTF submitted a replacement page via this meeting and will not submit a Revision 2 (see Attachment 3). The staff accepts this submittal and will incorporate the edit.

TSTF-242: The staff and TSTF agreed that the number should be bracketed. NRC will consider using the number 12 in the brackets and provide feedback to the TSTF.

TSTF-266, R.3: The TSTF submitted via this meeting, two pages that correct TSTF-266, R.3. The staff accepted these pages and will waive submittal of a Revision 4 (see Attachment 4).

TSTF-283, R.1: After discussion between the TSTF and NRC representatives, it was agreed that two types of notes will be inserted in the Surveillance Requirements: one that addresses performing all and one a portion. The TSTF will define which sections require full and which are partial and provide to the staff.

- TSTF 284, R.2: Pending Technical Specifications Branch section review.

TSTF-287, R.2: The staff will meet to resolve issues regarding a parenthetical phrase and provide feedback to the TSTF.

TSTF-322: TSTF proposed a modification to the Bases that the staff feel they can agree with. The TSTF will submit a revision.

TSTF-324: Approved by the staff on August 31,1999.

TSTF-327: Approved by the staff on August 12,1999.

Enclosure

TSTF-330: Contains issues that will probably not be resolved prior to publication of the Revision 2 NUREGs.

TSTF-335 and -336: These issues will probably not be resolved prior to publication of the Revision 2 NUREGs, however, an addendum may be issued to include them once resolved.

TSTF-338 and -339, R.1: Approved by the staff on August 30,1999.

TSTF-340: Generated as a result of a TSB-initiated proposed change, the staff suggested an additional modification and TSTF agreed.

TSTF-352: Pending staff review.

NEl Writers Guide (NUMARC 93-03 and April 1996 Update The TSTF requested the NRC to show via pen and ink changes where formats, etc. were changed with the publication of Revision 2 of the Standard Technical Specifications, NUREGS-1430 through -1434.

I July 15 and 16.1999 Owners Group Meetina Summary There were no objections to the subject meeting summary.

Future Owners Group Meetina The next Owners Group meeting has been tentatively set for October 13 and 14,1999.

I l

Enclosure i i

ATTENDEES LIST NRC/TSTF OWNER'S GROUP MEETING AUGUST 30 AND 31,1999 NAME ORGANIZATION ADDRESS PHONE # E-Mall ID Noel Clarkson Duke Energy Oconee Nuclear Site 864-885-3077 ntclarks@duk (BWOG TSTF) 7800 Rochester Highway e-enerav.com Seneca, SC 29679 H rold D. Comed /BWOG LaSalle County Station 815 357-6761 harold.d.conti Pontious, Jr. 2601 North 21" Road x2231 ousir@ucm.co Marseille, IL 61341 rn Tom Weber CEOG APS Palo Verde Nuclear 623-393-5764 tweber01 @ao Mail Station 7636 sc.com 5801 South Wintersburg Road Tonapah, AZ 85354-7529 Vince Gilbert NEl Suite 400 202-739-8138 iva@nei. ora 1776 i Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Brian Mann EXCEL /TSTF 301-984-4400 bmann@erois.

com D. Buschbaum TSTF/WOG TU Electric 254-897-5851 dbuschb1@tu P. O. Box 1002, M.S. A08 electric.com Glen Rose, TX 76043 Donald Hoffman EXCEL /TSTF 11921 Rockville Pike 301-984-4400 donaldh@exc Suite 100 elsves.com Ro_c_kville, MD 20852 Joo Birmingham NRR/RGEB NRC 304-415 2829 ilb4@nrc.aov Tom Dunning NRR/OTSB NRC 301-415 1189 tod@nrc.aov Bob Tjader NRR/TSB NRC 301-415-1187 trt@nrc.aov )

Bill Beckner NRR/TSB NRC 301-415 1161 wdb@nrc.aov l 1

Bob Dennig NRR/TSB NRC 301-415-1156 rid @nrc. gov  !

l Jrmes Lazevnick NRR/EElB NRC 301-415-2782 iil@nrc.aov l Ed Tomlinson NRR/OTSB NRC 301-415-3137 ebt@nrc.aov

_ Tommy Le NRR/OTSB NRC 301-415-1458 nbl@nrc.aov i Ccrl Schulten NRR/TSB NRC 301-415-1192 css 1 @nrc.aov Robert Giardina NRR/TSB NRC 301-415-3152 l

Enclosure i

ATTENDEES LIST NRC/TSTF OWNER'S GROUP MEETING AUGUST 30 AND 31,1999 l NAME ORGANIZATION ADDRESS PHONE # E-MAIL ID Craig Harbuck NRR/OTSB NRC 301-415-3140 cch@nrc.aov DOCUMENT NAME: C:\WP\TSTF\ ATTEND.WPD l Enclosure

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LCO Applicibility L LWm) g B 3.0 Ce GSL t9 BASES CodeLS LCO 3.0.6 (continued) -

PD f" If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 11 of Train B is  !

inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in System 11 which is in l turn supported by System 5. )

EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-3 I If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 1 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in Systems 2,4,5,8,9, 10 and 11.]

Isana Instui Spw=a Syemm a System 4 Syeese 4 S,sism e 8,emm .

Speem : 8, em :

Syeesm 10 System 10 System 4 Syeesm 6 System 11 System 11 System 1 System 1 Syenem 12 Syeesm 12 System 6 System 6 SpWm 13 Sphm13 Syeesm 3 System a Byesem 14 System 14 System 7 Syeesm 7 Synese 18 Syelem 14 If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures orloss of offsite power. Since operations is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit (s) and inoperable diesel generator (s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges PDF ccAst8 BWOG STS B 3.0 - 9 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

g LCO Applicabilit Tw BASES LCO 3.0.6 (continued)

If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 11 of Train B is Inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in System 11 which is in turn supported by System 5.

EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-3 If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 1 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in Systems 2,4,5,8,9, 10 and 11.

2naa4 man syseme e spense e syness 4 speeme 4 speeme e synene e syeese a speese a synese se synene to eyeese e synene a synesm it syneem ti syneme t syneem t synese 12 synes. 12 synese s s,.es s synes,eis sy.asm o speesm 8 synese 3 syssem $4 synes. 54 synene 7 speesa 7 sysism is e,seem u if this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power. Since operations is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circult(s) and inoperable diesel generator (s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges WOG STS B 3.0 - 9 Draft Rev 2,(Not Approved)

i i

g, {/fGf CavityWats Lsvg SylGLE FOOTER UAE 1 BASES i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) procedural controls of valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23,1972.

2. FSAR, Section [15.4.5).

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.

4. 10 CFR 100.10.

5. Malinowski, D. D., Bell, M. J., Duhn, E., and Locante, J., WCAP-828, Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident, i

December 1971. '

i WOG STS B 3.9.7 - 3 Draft Rev 2, (Last Approved)

l

\

I gy, J: DOL, L/M6 g Cavity Watrr Lcv:1 B 3.9.7 j

\

BASES poorge uMC l I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l procedural controls of valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23,1972. '

2. FSAR, Section [15.4.5].

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.

4. 10 CFR 100.10.

5. Malinowski, D. D., Bell, M. J., Duhn, E., and Locante, J., WCAP-828, Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident, December 1971.

1 l

WOG STS B 3.9.7 - 3 Draft Rev 2, (Last Approved) l_

d$l l/d6 add y $; **'***ya'g".y

.$INC%C bTER BASES / /AI ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With a water level of < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel ha'ndling accident cannot occur.

The suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVElLLANCE SR 3.9.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of a minimum waterlevel of 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange ensures that the design basis for the analysis of the postulated fuel handling accident during refueling operations is met.

Water at the required level above the top of the reactor vessel flange limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods that are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident inside containment (Ref. 2).

The Frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal l

procedural controls of valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely. l '

l REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23,1972. '

2. FSAR, Section [15.4.5).

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.

3.a 3.b.

4. 10 CFR 100.10.

5. Malinowski, D. D., Bell, M. J., Duhn, E., and Locante, J., WCAP-828, Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident, December 1971.

WOG STS B 3.9.7 - 3 Draft Rev 2, (Last Approved)

J

gy, f : Wh Ut Cavity Watu Lml B 3.9.7 1

BASES REFERENCES (continued) l l

l I

WOG STS B 3.9.7 - 4 Draft Rev 2, (Last Approved)

Csvity Water Lcvsl  !

g , M ,' p d / /M [ N h B 3.9.7 l l

BASES ujml stoct PRD7ECGod l

REFERENCES (continued) l 5. Malinowski, D. D., Bell, M. J., Duhn, E., and Locante, J., WCAP-828, Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident, December 1971.

l 1

WOG STS B 3.9.7 - 4 Draft Rev 2, (Last Approved)

{

l

l' Control BInk Ins 2rtion Limits Ey. 5 : N'o DBL L-idE" B 3.1.6 BASES I -

/hO REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, GDC 26, GDC 28.

1

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

l 3. FSAR, Chapter [15].

4. FSAR, Chapter [15).

5. FSAR, Chapter [15].

l l

l l

l l

l l

l' l

1 l

WOG STS B 3.1.6 - 6 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

f-I E)c. 5 : Conhnued *"*' ' "'"" '"* *' g" S"'it*

3.

t (17,231) (67,231) 231 p\

BANKB FULLY WITHDRAWN 200

[ (100,190) 7 (0,191) 1 5 j l

g150 /

/

b m

o

' BANK C 100 l

= < BANK D g ,

cr y (0, 73) 1 o

0 50 THIS FIGURE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY.

FULLY INSERTED DO NOT USE FOR 0 (19,0) ',/ OPER ATION.

EO A0 60 80 100 PERCENT OF RTP l

Figure B 3.1.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Bank insertion vs. Percent RTP l

WOG STS B 3.1.6 - 7 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

}

L

Control B0nk ins 9rtion Limits g , (, / pg[ ggg g g B 3.1.6 i AFme PtGuer I

(17,231) (67,231) ,

231 g\ {

l BANKB FULLY WITHDRAWN '

200

/ (100,190) 7 (0,191) 5 1 E

y150 / \

E r

m O

' BANK C

$ 100 m

'BANKD y

e y (0, 73) i o l O 50 THIS FIGURE FOR i ILLUSTR ATION ONLY.

FULLY INSERTED DO NOT USE FOR f

i j OP ER ATION.  ;

0 (19,o)

'/ I l 0 20 40 60 80 100 PERCENT OF RTP l

a j

Figure B 3.1.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Bank Insertion vs. Percent RTP

_. j WOG STS B 3.1.6 - 7 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved) l

r..

Control Bank Inssrtion Limits

@c. 1 : D& l.J^l6 FAu 5 B316 BASES 5E' FORE FiGuRC 1

l l REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, GDC 26, GDC 28.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. FSAR, Chapter (15].

4. FSAR, Chapter [15].

5. FSAR, Chapter (15].

WOG STS B 3.1.6 - 6 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

1 l- Control Bank Instrtion Limits W. 7: con}yhah B 3.1.6 (67,231) l 231 200 BANKB FULLY WITHDRAWN

[ (100,190) 7 (0,191)

?

m w

y150 /

E f m

O '

1

/ BANK C i

k100 m , BANK D a

o 1

y (0, 73)

O O 50 , ,

THIS FIGURE FOR A I N ONLY.

FULLY INSERTED DO NOT USE FOR OPE R ATION.

0 (19,0) 0 20 40 60 80 300 PERCENT OF RTP 1

Figure B 3.1.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Bank Insertion vs. Percent RTP WOG STS B 3.1.6 - 7 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

LCO Applicability 3.0

. . LCO Applicability LCO 3.0.4 (continued) conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or others specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

- REVIEWER'S NOTE (Not used in Plant TS)-

LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other

( specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES.

Before this version of LCO 3.0.4 can be implemented on a plant specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or Required ,

Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such j an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to '

facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS.

LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY, LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Raquired Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, an evaluation shall be performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, " Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and l

WOG STS 3.0 - 2 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

LCO Applicability 3.0 LCO Applicability LCO 3.0.4 (continued) conditions !n the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or others specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

- REVIEWER'S NOTE .

q d@ (Not used in Plant TS) LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a

)

shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has

[g[4 l been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1,2, 3, and 4. The l

MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. Before this version of LCO 3.0.4 can be implemented on a plant-specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or Required Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS.

LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be retumed to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, an evaluation shall be performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, " Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and WOG STS 3.0 - 2 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

. C:ntainm:nt Isolation Valvss (Atmosphsric, Subatmosphsric, Ice Condinstr, cnd Dual) 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l

3.6.3 Containment isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, ice Condenser, and Dual)

LC O 3.o.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

-NOTES-

1. Penetration flow path (s) [except for [42] inch purge valve flow paths] may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by  ;

, containment isolation valves. '

4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," when  !

isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

- REVIEWER'S NOTE -

penetration flow path by (Not used in Plant TS) use of at least one closed

/( Only applicable to penetration flow paths with and de-activated automatic valve, closed y two containment isolation-manual valve, blind flange, ya[ves;.

, .......... . . or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

A. One or more penetration flow paths with one 6NQ contwinment isolation valve inoperable [except for purge valve or shield building bypass leakage not within limit].

' WOG STS 3.6.31 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

ContainmInt Isol: tion Vciv;s (Atmosphsric, Subatm: spheric, ice Condsnser, and Dual) 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual)

LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

j ACTIONS l

1. Penetration flow path (s) [except for [42] inch purge valve flow paths] may be unisolated  ;

intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

- REVIEWER'S NOTE -

[Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one closed and de-activated two containmentisolation automatic valve, closed j valves.]

manual valve, blind flange, W

' or check valve with flow A. One or more penetration through the valve secured.

g ' flow paths with one containment isolation Y

( valve inoperable [except for purge valve or shield 6NQ b] building bypass leakage not within limit].

WOG STS 3.6.3 - 1 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

C:ntainmsnt Isoittion Valv:s (Atmosphsric, Substm: spheric, ice Condenstr, and Dual) 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.----------------------- C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

-NOTE-Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths use of atleast one closed and de-activated with only one automatic valve, closed containment isolation manual valve, or blind valve and a closed flange.

sy,s, tem;,,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,,

AND One or more penetration flow paths with one C.2 --------------------------

containment isolation -NOTES-valve inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use l of administrative '

means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or i otherwise secured i may be verified by use of administrative

~

• • ..a ns;________________

[ Verify the affected penetration flow path is Once per 31 days y isolated.

p Ed)

D. [ Shield building bypass D.1 Restore leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ] l leakage not within limit. limit.

E. [ One or more penetration E.1 Isolate the affected flow paths with one or more containment purge penetration flow path by 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3 e % gM  ;

use of at least one [ closed valves not within purge and de-activated iDg $ j l

% valve leakage limits.- automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind Y

flange).  ;

bND y hh i LM WOG STS 3.6.3 - 3 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

Cont inm:nt Isolation Vcivts (Atmosph ric, Sub;tmosphiric, Ice Condensir, and Dual) 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)

- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- NOTES -

{

/

/{ 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use '

/ of administrative

/ means.

2. Isolation devices that M

[Qb are locked, sealed, or

( otherwise secured gg h may be verified by use of administrative

...me a n,s,;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

tr r Verify the affected Once per 31 days for

'f penetration flow path is isolated.

isolation devices outside containment M

Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5if not performed within the previous 92 days for l

isolation devices inside containment E.3 Perform SR 3.6.3.7 for the resilient seal purge valves Once per [92] days ) ' h closed to comply with  !

i Required Action E.1.

l l

l - F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

- associated Completion Time not met. M F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> '

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- WOG STS 3.6.3 - 4 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved) v.

i V i l ,

C:ntrinm:nt isol: tion Vcives (Atmosphsric, Substm: spheric fee Ccndinssr, PcJ Dual) '

3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.--------------------- C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

-NOTE- penetration flow path by Only applicable to use of at least one closed pe7etration flow paths and de-setivated wita only one automatic valve, closed containment isolation manual valves, or blind l valve and a closed flange.

) system.

M One or more penetration flow paths with one C.2 - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

contL:nment isolation -NOTES-valve inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in l high radiation areas may be verified by use ofadministrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sp. led, or otherwise sece'2d may be verified by use j of administrative

.._me_a__n.s Verify the affected Once per 31 davs penetration flow path is isolated.

l D. [ Shield building bypass D.1 Restore leakage within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />s] l leakage not within limit. limit. {

I E. [ One or more penetratiot E.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> l flow paths with one or penetration flow path by ,  ;

l moe containment purge use of at least one [ closed L valves not within purge and de-activated valve leakage limits. automatic valve, closed manuel valve, or blind l flange].

M L

WOG STS - 3.6.3 - 3 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

Centainm2nt isolition Valvrs (Atmosphrric,

)

Subatm:sphrric, lee CondIns2r, and Dual) l 3.6.3 )

ACTIONS (continued) m CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.2 ----------------l--------

-NOTES-

1. Isolation devices in high radiation aress may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices thct are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative

...m,e,a ns,;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

Venfy the affected Once per 31 dave for penetration flow path is isolation devices isolated. outside containment e_NQ Prior to entering l NIODE 4 from l MODE 5 if not performed within the prev ous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment l E.3 Perform SR 3.6.3.7 for the Once per132) days }

resilient seal purge valves I closed to comply with Required Anion E.1.

F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. G hours associated Completion Time not met. 6NQ F.2 Be lh MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> SURVillLLA:JCE REQUIREMENTS WOG STS 3.6.3 - 4 Draft Rev 2, (Not Approved)

V L

y.5 p 2/7

}

! RPS Instrumentation Aev/

B 3.3.1

~

BASES BACKGROUND Channel Bvoass (continued) the bistable relay contacts. To place a protection channel in channel bypass, the other three channels must not be in channel bypass. This is ensured by contacts from the other channels being in series with the channel bypass relay. If any contact is open, the second channel cannot be bypassed. {

The second condition is the closing of the key switch. When  !

the bypass relay is energized, the bypass contact closes, maintaining the channel trip relay in an energized condition. All RPS trips are reduced to a two-aut-of-three logic in channel bypass.

Shutdown Bvoass During unit cooldown, it is desirable to leave the safety rods withdrawn to provide shutdown capabilities in the event of unusual positive reactivity additions (moderator dilution,etc.).

However, the unit is also depressurized as coolant temperature is decreased. If the safety rods are withdrawn and coolant pressure is decreased, an RCS Low Pressure trip will occur at 1800 psig and the rods will fall into the 1 core. To avoid this, the protection system allows the { '

i operator to bypass the low pressure trip and maintain shutdown capabilities. During the cooldown and p fg depressurization, the safety rods are inserted prior to the M, y ) low pressure trip of 1800 psig. The RCS pressure is i

decreased to less than 1720 psig, then each RPS channel is placed in shutdown bypass. j

,J.V In shutdown bypass, a normally closed contact opens and the

, y)/ // operator closes the shutdown bypass key switch. This action I  !

bypasses the RCS Low Pressure trip, Nuclear Overpower RCS Flow and Measured AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE trip, Reactor y Coolant Pump to Power trip, and the RCS Variable Low Pres re trip, and inserts a new RCS High Pressure, ,

pg) I psig trip. The operator can now withdraw the safety l

rods for additional SDM.

The insertion of the new high pressure trip performs two  !

functions. First, with a trip setpoint of 1720 psig, the bistable prevents operation at normal system pressure, g) r . , 2155 psig, with a portion of the RPS bypassed. The second (continued) i BWOG STS B 3.3-7 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

1 Attachment 3

~

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2

~

BASES '

APPLICABLE The critaria governing the design and the specific system SAFETY ANALYSES requirements of the Remote Shutdown System are located in (continued) 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 (Ref.1).

The Remote Shutdown System is considered an important contributor to reducing the risk of accidents; as such, it has been retained in the Technical Specifications (TS) as indicated in the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 The Remote Shutdown System LCO provides the requirements for the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation and controls necessary to place and maintain the plant in MODE 3 from a location other than the control room. The instrumentation and controls (typibal1N reauired are listed in  !

3.3.3.2-1 0n thA acc%moanvia LOL

,/ p d , g' 2,,

s Reviewer's Note: For channels that fulfill GDC 19 requirements, the number of OPERABLE channels required depsnds upon the plant's licensing basis as described in the i

f #,, -. f,7, f. 2-[/}-

NRC plant specific Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

N .' Generally, two divisions are required to be OPERABLE.

7 However, only one channel per given Function is required if i the plant has justified such a design and the NRC SER has acceoted the .iustification.

The controls, instrumentation, and transfer switches are those required for:

Reattor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure control; i

• Decay heat removal;

• RPV inventory control; and Safety support systems for the above functions, including service water, component cooling water, and onsite power, including the diesel generators.

The Remote Shutdown System is OPERABLE if all instrument and control channels needed to support the remote shutdown function are OPERAELE. In some cases, Rable 3.3.3.2-1 may!

3 indicate that.the required information or control capability is available from several alternate sources. In these cases, the Remote Shutdown System is OPERABLE as long as one i

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-75 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Attachment 4

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES 7 ggv M JM6 d l ACTIONS As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate (continued) Condition entry for each inoperable Remote Shutdown System Function.

L.1 N Condition A addresses the situati where one er more required Functions of the Remot Shutdown System is inoperable. This includesr4ny Function /JNytWm vano n 1.s v m wonv anytne contros ana transfer 3

[ witches,w ,J The Required Action is to restore the Function (both divisions, if applicable) to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

The Completion Time is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of tlie control room.

L.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, ,

the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from i full power conditions '.n an orderly manner and without  !

challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excesnve instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect l gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the l

(continued)

Bk'R/6 STS B 3.3-68 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i