ML20210G149

Rev 2 to 237.1(B), Electrical Protection Design,Thermal Overload Bypass & Indication Problems, Employee Concerns Special Program Rept

ML20210G149
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/02/1987
From:	Jordan C, Parkinson, Violette J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20210F779	List: ML20210F774 ML20210F887 ML20210F946 ML20210F966 ML20210F992 ML20210G050 ML20210G116 ML20210G149 ML20210G210 ML20210G293 ML20210G367 ML20210H094 ML20210H206 ML20210H262 ML20210H369 ML20210H511
References
237.1(B), 237.1(B)-R02, 237.1(B)-R2, NUDOCS 8702110229
Download: ML20210G149 (15)

Text

_

s TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B)

'- SPECIAL PROGRAM i

,- REPORT TYPE: SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMER: 2

(

TITLE: ELECTRICAL PROTECTION DESIGN l

Thermal Overload Bypass and Indication Probless PAGE 10F 14 REASON FOR REVISION:

1. Revised to incorporate Senior Rariew Panel and Technical Assistance Staff comments; to add CATD #237.01-SQN-4; and to conform with the recomumended format for SQN element report.

! 2. Revised to add chronoloy and Section 10, Corrective Action.

PREPARATI(Ni i PREPAntu BY:

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CEG-H: / d -i7 SRP h a kJ & , 1 2 4 7 l 5IGNATURE DATE f SIUNAly / DATE APPROVED BY:

I [ KfA I UATE FUUIAbtR W NULLEAR PUER DATE EU5F FUUUM[W CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

• SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

B702110229 870205 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR

s

., TVA EDFLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B) )

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUPSER: 2 PAGE 2 0F 14

1. CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE (S):

Concern: Issue:

XX-85-122-024, 025, 026 a. Inadequate desigi compliance with W!-85-100-008 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97. (This "Sequoyah - Thermal werload is being interpreted as inadequate bypass and indication problems compliance with Regulatory Guide involving Regulatory 1.106, which deals with thermal Guide 1.97. CI has no further werload bypass for motor operated information. Anonymous concern valves. )

via letter."

2. HAVE ISSUE (S) BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X N0 o Identifled by Black and Veatch (B&V)

Date October 27, 1982 and October 28, 1982 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, B&V Findings No. F-108 (10/27/82)

! and No. F-122 (10/28/82) o Identi fled by TVA Task Force for Review of B&V Findings _

i Date April 20,1983 l Task Force Category 38 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2, Evaluation Sheet Rev. 0 (04/20/83)

{ o Identifled by TVA Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS)

\

Date February 3,1986 - February 7,1986 i

. NSRS Iwesti gation Report No. I-85-129-SQN for Employee j Concern XX-85-122-024 Thermal Overload Bypass and Indication l Problems (dates of iwestigation 02/03/86 throz$i 02/07/86) l

} 3. DOCUIENT NOS. , TAG NOS. , LOCATIONS, OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE I IDENTIFICATIONS STAIED IN ELEIENT: )

i Concerns apply to all safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs).

i i.

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l 1061d (01/22/87)

- TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B)

- - SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 2

{' PAGE 3 0F 14

4. INTERVIEW FILES REVIEED:

Files WI-85-100 and XX-85-122 were reviewed and no additional unreviewed information for Sequoyah was identifled for the concerns addressed in this report.

5. DOCUMENTS REVIEED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:

See Appendix A.

6. lHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMITNENTS, DESIGN REQUIREENTS, OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA 7 See Appendix A.

7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSION 5 RELAltu TO ELtnt.NT:

See Appendix A.

8. EVALUATION PROCESS:

a. Retiewed available transcripts of NRC f rwestigative interviews for additional information on the concerns,

b. Determined applicability to SQN of NRC Regulatory Guides 1.106 and 1.97 for thermal overlot.d bypass and indication.

c. Reviewed the extent of SQN commitment regarding compliance to these guides and the method of compliance.

d. Reviewed existing reports (e. g. , NS'(S Report I-85-129-SQN),

findings, and responses to the findings to assess their adequacy and the extent to which they satisfy the employee concerns.

l i e. Reviewed existing TVA Construction, QA/QC, Ogarations, and Material Control reports for the Employee Cor.cerns Special Program for applicability to the concerns discussed in this

! report.

} 1061d (01/22/87) 1

. _ ~ . _ . _ . _ - . . __ ..

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NIN ER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLMBER: 2 l PAGE 4 0F 14 l

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f. Reviewed other documents (e.g., Tech. Spec. for MOV thermal overload protection, sample schematics for safety related MOVs, and criteria for selecting ard testing thennal overload elements for MOVs) to verify adequacy of complitace to the Regulatory Guides,

g. Assessed overall compliance to the Regulatory Guides and identified findings as applicable.

9. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS:

Chronology:

05/08/74: TVA memo provides Sequoyah with guidelines for selecting and testing of MCC overload elements used in MOV circuits 03/77: NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106 Revision 1 states positions on MOV thermal overload protection 04/20/83: TVA Task Force evaluates Black and Veatch findings on Watts Bar and concludes thtt Sequoyah is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 01/06/84: Sequoyah Technical Instruction, TI-76 R0, outlines post-maintenance testing on valves 03/29/84: Sequoyah Technical Specification amended to require periodic calibration of listed MOV thermal overload i protection devices 12/07/84: Sequoyah Surveillance Instructions, SI-251.1 and 251.2, revised to cover periodic calibration of MOV thermal overload protection devices 12/07/85: Concerns received by TVA 03/07/86: NSRS Report I-85-129-SQN cencludes that Sequoyah conforms with Regulatory Guide 1.106 .

Discussion:

Although Regulatory Guide 1.97 is referenced in the concerns, the applicable reference as interpreted by the evaluator is Regulatory

.. Guide 1.106. Regulatory Guide 1.97 deals with instrumentation to 1061d (01/22/87)

TVA EWLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NINEER: 2 i' PAGE 5 0F 14 assess plant and erwirons conditions during and following an accident, whereas Regulatory Guide 1.106 addresses thermal werload protection for motor operated valves. The thermal werload bypass and indication concerns bring out a plant safety-related issue, i because improper implementation of the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106 requirements could result in an unsafe condition.

l NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106 is primarily directed at ensuring a reliable operation of motor operated valves used in safety systems and in their auxiliary supporting systems. The intent of this

!. guide is to ensure that safety-related MOVs whose motors are equipped with thermal werload protection devices integral with the l

motor starter will perform their safety functions. To achieve

' this, the following two alternate regulatory positions are presented in the guide:

Position 1

"(a) The thermal werload protection dwices should be continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force only when the yalve motors are undergotng periodic or maintenance testing or (b) those thermal e werload protection devices that are normally in

'^ force during plant o

' accident conditions,peration or should be bypassed under

Position 2

"The trip setpoint of the thermal werload protection dwices should be established with all uncertainties resolved in favor of completing the safety related

! action. With respect to those uncertainties, i

consideration should be given to (a) variations in

the ambient temperature at the installed location of l

the werload protection devices and the valve motors, l

(b) inaccuracies in motor heating data and the overload protection dwice trip characteristics and j the matching of these two items, and (c) setpoint l

dri ft. In order to ensure continued functional reliability and the accuracy of the trip point, the I thermal werload protection dwice should le periodically tested."

The current design indicates that the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant adopted Position 2 to satisfy the regulatory requirements. The following information was used to supplement the rwiew of the concerns:

1061d (01/22/87)

, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUpBER: 237.1 (B)  !

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLSEER: 2

( PAGE 6 0F 14

a. TVA Task Force for review of Black and Veatch findings evaluated Watts Bar Nuclear Plant B&Y findings F-108 and F-122 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to detemine whether the design met the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106 and IEEE Standard 279-1971. The Task Force Report (04/23/83; App. A, 5.g) concluded that Position 2 of the regulatory requirement was implemented and, therefore, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was in full compliance with NRC Regulatory

Guide 1.106 and no further action was required. The report

indicated that the 16 to 30 seconds locked rotor current

setting of the overload relays as well as their periodic l

! testing per Technical Specifications fully satisfied the j regulatory position for vital motor operated valves. l

! b. The Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) also conducted an

investigation on this subject (from 02/03/86 through

02/07/86; App. A, 5.h), specifically to detemine the I validity of the employee concern of this regort. The NSRS, for the same considerations described in "a above, concluded

' in its report (I-85-129-SQN) that the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

- confomed to Regulatory Position 2 and, therefore, the i

I concern was not substantiated.

c. A memo, Chandler to Pierce (05/08/74; App. A, 5.1) contains l guidelines for selecting MCC overload elements. This document specifies that the themal overload relys for motor operated valves that are vital for reactor safety must be set l

to trip between 16 and 30 seconds at locked rotor current

~

t with an optimum setting of 20 seconds. The design basis for I the settings is, however, not documented, and it is unclear how this setting satisfies Position 2 of the regulatory requirement (i.e., correlation with stroke times for valves).

d. Amendments to Technical Specifications for Units 1 and 2 i (both dated 03/29/84; App. A, 5.e) stipulate the surveillance requirements for periodically testing (calibrating) the overload protection devices and provide the listing of valves to be tested under this program.

! e. Surveillance Instructions SI-251.1 and SI-251.2 ( App. A, 5.1) ,

! implement the Technical Specification requirements for

[

periodic calibration of the overload protection devices for i the valves listed in the Technical Specifications.

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1061d (01/22/87) l

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NIASER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NimBER: 2 i PAGE 7 0F 14 r

f. Technical Instruction TI-76 ( App. A, 5.k) outlines the post-maintenance testing required on equipment listed in the i instruction. Table 1 lists valves that must be tested per SI-251.1 and SI-251.2. Although the lists in these documents l

should be the same, valves 1-FCV-63-6 and 1-FCV-63-7 are 1

listed in SI-251.1 but not in TI-76.

1

g. Maintenance Instruction MI-10.52 ( App. A, 5.j) contains work instructions for selecting overload heaters. Specifically for MOVs, this document provides instructions for sizing overload heaters to meet SI-251.1 and SI-251.2 requirements.

j

h. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR, Appendix 6.8c ( App. A, 5.b) lists all the valves that are under the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant In-Service Valve Testing Program. A memo, Abercrombie to Seiberling (05/05/86; App. A, 5.p) implies that this list of valves is intended to be equivalent to the list of active

! valves in the Watts Bar FSAR Tables 3.9-17 and 3.9-25 with the exception of valves listed in Attachment 1 to the memo.

The memo states that no requirements exist for SQN to l

maintain a record of active valves, and it also implies that

/' ~ ^ the valves covered in Appendix 6.8c must remain active t

O

following an accident. However, not all the valves in this

appendix are currently listed in the Sequoyah Technical Specifications. Furthermore, no justification is provided in the memo for not including Watts Bar active valves l

0-FCV-67-151,1-FCV-67-147, 2-FCV-67-223, and 1-FCV-67-478 in Appendix 6.8c. (Note that although this memo addressed only

torque switch bypass requirements, it is assumed that Appendix 6.8c is equally applicable to the thermal overload bypass design.)

I None of the documents described in "c" through "h" above were j'

issued or revised as a result of corrective actions occurring subsequent to the concerns. In fact, since the concerns were not substantiated as indicated above, no corrective actions were deemed necessary.

Findings:

! a. No formal records were identified for the Sequoyah Nuclear r Plant documenting licensing commitments for the extent of compliance to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106. It should be

(

j noted, however, that commitment to comply with Regulatory .

I Position 2 is implied in the response to the B8V findings and f

! the NSRS conclusions.

! L 1061d (01/22/87)

I

, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLMBER: 2

'( PAGE 8 0F 14

b. No design basis for compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106 has been established through design criteria or other design basis documents. This results in an unclear definition of the valves that must meet the regulatory position which, in turn, results in inconsistencies among the different lists of valves included in documents "d," "e, "f," and "h" of the discussion.

c. No design basis has been documented which supports the motor operated valve thermal overload settings of 16 to 30 seconds at locked rotor current and demonstrates that they satisfy Position 2 requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106.

Conclusion It is concluded that the concerns as they apply to Sequoyah are valid. Although some documents imply SQN connitment to comply with Regulatory Position 2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, no licensing documents currently reflect this commitment. Furthermore, in view of the unavailability of design bases establishing the methods of

/ compliance with this guide, it is not possible to determine to what

(' extent the existing design satisfies the intent of this guide.

This also leads to inconsistencies among the different valve lists included in site procedures and in the SNP FSAR, Appendix 6.8c.

10. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Four corrective action tracking documents (CATDs) have been prepared as result of the findings described in above section.

These CATDs are numbered as 237.01-SQN-1 through 237.01-SQN-4. In response to the problems described in the CATDs, TVA has developed a corrective action plan (CAP). Revision 0 of the CAP was transmitted to Bechtel by TVA letter TCAB-024 (12/08/86; App. A, 5.r), and Revision 1 of the CAP is documented in TCAB-061 (01/16/87; App. A, 5.v).

i The CAP provides for the following actions to resolve the problems described in the CATDs:

a. The FSAR will be revised to document compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.106. This action is considered an acceptable resolution to the problem (CATD 237.01-SQN-1) that the licensing documents do not reflect the extent of Sequoyah's

compliance to the regulatory guide.

f f 1061d (01/22/87) i

.. 1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NL5WER: 237.1 (B)

• q SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLDSER: '2 l J

(. .

PAGE 9 0F 14

b. A design criteria document will be issued to provide the basis for TVA design. This action is considered an acceptable resolution to the problem (CATD 237.01-SQN-2) that design basis for compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 has not been established through design criteria or other documents.

I c. An active valve list will be prepared with justification for

listing only active valves instead of all safety-related l valves. In addition, the valve listings in the Technical Specification, SI-251.1, SI-251.2, and TI-76 will be reviewed and revised so that the valve lists will agree with each l

other. These actions are considered acceptable to resolve l the inconsistencies among the different valve lists in the l

' site procedures (CATD 237.01-SQN-4).

)

d. Calculation SQN-APS-003, Revision 0 issued in 11/24/86, will )

be reviewed for possible revision. This calculation ( App. A, l

{ 5.s) documents the evaluation _of thermal overload heaters i i used to protect class lE MOV motors. The calculation i

[ identifies the 11/04/86 TVA policy memo PM86-16 (EEB) ,

' M"

( App. A, 5.t) for requirements in overload heater selection.  ;

The evaluation team's review of the two documents raised a l i few questions on the calculation, and these were discussed with TVA which provided clarifying remarks and an appropriate i resolution by committing to review the calculation for i possible revision ( App. A, 7.c, d, and e). The possible

! revision of the calculation will not change the themal

! overload heater selection methodology and results as it is i intended to provide clarification.

Essentially, the existing heaters are evaluated to satisfy

' TVA criteria that the selected heaters will trip for a locked rotor condition between 10 to 15 seconds and will not trip at i motor full load current for at least 200 percent of the valve stroke time. The design basis for the locked rotor time criterion is based on the IEEE Paper No. F79 669-3 (App. A, 5.w) as indicated in the TVA policy memo; the evaluation team finds this acceptable. In addition, the evaluation team finds the methodology for selecting the heaters to be conservative in that the trip times of the heaters are based l

7 on using manufacturer's data for maximum trip time 1 characteristic of the heaters. This is viewed as ,

I establishing the trip set point of the thermal overload  !

j. protection device in favor of completing the MOV i safety-related function, thus satisfying Position 2 of 1061d (01/22/87) i _ . _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLMBER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLM ER: 2 PAGE 10 0F 14

(

Regulatory Guide 1.106. The evaluation team considers the corrective action acceptable to resolve the problem that no design basis was identified to support the thermal overload device setting of 16 to 30 seconds at locked rotor current (CATD 237.01-SQN-3).

TVA has estimated the completion date of the correction actions as l

i February 16, 1987.

In summary, the evaluation team believes that the completion of the TVA CAP will provide adequate design basis and documentation for

compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106.

l t

I e

1061d (01/22/87) l

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT N EER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NWWER: 2 PAGE 11 0F 14 APPENDIX A 1

5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:

a. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR, Chapters 7 and 8 l b. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR, Appendix 6.8c revised by Amendment 3, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Valve Program" l

! c. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.47 (05/73), " Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems;"

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, R3 (05/83), " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident;" and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, R1 (03/77), " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves"

d. IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

[ e. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications for Units 1 and 2, Sections 3.8.3.2 and 4.8.3.2, and Table 3.8-2

(* (Amendment No. 33, 03/29/84 for Unit 1 and Amendment No. 25, 03/29/84 for Unit 2)

f. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Black and Yeatch Findings F-108 (10/27/82) and F-122 (10/28/82)

g. TVA memo from Chandler to Jones, (EEB 840110 906), "Sequoyah

' Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Black and Veatch Findings -

Task Force Category 38," (01/11/84) and attached " Evaluation Sheet Rev. 0 (04/23/83) of the TVA Task Force for Review of

Black and Veatch Findings - Task Force Category 38 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2"

h. TVA memo from Whitt to Abercrombie, (no RIMS f), " Nuclear

' Safe 1;y Review Staff Investigation Report Transmittal,"

(03/07/86) and attached 'iSRS Investigation Report No.

I-85-129-SQN " Thermal Overload Bypass and Indication Problems," dates of investigation 02/03/86 through 02/07/86

i. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instructions SI-251.1, R3 (05/31/85) for Unit 1 and SI-251.2, R3 (10/09/85) for Unit 2,

" Channel Calibration of Class lE Motor Operated Valve Overload Relay Heaters" I

1061d (01/22/87)

' '~, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLMBER: 2

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(g PAGE 12 0F 14

[

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

j. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Maintenance Instruction MI-10.52, R0,

" Control of Overload Heaters in Appendix R Circuits,"

(07/30/86)

k. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Instruction TI-76, R4,

" Electrical Maintenance Post-Maintenance Testing," (11/01/85) l 1. TVA memo from Chandler to Pierce, (no RIMS #), "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Selecting and Testing of MCC Overload Elements," (05/08/74)

m. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Schematics E-45N779-31, R18 and E-45N779-15, R21

n. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR Tables 3.9-17 and 3.9-25 i

o. Letter from Shell, TVA, to Grace, NRC, " Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 85 Motor Operated Valve Common 7

Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch (fyf^ - Settings - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant," (05/12/86),

(L44 860512 803), and attached enclosure 1, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON), Response to IE Bulletin 85-03

p. TVA memo from Abercrombie to Seiberling, (no RIMS f),

" Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report No. I-85-612-SQN, RCS Pressurizer Relief Flow Control Valves - Failure to Make i

Torque Switch Bypass Modifications," (05/05/86) and attached response to this report

q. Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, (B46 860714 832), (6/23/86), with the attached transcript of the investigat ye interview conducted by the NRC on 02/21/86

! at the First Tennessee Bank Building in Knoxville, TN l

r. Letter .from G. P. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, TCAB-024 " Corrective Action Plan," (12/08/86)

s. DNE Calculation SQN-APS-003, "480V Ac APS Class 1E Load j Coordination , Study," R0, (B43 861124 906), (11/24/86) i t. TVA memo from Raughley to Those Listed, (B43 861107 908),

! " Policy Memorandum PM86-18 (EEB) - MCC Motor Starter Overload

Heater Selection," (11/04/86) t 1061d (01/22/87)

e v

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLDEER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 2

( PAGE 13 0F 14 APPENDIX A (cont'd)

u. TVA memo from Wilson to Denney, (B25 870102 019), " Report 237.1 - Corrective Action Plan Revision," (01/02/87)

v. Letter f rom G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, TCAB-061, "Corrcctive Action Plan," (01/15/87)

w. .

IEEE Transactions Paper No. F79 669-3, Vol . PAS-100, No.1, 01/81, Page 43, " Motor Overload Protection for Motor Actuated Valves"

6. WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMI1MENTS, DESIGN REQUIRDENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?

a. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves"

7. LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT:

a. Meeting between Nesbitt, Purcell, and Rosine, TVA, and Don-Doncow and Hegyi, Bechtel, at Sequoyah jobsite, IOM 530, (08/20/86)

b. Meeting between Nesbitt and Brush, TVA, and Don-Doncow, Bechtel, in Knoxville, IOM 530, (08/21/86)

c. Telecon between Fontenot and Pannel, TVA, and Lew, Bechtel, IOM 473, (12/23/86)

d. Telecon between Pannel, TVA, and Lew and Sarver, Bechtel, IOM 551, (01/09/87)

e. Telecon between Nicely and Nesbitt, TVA, and Don-Doncow, Lew, and Sarver, Bechtel, IOM 554, (01/20/87) 1061d (01/22/87)

- TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NLMBER: 237.1 (B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLDEER: 2 PAGE 14 0F 14 CATD LIST The following CATDs identify and provide corrective actions for the findings included in this report:

237.01-SQN-1 (12/05/86; CAP revised 01/13/87) 237.01-SON-2 (12/05/86; CAP revised 01 /1 3/87) 237.01-SQN-3 (12/05/86; CAP revised 01/13/87) 237.01-SQN-4 (12/05/86; CAP revised 01 /1 3/87) t

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l 1061d (01/2r/87) i

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REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE -

137 FREQUENCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR P0HER RUN TIME - 12:57:19 7-ONP - ISSS - RHM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - 12/02/86 LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: EN DES PROCESS & OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 23701 PROBLEMS HITH THERMAL DVERLOAD BYPASS & INDICATION

) S GENERIC KEYHORD A H APPL QTC/NSRS P KEYNORD B CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S CONCERN KEYNORD C

) NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R DESCRIPTION KEYHORD D HI 100-008 EN 23701 N HBN YYYY SR THERMAL OVERLOAD BYPASS AND INDICATI STANDARDS T50211 REPORT ON PROBLEMS INVOLVING REG. GUIDE 1.9 NONCONFORMANCE

7. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ELECTRICAL 3 ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETTER. GENERAL XX 122-024 EN 23701 N SQN YYYY I-85-D*E-SQN SS SEQUOYAH THERMAL OVERLOAD BYPASS AN STANDARDS T50214 REPORT D INDICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING REG. NDHCONFORMANCE

-) hwr fLf, GUIDE 1.97. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFO ELECTRICAL RMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LETT GENERAL ER.

) XX 122-025 EN 23701 N BLN YYYY SR BELLEFONTE: THERMAL OVERLOAD BYPASS STANDARDS T50214 REPORT AND INDICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING RE NONCONFORMANCE G. GUIDE 1.97. CI HAS NO FURTHER IN ELECTRICAL FORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA LE GENERAL j

) TTER.

l XX 122-026 EN 23701 N BFN YYYY I-85-773-BFN SS BROHN'S FERRY: THERMAL OVERLOAD BYPA STANDARDS T50215 REPORT SS AND INDICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING NONCONFORMANCE

) REG. GUIDE 1.97. CI HAS NO FURTHER ELECTRICAL INFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA GENERAL LETTER.

) 4 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUBCATEGORY 23701

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