ML20211B696
| ML20211B696 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1997 |
| From: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211B685 | List: |
| References | |
| PP-02, PP-2, NUDOCS 9709250306 | |
| Download: ML20211B696 (13) | |
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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES l
Title:
j Accident Mitigation Systems Review REVISION 3
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REVISION HISTORY l
REVISION DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION O
d4/03/97 Procedure initiation 1
06/09/97 incorporation of NRC Comments 2
06/27/97 Revision for AMSR Process Details 3
09/19/97 incorporation of NRC Comments O
9709250306 970924 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP pp.02 PROJECT PROCEDURES g,
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REYlEW REYlSION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 2 OF 13 i
i LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES i
Page No.
Revision No.
Pave No.
Revision No.
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11 3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0P1IRPOSE..................................................................................................3 2.0pEFINITIONS..............................................................................................................3 3.0AMSRIIASIS....................................................................................................3 4.0RES011RCES.......................................................................................-..................4 5.0 P R O C E D Qil E.........................................................
......... 4 j
5.1 CDC DEVELOPMENT DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCrlONS.
.7 5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT - IDENTIFY CRITICAL Cl!ARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS.
.9 5.1 CDC VALIDATION. COLLECT SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE DATA..
.. 10 5.4 CDC VALIDATION - VALIDA'm FSAR CllARACTERISTICS.
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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP pp.02 gj m
PROJECT PROCEDURES
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW l
REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 3 0F 13 1.0 PURPOSE ne Accident Mitigation Systems Review (AMSR) will identify and verify the critical design characteristics for accident mitigation systems and their components required to meet the Design Bases Events (DBEv) identified in Chapter 14 of the Millstone Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR).
2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Design Bases Event (DBEv) - Design Bases Events are defined as those initiating events as presented in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR and fonn the bases for the operating license of the p
Millstone Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
b 2.2 Critical Safety Functions (CSF) " Critical Safety Functions" are defined as the required specific set of activities that must occur in order to ensure that a success path associated with the design bases event mitigation is met and maintained.
2.3 Critical Design Characteristic (CDC) - A critical design characteristic is defined as that aspect of the functional / system design that must be provided to ensure that the system or component will mec' the performance criteria identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.
2.4 Critical Parameters - A numerical value associated with a CDC.
3.0 AMSR HASIS He following documer.ts are the basis for the ICAVP AMSR Chapters 14,6,7,8 and 9 of the UFSAR Accident Analyses & Supporting Calculations e
Technical Specifications
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP pp.02 gm PROJECT PROCEDURES p
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TITLE: ACCfDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 4 OF 13 Design Basis Documents (DBD) e System P&lDs & Diagrams System Design Descrir'. ions (SDD) e Design Calculations e
Emergency Oper4 ting Procedures Safety System logic Documents Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
Regulatory Commitments 4.0 RESOURCES The following resources are utilized to perform the AMSR System Engineer e
Accident Analyst Electrical Ent neer Mechanical Engineer e
Controls Engineer e
Operations Engineer Tier 2 Database e
5.0 PROCEDilRE Dimis Determine the critical design characteristics for systems and components that must be confirmed in order to ensure that the plant complies with the safety analyses identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR. Validate the presence of the critical design characteristics in the installed plant systems. The simphried process flowchart is presented in Exhibit 2 1. The DBEv groups covered by this procedures are identified in Exhibit 2-2.
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PROJECT PROCEDURES
>PRW ONS TITL.E: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 5 OF 13 Exhibit 21 AMSR Process FS $R Chariter 14 &
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Safety ary De ms r
Functons Degram g
NNEco Data W
Reg Revow Uc. Requirements y
Anatysis Pnorny DBEy CDC p
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+To Ter 1 to NRC for Reyww O
RMW u
Develop T2 Design Determine Cntcal Parameters &
Charactenstes tiy System I
Database
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Crtical Basts Structure Events Charactenstes Collect Vahdate FSAR I
NNEco Data &
System C
Charactenstes o
Desgn &
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Prepare Ter 2 Report f
Report r
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PROJECT PROCEDURES
> PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 8 OF 13 i
Exhibit 2 2 DBEv GROUPS DBEv Variation increase in liest Removal Decrease in Feedwater Temperature by the Secondary System Incerase in Feedwater Flow Increase in Steam Flow Inadvenent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve Steam Pipe Failure Inside and Outside containment Decrease in IIcat Removal Loss of Esternal Load by the Secondary System Turbine Trip Closuit of Main Steam isolation Valve l
Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Decrease in Reactor Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow l
Coolant Splem flow Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure Reactidly and Power Uncontrolled Control Rod Bank Withdrawal From a Distribution Anomatics Subcritical or lew Poner Stanup Condition Uncontrolled Control Rod / Bank Withdrawal at Power Control Rod Misoperation Startup of an Inactive Loop CVCS Malfunction That Results in a Decrease in the Boron l
Concentration in the Reactor Coolant l
Control Rod Ejection Accident Decrease in Reactor inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer PRV Coolant inventory Steam Generator Tube Failure - Rad Consequences LOCA Fmm Breaks in the RCP Boundary Radioactive Rele.ncs imm Waste Gas System Failure a Subsystem or component Fuelllandling Accident Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accident Non-Standard Review Plan Containment Analyses Es ents II drogen Accumulation in Containment 3
Radiological Consequences of the Design Bases Accident o) i
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> PARSONS sO TITLE: ACCIDENT MmGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 7 OF 13 5.1 CDC DEVELOPMENT - DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS Purpose 1.1 He purpose of this activity is to develop CSF Definitions e
CSF Diagrams e
System Bounotty Diagrams Tier-2 Database Structure e
Action 1.1 Review UFSAR Chapter 14 and identify design bases events by groups (refer to Exhibit 2 2).
1.2 Evaluate DDEv groups to identify Critical Safety Functions essential to achieve and maintain a controlled condition following an event. (e g. RCS Heat Removal, Reactivity Control, RCS Inventory Control, etc.)
1.3 Define Critical Safety Function objectives and system level processes / actions to achieve objectives.
1.4 Create generic Critical Safety Function Diagrams for each Critical Safety Function.
1.5 Identify system level active components that support the process or action.
(Example shown as Exhibit 2-3)
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i TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE. 06/27/97 PAGE 8 OF 13 1.6 Develop a Doundary Diagiam for cach System involved with the DBEv.
1.7 Develop a data base structure to record the system and component critical characteristics and parameters for each DBEv.
Exhibit 2-3 SAFETY FUNCTION DIAGRAM Loss of Feedwater Flow l
lV RCS hesawe A Reactmty
"**'"I inventory C<etrol Control M"'",",N M'* 8*=s h*
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Component Critical Design Criteda (m
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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 gm PROJECT PROCEDURES
> PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/37 PAGE 9 OF 13 5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT-IDENTIFY CRITICAL CilARACTERIRTICS AND PARAMETERS hlfP91C 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop Functional / system level critical characteristics e
Database file and reports of the critical parameter for each system and e
DUEv safety function.
Discrepancy report Action O
1.1 Review each FSAR chapter 14 DBEv, including supporting analyses and calculations, to identify design requirements. Using the Critical Safety Function Diagrams, identify functional / system level critical characteristics for each DBEv.
1.2 Using the System Boundary Diagrams identify the components and their critical parameters essential to achieving the functional / system critical characteristics for cach DBEv.
i 1.3 Identify additional component design requirements from FSAR chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9.
1.4 Enter DBEv critical characteristics and parameters into the Tier 2 database (T2DB).
l 1.5 Document source of a.alyses parameters and key assumptions.
I 1.6 If an inconsistency exists, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).
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w' MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP pP-02 PROJECT PROCEDURES
> PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 10 OF 13 1.7 Submit the DBEv functional / system level critical characteristics to the NRC for review.
l.8 Provide system and component critical design data to Tier i for Systerns selected for review.
5.3 CDC VALIDATION - COLLECT SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE DATA Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop Critical System / Component listing including performance requirements and e
capabilities Discrepancy Reports Action j
1.1 Develop system composite database for critical safety function systems using documented inromution (plant design drawings, calculations, DBDs, test procedures, etc.).
1.2 List component design perfornunce requirements into the T2DB.
1.3 Document references and source information used to identify the important to safety components and systems.
1.4 If a component or system is found to contain a discrepancy, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 11 OF 13 5.4 CDC VALIDATION - VALIDATE FSAR CIIARACTERISTICS j
Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to Validate that the Functional / System level Critical Design Characteristics are e
present in the installed plant systems.
Develop Discrepancy Reports Action 1.1 Validate 100% of the functional / system level critical characteristics derived from FSAR chapters 14,6,7,8 and 9. This validation will be based on review of plant test data, Technical Specifications, calculations, A/E design requirements or alternate methods, as appropriate.
1.2 Review Emergency Operating Procedures versus critical design characteristic to determine consistency.
1.3 Document the following infonnation:
Critical system / component design requirement from the FSAR DBEv resiew Confirmation that the installed design meets the design requirement e
Validation references e
1.4 Tier 1 personnel will validate that the Critical Design Characteristics are in place and properly documented for the NRC selected systems.
1.5 Tier 2 personnel will validate thr.t the Critical Design Characteristics are in place and properly documented for the remaining systems.
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> PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 12 OF 13 1.6 For Tier i systems, the Tier 1 Team will validate the Critical Design Characteristics. He SVSR Team will provide the validation through responses on the Tier 2 Validation form. An example of the Verification Form is rhown as Exhibit 2-4.
1.7 Sy stems and components not meeting the Critical Design Characteristics will be identified as a discrepancy in accordance with PP-07.
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gj MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP pp.02 as PROJECT PROCEDURES
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW
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REVISION: 3 DATE: 09/19/97 PAGE 13 OF 13 Exhibit 2-4 AMSR CDC Validation Form AMSR.
System:
Component:
Characteristic:.
Parameter (s):
T2 Engineer:
Dato:
Comnonent Location:
Testina/ Surveillance Document:
Name:
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Number:
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Revision:
Data found:
Characteristic Found. O Characteristic Verified. O Discrepancy O Characteristic Missing.O Assessment of Effect from missina characteristic:
Engineer signature:
Date: