ML20209E079
| ML20209E079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1987 |
| From: | Russell J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B481 | List: |
| References | |
| 237.2(B), 237.2(B)-R02, 237.2(B)-R2, NUDOCS 8702040596 | |
| Download: ML20209E079 (18) | |
Text
r TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUMBER:
2 TITLE:
ELECTRICAL PROTECTION DESIGN 400 to 500 Breakers Unacceptably Set.
National Electrical Code and Good PAGE 1 0F 17 Engineering Practices Violated.
Limitorque Valve Operators Inadequately Fused.
REASON FOR REVISION:
1.
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments.
1 2.
Added chronology to Section 9 and added Section 10, Corrective Action.
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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SIGNATURE DATE SIGdATURE*
DATE APPROVED BY:
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CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
i
e TVA Ef'PLOVEE CONCERidS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 2 0F 17 1.
CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE (S):
Concerns:
Issues:
VI-85-100-021 a.
Unacceptable trip ratings were "Petween 400 and 500 breakers selected for a large number of were unacceptable set. EN DES molded case breakers.
practices and attitudes con-cerning these breakers were b.
Engineering practices and attitudes poor.
The National Electrical in the selection of molded case Code and good engineering breaker trip ratings were poor.
The practices were violated."
National Electrical Code and good engineering practices were violated.
IN-85-332-001 "Limitorque valve operators are c.
Fuse size selection for valve found without enough margin to operators does not allow enough provide for emergency operation, margin for emergency operation.
They are fused to protect motor, not the circuit.
Example: ERCW d.
Fuse sizes are selected to protect valves in 5th diesel generator the valve operator motors and building are fused at 5.2 amps not the circuits (e.g., ERCW
.while running current is 4 amps.
valves in fifth diesel generator Generic to both units."
building).
2.
HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X N0 o
Identified by Black and Veatch Date October 10, 1982 Black and Veatch Finding Report - Findings F-136 and F-137, (10/30/82) o Identified by TVA SON NSRS Date Circa Jan.1984 - June 1986 Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report No. R-84-19-WBN, NSRS Assessment of the Results of Black and Yeatch Independent Design Review of The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System, dates of review 01/10/84 through 06/15/84 o
Identified by TVA SNP GCTF Date June C,1986 TVA Sf!P - Ceneric Conccen Task Force Report CCR 29-29, Limitorque Valve Operator Fusing, R1 (06/06/86) 03120 - 01/13/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION hUf1BER:
2 PAGE 3 0F 17 t
3.
DOCUMENT NOS., TAG NOS., LOCATIONS, OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT:
Concerns apply to all safety-related molded case circuit breakers used in 480 volt combination motor starters and to all power fuses for safety-related valve operators.
a.
INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
Files WI-25-100 and IN-85-332 were reviewed and no additional information regarding these concerns was identified.
5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
See Appendix A.
6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
7.
LIST REOUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See Appendix A.
P.
EVALUATION PROCESS:
a.
Reviewed available transcripts of NRC investigative interviews to extract information applicable to the employee concerns.
b.
Reviewed existing reports, findings, and responses to findings to assess their adequacy and the extent to which they satisfy the employee concerns. These included applicable Construction, QA/QC, Operations, and Material Control element reports for the TVA Employee Concerns Special Program.
i c.
Reviewed licensing documents, codes, design guides, and standards to determine the basis for breaker trip ratings and fuse selection.
03130 - 01/13/P7
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRM1 i
REVISION AUMBER: 2 PACE 4 0F 17 d.
Reviewed sample design calculations and time-current curves to verify compliance of calculated breaker trip ratings with licensing documents, codes, design guides, and standards.
Planned to review sample design documents, including drawings e.
and tabulations, to establish that breaker trip rating selection is supported by design calculations and curves.
Lack of detail in preliminary calculations precluded comparison with design documents.
f.
Planned to review design documents, including drawings and tabulations, to establish that fuse selection is supported by design, calculations, and curves.
The unavailability of calculations prevented comparison with design documents.
P.
DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS:
Chronology:
10/30/82: Circuit breaker setting problem identified in Black and Yeatch report for Watts Bar 11/14/83: Task force for Review of Black and Yeatch Findings for Sequoyah determined the circuit breaker setting problem not applicable to Sequoyah Of/85:
Fuse selection concern submitted to TVA 11 /85:
Circuit breaker setting concern submitted to TVA 0E/06/86: Generic Concern Task Force concluded the fuse selection concern not valid for Sequoyah 10/86:
Preliminary calculations issued to verify existing circuit breaker trip ratings Discussion:
a.
The concern that a considerable number of breakers were unacceptably set was expressed for the Watts Bar Plant.
This issue was identified also in the Black and Veatch Findings Report and subsequently reviewed in the TVA Task Force Report, " Evaluation of Black and Yeatch Findings," and in NSRS Report No. R-84-19-WBN.
03130 - 01/13/87
E TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERidS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRR4 REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 5 0F 17 The concern at Watts Bar was directed at the setting of molded case adjustable instantaneous circuit breakers applied for short circuit protection in motor control center combination starters. At Sequoyah, nonadjustable time limit (thermal magnetic) circuit breakers were used in the combination starters, differing from Watts Bar.
Thermal magnetic circuit breakers are factory-set and cannot be adjusted in the field.
In its evaluation for Sequoyah, the TVA Task Force for Review of Black and Yeatch Findings determined that the concern does not apply to Sequoyah because the circuit breakers do not use adjustable instantaneous trips.
However, for this report the concern is considered to cover a potential generic problem: the proper selection and application of molded case circuit breakers for short circuit protection in 480 volt combination motor starters.
This evaluation addresses the issue that selection of trip ratings for a large number of thermal magnetic circuit breakers may have been inappropriate.
The following criteria were in force when the original circuit breaker trip ratings were selected:
o FSAR Section 8.3.1.1, which states that the motor protector (circuit breaker) is selected and set to protect the motor and the cable; also, that the molded case circuit breaker provides short circuit protection.
o Design Criteria for Emergency Auxiliary Ac Power System (SON-DC-V-ll.4 and 11.5), which require conformance to applicable standards, including NFPA No. 70-1971 National Electrical Code (NEC).
This criteria document was superseded May 17, 1985 by Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 (see below).
o Design Standard DS-E9.2.1, " Motors - 460 Y Circuit Design
- Motor Control Center," which contained a table of typical trip ratings for thermal magnetic circuit breakers to protect a range of motor sizes.
Trip ratings for motors smaller than one-half horsepower are not included in the table. The standard states that manufacturers' data or test data take p.:cedence over the table and standards. This standard was superseded November 10, 1983 by Design Guide DG-E2.3.5 (see below).
0313D - Cl /13/87
m e
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION hUMBER:
2 PAGE 6 0F 17 These criteria fomed the basis for the original selection of circuit breaker trip ratings. Whether or not calculations formed part of the selection process is not clear.
In any case, documentation of the original selection cannot be found and TVA is preparing new calculations to verify the existing trip ratings.
Although the new calculations have not been completed, initial assessment by TVA predicts that only a small number of trip ratings will be found unsatisfactory.
Circuit breakers with unsatisfactory trip ratings will be replaced prior to restart of SQN.
Until final calculations are completed and can be evaluated, the magnitude of the problem remains undetermined.
A preliminary draft of the new calculations was reviewed and it was noted by the evaluation team that:
o Complete reference to current criteria was not included.
ANSI Standard N45.2.ll, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," requires design analyses to be sufficiently detailed, including definition of design inputs (criteria) and their sources, so that a person technically qualified in the subject can review and understand the analyses and verify the adequacy of the results without recourse to the originator.
The current criteria include:
Design Criteria for Normal and Emergency Ac Power Systems (SQN DC-Y-ll.4.1) issued May 17,1985, which requires conformance to listed design guides, standards, and codes including NFPA No. 70-1971 NEC, but permits exceptions to these standards if not in i
conflict with other criteria in the design criteria document itself, without requiring documented justification or approval.
Design Guide DG-E2.3.5, "480 Volt Motor Branch-Circuit Design and Protection," which provides a table of trip ratings for thermal magnetic circuit breakers to protect a range of motor sizes similar to the table provided in the superseded Design Standard DS-E9.2.1 except that trip ratings for motors two horsepower and smaller are not included.
The guide requires verification of the values listed using motor nameplate or test data.
l i
0313D - 01/13/87 i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAft REVISION f. UMBER:
2 PAGE 7 0F 17 Neither of the above listed documents was included in the calculations under Section 3.0, Sources of Information.
DG-E2.3.5 was referenced in the body of the calculations but not in Section 5.1.4, Equipment Fault Protection.
o The preliminary calculations lacked an analysis of fault protection for small motor circuits.
No coordination curves could be found to demonstrate the degree of fault protection for small motor circuits, including adequacy of protection for the thermal overload heaters in the motor starters.
If full fault protection cannot be provided, the basis for the exceptions should be addressed in the calculations.
o The preliminary calculations did not include under Section 5.1.4, " Equipment Fault Protection," analyses of the protection for mctcrs or starter heaters.
In addition, in paragraph 5.1.4b, the calculations did not address the effects of high momentary fault currents discussed in Design Guide DC-E2.3.5 for contactors.
Paragraph 5.1.4b also contains a questionable statement:
that the fault protection should be set at 1300 percent of full load current according to the NEC.
The NEC requires thermal magnetic circuit breakers to be rated not to exceed 400 percent of full load current where the maximum trip rating is not sufficient for the starting current.
o The preliminary calculations did not include results which would permit a comparison of calculated trip ratings with values shown on design documents, e.g.,
drawings and tabulations.
o No mention was found in the preliminary calculations regarding coordination of circuit breakers and thermal overload relays in motor operated valve circuits.
This coordination, a requirement of Regulatory Guide No.
1.106, is needed to preclude false tripping when the valve is required to perform its safety function.
Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.106 is addressed in detail in Sequoyah Element Report 237.1.
0312D - 01/12/87
r
~
TVA EfPLOVEE CCNCERHS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION liuliBER:
2 PAGE 8 0F 17 Guidance for selection of trip ratings for thermal magnetic circuit breakers used for short circuit protection of motors is provided in Cesign Guide DG-E2.3.5.
As stated in Section 3.4 of this guide, the lowest trip rating available is 15 amperes.
DG-E2.3.5 states also that the 15 ampere limitation precludes application of thermal magnetic circuit breakers for short circuit protecticm cf motors two horsepower and smaller.
For motors in this range, no criterion or guidance has been found other than by reference in Design Criteria SCH-DC-V-ll.4.1 to the NEC, and the statement in Design Guide DG-E2.3.5 that the manufacturer's recommendations for protection devices should be considered.
Typical manufacturer's reconnendation's include selection of 15 ampere thermal magnetic circuit breakers for motors two through one-half horsepower.
These recommendations conflict with the NEC, which specifies a maximum trip rating of 150 to 250 percent of full load motor current depending on the motor code letter. Where the maximum trip rating is not sufficient for the starting current, the NEC permits the rating to be increased to, but not to exceed, 400 percent of full load current.
Assuming the lowest available trip rating to be 15 amperes, thermal magnetic circuit breakers do not satisfy NEC maximum limitations stated above for motors two horsepower and smaller.
Criteria could not be found which would fully protect small motor circuits in this range.
Design criteria, either currently in effect or in force at the time of original selection of trip ratings, although heavily referencing the NEC, diJ not mandate conformance to the NEC.
Although Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4 and 11.5, which were in force 1970-1985, required conformance to applicable standards, including the NEC, it can be argued that the NEC itself exempts utility generating stations.
Criteria documents do not state clearly where the NEC should be followed and where it should not. This lack of definition could lead to confusion and inconsistencies in the design itself or in design reviews.
If strict adherence to the NEC is not required, an alternative basis should be specified.
0212D - 01/13/87
r TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 2 PAGE 9 0F 17 b.
The concern that fuse selection for valve operators provided insufficient margin for emergency operation only applies to the fifth diesel ERCW valves, since all other valve operators are equipped with magnetic overload devices (circuit breakers) for circuit protection, but no fuses.
Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29 concluded that the concern is not valid for Sequoyah since the fifth diesel ERCW valves are fused at 15 amperes.
This fuse rating is more than seven times locked rotor current and affords ample margin for emergency operation according to GCR 29-29.
Because operation of the fifth diesel is not required for restart, the concern is not pertinent to Sequoyah at present.
However, prior to a future need for operability of the fifth diesel, calculations will be required to support the conclusion of GOR 29-29 that sufficient margin has been allowed in fuse selection.
In the absence of calculations or other bases it is not certain that fuse selection provides adequate short circuit protection for motor starter, cable, and motor. While the margin appears to be sufficient for emergency operation, it may prove excessive for full short circuit protection and may permit unnecessary damage to the motor and circuit for low level fault currents.
No basis was found for the fuse selection, for margin above startin3 and running currents or for the degree of protection furnished the motor starter, cable, and motor for short circuits.
Findings:
TVA is preparing new calculations to verify the existing trip a.
ratings.
The majority of the molded case breaker trip ratings were acceptably selected, according to an initial assessment by TVA.
Circuit breakers with trip ratings found to be unacceptable will be replaced prior to restart.
A preliminary draft of the calculations did not completely address the issue and did not include results which could be compared with trip ratings shown on design documents.
Reference to current design criteria was incomplete.
Analysis of small motor circuit fault protection, including protection of the thermal overload heaters, was lacking.
A questionable interpretation of the NEC was found in the preliminary calculations which stated that circuit breakers should be set at 1,300 percent of full load currents where the NEC requires thermal magnetic circuit breakers to be rated 400 percent naximum.
0?12D - Cl/13/P7
F TVA El!PLOYEE CONCERNS REPDRT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUf;BER:
2 PAGE 10 0F 17 Design criteria and guiaance were not found for the application of thermal magnetic circuit breakers for fault protection of small motor circuits.
Exceptions to Design Criteria SON-DC-V-ll.4.1 are permitted without documented justification or approval, b.
No direct evidence was found that engineering practices and attitudes in the selection of molded case breaker trip ratings were poor, since the original selection process cannot be documented.
However, the absence of documentation itself and the lack of systematic design procedures are subjects of a number of employee concerns and are addressed in more detail in Sequoyah Element Reports 205.1 and 205.3.
The NEC, although not mandatory for utility generating stations, was referenced in design criteria currently in force.
Pending completion of the review of final calculations, the degree of conformity of the protection design to the NEC or to good engineering practices is not clear.
Criteria documents do not state clearly where the NEC should be followed and where not.
c.
Fuse size selection for valve operators appears to allow sufficient margin for emergency operation, as concluded by Generic Concern Task Force Report G0k 29-29.
However, the fuse selection process is not documented.
d.
Fuse sizes were selected to provide short circuit protection for motors and the circuits. Overload protection for motors and circuits was provided by thermal overload relays.
No basis could be found to demonstrate that the fuses provide adequate full range short circuit protection for motor starter, cable, t
and rotor.
Conclusioni:
a.
The issue that a large number of molded case circuit breaker l
trip ratings were unacceptable is valid since acceptability cannot be assessed until final calculations are reviewed, and the basis for protection of small motor circuits cannot be i
found. Also, preliminary c6lculations do not include complete reference to design inputs as required by ANSI h45.2.ll, including reference to Design Criteria SCN-DC-V-ll.4.1 and Design Guide DG-E2.3.5.
Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 are not clear regarding adherence to the NEC.
An analysis of fault protection for small motors was not included.
Completion of the calculations, clarification of the design criteria, and replacement of the circuit breakers found to be deficient (if any) should satisfy the issue.
031?D - 01/13/E7 l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 110F 17 b.
The issue is valid to the extent that the application of good l engineering practices is not clear since the original trip rating selection process is not documented.
The completion of the new, well documented calculations supporting the existing breaker selection should satisfy the issue.
l The NEC is not mandatory for utility generating stations; therefore, no justification for deviations from the NEC is required.
c.
The issue that fuse selection for valve operators does not l
provide sufficient margin for emergency operation is valid because fuse selection has not been supported by calculations.
However, since fuses are applied only to the fifth diesel ERCW valve operators and the fifth diesel is not required for restart of SQN, calculations are not required at this time. New calculations will be required prior to any need for fifth diesel operability.
d.
The issue that fuse sizes were selected to protect the valve l
operator motors and not the circuit is valid to the extent that the degree of short circuit protection of both motor and circuit is not clear.
No calculations or other basis for sizing the fuses have been found.
For reasons given in conclusion "c" above, calculations are not required now, but are necessary before the fifth diesel is placed in service.
10.
CORRECTIVE ACTION Two corrective action plans (CAPS) have been produced by TVA and transmitted by TVA letter TCAB-040, December 19,1986 ( App. A, E.w).
One of the CAPS was later revised as documented by TVA letter TCAB-065 dated January 17,1987 ( App. A, 5.y).
The first CAP responds to corrective action tracking documents (CATDs) 237.02(B) SQN 01, 02, 03, and 05 and commits to the following actions:
a.
TVA will review issued TVA DNE Calculation SQN-APS-003, R0 ( App. A, 5.aa; 11/24/86), which covers circuit breaker selection, to verify that design criteria and design guides that specify requirements for protective device coordination have been properly referenced, that protection for small motor circuits has been evaluated, that results of the calculation permit direct comparison with values shown on design documents, and that NEC requirements for setting of fault protection at 1,300 percent of full load current are clearly identified.
0313D - 01/13/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NtJf1BER:
2 PAGE 12 0F 17 b.
TVA will revise Design Criteria SON-DC-V-ll.4.1 to require that all exceptions to SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 be justified and documented.
c.
TVA will review design criteria, design standards, and design guides to verify proper delineation of requirements for the application of thennal magnetic circuit breakers, or alternative means, for the fault protection of small motors.
d.
The documents reviewed in a. and c. above will be revised as required.
e.
Protective devices that are determined by the review to be inadequate will be replaced.
All actions in the first CAP listed above must be completed prior to the restart of Unit 2.
Action "a" responds to CATDs 237.02(B) SQN 01 and 02.
CATD 237.02(B) SON 01 had the following problem description:
Preliminary calculations did not include complete reference to design criteria, did not analyze small motor circuit fault protection, did not list results which could be compared with trip ratings shown on design documents, and did not present an unequivocal interpretation of the NEC regarding setting of fault protection at 1,300 percent of full load.
Action "a" addresses directly each aspect of the problem and should be an acceptable sol ution. CATD 237.02 (B) SQN 02 had the following problem description: No calculations could be found to justify the original breaker trip ratings. To resolve this problem new calculations have been issued and, when these are reviewed and revised if necessary in pursuit of action "a," the CATD should be satisfied.
Action "b" responds to CATD 237.02(B) SQN 05 which had the following problem description:
Exceptions to Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 are pennitted without documented justification or approval.
By coninitting to revise SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1 to require that exceptions be justified and documented, action "b" should solve the problem.
Adherence to the procedures in NEP-3.2 ( App. A, 5.z) for requesting and approving exceptions to design criteria should preclude recurrence of the problem.
Action "c" responds to CATD 237.02(B) SQN 03 which had the following problem description:
No design criteria or guidance could be found for application of thennal magnetic circuit breakers, or alternative means, for fault protection of small n'oto rs. By reviewing design criteria, standards, and guides, 0313D - 01/13/87 i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 13 0F 17 action "c" should lead to a determination that sufficient criteria and guidance exist or that revised or new criteria and guidance should be created.
Actions "d" and "e" are appropriate actions necessary to revise documents and replace inadequate protective devices as determined by the reviews.
The second CAP responds to CATD 237.02(B) SQN 04 and commits to the following actions:
a.
TVA will review the fuse selection process presently in use to determine adequacy and to identify design criteria, design standards, or design guides needed to control the process.
b.
If necessary, TVA will revise documents reviewed above or create new documents.
TVA will prepare calculations to confirm adequacy of c.
electrical protection and margin for emergency operation of the fifth diesel ERCW valve operators.
d.
Protective devices that are determined by the calculations to be inadequate will be replaced.
The second CAP is not required for Sequoyah Unit 2 restart as discussed in Section 9, Conclusion "c" above.
Actions "a" and "c" of the second CAP respond to CATD 237.02(B)
SCN 04 which had the following problem description: No calculations were identified for fuse size selection. Action "a" addresses the absence of calculations by comitting to review the fuse selection process currently in use, which may or may not require calculations, to determine its adequacy. Action "c" solves the problem fully by comitting to the preparation of calculations to confirm adequacy of electrical protection and margin for emergency operation of the fifth diesel ERCW valve operators.
Actions "b" and "d" are appropriate actions necessary to revise documents and replace inadequate protective devices as detennined by the reviews.
Requirements of Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP-9.1, Corrective
/ction, will be considered for both CAPS in the reviews listed above to evaluate any deficiencies found. Adherence to the requirements of NEP-9.1 will preclude recurrence of the problems.
03130 - 01/13/87
r-4 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION nut 1BER:
2 PAGE 14 0F 17 APPENDIX A 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
a.
SNP FSAR Chapter 8 b.
TVA EN DES Calculations, " Black and Yeatch Task Force Category 35 Safety Evaluation of High Instantaneous Current Circuit Breaker Settings," (NEB 840207 222), (02/07/84) c.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report No. R-84-19-WBN, "NSRS Assessment of the Results of the Black and Veatch Independent Design Review of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System," (GNS 840705 054), dates of review 01/10/84 through 06/15/84 d.
Black and Yeatch Findings Report - Findings F-136 and F-137, (10/30/82) e.
TVA Task Force for Review of Black and Yeatch Findings - Task Force Category 25 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Evaluation Sheet R1, (11/09/83) f.
TVA SNP Generic Concern Task Force Report GOR 29-29, Revision 1, (06/06/86) g.
TVA memo from Costner to Standifer (0QA 840504 503), "WBNP -
April 1984 Surveillance Report Summary," (05/04/84) h.
TVA memo from Standifer to Costner (WBP 840718 076), "WBNP -
l April 1984 Surveillance Report Summary," (07/18/84) 1.
TVA memo from Whitt to Parris (Q01850913 052), "WBN Disposition of NSRS Concerns R-84-19-WBN-6 and 7 Resulting i
from Independent Assessment of the Black and Veatch Review,"
l (09/13/85) 1 j.
TVA memo from Drotleff to Seiberling (B26 860502 010), "WBNP Disposition of NSRS Concerns R-84-19-WBN A and 7 Resulting from Independent Assessment of the Black and Veatch Review,"
(05/20/86) k.
ECN 4251, (WBP 831018 518), (09/01/83) i 1.
TVA Electrical Design Cuide DG-E2.3.5, "480 Volt Motor Branch Circuit Design and Protection," R2 (06/19/85) i j
0?l3D - 01/13/87
[
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 15 0F 17
=
APPENDIX A (cont'd) m.
TVA Electrical Design Standard DS-E9.2.1 R1, " Motors - 460 V Circuit Design - Motor Control Center," (03/13/78),
(superseded) n.
PIR WBNEEB8638, (04/07/86)
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4 and 11.5, " Emergency o.
Auxiliary Ac Power System," R1 (07/25/75) (superseded) p.
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.4.1, "i!ormal and Emergency Ac Auxiliary Power System," R2 (07/22/86) q.
TVA Task Force for Review and Black and Yeatch Findings -
Task Force Category 35 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Evaluation Sheet R1, (11/14/83) r.
TVA DNE Calculation SQN-APS-003, "480 V Ac, APS, Cl a ss l E Load Coordination Study" for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Preliminary), (undated - transmitted 10/27/86) s.
Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, with the attached transcript of the investigative interview conducted by the NRC on 02/21/86 at the First Tennessee Bank i
Building in Knoxville, TN, (B45 860714 832), (06/23/86) l t.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, R1 (03/77), " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-0perated Valves" u.
TVA DNE Calculation OE2-DS196RP, " Containment Electrical Penetration Protection Analysis", R1 (B25 860804101)
(07/30/86) v.
TVA EN DES Calculation D2SDJ-P213350, " Analysis of the Auxiliary Power System for 10CFR50 Appendix R",
R3 (B23 860610 202) (06/10/86) w.
TVA letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, TCAB-040, " Corrective Action Plan," (12/19/86)
TVA Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP-9.1, " Corrective x.
Action," R0 (07/01/86)
TVA letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, y.
Bechtel, TCAB-065, " Corrective Action Plan," (01/17/87) l l
0313D - 01/13/87 l
l
c TVA El!PLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 2 PAGE 16 0F 17 APPENDIX A (cont'd) z.
TVA Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP-3.2, " Design Input," R0 (07/01/86) aa.
TVA DNE Calculation SQN-APS-003, R0, "480 V Ac APS class 1E Load Coordination Study,"
(B43 861124 906), (11/24/86) 6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
a.
SNP FSAR Chapter 8 b.
TVA Electrical Standard DS-E2.3.2, "480-Yolt Ac Auxiliary Power System Performance and Equipment Application Criteria" c.
TVA Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-11.4.1, " Normal and Emergency Ac Auxiliary Power System," R2 d.
ANSI Standard N45.2.11-1974, " Quality Assuranct Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants" 7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELAltu TD ELDRENT.
a.
Telephone call from Nesbitt, Hutson, Frederick, TVA, to i
Don-Doncow, Mehegan, Bechtel, IOM #316, (10/15/86) i l
l l
l 0313D - 01/13/87 i
L
l TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
237.2 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
2 PAGE 17 0F 17 CATD LIST The following CATDs identify and provide corrective actions for tne findings included in this report:
237.02(B) SON 01 (12/19/86) (CAP revised 01/15/87) 237.02(B) SQN 02 (12/19/86) (CAP revised 01/15/87) 3 237.02(B) SQN 03 (12/19/86) (CAP revised 01/15/87) 237.02(B) SQN 04 (12/19/86) 237.02(B) SQN 05 (12/19/86) (CAP revised 01/15/87)
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REFERENCE
- ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE 138 FREQUENCY
- REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER RUN TIME - 12:57:19 3
ONP - ISSS - RHM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
RUN DATE - 12/02/86 LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: EN DES PROCESS & OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 23702 400-500 BREAKERS UNACCEPTABLY SET I
S GENERIC KEYHORD A H
APPL QTC/NSRS P
KEYHORD B CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATIDH S
CONCERN KEYHORD C NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R
DESCRIPTION KEYHORD D 3
IN 332-001 EN 23702 N HBN YYYY SR LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATORS ARE FUSED DESIGN PROCESS T50091 K-FORM HITHOUT ENOUGH MARDIN TO PROVIDE F0 SPECIFICATIONS R EMERGENCY OPERATION. THEY ARE FUS ELECTRICAL l
ED TO PROTECT HOTOR NOT THE CIRCUIT MOTORS.
. EXAMPLE: ERCH VALVES IN STH DIESE L GENERATOR BLDG. ARE FUSED AT 5.2 A MPS HHILE RUNNING CURRENT IS 4 AMPS.
GENERIC TO BOTH UNIfS.
HI 100-021 EN 23702 N HBN YYYY SR BETHEEN 400 AND 500 BREAKERS HERE UN NONCONFORMANCE 3
T50212 REPORT ACCEPTABLY SET.
ENDES PRACTICES AND CONST PROCESS I
ATTITUDES CONCERNING THESE BREAKERS ELECTRICAL HERE POOR.
THE NATIONAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CODE AND GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICES HERE VIOLATED. CI HAS NO FURTHER I NFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN VIA L ETTER.
2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUBCATEGORY 23702
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