ML20210A915

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G.

Security and Safeguards

1

H.

Outages

2

N/A***

I.

Assurance of Quality

2

Improving

J.

Licensing Activities

2

Improving

K.

Training and Qualification

1

Effectiveness

L.

Engineering Support

Assurance of Quality, Training and Qualification Effectiveness, and Engineering

Support are three areas which were not formerly assessed, but are now treated

as separate functional areas.

- This area was not evaluated as a separate functional area during this assess-

ment period.

Pertinent observations are covered in other appropriate functional

areas.

- - There were no major planned outages during this assessment period; observations

regarding unscheduled outages are contained in the Maintenance functional area.

- - - Engineering Support is now considered as a separate functional area.

Due to

limited staff observations in this area, pertinent comments are included in

each of the functional areas.

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D.

Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips and Forced Outages

Power

Root

Functional

Date

Level

Description

Cause

Area

11/06/85

81%

Loss of the steam driven

Aging

Maintenance

feedwater pump following

failure of the recirculation

valve controller led to a

reactor trip on loss of load.

11/22/85

69%

Failure of the main generator Unknown

turbine control system caus-

ing reactor trip because of

turbine trip (loss of load).

01/04/86

75%

Shutdown to prevent equipment Personnel

Operations

damage when an administrative Error

limit on condenser differen- (inattention

pressure was reached.

to detail)

02/21/86

84%

Plant shutdown to repair

Inadequate

Maintenance

hydrogen leakage from main

Corrective

generator.

Maintenance

04/16/86

99%

One day shutdown for balanc-

Inadequate

Maintenance

ing of the main generator.

Corrective

Maintenance

04/17/86

55%

The speed controller for the Aging

Meentenance

steam driven feedwater pump

failed causing reactor trip

on high level in #3 steam

generator.

06/12/86

99%

Rupture disk failure on the

Component

Maintenance

excess steam flow check valve Failure Due

caused a reactor trip on low To Inadequate

SG level.

Preventive

Maintenance

06/30/86

85%

Plant shutdown to upgrade

Inadequate

Maintenance

excess flow check valve rup- Corrective

ture disks and Eddy Current

Maintenance

testing of the main condenser.

Outage was extended when seal

problems in the low pressure

turbine were detected.

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Power

Root

Functional

Date

Level

Description

Cause

Area

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08/10/86

99%

Failure of #1 inverter led

Aging

Maintenance

to a reactor trip on low SG

level,

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10/19/86

100%

Shutdown to prevent equipment Personnel

Maintenance

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damage when isophase support Installation

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structure was discovered

Error

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glowing red.

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11/15/86

100%

Loss of lube oil pressure at Inadequate

Maintenance

1

the steam driven feedwater

Preventive

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pump caused a trip of the

Maintenance

feedwater pump resulting in

f

a. reactor trip on loss of

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load.

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Note:

The root causes in this Table reflect the opinion of the SALP board based

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on the inspector (s) description of the event and may, in certain instances, differ

from the LER.

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IV.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A.

Plant Operations (1655 hours0.0192 days 0.46 hours 0.00274 weeks 6.297275e-4 months , 47%)

1.

Analysis

The last SALP report rated performance in the Operations area as

Category 2 with an improving trend primarily as the result of strong

management overview of daily plant activities.

During this assess-

ment period, two resident inspectors were assigned to the site and

were responsible for the majority of inspection effort in the

Operations area.

The licensee continues to exhibit strong performance in the Opera-

tions Area which reflects aggressive management overview of a well

trained highly qualified staff.

The fundamental corporate goal is

safe operations and successive layers of management are accountable

for achieving that goal.

Morning Managers meetings are the primary

mechanism used to focus and direct the staff.

The Plant Shift

Supervisor attends these meetings to provide input about any opera-

tional concerns and coordinate scheduling of daily activities.

All

aspects of plant operations are discussed in an open atmosphere.

A number of systems such as Morning Meeting minutes, Plant Informa-

tion Reports, and Unusual Occurrence Reports are utilized to keep

personnel aware of plant conditions and operational occurrences.

These systems are reviewed weekly at the Morning Managers meeting

for completeness and resolution of issues. When situations arise

that are not well understood, individual assignments are made for

collecting and documenting all related information in an attempt

to understand and resolve the problem.

That information/ resolution

is then reviewed either at a Morning Meeting or during a Plant

Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting.

Information concerning

problem tracking and resolution is widely distributed through the

use of Morning Meeting Minutes or Plant Information Reports.

This

results in a well informed, coordinated plant staff focused on safe

plant operations and problem resolution.

The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) provides an effective

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review function.

The licensee's initiative to use a Procedure Sub-

committee has resulted in a timely, thorough review of procedure

changes and allowed PORC to concentrate on additional issues.

PORC

routinely uses Special Meetings to review Operational events and

the results of special reviews of unique or unusually challenging

problems.

PORC reviews are thorough, detailed and timely; there

is good participation and strong leadership.

Senior Corporate Management is frequently involved in plant opera-

tions through routine plant visits and attendance at selected Morn-

ing managers meetings.

Additionally, management development and

planning sessions are periodically held throughout the year to

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12

measure plant performance in achieving the goals and objectives.

Particular attention has been given in these meetings to the number

of trips, shutdowns, and power reductions / limitations due to equip-

ment failure.

Plant operators are quick to recognize adverse trends and take ac-

tion to resolve them.

Alert and timely response by plant operators

has prevented instrument / equipment failures such as feedwater con-

trol system failures from affecting plant status.

The plant opera-

tors are professional in appearance and maintain an inquisitive

attitude.

Operators routinely coordinate plant evolutions with

other departments such as Engineering and Maintenance.

The plant

demonstrated their conservative approach to resolving technical

issues when they delayed a plant startup pending repairs to an in-

verter in April, 1986.

Control room noise and distractions have been reduced through the

use of a work processing area near the control room entrance.

The

effect of this area has been better control over access to the con-

trol room.

Maine Yankee utilizes a six crew rotation.

Plant Shift Supervisors

are rotated into the Operations Staff for six month assignments in

order to coordinate procedure reviews and special projects.

An

additional position in support of operations on the plant staff has

been authorized and filled.

Plant corrective actions and followup for operational events are

thorough.

When situations arise that are not well understood, the

plant utilizes a variety of methods to identify and correct those

problems including matrix tracking of symptoms and their closeout,

dedicated technicians for troubleshooting and the use of system log

books to track observed causes and effects.

Corrective actions are

also persistent.

When the cause of the excess flow check valve

rupture disk failures was thought to be corrected by controlled

cleanliness and torquing, the plant continued to investigate other

options.

As a result, contact sticking of the associated air com-

pressors along with an out of tolerance relief valve were ultimately

determined to be the root cause of the rupture disk failure.

Plant housekeeping has improved. The plant has released approximately

30 percent of formerly radiological controlled areas for unrestricted

access. Considerable effort was expended to plan for the storage

of refueling tools.

Storage of equipment throughout the plant has

improved during this assessment period through the use of dedicated

storage areas and individual cleaning area assignments.

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One minor violation involving operation of an instrument valve by

an unauthorized licensee engineer was observed.

This evolution

should have been controlled by Operations and is considered an

isolated incident.

The plant scram rate was 0.9 scrams per 1000 critical hours.

One

of the scrams was caused by operator error when the wrong circulat-

ing water pump discharge valve was closed following maintenance.

The operator was quick to recognize his mistake and inserted a

manual scram when condenser differential pressure reached an ad-

ministrative limit. One other partial activation of the engineered

safety features system was attributed to operator error when the

wrong switch was manipulated during a post scram recovery.

Although

these two instances were the result of operator error, the root

cause can be attributed to Human Factor Engineering (similar

switches performing similar functions in close proximity).

The plant has instituted a Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES)

for the review of events and identified deficiencies. The goal of

this system is to identify and correct potential problems through

the review of deficiencies prior to those problems contributing to

operational events.

This program has received management support

based upon the extent of the training conducted and the low thres-

hold of deficiencies reviewed under this system.

Generally the quality of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) continues

to improve.

Maine Yankee's discussion concerning failure mode and

manufacturer information in LERs is good.

Areas for LER improvement

include assessment of safety consequences and corrective actions.

In general, Maine Yankee LERs are judged to be average when compared

to other licensees.

In summary, safe operations continued to receive effective manage-

ment and staff attention.

The overall performance level by the

operations staff was high.

2.

Conclusion

Category 1.

3.

Board Recommendation

None.

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B.

Radiological Controls (382 hours0.00442 days 0.106 hours 6.316138e-4 weeks 1.45351e-4 months , 11%)

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)

1.

Analysis

In the previous assessment period the licensee was rated Category 2 with

weaknesses noted in the airborne sampling program, personnel contamina-

tion control, sorting of low level waste, and compliance with Radiation

Work Permit (RWP) requirements.

During this assessment period, there

were six inspections by Region I Specialists in the following areas:

three radiation protection inspections, one post accident sampling system

inspection, one non-radiological chemistry inspection and one transporta-

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tion inspection.

The resident inspectors also reviewed selected program

areas.

The licensee has initiated a number of program, policy and procedure up-

grades during this assessment period to improve the Radiological Controls

Program.

Upgrades included the redesign of the radiological controls

check point, development of the Radiological Controls Improvement Program

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and rewrite and reissuance of the Radiation Protection Manual.

The Radiological Controls Improvement Program has been introduced to

identify, track, analyze and resolve radiological incidents. Monthly

reports are issued to management to track progress.

Management support

of this program has been firm and severe disciplinary action has been

taken in a few instances for violations of plant procedures.

The result

has been better adherence to radiological control requirements as evi-

denced by fewer violations and internally identified deviations.

There

is evidence of corporate and site management involvement including fre-

quent meetings, use of feedback and tracking mechanisms, assessment of

activities, etc. with very tight control at all levels.

Decision making

authority regarding radiological controls programs occurs at the depart-

ment manager level or higher reflecting the high level of management

attention to this area.

The licensee has been conducting an effective program for liquid and

gaseous effluent control.

Releases were made in accordance with proce-

dures and Technical Specifications requirements.

Semiannual Radioactive

Effluent Release Reports were comprehensive, accurate and indicate that

releases are well below all regulatory limits.

Effluent control instru-

ments were maintained and calibrated in accordance with regulatory re-

quirements, and ventilation systems were maintained and tested as re-

quired.

Procedures related to the above areas were found to be adequate.

There was an unplanned release of noble gas to the atmosphere as the

result of a leaking flange.

Although this release was a small fraction

of regulatory limits, it was preventable.

The licensee should conduct

a review of plant systems and identify other potential release paths and

take action to prevent such unplanned releases.

There was significant progress in radwaste volume reduction activities

in 1986 including a 47% volume decrease, construction and use of new

waste facilities, and the development of a plan to dispose of the rad-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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waste backlog.

The licensee's program for transportation of solid radio-

active waste was adequate with regard to the selection of packaging,

training of personnel, low level waste storage, and use of and adherence

to procedures.

The licensee's ALARA program is well documented and effective at all

levels of the organization.

The ALARA program is controlled and directed

by the ALARA Committee.

This committee includes many of the PORC members

as well as members of the Radiation Protection staff and provides input

to the Plant Manager.

The licensee's exposure goal for 1986, a non-outage

year, was 200 man-rem.

Actual exposure of 92 man-rem reflects good con-

trols in this area.

The ALARA program will be reviewed during the up-

coming refueling outage.

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Although there were no major weaknesses or programmatic violations iden-

tified, several areas need additional licensee attention.

Long term

records such as dosimetry, training, and physicals are generally complete;

however, short term records such as radiological surveys and air samples

to support RWPs were, at times, incomplete or not retrievable.

Training

for self-monitoring by personnel was inadequate in that it did not pro-

vide adequate instructions for some survey equipment.

Previous techni-

cian experience credit may not be in conformance with industry standards

in some cases.

The comparatively small size of the licensee's staff

appears to limit the ability to react to changes.

There were some weaknesses noted in the chemistry program including a

lack of a measurement quality control program, inadequate equipment to

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support sulfate analysis, and failure to retrain chemistry technicians.

Little progress has been made in resolving three of nine open issues in

the chemistry area for the post accident sampling system.

The licensee

has taken major steps to resolve these chemistry issues including staff-

ing improvements and hardware changes.

The licensee's reaction to non-routine radiological situations varies

in effectiveness.

Most notable was the sand removed during repairs to

underground piping within the radiologically controlled area.

A portion

of the sand was released into the owner controlled area and was subse-

quently returned to the radiologically controlled area when it was found

partially contaminated.

Better surveys of the sand could have prevented

its initial release.

More aggressive followup of earlier indications

of the contamination problem (some sand material in the pile above back-

ground and employee identification of a potential problem) could have

achieved more timely problem resolution. In contrast, the licensee used

a technically sound and conservative approach in handling and removing

potentially contaminated ceiling tiles from the controlled area.

In summary, although there were many areas of strength and no major pro-

grammatic deficiencies observed in this functional area, there were

several areas where improvements could be realized.

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2.

Conclusion

Category 2.

3.

Board Recommendation

Licensee

Review staff to determine if its size contributes to deficiencies noted

in this area.

NRC

Evaluate chemistry program changes.

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C.

Maintenance (447 hours0.00517 days 0.124 hours 7.390873e-4 weeks 1.700835e-4 months , 13%)

1.

Analysis

The previous SALP rated this area category 2 as a result of good

overall management control.

The resident inspectors provided

coverage of this area during routine inspections. Regional inspec-

tors provided input for areas they observed during specialist in-

spections.

The Maintenance Department is_ composed of an experienced, well

qualified staff. Management is actively involved in the prioritiza-

tion of maintenance activities through the morning managers meeting.

During these meetings, input from the Operations Department is re-

ceived and Plant Engineering Department assistance is requested as

necessary. Weekly planning sessions provide for advanced coordina-

tion of surveillances and preventive maintenance.

During this as-

sessment period there were no significant violations identified.

The Deficiency Report / Repair Order (DR/R0) system utilized by the

licensee is an effective and comprehensive system for identifying,

reviewing and correcting off normal conditions. All design changes

and most preventive maintenance items are implemented through the

DR/R0 system. All DR/R0s get Engineering and Quality Assurance

Department reviews.

The Maintenance Department supplies Outage Coordinators to oversee

the repair efforts during outages.

This is a good practice in that

it releases the Plant Shift Supervisor to concentrate on plant

evolutions and status.

The plant maintains a prioritized work list

including items scheduled for unplanned outages which is aggres-

sively pursued.

Coordination and scheduling of additional outage

time was thoroughly planned and reviewed by the licensee.

This has

resulted in effective utilization of outage time.

The Maintenance Department has taken advantage of redundant plant

design features including installed spare components to conduct on-

line preventive maintenance on major equipment, such as, .ipray pump

motors, low pressure safety injection pump motors, condensate pumps

and high pressure drain pumps.

The overall effect is better utili-

zation of planned outage time.

The licensee has embarked on several long term programs to increase

the reliability and safety of the plant.

One particularly effective

program for the reduction of chloride intrusion problems associated

with the Main Condenser was the replacement of the waterboxes with

titanium waterboxes. Although at least 3 power reductions were

necessary in January and June 1986, due to chlorides, the problem

was eventually identified and corrected.

Recent operational data

indicate no chloride intrusion from the main condenser.

In addition,

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18

the licensee continues its program for elimination of copper com-

ponents in the feedwater system.

Upcoming replacement of two sets

of feedwater heaters will result in the elimination of 80 percent

of copper components from the feedwater system.

A spare reactor

coolant pump motor is already in use as a replacement allowing for

routine preventive maintenance on the out of service motor.

Staffing level and training appear to be adequate in the maintenance

area.

During heavy work load periods additional resources are con-

tracted.

Backlogs of outstanding work orders are trended and action

taken to resolve problem areas. Some mechanical maintenance proce-

dures rely primarily on the technicians experience; however, no

deficiencies have been identified as a result of these generic pro-

cedures. In fact, maintenance technicians are knowledgeable in their

field. The licensee has begun a program of converting technicians

experience into plant procedures.

Of the eight reactor trips and three unplanned shutdowns this period,

all but two were attributable to component failures or unscheduled

maintenance.

Two trips involved electronic controllers for the

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feedwater system.

The licensee has a Comprehensive Reliability

Study underway which addresses the replacement of these controllers

for which repair parts no longer exist.

Some controllers have al-

ready been replaced.

Additional recommendations for upgrades of

other feedwater equipment are scheduled for the upcoming outage.

One trip was attributed to a failure of an inverter.

Age of the

inverter was a contributor to its failure.

One trip appears to be

random failure of the turbine control circuit.

One manual trip

occurred due to faulty installation of the grounding device on the

isophase buswork.

One trip was due to the loss of the operating

steam driven feedwater pump.

A combination of lube oil system leaks

and a loose electrical contact were the cause of the trip.

One trip

attributed to the Excess Flow Check Valve (EFCV) had a number of

root causes including a corroded / sticking relay in an associated

air compressor controller and an out of tolerance relief valve for

the air compressor.

Aggressive followup and root cause determina-

tion resulted in the identification of several of these problems.

In addition to the above, there were numerous (approximately eigh-

teen) power reductions and limitations for a variety of maintenance

related tasks and equipment difficulties as summarized in Section

III.B.

Most of the unplanned trips, shutdowns, and power reductions /limita-

tions were either the direct result of component failure, due to

equipment performance difficulties or for the performance of main-

tenance related activities.

This high incidence of such occurrences

indicates that equipment (primarily balance of plant) performance

at Maine Yankee requires further attention to trend performance

in order to establish root causes to deal with problems in a

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proactive way.

This high number of trips / shutdowns / power

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reductions resulted in other undesirable but related consequen-

ces such as added challenges to safety systems and increased

stress for the operating staff due to the needs for added power

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maneuvering and plant monitoring.

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In summary, no programmatic problems were observed during the per-

formance of maintenance activities.

Improvements in the material

condition of the plant are needed through measures such as more

aggressive preventive maintenance, reviews of the effects of aging

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on plant components, component replacement, or system redesign.

2.

Conclusion

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Category 2.

3.

Recommendation

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Licensee:

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Conduct a review of trends of balance of plant equipment performance.

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NRC:

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Schedule a special inspection of the balance of plant equipment

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performance per Temporary Instruction 2515/83.

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D.

Surveillance (337 hours0.0039 days 0.0936 hours 5.57209e-4 weeks 1.282285e-4 months , 10%)

1.

Analysis

l

The last SALP appraisal rated this area a Category 1 based upon a

well implemented program.

The Resident Inspectors reviewed this

area during routine inspections and Regional Inspectors reviewed

sur/eillances in their respective areas as a part of specialist

inspections.

The licensee's surveillance program is detailed under the Compre-

hensive Equipment Performance (CEP) program.

Under this program

the Technical Specification (T.S.) required surveillances are in-

cluded under the License Enforced Surveillances (LES).

This area

encompasses T.S., Inservice Testing, Inservice Inspection and Code

required surveillances.

Each department maintains their surveil-

lance schedules with coordination of multiple surveillances for the

same equipment provided during the Horning Managers Meeting and

Weekly Planning Meetings.

The CEP also contains the Preventive

Maintenance (PM) program, Production Optimization Program (POP) and

the Operations Routine Instrumentation Surveillance Program (0RIS).

In addition to these, the Supplemental Equipment Reliability Program

(SERP) trends equipment performance and provides monthly reports

for management review.

The combination of these programs in the

CEP provides not only a system which verifies and assures equipment

operability but also trends and reviews equipment performance to

detect potential problems.

The overall affect is a well run program

which provides timely information on plant equipment.

One Technical

Specification required surveillance was late this period but this

is considered an isolated instance.

The licensee's review detected

and corrected the cencition.

The licensee's reaction to failed surveillances is conservative.

As an example, the licensee developed a set of acceptance criteria

for the containment personnel access hatch. When the access hatch

failed the pressurization test, the licensee tagged the hatch to

restrict use.

A special PORC meeting was called to discuss the

surveillance results, operability of the batch and required correc-

tive action.

The resultant corrective mai m eaance and retest in

accordance with PORC direction was timely.

Surveillances are conducted by various licensee departments includ-

ing Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Technical Support.

Personnel in all departments are knowledgeable of surveillance re-

quirements and the plant equipment involved.

A review of surveil-

lance activities during Generic Letter 83-28 Followup Inspection

(86-07) identified well written, comprehensive procedures and a well

informed Quality Control oversight function.

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One LER was issued as a result of an inquiry into a surveillance

testing procedure.

During a routine review of the Control Room

Breathing Air Surveillance procedure, which only checked equipment

operability, an observant operator recommended monitoring the re-

quired air flow.

When test results revealed a discrepancy between

this air flow and refueling interval data, the licensee declared

the system inoperable ar.d began a plant shutdown.

An Engineering

review identified the installed check valves as the source of an

excessive pressure drop.

Repiscement of the check valves terminated

the plant shutdown.

This timely effective resolution of a self-

identified problem is indicative of the licensee's conservative

approach to problem resolution.

One minor violation identified during this assessment period was

that some surveillance readings were marginally outside of the ac-

ceptance criteria and some completion dates for portions of sur-

veillances were not recorded.

Although the cause of the out of

tolerance readings was the result of an indication problem with the

instrument, more attention to detail in the review of completed

surveillances would have found the problem.

In summary, with the exception of the relatively minor problems

discussed above, the surveillance program was particularly well run.

Surveillances were generally accomplished with no adverse impact

on the plant such as trips, inadvertent ESF actuations, or equipment

rendered inoperable.

Personnel involved in surveillances exhibited

good coordination with operations and knowledge of equipment /proce-

dures.

The surveillance program was effective in demonstrating

equipment operability.

2.

Conclusion

Category 1.

3.

Recommendations

None.

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E.

Emergency Preparedness (100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months , 3%)

1.

Analysis

1

During the previous assessment period the licensee was rated Cate-

gory 1.

During this assessment period, one routine announced in-

spection was conducted during the licensee's partial scale emergency

exercise on September 23, 1986.

Prior to the exercise, discussions with the Emergency Preparedness

Coordinator, Corporate management representation, and Exercise Con-

{

trollers indicated a high level of upper level management involve-

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ment in controlling and assuring quality in emergency preparedness.

Two areas requiring licensee attention were identified by the NRC

during the Emergency Exercise.

The first, which was identified

by the licensee, was the coordination and flow of information be-

tween the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency

Operating Facility.

The second was the implementation of an iodine

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source term prediction capability, a previously identified defi-

ciency.

The licensee has addressed each of these areas but they

have not been evaluated by the NRC during an exercise.

These prob-

lems do not impact on the licensee's ability to protect the health

and safety of the public.

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Emergency positions are identified, and authorities and responsi-

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bilities are well defined.

Vacant key positions in the emergency

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organization are filled on a priority bases.

The training and

qualification program makes a positive contribution, commensurate

with procedures and staffing to understanding of work and adherence

to procedures with few personnel errors.

The licensee's audits of the emergency preparedness program were

found to be complete, timely, and thorough.

The licensee's Emer-

gency Plan (EP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)

are well stated, controlled, and explicit.

Changes to the EP and

EPIPs receive timely, thorough, and technically sound reviews.

The

Plant Operations Review Committee also maintains direct involvement

in program changes and approves revisions to the EP and EPIPs.

Procedures and policies are closely followed.

Corrective action

is generally effective.

The licensee's responses to previously identified items demonstrates

a clear understanding of issues raised.

The resolution of issues

routinely exhibit a conservative approach when a potential for

safety significance exists.

Responses from the licensee concerning

resolution of open items and NRC issues are technically sound,

thorough, and timely in almost all cases.

In summary, the licensee has implemented a strong, effective emer-

gency response program.

The two deficiencies noted last year will

be reviewed during the upcoming exercise.

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23

2.

Conclusion

Category 1.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

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24

F.

Security and Safeguards (149 hours0.00172 days 0.0414 hours 2.463624e-4 weeks 5.66945e-5 months , 4%)

1.

Analysis

During the last assessment period, this area was rated a Category

1 based on a quality program and prompt, thorough corrective actions.

During this assessment period, there was one specialist inspection

of this area in addition to routine resident inspector coverage.

During this assessment period, the licensee's overall performance

in the area of security remained essentially consistent with the

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previous assessment period.

Corporate management involvement in

the program remained evident by the on-site presence of the Director

of Security.

The incumbent is responsible for licensee oversight

of program implementation, program implementing procedures, security

force training and, through a proprietary site supervisor and a

contractor supervisor, for the contract security force performance

and routine, day-to-day operations.

This oversight provides the

licensee with necessary and current knowledge regarding overall

program performance and demonstrates the licensee's intention to

maintain cognizance of program implementation.

Program implementing procedures and instructions are updated, when

required, to provide the security force with current, clear and

concise directions.

Primary procedures and instructions are re-

viewed and approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee in an

effort to preclude any adverse impacts on plant safety.

Feedback

from routine program implementation is promptly integrated into

procedures, instructions and the training program.

This is indi-

cative of the licensee's desire to implement an effective security

program without compromising safe plant operations.

The training program is administered by two, full-time, experienced

instructors.

Lessons plans have been developed, are current, and

reflect the commitments in the NRC-approved program plans.

Training

facilities are adequate and instructional aids are utilized.

All

security related facilities, e.g., guard house, alarm stations, and

office areas, are well maintained, orderly and clean.

Members of

the security force were found to be generally knowledgeable of their

duties and responsibilities when interviewed by NRC personnel.

The security program is well supported by other plant functional

groups and personnel, and frequent and effective communications

among security and the other plant groups are evident by the lack

of interface problems during this assessment period.

This program

support is also reflected by the high mcrale of the security force

and the dedicated and professional attitude they exhibit in carrying

out their duties.

. . _

_

.

25

The turnover rate in the security force remains low and staffing

appears to be adequate, as indicated by the limited use of overtime.

All aspects of the program are maintained reasonably current.

Authority and responsibilities for all members of the security group

are clearly defined and well disseminated.

The licensee submitted two security event reports pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(c) during the assessment period.

Each report identified

security computer malfunctions.

The licensee took appropriate com-

pensatory action for each event and in each case, the security re-

ports were clear, concise and adequate for NRC analysis.

Because

of the age of the security computer and related equipment, the lic-

ensee is experiencing more frequent malfunctions that have neces-

sitated increased maintenance.

While reither the maintenance nor

the compensatory measures appear to have become burdensome, the

licensee should closely monitor the situation to avoid program de-

gradation in the future.

One concern about meeting NRC requirements occurred during the as-

sessment period from three separate incidents in which security

force members failed to identify encroachment into a plant isolation

zone.

While individually these incidents were not significant,

collectively, they may be indicative of inattention to detail on

the part of security and plant personnel about maintaining clear

isolation zones.

This required management attention.

The licensee

initiated prompt and effective corrective action.

No revisions to the licensee's security program plans were submitted

to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.54(p) or 10 CFR 50.90 during this assess-

ment period.

However, the licensee failed to respond to the Mis-

cellaneous Amendments to 10 CFR 73.55, codified by NRC on August

4, 1986, and requiring that by December 2, 1986, licensees transmit

to the NRC changes to safeguards plans describing how the miscel-

laneous amendments would be met.

The licensee stated that this was

an oversight and that the required response would be submitted as

soon as possible. While this is considered to be an isolated case,

it may indicate that the licensing group does not maintain full

awareness of Safeguards licensing issues and, therefore, management

attention is warranted.

In summary, the licensee has sustained its previous performance

level in the area of security during this assessment period.

Two

minor issues (isolation zone and miscellaneous amendments) were

identified that should receive further management attention.

There

is evidence that the licensee's efforts to maintain a high quality

security program are continuing.

I

.

26

2.

Conclusion

Category 1.

3.

Board Recommendation

None.

.__ . . _ _ . , .-

_ _ . _ _ _

. _ _ _ _

_ - . _ . - _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ .

__ _ _ _ _ _

-__

.

27

G.

Assurance of Quality (407 hours0.00471 days 0.113 hours 6.729497e-4 weeks 1.548635e-4 months , 12%)

1.

Analysis

Management involvement and control in assuring quality is being

considered as a separate functional area in addition to being one

of the evaluation criteria in the other functional areas.

The

various aspects of quality assurance (QA) program requirements have

been discussed as an integral part of each functional area and the

respective inspection hours for quality assurance activities are

included in each one. The hours listed above reflect specific in-

spections of the QA program.

Thfs discussion is a synopsis of the

assessments relating to the assurance of quality for activities in

quality assurance and other functional areas.

The assurance of quality is the stated responsibility of each

employee of Maine Yankee.

All personnel are encouraged to perform

'

their work activities in a quality fashion as evidenced by the low

number of personnel error related events.

Pride in a job well

done is reflected throughout plant personnel.

Employees are also

encouraged to report any indication of differences between expected

plant parameters and observed operating conditions that may suggest

a potential problem.

Plant resources are directed at understanding

these differences.

First line supervisors frequently review in-

progress work.

The overall effect is quality job performance at

all levels within the licensee organization.

Plant Management encourages feedback on methods to improve existing

practices. Management reviews operational problems and deficiencies

during the Morning Managers Meetings and develops lessons learned.

Followup corrective action is implemented as a result of these re-

views.

The plant uses several methods to identify, track and close-

out these issues including matrix tracking of probable causes and

individual action item assignments.

Corporate management support

for quality is evident through their participation in the details

of daily operations and their support of corrective action followup.

The QA/QC organization plays an active role in the assurance of

quality.

In addition to normal QA/QC reviews, inspections, and

monitoring activities, a structured independent inspection program

has been implemented.

These inspections are scoped, planned, and

scheduled for a more thorough verification.

To increase the effec-

tiveness of these inspections, the inspector / auditor is authorized

to modify and increase the scope of the planned inspection.

This

results in meaningful inspection findings which receive management

closecut support.

The technical knowledge level of QA/QC personnel

was found to be high as evidenced by NRC first hand observations.

o

.

28

QA/QC personnel possess experience from other departments including

Operations and Engineering.

Changes in the QA/QC organization have

resulted in an effective utilization of knowledgeable resources.

The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) is involved in the re-

view of operational data, Engineering Design Change Requests, and

other pertinent information. Special PORC meetings are frequently

utilized to review timely data and operational problems.

PORC

meetings are characterized by an open and free exchange of informa-

tion and questions.

Through their reviews, PORC plays a key role

in the assurance of quality.

Every two weeks the QA/QC managers and the plant management meet

to review QA/QC activities.

All deficiencies, corrective actions

and responses are reviewed and trended.

Additionally, Plant Manage-

ment requests QA/QC involvement in observed problem areas.

As a

result, the QA/QC organization is involved in routine plant activi-

ties, not as strictly compliance, but to determine better methods

and controls for areas reviewed.

Management effectively utilizes

QA/QC to improve performance, not just to identify failures to meet

commitments.

One violation was identified for a lack of administrative controls

applied to the review of concrete block walls.

Because of this lack

of controls, the inspections of block walls conducted in 1980 failed

to identify all block walls covered by Bulletin 80-11.

Further

attention to one-time plant walkdowns appears to be warranted.

In summary, there is evidence of assurance of quality at all levels

in the conduct of work activities at Maine Yankee.

Management

effectively uses various mechanisms including QA/QC in initiatives

to improve overall performance.

2.

Conclusion

Category 2, Improving Trend

3.

Board Recommendation

None.

.. -

.

29

1

H.

Licensing Activities

1.

Analysis

.

During the last assessment period this area was rated as Category

?

2. Strengths included management's support and participation in

licensing matters and a weakness was identified in that the licen-

see's responsiveness varied widely on different issues.

During the present rating period, the licensee's management demon-

strated active participation in licensing activities and kept

abreast of all current and anticipated actions.

During the Seismic

Design Review, there was consistent evidence of excellent prior

planning and assignment of priorities.

In general, submittals re-

flected good quality and proper management control to assure quality.

Throughout this assessment period the licensee has dedicated re-

sources to address open licensing issues.

As a result, a signifi-

cant reduction in the backlog of open issue has been realized.

The licensee's management and its staff demonstrated technical

understanding of issues involving licensing actions.

For the

majority of licensing actions, the licensee's submittals were tech-

nically sound, thorough, and well referenced.

They generally ex-

hibited conservatism when considering safety significance.

When information became available that indicated some non-conserva-

tive axial power shapes were possible under the present reload

analysis, the licensee was quick to adopt administrative controls

and brief the staff on the impact on the Loss of Coolant Analysis

'

(LOCA).

As a result, the issue was efficiently resolved.

The lic-

ensee's reload analysis was handled by Yankee Atomic Electric Com-

pany (YAEC) and was of high quality. YAEC personnel were utilized

for a variety of engineering and analysis functions.

They were

available as needed for other special engineering disciplines, such

as, Fire Protection and Seismic Design. The combination of the the

licensee's and YAEC's staff demonstrated their capacity to produce

quality engineering products.

The licensee's timeliness and responsiveness continued to vary

widely on different issues.

For example, the submittal for Tech-

nical Specification change for limiting overtime was listed in the

last SALP report as being significantly delayed by the licensee.

This issue remained open throughout this SALP period despite per-

sistent efforts by the NRC to close the issue.

Resolution of De-

mineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) level alarm and Inadequate

Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICCI) were similarly difficult to

achieve due primarily to timeliness and responsiveness problems with

>

the licensee.

There were other examples of good responsiveness and

timeliness to resolve questions on licensing submittals, such as,

1

Large Break LOCA and Spent Fuel Pool Reanalysis.

Although the

4

-n-

-

-,

-,,

- - ,

. -

,

.

30

licensee's responsiveness and timeliness has improved during the

latter part of this assessment period, the licensee needs to

review these issues to ensure difficulties that led to stale-

mates as described above are completely resolved.

As mentioned above, the licensee's response to the ongoing Seismic

Design Review was excellent.

This included not only the areas of

making information available to consultants and reviewers and as-

sisting with inspections, but also the licensee's willingness to

make hardware changes to improve the plant. The licensee's initi-

atives and efforts in this area were beyond regulatory r:q>iraments.

In summary, the licensing functions for Maine Yankee are carried

out in an effective manner.

Better coordination and direction of

licensing activities to provide better responses should be pursued.

In general, the licensee's performance in the latter part of the

period exhibited a willingness to be responsive and improve perform-

ance.

2.

Conclusion

Category 2, Improving Trend.

3.

Board Recommendation

None.

.

_

._ _ _ .

.

31

I.

Training and Qualification Effectiveness

1.

Analysis

During this assessment period, Training and Qualification Effective-

ness is being considered as a separate functional area for the first

time.

The various aspects of this functional area have been con-

sidered as an integral part of other functional areas and the re-

spective inspection hours have been included in those sections.

Licensed Operator Training Program continues to receive full support

of management.

The two license operator exams this period resulted

in a 100 percent pass rate with nine Senior Reactor Operator lic-

enses, three Reactor Operator licenses and one Instructor Certifi-

cation.

License training is available to the Nuclear Shift Engi-

neers (STA) and one third of the engineers currently fulfilling the

Shift Engineer Function hold SR0 licenses,

l

The licensee sets high initial qualification standards by requiring

all newly hired Auxiliary Operator candidates possess a Bachelor

Degree in Engineering or Science. This policy was effectively im-

plemented this SALP period. A Training Review Board is utilized

to review potential license candidates and review and track a can-

didate's progress in the license training program.

The Training

Review Coard provides prompt direction to the training program.

The site specific simulator was effectively utilized for license

candidates training, requalification training and verification of

the new Emergency Operating Procedures which were implemented this

assessment period.

Emergency Plan drills are run in real time on

the simulator providing realism not formerly achievable.

New or

revised procedures are practiced on the simulator prior to imple-

mentation, such as, late in life power reductions and turbine valve

testing utilizing the steam dump system.

Maine Yankee is presently

installing a simulator for the remote shutdown panel in order to

provide specialized training on its use.

As an indication of the

licensee's commitment to training, changes to plant equipment are

i

usually reflected in tne site simulator within six months of imple-

l

mentation.

!

The licensee's Specialty Training provides training for Maintenance,

Chemistry, Radiological Controls Technicians, General Employee

Training and Technical Training.

The training program for techni-

'

cians generally involves classroom lectures.

Future plans call for

a combination of classroom instruction, in plant evaluations and

l

exams.

Throughout this assessment period, technicians have been

observed to be knowledgeable and capable of required job skills.

l

The lack of plant trips or LER's attributed to personnel errors

'

by plant technicians is a significant decrease from the last assess-

ment period which included five (5) maintenance personnel errors.

i

,

_

- - - -

- - - - - --

-

- _ -

.-

0-

.

32

Additional positions in the maintenance department have been author-

ized to assist in the observation of work practices and qualifica-

tion of personnel.

The licensee continues to pursue the training program accreditation

through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0).

All ten

training programs have completed the Self Evaluation Review process

by the licensee. An INP0 team visit has reviewed the Senior Reactor

Operator, Reactor Operator, Auxiliary Operator and Radiation Ccntrol

Technician training programs and accreditation is expected soon.

Other programs are scheduled for INP0 team evaluation later this

year. The pace of the licensee's efforts in this area have been

slow; however, the licensee continues to implement all aspects of

the training program.

Through the use of the Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES),

the licensee conducts reviews of plant events and potential events.

Lessons learned from these reviews are returned to the Training

Department for incorporation into the Training Program.

A review

of plant events revealed no training deficiencies.

However, two

events required further evaluation because both resulted from

operation of the wrong control switch.

In each case, similar

switches providing the same function are located in close proximity

to each other.

Thus, these events appear to be more closely related

to problems with layout (human factors considerations) rather than

training.

The licensee is evaluating corrective action.

In summary, personnel exhibited good job knowledge with few per-

formance problems.

Licensee standards and success in qualifying

operations personnel was particularly noteworthy; good use was made

of the simulator.

Use of a remote shutdown panel simulator is a

good initiative.

2.

Conclusion

Category 1.

j

3.

Board Recommendation

None.

.

1

!

i

s

!

. - ~ . - - . _ - _

- - - , . . . - - . . . - , - _ . . _ _ . _ - _ - , _ - .

-

- - - - _ . , . - ,

.

~ .

- . - . - - -

. - ~ - -

-

.

-

33

V.

Supporting Data and Summaries

A.

Investigations and Allegations Revier

There were four allegations reviewed curing this SALP period.

The first

two involved contractors working in a espirator area without respirators.

The third involved the manner in which eiling tiles were disposed from

the radiological portion of the plant.

The fourth was involved with the

qualification of the computer section head.

All allegations were closed.

No significant health or safety were identified.

B.

Escalated Enforcement Actions

1.

Civil Penalties.

None

2.

Orders.

None

C.

Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period

On February 20, 1986, Region I Management met with Maine Yankee manage-

ment to discuss SALP Report 85-99.

D.

Confirmation of Action Letters

None

E.

Rgview of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

1.

fabular Listing

Type of Event

a.

Personnel Errors

1

b.

Design / Manufacturing /Const/ Installation

4

c.

External Cause

-

d.

Defective Procedure

-

e.

Component Failure

5

x.

Other

-

Total

10

2.

Causal Analysis

The following sets of common mode events were identified:

a.

LER's 85-18, 85-19, 86-02, 86-03 and 86-05 are events due to

component failures.

Two LER's (85-18 and 86-02) were due to

controller malfunctions in the feedwater system.

__.

- _ - - -

_

. .

. _ - .

_

-_

___

_

.

34

b.

LER's 86-06, 86-07 and 86-08 involved design or installation

deficiency.

Two of these resulted in plant trips (LER 86-06

and 86-07).

F.

Licensing Activities

1.

NRR/ Licensee Meetings

May 7-8, 1986

First Peer Review Group Meeting concerning

Seismic Design Margins Program

July 21-25,1986

Seismic Design Margins Program

August 25, 1986

Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

September 29,1986

Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape

September 30, 1986

Second Peer Review Group Meeting concerning

Seismic Design Margins Program

October 22, 1986

Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape

November 18-19, 1986

Third Peer Review Group Meeting concerning

Seismic Design Margins Program

December 16, 1986

Large Break LOCA Analysis Power Shape

December 19-20, 1986

Spent Fuel Pool Masonry Wall Failure Con-

sequence Analysis

2.

Visits to Licensee or Licensee Contractor Facilities

February 18, 1986

Management Meeting at Maine Yankee

April 29, 1986

Participate in Seismic Qualification of

Equipment meeting in San Francisco, CA.

May 7, 1986

Seismic Design Margins Program meeting in

San Francisco, CA.

June 10, 1986

Meeting in Framingham, MA concerning Seis-

mic Design Margins Program

<

June 13-14, 1986

Maine Yankee Plant Inspection

July 21-26,1986

Assist in Seismic Design Margins Review

at Maine Yankee

.

35

August 1, 1986

Participate in Seismic Design Margins Pro-

gram Peer Review Group Meeting in San

Francisco, CA.

August 4-6, 1986

Maine Yankee Plant Inspection

November 16-19, 1986

Peer Review Meeting at Maine Yankee

December 18-19, 1986

Participate in Spent Fuel Pool Masonry Wall

Failure Consequence Analysis in Framingham,

MA.

3.

Commission Briefings

None

4.

Schedular Extensions Granted

None

5.

Reliefs Granted

None

6.

Exemptions Granted

None

7.

License Amendments Issued / Denied

December 31, 1986

License Amendment 86 Technical Specifications

on RETS

March 4, 1986

License Amendment 87 Technical Specifications

on Monthly Operability of Turbine Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

March 17, 1986

License Amendment 88 Technical Specifications

on Auxiliary Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump to

be Operable During Operation

May 27, 1986

License Amendment 89 Technical Specifications

which add Manual Containment Isolation Valves

and Blowdown and Body Vent Valves on Instrument

Lines to List of Manual Combined Intermediate

Valves that may be positioned under Administra-

tive Controls

September 11, 1986

Technical Specifications concerning Introduction

of Peaking Factor Limit, Report - Denied

. _ - .

. - - - - . .

-_ _- _ _ -- -_ -

. . . .

. - - . .

- . _ - . _ . _ . .

.

36

.

October 27, 1986

License Amendment 90 Technical Specifications-

which Incorporate Requirements for Iodine Spik-

ing into Annual Report

December 11, 1986

License Amendment 91 Miscellaneous changes to

Technical Specifications for Clarification

January 30. 1986

License Amendment 92 Technical Specifications

for Higher Fuel Enrichment

8.

Emergency Technical Specifications Issued

None

9.

Orders Issued

None

10.

Licensing Actions

Open at beginning of period - 43

Number added during period - 28

Number closed during period - 43

Number open at end of period - 28

..

.

TABLE 1

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

REPORT

HOURS

' AREAS INSPECTED

85-31

58

Radiological Protectior, Activities

85-32

139

Routine Resident Inspection *

85-33

27

Nonradiological Chemistry

85-34

74

PAT Followup

85-35

30

Radiation Protection

85-36

94

Routine Resident Inspection

05-37

N/A

Operator Licensing Exams

-86-01

293

Routine Resident Inspection

86-02

106

Block Wall Bulletin Followup

86-03

355

Routine Resident Inspection

86-04

37

Safeguards

86-05

307

Routine Resident Inspection

86-06

26

Transportation

86-07

135

ATWS

86-08

286

Routine Resident Inspection

86-09

34

Radiation Protection

86-10

282

Routine Resident Inspection

86-11

32

Radiation Protection / Post Accident Sampling System

86-12

30

Fire Protection

86-13

235

Routine Resident Inspection

86-14

100

T1-1

o

.

REPORT

HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

86-15

239

Routine Resident Inspection

86-16

N/A

Operator Examinations

86-17

32

Safety Safeguards Interface

86-18

187

Routine Resident Inspection

86-19

115

Radiation Protection

86-20

108

Routine Resident Inspection

87-01

116

Quality Assurance Implementation

l

Routine Resident Inspection - includes operational activities (logs, records,

plant status); plant tours; physical security; housekeeping / fire protection; sur-

veillance activities; maintenance activities; periodic and special reports; event

"

follow-up; and, operational safety.

l

2

)

T1-2

,

- -

,

--

. .

. - .

.-.--

. - - . . . - . .

. _ _ . -

- _ _ _ _ - . - - . . -

_ _ - - - - .

.

TABLE 2

INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (11/1/85 - 1/31/87)

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

HOURS

ANNUALIZED

Percent

1.

Plant Operations

1655

1324

47

1

2.

Radiological Controls

382

305

11

3.

Maintenance

447

358

13

4.

Surveillance

337

270

10

5.

Fire Protection and Housekeeping

N/A

--

6.

100

80

3

7.

Security and Safeguards

149

119

4

8.

Outages

N/A

--

9.

Assurance of Quality

407

325

12

10.

Licensing Activities

N/A

--

11.

Training and Qualification

Effectiveness

N/A

--

Total

3477

2782

100

Allocations of inspection hours vs. Functional Areas are approximations. based upon

inspection report data.

!

1

T2-1

-

--

o

.

t

!

TABLE 3

ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

A.

Number and severity Level of Violations

Severity Level

Severity Level I

0

Severity Level II

0

Severity Level III

0

'

Severity Level IV

4

Severity Level V

7

TOTAL

II-

B.

Violations vs. Functional Area By Severity Levels

Severity Levels

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

I

II

III

IV

V

1.

Plant Operations

1

2.

Radiological Controls

1

3.

Maintenance

2

4.

Surveillance

1

5.

Fire Protection

6.

7.

Security and Safeguards

1

8.

Outages

9.

Assurance of Quality

1

3

10.

Licensing Activities

11.

Training and Qualification

1

Totals

4

7

T3-1

m

o

Inspection

Severity Functional

Brief

Number

Requirement

Levels

Area

Description

85-31

10 CFR 55

IV

Training

Chemistry Annual Retraining

Appendix A

not completed

ANSI N18.1

85-34Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI N18.185-34" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.

V

Maintenance

Lack of a Control Program

Appendix B

for Test Equipment

ANSI N45.2.11,

V

Anchor bolt installation

Section 4.2

miscalculation

V

Unauthorized Drawings in

Control Room

TS Sec. 5.8.1

V

Lack of Shelf Life Program

for Chemicals

86-01

TS 5.8.1.A

V

Operations

Operations of Valve by an

Unauthorized Person

86-02

IV

Inadequate Masonry Wall

Appendix B

Survey Procedures

86-06

10 CFR

IV

Radiological

Failure to list Radioactive

20.311(b)

Controls

Nuclides in Shipment

86-07

V

Maintenance

Lack of Calibration Control

Appendix B

Program for Dial Indicator

86-15

Security Plan

IV

Security and

Violations of Isolation Zone

Safeguards

87-01

V

Surveillance

Marginal Acceptance Values

Appendix B

and completion dates,

i

T3-2

_ _ _ _ _ _

F

l

0

4

l

TABLE 4

TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AREA

Cause Code

Total

A

g

[

D

{

X

1.

Plant Operations

1

2

2.

Radiological Controls

3.

Maintenance

1

5

6

4.

Surveillance

5.

Fire Protection

6.