ML20211P539

Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Sections 3.5 & 4.5 Following Recent Mod to Reactor Containment Fan Coolers & Converting Entire Section Into STS Format

ML20211P539
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	12/04/1986
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P483	List: ML20211P479 ML20211P539
References
NUDOCS 8612190093
Download: ML20211P539 (8)

Text

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SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENT-

.PAGE' 3.0 General 4.0 27a Bases 27c.

3.1 Reactor Protection Instrumentation and Logic 4.1 28 Bases 37 3.2 Reactivity Control and Power Distribution 4.2 39 3.2.1 Reactivity Control 4.2.1 39 3.2.2 Power Distribution Limits 4.2.2 45 3.2.3 Control Rod System Operability (per unit) 4.2.3 51 3.2.4 DNB Parameters 4.2.4 55 Bases 64 3.3 Reactor Coolant System (per unit) 4.3 73 3.3.1 Operational Components 4.3.1 73 Bases 77b 3.3.2 Pressurization and System Integrity 4.3.2 79 Bases 90 3.3.3 Leakage (per unit) 4.3.3 95 i

Bases 98 3.3.4 Structural Integrity 4.3.4 99 Bases 118 3.3.5 Chemistry (per unit) 4.3.5 120 Bases 122 3.3.6 Specific Activity 4.3.6 123 Bases 125 3.4 Safeguards Instrumentation and Control 4.4 127 Bases 144 3.5 Reactor Containment Fan Coolers 4.5 146 l

Bases 148 l

3.6 Containment Spray 4.6 150.

Bases 154 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) e612190093 861204 PDR ADOOK 0500 5

P 09430/09440 11

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.5 REACTOR CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS 4.5 REACTOR CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS 3.5.1 At least four reactor containment fan 4.5.1 Each required reactor containment fan coolers shall be OPERABLE.

cooler shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

ArPtICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7.

a.

At least once per 31 days by:

l ACTION:

1.

Starting each fan from the control room and verifying that it operates a.

With one of the above required reactor at low speed for at least 15 containment fan coolers inoperable and all minutes.

three containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore at least one of the inoperable coolers 2.

Verifying a cooling water flow rate to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at of greater than or equal to 1600 least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and gpm from each cooler.

In COLD SHUlDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

3.

Verifying a cooling water return i

b.

With two of the above required reactor pressure of greater than or equal containment fan coolers inoperable, and all to 47 psig for each cooler.

three containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore at least one of the inoperable coolers b.

At least once per 18 months by:

to GPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 1.

Verifying each fan starts in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

automatically on a safety injection test signal.

c.

With one of the above required reactor containment fan coolers inoperable and one 2.

Verifying that each damper listed containment spray system inoperable, restore in Table 4.5-1 is in the accident at least one of the inoperable coolers or the position.

inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status i

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN i

within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

I 09430/09440 146

2.

Accident Component Accident Component-Component Name Position Number Component Name Position Number containment Fan Cooler-1A/2A RV001-1 A(2A)

Containment Fan Cooler-lD/2D RV001-lD(2D)

J Accident Inlet Damper Open FCV-RV91 Accident Inlet Damper Open FCV-RV100 hormal Ficw Inlet Damper Closed FCV-RV92 Normal Flow Inlet Damper Closed FCV-RV101-Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV93A Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV102A Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV938 Accident Outlet Damper Open

'FCV-RV102B Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV93C Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV102C Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV930 Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV1020 containment Fan Cooler-1B/2B RV002-lB(28)

Containment Fan Cooler-lE/2E RV002-lE(2E)

Accident Inlet Damper Open FCV-RV94 Accident Inlet Damper Open FCV-RV103 Normal Flow Inlet Damper Closed FCV-RV95 Normal Flow Inlet Damper Closed FCV-RV104 Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV96A Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV105A.

Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV96B Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV105B Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV96C Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV105C Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV960 Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV105D Containment Fan Cooler-lC/2C RV003-lC(2C) j Accident inlet Damper Open FCV-RV97 l

ucrmal Flow Inlet Damper Closed FCV-RV98 Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV99A Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV99B Accident Outlet Dam'per Open FCV-RV99C Accident Outlet Damper Open FCV-RV99D Containment fan Cooler Dampers TABLE 4.5-1 09430/09440 147

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Basis:

3.5 The DPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-accident conditions.

i Since accident analyses are based on the operation of three fan coolers, only four of the five installed fan coolers need to be operable. Since fans operate at low speed during an accident, only the low speed needs to be j

operable for accident cooling.

The containment cooling system and the containment spray system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allcwable out-of-service time requirements for the containment cooling system have been appropriately adjusted.

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4.5 Cooling water return pressure is maintained equal to or greater than 47 PSIG to ensure that in the event of a S.W.

I leak inside containment under accident conditions there will be no release to the environment via that flow path.

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ATTACHMENT 2 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION PROPOSED CHANGES TO ZION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPENDIX A - SECTIONS 3.5 and 4.5 REACTOR CONTAINMENT PAN COOLERS DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST An amendment to the Zion Facility Operating License is proposed to clarify the surveillance requirements requiring Zion's Station RCFCs and to convert these section's format to the Standardized Technical Specification format.

DACKGROUND 10 CPR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment will involve a no l

significant hazards consideration if the proposed amendment does not:

l t

(1)

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of i

an accident previously evaluated; or i

t (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

l l

In addition, the Commission has provided guidance in the practical applica-tion of these criteria by publishing eight examples in 48 FR 14870.

l The discussion below addresses each of these three criteria and l

demonstrates that the proposed amendment involves a no significant hazards consideration.

BASIS FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Does the proposed amendment (1)

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or p

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

r 1

- DISCUSSION - ITEM #1 This change has no effect on the operation of Zion's RCFCs. The modification of the verb " stroke" to the verb " verify" merely clarifies the intent of the existing surveillance to ensure that the accident flow path is continuously available. The accident flow path on Zion's RCFCs is in continuous operation. Thus, the RCFCs are always available to perform their safety function.

The alteration of the format of Zion Technical Specifications also has no effect on any accident that has been previously evaluated. The format of the Zion Technical Specifications has no effect on Zion systems or structures. The reformatting is a purely administrative clarification.

Therefore, this proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

DISCUSSION #2 The clarification of the existing intent of the Zion Technical Specifications and the alteration of the format of Section 3.5 and 4.5 has no effect on any of Zion's systems or structures. There will be no change in the operation of Zion's RCFCs. Thus, there can be no potential for any previously unanalyzed malfunction or component failure.

The RCFCs are intended to remove energy from inside of the containment structure following a main steam line break or a loss of coolant accident. The analyses for these accidents contained in Zion's FSAR have been reviewed. Based upon the lack of system interaction discussed above, the proposed clarification of Zion technical specifications will not affect any of the pre-existing accident sequences.

Thus this proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

DISCUSSION #3 The clarification and reformatting of the Zion Technical Specifications does not affect the safety function of the RCFCs. The RCFCs will remain continuously available to perform their intended safety function.

Since the RCFCs ability to remove energy from inside of the Zion containment structure will be unaltered by this administrative clarification, there will be no change in the margin of safety.

r T

~. This proposed change involves clarifying the existing intent and reformatting of Sections 3.5 and 4.5 of the existing Zion Technical Specifications. Thus, example (i) is applicable in this instance.

Example (i) reads as follows:

(i) A purely administrative change to technical specifications:

for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

Therefore, since the application for amendment satisfies the criteria crociflod in 10CFR 50.92 and is similar to examples for which no significant hazards considerationexists, Commonwealth Edison company has made a determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

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