ML20210U109
| ML20210U109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/10/1999 |
| From: | Stewart S NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Afable S SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL, INC. |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-Y-6211, CON-NRC-04-94-045 NUDOCS 9908200007 | |
| Download: ML20210U109 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES g
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20se64001
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s, August 6, 1999 Scientech, Inc.
ATTN: Shirley Afable 910 Clopper Road Gaithersburg, MD 20878
SUBJECT:
CONTRACT NO. NRC-04-94-045, TASK ORDER NO. 3 ENTITLED,
DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS"
Dear Ms. Afable:
This is to confirm verbal authorization provided to you on July 14,1999, from Edna Knox-Davin,
. to commence work under the subject task order with a temporary ceiling of $18,500.00.
In accordance with the task order procedures of the subject contract, this letter also serves to definitize Task Order No. 3. This effort shall be performed in accordance with the enclosed Statement of Work and the Scientech technbal proposal dated July 8,1999 as revised July 12, 1999.
Task Order No. 3 shall be in effect from July 14,1999, through July 13,2001, with a cost ceiiing of $683,036.00. The amount of $623,777.00 represents the total estimated reimbursable costs and the amount of $59,259.00 represents the fixed fee.
The obligated amount of this task order shall at no time exceed the task order ceiling. When and if the amount (s) paid and payable to the Contractor hereunder shall equal the obligated amount, the Contractor shall not be obligated to continue performance of the work unless and -
until the Contracting Officer shall increase the amount obligated with respect to this task order.
Any work undertaken by the Contractor in excess of the obligated amount specified below is done so at the Contractor's sole risk.
The amount currently obligated by the Govemment with respect to this task order is
$225,000.00. It is estimated that the tmount currently allotted will cover performance through February 12,2000.
Accounting Data for Task Order No. 3 is as follows:
Commitment No:
RESC99-444 APPN No:
31X0200.960 B&R No:
96015110138 JOB CODE:
Y6211
/
BOC No:
252A Obligated Amount:
$225,000.00
,,,,900004 PDR CONTR fWtC-04-94-045 PDR
r, j.
Scientech, Inc.
-2' August 6. 1999 NRC-04-94-045, TO #3 l
The following individuals are considered to be essential to the successful performance for work l
hereunder: R. Youngblood, R. Bertucio, and H. Dezfuli. The Contractor agrees that such personnel shall not be removed from the task order effort without compliance with Contract j
Clause H.1, " Key Personnel."
Your contacts during the course of this task order are:
1 Technical Matters: Thomas Wolf, Project Officer (301)415-7576 Contractual Matters: Sally Adams, Contract Specialist (301) 415-6588 The issuance of this task order does not amend any terms or conditions of the subject contract.
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Please indicate your acceptance of Task Order No. 3 by having an official, authorized to bind 1
your organization, execute three copies of this document in the space provided and return two I
copies to the Contracting Officer. You should retain the third copy for your records.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Sally Adams, Contract Specialist, on (301) 415-6588.
Sincerely, Sharon D. Stewart, Contracting Officer Contract Management Branch 2 Division of Contracts and Property Management l
Office of Administration i
Enclosure:
Statement of Work l
ACCEPTED:
/[Ad b.
NAME l-se h ss e, I4 s4-oFmum
(% % k W nu TITLE g
i o ' 'i 'l DATE
i N-f
. STATEMENT OF WORK OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH DIVISION OF RISK ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS OPERATING EXPERIENCE RISK ANALYSIS BRANCH
- 1. TASK ORDER INFORMATION TITLE:
DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS JOB CODE:
Y6211 NRC CONTRACT:
NRC-04-94-045 TASK ORDER 3
CONTRACTOR:
Scientech, Inc.
LOCATION:
Rockville, MD NRC MANAGER:
Thomas R. Wolf (301) 415-7576
- 11. OBJECTIVE The objective of this task order is the development of risk-based performance indicators (RBPIs) that apply to the comerstones of, and can be used in, the agency's new reactor oversight process. This effort involves the development of RBPIs through the adoption of the methods, models and data; the determination of the thresholds for the RBPIs which will provide the basis forjudging the significance of performance changes directly associated with corresponding changes in public risk; the generation of a process to routinely collect, analyze and present plant-specific performance results; and the production of reports that document the methodologies used in the effort and summaries of the results.
lil. BACKGROUND in response to SECY-96-218, the Commission directed the staff to include, where practical, performance-based strategies in the implementation of risk-informed regulatory decision-making processes. The Commission's objective, in part, was to be responsive to numerous risk-informed industry initiatives in the power reactor area, where the potential benefits for reducing unnecessary burden, enhancing safety decision-making, and improving staff efficiency are readily apparent. As part of the response to this directive, the agency has embarked on an ambitious program to revamp the regulatory oversight process to be more risk-informed and performance-based. The memorandum from L. Joseph Callan, Executive Director of Operations, to Chairman Jackson, " Response to lasues Raised Within the Senate Authorization Context and July 17,1998 Stakeholder Meeting" of August 25,1998, details the tasks and schedules to accelerate the agency's movement in that direction. In particular, Topic Area Ill.A addresses performance assessment process improvements.
SECY-99-007 " Recommendations for Reactor Oversight Process improvements" dated January 8,1999, and SECY-99-007A " Recommendations for Reactor Oversight Progbss improvements (Follow-up to SECY-99-007)" dated March 22,1999, document the new risk-informed reactor oversight process developed to address Topic ill.A. As shown in Figure 1, j
this new oversight process uses a hierarchical regulatory oversight framework where performance affecting "Comerstones of Safety" (cornerstones)is monitored through a combination of performance indicators and risk-informed inspections. These inspections verify and validate the performance indicator data and supplement that data in areas where v
4 performance indicators are limited or, as of now, not developed or defined. Both the performance indicators and the risk-informed inspection activities are objectively evaluated
. against risk-informed performance thresholds to the extent currently practical. When licensee I
performance is outside the normal performance band, or is in further decline, a graded
- inspection response and other diagnostic and corrective regulatory actions are taken.
However, the majority of the performance indicators and associated thresholds presently defined for the oversight process are count-driven and several have limited direct relationship with public risk.
Risk-based performance indicators (RBPIs) are intended to provide objective measures for use in assessing reactor operational performance in the context of public risk. They relate plant j
performance to the cornerstones either directly or through the integration of the constituent
. parts that contribute to the risk The RBPIs include performance metrics such as frequency,.
reliability, availability, and probability that are measurable,' calculable and directly relate to public
- risk through accident sequence logic. The RBPIs provide complementary and more l
comprehensive risk information on plant performance both at an industry level and at a plant level than the current oversight process indicators. Likewise, the thresholds for the RBPIs will provide the basis for judging the significance of performance changes directly associated with
' corresponding changes in public risk. Their use in the reactor oversight process will tie regulatory actions more closely to risk performance.
Development of RBPIs will be the culmination of programs which the NRC and industry
__have undertaken over the past several years. Figure 2 shows the data and analyses programs that have preceded and currently support the development of RBPIs.' The figure is divided into four tiers of" Operational Data," " Industry-Wide Analyses," " Plant-Specific Event Analyses," and l:
- RBPI Development / The dotted lines indicate activities under development while the solid lines are completed or fully functional efforts.
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. Operational experience data (" Operational Data" in Fig. 2) on plant performance are the source of raw performance information used in this process The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations is prov ding the primary source of equipment performance data which is essential for the production of risk-related studies and RBPIs through the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPlX) system, which replaces the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System.
Databases on licensee event reports (Sequence Coding and Search System [SCSS]) and l
monthly operating reports (MORs) were developed several years ago and are currently available to provide additional needed performance data. The Reliability and Availability Data l
System (RADS) is being developed by the NRC to integrate the necessary information from these various data sources and to provide reliability and availability parameter estimates as a primary input to the RBPIs.
Several risk-related studies (" Industry-Wide Analyses" in Fig. 2) of reactor operating
- experience have been completed which provide a baseline of performance characteristics, models, and methods from which RBPIs will evolve (Refs.1 through 10). These studies include analyses of initiating event frequencies, reliabilities of risk-important systems and components, and evaluation of common-cause failure events and parameters. This has included trending
. industry-wide performance, comparing results witn probabilistic risk assessments, individual
. plant examinations and regulatory issues, and identifying engineering insights for use in i
regulatory activities such as risk-informed inspections.
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'O Plant-specific evaluations of safety performance (" Plant-Specific Event Analyses" in Fig. 2) rely on the information derived from evaluation of the " Industry-Wide Analyses" mentioned
- above and plant-specific design and operational features. The Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program (Ref.11) uses the " Industry-Wide Analyses" results in the evaluation of the risk significance of plant-specific operational events using the Simplified Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models (Ref.12). Results from the ASP program are expected to be a part of or provide input to the RBPIs. In addition, the SPAR models provide a framework to integrate risk-based l
pedormance information for both peiformance indicators and inspection findings.
In developing ths RBPIs, two fundamental principles must be applied:
RBPIs must measure performance related to the cornerstones of the reactor oversight process; '
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= RBPIs must measure performance 9s it relates to risk.
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' To meet the first principle, the RBPIs must have the following attributes:
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Directly relate to the cornerstone goals;
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Compatible with and complementary to the risk-informed inspection activities of the
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l-oversight process; i
Regulatory action thresholds consistent with the new oversight process; Timely and accurate with minimal mis-identification of performance problems; Cover all modes of plant operation.
To meet the second principle, the RBPIs must have the following attributes:
Relate logically to risk and the constituent elements of risk; l'
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Sensitive to risk significant changes in performance; Cover the systems, structures and components that have been shown to be important 1
contributors to risk; Amenable to establishing risk-informed thresholds of performance.
These general attributes are expected to have the following technical characteristics that j
connect them to plant risk:
Relate directly to parameters such as reliability, availability, probability and frequency that are the key constituents of measuring risk and related performance; Have definitions that are consistent across the industry but are also capable of accounting for differences in plant design and operation that could affect indicator results and associated thresholds selected to detect declining performance. For example, indicators of reliability and availability for emergency diesel generators may y 1
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be similar but their plant-specific threshold may vary depending on the number of diesel generators at each plant. Likewise, different plant-specific indicators may have similar overall thresholds. For example, auxiliary feedwater system reliability and availability performance indicators may have the same threshold for all plants but the specific plant indicator may be made up from a combination of models of train indicators based on the type of pump (such as turbine, motor or diesel) and the number of injection paths (such as two, three, or four);
Account for the sparseness of available data and associated statistical variance in identifying whether plant specific differences exist from industry or group performance (and whether performance changes can actually be detected). For example, data exists to track the frequency of risk-important initiators such as loss of offsite power or loss of feedwater. However, for events such as a loss-of-coolant accident due to large pipe breaks, the mean time between occurrences is so long (none have occurred yet) that they are not amenable to direct measurement as an RBPl; Thresholds for determining deviations from expected norms and establishing limits of acceptable performance should be able to distinguish between normal fluctuations (in order to prevent false identification of problems when none exist) and bona fide trends of poor performance (to allow for timely action to correct problems).
There are some instances where risk-informed inspection will provide the primary source of 6
licensee performance information for events of high potential safety consequence but low frequency, such as loss of coolant accidents, steam generator tube ruptures, and seismic events. Agency response for these events will be immediate and not dependent on performance indicator trends and action thresholds. Therefore, no specific RBPIs with associated oversight process action level thresholds will be developed for these types of events. However, specific industry trend industry indicators shall be developed so that the change in frequency of such events can be monitored.
Risk-informed inspections will likewise provide the primary source of licensee performance information in instances where RBPIs either do not cover or cover some, but not all, capability concems (e.g., design issues related to infrequently occurring conditions or scenarios will be
- captured as they are discovered). The areas not covered by the RBPIs which will require such risk-informed inspections shall be identified and documented.
Figure 3 shows the risk-based hierarchy and the associated levels of indication that shall form the bases for the RBPIs. Performance problems at a plant that are risk-significant will be manifested in one or more of the levels in this hierarchy. The levels of the RBPIs in this framework devolve from industry and sequence level indications suitable for comparison to the NRC Safety Goals. These further devolve to system, train, and basic event level indicators which are constituent parts of plant risk. In this sense, the lower level indicators of Figure 3 are
" leading" indicators of overall risk. This framework covers potentially risk significant performance for all areas of operation, including at power or shutdown / refueling events, and intemal or extemal events. The availability of data, methods, and models determine the quality
- and capability of RBPIs at the various levels in the hierarchy, but the framework is conceptually complete.
3 U. sing readily available data and existing and peer reviewed methods ano models, RBPIs
. will be developed in phases. Table i provides a' listing of the RBPis envisioned for each of these phases.
Phase 1 During Phase 1'(the current phase and the focus of this statement of work), RBPis shall be defined for the cornerstones of initiating events and mitigating systems, both during power operation and shutdown / refueling. An integrated sequence / plant level indicator shall also be developed. This integrated risk-based indicator shall use SPAR models to integrate cumulative risk implications of multiple indicators and inspection findings. It shall use indicator values for initiating event frequency, mitigation system performance, and when available, containment / barriers. Specific industry trend indicators will be developed to monitor the change
' in frequency of events of low frequency but high potential sefety consequence which the agency will respond to immediately.- Finally, risk-important comerstone areas not covered by l
the RBPIs which require risk-informed inspections will be identified and documented.
Using data, models and analytical techniques developed in the studies previously refeienced, the following characteristics of and analysis methods for the RBPIs listed in Table 1 for the " Initiating Events" and " Mitigating Systems" cornerstones shall be investigated:
Data requirements, sources and availability;
- Time periods required to identify trends; Sensitivity to grouping (e.g., peers, vendor, reactor type, trains, etc.);
Sensitivity to plant operating conditions;
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- Capability of providing leading performance indication; l
Ability to be validated; Statistical trending methods; Statistical methods to identify baselines of normal variance in industry and plant-specific
. performance;
' Statistical methods to identify adverse performance trends that are outside expected i
normal variance; Threshold values corresponding to the reactor oversight process action bands.
A similar investigation shall be conducted for indicators related to causal factors associated with " safety culture" as requested by the ACRS (ref.13).
Throughout this development process there shall be broad internal and public review, including a public workshop. The preliminary and final results shall also be discussed in public
- presentations to the ACRS and to the Commission. The current schedule is to complete the
' development and implementation of this set of RBPIs by January 2001.
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Phase 2 The second phase of the development will determine RBPIs for the cornerstone of barriers, both at power operation and shutdown / refueling. Completion of indicators found during the first
. phase to be impractical due to the lack of models or data will also be attempted during this phase. Efforts associated with this phase are not included in this statement of work.
Deferred or Not to be Developed No risk models are presently under development for the cornerstones of emergency preparedness, public radiation safety, occupational radiation safety and physical protection.
Consequently,'no RGPl development effort is envisioned to be undertaken' in these comerstone areas.
IV. EQAP_E_OF WORE The contrcctor shall provide oversight and lead technical support in Phase 1 of the development of RBPIs by (1) reviewing applicable technical literature, (2) recommending _
candidate indicators, (3) providing technical direction for model integration and statistical analysis efforts, (4) preparing discussion papers that outline the strengths and weaknesses of each RBPI (including its relationship to and effect on the oversight process), (5) preparing summary _ documents, and (6) performing other technical support functions as necessary, such as attendance at meetings with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the Commission. Model integration, statistical analysis work, and documentation of these efforts shall be performed by the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) under a separate contract. While the resources and programs associated with the
" Operational Data,* " industry-Wide Analyses," and " Plant-Specific Event Analyses" tiers shown in Fig. 2 are an integral part of the development of RBPIs, support for these areas is not part of this task order,
. The development of a Phase 1 set of credible, verified, and validated RBPIs shall consider the principles, attributes, characteristics and ane.',ysis methods discussed in Section lil
" Background" as the following work tasks are undertaken and completed:'
A. Work Plan - Provide a work plan for Phase 1 of the development of RBPIs. The work will
- be completed in five steps: development of a candidate set of RBPIs; trial application of the candidate RBPIs including NRC and public comment; development of a final set of RBPIs based on the results of the public, ACRS, staff, and Commission review during the trial application; development of an automated process for producing the RBPIs; and the initial
. production and distribution of the Commission-approved set of RBPIs.
The plan shallinclude:
- 1. Review of Refs.1 through 13 and other related studies that would help define RBPIs
' which apply to the cornerstones of the reactor oversight process (e.g., proposed performance indicators for fires being developed by the Nuclear Energy Institute).
- 2.. Formulation of RBPIs using the fundamental principles, attributes, characteristics and analysis methods discussed previously.
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? 3. : Trial application and validation including interrial NRC reviews, public comments and
. publicworkshop(s)
- 4. Presentation and documentation including:
- a. -
Identification of RBh Tsplay methods
' dentification of RBPI report contents b.
i c.
Identification of frequency and timing of report production, including supporting the annual NRC review of plant-specific performance 5.' Development committee participation, broad intemal and public review, and public
- presentations of the preliminary and final results to the ACRS and the Commission.
6 Preparation of two reports. With input from the INEEL, produce an interim report documenting the variables and analysis methods, including bases and assumptions, to be investigated to define a candidate set of RBPIs for trial application. Include a discussion of the risk-important areas of the associated cornerstones of the phase 1 RBPIs that the RBPIs do not cover and will require coverage by the risk-informed inspection process. With input from the INEEL, produce a final report documenting the
. risk-based indicators and their associated thresholds, the selection criteria and their bases. Drafts of both reports shall be issued for NRC comment. The final report shall i
also be issued for public comment and will address the resolution of comments received
.j during the trial application.'
- 7. Resowces and costs. Personnel to be assigned to this task order, along with their i
~ qualifications, should be identified. Requirements for information and data to be provded by others should be estimated. The time estimates and costs should be j
provded for all of the tasks and the individual elements of the work plan.
1 8,, Time line chart with major milestones and deliverables identified.
Cellve,eble and Schedule:
- 1. Draft work plan ~
5 working days from start of contract
' 2.' Final work plan 15 working days from start of contract B. Candidate Set of RBPIs - Following the approved work plan, develop a candidate set of RBPIs (including methods of display) based on those listed in Table 1 for intemal review and trial use prior to release to the public for comment. Utilize the expertise of the INEEL.
staff during data compilation, modeling and statistical analyses. The INEEL staff are also
!available for consultation on the various referenced studies. Participation is expected in interoffice coordination group meetings and NRC staff presentations to the ACRS and to the Commission during this step. Working with other groups such as the Nuclear Energy Institute, institute of Nuclear Power Operations should also be anticipated.
Deliverables and Schedule:
- 1. List of indicators, with definitions, to be considered 15 working days after work plan approval -
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- 2. Descriptions of baseline analysis methods to-be used 15 working days after work plan approval
- 3. Completed report defining the candidate RBPIs 08/13/99 i
C. Trial aoolication - Using the candidate indicators identified in Task B in coordination with INEEL, who will perform the detailed analyses, generate a set of trial indicators using available data. Included in this task will be the definition of the methods of calculating the indicators, m.a data sources, the trending methods, the methods for identifying normal variations in industry or plant performance as well as the methods for identifying performance degradations outside the normally expected variations, performance threshold values appropriate for use in the new reactor oversight process, and areas not covered by j
the indicators which could require risk-informed inspections. Participate in interoffice j
coordination group meetings, pubiic review meetings and NRC staff presentations to the ACRS and to the Commission.
Deliverables and Schedule:
- 1. Complete development of candidate RBPis and begin internal trial 09/31/99
- 2. Candidate set of RBPIs completed for NRC and public comment 12/01/99
- 3. Participate in public workshop 03/15/00 j
D. Final RBPI Development - In coordination with INEEL, oversee the modification of the methods, models and trial RBPIs as necessary to produce a final set of indicators which incorporate changes resulting from intemal and public reviews and comments. Attend and support interoffice coordination group meetings and NRC staff presentations to the ACRS and to the Commission. Document the results of these efforts. Drafts of the report shall be issued for NRC comment. The final report shall address and resolve the comments.
i Deliverables and Schedule:
- 1. Complete definition of Phase 1 set of RBPIs 03/31/00
- 2. Complete development of Phase 1 set of RBPIs 07/28/00 E. Production Process Develooment - Oversee and coordinate with the INEEL, the development of the process elements necessary to produce the final RBPI in an automated fashion. Attend and support interoffice coordination group meetings and NRC staff presentations to the ACRS ar.d to the Commission. Oversee the production and dissemination of the initial set of Commission-approved RBPl.
Deliverables and Schedule:
- 1. Produce initial pref set of indicators for review and process adjustment 09/22/00
- 2. Produce final proot set of indicators for review 10/30/00
- 3. Produce first official set of risk-based performance indicators 01/02/01 F. Monthly Letter Status Report - Submit a monthly business letter report detailing schedule and cost status. the schedule status should include accomplishments during the reporting period and planned activities for the next period. the status of each task, milestone, and deliverable, along with expenditures versus forecast, shall also be included 4
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Deliverables and Schedule:
Monthly letter status report Received by RES by the 20* of each month for the life of the contract V. TECHNICAL AND OTHER SPECIAL QUAllFICATIONS REQUIRED A variety of skills are reouired for the performance of this task order. The principal personnel shall have training, experience, and overall qualifications that permit the conduct of an integrated analysis of operating performance from a risk-informed perspective. They shall also be cognizant of risk-based performance model development and applications. For review purposes, some personnel shall be cognizant of applicable statistical methods used in analysis of sparse data. The personnel shall also have experience with developing methods for displaying the performance characteristics and in presenting the findings in an acceptable written document. Specific qualification requirements include:
1 ' Rick analysts shall have a thorough understanding of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods and practices and the application of these methods and practices to U.S.
commercial nuclear power plants operating at all power levels, from full power to shutdown and refueling. A minimum of five years of practical experience in applying PRA methods to I
commercial nuclear power plants is required. A formal education at the university level equivalent to receiving a bachelar's degree is also required.
- 2. Statistical analysts shall have a thorough understanding of the use of statistical methods in analyzing sparse data. A minimum of five years of practical experience in the application of statistical methods is required, along with a formal education at the university level equivalent to receiving a bachelor's degree. The INEEL will perform the required statistical analysis for RBPI development effort. The function of the statistical analyst under this task order is to provide expert review of the INEEL effort.
VI. LEVEL OF EFFORT The total level of effort on this task order is estimated to be approximately 3.0 staff-years j
(1.2 staff-years in FY 1999,1.4 staff-years in FY 2000 and 0.4 staff-years for FY 2001).
Vll. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE The period of performance is for 24 months, with the majority of the effort to be completed i
during the first 14 months of the contract.
Vill. MEETINGS AND TRAVEL
- The following meetings and, travel are anticipated and can be used for planning purposes and estimating costs:
- 1. Weekly local trips involving nominally two personnel to the NRC headquarters in Rockville, MD, to participate in coordination and progress meetings, interoffice coordination group 4
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L meetings, public workshops, and presentation of the development progress and result's to
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t,he ACRS and the Commission.
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- 2. Up to 12 one-week trips by two personnel to the INEEL at Idaho Falls, ID to participate in work sessions reviewing and commenting on analytical and model development results.
These trips will be coordinated with the NRC Project Manager.
IX. NRC-FURNISHED MATERIAL '
The NRC Project Manager will furnish or provide access to required supporting data.
X. DELIVERABLES / SCHEDULE AND OR MILESTONES
- 1. Work Plan - Provide a work plan for the development of a set of RBPl.-
- a. Draft work plan 5 working days from start of contract b.- Final work plan 15 working days from start of contract
- 2. Qanqlidate Set of RBPI - Following the approved work plan, develop a candidate set of RBPI (including methods of display) for internal review and trial use prior to release to the public for comment,
- a. List of variables, with definitions, to be considered 15 working days after work plan approval
- b. Descriptions of baseline analysis methods to be used 15 working days after work plan approval j
- c., Completed report defining the candidate _RBPIs 08/13/99 i
- 3. Tnal acolication - Using the candidate indicators identified in task 2, generate a set of trial j
1 indicators using available data.
i L a.1 Complete development of candidate RBPI and begin intomal trial 09/31/99
- b. Candidate set of RBPI completed for NRC and public comment 12/01/99
- c. Participate in public workshop 03/15/00
- 4. Final RBPI Development - Modify the methods, models and trial RBPI as necessary to produos a final set of indicators which incorporate changes resulting from intemal and public reviews and comments. Document the results of these efforts.
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- a. L Complete definition of final set of RBPI 03/31/00
- b. Complete development of final set of RBPI 07/28/00
- 5. PradMian Process Develooment - Develop the process elements necessary to produce the final RBPI in an automated fashion. Produce and disseminate the initial set of Commission-
' approved RBPl.
- a. Produce initial proof set of indicators for review and process adjustment 09/22/00 b.- Produce final proof set of indicators for review 10/30/00
- c. Produce first oNicial set of risk-based performance indicators 01/02/01
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- 6. Monthly Letter Status Report - Submit a monthly business letter report detailing schedule and cost status. the schedule status should include accomplishments during the reporting l
period and planned activities for the next period. the status of each task, milestone, and deliverable, along with expenditures versus forecast, shall also be included.
Monthly letter status report Received by RES by the 20* of each month for the life of the contract Xil. APPLICABLE SPECIAL PROVISIONS The work specified in this SOW is not fee recoverable.
It is the responsibility of the contractor to assign staff, employees, subcontractors, or j
consultants who have the required educational background, experience, or combination thereof to meet both the technical and regulatory objectives of the work specified in this SOW. The NRC will rely on the representations made by the contractor concerning the qualifications of the i
personnel assigned to this effort including assurances that all information contained in the techt,! cal and cost proposals, including resumes, is accurate and truthful.
Classified information will not be involved. Sensitive unclassified material (e.g., proprietary) may be involved. Equipment Performance information Exchange (EPIX) and Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) information may be used. EPIX, NPRDS, foreign proprietary, j
and vendor proprietary data are considered as sensitive. unclassified data.- Any system developed to access, process, or store, or in any manner handle such data is considered a sensitive system. To assure proper handling of this material, the contractor and subcontractors will implement a security program in accordance with NRC Management Directive 12.6, NRC l
Sensitive UnclassiRed Information Security Program.
1 XIll. REFERENCES 1.
G. M. Grant, et al. "High-Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) System Performance,1987-1993," AEOD/S95-02 (INEL-94/0158), February 1995, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1995).
2.
G. M. Grant, et al. " Isolation Condenser System Reliability, 1987-1993 " AEOD/S96-01 (INEL-95/0478) August 1996, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1996).
3.
G. M. Grant, et al. " Emergency Diesel Generator Power System Reliability 1987-1993,"
AEOD/S96-03 (INEL-95/0035), February 1996, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1996).
4.
J. P. Poloski, et al. " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Reliability, 1987-1993,"
AEOD/S97-02 (INEL-95/0196), June 1997, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1997).
5.
J. R. Houghton, "Special Study Fire Events - Feedback of U.S. Operating Experience,"
AEOD/S97-03, June 1997, NRC: Washington DC (1997).
6.
J. P. Poloski, G. M. Grant, C. D. Gentillon, "High Pressure Core Spray System Reliability, 1987-1993," AEOD/S98-02 (INEEL/ EXT-95-00133), May 1998. NRC:
Washington, D.C. (1998). I j
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c.
J 7.
C. L. Atwood, et al. " Evaluation of Loss of Offsite Power Events at Nuclear Power Plants: 1980-1996," NUREG/CR-5496 (INEEUEXT-97-00887), November 1998, NRC:
Washington, D.C. (1998).
8.
J. P. Poloski, et al. " Reliability Study: Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater System,1987-1995," NUREG/CR-5500, Vol.1 (INEEUEXT-97-00740), August 1998, NRC:
Washington,- D.C.' (1998).'
9.
J. P. Poloski,' et al. " Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1987-1995," NUREG/CR-5750 (INEEUEXT-98-00401), February 1999, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1996).
10.
F. M. Marshall, D. M. Rasmuson, A. Mosleh, " Common-Cause Failure Database ar. t Analysis System: Overview," NUREG/CR-6268 Vol.14 (INEEUEXT-97-00696), June 1998, NRC: Washington, D.C. (1998).
11.
R. J. Belles, et al. " Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents,"
NUREG/CR-4674 (ORNUNOAC-232, Vols.1 - 26), NRC: Washington, D.C. (1998).
12.
S. M. Long, et al. " Current Status of the SAPHIRE Models for ASP Evaluations,"
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management-PSAM 4, New York, NY, Sept.13-18, 1998, page 1195, Springer-Verlag, London, UK (1998).
13.
Letter dated June 10,1999, from Dana A. Powers, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to Dr. William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations, NRC,
Subject:
Pilot Application of the Revised Inspection and Assessment Programs, Risk-Based Performance Indicators, and Performance-Based Regulatory initiatives and Related. Matters, recommendation 4..
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Table 1 - Proposed Risk-Based Pe'formance Indicators To Be Developed f
Phase Co:nerstone ing unen ight Process Proposed Risk-Base Performance Indicators g
1 Indisting.
Power Unplanned Reactor Scrams Fire frequency Events Reactor scrams with loss of normal Loss of feedwater frequency heat removal Loss of ultimate heat sink frequency Unplanned reactor power changes Loss of offsite power frequency- - - - - _ - - -
Shutdown Shutdown margin (future)
Fire frequency -
/
Loss of offsite power frequency Refueling Loss of residual heat removal system frequency Loss of inventory frequency Mitigating Power Safety system unavailability Basic event level reliability and availability Systems Safety system functional failures Pumps (motor and turbine) [ key risk systems)
Safety system unreliabihty (future)
Valves (key risk systems)
- Common-cause failure Operator performance in response to transients Train level reliability and availabihty Emergency diesel generators
- Auxiliary feedwater pump trains
- Auxiliary feedwater injection paths
- PWR High pressure injsetion pump trains Component cooling water and service water pump trains System level reliability 1
On-site emergency ac power Auxiliary feedwater PWR High pressure injection.
- BWR High pressure coolant systems Component cooling water and service water Shutdown Mitigaison system availabihty (future)
Train level reliabihty and availability 1
- Emergency diesel generators Refueling
- Reactor vessel inventory control (e.g.,
high and low pressure injection)
'*a"L***"a' **r aad ".v'o'.**r _
C*a integrated Power None
.....e Damage Frequency Cor Shutdown None Corw Damage Frequency 2
Barriers Power Reactor coolant system specrfic Containment spray aistem trains activity Containment cooling system trains Reador cooiant system identWied Containment isolation system trains Loak rate l
Containment leakage............
Shutdown Reactor coolant system specsfic Containment spray system trains
/
acevity Containment isolation components (e.g.,
Refueling Reactor coolant system identified equipment & personnel hatches) leak rate l
j Co.ntainment leakage Integrated Power None,,_,,_
Core Damage Frequency + Bamer integrity _.
Shutdown None Core Damage Frequency + Bamer Integrity
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