ML20210P292
| ML20210P292 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1997 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210P291 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708270052 | |
| Download: ML20210P292 (93) | |
Text
._
Containment 3.6.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT $YSTEMS 3.6.1 Containment LC0 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE.
.WiLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
{
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET10N TIME.
A.
Containment A.)
Restore containment to I hour inoperable.
OPERABLE status.
B.
Required Action and B.)
Be in MODE'3.
hours associated Completion Time not met.
6HQ 3G 8.2 Be in MODE t.
M hours t'
es4 PDR y' Y
] 00 3.6 1 08/96 i\\mendment 0
Containment
~}
3.6.1 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE-FREQUENCY l
SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and
-- NOTE-leakage rate testing except for SR 3.0.2 is containment air lock testing, in not applicable accordance with the Containment leakage Rate Testing Program.
In accordance wit' the Containment Leakage Rate i
Testing Program DOL, _,
3.6-2 08/96 Amendment 0
l Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
- 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks LC0= 3.6.2 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
...................................... NOTES---- - ---- og
-~~------- ------ --- --
1.
Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs,p('the affected air lock (2) components.
2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.
3.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1,
" Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate. AccKF74uce c4sTERs4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A
A.
One or more
-NOTES -----------
containment air locks 1.
Required Actions A.1, with one containment A.2, and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors lnoperable.
in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
2.
Entry and exit is I
permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air
^
locks are inoperable.
A.1 Verify the OPERABLE door 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is closed in tF:
j affected air lock.
W A.2 Lock the OPERABLE door 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> closed in the affected i
air lock.
(continued)
(! AP600 3.6-3 08/96 Amendment 0 we' - eauen.e. m ne
.J
l Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)
&NQ A.3
........N0TE Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means.
Verify the OPERABLE door Once per is locked closed in the 31 days affected air lock.
B.
One or more
--- NOTES containment air locks 1.
Required Actions B.1, with containment air B.2, and B.3 are not lock interlock applicable if both doors mechanism inoperable.
in the same air lock are inoperable and
~
Condition C ntered.
2.
Entry and exit of containment is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual.
B.1 Verify an OPERABLE door 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is closed in the affected air lock.
AND B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> closed in affected air lock, h
T#c AND (continued) l l
- ](_
3.6-4 08/96 Amendment 0 w
w
Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITl0N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.3
..........N0TE-Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means.
Verify an OPERABLE door Once per is locked closed in affected air lock. g 31 days h
C.
One or more C.1 Initiate action to immediately containment air locks evaluate overall inoperable for containment leakage rate reasons other than per LCO 3.6.1 Condition A or B.
AND C.2 Verify a door is closed I hour in the affected air lock.
AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
D.
Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3.
p' hours associated Completion Time not set.
AND S
3Cm D.2 Be in MODE W.
Khours
]{
3.6 5 08/96 Amendraent 0 A
Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-NOTE -
6D SR 3.6.2.1
- NOT E S - -
1.
An inoperable air lock door does not SR 3..
s no invalidate the previous successful app)Jabl i
performance of the
--""^' ^>
-/
overall air lock leakage test.
2.
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria pf SR 3.6.1.1.
D APpkcMLK To Perform required air lock leakage rate in accordance testing in accordance with the with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Centainment Program.
Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.2.2
........N0TE----
Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the containment air # ock.
l Verify only one door in the air lock can 184 days be opened at a time.
AP600 3.6 6 08/96 Amendment 0 mw.emo
-os..
Containment 11 solation Valves
[
3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
.I 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LC0_'3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
j
-APPLICA8ILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
....................................N0Tgs......................................
Penetration flow path (s) may be unisolated intermittently under l.
administrative controls.
2.
' Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
3.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for..rre d systems made' inoperable by containment isolation valves.
4.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required _ Actions of LCO 3.6.1,
' Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment' leakage rate,4a shM cAirNJ.
a CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f
Y A.
-NOTE..--.--.
A.1 Isolate the affected pfhours Only-applicable to penetration flow path by h
e tee. penetration use of at least one flow paths with-two closed and de. activated 5 7 T 3. (..J containment-isolation automatic valve, closed g,I valves.
manual valve,-blind flange, or check valv.e with flow through the One or more valve secured.
i penetration flow paths with one AND
'c containment isolation valve inoperable.
A.2
NOTE----------
Isolation devices in high radiation; areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
(continued)
KAP 600 3.6-7 08/96 -Amendment 0 mi o.u im m.....,.
-e---
~. - -. -
Containment leolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ArTION COMPLETION TIME dD ra A.
(continued)-
A.2 Verify each affected Once per penetration flow path-is 31 days for
- isolated, isolation devices outside cohtainment.
AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment 8.
-- NOTE-B.1 Isolate the affected I hour Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow use of at least one paths with two closed and de-activated containment isolation automatic valve, closed valves.
manual valve, or blind f1ange.
One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable.
4 C.
---.-NOTE---------
C.1 Isolate the affected M hours Only applicable to penetration. flow path by penetration flow use of at least one 375303 paths with only one closedanddOctivated h C. I containment isolation automatic val"ve, closed valve and a closed manual valve, or blind system.
(continued) h AP600 3.6 8 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
(continued)
AND One or more C.2
-NOTE-- ------
penetration flow Isolation devices in paths with one high radiation areas may containment isolation be verified by use of valve inoperable, administrative means.
Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path is 31 days isolated.
D '.
Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3.
hours associated Completion Time not met in MODES AND 1, 2, 3, and 4.
5 Jf-D.2 Be in MODE f.
Khours
\\
a l
r AP60 {, _,
3.6 9 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves F
3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each [16 inch) containment purge 31 days 1
valve is closed, except when the
[16 inch) containment purge valves are
_oA open for pressure control, ALARAx air quality considerations for personn[el
(
containment entry, or for Surveillances which require the valves to be open.
---NOTE------~~-
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.
Verify each containment isolation manual 31 days valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.
NOTE---~~-------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.
Ve*ify each containment isolation manual Prior to va've and blind flange that is located entering MODE 4
- side containment and required to be from MODE S if closed during accident conditions is not performed closed, except for containment isolation within the.
valves that are open under previous administrative controls.
92 days (continued)
] 00 3.6-10 08/96 Amendment 0
f.
Containment isolation Valves 3.6.3 j
1 SURVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each power in accordance operated and each automatic containment with isolation valve is within limits.
Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.3.5 Verify each automatic containment in accordance isolation valve that is not locked, with sealed or otherwise secured in position, inservice actuates to the isolation position on an Testing actual or simulated actuation signal.
Program i
e
.a A,f6 3.6-11 08/96 Amendment 0
i Centainment Pressure 3.6.4 3.6 CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS-3.6.4 - Containment Pressure t
LC0 3.6.4 Containment pressure shall be (2 0.2-psig andi
$ +1.0 psig.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS 3
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION _ TIME I
-A.
Containment pressure A.1 Restore containment X hourg not within limits, pressure to within gg y,g,9 limits.
4,f B.
Required Action and B.1-Be in MODE 3.
/ hours associated Completion 4
Time not met.
AND 5
36 B.2 BeinMODEg.
M hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I2.
575 SR 3.6.4.1 ~
Verify containment pressure is within f( hours M Mt./
limits.
Reviewer Note: The low pressure limit is not needed for plant locations for which the lowest possible ambient temperature is approximately
. 20 *F.
g{_
3.6-12 08/96' Amendment 0 1
y-
Containment Air Terperature 3.6.5 7
i i
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i=
3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature LCO 3.6.5 Containment average air temperature shall be 1120*F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 8
A.
Containment average A.1 Restore containment
)(hours air te'nperature not average air temperature 575 34.5 within limit.
to within limit.
g,7 1
B.
Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.
ghours associated Completion Time not met.
AND S
.7C-B.2 BeinMODE/.
M hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR
- 3. 6. 5.1 -
Verify containment average air 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> temperature is within limit.
~
HAP 600 3.6-13 08/96 Amendment 0 wes~neu am
PCS - Operating 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
-3.6.6 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Operating LCO -3.6.6 The passive containment cooling system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One passive A.1 Restore flow path to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment cooling OPERABLE status, water flow path ineperable.
G B.
Water storage tank B.1 Restore water storage
)4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> temperature not tank to OPERABLE status, within limit.
d 0E Water storage tank volume not within
- limit, i.
h"-
C.
assive C.1 A w p th to r flo s
inoperab.le.
N (continued) l l
l AP600 3.6-14 08/96 Amendment 0 l
on......,
3.6.6 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 8.
Required Action and 4.1 Be in MODE 3.
ghours associated Completion Time of Conditions A AND p
eA B, t = t = t.
c.
5
$9 5.2 BeinMODE/.
M hours p3 s o 3.f4 En2.
LCO not met for
( 8* ?*
""5 reasons other than Ag o R B. et-C, SURVEllLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.1 Verify the water storage tank temperature
NOTE----
a 40 'F and s 120'F.
Only required when the ambient temperature is s 32*F or a 100'F 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> N 3.5 4. /
7 On y.s SR 3.6.6.2 Verify the water storage tank volume 24 50ers a #e;Me gallons.
53bd'0 s A 3.5. e.1
^
st on e-SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each passive containment cooling 4440ers system, power operated, and automatic valve in each flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in h 3. 5.2. :;t position, is in the correct position.
(continued) h AP600 3.6 15 08/96 Amendment 0
l PCS Operating 3.6.6 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continaed)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 2.+ meard 5 SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each passive containment cooling in accordance system automatic valve in each flow path with the that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise Inservice secured in position, actuates to the Testing correct position on an actual or simulated Program actuation signal.
SR 3.0.6.5 Verify the air flow path from the shield 24 months No 7947-44L 4,(
builfino annulus inlet to the er.it is unoDstructed4;d, th:t the inspctien prt; 2
a-su.
O.z.e....-..
s......
SM*FL2 59CTTH a
Fla s.) Mo whrM C*JEMGE go yg g SR 3.6.6.6 Verify passive containment cooling system accord /ce performance in accordance with the w h thV in;; ni n Test 1ng Program.
gins r ce g
s m & tnjet or N Aan.ory p7 97 j{_
3.6-16 08/96 Amendment 0
PCS o Shutdown 3.6.7 3.6 CONTAl_NMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.7 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Shutdown LCO 3.6.7 The passive containment cooling system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6 with reactor shutdown h :: th= [!^^ 5:r: 1.
ano w.w 74E cucmarso AsAroA oneAv g
ACTIONS
- FM >4.0MA.
C0t'91T10N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One passive A.1 Restore flow path to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment cooling OPERABLE status, water flow path inoperable.
8 8.
Water storage tank-B.1 Restore water storage 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> temperature not tank to OPERABLE status, within limit.
d 0._8 Water storage tank volume not within limit.
C.
Tw assive C.1 e
o 4 heurs contai oling OP s
wate w
hs rable.
(continued) h AP600 3.6 17 08/96 Amendment 0
PCS Shutdocn 3.6.7
\\
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME c
c'.
Reovired Action and B'l.1 If in MODE 5, initiate immediately F
associated Completion action to be in MODE 5 Time of Conditions A, with RCS intact and B, or C not met.
visible level in pressurizer.
9B LCO not met for c.
reasons other than A, Er.l.2 If in MODE 6, initiate immediately B, or C.
action to be in MODE 6 with the upper internals removed and the refueling cavity full.
AND c-p'. 2 Suspend positive immediately reactivity additions.
a SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS SVRVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.7.1 The SRs of Specification 3.6.6, " Passive In accordance Containment Cooling System - Operating" with are applicable.
applicable SRs
()AP600 3.6-18 08/96 Amendment 0
1
}
Containment Penetrations 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT 3 maas 3.6.8 Containment Penetrations
\\
-LCO 3.6.8 The containment penetrations shall be in the followint status:
a.
The equipment hatches closed and held in place by i
(four) bolts or, if open, clear of obstructions such that the hatches can be closed prior to steaming Sto cue of
/
' A d Acce cus so, e A g
- b. ^sThe containment ai ocks shall be clear of obstructions such that they ca e closed prior to steaming into the containment, y
c.
The containment spare penetrations, if open, shall be clear of obstructions such that the penetrations can be closed prior to steaming into the containment.
d.
Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
1.
closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or 2.
capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment isolation signal.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and @
ACTIONS CONDITION REQLilREDAbl0N COMPLETION TIME A.
Oie or more A.1 Restore containment I hour containment penetrations to penetrations not in required status, required status.
(continued) 30L _
3.6-19 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Penetrations 3.6.8 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
Required Action and B.1.1 If in MODE 5, immediately associated Completion initiate action to Time not met, be in MODE 5 with RCS intact and QB visible level in the pressurizer.
LCO not met for reasons other than QR Condition A.
B.I.2 If in H00E 6, initiate action to be in MODE 6 with inmediately the upper internals removed and the cavity full.
AND B.2 Suspend positive lamediately reactivity additions.
f 4
(HAP 600.
3.6-20 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Penetrations 3.6.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.8.)
Verify each required containment 7 days penetration is in the required status.
1 l
- NOTE Only required to be met for an open equipment hatch.
Verify that the hardware, tools, Prior to equipment and power source necessary to hatch removal install the equipmen,t hatch are available.
AND 7 days y maarros SR 3.6.8.3 Verify one automatic isolation valve in n accorda each open penetration providing direct w h access from the containment atmosphere in r ce
~
to the outside atmosphere actuates to Te g
the isolation position on an actual or ogra simulated actuation signal.
I we
. 30 3.6-21
-08/96 Amendment 0
pH Adjuttment 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 3.6.9 pH Adjustment j
LCO 3.6.9 The pH adjustment shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
The volume of-A.1 Restore volume of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trisodium phosphate trisodium phosphate to not within limit, within limit.
V B.
Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3.
I hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND
~
not met.
US 3
Bf
@ K B.2.1 Be in MODE t.
74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> f'f' L p d et fo reaeane ether th:r _
gg B.2.2 Verify the available 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> volume of trisodium /
=
phosphate meets Nf4 of the limit speciSed in SR 3.6.9.1.
30L _
3.6-22 08/96 Amendment 0
pH Adjustment 3.6.9 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.9.1 Fyerify that the pH adjustment kets 24 months are filled with at leastQ45 ft of TSP e
(Na,P0,12 H,0)y c.as,opg,wq cdamuc Kl RWM4 sos of YM RenGr cartram.
' - 9 C omm)WY M(o B REsosartoN - LATER.
J G
M l
jL 3.6-23 08/96 Amendmer,t 0
P.,sciw Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiners 3.6.10 3.6-CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.10 Passive Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiners
-f* 4 LC0 3.6.10
.Two passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARS) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One PAR inoperable.
A.1 NOTE LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
Restore one PAR to 30 days OPERABLE status.
o(,wate B.
Two PARS inoperable, B.1 Verify by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> g
administrative means that the hydrogen AND control function is maintained.
Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND TWlEE B.2 Restore ons.PARsto 7 days OPERABLE status.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not
- met, h AP600 3.6 1 Draft
l'assive Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiners 3.6.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMERTS SURVEILLANCE FRE0VENCY 2v htornNS SR 3.6.10.1 Visually examine each PAR enclosure and accorda e ensure there is no obstruction or w h the blockage of the inlets or outlets ffe Sys em,1.evel ecc:rd;,ce with tre Syst s Le e'. o Inservice
- Intervice T :tir,g Pr;;rea..
Testi V
' ogra 2.+ p104 T6)
SR 3.6.10.2 Perform a surveillance bench test on a accordange specimen removed from each PA Qe, wi they
- - -m s.... m - ;p,; ;;5im La Sys & revel Interne T stir,g Pr;;r=.
Ins ice Tpstin Program J
f 1
mg b AP600 3.6 2 Draft
Containment-B 3.6.1-
- \\
B 3.6_ CONTA.INMENT SYSTEMS i
8 3.6.1 Containment BASES BACKGROUND-The containment is a free standing steel pressure vessel surrounded by a reinforced concrete shield building..The containment vessel, including all its penetrations, is a loweisakage steel vessel designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core follow-ing a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such that offsite radia-tion exposures are maintained within limits. The containment and shield building provide shielding from the-fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment vessel is a vertical cylindrical steel pressure vessel with elliptical upper and lower heads, completely enclosed by a seismic Category I reinforced concrete shield building.
A-4.5 foot wide annular space._
exists between the walls and domes of the steel containment vessel and the concrete shield building to permit-inservice inspection and air flow over the steel dome for containment cooling.
The containment utilizes the outer concrete building for shielding and a missile barrier, and the inner steel containment for leak tightness and passive containment cooling.
Containment piping penetration assemblies provide for the passage of process, service and sampling pipelines into the containment vessel while maintaining containment iategrity.
The shield building provides biological shielding and environmental missile protection for the containment vessel and the Nuclear Steam Supply System.
The inner steel containment and its penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment.
-Maintaining'the containment OPERABl.E limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the nvironment.
SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate Surveillance e
Requirements conform with 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1 (Ref.1), as modified by approved exemptions.
(continued)
KAP 600 B 3.6 1 08/96 : Amendment 0
Contair ment B 3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND The isolation devices for the penetrations in the (continued) containment boundary are a part of the containment leak l
tight barrier.
To maintain this leek tight barrier:
a.
All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or 1
2.
closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.3,
" Containment isolation' Valves";
b.
Each air lock is OPERABLE, except >
nrovided in LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks"; and c.
All equipment hatches are closed.
APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rates, The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERASillTY from high pressures end temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a steam line break (Ref. 2).
In addition, release of significant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA.
The DBA analyses assume that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity. release to the environment is controlled by the rate nf containment leakage.
The containment is designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.12% of containment air weight of the original content of containment air after a DBA per day (Ref. 3).
This leakage rate, used in the evaluation of offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 1), as La: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (Pa) resulting from the limiting DBA.
The allowable leakage rate represented by la forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on containment leakage rate testing.
La 15 assumed to be 0.12% per day in the safety analysis.
(continued)
]{
8 3.6-2 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment i
B 3.6.1 BASES
= APPLICABLE Satisfactory leakage rate test results is a requirement for SAFETY ANALYSES-the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.
-(continued)
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to @
S 1.0 La, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program,. At this time,fapplicable leakage limits must be met. 4-4t*FJ re-sr
- Tws.
Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration,includingequipmenthatches,thatis structurally sound and that will limit -leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis, gep*a indi al le kafe rates itiea ~
the co inment ir 1
w a rw
-p lock an ves with seals are a ed in
/45E#/r lLCO 3.6 and 3.
- 3. retne el, _
2.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA cnuld cause a release of radioactive material into containment.
In MODES S and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of th9se MODES.
Except in MODE 5 with the loops not full, the time to boiling and core uncovery is significantly reduced due to reduced Reactor Coolant System inventory.
The MODES 5 and 6 requirements are specified in LCO 3.6.8, " Containment Penetrations".
(continued) g(_,
B 3.6 3 08/96 Amendment 0
f 4
BABES 3.6.li.
LCO PAGE B 3.6.
INSERT '-
'Last paragraph
- Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2)
- are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits.only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the overall acceptance criteria of 1.0 L,
b (4) h
_ =. -..
Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature 4
BASES BACKGROUND The containment structure serves to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident DBA).
The ;ontainment averaga air temperature is limited (during nermal operation to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident
. analyses fir a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break ($LB).
The containment average air temperature limit is derived from the input conditions used in the containment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressure analyses.
This LCO ensures that initial conditions assumed in the analysis of containment response to a DBA are not violated during plant operations.
The total amount of energy to be removed frnm containment by the passive containment cooling system during post accident conditions i; dependent upon the energy released to the containment due to the event, as well as the initial containment tem)erature and pressure.
The higher the initial temperature, t1e more energy that must be removed, resulting in higher peak a
containment pressure and temperature.
Exceeding containment design pressure may result in leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis.
Operation with containment temperature in excess of the LCO limit violates an initial condition assumed in the accident analysis.
APPLICABLE itainment average air temperature is an initial condition SAFETY ANALYSES use the DBA analyses that establishes the containment j
environ tal qualification operating envelope for botV pressure an emperature.
The limit for containment 4verage air temperature sures that operation is mainptffed within ReddCE the assumptions use n the DBA analyses f r4ontainment wmf (Ref.1).
JAMNtT' The limiting DBAs considered.
tive to containment OPERABILITY are the LOC SLB..
he DBA LOCA and SLB are analyzed using compj M r codes designe o predict the resultant cont nt temperature and pr ure transients.
No two DBA e assumed to occur simultaneo or conte ely.
The postulated DBAs are analyze ith regard to gineered safety features. assuming the loss o ne DC b, which is the worst case single active failure.
(continued) g(
B 3.6 26 08/96 Amendment 0 t
BASES 3.0.5..
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PAGE B 3.0 20 INSERT New Bases 3.0.5 Applicable Safety Analyses section:
Containment average air temperature is an initial condition used in the DBA analyses that establishes the containment environmental qualification operating envelope for both pressure and temperattire. The limit for containment average air temperature ensures that operation is maintained within the assumptions used in the DBA analyses for coatainment (Ref.1).
The 1:n4iting DBAs considered relative to containment OPERABILITY are the LOCA and SLB. The DBA LOCA and SLB are annlyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regerd to Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) systems, assuming the loss of one ESP bus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train each of the Containment Spray System Residual Heat Removal System, and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable.
The limiting DBAs for the maximum peak containment air temperature are large break LOCA and SLB. The initial containment average air temperature assumed in the design basis analyses (Ref.1)is 120'F. This resulted in a maximum containment air temperature as illustrated in reference 1.
The temperature limit is used to establish the environmental qualification operating envelope for containment. The maximum peak containment air temperature variation with time provides the basis for environmental qualification envelope to ensure the performance of safety related equipment inside containment (Ref. 2).
The temperature limit is also used in the depressurization analyses to ensure that the minimum pressure limit is maintained following an inadvertent actuation of the Passive Containment Cooling System (Ref.1).
The containment pressure transient is sensitive to the initial air mass in containment and, therefore, to the initial containment air temperature. The limiting DBA for establishing the maximum peak containment internal rressure is a SLB. The temperature limit is used in this analysis to ensure that in the event of an accident the maximum containment internal pressure will not be exceeded.
Containment average air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
(32)
Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 SASES i
APPLICABLE in one train of the Passive Containment ultin!ystes(PCS)beingrenderedinoperable.
SAFETY ANALYSES
- Coo g
(continnd)
Tlie limit DBAs for the maximum peak containmen air temperature e large break LOCA and SLB.
The initial cont ( ment average air temperature assumed in the design basis a ses (Ref.1) is 120'M The temperature limit is,ed in the depress #iration analyses to ensure that the mintgum pressure liW t is not exceeded h a negative pressure tran Ment such a Va loss of all AC powe coincident with extreme col weathef conditions which cool the external surface of the c ta)6 ment vessel (Ref. 1).
l Thecontainmentaverageairta/pe ture has an effect on the environmental qualification derati envelope for containment.
The basis of 4quipment lification is to ensure the performance of/ safety relat quipment inside containment (Ref. 2). Jhernal analyses s wed that the equipment temperatureVremained below the quelification temperature envelopt( Therefore, it is concivded that the calculated transient containment air temperatu is acceptable.
The containm t pressure transient is sensitive to t initial con inment air temperature.
The temperature imit is used i this analysis to ensure that in the event of n
accident he maximum containment internal pressure will n t be exc ded.
Con inment average air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of h th NRC Policy Statement.
I
(
/
t (continued) b
Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 BASES (continued)
LCO During a DBA, with an initial containment average air temperature less than or equal to the LCO temperature limit, the resultant peak accident temperature is computed to remain within acceptable limits.
As a result, the ability of containment to perform its design function is ensured.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment, in MODES $ and 6 the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.
Therefore, maintaining containment average air temperature within the limit is not required in MODE 5 or 6.
O ACTIONS A,1 j/
When containinen average air temperature is not within the limitoft/eL
, it must be restored to within its limit withinJ4 hour.
This Required Action is necessary to return operati n to within the bounds of the containment analysis.
The ?/ hour Completion Time is acceptable a
considering the sensitivity of the conservative analysis to variations in this parameter, and provides sufficient time to correct minor problems.
B.1 and B,2 5
M
/cannot be -
If the containment average air temperat e
restored to within its limit within t feguiredCompletion Time, the plant must be brought to E / where the probability and consequences on an vent are mi imized.
To h-acMave t status, the plant muv be broug o at least MODE 3 withi hours and to M00E'f' within ours.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, ba' sed on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
AP600 B 3.6 28 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that the containment average air temperature is within the LCO limit ensures that containment operation remains within the limits assumed for the containment analyses.
In order to determine the containment average air temperature, a weighted average is calculated using measurements taken at locations within the containment selected to provide a representative sample of the associated containment atmosphere.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this Surveillance Requirement is considered acceptable based on observed slow rates of temperature increase within containment as a result of environmental heat sources (due to the large volume of containments).
Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the main control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition.
REFERENCES 1.
AP600 SSAR, Section 6.2, " Containment Systems."
o 2.
10 CFR 50.49, " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants."
h AP600 8 3.6 29 08/96 Amendment 0
PCS o Operating 8 3.6.6 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.6 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Operating BASES BACKGROUND The PCS provides containment cooling to limit post accident pressure and temperature in containment to less than the design values. Reduction of containment pressure reduces the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
The Passive Containment Cooling System is designed to meet the requirements of GDC 38
' Containment Heat Removal' and GDC 40 ' Testing of Containment Heat Removal Systems' (Ref.1).
531 000 F*A The PCS consists of a 40h,400 gal cooling water tank,4heee-headered tank discharge lines with flow restricting orifices, and te separate full capacity discharge flow paths to the 4: >ht hcient vessel with isolation valves, each
+
GE9
@ fuse (r capable of mer g lig jesign bases._4 The isolation valves on eacn TTow pitc. 6n powered from a separate Division.
Upon actuation of the isolation valves, gravity flow of a
water from the cooling water tank (contained in the shield building structure above the containment) onto the upper portion of the containment shell reduces the containment pressure and temperature following a DBA.
The flow of water to the containnent : hell surface is initially established to assure that the required short term containment cooling requirements following the postulated worst case LOCA are achieved.
As the decay heat from the core becomes less with time, the water flow to the containment shell is reduced in two steps.
The change in flow rate is attained without active components in the system and is dependent only on the decreasing water level in the elevated storage tank, in order to ensure the containment surface is adequately and effectively wetted, the water is introduced at the center of the containment dome and flows outward. Weirs are placed on the dome surface to distribute the water and ensure effective wetting of the dome and vertical sides of the
/ A/'5 FO containment shelly The path for the natural circulation of air is from the air intakes in the shield building, down the outside of the baffle, up along the containment shell to the top, center (continued) h AP600 B 3.6 30 08/96 Amendment 0
l-BACK0ROUND BASES 3.6.6 PAGE B 3.6 30 i
INSERT Second paragraph l
t Algae growth is not expected within the PCCWST: however, to assure water clarity is maintained, a prevailing concentration of hydrogen peroxide is maintained at 50 ppmi The PCS valve room temperature must not be below 3
frecting for an extended period to assure the water flow path to the containment shell is available.
i (35)(36)
INSERT Third paragraph The monitoring of the containment surface through the Reliability Assurance Program (RAP) and the Inservice Testing Program assures surfe~ w Asmination does not unacceptably degrade containment heat reme' ge, srmance. Contamination can be removed by PCS actuation or by ust ww eing vendor cleaning procedures.
l t
(36) c f
1 a
i v
-w,-+
y y--
PCS Operating B 3.6.6
.g m 19 nye uMit h*5 **4ow sw.ssr Q
s e ct**d, w nt
- v*# w'"*A "**' 'M**'4 BASES r w m
,,,4 pe o.a P 4 w.
g exitintheshieldbuildingandisalwaysopen.T I
BACKGROUND g Heat is (continued) removed from within the containment utilizing the steal containment shell as the heat transfer surface combining conductive heat transfer to the water film, convective heat transfer from the water film to the air, radiative heat transfer from the film to the air baffle, and mass transfer (evaporation) of the water film into the air.
As the air heats up and water evaporates into the air, it becomes less dense than the cooler air in the air inlet annulus.
This i
differential causes an increase in the natural circulation of the air upward along the containment surface, with heated air / water vapor exiting the top / center of the shield butidina. 40pinwet. avnse oesu cer4ua AAe atowee @
su desir4sm 4.
The PCS is actuated either automatically, by a containment
'A -
nignfpressuresignal,ormanually. Automatic actuation opens the cooling water tank discharga valves, allowing gravity flow of the cooling water onto the containment pp '
shell. M -.....', ;;te:ti;r, ef 1l,, FG..,;..; th; ;;;r;t:r te ;;"::t-te ;;;;r;;; ; itd.n un m m.;,, ;;r,tr:1 b;;rd Ndi5b' $3)2F'i!'....The discharge continuesgr,ti' th; m p. 4,,,gy 7gg y, w$
The PCS is designed to limit post accident pressure and temperature in containment to less than the design values.
Reduction of containment pressure reduces the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment, in the event of a DBA.
1 5
The PCS is an ESF system and is designed to ensure that the heat removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained.
APPLICABLE ITh PCS limits the temperature and pressure that could be SAFETY ANALYSES Iexp need following a DBA.
The limiting DBAs considered are the f coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam Wie break (SLB).
10CA and SLB are analyzed.using~Tomputer QS W codes designed to pred % the resultant' containment pressure W'W and temperature transients X two DBAs are assumed to
'^# " T occur simultaneously or consecutive (ent englatered safety The postulated DBAs are analyzed with' regard to containm feature v assuming the loss of one Class IE En hged Safet7FeaturesActuationCabinet(ESFAC) Division,whichis t
(continued) jk_
B 3.6 31 08/96 Amendment 0
i I
BASES 3.6.6...
BACKGROUND PAGE B 3.6 31 l
INSERT Background, fifth paragraph The manual containment cooling actuation consists of four momentary k
controls. If two associated controls are operated simultaneously actuation will occur in all divisions.
j (43)
BASES 3.6.6 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES INSERT (replace existing section)
The Pa ssive Containment Cooling System limits the temperature and -
pressure that could be experienced following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break I
(SLB). The LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients, No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively, The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one Class 1E Engineered Safety Features Actuation Cabinet (ESPAC) Division, which is the worst case single ~ active failure and results in one PCS flow path being inoperable.
t The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case scenario, the highest peak containment pressure as indicated in reference 4 occurs during a SLB and is less than containment design pressure. The analysis shows i
that the peak containment temperature is as indicated in reference 4 also occurs during a SLB Both results meet the intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4, " Containment Pressure," and LCO 3.6.5 for a detailed discussion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level of 1933 MWt, one passive containment cooling flow path operating, and initial (pre accident) containment conditions of 120'F and 1.0 psig. The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses.- The total response time includes actuation time plus the time required to achieve full flow to the containment shell, The modeled Passive Containment Cooling System actuation response time from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated.
i with exceeding the containment High4 2 pressure setpoint to opening of
. isolation valves.
f The Passive Containment Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
1(44) r
.a.-
.= -- -. -
PCS Operating B 3.6.6 BASES 2
APPLICABLE worst case single active failure and results in one PCS SAFETY ANALYSES jfl ath being inoperable.
(continued)
The analy and evaluation show that, under t e worst case f
scenario, t hest peak containment p pisure meets design limits.
The a yses and evaluations Assume a core level of 1933 MWt, one pas (ve containment cooling water flow path operating, and inith (pre.accidest) containment conditions of 120'F and 1.0 psig.
e a. fyses also assume a response time delayed initiation in der to provide conservative peak calculated contain t
ssure and temperature responses.
The modeled PCS a~ctuation from the e ainment analysis is based upon a sponse time associated w exceeding the
{containmei igh pre'ssure setpoint to ach ement of full flow (
. 4).
J PCS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy St ement.
LCO During a DBA, one passive containment cooling water flow path is required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 4).
To ensure that this requirement is met, two passive containment cooling water flow paths must be OPERABLE.
Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one flow path operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.
The PCS includes a cooling water tank, valvas, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of delivering water from the cooling water tank upon an actuation signal. An OPERABLE flow path consists of either the normally closed air operated valve capable of automatically opening or the air operated valve h
dministretinly open and the motor operated valve closed and capable of automatically opening.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature requiring the operation of the PCS.
(continued) p{
B 3.6 32 08/96 Amendment 0
- _ _ _ =
PCS Operating B 3.6.6 BASES APPLICABillTY During shutdown the PCS may be required to remove heat (continued) from containment.
The requirements in MODES 5 and 6 are specified in LCO 3.6.7, Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Shutdown.
ACTIONS M
With one passive containment cooling water flow path inoperable, the affected flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
In this degraded condition, the remaining flow path is capable of providing greater than 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen in light of the remaining heat removal capability and the low probability of DBA occurring during this period.
U 8S If the cooling water tan is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status w thi X hours.
The tank may be declared inoperable ue to low water level or temperature out of limits.
The hour Completion Time is reasonabic based on the remaining heat removal capability of the system and the availability of cooling water from alternate sources.
~ ~ ~ ~ - - - -
m l
With wo cooling water flow paths inoperable, action must be taken to. restore one flow path to OPERABLE status within 1
' 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Without cooling water,* heat transfer from the containment shell is severely limited, in this Condition the only available cooling water is from nonsafety related, alternate sources.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides time (towwkeminorrepairsandminimizesAheprobabilityofan accidentoccurringpichrequiresc4ntainment. cooling.
(continued) h AP600 B 3.6 33 08/96 Amendment 0 e
nmm n.
PCS Operating B 3.6.6 BASES C-ACTIONS g.d (continued)
/,g If any of the Required ion #sandassociatedCompletion Times for Condition A, r
are not met, orif the LCO is not met for reasons other a'n ionditions A, M D f, the plant must be brought to MODE /twhere the probability and
.5 -
consequences.on an event are minimized.
To achieve this status, the plankmust be brou ht to at least MODE 3 within 6g hours and to MODb/ within J hours.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the require plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly m anner and without llenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach 5
M00 A allows additional time and is reasonable when considering that the driving for e for a release of radioactive material from the R ctor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.
o+
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6,6.1 REQUIREMENTS This surveillance requires verification that the cooling water temperature is within the limits assumed in the accident analyses.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is adequate to identify a temperature change that would approach the temperature limit and has been shown to be acceptable in similar applications.
1R 3.6.6.2 Verification that the cooling water volume is above the required minimum ensures that a sufficient supply is available for containment cooling.
Since the cooling water volume is normally stable and low level is indicated by a main control room alarm, a M huur. Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptabl through operating experienceinsimilarapplications(t SR 3.6.6,3 2
Verifying the correct alignment of power operated, and automatic valves, excluding check valves, in the Passive Containment Cooling System provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for system operation.
This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise (continued)
_]00 B 3.6 34 08/96 Amendment 0 A
PCS Operating 8 3.6.6 BASES
$URVEILLANCE SR 3.6,6,3(continued)
REQUIREMENTS secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct positions prior to being secured. ITh
"'hr VPdY v
oc i SR 3.6.6,4 This SR requires verification that each automatic isolation valve actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation signal.
This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.
TM ia ec ~ dtace IA/SE4T - P :!th th; 'r,;;rs k, i d ;,,, r..'r:;=:y !!
- =.
SR 3.6.6.5 This $R r quires ve if atton th the air flot ath from l eshje uilding ulus in) to the exitA u bytructe nd thft t in ect port /s. nth r
affla Dg are losed ens ing that noantib)capabili aeat re s
h
>W '
{hichwo4Aause41 owpat(h sifuction the effect fint ed. Alth th e a
ed mechani r,.
of an opey'ktspectio t is ver mall it/ considered crudent to verify thh tanabilit evy y 24 monthsf SR 3,6,6,6 This SR rduires performece of a Ptysiv(Containpent to ing System est to Verify systeth capapuitig( such the afityflow te/ The hqeffi performanct< test h $ h ]J UN demons tes that t
' ontainmentx'ooling capability a sumed Y
t),a'ccide i
analyses is intained. AlhoughtheInelihood system formance wou ( degrade w time is log it fsc sidered p ent to periolically verif ystem perfo ce.. The hequ6cy is in at:4rdance 4th the esxmk
' nWinservice hiingPrograml (continued)
](
B 3.6 35 08/96 Amendment 0
BASES 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE H 3.6 35 INSERT SR 3.B.6.3 This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather,it
. involves verification, through control room instrumentation or a system walkdown, that valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.
(40)
INSERT SR 3.6.6.4 The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
(41)
INSERT SR 3.6.6.5 Thie SR requires verification that the air flow path from the shield building annulus inlet to the exit is unobstructed. Additionally, the SR requires verification that removable sections of the air baffle are in place to maintain the heat removal capability. Although there are no anticipated mechanisms which would cause air flow path obstruction and the effect of a missing air baille section is small,it is considered prudent to verify this capability every 24 months.
(42)
INSERT SR 3.6.6.6 This SR requires performance of a Passive Containment Cooling System test to verify system flow and water coverage capabilities in accordance with the System Level Operability Testing Program. The system performance-test demonstrates that the containment cooling capability assumed in accident analyses is maintained by verifying the flow rates via each standpipe and measurement of containment wetting coverage. Although the likelihood that system performance would degrade with time is low,it is considered prudent to periodically verify system performance. The 10 year-Frequency is based on the ability of the more frequent surveillances to verify the OPERABILITY of the active components and features which could degrade with time.
. (49).
l PCS. Operating B 3.6.6 BASES (continued)
]
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A. ' General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.'
2.
10 CFR 50, Appendix K, 'ECCS Evaluation Models.'
3.
AP600 $5AR, Chapter 15, ' Accident Analysis."
l l
4.
AP600 $$AR, Chapter 6.2, ' Containment Systems.'
i e
9
. jk _
B 3.6 36 08/96 Amendment 0
l PCS Shutdown B 3.6.7 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT $YSTEMS 8 3.6.7 Eassive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the PCS is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.6.6, ' Passive Containment Cooling System. Operating."
APPLICABLE The PCS limits the temperature and pressure that could be SAFETY ANALYSES experienced following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
The limiting DBAs considered during shutdown are the loss of decay heat removal and loss of shutdown margin events.
For shutdown events, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) sensible and decay heat removal requirements are reduced as compared to heat removal requiremc.ts for MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 events.
Therefore, the shutdown containment heat removal requirements are bounded by analyses of MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 events.
A discussion of MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 DBAs is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.6.6
" Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)
Operating."
The PCS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
( W. D LCO for postulated shutdown events, one pafsive containment cooling water flow path is required to provide the required containment heat removal capabilitg.l To ensure that this requirement is met, two passive containment cooling water flow phths must be OPERABLE.
Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one flow path operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.
The PCS includes a ecoling water tank, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of delivering water from the cooling water tank upon an actuation signal.
(continued)
]Q, B 3.6 37 08/96 Amendment 0
PCS. Shutdown B 3.6.7 BASES (cont.inued)
APPLICABILITY IrrwDid Ip4a Qng peu ent nt W ors 13 decaydatp(hoyrt-beyf_o 45 =M f.it, T W du I/ Db d nrreactW sitile heatgevels at %1 time hbby removed f%pcay conta(irussot via the Qwith ai(r tooling ahe.con s
m
@#[
8
$r Il per as eyondtye[
0] hot)rs imit Tp i
adeq.
time r pa1ntena prthe tank ater delipie systenk ' Limited m) tenance afi tie air flow p th or conta megt'she 1 can 16 pe formed 91thout a factin?
Ayttaa nnerability.r The PCS requirements in MODES 1, 2, 3, anu 4 are specified in LCO 3.6.6, Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) -
Operating.
ACTIONS M
With one passive containment cooling water flow path inoperable, the affected flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
in this degraded condition, the remaining flow path is capable of providing greater than 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen in light of the remaining heat removal capability and the low probability of DBA occurring during this period.
M S
If the cooling water ta k i} inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status wittinir4 hours. The tank may be declared inoperable d to low water level or temperature out of limits.
The hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the remainin heat removal capability of the system and the availability of cooling water from alternate
- sources, b
/
g m
tore one flow path pif$erable, ahion ing water flow p th be' iWith two taken to fer,oOPERABLEstatus, thin 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Wit ut coolin eat transf frrom the e
conta ment she is erely lim .d. In iWis Condition the only available oling water is om abnsafety related. L_- 3 (continued) A]{, B 3.6 38 08/96 Amendment 0
l t i BASES 3.6,7 +.. APPLICABILITY j t PAGE B 3.6 38 l i P INSEHT OPERABILITY of the PCS is required in MODES 5 and 6 with the reactor shutdown and the calculated reactor decay heat greater than 6 MWt for i heat removal in the event of a loss of nonsafety decay heat removal capabilities. With the decay heat less than 6 MWt, the decay and sensible heat can be - easily removed from containment with air cooling alone. - i 3 ? 5 f a e f y, ,i.- -,+c,-. L,w.,.-. --4,e +:... ~ k.,.--.- --.4.,,.. .e,,~-, .,4 ,-.~~~r-.
PCS. Shutdown B 3.6.7 BASES ACTIONS ' (J.(continued) alternate somres. int 5'EoCompletion Time vides tis (e t,o make minor'rlpairs and minimf2q the probab y of an' eccident occurring iirMchaquires cMiainpfnt cooling. ' 1 Action must be initiated if any of the Requir Actions and associated Completion Times for Condition A4 8, r k are not met, or if thelCO is not met for reasons other an Conditions A, T,DID Y. If in MODE 5 with the RCS open and/or pressurizer level not visible, action must be initiated, imediately, to increase the RCS level to a visible pressurizer level and to close the RCS so that the PRHR HX operation is available. If in MODE 6 with the upper internals in place and/or the refueling cavity less than full, action must be initiated, immediately, to increase the refueling cavity level to full with the upper internals
- removed, in both cases, the time to RCS boiling is maximized by maximizing the RCS inventory and maintaining RCS temperature as low as practical.
Additionally, action to suspend positive reactivity additions is required to ensure that the shutdown margin is maintainei. Sources of o positive reactivity addition include boron F.ution, withdrawal of reactivity control assemblies, and excessive cooling of the RCS. These Actions place the plant in a condition which maximize the time to actuation of the Passive Containment Cooling System, thus providing time for repairs or application of alternative cooling capabilities. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.7 { REQUIREMENTS The LCO 3.6.6 Surveillance Requirements (SR 3.6.6.1 through 3.6.6.8) are applicable. The Frequencies associated with each specified SR are applicable. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.6.6 for a discussion of each SR. REFERENCES tu /, Aff oc) sYAR, TEC 7t o A/ &.2,, "coM %gagNr s t S 7mes " j {,_, B 3.6 39 08/96 Amendment 0
=- Containment Penetrations B 3.6.8 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT Systems 8 3.6.8 Containment Penetrations BASES BACKGROUND Containment closure capability is required during shutdown operations when there is fuel inside containment. Containment closure is required to maintain within containment the cooling water inventory. Due to tha large volume of the IRWST and the reduced sensible heat during shutdown, the loss of some of the water inventory can be accepted. Further, accident analyses have shown that containment closure capability is E21 required to meet offsite dose requirements. Therefore, containment does not need to be leak tight as required for MODES 1 through 4. In MODES 5 and 6, the LCO requirements are referred to as ' containment closure
- rather than
- containment OPERABILITY.*
Contairment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being cl; id. Since there is no requirement for containment leak tightness, compliance with the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required, 4 in Modes 5 and 6, there is no potential for steam release a into the containment immediately following a accident. Pressurization of the containment could only occur after heatup of the IRWST due to PRHR HX operation (MODE 5 with RCS intact) or after heatup of the RCS with direct venting to the containment (MODE 5 with reduced RCS inventory or MODE 6 with the refueling cavity not fully flooded) or after heatup of the RCS and refueling cavity (MODE 6 with refueling cavity fully flooded). The time from loss of normal cooling until steam release to the containment for these different MODES is shown in Figure B 3.6.8 1 as a function of time after shutdown. Because local manual action may be required to achieve containment closure it is assumed that the containment hatches, air locks and penetrations must be closed prior to steaming into containment. The containment equipment hatches, which are part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment. If closed, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four) bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced. Alternatively, if open, each equipment hatch can be (continued) ] 00 B 3.6 40 08/96 Amendment 0
Contai ment Penetrations B 3.6.8 BASES BACKGROUND installed using a dedicate. set of hardware, tools and (continued) equipment. A self contain' power source is provided to drive each hoist while 10wi ng the hatch into position. Large equipment and con.. ant t5 may be moved through the i hat nes as long as they > se removed and the hatch closed pri. to steaming into the containment. The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unit operation in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, ' Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY.s required. During periods of unit shutdown when containment closure is required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Temporary equipment connections (e.g., power or communications cables) are permitted as long as they can be removed to allow containment closure prior to steaming into the containment. Containment spare penetrations which also provide a part of the containment boundary provide for temporary support services (electrical, 14C, air, and water supplies) during MODES 5 and 6. Each penetration is flanged and normally closed. During periods of plant shutdown, temporary support systems may be routed through the penetrations; temporary equipment connections (e.g., power or communications cables) are permitted as long as they can be removed to allow containment closure prior to steaming into the containment. The spare penetrations must be closed or, if open, capable of closure prior to reaching boiling conditions within reactor coolant inventory. Containment penetrations, including purge system flow paths, that provide direct accett from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated or7h;huth on at (J r least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE " ' 4 ' ' ** automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations (Ref. 1), i (continued) jL _, B 3.6-41 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Penetrations B 3.6.8 BASES (contjnued) APPLICABLE For postulated shutdown events in MODES 5 and 6. RCS SAFETY ANALYSES
- heat removal is provided by either passive residual heat removal recircula(tion.PRHR) or IRWST in.jection and containment sump To support RCS heat removal, containment closure is required to limit the loss of the cooling water inventory from containment g,y g
Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Interim Policy Statement. LCO This LCO limits the loss of cooling water inventory in containment to assure continued coolant inventory by limiting the potential escape paths for water released within containment. ' Penetrations closed in accordance with these requirements are not required to be leak tight. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed or capable of being closed prior to steaming into the containment..The equipment hatches may be opent however, the hatches shall be clear of obstructions such that capability to close the hatch within the indicated time A period is maintained. The hardware, tools, equipment and power sources necessary to install the hatches shall be available when the hatch is open. Both doors in each containmenLLJr ock may be opent however, the airjocks shall i f be clear of obstructions such that the capability to close g g ,ggg at least one door within the indicated time period is m g y 4,g, maintained. Containment spare penetrations may be open;
- d ' " "# '
however, the penetrations shall be capable of being closed within the indicated time period. Direct access penetrations shall be closed by at least one manual or automatic isolhtion valve, blind flange or equivalent, or capable of being closed by at least one valve actuated by a g g g._ containment isolation signal.a figure B 3.6.81 provides the acceptable required closure times for various modes and conditions. (continutd) AP6 g 3,6 42 08/96 Amendment 0_
i t BASES 3.6.8 -LCO i PAGE B 3.6-42 INSERT i If direct access penetrations are open, OPERABILITY of the containment i isolation instrumentation is required for the open penetrations by LCO 3.3.2, Function 3.a. Containment Isolation, Manual Initiation. An OPERABLE Containment Isolation Function includes LCO 3.3.2, Function ) 19.b, Containment Air Filtration System Isolation, Containment Isolation. 6 (60) f I h S 5 I -h
Containment Penetrations B 3.6.8 BASES APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during conditions for which the primary fadety related core cooling and boration capabilities are pr(vided by IRWST or injection or PRHR MODES $ and 6. The capability to close containment is required to ensure that the cooling water inventory is not lost in the event of an accident, in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. ACTIONS M If the containment equipment hatches, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the containment isolation function not capable of actuation when automatic isolation valves are open, the penetration (s) must be restored to the required status within 1 hour. B.1 and B.? If Required Action A.1 is not completed within 1 hour or the LCO is not met for reasons other t' an Condition A, action must be taken to minimize the probability and consequences of an accident. In MODE 5, action must be initiated, immediately, to be in MODE 5 with a visible level in the pressurizer and to close the RCS so that the PRHR HX operation is available, in MODE 6, action must be initiated, immedittely, to be in MODE 6 with the upper internals removed a d the refueling cavity full. The time to RCS boiling is caximized by maximizing RCS inventory, and allowing PRHR HX operation. Additionally, action to suspend positive reactivity additions is required to ensure that the shutdown margin is maintained. Sources of positive reactivity addition include boron dilution, withdrawal of reactivity control assemblies, and excessive cooling of the RCS. (continued) j{ B 3.6 43 08/96 Amendment 0
^ i F Containment Penetrations B 3.6.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. The Surveillance on the open purge and exhaust valves will demonstrate that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also the Surveillance will demonstrate that each valve operator has motive power, which will ensure that each valve is capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation signal. Open containment spare penetrations shall be verified capable of being closed prior to RCS boiling by remnval of obstructions and installation of the flange or by other closure means which will limit loss of the cooling water inventory from containment. The Surveillance is performed every 7 days. The Surveillance interval is selected to ensure that the required penetration status is maintained during shutdown inspections, testing, and maintenance. (continued) ]Q_ B 3.6 44 08/96 Amendment 0
t-1 I la=@ Time Permitted for Containment Closure E 20 1 i .c' l I e g .i _ _ f 2 -- ~- -- - ~ ~ ' -~ s g is _ _._7 7,,,,,,,,_33,,, Mode 5. Intact. IRWST _o ~ /,4 C Z. e 7_._ ) g L C uoo. s. covey rioooed. E to M -[ Temperature-1m dop ~= - - - o j l i,, O . _./ ~ ~ ~~ ./ ~ O / ,L -P v f f-e A = / gs - --y- ------- E woos s. can noi noodeo. uoo. s. uwoop. _ _ _. ____ A. Twave - 1M @g F [ Temperature-150 dog F l f yd .._.- l__ l_ O S s o 50 100 150 Me 2 ~*- Time After Shutdown (hrs) =- E S = w4 Figure B 3.6.8-1 (page I of I) Time Prior to Coolant Inventory Boiling ,g ~ i I .o o =-
Containment Penetrations B 3.6.8 BASES SURVElLLANCE SR 3.6.8.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Each of the two equipment hatches is provided with a set of hardware, tools, equipment, and self contained power source for moving the hatch from its storage location and installing it in the opening. The required set of hardware and tools shall be visually inspected to ensure that they can perform the required functions. The equipment and power source shall be inspected and/or operated as necessary to verify that the hatch can be installed. The power source shall be verified as containing sufficient energy to install the hatch from the storage location. The 7 day frequency is adequate considering that the hardware, tools, equipment, and power sources are dedicated to the associated equipment hatch and not used for any other functions. The SR is modified by a Note which only requires that the surveillance be met for an open equipment hatch. If the equipment hatch is installed in position, then the availability of the means to install the hatch is not required. g I,,.gowwy cavver7mc4 A d w its o W r e. h, 4 SR 3.6.8.3 24 Lv W 4 N T'M **Cwit w MT. This Surveillance demon rates t at at least one valve in each open penetration ,tuates t ) its isolation position on manual initiation or o an actua' or simulated containment isolation signal. The Frequencylu u ::ce-e nce with the: luwek: Te s t;w-Pres, a. The OPERABillTY requirements for theContainment}solationfunctionarespecifiedin LC0 3.3.2. REFERENCES l. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE 0002000 001, Rev. O, May 20, 1988. 2. TS'0, k:t t er l13.4. ',}, '"?EG-0000, Shiiun 15.7.4, Rev.1 My 198h em m w eenr... 30 B 3.6 46 08/96 Amendment 0
pH Adjustment B 3.6.9 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT 8 3.6.9 pH Adjustment BASES BACKGROUND The Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) includes two pH adjustment baskets which provide adjustment of the pH of the water in the containment following an accident where the containment floods. pgg 7gga out/sW.7* Following an accident with a large release of radioacti /ity, the containment pH is automatically adjusted to ?;t==A7.0 n 0.L. to enhance' iodine retention in the containment water. Chemical addition is necessary to counter the affects of the boric acid contained in the safety injection gg sup bies The desired pH values significantly reduces formatTon of elemental iodine in the containment water, which reduces the a x ;., production of organic iodine and the total airborne iodine in the containment. This pH adjustment is also provided to prevent stress corrosion cracking of safety related containment components during long term cooling, Grapular trisodium phosphate (TSP) contained in baskets o provh_ passive means of pH control for such accide(nts. These basketrare-located inside containment atJn ele tor M/Megl that is below the flo6 dup-level.. NaturgLrecirculation of wi n/ W waterinsidethecontainmentdriiian-bfthecoredecayheat 'Nmr, provides mixing to achieve-a-tiniform pH.' Crystalline TSP gg (Na P0cl2H,0) is initially loaded into the baskettbecause ii is ydrate,d and'Eill undergo less physical rd 0. J chan thin would anhydrous Na,PO, as a result oflta dit_v inside containment.3 APPLICABLE In the event of a Design Basis Accident (OBA), iodine may be SAFETY ANALYSES released from the fuel to containment. To limit this iodine release from containment, the pH of the water in the containment sump is adjusted by the addition of TSP. Adjusting the sump water to neutral or alkaline pH will augment the retention of the iodine, and thus reduce the iodine available to leak to the environment, pH adjustment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued) g60 B 3.6 47 08/96 Amendment 0
- _ = - i t BASES 3.6.9 BACKGROUND PAGE B 3.6-47. INSERT. Second paragraph ... and acida produced in the post LOCA environment (nitric acid from the irradiation of water and air, and hydrochloric acid from irradiation and pyrolysis of electric cable insulation). INSERT Third paragraph Granular trisodium phosphate (TSP) contained in baskets provides a passive means of pH control for such accidents. The baskets are made of stainless steel with a mesh front that eadily permits contact with water. These baskets are located inside containment at an elevation that is below the minimum floodup level. The baskets are placed at least a foot above the floor to reduce the chance that water spills will dissolve the TSP. Natural recirculation of water inside the containment, following a LOCA, is driven by the core decay heat and provides mixing to achieve a uniform pH. The dodecahydrate form of TSP (Na3PO 12H 0)is initially loaded into the baskats because it is hydrated and will undergo less physical and chemical change than would anhydrous Na3PO as a result o?.he humidity inside 4 4 containment. (Refs. I and 2) (68) (70)
nN Adjustment B 3.6.9 BASES (continued) LC0 The requirement to maintain the pH adjustment baskets OPERABLE with the required volume of TSP assures that for DBA releases of iodine into containment, the pH of the containment sump will be adjusted to enhance the retention of the iodine. A required volume is specified instead of mass because it is not feasible to weigh the TSP in the containment. The 7 minimum required volume is based on the manuf= & ed density of TSP. This is conservative because the der.;ity if TSP may increase after installation due to compaction. APPL'CABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a DBA could cause release of radioactive iodine to containment requiring pH adjustment. The pH adjustment baskets assist in reducing the airborne iodine fission product inventory available for release t-the environment. In H00ES 5 and 6. the reabability and consequences of these events are reduced dua 19 the pressure and temperature limitations of these 110 DES. Thus, pH adjustment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6. ACTIONS A.) If the TSP volume in the baskets is not within limits, the iodine retention may be less than that assumed in the accident analysis for the limiting DBA. Due to the very low probability that the volume of TSP may change, the variations is expected to be minor such that t~ e required n capability is substantially available. The 72 hour Completion Time for restoration to within limits is consistent with times applied to minor degradations of ECCS parameters. B.1. ems B. 2.1. Aao 02 1 ,5 / If the Required Actions and associated Completion T;mes are not met, the plant must be brought to MODE // where the probability and consequences on an event are minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least (continued) joL _ B 3.6-48 08/96 Amendment 0
_ _ _ _ = _ pH Adjusttent B 3.6.9 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) MODE 3withinkhoursandtoMODE within hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. t M t4 T s-p SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.9.1 REQUIREMENTS lThis surveillance requires that a visual inspection be l eu,gy,vt 6F / performed of the pH adjustment baskets to verify that the F g,g j This inspection is required to ensure that leaks inside containment have not sprayed on the baskets and caused TSP ~ L'tTE R dissolution. The probability of dissolution of the TSP during normal plant operation is very low becaase of the location and design of the baskets. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with frequencies applied to this type of design in operating plants, e REFERENCES h re _f / / wsmT Go e 20L _ B 3.6-49 08/96 Amendment 0
l BASES 3.6.9. ;., - ACTIONS - PAGE B 3.6 49 INSERT B.1 and B.2 An alternative to coohng the plant to MODE 5 conditions is to verify within. a Completion Time of 84 hours that 70% of the required TSP volume is available while in MODE 3. The reduced TSP volume is adequate in MODE 3, considering that the required volume is based on severe accident conditions and that no MODE 3 DBAa are predicted to result in a significant fission product release. - INSERT REFERENCES 1. SSAR Section 6.3.2.1.4, Containment pH Control 2. SSAR Section 6.3.2.2.4, pH Adjustment Baskets. 3. SSAR Section 15.6.5.3.1, Identification of Cause and Accident Description.. 4 (69) 3 l 1 rw i w' r71-v- w-' w
. ~ _. Passive Autocatalytic Myo? ogen Recemoinefs B 3.6.10 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.10 Passrve Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiners e,a um4E H WWM '^"W# BASES /r f BACKGROUND The function of the@oge$ passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARS s to elimnate the potential due to an uncontrolled h rogen-orygen reacton. Tn 7M s to/>#E WE pen 8 WN ddoGM cnnn et mens <ns mm.s4 A ** sad Ens moowr-PA e reqwffed to r the hydr ~ cofictn wthe .tsmant pgg following s of coolant OCA). The PARS a plish this by j g g , mpg 7 recom6ining h and , to water vapor'The P are self f initdited in the oranars of rocen. g cow. Two.100 percent capacity independent passive autocatalytic recombiners are provided.,The PARS are passive devices which contain no moving parts and do not need electncal power or any other support system. Recombination is accomplished by the attracten of oxygen and hydrogen molecules to the surface of he catalyst. The two gases are combined to form water vapor via an exothermic reaction. The heat produced by the reaction causes the air to rise a within the enclosure by natural convection. As it nses, replacement air is drawn into the PAR through the bottom, and is exhausted through the chimney where the hot gases mix with the containment atmosphere. The device is a molecular 4 diffusion filter, not a fixed bed particle filter, and thus the open flow channels are gg not susceptible to foding. A singlelPAR is capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration in containment below the 4.0 volume percent (v/o) flammability limity following a DBA. Since PARS are not subject to single failure, the secondjPAR is installed as a spare and provides the ability to continue operations for a limited time. in the event one PAR is declared inoperable.4The PARS will operate following any accdont which results in hydrogen generation, independent of the availability of offsrte or onsite power. w t. u M - APPLICABLE The PARS prove for the capability of controlling the buk/iydrogen SAFETY ANALYSES in containment to less than the lower flammable concentration of 4.0 v/o following a DBA. This control would prevent an uncontrolled hydrogen bum, thus ensunng the containment pressure and temperature assumed in the analysis are not exceeded The limiting DBA relative to hydrogen generatio is a LOCA. (continued) HAP 600 B3.61 03/97 Dratt
BASES 3.6.10'.. BACKGROUND PAGE B 3.61 INSERT ~ Second paragraph Per 10 CFR 50.44, " Standards for Combustible Gas Control Systems in Light Water Cooled Reactors" (Ref.1), and GDC 41, " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 2),- hydrogen recombiners are required to reduce the hydrogen concentration in the containment following a loss of coolant. accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). The PARS accomplish this by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. The vapor remains in containmerit, thus eliminating any discharge to the' environment. The - PARS are selfinitiated in the presence of hydrogen. (72)- INSERT Third paragraph, following first sentence In addition, compartment PARS are located in the IRWST vent and in the - CVS compartment. The two PARS have been located in confined areas as assurance that the hydrogen control function can be accomplished. However, one global PAR in combination with gas diffusion and natural circulation from the compartments will provide the hydrogen control function. INSERT-Third paragraph, before last sentence There are no installed spares for the IRWST and CVS compartment PARS. These units are controlling hydrogen in smaller areas, _they are easier to maintain and are not as critical in controlling global or local concentrations. That is, should the IRWST and CVS units be unavailable gas diffusion and - natural circulation will assist in limiting hydrogen concentrations. 4 +++e 4 + m -4 -a w..
Passive AutocatalylC nyOf0 gen nMomu(@e B 3.6.t0 i 8ASES.(conteued) d Hydrogen may accumulate in containment following a LOCA as a result of: APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) a. A metaksteam reacton between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant; b. Radclytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sump; c. Hydrogen in the RCS at the time of the LOCA (i.e., hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hydrogen gas in the pressunzer vapor space); or d. Corrosion of metals exposed to the post acedent environment. l To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in containment following a Racemrwrol LOCA the hydrogen oeneraton is calculated as a function of time following the 39 ftsprema 3 initiaton of the accident. Conservative assumptons}re used to maximize the amount of nydrogen calculated.. As such, the PARS are designed to control an amount of hydrogen generation in containment considerably in excess of the amount that would be expected from the limiting DBA LOCA.
- ,s Based on the conservative assumptons used to calculate the hydrogen concentraton vs, sus time after a LOCA, the hydrogen concentration in the pnmary containment would reach 3.5 vlo about 20 days after the LOCA and 4.0 vlo about 8 days later if no recombiner was functioning (Ref f).
V The PARS are designed such that, with the evnservatively calculated hydrogen generation rates discussed above, a single PAR is capable of limiting the peak hydrogen concentraton in containment to less than 4.0 vlo (Ref./) Y The PARS satisfy Cnterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO A nitis OPE [A I BLE the PARS a worst se p gg single
- failure,
, in e an ' alled spar allow ~ g,yv f, f ued in ~ with in ont is ermined to be in rable. /^>55q (continued) 4 HAP 600 B3.62 03/97 Ofatt
BASES 3.6.10 LCO PAGE B 3.6-2 INSERT-Replacement paragraphs Four PARS must be OPERABLE; two global PARS and two compartment PARS. Since the PARS are not subject to a single active failure, one global PAR is, in effect, an installed spare, thus allowing continued operation in accordance with Action A,in the event one global PAR is determined to be inoperable. Two compartment PARS shall be OPERABLE; one in the IRWST vent and one in the CVS compartment.- One global PAR in combination with gas diffusion and natural circulation from the compartments will provide the hydrogen control function. However, the two PARS have been located in confined areas as added assurance that the post accident hydrogen control function. ;m be accomplished.
i Passrve AutocatalyM Hydfogen Recombiners B 3.6.10 BASES (contEued) LCO Cp ;;.;n 9 !'r:! ce "^n enn n :n;; N ;;;' LOC A-(continued) lyt,;, cordfste can M p:=rt*d Nm ::=;ing :n; neroni;LJg '.-! APPLICABILITY In MODES t and 2, the PARS are required to control the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o. In MODES 3 and 4, both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the PARS is low. Therefore, the PARS are not required in MODE 3 or 4. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, PARS are not required in these MODES. h ACTIONS AJ{ 30 oA S48 30 be restore [E PAR OPERABLE With one PA noperable, the inoperable PAR m CPCP.? L 4 p. oana; = d = 4 ::;r cW Ny:- Thet day Completion T status within it days !n tb t-O,, N ;;ca ,9 y ,g g _ -u.. i is based on the ability to perform the safety funtton and that no single failure of the remaining PAR is postulated. The Completon Time is further supported by the low probability eHhe$eetwfence of a LOCAjhat would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability time) and the length of time after the p' that operator acbon would be requred to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding this limit. Requred Acbon A.1 is modified by a Note which states the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not gishle. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one PAR is inoperable. ' aliow provided "-".: the remain ERAB E salpf(f the p bil' RE@f(E yis capable orm MM of a LOC und hydrogen in unts p '#N e x '.- *,0 dabiiny limit 's . the r , MEALE AA in no (continued) 03/97 OI8ft HAP 600 33.63
a - BASES 3.6.10 =, ACTIONS - PAGE B 3.6 3 INSERT M First paragraph If one of the global PARS is inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE PARS are capable of performing 100% of the hydrogen control function. If either of the compartment PARS is inoperable, the compartment hydrogen-- concentration is controlled by diffusion and mixing. In this condition, the diffusion and mixing is enhanced the' low hydrogen concentration produced ' by the two OPERABLE global PARS, thus providing greater assurance that the hydrogen control function can be accomplished.' - INSERT M Second paragraph - This allowance is provided because.the remaining OPERABLE PARS are capable of performing the safety function, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB occurring (that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit), the remaining OPERABLE PARS are not subject to a single failure, and the length of time after a postulated LOCA before operator action would be required to prevent exceeding the flammability limit. A N t 4 ..-w. -~ .,r v-y
-. - -. - ~. - - - - c ewv, w.. " s... r.......... %.. L B 3.6.10 L i - BASES ACTIONS 6,.]. (continued) l
- O:: 0 ; i;'t ete W r; : -@ : i,....Li. W.J LOCA A.
8
==t"' :f: ;:M h ::;r:d " ;;;;;n: r:::1 ; M trf'?; M..;. B 1 and B.2 on.. 4a - With twofARs inoperable, the ability to perform thel hydrogen control function via altemate capabilities must be venfied by administrative means within 1 hour. The altemate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the containment Hydrogen Ignitor System. The I hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to venty that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. In addition, the altamate hydrogen control system capability must be venfied once per 12 hours thereafter to ensure its continued availability Both ene initial venfication and all subsequent venfications may be perfonned as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the attemale hydrogen control system, it does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the altemate hydrogen control system, if the ability to perform the hydrogen control funcbon is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two! PARS inoperable for up to,W. Howe (is a j reasonable trne to allow 4we. PARS to be inope able because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low 5 obability of the occ.1rrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in the am nts capable of excoeding the flammability limit. 7 p4y3 w 6 Gat if the bepere PA cannot be restored to O LE status within the required Compie Time, the plant must be brought a MODE in which the LCO does not . To achieve this status, the plant m be brought to at least MODE 3 within rs. The allowed Completion Trne of hours is reasonable, based on operating exponence, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderty manner and without challenging olant systems, a (continued) 4 J 1 4 @ AP600 B3.64 03/97 Di' aft
Passwe Autocatasyic nyorogen necomoinors L B 3.6.10 BASES (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.10.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance Requirement ensures there are no physcal obstructons to air flow that could affect recombiner operaton. A visualinspecten of each PAR is suffic ent to venty that there is no obstructen or blockage of the inle;3 or outlets. O'D / o se c.r -* -0; Er.;'::.cw Fmuency.. ii.;;erdre; wnh the ;ceerice Temi Fie m. w SR 3.6.10.2 This Surveillance Requirement requires removal and testing of a specimen sample from each of the PARS, and it subjects the sample to bench tests to confirm continued satisfactory performance. 0; berd :::t,Te;;e,e;ia e;r tee.pretur; C0!!! d"^ t0 000er; Of te ;.io!y51is e kisen sir!!7 dies,G i.in@, s.d it 7 t-ee:t:0 ret 74 ee'd ;; eentage te be egr;b';. S; Ogr;;C'.re; i @ Insec --* -I:;w; ray i: b x;erderse w;;,in; lnx ed T::teg Pregt;T, e-d iekn in 10 - - re?' '".: :::t et: ref$'t !:r PAR:, d me !:: prd$iWj e! cetf :t i --pe:.cg. .6Cg' / M 5 EA.T -* REFERENCES yt. AP600 SSAR, Secten 6.2.4, ' Containment Hydrogen Control Systems.' 3 /. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Rev./.L bAP600 B 3.6 5 03/97 Draft , m.....,,, n
1 I HASES 3.6.10. SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS / REFERENCES PAGE B 3.6 5 INSERT SR 3.6.10.1 The 24 month Frequency is adequate, considering there are no known sources of PAR obstruction or blockage. (76) INSERT SR 3.6.10.2 The bench test evaluates the recombination rate as a result of specimen exposure to a known air / hydrogen sample, and it demonstrates that the catalyst continues to be OPERABLE. The 24 month Frequency for this SR was developed considering the simplicity of the passive PAR devices, the low i potential for degradation of the catalyst material, and the significant performance margin discussed in reference 4. The catalyst is not expected to degrade over its useful lifetime and surveillance on a 24 month Frequency is adequate to observe degradation. (76) INSERT REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.44. 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41. (72) (73)
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES (continued) ACTIONS A.1 In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1-nour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, ar,J 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2 g if containment cannot be restored to O RABLE status within equired Completion Time, the pla must be brought to MODE where the probability and con equences of an event are minimized. To achieve this sta s, the plant must be brou toatleastMODE3withinghoursandtoMODEf5 ,f(cr withi hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage limits specified in LCO 3.6.2 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be calculated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test is required to be < 0.6 La for combined Type B and C leakage, and < 0.75 La for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of 5 1.0 La. At s 1.0 La the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. (continued) d( B 3.5-4 08/96 Amendment 0
I. s l Containment l B 3.6.1 BASES (cont.inued) REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. ' Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors." 2. AP600 SSAR, Chapter 15, " Accident Analysis." 3. AP600 SSAR, Section 6.2, " Containment Systems." .,, 30L, B 3.6-5 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks BASES BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation. Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder, 10 feet in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident-(DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY, Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door). The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness are essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analyses. APPLICABLE The DBA that results in the largest release of radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES material within containment is a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 3), in the analyses of DBAs, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment is designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.12% of containment air weight of the original content of containment air per day after'a DBA (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50, (continued) AP60 B 3.6-6 08/96 Amendment 0
= Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE Appendix J (Ref.1), as L, the maximum allowable containment SAFETY ANALYSES leakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternal (continued) pressure P, following a DBA. This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks. The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO Eact containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of containment, the air lock
- sfety function is related to control of offsite radiation exposures resulting from a DBA.
Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event. Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock r.ust be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock ^ door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is necessary to support containment OPERABILITY following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry and exit from containment. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODE 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES and large inventory of coolant. Therefore, containment air locks are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. However, containment closure capability is required within MODE 5 and 6 as specified in LCO 3.6.8. (continued) M L _,, B 3.6-7 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment m r LocAs B 3.6.2 BASES (continued) ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component, if the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair without interrupting containment integrity, if containment entry is required, it is preferred that tne air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering through the other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which means there is a short-time during which the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be immediately closed. If radiological conditions permit, entry and exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO,-separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and a subsequent inoperable air lock is governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions, in the event t1at air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 3 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment." A.1, A.2, and A.3 With one air lock door in one or more containment air locks inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock. This ensures a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within I hour. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," which requires contairaent be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. (cor.tinued) ]{ B 3.6 8 08/96. Amendment 0
CCntainment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2. and A.3 (continued) In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is being maintained closed. Required Action A.3 verifies that an air lock with an inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked and closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is reasonable based on engineering judgement and is considered adequate in view of the low likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified to be locked closed by administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small. The Required Actions are modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the airlock are inoperable. With both doors in the same airlock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.) and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial entry into Condition A; only the requirement to comply with the Required Actions. Note 2 allows use of an airlock for entry and exit for 7 days, under administrative controls if both airlocks have an inoperable door. This 7 day restriction begins when the second air lock is discovered inoperable. Containment entry may be required on a periodic basis to perform Technical Specification (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities on equipment inside containment that are required by TS or activities on equipment that support TS-required equipment. This Note (continued) j{_ B 3.6 9 08/96 Amendment 0
Centainment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2. and A.3 (contiliued) is not intended to preclude performing other activities (non TS related activities if the containment is entered, . using the inoperable airloc)k, to perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. .B.l. B.2. and-B.3 With an air lock door interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more air locks, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are col.sistent with Condition A. The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same airlock are inoperable. With both doors in the same airlock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and exit from containment under the control of a dedicated individual staticaed at the airlock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time the individual performs the u function of the interlock. Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to airlock doors located in high radiation areas that allows these doors to be verified locked closed by administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position is small. C.1, C.2, and C.3 With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires action to be initiated immediately to evaluate previous combined leakage rates using current air lock test results. An evaluatien is acceptable, since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits in many instances (e.g., only one seal per door has failed), containment remains OPERABLE, yet only I hour (per LCO 3.6.1 would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE s)tatus prior to requiring a plant shutdown, in (continued) j{ _, B 3.6-10 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Air Locks ( B 3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2. and C.3 (continued) addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits. Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air lock must be verified to be closed within the I hour Com)letion Time. This specified time period is consistent wit) the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. Additionally, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock. D.1 and 0.2 6 3 I" / If the inoperable containment r' lock cas ot be restored to OPERABLEstatuswithinthepequ)redCompletionTime,the plant must be brought to DE A where the probability and consequences of an eve are minirpzed. To achieve this status, the plant mus be brough 4ghoursandtoMODE within J(g/to at least MODE 3 within hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6,2.1 h Rsve:c7 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPE BLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test equirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Prog am. This SR reflects MTE the leakageltesting requirements with,regwd to air lock laakage (Type B leakage tests). The periodic testing - d r:quirements verify that the ai lock leakage does not re Exceso rd'y
- M S :::::d!
The Frequency is$q the overalcontainment leakage rate. "" "] 8 "*
- D equired by J J, ;; sp;;ift:d 'n the ContainmentLeakageRateTesping:ndi:
Program. IL;, SP .0.t P i m e: Trequency ::t m ; ten:} dee et apply _ (continued) THE AcandNCE C/t*TErts4 WERE esM6htseto MWto w nis4 L 44 m 90 cerdwmear ersedda,:ry m:ru>d. b AP600 8 3.6-11 08/96 Amendment 0 min ma.o m==.
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued) 7#e The SR has been modifiec b Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock dc does not invalidate the previous successful performance of
- overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the W W KAd 4 70 3 results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria uf-sSR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accountedforindeterminingthe=r.Qcontainmentleakage rate. eg g,,, pu a yo, SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock door interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting a containment air lock but is not required more frequently than 184 days. Th6 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgement and is considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel. Q e t, tor) 6 10CFR50,AppendixJ,[PrimaryReactorContainment REFERENCES 1. Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" etn.eemov: ,fu MmMcL~C+sso 2. AP600 SSAR, Section 6.2, " Containment Systems." 3. AP600 SSAR, Chapter 15, " Accident Analysis." h AP600 B 3.6-12 08/96 Amendment 0 m i
- o. m.on
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves BASES BACKGROUND The containment isolation valves form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for fluid penetrations not serving accident consequence limiting systems to be provided with two isolation barriers. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system. These barriers (typically containment isolation valves) make up the Containment Isolation System. Automatic isolation signals are produced during accident conditions. SSAR Section 6.2 (Ref. 1) identifies parameters which initiate isolation signal generation for containment isolation valves. The containment isolation valves (and blind flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the environment in the event of a release of fission product radioactivity to the containment atmosphere as a result of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The OPERABILITY requirements for containment isolation valves help ensure that containment is isolated within the time limits assumed in the sefety analysis. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that containment function assumed in the safety analysis will be maintained. (continued) h AP600 B 3.6-13 08/96 Amendment 0 f
L l Centainment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES BACKGROUND Containment Air Filtration System Il6 inchl ource valves I (continued) The Containment Air Filtration System operates to: ] a. Supply outside air-into the containment for ventilation i and cooling or_ heating, b. Reduce the concentration of noble gases within i containment prior to and during personnel access, and c. Equalize internal and external pressures. Since the valves used in the Containment Air Filtration System are designed to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation valves, these valves may be opened as needed in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. APPLICABLE The containment isolation valve LCO was derived from the SAFETY ANALYSES sssumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the containment boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABillTY supports leak tightness of the containment. Therefore, the safsty analysis of any event requiring isolation of containment is applicable to this LCO. The DBA that results in the largest release of radioactive material within containment is a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 2). In the LOCA analyses, it is assumed that containment isolation valves are either closed or function to close within the required isolation time follewing event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through containment isolation valves (including containment purge valves) are minimized. The LOCA dose analysis assumes that, following containment isolation signal generation, the containment purge isolation valves are closed within 15 seconds. The remainder of the automatic isolation valves are assumed closed and the containment leakage is terminated except for the design leakage rate, L,. Since the containment isolation valves (continued) h AP600 B 3.6 14 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES APPLICABLE are powered from the IE division batteries no diesel SAFETY ANALYSES generator startup time is applied. (continued) The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of plant safety analyses was considered in the design of the containment purge isolation valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred. The inboard and outboard isolation valves on each line are pneumatically operated, spring closed valves that fail in the closed position and are provided with power via independent sources. The containment isolation valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 Containment isolation valves form a part of the containment boundary. The containment isolation valves' safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during a DBA. The automatic power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed along with their associated stroke times in the SSAR (Ref. 1). The normally closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de activated and secured in their closed position, or blind - flanges are in place and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves / devices are those listed in Reference 1. This LCO provides assurance that the containment isolation valves and purge valves will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containment boundary during accidents. (continued) b AP600 B 3.6 15 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment isolation Valves l B 3.6.3 BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a DBA could ccuse a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODE 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES and large inventory of coolant. Therefore, containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. However, containment closure capability is required in MODES S and 6. The requirements for containment isolation valves during MODE 5 and 6 are addressed in LCO 3.6.8 " Containment Penetrations." ACTIONS The Actions are modified by a Note allowing containment penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative control. These administrative controls consist of statioring a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. in this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for cortainment isolation is indicated. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that. A for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve. In the event that the containment isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1. (continued) g{ B 3.6-16 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. T - Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual. valve, a blind flange, or a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration flow path isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest E available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be reasonable consicTering the tim [e'J(hour Completion Time is completed within*)f hours. Th required to isolate the penetration, the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and the availability of a second barrior. 8 For affected penetrations that (annot be restored to f OPERABLE status within the ) D hour Completion Time and have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetrations must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations that are required to be isolated following an accident and that are no longer capable of i being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those i isolation devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, if not performed wid.in the previous 92 days," is based on engineering juvament.nd is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessirelity af the isolation devices and other L administrative cont els that will ensure that isolation i device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. 1 (continued) l h,, AP%,,,,,, _ B 3.6-17 08/96 Amendment 0 L
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS A.] and A.2 (continued) Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition C provides the appropriate actions. 1 Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note which applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. B.1 With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic valve, a closed manual valve and a blind flange. The I hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2 which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to ensure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affecteo penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. Condition A of this LCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path. (continued)- h AP600 B 3.6-18 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment isolation Yalves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS C.) and C.2 (continued) With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve flow path mun be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration must be isolated. The rHhod of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active ftilure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automat c valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affegle_dJenetr1 flow path. Required Action C.) must be completed iiftliin%ey hour Compietion Time. a. 7 th The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of maintaining containment integrity during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the event that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.l. the affected penetration must be verified t$ be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leck tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for o verifying that each affected penetration-flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths witn oily on6 containment isolation valve and a closed system. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written to specifically address those penetration flow paths in a closed system. Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note which applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas, and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. (continued) h AP600 B 3.6 19 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves i B 3.6.3 i BASES ACTIONS O_1 and 0.2 g ,Jd (continued) l' :he Required Actions and associated C letion Times are no: met, the plant must be brought to OE7wherethe probability and consequences on an ent are minhnizer. To e t._this status, the plant mus be brou 5 o at least g v MODE 3 within)f hours and to MODE # within ours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating expsrience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly man;.er and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the [16 inch) purge vah es are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason, if a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the v31ve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to hive excessive 1e.kage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is not required to be met when the (16 inch) pt,cge valves are open for the reas61s stated. The valves may be opened for pressure control, ALARA or air quality con:iderations for personnel ertry, or for Surveillancos that require the valves to ta open. The [16 inch) purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to bw open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3,J SR 3.6.3.2 This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorpasesoutsideof the containment boundary is within desitn ilmits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
- Rather,
-it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for valves outside (continued) g(_ B 3.6 20 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions. -1 The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet tie !R during the time the valves are open. The Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. SR 3.6.3.3 This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post a accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valves inside containment, the Frequency specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these containment isolation valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low. The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time they are open. This Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. (continued) g(_ B 3.6 21 08/96 Amendment 0
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3,6,3,4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and automatic containe.nt isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABitITY. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period 455 than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. 1',s isolation times are specified in SSAR Section 6.2.3 l4 f. 1) and frequency of this SR is in accordance with the I.iservice Testing Program. SR 3.6,3.5 Automatic containment isolation valves close on isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isciation position on a containment isolation signal. This surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. REFERENCES 1. AP600 SSAR, Section 6.2, " Containment Systems." 2. AP600 SSAR, Chapter 15, ' Accident Analysis." 3. NUREG 1449, " Shutdown and low Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States." A P6 Q,,,,, _ B 3.6 22 08/96 Amendment 0
Ccntainment Pressure B 3.6.4 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 8 3.6.4 Containment Pressure BASES BACKGROUND The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). These limits also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere in the event of transients which result in a negative pressure. Containment pressure,is a process variable that is monitored and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derived from the operating band of conditions used in the containment pressure analyses for the Design Basis Events which result in internal or external pressure loads on the containment vessel. Should operation occur outside these limits, the initial containment pressure would be outside the range used for containment pressure analyses. APPLICABLE tainment internal pressure is an initial condition used SAFETY ANALYSES in DBA analyses to establish the maximum peak contain t internal pressure. The limiting DBAs co # dere' l relative to ntainment pressure, are the LOCA and4LB. (Ref.1). RENAte The initial pressur ondition used in containment W'M analysis was 15.7 psia 1.0psig). maximum containment MMT pressure resulting from wo se DBA, does not exceed the containment design pres r, 45 psig (Ref. 1). / [The containment was alsVdesign for an external pressure-load equivalent to 3.Vp'sig. The iting negative pressure transient is a losp of all AC power s rces coincident with extreme cold we her conditions which c 1 the external surface of-t containment vessel. The in tal pressure condition ed in this analysis was 14.5 psi This resulted in a_mi um pressure inside containment which within the dest capability.) Containment pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC licy{ Statement. L (continued) j{ B 3.6 23 -08/96 Amendment 0 1 m r - y vw v v-w---tew-y y-wW-w y
BASES 3.6.4 - APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES PAGE B 3.6 23 INSERT New Bases 3.6.4 Applicable Safety Analyses section Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the DBA analyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure. The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment pressure, are tha LOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer pressure transients. The worst case SLB generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case LOCA. Thus, the SLB cvent bounds the LOCA event from the containment peak pressure standpnint (Ref.1). The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.7 psia (1.0 psig). This resulted in the maximum peak pressure from a LOCA as indicated in reference 1. The containment analysis (Ref.1) shows that the maximum peak calculated containment pressure, P., results from the limiting SLB. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA does not exceed the containment design pressure,45 psig. The containment was also designed for an external pressure load equivalent to 3.0 psig. The limiting negative pressure transient is a loss of all AC power sources coincident with extreme cold weather conditions which cool the external surface of the containment vessel. The initial pressure condition used in this analysis was -0.2 psig. This resulted in a minimum pressure inside containment, as illustrated in reference 1, which is less than the design load. Other external pressure load events evaluated include: Failed fan cooler control Malfunction of containment purge system Inadvertent Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) drain Inadvertent Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) actuation Inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation Since the containment external pressure design limits can be met by ensuring compliance with the initial pressure condition, NUREG 1431 LCO 3.6.12, Vacuum Relief System is not applicable to the AP600 containment. Containment pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. (29) (78)
Containment Pressure B 3.6.4 BASES (continued) LCO Maintaining containment pressure at less than or equal to the LCO upper pressure limit ensures that, in the event of a DBA, the resultant peak containment accident pressure will remain below the containment design pressure. Maintaining containment pressure at greater than or equal to the LCO lower pressure limit ensures that the containment will not exceed the design negative differential pressure following negative pressure transients. APPLICABillTY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. Since maintaining containment pressure within limits is essential to ensure initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses are maintained, the LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining containment pressure within the limits of the LCO is not required in MODES S or 6. 2 I ACTIONS Ad When containment pressure is not wit in the limits of the LCO, it must be restored within W hrurt The Required Action is necessary to return operat on to within the bounds of the containment analysis. The 2( hour Completion Time is based on the time required to rest' ore the containment to within limits, the conservative assumption of the containment analysis and minor pressure deviations expected during normal operation. B.1 and B.2 gg f6 6 p If containment ressure cannot be restored to within limits within the re' qui d Completion Time, the plant must be brought to MOD where'the probability and consequences on an event'are minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must b4 brought loAt least MODE 3 within B'/ hours and to MODEfrwithinJOiours. The allowed Compfetion Times-are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. (continued) ]{ B 3.6 24 08/96 Amendment 0
.. -.--~-.- Containment Pressure B 3.6.4 BASES (continued) SURVE!LLANCE SR 3.6.4.1 p 1L REQUIREMENTS Verifying that containment pres re s within limits ensuces that unit operation remains wi in he limits assumed in the containment analysis. The hour requency of this SR was developed based on operating xpertence related to trending of both containment pressure variat ions during the applicable MODES. Furthermore,thekf4,hourFrequencyis considered adequate in view of other indications available in the main control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal containment pressure condition. REFERENCES 1. AP600 SSAR, Section 6.2, " Containment Analysis." B 3.6 25 08/96 Amendment 0 -}}