ML20212A399
| ML20212A399 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1986 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212A376 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8607280173 | |
| Download: ML20212A399 (9) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT I TO JPN-86-34 PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING ENRICHMENT OF FUEL BUNDLES STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL i
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NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY i
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT i
DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59 i
8607280173 860724 i
PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
PDR,
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JAFNPP 5.5 (Cont'd)
B. The spent fuel storage pool is designed to
. maintain kegg less than'O.95 under all condi-tions as described in the Authority's applica-I tion for spent fuel storage modification trans-mitted to the NRC July 26, 1978.
This k gg e
value is satisfied if the maximum, exposure dependent, infinite lattice multiplication k,, of the individual fuel bundle is
- factor, g
less than or equal to 1.36.
The number of 1
spent fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool shall not exceed 2244.
I 5.6 SEISMIC DESIGN The reactor building and all engineered safeguards are designed on a basis of dynamic analysis using acceleration response spectrum curves which are i
normalized to a ground motion of 0.03 g for the Operating Basis Earthquake and 0.15 g for the Design Basis Earthquake.
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AmendmentNo.[.h,f 246 4
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JAFNPP 5.5.B Bases j
The spent fuel pool and high density fuel storage racks are Class I structures designed to store up to 2244 fuel bundles. The storage racks are designed to maintain a suberitical configuration having a multiplication factor (k fg) less than 0.95 for all possible opera-tional and abnormal conditions.
The nuclear criticality analysis for the Spent Fuel Racks (Reference 1) concludes that fresh fuel bundles with 3.3 w/o U-235 meet the 0.95 k gg limit with a 3.2% 4 k margin.
This e
design basis bundle was reanalyzed to determine its infinite lattice multiplication factor, koo, when in a reactor core geometry (Reference 2).
This k.,was obtained under conservative calculational assumptions and reduced by 2.33 times the standard deviation in the calculation resulting in the Technical Specification limit of 1.36.
References
- 1) Increased Spent Fuel Storage Modification, i
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Mass. March 15, 1986.
- 2) General Electric letter, P.
Van Dieman to G.
- Rorke, FitzPatrick Fuel Storage K-infinity Conversion, Refision 1,
dated d
July 10, 1986.
j Amendment No.
246a
ATTACHMENT II TO JPN-86-34 i
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING THE ENRICHMENT OF FUEL BUNDLESSTORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL l
i NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59
I.
Description of the Proposed Chance The revised fuel storage acceptance criterion in Section 5.5.B on page 246 of the James A.
FitzPatrick Technical Specifications is changed from:
"In order to assure that the criterion is met, new fuel will be limited to an axial loading of 16.28 gm U-235/ axial em or equivalent.
(For the present fuel design, described in NEDO-240ll, this axial loading is i
equivalent to an average lattice enrichment of 3.3 w/o U-235.)"
to read:
"This k gg value is satisfied if the maximum, erposure e
dependent, infinite lattice multiplication factor, km, of the individual fuel bundle is less than or equal to 1.36."
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An associated BASES Section on a new page 246a is added to read:
"5.5.B Bases The spent fuel pool and high density fuel storage racks are Class I structures designed to store up to 2244 fuel bundles.
The storage racks are designed to maintain a subcritical configuration having a multiplication factor (k gg) less than 0.95 for all possible operational and e
abnormal conditions.
The Nuclear criticality analysis for the Spent Fuel Racks (Reference 1) concludes that fresh fuel bundles with 3.3 w/o U-235 meet the 0.95 k gg limit with a 3.2% 4k margin.
This design basis e
bundle was reanalyzed to determine its infinite lattice multiplication factor, km, when in a reactor core geometry (Reference 2).
This K was obtained under conservative calculational assumptions and redu'ced by 2.33 times the standard deviation in the calculation resulting in the Technical Specification limit of 1.36.
References i
1.
Increased Spent Fuel Storage Modification, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Mass. March 15, 1986 1
2.
General Electric letter, P. Van Dieman to G.
Rorke.
FitzPatrick Fuel Storage K-infinity Conversion, Revision 1, dated July 10, 1986."
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II.
Purpose of the Proposed Chance Reload 7 fuel and other new fuel designs to be stored in the FitzPatrick spent fuel pool may have U-235 i
enrichments above that allowed by the current Technical Specifications.
The inclusion of burnable poisons,such as gadolinia, in the fuel maintain the reactivity of the-1 new fuel bundles at or below that of the current design basis fuel bundle despite the higher U-235 enrichments.
Basing the loading criterion on maximum fuel reactivity j
instead of U-235 enrichment will ensure the same subcriticality requirement in the Technical Specification for the spent fuel pool is met without unnecessary limitations on fuel bundle enrichment.
l III.
Impact of the Proposed Chance 1
The overall safety criteria for this section of the Technical Specifications is to maintain the spent fuel pool subcritical with a k gg less than 0.95 under all e
conditions (Reference 1).
This criteria is achieved by placing restrictions on new fuel.
The current Technical Specification limit for new fuel is based upon the enrichment sensitivity analysis contained in Reference 1
2.
The axial U-235 loading and enrichment of a design basic fuel bundle became the Technical Specification limit.
The proposed Technical Specification change merely changes the method of assuring compliance with the i
spent fuel storage pool reactivity criterion.
An infinite lattice neutron multiplication factor, k-infinity, was calculated by General Electric using its
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approved method for the design basis fuel bundle (Reference 3).
Any new fuel bundle with a maximum exposure dependent k-infinity equal to or less than that c
of the design basis bundle will meet the safety criteria for the spent fuel pool by maintaining the pool subcritical with a k gg of less than 0.95.
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The proposed technical specification k-infinity limit of i
1.36 is conservative.
The MERIT code calculation of l
k-infinity for the design basis fuel bundle (Reference 3) l gave k.,= 1.366 under the conservative moderator tempirature assumption of 20*C.
This result was then reduced by two and one third times the standard deviation to account for calculational and model uncertainties
( 2. 3 3 0" = 0.006) to arrive at 1.36.
I K-infinity requirements can be met by fuel with U-235 enrichments greater than that currently allowed by the Technical Specification by inclusion of burnable poisons, such as gadolinia, in the fuel design.
The k-infinity for fuel containing gadolinia is dependent upon the integrated exposure of the bundle.
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Compliance to this specification will be assured by calculation, on a conservative basis, of the maximum exposure dependant k-infinity of each lattice type inserted into the spent fuel pcol.
The maximum exposure dependent kao's for all General Electric fuel designs is readily available in Reference 4.
IV.
' Evaluation of Sioniticant Hazards Considerations Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92 since it would not.
1) involve significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because revising the existing spent fuel storage rack Technical Specification from an enrichment limit to a bundle lattice reactivity limit (koo) does not involve a physical change to the facility.
In addition, the k,, represents the fuel reactivity limit equivalent to the existing allowable design basis fuel bundle enrichment limit.
This bundle meets the spent fuel pool reactivity limit, keff of 0.95, which is not being modified.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the magnitude of the consequences of abnormal occurrences or accidents analyzed in the FSAR and Nuclear Criticality Analysis for the Spent Fuel Racks will not be changed since k gg e
will remain below 0.95 under all conditions.
2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the amendment merely changes the method of assuring compliance with the spent fuel pool reactivity criterion to an equivalent method.
This can not introduce the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
3) involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, since the margin of safety for the spent fuel pool is defined by the existing kegg reactivity limit (k gg = 0.95) for the spent e
fuel pool which is not being changed.
The replacement of the axial enrichment limit with an equivalent bundle lattice k-infinity limit will not reduce the margin of safety.
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In the April 6, 1983 Federal Register (48 FR 14870), the NRC published examples of license amendment that are not j
likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.
i Example number (iii) of that list states:
"For a nuclear power reactor, a change resulting from a nuclear reactor core reloading, if no fuel assemblies significantly different from those found previously
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acceptable to the NRC for a previous core at the facility 8
i in question are involved.
This assumes that no significant changes are made to the acceptance criteria I
for the technical specifications, that the analytical l
methods used to demonstrate conformance with the technical specifications and regulations are not significantly changed, and that NRC has previously found such methods acceptable."
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This amendment is necessary for storage of Reload 7 1
l fuel.
This fuel is not significantly different from i
previous designs used in the FitzPatrick core.
The acceptance criteria for this Technical Specification is a k gg for the spent fuel pool of less than 0.95.
This e
criteria remains unchanged.
i The NRC has previously found that replacing a fuel enrichment limit with a K. reactivity limit to assure j
conformance with the Technical Specifications fuel pool O.95 k gg requirement to be acceptable.
This l
e methodology was the basis of the NRC issuance of l
Amendment No. 116 to the Duane Arnold Energy Center i
(Reference 5).
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V.
Implementation of the Proposed Chance The proposed change will not adversely impact the ALARA, Security or Fire Protection programs at the FitzPatrick i
plant, nor will it impact the environment.
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VI.
Conclusion l
The change, as proposed, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, that is, it (a) will not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment i
important to safety as evaluated previously in the safety i
analysis report; (b) will not increase the possibility of i
an accident or malfunction of a different type than any i
evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; (c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the i
basis for any technical specification; (d) does not l
constitute an unreviewed safety question; and (e)
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involves no significant hazards considerations, as i
defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
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VII.
References
- 1) James A. FitzPatrick Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 9.3.
- 2) Increased Spent Fuel Storage Modification.
Stone &
Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Mass.
March 15, 1978.
- 3) Gencral Electric letter, P. Van Dieman to G.
- Rorke, FitzPatrick Fuel Storage K-infinity Conversion, Revision 1, dated July 10, 1986.
- 4) General Electric Topical Report, "GESTAR II, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel" (NEDE 240ll-P-A).
- 5) NRC letter to Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, M.
C. Thadani to L. Liu, dated April ll, 1985.
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