ML20209D846
| ML20209D846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1987 |
| From: | Russell J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B481 | List: |
| References | |
| 215.6(B), 215.6(B)-R01, 215.6(B)-R1, NUDOCS 8702040558 | |
| Download: ML20209D846 (16) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215,6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SEQUOYAH ELEIENT REVISION NUMBER: 1 TITLE:
CIVIL / STRUCTURAL DESIGN Hanger Loads on Structures PAGE 1 0F 15 i
REASON FOR REVISION:
1.
Revised to incorporate comunents from TVA line Organization, SRP, and TAS; added Chronology; Section 10, Corrective Action; and CATD list.
FMtPARATION PREPARED BY:
D oN 4A.u.
- 8!/J'!B7 SIGNATURE Q
/ DATE REVIEW 5 REVIEW CG9lliitt:
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/~IS-47 DATE SIGNpRE 1 di h
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SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCE 5 V/. LL
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/.27-37 SRP:
SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE
- DATE APPROVED BY:
M6!a/Au-i-tn1 ain ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
SRP Secretary',s signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 2 0F 15 f
1 1.
CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE (S):
Concerns:
i Issues:
IN-85-220-003 a.
Structural integrity of concrete "In Unit 2, due to excessive walls and slabs in the annulus area nunber of hangers being used in of the Unit 2 Reactor Building is reactor b1dg. annulus areas and questionable due to excessive number air pockets in concrete walls of hangers, in annulus areas from azimuth 292 to 358, the structural b.
Design calculations have not evalu-integrity of the supporting ated individual and cumulative walls / floors is questionable...."
effects of hangerr on concrete walls and slabs.
i IN-86-173-001 "CI is concerned that design calculations have not considered the weight of all ' extra'.
Structural integrity of the Unit 2 hangers added with respect to Reactor Building wall in annulus concrete structures (walls &
area between azimuths 292 and 358 ceilings)...."
is questionable due to presence of air pockets (addressed in Subcategory Report 10200).
2.
HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTERATIC ANALYSIS? YES X N0 o
Identified by TVA DNE Date 05/11/83 TVA memo fran. R. O. Barnett to J. P. Yineyard, "SQN-Design Input Memorandun on the General Design Criteria for Design of Reinforced Concrete Structures - SQN-DC-V-1.1,"
[CEB 830511007]
o Identified by TVA DNE Date 03/20/84 and 03/20/86 TVA DNE NCR SQN CEB 8403 and SCR SQN CEB 8622, R1 o
Identified by Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc.
Date 03/03/86 Gilbert /Cawnonwealth Final Report, " Technical Review of SQN Modifications for TVA," No. 2614 0277D - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 FAGI 3 0F 15 3.
DOCUMENT NOS., TAG NOS., LOCATIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATIDNS STAltD IN ELEMENT:
i Hanger loads on concrete structures.
4.
INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
The expurgated interview files for concerns IN-85-220-003 and IN-86-173-001 were reviewed on 10/14/86 (App. A, 7.f).
The files contain only the K-forms and Generic Applicability Sheets.
5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
See Appendix A.
6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA 7 See Appendix A.
7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER
- DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See Appendix A.
8.
EVALUATION PROCESS:
a.
Sought existing programs for systematic logging and structural review of hangers attached to concrete walls and slabs.
b.
Reviewed available information for adequacy and effectiveness of implementation.
c.
Detennined whether structural review considered feedback from cut rebar considerations [ Element Report 215.2(B)].
d.
Reviewed an appropriate sampling of calculations and compared with the FSAR commitments.
02/73 - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B) q SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 4 0F 15 9.
DISCUSSION, FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS:
Chronology:
i 05/83:
TVA issues design input memo requiring reevaluation of loads 03/84:
NCR SQN CEB 8403 identifies overstressed partition walls 06/85:
TVA initiates live load evaluation 08/85 and 09/85:
Two concerns are submitted to TVA 01 /86:
TVA issues a memo reminding engineers to coordinate I
hanger attachments 02/86:
SCR SqN CEB 8607 identifies unconservative embedded plate detign 02/86:
NCR SQN MEB 8609 identifies a need for better coordination of piping analyses 03/86:
Gilbert /Consonwealth (G/C) report recommends several actions on this subject 03/86:
SCR SQN CEB 8622 identifies supports with larger loads than original estimates 04 /86:
NRC concurs with G/C report i
Discussion:
i FSAR Section 3.8 describes the structural design basis of Category I structures. SQN Design Criteria V-1.1 and V-1.3.3.1 amplify and articulate the connitments of the FSAR. The design criteria provide a basis for detailed design to achieve a safe and complete structural design considering all loading conditions involved. Section 4.1 of the latter criteria states:
"A review and reevaluation for loads estimated or assized during the design and construction process shall be made. The review / reevaluation is to be made by the organization responsible for the detailed design. The review / reevaluation shall be 02770 - 01/12/87
-. = _
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NtM8ER: 1 PAGE 5 0F 15 made after the total plant design and construction has progressed to a point where the actual loads can be deterinined with a reasonable degree of certainty. A live load to be used by the plant operating personnel shall be ascertained and doctamented on a drawing for use during the operating plant life."
Generally, in early stages of structural design, principal loads for major equipment and structures are reasonably well defined; but other loads, including hanger loads, are conservatively estimated to allow for various components, e.g., process piping, electrical raceways, HVAC ducts, and small equipment. This ap3 roach is necessary since final locations and exact loads are uncnown for these components until their detailed analyses are performed. The final loads are then compared with the estimated loads to assure adequate margins of safety. This iterative process is normally satisfactory unless significant design additions have been made.
If they have, localized concentrated hanger loads could produce overstresses when analyses are simple and code interpretations are conservative. Therefore, establishing adequate design margins would require rigorous analyses and precise interpretations of the latest design codes.
Within the DNE organization, the Civil Engineering Branch is responsible for both activities, i.e., first; analyzing and designing concrete slabs and walls and second; finalizing all camponent support arrangements and their reactions. Generally, because of the complexity and size of these activities, several different groups perform them. Therefore, interface reviews must l
be conducted to ensure that all loads are properly tracked and analyzed for the structural systems. DNE Procedure NEP-5.2 Section 3.2 defines interface review requirements, and Section 4.2 outlines procedures used to coordinate work between engineering groups.
The l
earlier TVA Engineering Procedure, EN DES-EP 4.04 entitled i
"Squadcheck Process," was also followed to submit hanger drawings as an inter-or intra-organizational routing process for the purpose of review and comments.
l The issues, listed in Section 1, stato that TVA design calculations j
have not evaluated individual and clanulative effects of hangers on concrete walls and slabs including the annulus area.
i l
l 02770 - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 6 0F 15 TVA identified the issue in a design input memorandum in May 1983
( App. A, 5.a) by requiring a general reevaluation of relationships between estimated i16 ads and actual loads.
There was an implicit recognition that some areas of the plant might have greater loads than originally assumed.
However, reevaluation was not performed at that time.
In March 1984, NCR SQN CEB 8403 identified that, during a postulated seismic event, two 8-inch thick reinforced concrete partition walls were overstressed because of the attachment of conduits and fire protection piping supports.
TVA's review of the NCR concluded that originally it had designed these walls for the weight of the walls only and had not considered any attachment loadings. As a result, the corrective action required DNE to survey those two partition walls in detail by' field walkdowns and to perform engineering analyses for design compliance.
The analyses required additional steel braces to qualify the partition walls.
The disposition of the NCR, recognizing the importance of the coordination process, also stated that action was required to prevent recurrence. As a result, all responsible engineers were reminded of the need to ensure that all future attachments to concrete be coordinated by the squadcheck process ( App. A, 5.e).
TVA retained Gilbert /Connonwealth Associates (G/C) to review the technical adequacy of design changes perfonned at SQN after the issuance of the operating license. Among other tasks, G/C reviewed internal design interfaces for appropriateness, completeness, and correctness and stated in March 1986 that general " maintenance of interfaces was evident" ( App. A, 5.g Sec. 3. 2. 5.2-2).
- However, the G/C report noted:
" Failure to post significant changes in support design loads on the drawings identifies a need for better control of the results of the engineering evaluation. Although the loads were properly interfaced at the time, no process existed to assure that they would be included in any future evaluation of additional changes."
This finding was also summarized in NCR SQN CEB 8609 ( App. A, 5.n).
The TVA action plan required that they would identify all piping analyses or evaluation results where support loads had increased and would interface with the proper engineering groups (G/C Technical Issue Data Sheet No.17 and Observation Sheet No.
5). Furthermore, G/C also determined that the individual effects of pipe supports were not properly considered for certain embedded 07770 - 01/12/87
~. _.
I TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NtM8ER: 215.6 (B) l SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 i
i' PAGE 7 0F 15 I,
plates because of inadequate edge distances. This resulted in an unconservative design and was identified in SCR SQN CEB 8607 (App.
t i
A,5.m).
To assure that no similar conditions exist, TVA initiated j
a review of design drawings and plant walkdowns (G/C Technical Issue Data Sheet No. 8). The NRC staff perfomed a special inspection of the G/C review and concluded (App. A, 5.h) that the j
G/C review was thorough and appropriate, and that the technical and j
generic issues appeared valid.
'l Finally, SCR SQN CEB 8622 identified embedded plates supporting l
cable trays with larger loads there original estimates. DNE i
initially sampled 30 relatively heavily loaded supports to evaluate for compliance to the applicable design criteria. This evaluation is currently in progress (App. A, 7.g).
The sample size has been recently increased to approximately 70 to establish an adequate j
confidence level.
l The foregoing discussion discloses need for a specific TVA 1
procedure requiring hanger loads to be appropriately coordinated with other engineering groups. The hanger loads requiring j
coordination could be defined as those above a predetemined j
threshold value for all components. The procedure should also j
include a systematic logging and tracking program for all j
structural members. The hanger load review must include structural i
evaluation of local load transfer as well as overall effects.
Reinforcing bars cut during core drilling operations must be appropriately identified and integrated with this procedure.
The 47A050 series drawings covering mechanical seismic hanger supports for various components, or similar docuent(s), should have specific notes requiring coordination of hanger support reactions j
with engineering groups responsible for concrete structures design.
An assessment program is presently in the planning stage to consider overall effects of hanger loads for Category I load bearing structural walls and shielding walls. Critical walls with heavy loads, e.g., the crane wall in the Reactor Building, will require careful review of localized stress intensities due to an
' excessive' neber of hangers.
I An effort has been under way at SQN to evaluate in-place actual l
j dead loads, including those of all components, in order to i
detemine the pemissible live loads for all Category I floor i
slabs. Another purpose of the effort has been to evaluate caulative effects of hanger loads on all slabs. The infomation required has been collected through plant walkdowns and drawing
(
reviews. The calculations (App. A, 5.k), which are currently in I
f i
02770 - 01 /12/87 i
u
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NtMBER:
215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NIMBER: 1 PAGE 8 0F 15 checking stage, show that the Auxiliary Duilding floor slabs were originally designed,for total dead plus live loads of 350 psf, but the minimum loads 'used in the as-built evaluation are increased by approximately 100 psf. This increase is due to higher loads from various components ( App. A, 5.j).
All elevated concrete floors in the Auxiliary Control Building and Reactor Building were originally designed using the working stress design method described in SQN FSAR Table 3.8.4-1.
However, the current assessment is based on the ultimate strength design method permitted by SQN design criteria ( App. A, 6.c), and this method has resulted in higher floor load capacities.
In some cases, the actual concrete strengths may be used instead of the' design strengths.
This will yield increased load capacities. Based on accurate concrete cylinder test records for each pour confoming to ACI requirements, use of the actual concrete strengths is generally pemissible for assessment calculations. Furthermore, moments in slabs are redistributed using ACI 318-77 code instead of the 318-63 code stated in the FSAR. Proper values of vertical accelerations (1.5 times the peak values for the Auxiliary Building and associated accelerations based on the computations of the natural frequencies for other Category I structures) are used to allow for multimodal responses for seismic loading conditions.
As a result of this effort, SQN plans to demonstrate soon that in all cases, after allowing for all as-built components, the required additional capacities to resist superimposed design live loads are unimpaired. The current pemissible design live loads for Reactor, Auxiliary, and Control Buildings are identified on SQN design drawing 41N704-1. The new values of live loads are expected to be less than the previous values only in some areas. Drawing 41N704-1 will then be revised to reflect any changes in the values.
For other Category I structures, the design live load values will be added to the appropriate outline drawings.' The values, however, reviewed to date are considered to be adequate by TVA for the superimposed transient live loads and thus meeting the design requirements of the plant.
The related subject, but for another concern, affecting strengths of structural members has been investigated under Element Report 215.2(B) entitled " Cut Rebar Control." Concrete with cut reinforcing bars would have an additional negative effect by reducing strength. The review of the preliminary calculations shows that effects of cut rebars have not been incorporated now in computing the as-built load carrying capacities ( App. A, 5.k).
Ibwever, TVA plans to consider these effects prior to the SQN restart (App. A, 7.1).
02770 - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 21 5.6 (8 )
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 9 0F 15 t
Findings:
The alphabetic identifiers below correspond to the list of issues in Section 1.
a.
TVA DNE, at present, has not completed assessment calculations to establish structural integrity of concrete walls and slabs in the annulus area of the Unit 2 Reactor Building by considering all hanger loads.
Therefore, the issue of structural integrity is valid.
b.
TVA design calculations have not evaluated all individual and cumulative effects of hangers on concrete wallt'and slabs of Category I structures.
An assessment is currently either in the planning stage or in progress, and some calculations are being finalized.
The assessment, when final, will determine the adequacy of the structures. Thus, the issue of design l
calculations is valid.
c.
SQN FSAR Sections 3.8.4.3.2 and 3.8.4.4.1 as well as Tables 3.8.3-1 and 3.8.4-1 for Category I concrete design commit to ACI 318-63 code using the working stress design method.
Moreover, Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.4.2 state that, "In some instances, later revisions of the listed documents were used where design safety was not compromised." SQN's current assessment program, however, uses the ultimate strength design method and the ACI 318-77 code.
Therefore, the FSAR and the final design basis are not in agreement at present.
TVA plans to revise the FSAR to clarify TVA's position i
( App. A, 7.h).
d.
A definitive procedure / program to fonnally coordinate and evaluate final hanger loads due to piping, raceways, and ductwork, etc., imposed on concrete structures under various loading conditions has not been found. Local load transfer at points of attachment has been generally evaluated; however, cumulative effects of attachments as well as the effects of cut rebars need to be evaluated for concrete floors, walls, and partitions.
DNE Procedure NEP-5.2 defines general ri.quirements for interfacing and dotat. led step-by-step procedures to follow, llowever, 47A050 series drawings covering mechanical seismic supports, or similar document (s), do not have specific notes requiring coordination of hanger support reactions with other engineering groups.
i i
0?770 - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NimBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NLMBER: 1 i
PAGE 10 0F 15
==
Conclusions:==
The FSAR commitmedt for Category I concrete structures and the TVA assessment calculations are not in agreement. Further, the l
existing TVA procedures, which do not specifically address hanger loads but only cover general interfaces, are not being sufficiently implemented to provide an effective program to control and monitor hanger loads en structures.
Therefore, at the present time, there is no assurance of compliance with the licensing commitments of the FSAR and with TVA design criteria.
4 10.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
To comply with the design requirements, TVA has committed to the following corrective action plan (CAP) (TCAB-025 and 060; App. A, 5.0).
a.
TVA is presently comparing the final as-built hanger loads i
with the assumed loads used during the earlier design process i
for various Category I floor slabs.
The selected slabs are i
the most unfavorable structural elements having relatively large span-to-depth ratios and with numerous hangers supporting piping, cable trays, conduits, and HVAC ducts.
TVA will perform detailed calculations on these elements and will consider cumulative effects of hangers in addition to all other design loads. Hanger load data will be compiled by reviewing drawings and calculations and by perfonning field walkdown inspections.
l The effects of cut rebar on structural strength of slabs will also be evaluated and incorporated in the final analysis.
This slab assessment is nearly complete and indicates that TVA had originally designed concrete structures sufficiently l
and conservatively so that addition of as-built hanger loads j
does not impair the structural integrity of the slabs.
The I
results of this assessment of the most unfavorable elements should provide reasonable assurance that all Category I concrete slabs meet SQN FSAR commitment.
l Further, TVA will assess selected most unfavorable structural i
~ walls and shielding walls for cumulative effects of as-built
' hangers and cut reinforcing bars in addition to other design i
j loads. The selected walls will include shield wall and crane i
wall in the annulus area of the Reactor Building as l
identified in the employee concern. The "U" line wall 02770 - 01/12/87 U.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 11 0F 15 of the Auxiliary Building will also be included since, in addition to other design loads, it is also subjected to tornado depressurization and pipe break loads.
Structural assessment of the selected walls will be performed in detail similar tU that outlined for the slabs. TVA has committed to establishing that the actual dasign stresses are less than the allowable stresses.
If necessary, design modifications will be issued to meet the FSAR design connitment and sample sizes will be increased to establish an appropriate confidence level. The results of this assessment of the most unfavorable wall elements should provide reasonable assurance that all Category I concrete walls meet the SQN FSAR commitment.
h.
TVA will revise all applicable plant procedures to require DNE-CEB review of significant hanger attachment loads.
Additionally, TVA will write a new engineering procedure for SQN to ensure interface review of cumulative hanger attachment loads by the cognizant concrete design engineers.
As a post-restart item, TVA will revise Section 3.8 of the c.
FSAR to incorporate the ultimate strength design method used for the assessment of Category I concrete structures.
Moreover, TVA will identify in the FSAR the later ACI code used in the final calculations.
TVA',s CAP as described will meet its FSAR commitment for the Category I concrete structures at SQN.
The evaluation team, therefore, concludes that the stated CAP is an acceptable resolution of the concerns and should also preclude their recurrence.
l 0277D - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 12 0F 15 APPENDIX A 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATE 6 TO THE ELEMENT:
TVA memo from R. O. Barnett to J. P. Vineyard, "SQN-Design a.
Input Memorandum on the General Design Criteria for Design of Reinforced Concrete Structures - SQN-DC-V-1,1,"
[CEB 830511007] (05/11/83) b.
TVA memo from L. A. Rather to Project Files, "SQN -
Overloading of Structural Elements Due to Pipe Support Loads," [SQP 841018 006] (10/18/84) and [SQP 850205 005]
(02/05/85)
TVA memo from R. O. Barnett to J. P. Vineyard, "SQN - NCR SQN c.
CEB 8403 - Attachments to Reinforced Concrete Partition Walls," [CEB 841113 002] (11/13/84) d.
TVA Failure Evaluation / Engineering Report for NCR SQN CEB 8403 R1, [SQP 841128 005] (11/20/84)
TVA memo from J. P. Vineyard to All SQEP Managers, "SQN -
e.
Live Loads not Considered in Design of Concrete Partition Walls - NCR SQN CEB 8403 R1," (B25 860129 023] (01/29/86) f.
TVA SQN Drawings 41N373-1 R3 Auxiliary Building Units 1 and 2 Partition Walls El. 734.0 Outline and Reinforcement 41H704-1 R6 Reactor, Auxiliary, and Control Buildings - Concrete Floor Design Data g.
Gilbert / Commonwealth Final Report, " Technical Revicw of SQN Modifications for TVA," No. 2614, (0'/03/86) h.
NRC Report, "SQN-Special Inspection," No. 50-327/86-27 and 50-328/86-27 [L44 860506 542] (04/22/86) 1.
TVA memo from H. L. Abercrombie to D. W. Wilson, "SQN -
Corrective Action Report for CAQ Report No. SQN CEB 8622, R1," [S56 860929 953] (09/29/86) 02770 - 01 /12/87
a TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 13 0F 15 APPENDIX A (continued) j.
TVA memo fnom R. O Hernandez to C. N. Johnson, "SQN - Live Load Evaluation - Final Report," draft as of 08/26/86
[No RIMS #]
k.
TVA DNE Calculations, " Floor Live Lead Reevaluation,"
preliminary as of 08/26/86 [No RIMS #]
1.
TVA Employee Concerns SQN Report No. 215.2 (B), R0
" Civil / Structural Design - Cut Rebar Control," BET-033 (10/13/86) q TVA memo from R. O. Barnett to J. P. Vineyard, "SCR SQN CEB m.
8607 - Reduced Embedment Load Capacity, [B41860212 004]"
(02/12/86)
TVA memo from R. O. Barnett to'J. P. Vineyard, "SCR SQN CEB n.
8609 - Failure to Update Support Load Table,
[B41 860219 003]" (02/19/66) o.
Letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel,
" Employee Concern Evaluation Program - SQN Restart Program -
Corrective Action Plan [S03 861205 806] and
[S03 870115 802]," TCAB-025 (12/08/86) and TCAB-060 (01/17/87) 6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER XPPTY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA 7 a.
SQN FSAR update through Amendment 3, Section 3.8 " Design of Category I Structures" b.
TVA SQN " Design Criteria for Design of Reinforced Concrete Structures," No. SQN-DC-V-1.1, R1 TVA SQN " Design Criteria for Additions After November 14, c.
1979 - Reinforced Concrete, Structural, and Miscellaneous Steel," No. SQN-DC-V-1.3.3.1, R4 d.
TVA DNE Nuclear Engineering Procedure, " Calculations",
NEP-3.1, R0 e.
TVA DNE Nuclear Engineering Procedure, " Review," NEP-5.2, RO f.
TVA Engineering Procedure, "Squadcheck Process,"
EN DES-EP 4.04, R9 02770 - 01/12/87 4
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 1 PAGE 14 0F 15 APPENDIX A (continued) 7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCU$SIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
a.
TVA Transmittal No. 099, Item 3 (08/26/86) c.
BLT 037, (09/05/86) d.
Telephone call from K. Parikh, Bechtel, to A. Rather and M.
~
Maxwell, TVA, IOM 253 (08/27/86)
Telephone call from N. Shah, Bechtel, to M. Maxwell and J.
e.
Baker, TVA, IOM 314 (10/15/86) f.
Review of ECTG Files, Documentation for Concerns IN-85-220-003 and IN-86-173-001, by B. York (10/14/86)
Telephone call from N. Shah, Bechtel, to A. Rather, TVA, IOM g.
344 (10/27/86) h.
Telephone call from N. Liakonis et al., TVA, to J. Benkert and N. Shah, Bechtel, IOM 359 (11/03/86) 1.
RFI SQN #759, (12/19/86) 0277D - 01/12/87
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 215.6 (B) i SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 15 0F 15 CATD LIST The following CA7Ds identify and provide corrective actions for the findings included in this report:
215.06 SQN 01 (12/05/86; Supplemental CAP 01/16/87)
~
215.06 SQN 02 (12/05/86; Supplemental CAP 01/16/87) 215.06 SQN 03 (12/05/86; Supplemental CAP 01/16/87) 0277D - 01/12/87
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PAGE 84 i
REFERENCE- - ECPS120J-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY I
RUN TIME - 12:57:19
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
RUN DATE - 12/02/86 4
FREQUENCY
- REQUEST
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ONP - ISSS - RHM LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION i
CATEGORY: EN DES PROCESS & OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 21506 HANGER LOADS ON STRUCTURES
$)
KEYHORD A
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S GENERIC KEYHORD B H
APPL QTC/NSRS P
CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION S
CONCERN KEYHORD C 1
NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT R
DESCRIPTION KEYHORD D
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i IN 220-003 CD 10200 S HBN YYYY I-85-530-HBN SR IN UNIT 2, DUE TO EXCESSIVE NUMBER 0 - DESIGN PROCESS T50149 EN 21506 REPORT F HANGERS BEING USED IN REACTOR BLDG DESIGN RELATED
. ANNULUS AREA AND AIR POCKETS IN CD CIVIL O
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NCRETE HALLS IN ANNULUS AREA FRON AZ STRUCTURES 1
IMUTH 292 TO 358. THE STRUCTURAL INT EGRITY OF THE SUPPORTING HALLS / FLOOR S IS QUESTIONABLE. CONSTRUCTION DEP
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ARTMENT CONCERN. C/I COULD NOT PROV IDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS / SPECIFICS s
NO FOLLOH-UP REQUIRED.
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IN 173-001 EN 21506 N HBN YYYY I-85-456-NBN SR CI IS CONCERNED THAT DESIGN CALCULAT DESIGN REVIEW IONS HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE HEIGHT DESIGN RELATED T50128 REPORT OF ALL " EXTRA" HANGERS ADDED WITH RE ENGINEERING SPECT TO CONCRETE STRUCTURES (HALLS HANGERS
-):
-)
& CEILINGS). UNIT 1 & 2 CONSTRUCTIO N CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INF ORMATION.
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2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUBCATEGORY 21506
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i
.)
.)
i eY
.