ML20209F472
| ML20209F472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1986 |
| From: | Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Scheppens R, Sinkule M, Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209F400 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-60, 50-425-86-27, NUDOCS 8609120166 | |
| Download: ML20209F472 (53) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1986060
Text
7- .
-
/
>R CEI
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
o
,3 *
'
REGION li
o
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
! *j
g
ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323
k.g.....,/
Report Nos.:
50-424/86-60 and 50-425/86-27
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109
Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: July 1 - August 11, 1986
Inspectors: [
.
~4
2-@ 6
Date Signed
h{H.H.Livermore,SeniorResidentInspector
Construct on
f_
474
4
J~K
B/2.8/as
r',4/_ J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
6
Operati
/
Y ) $ons
I-f
9/2e/86
R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
% Operations & Construction
,
f S Ct'
-h/
'Bhs/s 6
P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
%
Cata a (15-18 July, 4-8 August)
Approved By:
M
/
M/
b
M.~ V. Sinkule, Section Chief
/) ate' Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in t_he
following areas: containment and safety related structures, piping systems and
supports, safety related components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment and
cables, instrumentation, preoperational test program, quality programs and
administrative controls affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspection
identified items.
Readiness Review Module 7 was examined.
Results: One violation was identified " Failure to Implement Adequate Design
Control"
paragraphs 20 & 22.
8609120166 860904
gDR
ADOCK 05000424
PIDR1 _
~
__
'
r
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
- D. O. Foster, Vice-President, Project Support
- R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
- C. W. Whitney, Project Management, Legal
- W.
T. Nickerson, Assistant to the Project Director
- R. W. McManus, Readiness Review
M. H. Googe, Project Construction Manager
- G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations
- H. P. Walker, Manager Unit Operations
R. M. Bellamy, Manager Test & Outage
D. S. Read, General Manager QA
- C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
- W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
- D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2
- B. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control
- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
- W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist
C. F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent
R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- M. A. Griffis, Superintendent - Maintenance
N. R. Harris, Quality Control Assistant Manager
W. R. Duncan, Readiness Review
D. McCary, Engineering Supervisor, GPC/PKF
G. E. Spell, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
- R. E. Spinnato, ISEG Supervisor
S. A. Bradley, ISEG Member
J. F. D' Amico, Superintendent Regulatory Compliance
V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration
T. Brewer, Assistant QC Manager
- G. R. Frederick, Senior QA Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted
included craftsmen,
technicians,
supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
- F. B. Marsh, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel
H. M. Handfinger, Preoperational Test Superintendent - Bechtel
D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
G. Introcaso, Administration Manager, Pullman Power Products
B. Edwards, Project Manager, Pullman Power Products
J. Miller, QA Manager, Pullman Power Products
i
'
r
2
- Attended Exit Interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703C)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 11, 1986
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed
below.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee.
The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or
reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
(0 pen) Violation 50-424/86-60-01 & 50-425/86-27-01 " Failure to Implement
Adequate Design Control." - Paragraph 20 & 22
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-424/86-60-02 " Inadequate Instruction and Training
for RayChem Electrical Splice Installations." - Paragraph 6a
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-60-03 " Review Technical
Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.1 Implementation Procedure for Proper
Verification of AC Independent Power Sources." - Paragraph 23a1
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-04 " Review Results of Baselining the Regulatory
Compliance Computer Database with the Readiness Review Module 7 Database." -
Paragraph 23a1
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-05 " Review the Inspection Status Regarding Plant
Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control." - Paragraph 23d
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-06 " Review the Establishment of a Plan to Collect
and Evaluate Transient or Operational Cycles." - Paragraph 23m
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-07 " Review Corrective Action Regarding Item #7-5 and
- 7-9 of Readiness Review Module 7." - Paragraph 23m
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-08 " Review Operations Procedure 17012-1, Annunciator
Response Procedure, for Resolution of Comments." - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-09 "QC Reinspection - Anti Drug Program" - Paragraph
6f
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-10 " Review Compliance with TMI Item I .C.2."
-
Paragraph 22
(0 pen) IFI 50-424/86-60-11 " Review Licensee Response to the Locking of Four
RHR Valves" pursuant to FSAR Section 7.6.2.2.D" - Paragraph 23a
(Closed) Violation 50-424/85-37-02, " Failure to Establish Appropriate
Acceptance Criteria to Verify Pump Internal Cleanliness." - Paragraph 3
(Closed) Violation 50-424/85-43-01, and 50-425/85-32-01, " Failure to Provide
Adequate Protection to Safety Related Components." - Paragraph 3
4
'
i
3
(Closed) Violation 50-424/85-52-01, " Failure to Provide Adequate Maintenance
Procedures." - Paragraph 3
'
(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) CDR 50-424&425/84-62 " Quality
Concerns Involving Erroneous Liquid Penetrant Testing Records." - Paragraph
5
(0 pen) CDR 50-424/86-121, "NSCW Stainless Steel Pipe Fitup" - Paragraph 5
(Closed) CDR 50-424/425 CDR 80-09 " Charging Pumps." - Paragraph 5
(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-09-04 " Review Projects Revised Response to Quality
Concern No. 85V0582." - Paragraph 5
(Closed) IFI 50-424/85-13-03 " Review the Results of Additional Re-examina-
tions of Weld Liquid Penetrant Examinations." - Paragraph 5
,
(0 pen) IFI I.C.2 " Shift Relief and Turnover Procedures." - Paragraph 22
(0 pen) .IFI II.D.3 " Direct Indication of Relief-and Safety-Valve Position."
Paragraph 22
(Closed) IFI II.G.1 " Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment." - Paragraph
22
,
The following NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period
by a resident inspector:
Date
Name
July 2
M. D. Hunt, T. F. McElhenney
<
<
July 11
L. H. Jackson, R. D. Gibbs
July 18
W. Ross, W. Gloerson
i
W. Kleinsorge
!
July 25
N. Merriweather
W. H. Miller, G. R. Wiseman
M. D. Hunt, et. al.
.
J. D. Harris
July 31
J. York, S. J. Vias
August 08
H. Philips, D. Ferd
B. Crowley, J. Menning
l
L. Nicholson
i
c
,.
4
On August 7, 1986, Mr. P. H. Skinner presented the results of his inspection
pertaining to allegations.
The licensee was informed that his inspection
items would be documented in the resident inspector report. (See paragraph
6c, d, & e)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation, 50-424/85-37-02 " Failure to Establish Appropriate
Acceptance Criteria to Verify Pump Internal Cleanliness". This violation
identified discrepancies between the cleanliness criteria of Pullman Power
Products used in the disassembly, cleanliness verification, and reassembly
of Unit 1 Train B Safety Injection Pump, and Revision 9 of Westinghouse-
Specification No. 292722. The Westinghouse document requires a wipe test in
accordance with ASTM-A-380 to verify equipment internal cleanliness prior to
reassembly. The PPP procedure did not contain this requirement. Georgia
Power Company's (GPC) response contained in Letter No. X7BG10, GN-723, dated
October 23, 1985 outlined the corrective action-to be taken. The inspector
has reviewed Rev. 12/16/85 of PPP Procedure No. XIII-4 which incorporates
the cleanliness' verification requirements of Westinghouse Process Specifica-
tion No. 292722.
In addition, a review was conducted of Operational
Deviation Report No's. T-2-85-1535, T-1-85-1648, and T-1-85-1647 which
identified and dispositioned all Westinghouse equipment which had been
disassembled and reassembled and was subject to cleanliness verification
y
requirements of Process Specification No. 292722. Based on the above review
the inspector determined that the corrective actions have been adequately
addressed and are complete.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/85-52-01 " Failure to Provide Adequate Maintenance
Procedures".
This violation identified a failure to adequately prescribe
maintenance activities relative to the preplanning, review, and execution of
Maintenance Work Orders (MW0's) associated with the disassembly and
reassembly of the Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Centrifugal
Charging Pumps. Georgia Power Company's (GPC) response contained in Letter
No. X7BG10, GN-790, dated February 11, 1986 outlined the corrective action
to be taken. The insper*ar has reviewed internal correspondence documenting
the me.eting held with c.ht maintenance planners, Quality Control inspectors,
and maintenance ret tme
in regard to corrective action. The maintenance
planners were irit m.tm
.o identify MWO's requiring additional preplanning
detail and to fo u ra v e to the maintenance foreman assigned to the job so
as to involve / include him in the preplanning process. Also, guidelines
were given as criteria to use for determining which MW0's require additional
preplanning.
The Quality Control (QC) inspectors were instructed on the
assignment of QC hold points and to assure hold points are applicable to the
work activity being conducted and that they can be used to verify quality.
Also, guidelines were established and reinforced as to process of the
waiving QC hold points.
The maintenance personnel were retrained in
procedural requirements, compliance and the importance of agreement between
verbal instructions and procedural requirements. In addition, the inspector
has observed the implementation of the preplanning process and maintenance
"
..
'
o
5
activities.on various safety related components sir.ce the occurrence of the
violation. Based on the above reviews and field observations the inspector
has determined that the corrective actions hava been adequately addressed
and are complete.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/85-43-01 and 50-425/85-32-01 " Failure to Provide
Adequate Protection to Safety-Related Components." This violation identi-
fied five
(5) valves and one (1) electrical panel which were not
adequately protected from damage or contamination in accordance with
established procedures.
Georgia Power Company's (GPC) response contained
in Letter No. X78G10, GN-756, dated December 10,19.5 outlined the correc-
tive action to be taken. The inspector has reviewed internal correspondence
documenting the following action taken:
Quality Control has assigned full
time Quality Control inspectors to conduct plant housekeeping and storage
inspections; Pullman Power Products (PPP) have assigned personnel to monitor
construction field storage conditions for valves and other equipment during
each shift to ensure that covers and other protective methods are properly
maintained; and a Standing Order No. 1-86-05 was written to implement an
area access control plan which requires joint participation with construc-
tion to ensure equipment protection and cleanliness is maintained. The plan
applies to all areas of the plant not turned over to operations and areas
not specifically designated as a controlled area by Construction. The plan
classifies areas as Level I, II, or III as appropriate for the type and
Class of equipment in the area; with Level I requiring the most restrictive
access control. Examples of Level I areas are Class 1E large motor or pump
areas, Class 1E instrument or control panel areas, DC battery rooms and
switchgear rooms, etc.
In addition, the inspector has observed the
implementation of the area access control plan since initiation of the
program. Based on the above reviews and field observation of area access
control plan, the inspector has determined that corrective actions have been
adequately addressed and are complete.
4.
Unresolved Items (92701)
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
,
'
deviations. One unresolved item was identified which involved inadequate
l
instruction and training for RayChem electrical splice installations. This
item is discussed in paragraph 6a of this report.
l
l
S.
Followup on Licensee and Inspector Identified Inspection Items (92701)
(92712) (92700)
(Closed) CDR 50-424 and 425/80-09 " Charging Pumps" This item was inspected
,
to complete the previous action as documented in NRC reports 50-424 and
1
425/85-05 and 50-424 and 425/85-13.
The inspector completed walkdowns at
the auxiliary mini-flow path installation and reviewed the emergency
,
l
operating procedures governing the use of this flow path.
This item is
considered closed.
!
!
i
.
'
>
6
(Closed) CDR 50-424 and 425/84-62 " Quality Concerns Involving Erroneous
Liquid Penetrant Testing Records" This item was initially reported as a
potential deficiency on April 24, 1984, which involved an incident where an
Liquid Penetrant Test (LPT) examiner was suspected of falsifying liquid
penetrant inspection -reports. - Subsequent to this incident, another examiner
was also suspected of submitting erroneous liquid penetrant examination
reports, resulting in additional reinspections of both individuals. The two
situations, for reporting purposes pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), were combined and documented in this CDR.
The final report was
submitted on April 18, 1985 which documented the licensee's evaluation of
this matter as not reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 21 and
A review was made of the licensee program for the
reinspection of selected welds related to a qualify concern involving
erroneous liquid penetrant examination (LPE) records.
The reinspection
plans for each individual were developed specifically for the particular
person and circumstances to determine if test had been falsified and if so,
what period in their working tenure at the site did this start.
Pullman
Power Products initiated the first inspection plan consisting of a 100%
reinspection of accessible welds within a specified time frame.
Power Company (GPC) initiated a second inspection per Mil-Std-105D Sample
Reinspection Plan. The re examination results were plotted in graphic form
to show the percentage of tests performed and the resultant discrepancies as
percent re-examined each month.
The Resident Inspector reviewed these
graphs in a meeting with the licensee.
The results of the meeting
determined that additional welds were to be liquid penetrant tested within a
specified time frame.
As a result of these reinspections the licensee
subsequently conducted a 100% reinspection of all accessible ASME welds
requiring LP inspection by both individuals (i.e. ASME Code Class 3 2" and
smaller and ANSI B31.1 welds which were originally LP inspected were not
reinspected as part of the reinspection program since they are not required
to be inspected initially in accordance with the Code). The inspector held
discussions with
responsible licensee representatives and reviewed
supporting documentation to verify implementation of the reinspection
program. The reinspection of these inspector's work was documented as being
complete in a letter from Pullman Power Products, dated 5/29/86.
The
irspector also reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation which
concluded in both instances analyzed that a reportable condition did not
exist. The licensee also identified other inspections conducted by these
individuals which consisted of ultrasonic testing for thickness measure-
ments. A reinspection program per Mil-Std-1050 was implemented by PPP and
the results were found to be acceptable.
The inspector concurs with the
licensee's evaluation.
(0 pen) CDR 50-424/86-121 "NSCW Stainless Steel Pump Fitup" The licensee
reported a potential deficiency pertaining to the Unit 2 Nuclear Service
Cooling Water (NSCW) ASME Class III 14" and larger Schedule 10 stainless
steel pipe welding.
The resident inspectors attended several license
meetings pertaining to the status of their investigation of this matter.
Also the resident inspectors conducted a visual inspection of the inside
diameter of the following pipe welds as part of this item.
>
_
>
7
ISO No.
Weld No.
006-W-25
006-W-22
006-W-21
The resident inspectors will continue to follow the progress of the licensee
evaluation of the item.
This matter will be followed up by the Region
Materials and Processes Section upon receipt of the licensee's final report.
(Closed) IFI 50-424/85-13-03 " Review the Results of Additional Re-examina-
tions of Weld Liquid Penetrant Examinations"
The licensee conducted a
re-examination of additional welds selected within a specified time frame.
As a result of these reinspections the licensee subsequently conducted a
100% reinspection of all accessible ASME welds requiring LP inspection by
both individuals (i.e. ASME Code Class 3 2" and smaller and ANSI B31.1 welds
which were originally LP inspected were not reinspected as part of the
reinspection program since they are not required to be inspected annually in
accordance with the Code).
The reinspection of these inspector's work was
documented as being complete in a letter from Pullman Power Products, dated
5/29/86.
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee
representatives and reviewed supporting documentation to verify implementa-
tion of the reinspection program. The inspector concurs with the licensee's
evaluation. This item is considered closed.
(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-09-04 " Review Projects Revised Response to Quality
Concern No. 85V0582". The inspector has conducted a review of the Project's
response contained in a letter dated May 16, 1986 which acceptably addressed
all of the Resident Inspector's questions. The inspector has no further
questions therefore, this item is considered closed.
6.
Allegations
a.
On July 3, 1986, the inspector requested a meeting with GPC QA, QC and'
Engineering in regards to a concern with the field design and installa-
tion of electrical RayChem splice kits.
discussion of past problems at other sites with RayChem electrical kit
installations, was also distributed to and discussed with the
attendees. The gist of the concern was that there may be inadequate
detail instructions and training provided to the craft and QC for the
splicing and inspection of electrical cable. The concern specifically
applies when a RayChem "make-up kit" or a " field designed kit" is
authorized for a specific splice configuration.
Without detailed
installation instructions, the potential for installation error is
magnified, furthermore, errors may be hidden by the subsequent boot
installation. Inadequate instructions may also place the QC Inspector
in an incorrect role as having to direct the craft workers how to
install the s~ lice kit. At present, there are no identified examples
p
.
-
.
-__
>
8
of faulty hardware although the potential is present. The licensee was
asked to address the concern in regard to hardware status (past problem
identification), procedure upgrade, and personnel training (QC and
craft).
The concern applies to Construction as well as Operation
departments.
Subsequently, the licensee has issued a Construction Desk-Top DT-E-33
that presents a detail method for issuing and controlling field
designed electrical splice configurations.
Since more information is
required, this is considered as Unresolved Item 50-424/86-60-02.
b .-
Allegation RII-84-A-0181,
Investigation Concerning Nondestructive
Examination (NDE) Technician Falsifying NDE Reports.
Concern
The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) at Vogtle was notified by Pullman
Power Product (PPP) management that they had fired a NDE technician for
allegedly falsifying liquid penetrant testing.
The individual was
terminated from employment on 8/22/84 after being confronted by PPP
management to point out location of welds recently inspected and then
not being able to do so.
The licensee (GPC) and PPP advised the SRI
that an investigation into this matter would be conducted.
Discussion
The inspector conducted a review of PPP's interoffice correspondence
which documented their justification for terminating the subject
individual for serious misconduct in preparing and submitting incorrect
QA records falsely indicatino that he had performed certain tests. A
review was also conducted of the generic corrective actions implemented
as a result of this finding which are documented in a memo to file
dated 8/22/84 by the PPP QA/QC Manager. These actions consisted of 1.)
Assigning NDT technicians a unique number with a stamp, 2.) Imple-
menting a program of reinspection of randomly selecting work from work
sheets, 3.) Requiring each PT and MT technician to list acceptable
relevant indications on the inspection report, 4.) Randomly selecting
fifteen (15) welds from all PT technicians for reinspection for
evidence of being previously examined and for adequacy of work
performed, 5.) Meetings were held with all NDE technicians on 8/17 and
8/20/84 to advise them of problems associated with failure to perform
adequately and possible consequences, 6.) Changed in the method of
scheduling NDE work to assure accurate assignments, 7.) Relocation of
NDE supervisor to the field to allow more involvement in direct work
assignments and manpower supervision, and 8.) Changes to the lead
technician position on
"C"
shift.
The inspector conducted several
interviews with the PPP QA/QC Manager and licensee representatives
pertaining to this matter,
u
.
.
..
.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
__
- _
_.
.
,
9
The inspector followed and reviewed the PPP and GPC reinspection
program for the subject inspector's work. This review consisted of
reviewing interoffice correspondence with documented the status and
findings of the reinspection program at various phases during the
reinspection process, reviewing liquid penetrant examination records
documenting the reinspection of ISO / Weld No's 2K2-1592-007-01/007-W-06;
2K2-1592-007-01/007-W-05; 2K2-1202-447-01/005-W-22;
064-W-06X; and 2K3-1202-134-01/134-W-17, and reviewing Deviation Report
No's PPP DR-07401, and SQ- 0060 which documented the weld repair for
deficient conditions identified during the reinspection program.
Conclusion
The licensee identified all welds inspected by the subject individual
during his period of employment from 1/16/84 to 8/22/84. This list
consisted of safety and non safety related piping welds in accordance
with ASME and ANSI B31.1 power piping codes as applicable.
After
conducting several random sampling plan reinspections per Mil-Std-105
the licensee decided to reinspect 100% of all accessible ASME welds
requiring LP inspection by Code (i.e. ASME Code Class 3 2" and smaller
and ANSI 831.1 welds which were originally LP inspected were not
reinspected as part of the reinspection program since they are not
required to be inspected initially in accordance with the Code) by this
individual.
This was documented in a letter by the- Unit #1 PPP QA
Manager dated 5/29/86. The licensee also identified other inspections
conducted by this individual which consisted of ultrasonic testing for
thickness measurements. A reinspection program per Mil-Std-105D was
implemented by PPP and the results were found to be acceptable. Based
on the above review, the inspector concludes that the licensee's
corrective action is acceptable, therefore, this concern is considered
closed.
c.
Allegation RII-85-A-0016-023 Concerning Use of Uncertified Inspectors
to Conduct Inspections
Concern
An alleger stated that a section supervisor in charge of inspecting
electrical terminations at the site had sent unqualified inspectors out
into the field during the summer of 1984. The alleger heard that these
uncertified inspectors would conduct inspections without being
accompanied by certified inspectors.
The alleger stated that the
supervisor would then sign the QC inspection paperwork to reflect that
he had either performed the inspection or he had been with the
uncertified inspector while he performed the inspection. The alleger
stated that one inspector complained about this to the head of the QC
Department, who then relieved the supervisor. The alleger expressed
concern as to whether or not the inspections performed by the uncerti-
fied inspectors 4ere ever reinspected by certified inspectors.
The
alleger heard that the inspector was chastised by other workers for
reporting this problem.
l
L
o
10
Discussion
The inspector interviewed the Quality Control inspector that voiced his
concern over being assigned to inspect areas in which he was not
qualified and the head of the QA Department at that time. .The problem
did occur as stated by the alleger except it occurred earlier than the
summer of 1984.
Upon notification of this concern by the Quality
Control inspector, the head of the QA Department immediately initiated
an investigation into the concerns of.the inspector. The supervisor in
question was transferred out of the Quality Control group. The areas
that had been inspected by the ' unqualified personnel were areas
containing non safety related equipment, but were nevertheless
reinspected by certified inspectors.
This investigation by the
licensee is documented in a memorandum to Robert McManus from
M. Upchurch and T. Weatherspoon dated March 15, 1984 and filed in the -
Quality Concern Program file.
Discussions with the Quality Control
inspector indicates there was one isolated case of harassment by
another worker but that was corrected by supervision. There appears to
be no antagonistic view by management and in fact inspector concerns
are encouraged.
Conclusion
Although the allegation was as described, the licensee had taken
adequate corrective action and the inspector considers the action taken
to be adequate.
This concern is closed.
d.
Allegation RII-85-A-0016-019 Investigation of Missing Deviation Report
Concern
An allegation was received that concerned DR (Deviation Report) 06310.
The allegation was that the inspector who wrote the DR took it 'to his
supervisor who would not permit the DR to be issued.
The alleger stated another person said everyone was looking for the DR
and no-one was able to find it. A11eger further stated that when the
DR was later found, only the cover page could be found and the four
l
pages that were attached could not be located. The alleger provided a
copy of the DR and expressed concern as to what happened to the DR.
r
Discussion
The inspector requested a copy of DR 06310 from the licensee. A copy
was provided by QC Department. The inspector verified the completed
i
official copy was in the Operations Department Quality Control vault.
The copy of the DR obtained from the alleger was compared to that
obtained from the licensee. The pages provided by the alleger matched
those from the licensee except that the alleger's copy was incomplete,
.
l
l
l
L
,
11
1.e. pages 5 through 11 were not included and corrective action not
documented.
The inspector also interviewed the individual who
initiated the DR. This individual stated his supervision at first did
not want to process the DR but after the details were explained to him
by the inspector there was no hesitation in the approval process. The
initiating inspector stated he had written several other DR's
concerning the same subject matter (different examples) and he had
reviewed the corrective actions of all and was satisfied.
It appears
from documents reviewed that the DR was issued on 10/21/84 and sent to
the Engineering Section the same day.
Conclusion
The inspector could not substantiate this allegation. It appears that
a licensee inspector identified a process in effect that was not
working properly.
He issued several DR's to identify the problem.
Supervision took action to modify the process and Engineering specified
the disposition of the activities previously accomplished by the old
process. Based on this review, the inspector considers this
item closed.
e.
Allegation RII-85-A-0016-029 Investigation Concerning Falsification of
Inspector Certifications
Concern
An alleger stated that two specific Quality Control (QC) inspectors
were not qualified to be inspectors.
In addition the alleger stated
that their certifications have been falsified.
Discussion
The inspector reviewed all training records of both individuals. These
records indicate that these individuals have had the required training
and have been examined in the areas in which they perform inspections.
Documentation is available showing dates of training, eye examinations,
specific graded examinations taken and documentation of continuing
satisfactory job performance.
The examinations reviewed appear to be
in the individual's own handwriting and there is no apparent indication
of record falsification. Education requirements were also reviewed and
met program requirements.
Conclusion
!
Based on this review, the inspector considers this item closed.
i
i
i
l
,
-.
,
12
I
f.
Allegation RII-85-A-0016-015 Concerning Employee Terminations Due to
Drug Use.
Concern
<
i
The alleger is concerned that when employees are terminated for drug
abuse activity that Georgia Power Company (GPC) does not list the
reason for the termination in the individual's work records as drug
1
abuse activity. The alleger stated that the reason for the termination
is usually listed as misconduct or insubordination.
The reason that
this is placed in the records is because GPC is concerned that the NRC
'
will make GPC go back and reinspect all of the work that was performed
by the worker.
Discussion
By letter dated June 5,1986, US NRC Region II assigned the subject
allegation to Georgia Power Co. for action and disposition. A reply
'
was received on July 3 and 10, 1986.
The inspector performed a
preliminary review of the Vogtle Drug Program in order to obtain a base
to investigate and disposition this allegation. The GPC QC Re-inspec-
tion Procedure was reviewed as was the Vogtle Drug Program Manual.
<
Numerous interviews were conducted with the program constituents
including QC, contractors, and the GPC legal representative.
Conclusion
From a procedural aspect, the program is lacking some continuity and
detail to insure standardization in the areas of: the formal QC
1
notification process of those called in on the Drug Abuse Hot Line;
those who will be addressed by QC for re-inspection (field engineers,
QC, etc.); and detail decision making guidelines as to how a supervisor
decides who will be tested or not.
Since more review and information
is required, .this is considered Inspector Followup Item 50-424/
,
'
86-60-09.
7.
General Construction Inspection - Units 1 & 2
,
Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this reporting
l
period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of both
i
facilities. The areas were selected on the basis of- the scheduled activi-
ties and were varied to provide wide coverage. Observations were made of
,
!
activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance
with the required codes and regulatory requirements. On these inspections,
particular note was made of the presence of quality control inspectors,
supervisors, and quality control evidence in the form of available process
'
sheets, drawings, material identification, material protection, performance
of tests, and housekeeping. Interviews were conducted with craft personnel,
j
supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they
i
i
i
k
.
.
13
were available in the work areas.
The inspector reviewed numerous
construction deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the
areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, and approval
signatures in accordance with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - tinits 1 & 2 (42051C)
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the
inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches and
extinguishers.
Post indicator valves were being maintained in the open
position. Fire fighting equipment is in its designated areas throughout the
plant.
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following procedures
pertaining to the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping
measures to determine whether they comply with applicable codes, standards,
NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
-
SD-T-05, Rev. 6 Fire-Protection Equipment Inspection and Testing
-
GD-T-15, Rev. 5 Welding and Cutting
GD-T-17, Rev. 3 Housekeeping
-
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas
containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify
the following:
Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work areas
-
as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of
combustibles
Flammable liquids are stored in appropriate containers and in
-
designated areas throughout the plant
-
Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an
i
appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely
j
covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required
i
'
Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in
-
accordance with applicable requirements
,
i
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
!
!
!
!
.
k
,
14
9.
Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)
a.
Procedure and Document Review
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine whether
they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee commitments.
-
CD-T-02, Rev. 17
Concrete Quality Control
-
CD-T-06, Rev.
9
Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control
-
CD-T-07, Rev.
8
Embed Installation and Inspection
-
CD-T-20, Rev.
6
Installation and Inspection of Trumpets,
Rigid Extensions, and Duct Sheathing
b.
Installation Activities
The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement to verify
the following:
(1) Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Installation
-
Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.
-
Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in
accordance with construction specifications and drawings,
secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified
distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where
applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.
(2) Delivery, Placement and Curing
Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior to
-
placement
utilizing
a
Pour Card
(Procedure
Exhibit
CD-T-02*18).
-
Construction joints were prepared as specified.
Proper mix was specified and delivered.
-
Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and ambient
-
were monitored.
Consolidation was performed correctly.
-
Testing at placement location was properly performed in
-
accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a
Concrete Placement Pour Log (Procedure Exhibit CD-T-02*20).
Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.
-
L
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
,
15
-
Inspections during placements were conducted effectively by a
sufficient number of qualified personnel.
-
Curing methods and temperature was monitored.
(3) Rebar Splicing
>
The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the
following:
Inspections are performed during and after splicing by
-
qualified QC inspection personnel.
Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of the
-
bar size, splice type, the position, the operator's symbol,
and a sequential. number.
-
Process and crews are qualified.
-
The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on
all completed cadwelds.
The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed
cadwelds to verify the following:
Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.
-
Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve
-
and at the tap hole in the center of the sleeve.
No voids
were detected at the ends of the sleeves.
The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on
-
all completed cadwelds.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Unit 2 (48053C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and support
installation activities in progress, to verify the following:
Components were being properly handled (included bending or straigh-
-
tening).
Specified clearances were being maintained.
-
Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.
-
Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during
-
storage.
L
r_
n
.
16
i
Fit-up/ alignment ' meets the tolerances in the specifications and
-
drawings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. . Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Units 1 & 2
(48063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside the
containment to verify that:
,
Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent damage.
-
Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing
-
l
requirements.
Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.
!
-
Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.
-
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Unit 1 & 2
(49053C) (49063C) (37301)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations
l
inside and outside Containments.
Verifications included but were not
limited to the following:
Material and components were being properly handled and stored in order
-
l
to prevent damage.
Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and
-
drawings.
Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were
-
met.
Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable
-
drawings, specifications, and procedures.
Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the
-
applicable function.
Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and
-
used correctly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
I.
o
.
,
17
{
13.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding
Unit 1 & 2 (55073C) (55083C) Periodic inspections were conducted during
daily plant surveillances on safety-related pipe welding at various stages
of weld completion. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether
the requirements of applicable specifications, codes, standards, work
performance procedures and QC procedures are being met as follows:
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifies
-
the weld and its location by system, references procedures or instruc-
tions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
-
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
-
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record
(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.
Base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert
-
materials were of the specified type and grade, have been properly
inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or certifications.
Purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as specified in
-
the welding procedure specification and that protection was provided to
shield the welding operation from adverse environmental conditions.
Weld joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and
-
that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected in
accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
-
personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in
progress.
The weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and
-
fit-up tolerances were within specified limits.
Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
-
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
of material and was stored properly and that weld rod stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,
-
sugaring, or excessive crown on welds.
Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and
-
that necessary controls and records were in place.
..
.--
-
.--
._
_
-
,
18
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Unit 1 & 2 (50053C
and 50063C)
Periodic Unit 1 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel
and the installed integrated head package.
The Unit 2 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel
installed in containment, the Reactor Vessel head with the installed control
rod drive mechanisms located on the refueling floor, and the upper internals
in its designated laydown area.
Inspections also determined that proper
storage protection practices were in place and that entry of foreign objects
and debris _was prevented.
,
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Safety Related Components - Units 1 & 2 (50073C)
i
l
The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and
!
protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of
safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in
accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
,
During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various times
during the inspection period to verify the following:
!
Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance
-
with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.
Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such as:
-
rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing (elec-
trical), cleanliness,etc.
>
Performance
of
licensee / contractor
surveillance
activities
and
-
documentation thereof was being accomplished.
Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, placement,
-
orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion
anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearance.
Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to prevent
-
oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and
the prevention of inadvertent operation.
L
,
19
Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation
were inspected in the following Unit 1 and 2 -areas on a random sampling
basis throughout the inspection period:
Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms
-
Diesel Generator Building
-
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse
-
Containment Spray Pump Rooms
-
Pressurizer Rooms
-
Main Coolant Pump Areas
-
-
Steam Generator Areas
Safety Injection Pump Rooms
-
RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms
-
Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks & Pump Rooms
-
-
Cable Spreading Rooms
Accumulator Tank Areas
-
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger Pump
-
Room
Battery & Charger Rooms
-
Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas
-
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms
-
Pressurizer Relief Tank Area
-
CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms
-
Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area
-
-
BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel
NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels
-
Containment, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Fuel Handling
-
Building auxiliary (secondary) areas
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Units 1 & 2 (50090C)
Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe
supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance
with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments:
Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate
-
" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.
No deformation or forced bending was evident.
-
Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were
-
welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent
slippage.
Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or
-
lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding
contact surfaces.
Supports are located and installed as specified.
-
_.
-
---
g
I
.
20
s
b
The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free
-
from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks,
discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the
welded surface.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Units 1 & 2 (51053C)
(52153C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspection period to observe
safety-related electrical equipment in order to verify that the storage,
installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with
applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments.
Inspections were performed on various pieces of electrical equipment in
order to verify the following as applicable:
-
Location and alignment
Type and size of anchor bolts
-
-
Identification
-
Segregation and identification of nonconforming items
-
Location, separation and redundancy requirements
Equipment space heating
-
Cable identification
-
Proper lugs used
-
Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
-
-
Bending radius not exceeded
Cable entry to terminal point
-
Separation
-
No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Unit 1 & 2 (51063C)
(52063C)
a.
Raceway / Cable Installation
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine
whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee commitments.
EO-T-02, Rev. 8 Raceway Installation
-
ED-T-07, Rev. 9 Cable Installation
-
periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities
of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.
In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
4
,
21
Identification
-
-
Alignment
-
Bushings (Conduit)
Grounding
-
-
Supports and Anchorages
'
In reference to the cable installation the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)
-
-
Coiled cable ends properly secured
Non-terminated cable ends taped
-
Cable trays, junction boxes, etc., reasonably free of debris
-
-
Conduit capped, if no cable installed
Cable supported
-
Bend radius not exceeded
-
Separation
-
b.
Cable Terminations
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they
comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee
commitments.
-
ED-T-08, Rev. 7 Cable Termination
In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected
to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.
Cable identification
-
1
Proper lugs used
-
Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)
-
!
Tightness of connection
-
1
-
Bending radius not exceeded
Cable entry to terminal point
-
-
Separation
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
19.
Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Units 1&2
(55053C) (55063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.
The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and
QC procedures are being met as follows:
L
_
_
-
--
,
22
,
t
-
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing which
!
identifies the weld and its location by system, references, procedures
or instructions, and provides for production and/or QC signoffs.
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
-
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
-
-
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record
(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.
-
Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type and
grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.
Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse
-
environmental conditions.
,
i
Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that surfaces
-
to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in accordance with
applicable procedures or instructions.
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
-
,
personnel commensurate with the work in progress were present at the
'
work site.
Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up
-
tolerances were within specified limits.
'
t
Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
'
-
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
'
of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
1
-
There were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or
!
excessive crown on welds,
Welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness; and
i
-
that necessary controls and records were in place.
l
No violations or deviations were identified.
20.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1 (70302)
(71302)
The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test
program. Test program attributes inspected included review of administra-
tive requirements, document control, documentation of major test events and
deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation calibrations,
f
and correction of problems revealed by testing.
.
l
l
---w-
. , - . - , - , - - - - - - - - - -
,
23
l
Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess
plant condition and conduct of shift personnel. The inspector observed that
Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional
manner.
Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions,
i.e.,
ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and alarm /
annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on
various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing, operational
problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnovers.
Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with
operations personnel.
Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant conditions,
maintenance and preoperational activities in progress.
Schedules for
program completion and progress reports were
routinely monitored.
Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to
determine their knowledge of the preoperational program.
The Inspector
reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements
were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,
corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed
below:
a.
Preoperational Tests
(1) Test Procedure Review (70300)
The inspector reviewed the following listed preoperational test
procedures.
Each test was reviewed for administrative format and
technical adequacy.
The procedures were compared with licensee
commitments from the applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1137). This included
verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial
test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance
criteria were specified and management approval indicated:
NRC
Procedure
Insp.
Test Title
No.
No.
1-300-07/R1
70308
RCS Hot Functional
1-3AL-03/R1
70338
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Testing During HFT
1-300-14/R0
92706
Initial Turbine Roll
,
l
t
.
24
(2) Test Witnessing (70312)
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following
preoperational test procedures as they were conducted.
The
inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test
supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of
the procedure with the test participants.
Overall crew perform-
ance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review of the
test results was compared to the inspector's own observations.
Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified
to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned. During
the Hot Functional Test the inspectors noted that a well-coordi-
nated and complete program was being conducted.
Minor and major
equipment problems received appropriate levels of attention by
management to minimize the impact to the overall test program.
Plant maintenance teams were fully supportive in providing quick
turnaround.
Plant operations personnel were also supportive of
the test program, however they demonstrated a weakness in plant
control (See Paragraph 20.b).
Procedure
NRC Insp.
Test Title
Activity Observed
No.
No.
1-300-07
70314
RCS Hot
Various as Testing
Functional
Progressed
1-3 AL-03
70438B
Auxiliary Feed-
-AFW pump B
water System
Full Flow
Testing During
Injection
HFT
-AFW pump A & B
48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> run
-TDAFW pump 48
hour run
1-3AB-01
70437
Main Steam System Operation of
Atmospheric
Relief Valves
During HFT
1-3GD-01
71302
AFW Pumphouse
Operation of the
HVAC System
Train "A"
& "B"
Supply Fan During
HFT
1-3GR-01
70445
CROM, Cavity &
Operation of CRDM
Vessel Support
Fans, Cavity Fans
Cooling
and Vessel Support
Cooling During HFT
i
i
..
- _ _ ---- _ --- ---- _ --__ - - - - - - - - - - - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - _ . - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ _ _ _
O'
,
25
1-3GN-01
70445
Containment
Operation of Train
Cooling
"A" & "B"
Containment Cooling
Fans and Auxiliary
Containment
Coolers During HFT
1-300-06
70431
Steady State
70370C
System Vibration
Operation-Walkdown
Monitoring
of Portions of
Loops, Pressurizer
Surge Line, and
Pressurizer Relief
Line Piping &
Components to
Ensure No
Structural Damage
During HFT.
1-300-08
71302
Thermal
Heatup from 550 F
70370C
Expansion
Walkdown Conducted
in Containment to
Observe Snubber
Movement. Also,
Walkdown Terry
Turbine Steam
Supply Line During
Initial Heatup.
b.
Followup of Event Occurring During Testing
The inspectors reviewed the following events which occurred as a result
of testing:
(1) Pressurizer Power Operated Reitef Valve (PORV) Lifting - This
involved inadvertent loss of pressure control when spray flow was
lost due to securing the #4 reactor coolant pump.
Review of the
event determined that the source of pressure increase was due to a
failure of the operator to secure the Backup Heaters which were'in
manual control prior to securing the RCP. With heaters on, and
spray flow reduced, the pressurizer pressure slowly increased
,
!
until relieved by the PORV.
[
(2) Steam Generator Relief Lif ting - This involved the lif ting of the
1085 psig relief.
Following the lift the valve was gagged.
!
!
Later, the 1200 psig relief lif ted.
The license had the vendor
!
perform setpoint verification and determined that the sotpoints
l
were correct.
These tests were witnessed by regional based
i
inspectors. The licensee has determined that the operators must
!
have allowed pressure to rise and lift the relief, however, this
could not be confirmed.
!
l
l
t
.
26
(3) High Moisture Levels in the Diesel Generator B Building - This
event resulted during testing of the Turbine Auxiliary Feed Pump.
Due to plant design the steam exhaust was pulled into the Diesel
Building by the safety grade HVAC system.
The plant has blanked
off this steam exhaust path and engineering is preparing the
necessary design changes. While no damage was initially noted,
the licensee is currently investigating damage to a failed power
c.
Operation Deficiency Report Review (ODR)
During review of ODR No. T-1-85-1810 the inspector noted that the
Unit 2 change required stamp placed on the attached FCR Nos. EFCRB
14678,14681,14686,14687 and 14688 reflected that the design change
was not applicable to Unit No. 2.
Further review revealed that the
design change should have indicated applicability to Unit 2. Bechtel
Desk Instruction PFE-X3DIO8, Rev. O establishes the method for
documenting and tracking the Unit 1 design changes which are applicable
to Unit 2 design. The method utilized by Bechtel for identifying
applicability is a stamp which identifies a Unit 2 change is or is not
required and whether or not a change has been processed.
The licensee has taken the following action pertaining to this matter.
A Bechtel Corrective Action Request No. VS-86-204 has been written as a
result of a review of a sample of EFCRB's for similar problems.
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of 10CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V and will be identified as part 2 of Violation
50-424/86-60-01 & 50-425/86-27-01 " Failure to Implement Adequate Design
Control".
21.
Plant Procedures - Unit 1 and 2 (42400B)
This inspection consists of a procedural review to verify that administra-
tive controls are established and implemented to control safety related
operations. Procedures are selected at random and reviewed for technical
adequacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the proper
operation of a nuclear facility in the startup and operational phase. The
following requirements, guidance and licensee commitment were utilized as
appropriate:
Change, Tests, and Experiments
Instructions, Procedures and Drawings
Criteria V
Administrative Controls and Quality
Assurance for the Operational Phase
Quality Assurance Requirements for the
Rev 2, 1978
Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants
- FSAR Section 13
Conduct of Operations
.
. 3
27
Procedures reviewed were:
a.
-Administrative
Number
Rev-
Title
00008-C
2
Plant Lock and Key Control
00050-C
5
Procedure Development
00056-C
1
Safety Evaluations
00152-C
0
Federal and State Reporting
00254-C
2
Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control
00267-C
0
Safe Work Procedures for Chlorine
00304-C
7
Equipment Clearance and Tagging
00308-C
0
Independent Verification Policy
00420-C
0
Equipment Qualification Program
00851-C
2
Storage, Handling and Shipping Requirements
b.
Startup Manual
Number
Rev
Title
SUM-10
4
Temporary Modification Control
SUM-18
9
Operations Oeficiency Reports (00R)
SUM-19
4
Request for Engineering Assistance
.
c.
Operations
!
l
Number
Rev
Title
10000-C
1
Conduct of Operations
l
10001-C
2
Log Keeping
i
10005-C
1
Operability Status Indication for Plant
'
Safety Systems
i
10010-C
3
Operator Qualification Program
'
10016-C
1
Equipment Labeling Guidelines
l
14900-C
0
Containment Exit Inspection
j
14903-1
0
Containment General Inspection
d.
Maintenance
l
R_ev
Title
Number
e
20409-C
1
Maintenanco Procedure Review Qualification
Checklist
!
20406-C
1
Control of Welding Material
In addition, see procedure reviews listed in paragraph 23 k.
l
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_____ _ ______ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
__
. _ _ _ _ -
e
.
i
28
i
4
22. Three Mile Island Task Action Plan Followup - Unit 1 (4254018)
'
2
This inspection consists of verification that the licensee has implemented
the requirements of NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require-
'
4
ments" as committed to in the facility FSAR or other appropriate documents.
Verification consisted of one or more of the following attributes, as
appropriate, to determine acceptability for each listed action item:
i
<
i
-
Program or procedure established
Personnel training or qualification
-
,
Completion of item
-
'
Installation of equipment
-
'
Drawings reflect the as-built configuration
-
Component tested and in service or integrated into the preoperational
!
-
,
l
test program
The following documents were utilized in performing the review, as-
appropriate:
i
!
!
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report
l
NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the
TMI-2 Accident
TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses
4
i
NUREG 0737 and
Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements
Supplement 1
FSAR thru
Final Safety Analysis Report
l
Amendment 24
j
NUREG 1137 and
Safety Evaluation Report
Supplements
!
I.C.2. (0 pen) " Shift Relief and Turnover Procedures" This item involves the
establishment of plant procedures for shift relief and turnover which
requires signed checklists and logs to assure that the operating staff
'
(including auxiliary operators and maintenance personnel) possess adequate
knowledge of critical plant parameter status, system status, availability,
i
and alignment. FSAR Section 13.5.1.1.H describes the procedures which will
j
be implemented to ensure that a comprehensive exchange of information takes
!
place between the oncoming and of fgoing shift personnel.
Administrative
!
procedure 00003-C, Rev 0 "Shif t Relief" is the basic implementing document
i
which establishes general guidance to be further implemented by the
'
,
Operations Maintenance,
Health
Physics
and Chemistry
Departments.
i
Operations Procedure 10004-C, Rev 1 "Shif t Relief" establishes the general
'i
i
requirements for shift relief and directs the use of the following
!
checklists:
i
<
!
11869-C, " Balance of Plant Operator Relief Checklist"
11870-C, " Operations Supervisor Checklist"
'
l
11871-C, " Shift Supervisor Relief Checklist"
11872-C, " Plant Operator Relief Checklist"
!
I
i
<
l
i
i
!
!
_ . _ __ _ _ ._ _ ~
_ . , _ . _ . _ . _ . , , _ , _ , _ _ _ . . , , _ _ _ _ , . , _ _
.._,_,_ _ _
.
29
11873-C, " Plant Equipment Status Checklist"
11878-C, " Shift Technical Advisor Relief Checklist"
The latest revision of the above checklists were reviewed against NRC
requirements contained in a November 9,1979 letter to all licensees. The
inspector determined that implementation of this item by the licensee did
not conform to the NRC requirements in that checklists do not include:
(1) Critical plant parameters and allowable limits.
(2) What is to be checked and acceptance criteria to assure the avail-
ability of all systems essential to prevention and mitigation of
operational transients and accidents during a check of the control room
panel.
(3) The requirement to make a separate checklist entry for each system and
component that are in a degraded mode of operation permitted by
Technical Specification.
In addition, no system has been established to evaluate the effectiveness of
the shift and relief turnover procedures.
The licensee is evaluating their program.
This item will be further
inspected when the licensee evaluation is completed.
This item will be
tracked as Inspector Follow-up Item 50-424/86-60-10 " Review Compliance with
TMI Item I.C.2."
(Closed) II.G.1 " Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment".
This TMI-2
Action Plan Item requires that the motive and control components of the
power-operated relief valves (PORV's) and associated block valves and the
pressurizer level indication shall be capable of being supplied from the
offsite power source or from the emergency power buses when offsite power is
not available.
FSAR Section 5.4.11 describes that the pressurizer is
equipped with two (2) Class 1E block valves (motor operated). The PORV and
associated block valve on one line are supplied with control and motive
power from Train A, while the other PORV and associated block valve on the
other line are powered from Train B.
The PORV block valves 1HV-8000A and
1HV-80008 are powered from Class IE 486-V buses.
These buses are normally
supplied from offsite power. In the event of a loss of offsite power, these
buses are automatically loaded onto the diesels.
PORV's 455A and 456A are
Class 1E DC solenoid valves and are powered from redundant Class 1E 125-V DC
Trains A and B respectively.
Pressurizer Level Indicators LI-0459,. LI-0460, and LI-0461 are powered from
Channels I, II, and III vital buses respectively.
The vital buses are
capable of being powered from either onsite or offsite power sources. A
fourth level instrument LI-0462, is powered from a non-Class 1E inverter-
backed bus.
--
o
,
30
The inspector conducted a review of the following one line drawings to
verify the capability of supplying offsite and emergency power to the PORV's
(1PV-0455A and IPV-0456A); PORV block valves (1HV-80008) and the pressurizer
level indicators (LI-0459, LI-0460, and LI-0461) as described in the FSAR.
Drawing No.
Valve Instrument No's.
Title
1X3D-AA-A01A, Rev 12 1HV8000A & 1HV8000B
Main One Line-Unit 1
1X3D-AA-K02A, Rev 2
Diesel Generator IA and
"
Train "A" AC Buses
"
1X3D-AA-K02B, Rev 2
Loading Table shts 1 & 2
IX3D-AA-F24A, Rev 8
480V Motor Control Center
"
1ABE(1-1805-S3-ABE)
1X3D-AA-F25A, Rev 6
480V Motor Control Center
"
1BBE(1-1805-S3-BBE)
1X3D-AA-G01A, Rev 4
1PV-455A & 1PV456A
Class 1E 125V DC and 120V
Vital AC Systems
1X30-AA-H01A, Rev 8
125V DC Class 1E Distr
"
Train A (1-1805-S3-DCA)
1X3D-AA-H02A, Rev 9
125V DC Class 1E Distr
"
Train B(1-1805-S3-DCB)
1X3D-AA-F18A, Rev 7
480V Motor Control Center
"
1ABA (1-1805-S3-ABA)
1X3D-AA-F19A, Rev 6
480V Motor Control Center
"
1BBA (1-1805-S3-BBA)
1X30-AA-G01A, Rev 4
ILI-0459, ILI-0460&
Main One Line Class 1E
ILI-0461
125V DC and 120V Vital
AC Systems
IX30-AA-G02A, Rev 9
"
Instr Distr Pnis
IX3D-AA-G02C, Rev 5
120V AC Class 1E Vital
"
Instr Distr Pnis
'
The inspector conducted an inspection of the field installed power supply
sources to the PORV's, PORV block valves, and pressurizer level ' trans-
mitters/ indicators to verify installation as per applicable drawings. Based
on this review and a field inspection of the installed condition the
inspector finds that the licensee has properly implemented the requirement
of NUREG-0737, Item II.G.1, therefore this item is considered closed.
(0 pen) II.D.3 " Direct Indication of Relief-and Safety-Valve Position" This
TMI-2 action plan requires the licensee to provide Reactor Coolant ' System
Relief and Safety Valves with positive indication in the control room
derived from a reliable valve position detection device or a reliable
indication of flow in the discharge pipe.
FSAR Section 5.4.13.2 describes
that position indication on the PORV is accomplished through electrical reed
switches. A magnetic rod, activated by the valve plug, is located inside a
1
.
,
31
projection above the top face of the bonnet and operates the reed switches
contained in a switch assembly mounted externally on the bonnet.
Safety
valve indication is also accomplished through reed switches. NRC Questions
420.8, 440.3, and 440.142 al so address this TMI item and state that
indication is in the control room with appropriate lights on the main
control board. The indication is seismically qualified and safety related
and will be included in operating procedures and training.
SER Section
7.5.2.3 addresses this TMI item also.
The inspector conducted a review of the following elementary diagrams to
verify the PORV and safety valve safety grade positive indication in the
control room.
Drawing No.
Valve No.
IX3D-BD-803H, Rev 7
1X30-BD-803F, Rev 7
IX3D-80-803J, Rev 1
Safety Valve (IPSV 8010A, B, &C)
A review was also conducted of the PORV and safety valve indicating switch
assembly.
Drawing No.
Title
'INAAPE167-2
Nozzle Type Safety Valve
1Y6AA06-574-4
Crosby PSV Lift Indicating
1X6AA06-575-4
Switch Assembly
1X6AA06-579-2
Power Operated Relief Valve
An inspection of the field installed condition per the applicable drawings
and FSAR requirements as noted below was conducted.
P&ID 1X408112, Rev.19
FSAR Section 7.5.3.6
Plant Safety Monitoring System
& Table 7.5.2.1
The PORV's position indication was found to be installed in accordance with
applicable drawings and as stated in the FSAR. The inspector noted that the
Pressurizer Primary Safety Valve position indication status is available on
!
the Emergency Respnse Facility (ERF) Computer however, it is not presently
available on Plasma Display in accordance with applicable drawing and FSAR
requirements. P&ID 1XDB112 shows that direct position indication status for
the safety valves is to be provided on demand on the ERF computer and the
-
Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) computer.
In Addition, FSAR Section
,
7.5.3.6 describes PSMS and Table 7.5.2.1 shows that the pressurizer primary
'
safety valve position indication status is to be provided on demand on
plasma display (i.e. PSMS).
The inspector also conducted a review of the
'
Bechtel design specification No. X5AH01 for the Post Accident Monitoring
.
System and the Westinghouse design specification No. X6AZ02-18-1 for PSMS
- -
!
l
l
lL
.
32
and noted that the design criteria did not specify the requirement that the
-
function to display pressurizer primary safety valve position indication on
demand be provided on plasma display. A meeting was held with the licensee
to discuss this item.
The licensee acknowledged that this item had
apparently been missed and that a software change to PSMS would be required
to allow pressuizer primary safety valve indication status on demand on
plasma display.
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of 10CFR50 criterion V and
will be identified as part 1 of Violation 50-424/86-60-01 & 50-425/86-27-01
" Failure to Implement Adequate Design Control".
The inspector also conducted a review of the following Operations Procedures
for incorporation of operator action to determine PORV and safety valve
position.
17012-1, Rev 0
Annunciator Procedures for ALB12
on Panel 101 on MCB
The inspector noted that neither the pressurizer relief discharge hot
temperature (Window E01) nor the pressurizer safety relief discharge high
1
temperature (Window F01) alarms operator actions directed the operator to
look at valve position indication to determine valve position, the operator
actions in the procedure are to look at temperature indication in the PORV &
safety valves discharge line. It should be noted that SER Section 7.5.2.3
it is stated in part that in reply to NRC Question 420.8 the backup methods
available in the control room to determine valve position are temperature
indication in the PORV & safety valve discharge line indication as well as
,
pressurizer relief tank temperature, pressure and level indication. Pending
incorporation of operator action to check direct valve. position indication
to determine which PORV & safety relief valve status identified as IFI
50-424/86-60-08, " Review Operations Procedure 17012-1, Annunciator Response
Procedure, for Resolution of Comments.
.
23.
Readiness Review - Unit 1
a)
Section 3.3, Implementation Matrix and Section 6.1, Verification Plan
During the inspection period the inspectors reviewed the following
commitments as part of Readiness Review Module 7 " Plant Operations and
Support. The commitments were reviewed for accuracy between the source
document, Readiness Review Module and the implementing document.
i
)
._
. _ _ - -
. - -
o
.
33
(1) Operations Area Reviewer
'
Commitmenc
Implementing
Number
Source
Document
i
1207.00
FSAR 9.3.3-5
11211-1 Rev 0
1356.00
FSAR 10.A.2.2
11610-1 Rev 0
1572.00
FSAR 13.1.2.2.2
Procedure in Draft
"
1576.00
FSAR 13.1.2.2.2
"
1577.00
FSAR 13.1.2.2.2
1747.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.D
10000-C Rev 1
1748.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.E
10000-C Rev 1
2764.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.E
10000-C Rev 1
"
1743.00
00301-C Rev 0
1744.00
00301-C Rev 0
"
1745.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.0
00301-C Rev 0
1746.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.D
00301-C Rev 0
1749.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.E
10000-C Rev 1
1750.00
10000-C Rev 1
"
"
"
1751.00
"
"
1752.00
'
"
"
1753.00
"
"
1754.00
"
"
1755.00
"
1760.00
FSAR 13.5 1.1.G
"
"
1761.00
"
"
1762.00
"
"
1763.00
"
"
1764.00
"
"
2766.00
"
"
2767.00
"
2768.00
00005-C Rev 0
1576.00
FSAR 13.1.2.2.2
10000-C Rev 1
"
"
1577.00
1592.00
FSla 13.1.2.3
None
1729.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.A
00051-C Rev 3
10011-C Rev 7
'
L
10012-C Rev 2
1730.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.A
00051-C Rev 3
"
"
1731.00
"
"
l
1732.00
I
1733.00
"
"
"
"
1734.00
"
"
l
2755.00
"
"
2756.00
00056-C Rev 0
"
"
2757.00
'
"
"
2758.00
1735.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.B
00052-C Rev 2
I
1736.00
"
"
l
..
.
- - -
-.
.
- - -.
.
34
1756.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.F
10002-C Rev 2
"
"
1757.00
"
"
1758.00
"
"
1759.00
1765.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.H
00003-C Rev 0, 100004-C, Rev 0 &
20020-C Rev 0
"
"
1766.00
"
"
1767.00
"
"
1768.00
"
"
1769.00
"
"
1770.00
1783.00
FSAR 13.5.1.1.M &
00053-C Rev 0
5.2.1.G
1794.00
FSAR 13.5.2.1.P
17000 (Series)
1795.00
17000 (Series)
"
1849.00
FSAR 14.2.5
Procedure in Draft
2280.00
FSAR 18.1.1.1
CROR Program Plan
2281.00
CRDR Program Plan
"
2495.00
NRC Quest Q430.26
19000-1 Rev 1
19010-1 Rev 1
19030-1 Rev 1
2511.00
NRC Quest Q430.60
13427-1 Rev 0
13145-1 Rev 0
13415-1 Rev 2
2912.00
Q430.61
13431-1 Rev 0
"
2515.00
Q430.73
13006-1 Rev 1
"
2516.00
Q430.73
13105-1 Rev 0
"
2522.00
Q440.28
18028-1 Rev 1
"
2523.00
Q440.32
13011-1 Rev 2
"
2524.00
Q440.44
18019-1 Rev 1
"
2527.00
Q440.54
14900-1 Rev 0
"
14903-1 Rev 0
2531.00
Q440.142 II.D.3
"
2553.00
Q480.5
14900-1 Rev 1
"
14903-1 Rev 1
i
2612.00
Ltr Aug 10, 1982
19000-1 Rev 0
2623.00
10000-C Rev 1
4
2624.00
TS Table 6.2-1
10003-C Rev 1
2627.00
TS Table 6.2.1
10003-C Rev 1
2628.00
TS Table 6.2.1
10003-C Rev 1
2629.00
10003-C Rev 1
2631,00
10000-C Rev 1
2632.00
10000-C Rev 1
2640.00
Procedure Not Identified
i
2642.00
Procedure In Draft
"
2643.00
2646.00
Procedure Not Identified
l
2673.00
00156-C Rev 0
l
- -
--
._ _ _ _ _ . ,
-
- _ _ _
. . _ .
_,
_
.
.
l
35
l
For Commitments 1768 and 1769 see Paragraph 22 TMI item I.C.2
compliance.
The following commitments utilized the Regulatory Compliance
Tracking system to locate the implementing document.
The
implementation of these commitments were at time of the readiness
review work were mostly listed as being in a draft procedure.
Commitment
Implementing
Number
Source
Document
1344.00
FSAR 10.4.4.4
1-3AB-02
911.00
FSAR 2.5.4.13.2
Procedure in Draft
789.00
FSAR 1.9.45
Procedure in Draft
827.90
FSAR 2.9.93
14230-1 Rev 1
14235-1 Rev 0
1117.00
FSAR 7.5.2.3.3.3.B
Deleted by FSAR Change
1120.00
FSAR 7.6.2.2.D
13011-1 Rev 2
1121.00
FSAR 7.6.4
12002-1 Rev 1
12006-1 Rev 1
2530.00
NRC Q440.116
12006-1 Rev 1
2640.00
00152-C Rev 0
2642.00
00152-C Rev 0
2724.00
FSAR 10.2.3.6.D
12002-1 Rev 1
1207.00
FSAR 9.3.3.5
11211-1 Rev 0
1094.00
FSAR 7.2.2.2.3.N
10000-C Rev 1
1095.00
FSAR 7.2.2.2.3.R
20000-C Rev 1
1101.00
FSAR 7.2.2.5
No Procedure
1106.00
FSAR 7.3.1.2.2.5.8
14600-1 Rev 0
1061.00
FSAR 6.3.1
00050-C Rev 5
1063.00
FSAR 6.3.2.2.16
12002-1 Rev 1
1064.00
FSAR 6.2.2.2.17
11105-C Rev 0
11011-1 Rev 2
11006-1 Rev 1
11115-1 Rev 0
1065.00
FSAR 6.3.2.2.17
11105-C Rev 0
1066.00
FSAR 6.3.2.2.17
11105-C Rev 0
11115-1 Rev 0
Commitment 827 pertains to proper implementation of a Technical
Specification (TS) for electrical systems per Regulatory Guide 1.9.9.3.
T.S.
Surveillance Item 4.8.1.1.1.a will require that
each independent circuit between the offsite transmission network
and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System be determined OPERABLE
at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment
and indicated power availability.
Procedure 14230-1, "AC Source
Verification", was established to implement this requirement,
L
.
36
however, only verifies independent systems up to the Reserve
Auxiliary Transformers. This procedure needs to include verifi-
cation to the IE Class power to ensure that two independent AC
power sources exist.
The inspector determined that this would
have constituted an NRC violation. A second issue was noted to
the licensee regarding TS surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.b.
This item has
been proposed for deletion by the licensee based on the plant
design not having a typical PWR transfer setup on the class 1E bus
between normal and alternate power supplies.
The inspector
informed the licensee that this surveillance pertains to all
transfer devices that interface with the " independent circuits
between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E
Distribution System." A review of FSAR Fig. 8.3.1-1 indicates the
following busses would be included in this surveillance:
INAA,
INAB, INA01, INA04, INA03, IAA02 and 1.BA03.
Both items will be
reviewed closer to licensing and tracked as IFI 50-424/86-60-03
" Review Technical Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.1 Implementa-
tion Procedure for Proper Verification of independent AC Power
Sources".
Commitment 1120 concerns the implementation of FSAR Section
7.6.2.2.D which states that the bypass of RHRS interlocks at the
local station is under strict administrative control with the
valves locked closed to prevent unauthorized opening of the
valves.
The valves in question are 1-HV-8701A, 1-HV-8701B,
1-HV-8702A and 1-HV-8702B are the RHR isolation valves utilized
during cooldown and must be maintained shut during Modes 1, 2 and
3.
The implementing document 13011-1, "Re sidt.al Heat Removal
System" controls the opening and locking of the power supplies to
prevent operation from the control room as part of placing RHR in
standby. The inspector questioned the licensee why the manual
handwheels were not locked and what procedure controls this
evolution. The inspector noted that P&ID 1X4D122 does not denote
these valves as being locked closed. In order to track this item
the following is identified IFI 50-424/86-60-11 " Review Licensee
Response to the Locking of Four RHR Valves Pursuant to FSAR
Section 7.6.2.2.0".
During the process of locating the above commitments the inspector
was informed that the Readiness Review data base had not been
baselined into the Regulatory Compliance Commitment data base.
The baseline process would ensure that the Regulatory Compliance
data base contains all commitments in order to prevent maintaining
two data bases.
In order to ensure that the baseline process is
completed the following inspector follow-up item is identified.
IFI 50-424/86-60-04 " Review Results of Baselining the Regulatory
Compliance Computer database with the Readiness Review Module 7
Database".
,
f
1
L
.
37
(2) Maintenance Area Reviewer
Commitment
Implementing
Number
Source
Document
949
FSAR 3.9.8
00412-C, Rev. I
14801-1, Rev. 0
14802-1, Rev. 0
14803-1, Rev. 0
14807-1, Rev. 0
14809-1, Rev. 0
14810-1, Rev. 0
964
FSAR 3.11.B
00350-C, Rev. 1
00420-C, Rev 0
967
FSAR 3.11.B.3-1
00420-C, Rev. O
1003
FSAR 5.2.3.4.1
00851-C, Rev. 2
'
20004-C, Rev. I
1004
FSAR 5.2.3.4.6
20406-C, Rev. 1
1005
FSAR 5.2.4
00411-C, Rev. 1
1024
FSAR 6.2.2.2.4.2.2
14806-1, Rev. 0
1089
FSAR 6.6.1
20100-C, Rev. 1
00411-C, Rev. O
i-
00412-C, Rev. I
1101
FSAR 7.2.2.5
00100-C, Rev. 4
1105
FSAR 7.3.1.2.2.5.2
25731-C, Rev. 4
1141
FSAR 8.3.1.1.3.3.K
25505-C, Rev. 0
1153
FSAR 8.3.2.2
00851-C, Rev. 2
2725
FSAR 10.4.9.4
11610-1, Rev. 1
00304-C, Rev. 7
,
00308-C, Rev. O
00350-C, Rev. I
1500
FSAR 12.5.3.2.9
00254-C, Rev. 2
00350-C, Rev. I
1564
FSAR 13.1.1.1.2.4
003500C, Rev. 1
1565
FSAR 13.1 1 1 2.4
00350-C, Rev. 1
'
1566
FSAR 13.1.1.1.2.4
00350-C, Rev. I
4
1567
FSAR 13.1.1.1.2.4
00350-C, Rev. 1
1802
FSAR 13.5.2.2
00050-C, REv. 5, 00400-C, Rev. 0
1803
FSAR 13.5.2.2
00050-C, Rev. 5
2354
Generic Letter
10006-C, Rev. 1
83-28
2355
Generic Letter
14420-1, Rev. 1
83-28
2369
Commitment Tracking #3021
2370
Commitment Tracking #3022
2371
Commitment Tracking #3023
2372
Commitment Tracking #3023
2383
Commitment Tracking #3024
2374
Commitment Tracking #3025
2375
.-
-
- - _ _ _
__
_
_ _ _ - . _
_ _ _
_. _ ,
_.
._ _
._.
O
o
38
2376
Commitment Tracking #2967
2377
Commitment Tracking #2974
2378
Commitment Tracking #2974
2379
Commitment Tracking #3028
2381
Commitment Tracking #2968
2382
Commitment Tracking #2969
2888
Discussed with Reg. Compl.
2383
Commitment Tracking 2971
2889
Commitment Tracking 9657
2488
NRC Q430.17
13146-1, Rev. 0
2495
NRC Q430.26
19000-1, Rev. 0
19010-1, Rev. 0
19030-1, Rev. 0
2507
NRC Q430.45
25505-C, Rev. 0
2508
NRC Q430.45
25505-C, Rev. 0
2512
NRC Q430.62
28908-C, Rev. 1
26909-C, Rev. 0
2513
NRC Q430.62
27740-C, Rev. 2
2519
NRC Q440.10
00350-C, Rev. 1
20015-C, Rev. 4
2609
NRC Q730.1
14900-C, Rev. 0
2651
Tech Spec. 6.8.1.A 00050-C, Rev. 5
2660
Tech Spec. 6.8.4.A
55010-1, Rev. 0
55011-1, Rev. 1
55012-1, Rev. 0
55013-1, Rev. 0
55014-1, Rev. 0
55016-1, Rev. 0
2661
Tech Spec. 6.8.4.A 55010-1, Rev. 0
55011-1, Rev. 1
55012-1, Rev. 0
55013-1, Rev. 0
55014-1, Rev. 0
55016-1, Rev. 0
2662
Tech Spec 6.8.4.A.I 20015-C, Rev. 4
2691
Tech Spec 6.10.2.B 00100-C, Rev. 4
00350-C, Rev. 1
2692
Tech Spec 6.10.2.0 00100-C, Rev. 4
00404-C, Rev.
2693
Tech Spec 6.10.2.E 00100-C, Rev. 4
2695
Tech Spec 6.10.3.A 00100-C, Rev. 4
b)
Section 4.1.1.5, Logkeeping
This section describes the types of logs, who maintains the logs and in
general what information is contained within the logs.
Procedure
10001-C, Rev 2 "Logkeeping" was reviewed.
This procedure contains
additional detail on specific activities which would be recorded.
Logkeeping practices in the control room were reviewed on various days
to determine compliance with this procedure.
In general, compliance
L
.
39
was noted, however, to have a complete understanding of the activities
being logged one has to review . test logs.
An example of this was
repeated logging of Reactor Coolant Pump stopping and starting without
stating the purpose or test in progress.
Management attention is
needed to improve performance in this area.
c)
Section 4.1.2, Equipment and Plant Status Controls
This section describes the methods by which operators remain aware of
and control equipment and plant status. There are seven subparts to
this section.
Each subpart was reviewed against the applicable plant
procedure as listed below. Plant tours were conducted to determine the
level of compliance commensurate with the test status and plant
conditions.
Section
Procedure
4.1.2.1 Operability Status Indication
10005-C
4.1.2.2 Clearance and Tagging
00304-C
4.1.2.3 System Alignments
10000-C
4.1.2.4 Independent Verification
00308-C
4.1.2.5 Key Control
00008-C
4.1.2.6 Rounds Sheets
10001-C
4.1.2.7 Equipment Labeling
10016-C
The review of the procedures and practices determined that basic
implementation has occurred except for independent verification and
that the Readiness Review Module reflects these procedural programs.
d)
Section 4.1.3, Housekeeping and Cleanliness
This section describes controls established to ensure plant areas meet
established cleanliness.
Procedure 00254-C, Rev 2 " Plant Housekeeping
and Cleanliness Control" establishes a program of monthly inspections
to be performed by the superintendents of the various departments. The
inspector reviewed the results of the inspections by examining the data
forms in Document Control. The inspector noted that only the Warehouse
and Warehouse Receiving Building were being consistently inspected.
Areas such as the Maintenance Building and Service Building, and River
Intake Structure have been inspected at least once but appear to have
not been inspected for at least three months. Other areas such as the
Water Treatment Building, Fire Pumphouses, Administration Building,
Nuclear Training Center, and Meteorological Tower should have been
inspected but no records exist.
The remaining areas in the procedure
are under construction control and inspection by operations is not
necessary. The licensee was requested to review the item to determine
the current status of inspection. This item will be tracked as IFI
50-424/86-60-05 " Review the Inspection Status of Regarding Plant
Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control".
._.
.
40
e)
Section 4.1.4, Fire Prevention and Firefighting
This section describes the measures to be established as part of the
fire protection program. This area will not be evaluated as ,part of
this module but will be inspected during the NRC fire protection team
inspection. This will allow time for construction to be completed and
the procedures to be established to support a more meaningful review.
f)
Section 4.1.5, Control Room Design Review
This section describes the basic effort to upgrade the control room,
emergency response facilities and procedures.
This area will be
evaluated by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and not as a part
of this module,
g)
Section 4.2.1, Control of Maintenance
This section of the module described the process by which maintenance
activities are identified, controlled, and documented to ensure proper
implementation.
<
The following procedures were reviewed which implement requirements
pertaining to the above areas:
Procedure No.
Revision
Title
00304-C
7
Equipment Clearance and Tagging
00306-C
1
Temporary Jumper and Lifted
Wire Control
00350-C
1
Maintenance Program
00420-C
0
Equipment Qualification Program
00853-C
4
Material Identification, Control
and Issue
85301-C
0
Work Planning Group and Hold
Point Assignment
Based on this review the inspector has determined that commitments made
in this area appeared to be implemented.
!
The licensee has implemented a maintenance program in accordance with
the startup manual during the preoperational test phase. This program
is similar to the programs being established for operations.
The
inspector has observed the implementation of this program during this
readiness review.
To date approximately 558 of 568 maintenance
mechanical & electrical procedures have been issued.
The licensee
intends to work as many of these procedures as possible during the
preoperational test program to ensure their workability.
These
procedures combined with the additional programatic elements required
of a plant in the operational phase should comprise an adequate
maintenance program.
!
i
1
.
.
-
-
.
..
.
41
These procedures combined with the additional programatic elements
required of a plant in the operational phase should comprise an
adequate maintenance program.
h)
Section 4.2.2 Control of Modifications
This section of the module describes the process by which planned
changes in plant structure, systems, or components are accomplished to
ensure that implementaticn is in accordance with the requirements and
limitations of applicable procedures, codes, standards, specifications,
licenses, and predetermined safety restrictions.
The following procedures were reviewed which inplement requirements
pertaining to the above areas:
Procedure No.
Revised
Title
00056-C
1
Safety Evaluations
00400-C
0
Plant Modifications
00307-C
0
50005-C
0
Request for Engineering
Assistance
Based on this review the inspector has determined that commitments made
in this area appeared to be implemented.
The licensee has implemented a modification control program during the
preoperational test phase. The inspector has observed implementation
of this program during the readiness review.
These procedures combined with the additional programatic elements
required of a plant in the operational phase should comprise an
adequate plant modification control program.
1)
Section 4.2.6.1, Preventive Maintenance
This section of the module describes the program by which equipment
maintenance is to be conducted to minimize unplanned outages due to
breakdown, to maintain equipment in a satisfactory condition for safe
operation, and to assure equipment operates at its maximum efficiency.
Preventive maintenance includes, but is not limited to, tasks such as
inspection, lubrication, megger testing, calibration, and verification
of operability.
Preventive maintenance also incorporates scheduling
equipment qualifiction requirements for plant equipment and components.
L
.
42
The folowing procedures were reviewed which implement requirements
pertaining to the above areas:
Procedure No.
Revision-
Title
00350-C
1
Maintenance Program
20015-C
4
Planned Maintenance
Based on this review the inspector has determined that commitments made
in this area appeared to be implemneted.
The license has implemented a preventive maintenance program in
accordance with the startup manual procedure no. SUM-25 during the
preoperational test phase. This program is consistent with preventive
and storage maintenance identified and performed by construction
personnel. The inspector has observed implementation of this program
during the readiness review.
Preventive maintenance checklist are presently being generated for the
operations phase.
These will be implemented upon system release to
operations.
j)
Section 4.2.6.2, Predictive Maintenance
This section of the module describes a program which is an extension of
the preventive maintenance program. .This program consists of
monitoring key parameters such as vibration analysis, fluid analysis,
infrared surveillance, and failure anlysis as appropriate to diagnose
impending equipment failure and to schedule maintenance at the most
appropriate time.
The following procedures were reviewed which implement requirements
pertaining to the above areas:
Procedure No.
Revision
Title
00350-C
1
Maintenance Program
20016-C
0
Predictive Maintenance Program
The liscensee is presently developing the predictive maintenance data
base.
Implementation of the program to obtain base line -data is
scheduled to begin once equipment is up and running for an extended
period of time.
k)
Section 4.4, Coordination Activities
This section describes the activities which coordinate plant operations
and support. There are four subparts as follows:
4.4.1
Procedures
4.4.2 Manuals and Drawings
L_
.
43
4.4.3
Data Processing
4.4.4
Planning and Scheduling
Section 4.4.1 was evaluated by reviewing the plant . procedures which
establish the format, terminology, component identification, and
writing styles for the various type procedures. Procedures reviewed in
conjunction with the evaluation of commitments were noted as being in
conformance with the guidelines. One problem was noted between the
body of procedures and data forms where the required signatures for
each completed step were not consistent. This item had been identified
by the licensee as part of this readiness review area and corrective
action is in progress. The following plant procedures were reviewed
which govern the writing, and control the use of procedures.
00050-C Rev 5
Procedure Development
00051-C Rev 3
Procedure Review and Approval
00052-C Rev 2
Temporary Changes to Procedures
00053-C Rev 0
Temporary Procedures
00054-C Rev 0
Rules for Performing Procedures
10011-C Rev 8
Operations Procedure Preparation and
Review Guidelines
10012-C Rev 2
E0P and AOP Writers Guide
10013-C Rev 1
Writing E0P from the Westinghouse ERG
10014-C Rev 0
Verification of E0P
20409-C Rev 0
Maintenance Procedure Review and
Qualification Checklist
A random sample of department procedures were reviewed for compliance
with Plant Administrative Guidelines, Regulatory Guides, and applicable
codes and standards listed below:
-
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2
-
ANSI N 18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance
for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants
-
-
00050-C, Rev 5, Procedure Development
-
00051-C, Rev 3, Procedures Review and Approval
-
00052-C, Rev 2, Temporary Changes to Procedures
-
00053-C, Rev 0, Temporary Procedures
-
00054-C, Rev 0, Rules for Performing Procedures
-
00056-C, Rev 0, Safety Evaluation
The following procedures were reviewed for compliance:
System Operating Procedures:
13115-1, Rev 0, Containment Spray System
13130-1, Rev 0, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control
13146-1, Rev 0, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System
_
-
.
.
44
13150-1, Rev 0, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
13610-1, Rev 0, Auxiliary Feedwater System
Operations Surveillance Procedures:
14465-1, Rev 0, Accumulator Isolation M0V Power Disconnect
Verification
14485-1, Rev 0, Containment Spray System Flow Path
Verification
14505-1, Rev 0, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves Partial
Stroke Functional Test
14495-1, Rev 0, Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Path
Verification
14804-1, Rev 0, Safety Injection Pump Inservice Test
14842-1, Rev 0, Main Steam Isolation Valves Partial Stroke
Functional Test
14845-1, Rev 0, Containment Spray System Valves Quarterly
Inservice Test
14910-1, Rev 1, RCS Leakage Inspection
Instrumentation and Control Surveillance Procedures:
24204-1, Rev 0, Feedwater Pump Speed Control P-509 Channel
Calibration
24221-1, Rev 0, Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Train B
Supply and Return Flow Loops F-1641A and
F-1641B Channel Calibration
24238-1, Rev 1, NSCW Flow for Diesel Generator F-1650A and
F-16508 Channel Calibration
24342-1, Rev 0, Pressurizer Level Control F-121 Channel
Calibration
24363-1, Rev 1, RHR Heat Exchanger #1 Outlet H-606
Channel Calibration
24376-1, Rev 0, Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve
Control Loop 3000 Channel Calibration
24484-1, Rev 0, Steam Generator #3 Level Control F-531
Loop Functional Test and Calibration
l.
24528-1, Rev 0, Pressurizer Pressure Protection
Channel IV Loop P-458 Analog Channel
Operational Test and Channel Calibration
The inspector concluded that an adequate program has been established
to develop procedures and procedures are being developed to the
program. The inspector notes that due to the status of construction
and testing the majority of procedures have not been in actual use.
The plant test program does utilize plant procedures to the maximum
extent practicable for operating and maintenance procedures.
It is
expected that operations surveillance and maintenance surveillance
procedures will be utilized as much as possible prior to fuel load.
.
_
_
_
_
_ -.-
.
-
--
_
.
..
45
The inspector also notes that the inadequacy of procedure 00051-C need
to be resolved as addressed in paragraph 23 o.
1)
Section 4.4.2 references Readiness Review Module 5 and Appendix 0 and
this was not reviewed.
m)
Section 4.4.3 pertains to the following Data Processing systems:
Nuclear Plant Management Information System
Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System
Nuclear Network
Nuclear Operations Records Management System
The evaluation of this section was performed by having the licensee
discuss the input / output features and through discussions with plant
staff.
In addition to the above computer systems the Technical
Specifications Surveillance Tracking System was also reviewed.
The Nuclear Plant Management Information System provides computer
control for maintenance work orders, plant equipment, preventative
maintenance and inventory control.
Each display format and data base
structure was reviewed with the licensee. Maintenance work order (MWO)
processing flow was discussed in detail. As an MWO is reviewed by the
various disciplines various support data files can be accessed, such
as, a three year history, applicable procedures, technical specifica-
tion, vendor and equipment data.
These files provide for a more
in-depth review capability.
The MWO are each statused as they are
processed to completion.
This system also provides the necessary
failure data to the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System. Inventory
control is also a major portion of this system, however was not
reviewed in detail.
Future improvements to the system will include a
clearance tagging and control system.
The inspector concluded that
this computer system is a major benefit for the licensee, greatly
enhances the level of research and review which can be conducted by the
plant staff and should provide the necessary level of support to meet
the needs of the plant in the future. It was noted, however, that data
is still being loaded to the support files. One area of particular
note is the technical specification (TS) surveillance file. This file
is waiting finalization of the TS. While the impact at this point is
minimal, the lack of data hinders the overall system capabilities.
The Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System was found to not be in actual
use.
Procedures are being developed to control the use of the system
l
at the Plant level.
Engineering is currently making entries to
!
baseline the data base with component and system data.
Component
failure data should start at the time the plant reaches commercial
,
!
operation.
-
_ _ .
.
..
,
46
The Nuclear Network was found to be in use at the Plant. Information
is being distributed to various department coordinators for use.
Important information such as INPO significant event reports are
incorporated into the Operational Assessment Program in order to
achieve traceability and resolution of each item.
The Nuclear Operations Records Management Systen was found to be
implemented at the Plant.
This system is a state-of-the-art type
system to maintain and enhance the retrieval of documents. This system
utilizes multiple cross-referencing schemes to allow for rapid location
of documents.
The data entry process appears to capture sufficient
data to support this function.
The inspector reviewed the various
computer display formats that are utilized by the end user and
determined that the system will be an exceptional tool. Currently a
backlog of maintenance work orders, construction and operations records
need to be entered in order to have full use of the systems capabili-
ties.
The Technical Specification Surveillance Tracking Program was also
demonstrated to the inspector.
The data bases and programming
parameters were discussed.
This system will track the completion
status for all surveillance with one month or longer periodicity.
Department coordinators are established and are providing the necessary
data to support the system. This system, when fully functional, should
support the plant's needs to ensure that technical specification
surveillances are completed at the required periodicities.
The overall conclusion was that the plant has or will have computer
systems which should greatly improve plant performance if fully
utilized by the plant staff, however, data loading time delays degrade
the capabilities.
n)
Section 5.1, Audit Summaries
This section summarizes the various audit activities of the following
groups:
-
GPC Quality Assurance Audits
-
NRC Audits
INP0 Evaluation Visit
-
-
Southern Company Services Audit
Plant E.I. Hatch Management Assistance Visit
-
These audit activities were considered by the applicant to be pertinent
to this module. Table 5.1-1 lists each finding, response and status.
The inspector selected three GPC audit findings and verified the
corrective action implemented agreed with the response.
The NRC
findings were reviewed against the complete NRC list of findings. This
review indicated that the applicant had identified all items pertinent
.
47
to this module.
It was noted that Unresolved Item 50-424/85-07-02 as
described in the module is open vice closed as listed. The GPC project
listing was verified to have this item in an open status.
In order to
evaluate the effectiveness of the GPC QA
organization since the readiness review effort was completed the
inspector reviewed QA audit findings regarding this area.
The
following audits were reviewed:
Audit
Titled
OP15-85/12
Maintenance Program
OP09-85/13
Surveillance Program
SP01-85/14
Readiness Review Module 7
OP21-86/02
Corrective Action Program
OP07-86/06
Material Control
0P09-86/08
Records Management & Document Control
OP13-86/09
Design Control & Plant Modification Control
OP10-86/13
Test Equipment Calibration & Control
0P01-86/14
Administrative Controls & Reporting Requirements
OP15/19-86/15
Procedure Control & Review / Records Management
and Document Control
Of particular note was. audit report OP15/19-86/15 where the QA auditor
reviewed the corrective action of regarding readiness review findings
- 7-5, #7-9, #7-12, #7-15 and #7-16 which pertain to this module.
In
this review the auditor determined that items #7-5 and #7-9 were not
fully implemented.
The inspector considered this determination to be
indicative of an objective QA audit.
The results of the audit for
items #7-5 and #7-9 are discussed in. paragraph 7 of this report.
Overall the inspection concluded that this section of the module does
reflect the audits that pertain to this area and that the QA program is
aggressively pursuing an effective. audit program.
o)
Section 6.2, Findings and Responses
This section of the module contains the conclusions of the Readiness
Review Team as a result of the team's findings. The overall evaluation
of the findings determined that four categories exist which charac-
terize the results as follows:
-
Inadequate administrative controls
-
Inadequate procedures
l
-
Inadequate procedure review
'
-
Procedure noncompliance
l
!
l
l
!
t
. .
,
48
The review of this section consisted of reading the finding as
presented in the module; reviewing the actual documentation which
documents the finding and' project response; verifying selected
commitments are now implemented; and discussions with knowledgeable
project personnel. The following findings were reviewed:
- 7-1
Inservice Inspection
- 7-3
Startup Procedures
- 7-4
Data Collection
- 7-5
Procedure Qualifications
- 7-6
Procedure Revisions
- 7-9
Temporary Procedure Revisions
- 7-10
Standing Orders
- 7-11
Surveillance Procedure Writing
- 7-12
Maintenance Procedures
- 7-14
Surveillance Procedure Electrical
- 7-15
Housekeeping Requirements
- 7-16
Overtime
- 7-17
Fire Brigade Leader
- 7-18
Fire Hazards
- 7-20
Storage, Handling and Shipping
- 7-21
Startup Test
The following findings of the Readiness Review Team, classified by the
project as nonfinding, were also examined to determine the validity and
appropriateness of the response:
- 7-2
- 7-7
Procedure Approval Authority
- 7-8
Annunciator Response Procedures
- 7-13
Control of Measuring and Test Equipment
- 7-19
Source Range Count Rate
Finding #7-4 concerns a finding that no plan or program could be found
in Operations, Maintenance, or Engineering departments to collect data
related to transient or operational cycles for components in Table
5.7-1 of Technical Specification. The project response determined the
root cause to be related to the commitment assignment process and
conducted a program to have commitments evaluated for correct
department assignment. The inspector's review of this item determined
that the project did not address the subject of establishing a plan or
program to collect the data.
In order to ensure that an adequate
program or plan is established the following is identified.
IFI
50-424/86-60-06 " Review the Establishment of a Plan to Collect and
Evaluate Transient or Operational Cycles for Adequacy".
Finding #7-5 concerns a finding that objective evidence that mainten-
ance procedures had been reviewed by appropriately qualified personnel
was not available.
The GPC QA audit OP18/19-86/15 did an indepth
review of the area of reviewer qualification. Programmatic concerns of
the original concern were extended in the audit to other departments.
e ,
,
49
A sample of reviewer qualifications resulted in a determination that
problems still exist in providing objective evidence and a final
overall conclusion that the readiness review finding has not been fully
corrected.
The inspector agrees with the results of this audit.
Finding #7-9_ concerns a finding that two of four temporary changes
(TCP) to procedures issued were processed improperly.
GPC QA audit
OP18/19-86/15 attempted to verify that the routing and issuance of
TCP's by selecting seventeen TCP's and reviewing their status. This
'
.
verification instead disclosed numerous discrepancies and overall
process problems.
This resulted in an overall conclusion that
procedure 00051-C, Rev 2 " Temporary Changes to Proc.edures" was
inadequate. The inspector agrees with the results of this audit.
Findings #7-5 and #7-9 both represent a lack of achieving in-depth
corrective action beyond the original
finding.
The inspector
determined that the GPC QA group has done a more extensive job at
determining the root cause.
In order to further evaluate the final
corrective action the following IFI is identified.
50-424/86-60-07
" Review Corrective Action Regarding Item #7-5 and #7-9 of Readiness
Review Module 7".
The inspector concluded, except for the following above listed items,
that project responses to the findings were appropriate and implemented
per commitments contained in the responses.
p)
Section 7.0, Assessment
This section contains a summary of open corrective actions associated
with the readiness review findings. Additionally, statements assessing
the acceptability of the readiness review from the readiness review
quality assurance representative, the nuclear operations organizations,
and the readiness review board are included. Resumes of the personnel
instrumental in the development of Module 7 were also included. This
,
section was reviewed for content only.
(
,
l
l
!
,
L
- *
, ,
Sgp 9 41986
Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425
License Nos. CPPR-108, CPPR-109
Georgia. Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. J. H. Miller, Jr.
President
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-424/86-60 AND 50-425/86-27)
This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted by
Messrs. H. H. Livermore, J. F. Rogge, and R. J. Schepens on July 1 - August 11,
1986.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your. Vogtle
facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with
those members of your staff identified inthe enclosed inspection report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and
representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities
in progress.
The inspection findings indicate that certain activities violated NRC require-
ments.
The violation, references to pertinent requirements, and elements to be
included in your response are presented in the enclosed Notice of Violation.
Your attention is invited to an unresolved item identified in the inspection
report.
This matter will be pursued during future inspections.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures
'
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The response directed by this letter and the enclosures are not subject to the
clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget issued under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
1
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
j
Sincerely,
Original Signed by
Luis A. Reyes /for
Roger D. Walker, Director
,
Division of Reactor Projects
?
Enclosures:
'
1.
2.
NRC Inspection Report
l
cc w/encis:
(See page 2)
L
SEP o 11996
* .*
.
Georgia Power Company
,2
cc w/encis:
-J. P. O'Reilly, Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations
R. E. Conway, Senior Vice President &-
Project Director
D. O. Foster, Vice President, Project
Support
P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project
Engineering
R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Project
Construction
J. T. Beckham,_Vice President &
General Manager - Operations
R. A. Thomas, Vice President,
Licensing
D. S. Read, General Manager,
-Quality Assurance
C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality
Assurance Manager
W. C. Ramsey, Manager -
Readiness Review
G. B. Bockhold, General Manager,
Nuclear Operations
L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety
and Licensing
M. H. Googe, Project
Construction Manager
E. D. Groover, Quality
Assurance Site Manager -
Construction
J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing
Manager
G. F. Trowbridge, Esq., Shaw,
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
-B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw,
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
E. L. Blake, Jr. , Esq. , Shaw,
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
J. E. Joiner, Troutman, Sanders,
Lockerman and Ashmore
J. G. Ledbetter, Commissioner,
Department of Human Resources
C. H. Badger, Office of Planning
and Budget
D. Kirkland, III, Counsel,
Office of the Consumer's Utility
Council
,
D. C. Teper, Georgians Against
?
Nuclear Energy
(cc w/encls cont'd - see page 3)
u
- * *'
- '
-
,
SEP 0 41956
4
Georgia Power Company
3
(cc-w/encls cont'd)
M. B. Margulies, Esq., Chairman,
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel
Dr. O. H. Paris, Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel
G. A. Linenberger, Jr., Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel
B. P. Garde, Citizens Clinic, Director
Government Accountability Project
- bcc w/encls:
E. Reis, ELD
W. M. Hill, IE
M. Miller, NRR
W. Brach, EDO
M. Sinkule, RII
E. Christnot, RII
NRC Resident Inspector
Document Control Desk
State of Georgia
.
l
!
!
l
1
!,
RII
RII
RII
7
S
f >L
4.,
7,$
'
EChristnot:cdg
MSinkule
VLFrownlee
08/Mt/86
082y/86
08/;;/86