ML20209D487
| ML20209D487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1987 |
| From: | Brown R, Russell Gibbs TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B481 | List: |
| References | |
| C010900-SQN, C010900-SQN-R05, C10900-SQN, C10900-SQN-R5, NUDOCS 8702040494 | |
| Download: ML20209D487 (51) | |
Text
_.
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER:
5 (FINAL REPORT)
TITLE: Cable PAGE 1 0F 37 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TAS and SRP consents.
Revision 1 Revised to incorporate a new evaluation at SQN and NRC coussents.
Revision 2 Revised to incorporate TAS, DNQA, and SRP comments.
Revision 3 Revised to incorporate SRP comments, further evaluations at Revision 4 SQN, line management responses, and to finalize report.
Revised to incorporate revised CAP Revision 5 PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
Y h
l#k3'YY L
SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS PEER:
WGY b th h23-37
'9 SIGNATURE DATE gf
_e v
AS:
9'
/-H-87
\\
p#P '
p Pv6 SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES
.I
_$$~
l CEG-lW f
/E l ~Eb 'W
[
SIGNATURE [
DATE SIGNATURE DATE APPROVED BY:
M084W MH1 NiA ECSP 7 TANAGER DATE' MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE
~
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) l 1365T S?S" AEU ENhj7 P
.o TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM o
REVISION NUM8ER:
5 PAGE 2 0F 37 I
I.
INTRODUCTION The following concerns have been evaluated in relation to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) specific and Watts Bar Nuclear Plsnt (WBN) generic issues relative to all areas of the cable program:
WBN GENERIC SQN SPECIFIC CABLE PULLING Spilcing (1 concern)
NAS-85-003 Minimus Bend Radius (1 concern)
Maximum Pull Tension and JLH-86-002 Sidewall Pressure (21 concerns)
EI-85-076-003 Insulation Damage (1 concern)
EI-85-086-001 00-85-005-014 IN-85-213-001 IN-85-255-001 IN-85-295-003 IN-85-325-005 IN-85-433-002 IN-85-436-004 IN-85-581-001 IN-85-733-001 IN-85-856-005 IN-85-935-001 IN-85-978-001 IN-86-028-001 IN-86-199-001 IN-86-201-001 IN-86-259-001 IN-86-259-004 IN-86-262-003 II-85-008-001 II-85-094-004 Minimus Bend Radius (3 concerns)
EX-85-157-002 IN-86-266-006 WI-85-100-013 I
i
.=
- O TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN o
REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 3 0F 37 I.
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
WBN GENERIC Cable Coatina (3 concerns)
IN-86-259-005 j
IN-86-268-002 OW-85-007-004 480-volt Receptacle (1 concern)
IN-85-009-001 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable (1 concern)
IN-85-120-001 Firebarrier (2 concerns)
IN-85-018-004 II-85-094-005 Cable Routina (2 concerns)
IN-85-300-002 IN-86-268-003 Spilcina (1 concern)
IN-86-314-005 Terminations (2 concerns)
I-85-101-WBN PH-85-003-N32 II.
SU7 DIARY OF PERCEIVED PR08LEN The perceived problems evaluated in this element report are:
Cable pullina - Allowable limits for maximum pull tension (NPT),
cable sidewall pressure (SWP), and minimum bend radius (NBR) have i
been exceeded.
i Cable coating - Flamemastic 77 has been applied thicker than specified by site procedures allowing too much heat buildup in cable trays.
It has also been removed from cables with sharp instruments l
which resulted in possible cable damage.
I Firebarriers - Inadequate controls and improper tools have been used to breach firebarriers (Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) silicone I
foam) in wall and floor penetrations.
I I
i
r TVA ENPIhYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 5 PAGE 4 0F 37 II.
SUNNARY OF PERCEIVED PROBLEN (Continued)
Insulation damage - Insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which feeds the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor (part of Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System), and was incorrectly repaired using electrical tape.
480-volt receptacles - Receptacles have not been properly sized for Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) specified wire size for receptacles found throughout the plant.
Cable routing - Cables were improperly routed outside of cable trays.
Spilcing (NAS-85-003) - This covered a specific instance of an improper splice.
Spilcing (IN-86-314-005) - There was improper splicing at the plant site.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables - Cables were not supported for long distances after they erited the raceway to the NIS detectors.
Terminations - AMP Diamond Grip Insulated Terminal Lugs (PIDG) which were designed for use with stranded wire were used on solid wire leads.
List of Evaluators Lead Evaluator Rob Brown Evaluator Guy Nuff Mike Shirey Beth Selewski Chris Haerr III. EVALUATION NETHODOLOGY It was determined whether or not other investigations had been performed on these issues.
The expurgated Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) flies were reviewed to determine if additional information was available to assist in evaluation.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 5 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION NETHODOLOGY (Continued)
Cable Pulling Sidewall Pressure (SWP) and Nazimum Pull Tension (NPT)
R. W. Centre 11's memorandum to C. C. Nason, dated December 2,1985 (843 851203 915) was reviewed to determine the significance of Division of Nuclear Engineering's (DNE) program for addressing Class 1E installed cables.
Modifications and Additions Instruction N&AI-04 " Control, Power, and Signal Cables," Revision 8, was reviewed to determine the site t
requirements for monitoring maximum pull tension.
NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the inadequacies cited in TVA's cable pulling program, and to determine if findings, conclusions, and recommendations were adequate.
R. N. Pierce's memorandum to K. W. Whitt dated July 8, 1985 (F01 850708 604), " Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigations of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing. Installation, and Inspection Practices - NSRS Report Number I-85-06-WBN" was reviewed to determine the NSRS recommendations regarding the adequacy of the program for cable pulling.
l
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" conducted by the Division of Operations Support Central Laboratories Service Branch was reviewed to determine test results, i
SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits," was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning conduit overfill.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimus Bend Radius Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Nothods,"
was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning sidewall pressure and maximum pull tension concern issues.
Discussions were conducted with cognizant Nodifications engineers involved with cable pulling.
W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, i
1986 (843 860903 905) was reviewed to determine DNE's response to l
the NRC's request for information in their letter dated August 4, 1986, to Steven A. White with regard to sidewall bearing pressure j
concerns.
I f
l l
I l
L
l TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 6 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Discussions were conducted with cognizant DNE design engineers involved in walkdowns and calculations addressing conduits with multiple bonds between cable pull points which could cause excessive SWP.
DNE calculation SQN-E12-015 (B25 860724 801) titled " Identifying Sidewall Pressure Violations" was reviewed to determine how SWP was analyzed at SQN and to determine calculation results.
Minimum Bend Radius (N85t},
Site procedure NEAI-4, all revisions, General Construction Specification G-38 Revision 8, and Design Specification DS-E12.1.5,
" Minimum Radii for Field Installed Insulated Cable Rated 15,000 Volts and Less," were reviewed to determine appilcable requirements for MBR at SQN.
Two personnel knowledgeable of the design, construction, and operation of SQN were interviewed to determine if any work had been done concerning N8R violations at SQN.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violation of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Netnods," wai reviewed to determine the findings and conclusions relative to this evaluation.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the findings and recommendations applicable to this evaluation.
W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 (843 860903 904) l titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" was reviewed to determine what additional work needed to be completed before Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's restart concerning the bend radius of Class 1E cables.
With respect to concern JLH-86-002, the NQA supervisor at SQN was interviewed on what corrective actions have been generated as a result of the concern.
SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was reviewed for the actions taken to answer JLH-86-002.
Cable Coating Site personnel in Modifications (1) and Electrical Naintenance (3) were interviewed about the existence of procedures for the removal of Flamemastic cable coating and if they had removed Flamemastic in the past.
TVA EMP!AYEE CONCERNS XEPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REFTSION NUMBER:
5 PACE 7 OF 37 III.
EVALUATION NETHODOLOGY (Continued)
M&AI-13. Revision 6, and SQN Inspection Instruction (II) A4, Revision 1 and Revision 6, were reviewed for any precautions against the use of sharp instruments to renove Flamemastic and for acceptance criteria for the depth of coating to be applied.
The SQN Generic Concerns Task Force Report on OW-85-007-004 and IN-86-262-002 was reviewed for adequacy of findings and conclusions.
Reviewed the Joslyn Research Center Report on the use of Flamemastic for information relative to this evaluation.
Members of the WBN ECTG walked down trays in the Cable Spread Room for evidence of excessive depth of cable coating.
The responsible DNE engineer was interviewed on the steps that had been taken to initiate a sampling program to verify the adequacy of ampacity of the installed cables.
Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Surveillance Instruction, SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Nechanical" was reviewed.
Surveillance Instruction, SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Electrical" was reviewed.
Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13. Revision 48, " Fire" was reviewed.
The Safety Supervisor was interviewed on the subjects of penetrations. SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and control of breaching. His section prepared SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and PHYSI-13.
i Firebarriers (Breaching Tools)
Modifications and Addition Instruction, N&AI-13 Revision 6
" Electrical Pressure Seal. Firestop Barrier, and Flame Retardant Cable Coating" was reviewed.
A responsible Modifications supervisor was interviewed on the subject of breaching electrical penetrations.
A responsible general foreman was interviewed on the subject of l
breaching electrical penetrations.
l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
S PAGE 8 0F 37 III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued) i Insulation Demane Personnel knowledgeable of the equipment at SQN were interviewed to l
determine the location and function of the discharge gates hoist motors specific to this evaluation.
i l
Observation of the supply cables on the above motors was performed l
to determine their status and condition.
Workplan 11043 and Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720 were l
reviewed to determine what work had been done on the cables and what l
were the changes and reason for changes of the ECN.
I The SQN system 27 Systems engineer was interviewed on the method used to de-energize the gate hoist motors.
480-volt Recentacles I
A walkdown was conducted with two electricians to determine the j
manufacturer and model number of 480-volt receptacles in the fifth diesel generator area.
I Discussions were conducted with the cognizant DNE procurement supervisor to determine the acceptable cable diameter range for the receptacles found in the walkdown.
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer to determine the cable diameter for number 2 wire.
Cable toutina II-28. " Cable Pulling Inspection," Revision 4 N&AI-04, " Control, Power and Signal Cables," Revision 0 through Revision 8. G-38, Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts " Revision 8 SOP-104, " Electrical Cable Installation," Revision 1, and E-6,
" Cable Storage and Installation," Revision 0 through Revision 7, were reviewed for information on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays.
Two Nodifications electrical engineers and two DNE onsite engineers were interviewed on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays and on the removal of temporary cables.
The DNE engineer responsible for revisions to G-38 was interviewed on the interpretation given to step 3.2.1.8.2(b) regarding the acceptability of routing cable outside cable trays.
A walkdown of cable trays in the Cable Spread Room was conducted to locate examples of improperly routed cables.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUNBER: 5 PAGE 9 OF 37 III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Splicing (NAS-85-003)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Naintenance engineer in regards to split insulation on cable to the CS Component Cooling System (CCS) pump that had been taped during construction.
Maintenance Request (NR) A561116 was reviewed to determine if the splice had been reworked using a Raychem sleeve.
Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of Nonconformance Reports (NCR) 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual responsible for the SQN Experience Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224.
A discussion was conducted with cognizant DNE nuclear licensing and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
Applicable DNE and site documentation of the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774 was reviewed for actions taken at SQN on the i
subject.
A discussion was conducted with SQN DNE and EEB engineers with respect to the disposition of NCR 6623/6774.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable The SQN GCTF Report on concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning the supports for NIS cable.
Terminations NSRS Report I-85-101-WBN, " Improper Termination Techniques," was reviewed to evaluate the finding, conclusion, and recommendation pertaining to SQN concerning the use of PIDG lugs for termination of discrete electrical components with solid wire leads.
A memorandum from H. G. Parris to K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850904 010), was reviewed to discover what corrective action was specified to resolve the NSRS recommendations in I-85-101-WBN.
I i
1
TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 10 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION NETHODOLOGY (Continued)
Potential Generic Condition Evaluation memorandums (843 850923 916 and B25 851008 015) for SCR WBNEEB8537 and a memorandum from H. G. Parris to Those listed, dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850905 009), were reviewed to discover the generic applicability of the subject SCR and what section was responsible for corrective action.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Electrical Naintenance engineer concerning the corrective action taken in relation to SCR WBNEEB8537.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Compliance engineer concerning the status of the question raised pertaining to PIDG lugs on surge suppression networks.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible DNE engineer on the status of the docision to be made on whether or not to replace the PIDG lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
A preliminary memorandum from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated October 24, 1986 was reviewed for more detail on the DNE response to replacing PIDG lugs on surge suppression networks.
IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS Cable pulling (NPT and SWP)
Review of R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Nason dated December 2, 1985, revealed the purpose of the evaluation was to collect and review operational, maintenance, and surveillance test data on cable from TVA's operating plants and any readily available equivalent data from other outside sources to determine if cable failures could be attributed to past cable pulling practices. As a result of the evaluation DNE determined that no cable failures could be attributed to past cable pulling practices, i.e., violations of the minimum bending radius or maximum allowable sidewall pressure. The following statement was given in an executive summary attached to the memorandum:
"From the evaluation, DNE concludes that past Class 1E cable installations could not adversely affect startup, operation, or safe shutdown capabilities. DNE has used historical data, ongoing surveillance requirements and a random failure concept to arrive at this conclusion."
l I
I
TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 11 0F 37 IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
For specifics on representative cable test data, see Section II titled, "Collectica and Evaluation of Cable Test Data" of the above mentioned memorandum.
Review of M&AI-4 revealed the following statement concerning mechanical assistance on cable pulls:
"On pulls requiring mechanical assistance, the craft foreman shall notify the cognizant engineer that mechanical assistance will be required on that particular cable pull. The cognizant engineer will in turn perform the sizing of the pull rope and necessary calculations (refer to sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1) prior to the cable pull."
Nothods for determining the maximum pulling force were given in section 6.0.
Table 6.2.1.3.c provided manila break rope sizes for various conductor sizes.
Non-Class 1E cables were not monitored for maximum pull tension nor sidewall pressure.
I NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed and three problem areas of the cable program were found that were applicable to this evaluation:
(1) the fact
]
that TVA did not include sidewall pressure (SWP) calculations in their J
cable pull procedure, (2) the way TVA defined their method of calculating maximum pull tension (NPT) on multi-cable pulls, and (3) the way DNE resolved the question of exceeding minimum bend radius.
The NSRS recommendations consisted of establishing values for pulling and training radil that were fully supported by manufacturer's test data.
These values were to be used to disposition NCRs on the subject. The report suggested a sample at WBN, (the plant to which the report was written) Unit 1 for Class IE cables for inspection of pulling and training radii.
If the evaluation failed to justify the as-installed conditions, then it was suggested that a formal in-service surveillance / inspection program be considered.
A review of "NSRS Investigation of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing Installation, and Inspection Practices" revealed the following conclusion and recommendation concerning the adequacy for cable pulling:
"The DNE and Nuclear Construction established and documented program was determined to be inadequate to accomplish the cable pull activities. The past and present programs have been inadequate, inconsistent, and in vloistion of the accepted industry standards and practices."
l l
l
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 12 0F 37 IV.
SURRARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
"DNE management should revise G-38 and G-40 to incorporate resolutions to the identified problems discussed in this report; and, subsequently, WBN DNE, NU CON, and DNP management should revise the relevant DNE documents, as well as NU CON and DNP procedures. The final adequacy of the present cable installation should then be evaluated per revised acceptance criteria."
A similar program to that given for pulling and training radius was also suggested.
4
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" was reviewed, and the objective and results are summarized below:
The objective of the test was to determine the maximum Sidewall Bearing Pressure (SWBP) possible on cable pulls without cable degradation.
Representative samples of power, control, signal and instrument, and coaxial cables from TVA's nuclear power plants were pulled through a conduit test setup containing four horizontal 90-degree bonds. The applied tension was controlled and measured during each cable sample pull to achieve maximum SWBP. With the exception of the larger power cables, size No. 2 and larger, each cable was tensioned to near its ultimate breaking strength. The maximum SWBP values achieved are summarized in the following table:
i Cable Types Marinum SWBP (1bs/ft)
Power Cables The cable with the lowest tenslie strength 1398 The cable with the highest tensile strength 3104 Control Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 602 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1831 Signal and Instrument Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 447 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1496
TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NC1BER:
5 PAGE 13 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Cable Types Maximum SWBP (1bs/ft)
Coaxial Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 373 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1242 After pulling, the cables were inspected, dimensioned, and outer jackets were removed from multi-conductors. They were then subjected to dielectric breakdown tests (see section 6.0 of the above mentioned test for the acceptance criteria).
"All cables met the established acceptance criteria."
Review of GCTF report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits,"
revealed the following:
There was no computer program check or QA records kept on the total cross sectional area fill of cables in conduits.
SCR SQNEEB8529 was generated to document conduit overfill of 55 conduits at Sequoyah. The recommendation for the disposition was use-as-is. Tests and inspections were performed on the cables in question, and no damage was revealed.
The SCR was closed out on January 28, 1986.
However, in the time since then, it was discovered that the cable diameters used in the cable fill program were not auditable.
For this reason, cable diameters were measured at TVA Singleton Labs for various cable samples and sizes. The cable diametec data was distributed to each Engineering Project in TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13. SQN Engineering Project was in the
. process of incorporating the new values into their conduit fill i
program. NCRs will be written on any conduits where SWP has been exceeded.
Review of GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius l
Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Nothods,"
I revealed the following conclusion stated in the report:
"The NSRS Recommendation No. I-85-06-WBN-02 and the DNE walkdown procedure are appropriate actions to determine if "Overtensioning of Cables" is a problem at SQN."
The evaluation agreed with the findings of the report.
r l
l l
l
TVA EMPLOYER CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 14 0F 37 IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Nodifications engineer concerning monitoring of NPT during cable pulls. The following information was obtained. NPT had been monitored in the past using break ropes and other devices. General Construction Specification G-38 was recently revised which changed the way NPT and SWP were determined. The majority of the cable were pulled before these changes and were pulled by the old requirements.
Concerning cable pulls with trucks, cherry pickers, or other devices, the use of a mechanical device was acceptable when pull tensions were monitored by break ropes or dynamometers. The use of a choker was also acceptable for safety purposes only. The choker was used to prevent the cable from whipping out and hitting personnel if the break rope broke.
Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, 1986, revealed the following response to the NRC's request for information concerning the methods used by TVA in determining the acceptability of sidewall pressure eserted on Class IE cable:
"The purpose of the calculations was to determine acceptability of sidewall bearing pressures exerted on Class IE cables in esisting conduits. All Class IE (approximately 10,400) conduits were evaluated through preliminary screening and field inspection."
Note:
Data was taken from WBN assumed worst-case conduit configurations to determine the SWBP test set-up.
" PRELIMINARY SCREENING The screening analysis was performed as follows:
(1)
Developed a list of assumed worst-case configurations based on vertical conduit with four 90 degree bends in pulling end of conduit. The cable pull was assumed to be upward. See figure:
3" Conduit
'fi 3 Cables We =1.4 K = 0.42 N = 0.955 Ft a = 90' (1.57 rad)
~b
~
Sidewall bearing pressure i
(SWP) = 300 lbs/ft "q
(Conservatively assumed) 1( q
~
W = Cable weight per foot
[
TVA EMPLOYIE CONCERNS REPORT NUN 85R: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE IS OF 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDING': (Continued)
(2)
Calculated maximum pulling tension allowable to avoid exceeding sidewall bearing pressure limits (300 lbs/ft for power and control; 100 lbs/ft for instrumentation)
EXAMPLE:
y, _3(SWP)R (3We -2)
T = 391 lbs for above figure (3)
Calculated length of conduit in terms of W that would correspond with allowable sidewall bearing pressure limits.
This was done for all the conduit sizes and number of cables in each conduit.
EXAMPLE:
T1 = WL1 7 =Tg ela = T3
( 1.93) 2 T =T2 eEt = T1
( 3.72) 3 T mT3 ela = T3
( 7.18) 47 "T4 ela - Ti (13.86) = WL1 (13.86) 5 28.21 L1-TS=
391
=
(13.86)(W)
(13.86)W W
(4)
Screened the conduit schedule for lengths escoeding the calculated lengths by using nominal weights of cables. A large number of estremely short cables were eliminated from further analysis because they were shorter than the langth of four 90 degree bends.
The original number of 10,400 conduits was reduced during the preliminary screening process to a list of 1914 conduits requiring further evaluation.
Conservatism was used in the screening method because:
(a) Sidewall bearing pressure criteria was 300 lb./ft. Test results of 600 - 1500 lb./ft. were later reported.
(b) Four conduit bends were assumed back to back. Using a more typical conduit with bends distributed throughout the conduit could result in pulling tensions 1/2 to 1/4 of those in screening.
(c) Initial conduit section assumed to be vertical. This assumption doubled the resultant tension as compared to pulling through a horizontal section (which is far more typical)."
I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NURSER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUN 8ER:
5 PAGE 16 0F 37 IV.
SURNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
FIELD INSPECTION Obtained a sample size of 81 worst-case conduits at WBN for detailed calculations (approximately 20 conduits per voltage level). The worst case conduits were selected by visual inspection of 778 conduits using the criteria of multiple bends
(>360'), long lengths, elevation changes and conduit fill (>30%)
(EEB Engineering Procedure 22.29).
Discussions with two DNE cognizant engineers revealed TVA selected and conducted a walkdown of 16 condults at SQN which should meet the worst case configurations to determine whether the allowable sidewall pressure (SWP) or MPT for cable in conduit had been exceeded. The conduit configurations were tabulated, isometric sketches were drawn, and cable pull cards were obtained for SWP calculations.
Review of SQN-E2-015 titled " Identifying Sidewall Pressure Violations" revealed calculations were performed by DNE for SQN l
to determine if sidewall pressure inside condults had escoeded allowable limits.
Sixteen conduits were selected as indicated in the above mentioned walkdown. The conduits were assumed to be worst-case. The calculation concluded that all of the calculated sidewall pressure and pulling tension values were within the prescribed guidelines.
At the writing of this report, DNE's evaluation of sidewall pressure and MPT was not yet complete. DNE was involved in contract negotiations with a third party engineering company to evaluate the sampling program mentioned above.
Final resolution of the SWP and MPT lasues addressed for all TVA Nuclear Plants depend on DNE's final response.
Because of the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further information was available concerning the resolution of this issue.
4 1
L
TVA ENPIAYBE CONCERNS RSPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNSER:
5 PAGE 17 0F 37 IV. SUtgl&RY OF FINDINGS (continued)
==
Conclusion:==
NPT and SWP issues were verified. The program inadequacies were identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN and later addressed in SQN GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Ninimum Send Radius Violations of Cables because of Improper Cable Installation Nothods." To provide a resolution DNE was actively evaluating sidewall bearing pressure to determine the acceptability of installed Class 1E cables.
TVA's Central Laboratory conducted a test to determine acceptable SWP limits using representative cable samples from SQN, SFN, and SLN and surveys from sections of assumed worst-case conduits at WON.
The test results were favorable since SWP limits were reported between 600 to 1500 pounds / foot wh!!e TVA's prescribed guidelines were from 100 to 300 pounds / foot. To verify the installed cable at SQN, DNE selected 16 worst-case conduits, performed walkdowns to develop isometric sketches, and then performed calculations.
The initial calculation results were favorable since SWP and NPT values were within TVA's prescribed guidelines. Wh!!e actions appeared to be complete, the sampling program used to determine worst-case conduits was in question. For this reason TVA was involved in contract negotiations with a third-party engineering company to evaluate the methods used to select the worst case conduits.
Until further evaluation is complete and NSRS report I-85-06-WBN is addressed. SWP and NPT issues will remain open.
Mlpleum Send _Redigt Design standards, site procedures, and construction specifications were reviewed and those found applicable for cable NSR installation guidelines are listed below:
Design Standard 05-E12.1.5 N&AI-4 Construction Specification 0-38
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUR8ER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 18 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Four concerns were evaluated concerning minimum bend radius (MBR).
Interviews with two personnel involved in both the design and construction of SQN and knowledgeable of the problems concerning MBR, revealed that some attention had been given to this issue at SQN.
Review of NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN revealed the NSRS conducted a comprehensive review of cable bend radius issues for installations between 1979 through 1985. The report questioned the way DNE resolved the issue of exceeding manufacturers' requirements for cable bend radius. The NSRS recossmendation consisted of establishing values for training radit that were fully supported by manufacturer test data.
(See discussion given below for W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 for action taken concerning this issue.)
The SQN GCTF report on MPT and NBR was reviewed and no pertinent information was discovered.
Interviews with personnel involved in the installation of cable at SQN as well as some limited field evaluation indicated that violations of M8R requirements existed.
Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986, titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" revealed the purpose of the memorandum was to provide direction to each project concerning specific work actions which were necessary to resolve concerns on bend radil of Class 1E cables before each plant could operate. The following direction was given pertaining to SQN "The Electrical Engineering Branch has evaluated the adequacy of the bend radius to which Class IE cables were installed. The basis for the evaluation was the comprehensive investigation conducted by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff on the same subject during February to April 1985. The measures specified herein are espected to comprise the majority of any project specific corrective actions resulting from this investigation.
EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing conclusions and reconsnendations based upon an independent review of our evaluation will be issued in September 1986.
(Discussion on November 14, 1986 with the DNE Engineer responsible for preparing this report revealed the report was not complete because DNE was concentrating on ampacity calculations.)
Each project should proceed insnediately to perform the following Inspections, as applicable, and to forward the results to the l
respective engineering projects.
l l
I
~
S TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 19 0F 37 IV.
SUMNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(1)
(Instructions pertained to WBN and BLN only).
(2) All projects shall perform a field inspection of all conduits containing Class IE medium voltage power cables for the existence of any straight-through pull box or conduit type s
(C. ELL. TEE, etc.) raceway fitting or any conduit raceway fitting other than a standard conduit bend around which a cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size, and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
(3) All projects shall determine the minimum size conduit that the following coaxial, triarlal, and twinarial cables, if utilized in Class 1E applications and routed in conduit, are installed in. If any of these cables are installed in Class II appilcations and in a conduit smaller than indicated below, the project shall perform a field inspection for the existence of conduits of any type (ELL, TEE, etc.) in which the cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
In addition, each project shall verify that the following list includes all coaxial, triarlal, and twinarial cables installed in Class 1E applications. A positive statement to this effect or a list of additional cable mark numbers shall be addressed to my attention.
Minimum Conduit
' Cable Mark No.
Description Size (Inches)
WTJ Coar RG6A/U 2
VTJ-5 1/c #21 Coar Solid Cu Clad Steel 2
WTK
- 22 Coax RG59B/U 1-1/2 WTK-1 Coar RG598/U XLP 1-1/2 WTL Coar RG216/U Except 3 Shields 3
4 -
WIL-4 Coax 55 ohn #22 AWG 1-1/2 WTM Coar RG114A/U Except 3 Shields & ST 3
WTM-6 1/c Coax #26, 7 Strands, LOCA 3
VTY-1
- 21 AWG, Coax, RGS8C/U 1-1/2 WTU
- 20 Triar RG 11/U 3
WTN Trian RG-59U #22, 2 Shields LOCA 2
WTN-1 Triar Similar to RG11/U LOCA 3
WTN-2 Twinar RG228/U 3
WWK TP #22 W/SH TP #20 7/c #22 2-Coar 3
+
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN
)
SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5
)
PAGE 20 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(4) The Watts Bar project shall perform a field inspection of all Class 1E coaxial, twinarial, and triarial cables which were installed or modified during the period of May 25, 1979 to May 18, 1981, under the guidance of Design Information Request (DIR) No. E-9.
In addition, all projects shall inspect all Class IE coaxial and twinarial cables which were installed or modified during the period of September 20, 1983 to April 23, 1986, under the direction of DS-E12.1.5 Revision 0.
The cable shall be verified to be installed to a bend radius equal to 8 times its outside diameter. This inspection need not address the bend radius in standard conduit bends as this has been addressed generically in PIRGENEEB8605. The inspection of the bend radius in conduits is covered in item 3 above. Therefore, provided the project establishes that all cable tray fittings were procured with a radius equal to or greater than 8 times the outside diameter of the largest cable in question or that the cable was restricted to use in conduit and that all conduit bends meet the miniaan requirements of DS-E13.1.7, this inspection may be limited to cables in free air (transitions from racewey to raceway or raceway to equipment) and to the points of termination.
All installations which do not conform to the specified 8 times factor shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for dispcsition. The documentation shall include the cable and, if applicable, the raceway number, the location of the violation, the actual installed bend radius and the results of a visual inspection noting any discernible rtress on the cable jacket in the area of the bend or any ripples in the cable jacket which could indicate shield deformation.
Each Lead Engineer should prepare a fragnet reflecting the individual project's approach and schedule for resolving these issues.
Resolution of these concerns has been tied to plant restart and should be scheduled for implementation accordingly."
Due to the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further information was available concerning the resolution of this issue.
An interview was conducted with the NQA supervisor at SQN to determine what actions had been initiated as a result of JLH-86-002.
This concern specified violations of NBR for Conar connectors. The supervisor stated that a survey had been conducted as a result of the concern. SQ-CAR-86-02-005 had been generated on February 10, 1936 because of the discrepancies found.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 21 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was reviewed to discover what corrective actions had occurred. The CAR stated that:
" Contrary to the requirements of N&&I-19 and the Conax Vendor Manual IPS-725 not all Conar connectors were installed with wire bend radii within allowable limits. In addition, M&AI-19 is not consistent with the vendor manual revision referenced in the EQ binder. Adherence to these requirements is j
necessary to maintain equipment environmental qualification."
The survey conducted due to JLH-86-002 had revealed three problem areas:
(1) Two valves were found to have excessive NBR during maintenance activities.
These valves had been installed on WP 11077 R1.
A review of the workplans used to install the Conar connectors revealed that three of them had been field complete before M&AI-19 (the ONP procedure used to install Conax connectors) was written. Another workplan was found to have been written and approved before M&AI-19 was issued but was not field complete until after M&AI-19 was issued. No change to this workplan had been initiated to incorporate requirements for wire bend radii.
(2) Two work releases had been initiated to sample valves for wire bend radil problems. Five of nine in unit 1 and nine of nine in unit 2 were unacceptable.
(3) M&AI-19 had a different torquing sequence with a different final torque value than the Conar Vendor Nanual (IPS-725 Revision G) referenced in the EQ binder.
In response to item 3, a memorandum from B. M. Patterson to R. A. Sessoms dated February 7, 1986 (S01 860207 956) was initiated asking if the torquing sequence found in N&AI-19 was equivalent to the Revision G of IPS-725 found in the EQ binder. The response (B70 860304 005) dated March 4, 1386 stated that the two sequences were equivalent based on information from Conaz Buffalo Corporation (B70 860226 100). The vendor stated that the method in M&AI-19 was a longer process for torquing than Revision G.
A memorandum from R. W. Olson to D. C. Craven dated March 26, 1986 (S02 860326 862) gave the corrective action for items 1 and 2 as inspection of all field terminations of Conar connectors. Those found out of compliance were to be reworked.
TVA ERPI4YEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER: 5 PAGE 22 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
SMIs 1-363-1 and 2-363-1 had been written to provide walkdown procedures for reinspection of the connectors (these SNI were initiated by work releases B122261 and 8106248). The reinspection was complete. SNIs 1-363-2 and 2-363-2 were initiated for all rework of Conar connectors.
The ECTG group for other sites which was evaluating the classical NSRS items interviewed SQN Nodifications personnel and discovered all rework l
was complete. The data packages had been sent to QA for review. They had been rejected because there was no Nuclear Performance Reliability Data System reporting. The packages were still in Nodifications.
j
==
Conclusion:==
The NBR issue was verified. The issue was actively being evaluated by DNE. The program discrepancies were identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN mentioned above. SQN GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables Because of Improper Cable Installation Nethods," also identified the problem at SQN. Based upon the above findings, we concur with the SQN GCTF report. EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing conclusions and recommendations will be required to provide a resolution to the minimum bend radius concerns.
Concern JLH-86-002 was verified. Conar connectors had been installed with excessive NBR. However, corrective action had been initiated. All rework was complete.
Cable Coating The use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified. ONP had no written method for removing Flamemastic, but through conversation with a cognizant general foreman, it was determined that it was not an approved practice to use sharp instruments to remove the coating. He also stated they had never removed Flamemastic except at penetrations where the cables were terminated. Here the procedure was to flex the cable until the coating cracked and then peel it off.
There was some question that the Flamemastic coating had exceeded the limits set by DNE for depth of coating. However, the examples noted in the spread room which appeared to have excessive coating were Non-QA trays (trays VCA, VCB, and WB). The safety-related trays were much neater in that the surface was smoother and was more evenly applied. In a review of the Joslyn Research Center report on the effects of Flamemastic on grouped cables, it was noted that this report was almost identical to the Factory Nutual Report on Vimasco and the same conclusions were reached. At WBN the above mentioned test did not appear to be adequate for the
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 23 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) configurations in the plant, therefore the same recommendation is made for SQN as for WBN in NSRS report I-85-569-WBN. The recommendation consisted of testing using trays which were filled, as found at the plant sites.
New ampacity tables had been generated in DS-E12.6.3 which included the derating effects of cable coatings. As a result of the changes made in these tables, the adequacy of ampacity of installed cables was questioned. An interview with the responsible DNE engineer revealed that a sampling program was to be conducted to verify the adequacy of V3, V4, and V5 level cables installed prior to the issuance of DS-E12.6.3, Revision 0.
However, there was no procedure drafted for this program.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern (IN-86-268-002) for the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified. Although the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was not verified, the potential existed that this could occur because there was nothing in any site procedure preventing their use and no provision for assuring that there was no cable damage after the coating was removed. The concerns (IN-86-259-005 OW-85-007-004) for Flamemastic coatings exceeding the limits set by DNE for depth of coating were verified.
Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Review of Surveillance Instructions (SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual l
Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Nechanical," and SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers -
Electrical"), and Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13 Revision 48,
" Fire", along with an interview with the safety supervisor revealed the following:
SQN had only one procedure for control of breaching fire barriers. This has been PHYSI-13. " Fire," Attachment F. " Procedure for the Control of l
Breaching Fire Barriers." The condition of attempted control through multiple organizations of ONP and DNC at WBN has not existed at SQN. SQN has not had a problem with fire barrier breaching control. Surveillance instructions are in place at SQN to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
l I
l i
l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 24 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
Based on the above findings, SQN had adequate procedures and control to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
Firebarriers (Ereaching Tools)
M&AI-13, revision 6, stated that a metallic breaching tool may be used.
The foreman must note and sign the data sheet that the metallic tool is free of burrs and sharp edges before use.
Both interviews had the following findings. There was no known fish-hook tool for foam removal. As with the WBN ECTG Report, it was assumed that the concerned individual had meant to use the term fish tape. Fish tape had been used at SQN to breach the fire barriers. This was acceptable by M&AI-13. No problems were identified because of the use of fish tape.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern was not verified. However, WBN MAI-14 had been revised on revision 6 to exclude the use of fish tape.
Fiberglass or wooden rods were to be used to breach penetrations. This same change should be evaluated at SQN for inclusion in SQN M&AI-13.
Insulation Damage This concern stated that insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which fed the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor of the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) system. Electrical tape was supposedly t
used to re-attach this insulation. The concerned individual gave four motor numbers (IAA, IBB, 2AA, and 2BB) as well as four conduits (1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-6360-A, 2-PL-6370-B, and 2-PL-6360-A).
l Discussions with various personnel from the Electrical Engineering l
Branch-site, Electrical Maintenance, and Operations units revealed l
that these motors were used to control the gates which prevented the l
backflow of hot condenser circulating water to the intake when the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Pumps were located at the initial intake pumping station. This was a necessary precaution needed to maintain the ERCW supply temperature requirements. However, the ERCW
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 25 0F 37 IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued) pumps had been moved to a separate pumping station (ERCW pumping station) and the need for these backflow gates no longer existed.
Currently, these gates have been blocked in the open position and the subject cables have been de-energized.
A field evaluation of these motors verified that they were numbered as the concerned individual stated, and they had been taken out of service as described above. This field evaluation did reveal a disconnected cable inside a control panel with a tag referencing Workplan 11043. A review of this workplan revealed that this work was done to remove several instruments from service. This was required according to Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720. A review of this ECN revealed that it gave the same information concerning these gates as that stated above.
The SQN system 27 Systems engineer was interviewed on the specifics of how the gate hoist motors had been removed from service. The engineer discovered that the breakers were open with a Caution Order sign attached.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the fact that the subject cables were not energized, and no longer needed, and had been taken out of service, the need for further action concerning this item was not required.
480-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted and assisted by two electricians. During the walkdown, the electricians removed covers from two of the 480-volt receptacles in question. These were box 4097 (480-volt Receptacle-DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S) and box 4100 (480-volt Receptacle - DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S).
Both of the receptacles-were Crouse-Hinds model number AEQ 01648. Both of the receptacles were wired with 3 conductor number 2 wire. This was the only model number found in the fifth diesel generator area.
Discussions with the Procurement Section Supervisor (DNE) revealed that catalog information for Crouse-Hinds catalog number 4700 (catalog page IP-27), model number AEQ 1648 stated the cable diameter range for the receptacle was from 0.64 inches to 1.37 inches.
Discussions with an Electrical Naintenance engineer revealed the l
diameter of one number 2 wire is 0.476 inches. By using TVA Cable Splice and Termination drawing number SD-E12.5.8, Revision 2, the evaluator determined that 3 conductor WNT wire now being used had a minimum diameter of 1.02 inches and a maximum of 1.30 inches.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 26 0F 37 IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
~
This investigation demonstrated the receptacles being used were rated f,r 3 conductor number 2 wire and therefore were not a problem.
Cable Routing From a review of site DNC and Modifications instructions, no specific references to maintaining cables in cable trays was discovered until M&AI-04 Revision 8 dated December 31, 1985. This was due to a misinterpretation of G-38.
G-38 step 3.2.1.8.2(b) was worded such that there was a difference of interpretation between site DNE and Modifications personnel and DNE personnel in Knoxville. This difference was extremely significant because site personnel believed before December 31, 1985, it was acceptable to run cable outside of cable trays while DNE in Knoxville said something entirely different. The wording must be made clear. It will mean a walkdown at SQN to verify all permanent cables are in the cable trays and to correct those that are not (An example of an " improperly" routed non-QA cable was discovered at SQN in the 480-volt Shutdown Board Room 2A2 in cable tray JAN.) It should be noted all examples found were non-QA.
The removal and/or identification of temporary cables had been the source of improperly routed cables outside of cable trays at WBN determined during the WBN site evaluation. The cables had not been identified or they had not been removed at the end of use by DNC.
The major source of these cables was temporary security cables.
SQN site personnel stated they had seen one or two cables running outside of cable trays in various locations around the plant (no specific locations given) but there were no massive amounts of unsupported cable. There were large amounts of cable running outside cable trays at WBN. As stated previously, these cables were determined to be temporary DNC cables and temporary security cables in a walkdown of the cable trays. DNE and Nodifications personnel were confident that all temporary security cables had been removed in 1981 or 1982. The temporary security cables were removed by workplan because they appeared on design drawings which were then voided. The DNE response to NCR W-283-P (the NCR written at WBN which dealt with unidentified cables in cable trays) reads that " Abandoned cables are spares not given numbers yet. Spare cables have no function, thus cannot affect safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant." This would indicate l
l l
l' --
- =.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 27 0F 37 i
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) that if there are unidentified temporary cables they are not a problem as far as the safe operation of the plant is concerned.
A walkdown of all cable trays should identify all cables routed outside of cable trays.
==
Conclusion:==
This evaluation concentrated on the removal of temporary cables because this was the problem identified at WBN. However, interviews conducted indicated that temporary DNC and security cables had been removed.
Attention was turned to permanent cables. The concern for cable routing outside cable trays was valid because site personnel telieved it was acceptable before the December 31, 1985 revision to N&AI-04.
Splicing (NAS-85-003) l I
Discus-lon with a cognizant engineer in Electrical Naintenance revealed they were aware of a specific case of split insulation on cable to the CS CCS pump that had been taped during construction.
The concern had been that this cable might still be taped according to earlier procedures rather than meeting II-10, Revision 11, which required the use of Raychem for splices. A review of NR A561116 revealed that cables IPL47355 and IPL47365 were inspected and repaired. Cable 1PL47355 had Raychem sleeves placed on it.
Cable IPL47365 was found to have no damage.
==
Conclusion:==
The taped insulation on cable IPL47355 had been replaced with Raychem sleeves and was no longer a problem. No further action was required.
Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on i
the disposition of NCRs 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774. The NCRs had been identified as the problem areas in the WBN Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) report on cable. It was determined that NCRs 6208, 6224, and 6623, 6774 were to be grouped together because they were NCRs on the same subject with different affected units i
l
TVA ENPLOYBE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 28 0F 37 IV.
SUNNARY OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(one for unit 1 and one for unit 2).
The sites dealt with only one NCR and evaluated it for both units. The engineer had information on NCR 6208/6224 and 6536. The problem defined in NCR 6536 was determined not to exist at SQN because the site used a different series of products to make a splice than at WBN. The engineer referred to ONP for further details on NCR 6208/6224. He had information that the NCR was to be handled by the Experience Review Program.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual in charge of the SQN Experience Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224. This program was a method of handling questions generated by NRC bulletins. INPO reports, SCRs, etc. The licensing unit would assign the questions to the appropriate plant sections which would respond as to whether a problem existed onsite.
In the j
case of this NCR, all splices in question were inspected and j
corrections were made as necessary. The documentation was then sent to the Environmental Qualification (EQ) project to become a part of the EQ binder. The NCR in question was considered closed on the SQN site.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant DNE Nuclear Licensing Section and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774. These NCRs questioned all splices in harsh environments in that it questioned the l
environmental qualification of the Raychem products used before December 1985. They had documentation that a potential generic applicability memorandum had been sent to SQN and that a response had been received.
Applicable DNE and site documentation was reviewed to determine what had been decided on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
This included reviewing the potential generic applicability memorandum from DNE to SQN and their response. It was determined that the activities in question were applicable to SQN and Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQNEEB8631 was generated.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE and EEB engineers on the disposition of SCR SQNEEB8631. The SQN DNE engineer said that there were three parts to the SCR. The part that dealt with the use of HVS Raychem kits was not applicable to SQN because this particular kit was not used onsite in the timeframe noted. The part that dealt with the application ranges of WCSF-N tubing was dispositioned by the fact that the ranges for use
TVA RNPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 29 0F 37 IV.
SUhMARY OF FINDINGS (Continued) were broadened, and therefore any applications before this change l
were well within the specified range. The site DNE engineer referred to the cognizant EEB engineer on the disposition of the last part of the SCR which dealt with the use of breakouts and end l
caps with no oversleeve in harsh environments. The EEB engineer l
said that this part of the SCR was being dispositioned use-as-is according to an EEB calculation which was in the process of being l
finalized. This caleclation was to prove that there has no problem for cables whose ends were not sealed to keep the shield (or drain) wire separated from the ground. The SCR has since been dispositioned and no rework was required.
==
Conclusion:==
l No problem was found at SQN with NCR 6536. NCR 6208/6224 had been found generic, but all work associated with this NCR had been completed. NCR 6623/6774 was dispositioned use-as-is.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables The SQN Employee Concerns Task Force Report on WBN Concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed for adequacy. The evaluation agreed with the report. The design of the system was different between SQN and WBN. The SQN orientation did not have the large distances found l
l between the raceway and the detectors.
l
==
Conclusion:==
l This evaluation agreed with the SQN Employee Concerns Task Force report.
The layout of the NIS cables at SQN was different from WBN because the j
orientation of cables at SQN did not have large distances between raceways l
and detectors and the concern was not verified at SQN.
Terminations NSRS report I-85-101-WBN had been written describing the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs. As part of this evaluation at WBN, SQN was tied into the report. The evaluator discovered that SQN had experienced test point resistor failures in the Foxboro racks due to crimp failures and that all PIDG lugs in the security system which were crimped on solid wire were replaced with the appropriate type terminal lugs. The evaluation did discover that even though there had been problems with past installations, the present SQN procedure M&AI-12. " Interconnecting Cable Termination and Insulation
.o TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 30 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Inspection," Revision 7 did note that only AMP Solistrand lugs were to be used on solid conductors. Through interviews with SQN personnel, it was determined that the PIDG lugs used on solid conductors were being replaced and/or soldered over on an as-needed basis. The recommendation was made by the NSRS that a formal replacement and/or solder program be implemented for all AMP PIDG lugs used for terminations of discrete electrical components with solid wire leads.
A memorandum from H. G. Parris to K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850904 010) described the proposed corrective action for SQN due to the recommendation of NSRS report I-85-101-WBN.
Some PIDG lugs on smoke actuated dampers were found to be installed incorrectly. They were to be replaced by August 27, 1985. A memorandum was to be issued from the plant manager to Instrument and Electrical Maintenance and the Modifications group to remind then to use the proper type of lug on safety-related equipment.
Inspections were in progress to verify the extent of the misapplication of PIDG lugs and to identify all sources of misapplication. SQN engineers were then to evaluate the impact to plant safety of each application.
Corrective action and a schedule for rework would follow this. These evaluations were l
to be completed by October 15, 1985.
A review of the potential generic condition evaluation memorandum and a memorandum from H. G. Parris to Those listed dated September 13, 1985, revealed that the issue had been referred to ONP.
The H. G. Parris memorandum in particular stated that the problem would be handled by the Experience Review Program at SQN.
An interview with the individual responsible for the Experience Review Program revealed that the problem was being evaluated by Electrical Maintenance. An interview with the responsible Electrical Maintenance engineer verified that all work specified in the preceding paragraph which dealt with smoke actuated dampers was complete. It was also verified that all evaluations and rework associated with the misapplication of PIDG lugs was complete except for the rework of lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks. The work had been specified on SMI-2-317-25.
The Compliance Section had been asked to justify not replacing these lugs. The existence of a memorandum to ensure that Instrument Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, and Modifications used the proper type lug was not verified. However, M&AI-7, " Cable Terminations. Splicing, and Repairing of Damaged Cables", Revision 7 and M&AI-12 " Interconnecting Cable Termination
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 31 0F 37 l
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) and Insulation Inspection," up until it was cancelled with Revision 8 both specified that AMP solistrand lugs were to be used on solid conductors. There was also a requirement for the QC inspector to verify the proper type lug was used. Therefore, there was no need for any further action since the site procedures contained the proper information.
The individual responsible for resolving the surge suppression issue in Compliance stated that the issue had been referred to DNE and that no response had been received.
An interview with the EEB engineer resolving the problem stated he was writing a memorandum requiring that all valves where the solenoid energized to perform its safety function were to have the lugs replaced or soldered over immediately. All others would have to be i
checked to determine if the lugs were in an acceptable condition.
It was going to be recommended that these lugs be reworked.
i A preliminary copy of the memorandum referenced in the preceding paragraph (from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated October 24, 1986) gave a general description of the use of are suppressors. They were "to protect the circuit contacts against pitting and burning caused by arcing associated with breaking the inductive load current of the solenoid valve." The memorandum indicated that PIDG lugs on Class IE surge suppressors should be replaced or soldered.
i As mentioned in the previous paragraph, all PIDG lugs on solenoid valves which energize to perform their safety function were to be l
replaced or soldered prior to restart.
For those which de-energerized a 10-percent sample was to be verified operable by field measurement of are suppressor circuit resistance. If any were found open, all Class IE are suppressors should be checked.
It was suggested this 1
procedure be repeated periodically until all are suppressor circuits were permanently fixed.
l
==
Conclusion:==
The evaluation agreed with the NSRS report that a problem with the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs existed at SQN. A replacement program had been initiated but not completed due to the question over the replacement of lugs on surge suppression networks.
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN
~ REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 32 0F 37 V.
ROOT CAUSE Cable Pulling NPT, SWP, NBR - The upper-tier document (G-38) for pulling cable was inadequate which, in turn, resulted in inadequate site procedures. The reason was failure to recognize a need to monitor maximum pull tension, sidewall bearing pressure and adhere to the manufacturers' minimum bend radius limits.
Conduit Overfill - The Design Project used non-auditable records for conduit fill. There was no Quality Assurance record kept on the total cross sectional area fill and TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13. Revision 1 (recently revised) did not incorporate average cable diameters also resulting in some error.
Cable Coating The root cause of cable coating concerns was a failure to follow the manufacturer's recommended maximum thickness. Inadequate administrative control over the application of Flamemastic was the major cause of the excessive coatings.
Cable Routing The root cause of the routing problem was inadequate site procedures due I
to a misinterpretation of Construction Specification G-38 in regards to routing cables outside of cable trays. These procedures have since been updated.
Terminations Failure by TVA and Foxboro to follow vendor recommendations in the application of terminal lugs, and failure of TVA to follow General Construction Specification G-38.
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-01 was:
An evaluation will be performed on cables routed outside of trays to determine the potential areas of concern. In particular this evaluation will consider the potential impact on electrical separation, cable ampacity, physical support and protection of the cable, and adequacy of tray supports. A field inspection will then
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER: 5 PAGE 33 0F 37 i
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued) be performed to locate and determine the extent of cables routed 1
outside of trays which are subject to the concerns evaluated above.
l The process will continue until it is determined that all such cables L
with a potential concern are identified and the configuration j
justified or modified.
l This is a SQN restart item.
The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-02 was:
An investigation was initiated in response to PIRGENEEB8605. A i
sampling program (that led to the evaluation of all 480 Y and 6900 V Class IE cables in trays and non-Class 1E cables routed with Class IE cables in trays) was conducted to determine if the cables installed in Class IE cable trays at Sequoyah were adequately sized. The cables were evaluated according to the i
requirements of Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.6.3.
This standard applied a dorating factor for Flamemastic 77 cable coating.
Other derating factors applied were cable tray covers, cable tray bottoms, cable tray fill and qualified cable insulation temperature.
The derating factors for the effects of Flamemastic 77 on cable l
ampacity were derived from test data. The test applied varying cable coating thicknesses to cables grouped in bundles by voltage level as required by Construction Specification G-38.
This program identified some undersized cables for which SCP SQNEEB86178 was initiated describing a condition adverse to quality. Those cables identified on SCR SQNEEB86178 were further evaluated, and certain physical modifications and engineering controls were applied such that the majority of the cables were made acceptable for use. The remainder were being replaced with adequately sized cable.
l The test will be reviewed to determine if the test report encompasses the worst case as-constructed condition at Sequoyah for Class IE cable trays.
This is a SQN restart item.
t
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 34 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-03 was:
To prevent further recurrences the site procedure has been revised to comply with G-38 regarding cable pulling. N&AI-4 now requires monitoring and documenting the pulling forces used in the installation of non-Class IE cables (with certain listed exceptions as contained in G-38).
The few associated cables (i.e., non-Class 1E cables routed in raceways designated for Class IE circuits) that exist at SQN were pulled to the same requirements as Class IE cables.
All systems (including non-Class 1E cables) have undergone Pre-Op or functional testing. Additionally, all medium-voltage cables (i.e.,
480 volt equipment rated at more than 100 horsepower and 6900 volt equipment) are periodically tested under the plant's maintenance schedule (NI-10.20).
The inclusion of non-Class IE cables in G-38's requirement for monitoring pull tension is an economic consideration only (to preclude damage and thus wasting material) and is not a safety-related concern. Failure of these cables would be a random occurrence and will be remedied on a case-by-case basis.
Hence, this employee concern item requires no further corrective action.
The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-04 was:
1.
Determine if a CAQ exists.
2.
Identify the appropriate place to provide written instruction for craft and inspector use in the removal of Flamemastic. The written instruction is to include the identification of proper tooling and prohibit the use of sharp tools.
3.
Revise as appropriate the identified document or generate a new document to pr6 vide written instruction for the removal of Flamemastic.
This corrective action is not a SQN restart item.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 35 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-01 was:
To determine the magnitude of the SWP spplied to SQN cables during installation, TVA reviewed all conduits containing safety-related cables against screening criteria. This was used to determine 16 of the worst conduit sections. The maximum SWP of cables within there conduits were determined. These values were compared to maximum SWP values determined from testing at TVA's Central Laboratories. The SQN values were less than those determined in testing. The overall conclusions of TVA's testing were confirmed by the report of a third party reviewer. TVA has, through the above testing and analysis, conclusively demonstrated that the practices employed during the installation of electrical cable at SQN maintained the adequacy and integrity of Class IE cable with respect to SWP.
TVA practice of monitoring total tension rather than individual tension, does assure individual conductor strength limits are not exceeded, and is consistent with IEEE 690-1984. In fact. TVA practice is more conservative.
Since August of 1978 DNC takes 80 percent rather than 100 percent of individual conductor strength on multi-cable pulls.
TVA's EEB has used NSRS report I-85-06-WBN in addition to the manufacturer's requirements, to form the basis for its evaluation.
Each of the areas of potential concern is being resolved into elements for further analysis.
In each case the actual bend radius to which a cable has or could have been subjected is determined. In particular, EEB has identified the elongation stress, to which a cable is subjected as the result of a bend, as the critical parameter in determining acceptability. Preliminary conclusions of the study indicate that this worst case bend at SQN does not reduce the cable's available elongation properties below that required for it to perform its safety-related function. The final report is expected to be issued in March 1987 for SQN.
The effects of a reduced bend on shielded medium voltage power cable and coaxial, triazial and twinarial cables will be evaluated separately. EEB has issued project specific actions for the evaluation of these cables. These actions will include field inspections for the existence of pull boxes or conduits of any type in which the cable is bent as well as individual inspections of a cable's bend radius. The actual bend radius will be determined and the resulting effects on the integrity of the cable will be established. The work is expected to be complete by Narch 1987.
The work is being tracked by SCR SQNEEB8703.
This is a SQN restart item.
.~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER:
5 PAGE 36 OF 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-02 was:
No problems were identified during the investigation / evaluation because of the use of fish tape to breach fire barriers.
Note that section 6.G.1.2 on page 29 of N&AI-13 satisfactorily addresses the use of metallic breaching tools.
The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-03 was:
Corrective action which include soldering or replacing AMP (PIDG) terminal lugs on solid wire, has been completed for unit 2 per SNI-2-317-25 except the solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
j Those CAQ's will be addressed by the resolution of the more specific l
j employee concerns 241.02-SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02.
l l
The estimated completion date of employee concern 10900-NPS-03 will be l determined by the dates shown on employee concerns 241.02 SQN-01 and l
241.02-SQN-02.
l IRS The line management response to 241.02-SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02 was:
l l
l For solenoid valve are suppressors, those identified as required for l
safety require replacement. Rework should be completed prior to l
i restart on each unit. Arc suppressors required for safety on both I
units will be identified on the schematics prior to unit I restart.
l This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
i The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-04 was:
This potential problem was identified by Problem Identification Report PIRGENEEB8605 (B43 860808 908). This PIR will assure I
corrective action will be identified and implemented.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
1 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-05 was:
The new cable diameters are being incorporated into the SQN cable routing system per memorandum to Roberts from Raughley dated September 23, 1986 (B45 860923 908).
Corrective action to NCR SQN EEB8601 will assure verification of cable input diameter information and that the cable raceway fill program is reevaluated using the new verified values.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
i I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
5 PAGE 37 0F 37 VII. GENERIC APPLICABILITY The concerns which dealt with NPT, NBR, and SWP have been determined in the WBN ECTG report on cable to be applicable to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN), and Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN).
The cable coating concerns were found to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
One of the fire barrier concerns (IN-85-018-004) was found to be potentially generic to BFN and BLN in thu WBN ECTG report on cable.
The other concern (II-85-094-005) was determined to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Splicing concern IN-86-314-005 was considered potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Due to SCR WBNEEB8537, I-85-101-WBN and PH-85-003-N32 were generic to BLN and BFN.
No new generically applicable concerns were found in the SQN evaluation.
VIII. ATTACHNENTS Attachment A - List of SQN Concerns l
l l
l l
l l
f,I-h
__ i
<f i
~~ $[./M l([kW EX 25-076-003 CD 10900 N HBN YYYY HS T50125 K-FDRM CADLE DREAK LINK *.IIERE NOT USED F PRE-198' CABL E PUL L IliG.
POSSintF CA BLE DAMAGE MAY HAVE RESULTED IN U 2.
GEf4ERIC CONCERN. C0flSTRUCT10N DEPT. C ONCE Ril. Cl HAS fl0 ADDITI0llAL INFORI1ATION.
EX 086-001 CD 10900 H I-IBN YYYY ll5 750197 K-FORM 0URING THE HEEK OF DCTOBER 14. 1985 A CADLE ilAS PULLED USIfiG A "C0ftE ALO HC" DURifl0 A L ullG PULL THAT HEllT FR0 M MANHOLE 10 flANHOLE.
( NAtlES/DET AIL S TO Tile SPEC!rIC CASE ARE KNDHN TO QTC At3D HITilHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDE NTIALITY).
C0tlSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCE RN.
CI HAS HD TURTHER INFORMATIDH.
EX 157-002 CD' 10900 N HBH YYYY HS T50205 REPORT LL ArtD LR CONDUILETTE FITTINGS CAUSE TOO GREAT OF A BEND AT THE FITT1 HGS FOR THE CADLES. THEY ARE USED SITE HIDE.
CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
CI HAS NO ADDITIDHAL INFORNATION.
-GENERIC CONCERN-IN 009-001 CD 10900 N HBN YYYY HS In IkERCH OR APRIL 1985, 480V RECPT'S 750031 REPORT IN THE ADDITIDHAL DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING FEED CABLES HERE SIZED LARG ER THAN THE PLUGS COULD HANDLE. THE
- THE TRANSFER (SCHEDULE) HAD TO BE MET.
C/I ELECT. ENGR. AIDE IN CHARGE OF THIS WITNESSED THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN ENGINEER AND HORK (NAME GIVEH) DISCUSSED THIS PR OBLEM HITH DESIGH ENGINEEP.ING AND HA ENG* AIDE AND IS CONCERNED THAT SCHEDULE TOOK 5 TOLD AN ECR HOULD BE ISSUED TO ADD PRECEDENCE OVER QUALITY.
RE55 THIS PROBLEM. HHEN ELECT. ENGR
.. AIDE (HAME GIVEH) TOLD THE ELECT.
ENGINEER IH CilARDE OF THE SYSTEM (HA ME GIVEN), ENGlHEER IN CHARGE OF SYS TEM STATED THAT "I DON'T HAVE TIME T O HORRY ABOUT THIS PROBLEM BECAUSE*
IH ~25-018-004 CD 20900 N HBN YYYY I-25-699-RBN N5 SUPERVISION (KHDHN) HOULD NOT FOLLDH T50164 REPORT CABLE PULLING PROCEDURE. THE NORK PROCEEDEE WITHOUT PERMIT 5 A5 REQUIRE D BY PRDOEDURE. SUMMER 1984.
CONST RUCTION DEP' 00ll0ERt;. O! HA5 NO FUR 7
THER INFORMATION. NO FOLLDHUP REOUI RED.'
IN -E!-120-001 00 10900 N HBH NNYY SS HBNP UN!T 1. THE TRIAXIAL CABLES (HT T50074 K-FORM V TYPE) FOR THE NEUTRON FLUX DETECTO l
R$ 15 NOT SUPPORTED FROM HMERE THE O ADLES EXIT FROM THE REACTOR CAVITY $ *
- TAINLE55 STEEL HALL FROM A RACENAY, TO THE TERMINATI0l!5 ON THE DETECTORS
. C/I COULD HOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIO NAL INFORMATION. ND FURTHER INFORMA TION AVAILABLE. HC FOLLOH-UP REQUIR ED.
IN -E!-213-001 00 10900 N H3N YYYY 55 CABLE PULLING PROCEDURES HERE CHAliGE 75000L K-FORM L AROUNE 1951. ' ITEMS SUCH AS PULL T ENSIONS HERE t*0DIFIEO.
HD 00RRECTIV E ACTION HAS TAKEN FOR CABLE DULLED PRIGK it PRCCEDURE CHANGE. PERTAIN 3 TL LCTH UN'T5 I
IN 255-0C; OD 10900 N H5N YYYY IS 00NDU:7 ARE TOO FULL ANr 0ABLE 'ULL:
T50026 REPORT NG ICI VIG.ATED
.*N THAT THE MAXIMUP T EF : ION FOR PULLING OAELE HAS EXCEED II.
N
'UL L T EN!I ON ME ASURING DEV10 E WA5 AVAILAELE FOR USE.
THIS EX;37 Et PF.: DF TC 1 YEAE AGL !5/24) ANT 00 CURRE: IN THE TUREINE AN A"X ILOO3.
, UNITS 1 5 2..
~-,
,.-_..r..,y.
!oO 0-
'? ?- [ f t
\\
7$C f,1/e'.([~' -.
IH 85 295-003 CD 10900 N HBN YYYY T50096 SS K-FORM CABLE PULLS HERE PERFORMED IN A"RUS HED" MAtulER.
CADLES HHICH WitERE PUL LED UNDER lHE OLD "UNCOH1 ROLLED" PRO CEDURE HERE POSSIBLY HOT RECHECKE TIME FRAME OF OLD PROCEDURE PRIO O 1952 (APPROX.),
- 10 FURTHER DETAIL 5 AVAILABLE. HD FOLLOH UP REQUIRED.
IN ~85-300-002 CD 10900 H HBH YYYY T500ZI HS REPORT CADL ES IN CABL E TRAYS, PARTICUL ARLY IN THE CABL E SPREADlHG ROOM (BOTH UN ITS), ARE 2HPROPERLY ROUTED AND PULL ED.
IN 325-005 CD 10900 N HBH YYYY I-85-231-HBN NS T50052 HUMEROUS NDH-SPECIFIC INSTANCE REPORT L ES DURING PULLIllG OPE CTRICAL CABLES, (ELE DOTH UNITS 1&2) DVER STRESS HA5 OF SUFFICIENT SEVERI
.LA RDPE BREAKING.CAUSE MU NO SPECIFICS (NAM ES, DATES, LOCATIDHS) HERE PROVIDED.
IN 433-002 CD 10900 H HBN YYYY 750041 K-FORM 55 THE CABLE DH.UHIT5 1&2 HAS BEEN ED 50 NARD (MANUALLY HDT HECHAN Y) THAT THE IHSULATION SLIP 5 DR BRE KS.
THE CABLE THAT BREAKS IS CORR TED BUT THE DAMAGED CABLE 15 IGN AND LEFT FOR THE MEGGER TEST TO ERMINE DAMAGE.
CRAFT ARE OFTEN ORDE RED HOT 10 NAIT FOR OC INSPECTDRS IH 436-004 CD 19900 N HBN YYYY 750011 K-FDRM H5 TOO MANY HIRES IN ONE CONDUIT B PULLED DVER ENERGIZED HIRES.
TO I YR AGO THIS DATE (6-5-85) PRIOR.
THE MAX.
PULL TENSIDH HA5 NOT NDNITORE gh31-001
~
CD 10900 N H3N YYyy
~'
y REPORT 55 AB PUL iG ET D5 t!5ED DURING 19 AVE DAMAGED Tgr.
L{ER, AND 000(p g D
EXAMPL E5 : to NDUIT HAS NOT
- THE REACTOR COOLING PUMPS WAS PULLED WITH A Runs FROM UNIT ha " IIIIEP 257 WINCH TRUCK AN NO DYNOMETER WAS USED.
(THESE EVATION ODNTROL MD,-)7@ CARE HAS
~? "
Il CABLES RUN EROM AUX. BLDG. 737' ELEV., NORTH EST PUltgn, A t Aggg gg,
ELEV' THROUGH PENETRATION TO 757' ELEV., TO 780AND THEN TO THE ANNULUS PENETRATIO SIDE 5, HATER. ROCKS AND GR N' WER PUSH ED OUT OF THE CONDUITt 3H THE C1BLE TYPE CHANGES). CI HAD NO MORE INFORMA-HAVE DAMAGED THE ADtg n3gtf7 i
TION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
wABLES THAT RUN5 pggg, I!TAKEPUMPiH
'hl5 C NDU 9
V AB 1 -E!-733-001 CD 10900 N H2H YYYY T50lI7 REPORT HS SUPERVISION IS INTERESTED IN QUANT Y RATHER THaN DUA;;Ty.
15 THE SLDGAM.
GET IT IHei CASLES ARE DULLED RD UGHLY AROUND SHARF CORNE:'S ANC Z
, WHEN THE CONDUITS ARE ULL. ELEV 7 29',.737', 747', AND 75?' AUX. 3;DG.
UN:T :.
TRD; RDOM UN:ALSO FR02.EM Ix;5:5 II; :DH 75 1 & 2. :: HAS HL :UR THER IH:00f AT:0N. C0"5TRUCT 0N DEST
%E5-!5f-005 CD 10900 N H5N YYYY FULLCM UF N;T REOU'REI.
OCHERN.
750094 K-:0RM 05 THE CRt,0T;*E 0: USING A BREA RO*! H HEN PULLING Ct.n E :D HOT EE:
0Mg E::
ECTIVE UN IL 19U. A:TER A;, THE "I:0
PULLS HERE MADE 5-YE A?.;
AGO W:iHO UT BREAK RD'E;.
Mr MORE IN:GRMATIDH AVAILAR E.
ND FOLLDN UF RE;t: REC.
l.
?,Q q C n
- u(Q. \\l-rh n
C n
& c.
_;L u
h h /IA[b b -
IN 935-001 CD 1D900 $ HBH YYYY T5DD96-00 15100 REPORT H5 C.I. STATES THAT 7Dx 10 75x 0F TH'E C ABLE IN51ALLED.J5 BE REPLACED.
DAD Atto IT SHOUL D IIHEH THE CABLE llAS Itts TALLED, PRESSURE BY SUPERVISORS CAUS ED PRODUCTIUli HOT DUALITY. CABLE HA 3 PULLED HITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMEllT.
BEND RADUS HAS VIOL ATED AllD PULLING PROCEDURE ilAS fl0T TOL L DHED.
AFTER C ADLE HAS IN PLACE, IT HAS tt0T PROTEC TED AND HAS DAllAGED FURTHER BY C0fl5 RUCT10tl (UllIT 2)
TOLLDH UP RE,0UIRED.
IN 97a-001 CD 1D900 N HBN YYYY 15ctos -
!!$ SUPERVISOR ( Kilolfil) DIRECTED TifAT ELE K-PORil CTRICAL Cant t nr PutLED llITH CilERRY l'1CKERS, ilACK IRULK5, AllU lilVCK llUU NTED HIllCHES. PROBLEN HAS HIDESPREA D.
EXAMPL ES INCLUDE ( A)MUCH OF THE LARGE CABLE IN DURIED CONDUIT IH.THE 500 KV SHITCHYARD. AND (BP5DD HCM C ABLE THAT IS HON lil510E THE TURBINE.
BUILDING II, BUT HHICH HAS PULLED BY A MACK TRUCK USING A STEEL CABLE.
CONDUIT ENDS HERE IN LINE HITH THE D 00R IN THE TURBIHE BLDG.
THAT OPENS IN THE DIRECTIDH OF THE 500 KV SHIT
?" h [ HEN O k N Wk I
A
~~
1976. CI HAS NO FURTHE INFORMA IOC.
IN 028-001 CD 55900NHBN YYYY SS T50110 CA5LE }ULL LIMITS HERE EXCEEDED ON REPORT HE CABLE GOIHG TO THE INTAKE PUMPIN G STRUCTURE (IPS) ELECTRCAL MAN HDLE 55,4, 5,6,7.E.
CI HA5 NO ADDIT 10NAL INFORNATIDH.
IN 199-001 CD 109D0 N HBH YYYY I-25-466-NBN SS CABLE PULLS ARE HOT ALHAYS PERFORMED T50125 REPORT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 001.
F0 i
R EXAMPLE, BREAK LINKS HERE NOT USED DURING CABLE PULLS, AND CONDUITS AR E 100 FULL.
CONSTRUCTION CONCERH.
CI HAS NO ADDIT 10HAL INFORMATI0H.
IN 201-001 CD 10900 N HBN YYYY 1-ES-466-HBH SS CABLE PULLING LIMITS NAY HAVE BEEN E T50150 REPORT XCEEDED DURIHC OABLE PULLS BEFORE 19 E2, C1 ST ATES THAT PULLING LIMITS HE RE N01 ADHERED 10 OR MONITOREE !!FOR E THAT OATE. 00r!37 DE*T. COMOERN. O I HAS 110 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. NO FOLLDH UP REQUIRED..
IN 259-001 CD 1090C N HBN YYYY I-[5-56E-HBN 750149 SS TVA FAILED TO USE FUSE LINKS OR OTHE REPORT R TENSION INDICA 10R5 HHILE PULLING 0 ABLE.
FUSE LINKS HAVE ONLY BEEN USE D IN THE PAST I I/2 YEARS. CONSTRUC TION' DEPT. CONCERN. 01 HAS HD ADDIT 10NAL INFORMATION. !!0 FOLLOH-UP REQ' UIRED.
1H 259-005 CD 20900 N HDN YNYY I-E5-569-HBN NS MARY ELECTRICAL CABLES HERE BUNCHED 150149 REPORT TOGETHER IN CADLE TRAYS TC MAKE !T E ASIER TO COVER lt!!P HITH Ir:5ULATION (VEMASCO) OR FLAMEASTIO. THIS MAY R ESULT Ih HEAT BUILDUP 5.
C0t:STRUCTIO l' DE"T. COHOERH 02 HAS N0 :URTHER I Hf0RMATION. NO FOLL0h-UP REDUIRED.
!N -8f-262-D05 00 IC900 N HBN YYYY l-E5-5TI-HSH US UNITS I 2, APPRDXIMATELY A YEAF. AMO 150145 REPORT DNE-HAL: AGO (ITES) A 5EEAK L1HK llAS 70 EE USEI DURIn0 A CADLE 'ULL; H0H I
EVER. A "$ TEEL O!! DEEP" II STILL EEIN O A0DEP ANO THE PRDBAEILITY 0: EXCEE OING THE f: XIriUP. PULL TEt:5Ich 13 VER Y HIGh.
t:0ST 0: THE CAELE HAD !!!ti PULLEO SY lill. CONSTRU:TICN OEri 0 0:0ERN. OI HA5 tlc :URTHEP. IHFORMATI DM.
NO FCLLCf UP RE;UIREO.
OnOMO-&M-X5 e
"**k d I.',I* O g
IN 266-006 CD 509hhHHBN T50253 YYYY REPORT HS MAlif CARLES llERE PULL ED ARO GREE BEHUS N11H0tlT MAlfi1 AlH R rLACEMEt31 I ti ADDITIONAL 1HE CABLE 1 RAYS.
11 0
- FILE,
]Nr0Rf1Afl0ll AVAILABLE IN RN.
Culf$lRUCilute DEPARittEHT COII IN 268-002 CO 10900 !! HDH YHYY T50241 REPORT HS BY REMOVINO VAttVSCO FROM ELE CADLES H11H A BJEC15 PROVIDES AKil!FE OR OTHER SH P01ENTIAL FOR dalla GIllG 1HE ELECTRICAL CABLES.
i NOT KHUN AtiY SPECIFICS.
CI DOES It0R HAS AH Y ADDIT 1014AL lit F ORilA T I ON. CON ION DEPARTMElli CDHCERN.
IN 268-003 CD 10900 H llDN
'YYY I-15-570-HDN HS T50150-REPORT CABLES HERE ItiSTALLED IMPROPERL THE CONTROL DLOG.,
AND 741' SPRE ADER ROOM.AT ELEV RATION HAS IMPROPER REFORE PA
. HITH INSULATI0ft.
' i'.
(FL ANUASTIC OR VEM ASCO).
CONS 1RUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
CI HAS 110 ADDITIDHAL INFORMATION NO FOLLOH-UP REQUIRED.
JLN-86-002 CO 10900 N SQN NNYN
- REPORT, SS ELECTRICAL CONAX CONNECTORS HA N INSTALLED HITH HIRE BEND RADIUS S ALLER THAN ALLOHED BY M&Al-19, RAPH 3.4.
PARAG MAS-85-003 CD 10900 N SON NNYN REPORT SS ADEQUAC
'3 CCS PUMP MOTOROF CABLE SPL t
00 005-014 CD 10900 N SQN NNYN T50272 SEQUDYAN - INSULATIDH HAS MISTAK REPORT CUT OFF OF A 440 VOLT CABLE. HN Eti THE MISTAKE HAS DISCOVERED, THE INSU LATION HAS REATTACHED HITH ELECT L TAPE.
THE BACK FLDH (OR DISCHARO GATE HD IST MOTOR (MOTOR NOS. lAA, IBB, 2AA AND 2BB IN OtlE OF THE Foll0HING COND UITS:
1-PL-6370-8, L-6570-B OR 2-PL-6360-A).1-PL-6360-A, 2-P IHOIDENT OCOURF.ED IN 1977.
DETAILS KNOWN TO
- CTO, HITHHELO DUE TO 00tiFIDENTIALITY NO FURTHER ll4 FORMATION MAY BE R
EASEL.
CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT COSCERN
)
CI HAS NO FURTRER 'INFORMATION.
3H 007-004 00 j
T5C224 10900 N H5N YYYY K-FORM NS VAMA 500 FIRE PRC0FINO HAS APP ELECTRICAL P0HER CABLES 50 THIO AT TO DISSIPATE.THAT IT HILL i
E ELECTRICAL IllSULATION TO t
N AND FAIL.
NATION 00tiSTRU0i10ll DEPA lI 100-013 00 10900 N HBN YYYY RN NO FOLLDH UP REQUIRED.
T50211 R* PORT lS CA2LE BEllDIt10 RADII PROD.' EMI, S NC FURTMER INCORMATION. OI HA 00t:0ERN VI A LETTER.
AN0t!YMOUS X 001-001 00 1090C N BLN YYYY I-EE-3II-t;N
.50075,'
r.-F ORM HAS L'Str 10 PULL oar;ES.AT 2EL(Er0 THEREFORE, t:ts f:ANY tiEN AS TFEY HANTE:H U
SE:
1C.
Ax T!nSION ut: Ex:Egeg:,
UR21NE BUI;*ING OF UtiIT 1 & C.iM 1
t
=
!/ 0 { 0~h Sh
.-k'/.'.I[ O N
- ~'
lil -8 6 -266-0 06 CD 1090L N HDN YYYY 15C055 REPORT
!!5 MAlli CADL ES IlERE PUL L ED AROVH GREE DEllDS H11H00T f)Altil AlHlHD F PL ACEf tf H1 IN IHE CADLE TRAYS.
A DH1 T 10tdA L Ilif CRt1A110H t.VAILA NO TILE.
COH51RUC110N DEPAR1tttt4T Con Rit.
Ill 264-0C0. CO 10900 ti ilDil YHYY T50241 REPORT 1:5 BY REMOVltl0 vat 1V5CD FROM ELEC CADLES H11H A Kit!FE OR 01HER SHARP O BJEC15 PROVIDES A P01E11TIAL FOR DAt1A GlHD lite ELEC1RICAL CABLES.
tl0T Kil0H ANY srECIFICS.
CI DOES HOR HA5 AN Y ADDITI0llAL I tt F ORilA T I ON. CONSTRUCT ION DEPAR1t1EtIT COHCERH.
IN 268-D03
- CD 10900 N HDH YYYY I-55-570-HDN H5 150150' REPORT CADLES HERE INST ALLED It! PROPER THE CONTROL DLDC., AT ELEVATION 729' AND 7 41 ' SPREADER ROOM.
CABLE SEPE RATION HA5 IMPROPER DEFORE PAlHT HITH It(SUL AT10tt.
(FLANUASTIC OR VEM ASCO).
CON 51RUCTION DEPT. COHOERN.
CI HAS HO A00!TI0tiAL INFORMATION.
NO FOLLOH-UP REQUIRED.
JLH-36-DC:
CD 10900 N SON NNYN REPORT'
$5 ELECTRICAL C0HAX C0HilECTORS HAV N INSTALLED HITH HIRE BEND RADIUS S AL L ER THAf4 AL L OllED BY h&Al-19, PARAC RAPH 3.4 MA5-25-CC3 CD 10900 N SON NNYN ADEQUA0h DF CABLE SPLICE / REP REPORT 35 5 C05 PUMP MOTOR 00 D05-014 CD 10900 N SON NNYH T50272 SS SEQUDYAH - IH5ULATION HAS MISTAK REPORT CUT OFF OF A 440 VOLT CABLE.
HHEN THE MISTAKE HA5 DISCOVERED, THE IH5U LATION HA5 REATTACHED HITH ELECTR L TAPE.
THE BAOK FLOH (ORCADLE IS THE P0 DISCHARDE) CATE HD IST MOTOR (MUTOR N05. IAA, IEE, 2AA AND 255 III OllE OF THE FOLLOHING COND UIT5 1-PL-(370-2. I-PL-6360-A, 2-P L-E370-2 OR 2-*L-(360-A).
Itt0! DENT 000VRRED IN 1977 DETAIL 5 KNDWh TC
- CTO,
!!ITHHE' D DUE T O CONFIt!NTI A*.ITY HD FURTHER INFORt1ATION MAY EE REL EA EI.
00HSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN j
CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.
3W -t5-0C7-004 00 1090C N W3N YYYY
.5C024
'S VAttA500 FIRE PR00FItfC liA5 APPL *E H
t-FORM ELE 0lRICAL PDHER CADLE5 50 THI t AT TO DIESIPATE.THAT IT HILL f E ELECTRICAL II:
THIS HILL CAUSE TH N AtlD FAIL.
5ULATIDH TO BREAK DON CI HAS 110 FURTHER INFOR ttATION CONSTRUCT 10H DEPARTM
- I j(({00-013 RN ltC FOLLDH UP REQUIREC.
CD 10900 N W3N YYv Y
'E U",'
n
- r;r 7ggp;ng pgg.; pppp,.,g 5 NE 8URTFER Iur0PMATIch.
.. gg CONCERN VIA L ET T EF,.
AN0r(TMOUS X - {- E-DCI Ot Ip9 t c I;n v
y
- .
- 3.: ;.;. g 7,,
g 7,..,
7,
..... :.. :,,., t,.. "
- :--.. "?; e i,,v '
..-n
'M?
- * " "
- 0 !...
l.
4 IFEIEECTE.
1M * [;*((;{;
!! 00*JrTE
- J:;NO ; s t ; t,
- rE -
UE.I;"E !.!.:.10 L U:.I *
(
[(h'/[) C Aq ~ &! /\\-M_
e C
~ -
t iIL
~
t
~I l& ?iA!
~
s.094 004 CO 10900 N BLN YYYY I-ES-579-DLN H5 n -g'0150 T5 7.-FORM DELLETONTE IllE ttAJORITY OF CABLE HA S BEEtt PULLED pef 0RE THE USE OF FISH 1 APE FUSE LINP, 5 llERE REQUIRED; OR flullIl0 RING DEVICE THEREFORE T HE flax.
PULL T ENSIUll llA5 flui t:0N110 RED.
C0tl STRUCTION DEPT. C OIIC ERii. CI HAS tid FUR 1HER lilF O RilA T 10ll. 110 FOLLDH UP R EQUIRED.
XX 094-005 CD 20900 N DLN YYYY I-85-550-DLtl H5 D E L L E F0llT E : AN " ILLEGAL" FISH HOOK T T50150 REPORT YPE 10DL HAS TREQUENTLY USED TO REMO VE THE FDAM DN TERftlflAT10ll5 30 NORE CADLE COULD DE PULLED.
T1115 ILLEGAL TOOL CAUSED All lilDET ERttlilATE AMOUllT OF DAf1ADE.
AH flCR ( 8 UtlKil0llfl) NAS 0 EllEll A I E D 11 ft!#i t'n 4 s u AlitmtSS 1 11.
C0rlDI120N DUT llAY llAVE DEEN IllADE QU
' ATE TO VERITY ALL DArtADED CABLE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AllD CORRECTED. CONS T RUCTI ON DEPT, CONCERN. CI HA5 t!0 F URTHER INFORtlATION. NO FOLLOW UP RE QUIRED.
IR 514-005 CD 10900 5 WBH YYYY N5 CABLE SPLICIllG IN NAllY CASES HA5 BEE T50255 MP 70605 REPORT N IMPROPER AND fl0T DOCUMENTED CORREO TLY.
(E.G. A CollDUOTOR HAD A HDLE I N THE OUTER INSUL ATION, A SUPERVISOR WAS CALLED TO LOOK AT IT AND HE SAI
-D.
" TAPE IT OVER AND PULL IT IN".
19 E3.)
ADDITIONAL IliFORMATION KNOWN T 0 QTC. HITHHEL D TO MAINT AIN CONFIDEN TIALITY. NO ADDITIDilAL INFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.
Cott0ERN. NO FOLLOH-UP REQUIRED.
Ill L39-004 CD 10900 N HBH YYYY I-E!-5IE-HBN IS CABLES HAVE DEEN PULLED AT WATTS BAR T50145 REPORT BY USIND A COME-ALOND HINCH.
000R$
WERE HELD SHUT TO PREVENT 00 O!$ERV ATION.
CONSTRUCTION DEPT 00tl0ERN.
(DETAIL 5 TO Tit:5 SPE0;F 0 CASE ARE K ll0HN TC OTO Ant I :THHELE TC MAlf;TAIN CON'IDENTIALITY;. 0; HA5 130 FU?iME R INFORMATION. 110 FOL L Di--UP R10L' IRE E.
I-E b101-WBN 00 109 WBN YYyy N*e M
IHeROD ELECTRICAL TERMINAI!ON IE REPORT yngege,ERc.;gIMs-op-TYPE LUOS WERE U SED FOR TERMINATION OF r:50 RETE ELEO TRICAL COMPONENT 5 WITH.50L;D W:RE LE AD5 pg -g3-003-N:0 CD 109 HBN YYYY N5 NRC IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOW!!i3 CONCERN' REPORT FROM THEIR REVIEW 0: THE OTO FI.Est ORIM* DN LUC 5 SDECIFIED FOR STRAND Et WIR! ARE USEI DN SOLID WIRE AGAIN ST VEN00R S*EO. (AMo) b
ECIG C.3 Attachment A l'n t. e 1 of I lie v i e l en 2 - A ECSP Corrective Action Irnetint, Document (CATil) i IllI TI ATIOil Applienile ECSP Report fl0:
2.
i Innediate Corrective Action Required:
/Pyrf -S O} Al O Yes Cr tJo 2.
Stop klork Reconnended: O fen 9' !!n 3.
CATD No.
/# f' 00 - JQN - O /
4.
INITIATI0ld DATE
/ c T f, 5.
RESPONSIDLE ORGAllIZATIOll:
.JQ M
.5,,/g_
D, kr e 4,,-
~
6.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: ErQR O NQR_
~T+
voa v,cc///r c/ 4Aa_/-
_.5*6 r>4 P CA ntr r U d~f r N o v *e"/)
O v :'~.? / h t-
-_ c x tig t 7~c u r 7Wi~
_or
/NrNr W
G-22 C O A/C e*Eslnif c
C' A A L E N o d?/NC 0
/ //o w CAntf' 7"?
E 4" Pe v772 UAS
~7D N 0 7~
C A l?t r T/22 y e o v75/b r 05
_m 7.
PREPARED DY: HAME O ATTACHf1ENTS
~7frT@ 777@'
8.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-l! __ x M 7.- 'mowl DATE:
_/
f DATE:
_ /e/ 6 //4 9.
APPROVAL: ECIG P RAM MGR.
_/e/p//-
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
t 21.
PROPOSED DY: DIRECTOR /MGR:
O ATTACHMEt:!F 12.
CONOURREllCE: CEG-!!:
DATE:
SRP:
Dr.TE : _
'l DATE:
DATE:
DATE:,_
DLTE:
ECTG FROGRAM MGR: _
DATE:
YEFIFICAT'0f! AND CLOSE007
- 13. A PProved corrective actions hsve been verifled at i mpl e,;e n t e d.
s a t i e f e c t o-l l y.
e n
g g
ECTG C.3 A L ' a c hrne n t A Page 1 of I heviaton 2 - A EC';P Correc t i ve Action Irotting Documnnt (CATD) 3 JNITIATION Applicable EC';P Report NO: '
/09$0*.$VA' /)
1.
] mediate Corrective Action Required:
G, Ic e O No y
"'2.
Stop Vork. Recommended:
C(. Ies G. lio
/
3.
CAID No. /C90C
.Yd1N-CZ
-4.
INITIAT ON DATE
/o/t,/ d
.s, 5.
RESPON:l IDLE ORGANIZAIION:
J27U\\/ r [. ?*
Dh_ e t -6v '
- f..
PROD EM DESCRIPTION: E!'QR O NQR 7%c o /-/r e
- o4 7E
}4 m en,s e A.~e Co st A.n'
,em Cnb Jee svi ?4 r -r. e d
~+
n m i ti e s h.
hu nAW A.o p >,
cs e e i Orn /l..
nh r i.,? e,,.L%/
-% r a //
. C L9 A ) ' it)ln/tc n Men r O ATTACliMENTS 7.
PREPARED BI: NAME _
4cf4MipubaLAM J DATE:
/d/ G/n..
8.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-g'o/4 -f #2%<M DATE:
/ / /A V A '- (~ -
9.
APPROVAL: ECTG CRAM MGR.
~DATE:
. 'f CORRECTIVE ACTION r
- -,en.
1.... ' '?5 ' P :.' 10.
,,,s..
- ;).f.2.7 =l:/.
- PROPOSED CORRECTIVE' ACTION PLAN,:.
' ^ 9?N.NI '*l/"'.'
.,...,..e..
t 3 0..,
...e '
.s..
.e.. :. e:...,.
- ,,.....' i,". :
=
E O A7Tt.CHMENTO 11.
PROPOSED DI: DIRECTOR /MOR:.'
22.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-il:
_ DATE:
DATE:
SRP:
_ DATE:
D/.TE :
i DATE:
DATE:
ECTC PROGPJ..". MGE:
DA!!:
VERITICATION AND CLOSE0UT 13.
Approved corrective actions bove been ver!fied as setlefectorily liepl emen t ed.
\\
da
e FCIG C.3 Att achinent A Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A ECSP Corrective Action TractinL Documnnt (CATD) l JilITI ATIOil Aprilcable ECSP Report 110:
1, Immediate Corrective Action' Required:.
. h llo
- 2..
Stop Work. Recommended:
O Tee O., T e s D ' flo 3.
CATD No. _ /d9dd dOAl-OL4 5.
RESP 0llSIDLE ORGANIZATIoll:
IllITI ATI0tt D c.......
PRont.Ett DCSCRIPTION:
.S~GA)-L-4* > ATE. /0/.c./Pfo r,.
O Olt nf nytt D/ve,X4,4
~
r* S e u N d'.
0., As o r o c e. _6 e e,-
- ;,/.,
-.*A rb /r C l a r r //--
.r/s A/s e
?uH -/~ % e M m mi, n, %w,/
,f m &~
A 'n M 'h e 4-.
xn so n m <of K-Pf rA e n' Mis r. 4 y s-y
}
7 PREPARED BI: NAME _-37<-:
' O ATTACll? TENTS _.
S.
CollCURRENCE: CEG
- s ~2/A' Ft5#7%'y& ~
e DATE: _ /o/6 /Id'
'l -. =
- 9. ' APPROYAL: *!.. ECTO # OCRAM MGR. _
~st
.r v 2 ^ DATE: J il/6/ S6.S...
r
.7
, r,:
~
9.+F.d....I:".'$....?
- -- " i.
.ya,,.
.. DATE:
_ CORRECT!VE ACTIOfi
- .n,.
',; u
- ,,;,, g,,,,,.;;j;,,,
.,",,y,..
f 7,gt, ;,,;...
9 ~~...w..
- .,y'yy%. 3.,;,
10.
?
.. ' ~..
.,,,. " ',..PROPCSED CORRE0!IVE ACTION PLAN:
. ~..
~
.. ' " ' " " ~ " " * - " * - - - - '
'..v...
s
.,o e..*N.
.......
- f *t t-b,s'.1
.,'o e.. e
.t.
s s
6m
-- '7 : 7/p?f.T. v",'.-
- e
- ,1;cs,'.w'r &.R.q:
1
,,t.
., ;, :. ::. r..
~
..,.%,. 7.,.'.: ;. Nl&.*."
4 1
', 4..
..,...s..
- v..... i.,, r...
~
e
- w. 4. n, -
.. L *..
t
!.' cr.3e ::uu.e't '* c /
.. t:
! [',.$2:ii.
,..,..'...I. 7. : : '. '
- i 3
~
c.
^ w:
[
11.
PROPOSED BY:
DIRECIOR/HGP..'
O ATTACllMENTS ~
t 12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-!:: _
~ DATg: _
DATE:
SRP:
~
]DATE: _
DATE:
~
DATE: _
~
ECTG PROORAM NGR: _
DATE:
~
YERIFICt.TICtl /,ND CLC EOUT
_ DATE: __
s 13.
Approved ccrrective actient irnlementet.
Leve been terified as satlaracteri'v
(
=
g
.D 6. v.gt
. L j...
.....g
-~
e,
-4 o
FCTG C.3 3p-At techroent A Par.e 1 of I Revision 2 - A A
ECSP Corrective ~
Ac tion Tractintliocumont~
(CATD}
1 Ji/ITJ1TJ0!I.
~ r
~
ApplIeab]e ECSP Report 110 3.'
Immediate Corrective Action Required:
/Of6W.S&;1//
~
' '. -2.-
Stop Work. Recomtnended:
D( Yes
.O No
.. I,q d18[. ilo 3.
CATD llo.- /0900 ~SG Of?' t " A.
RESPONSIDLE OltGAtlIZATI0ll:
IllIT1LT10tl DATE_
lolCs/ Sin L.
.2.
6, PRODLEM DESCRIPTIO?l:
_ SQfd sid,
'D;, ca,4,7 R QR O NQR _ Ot N t 4 M w r,l' d n,.,, ;,,,/-,,g/f je, p> >mw n/es,rr,.m l,'e nel suk/n av!,A/sef J/,r n.,/,,a',;, / ).1;, /
ran <
.)lJ o, a o.IIeei e.m/d oreu.- Am,n <s JJea wa < nn/4 ;,,n,,. n
,,,t./,fa}-
t n,, el ar e,,r e,sica,n e lor-w s;le,,,,
. d....
ens k i t.>c s rw ner d o s sz> r,n nyll,a 4 4 n,,a,, <,,,,e,.r.!u,.e n<r,,,,r I,,,3 '.
- aJh.,t!v ral./r a,'o,.,a ne
_1, PREPhi;ED s E t t-TiAHE 14mga rg - 2,.$rfu ujg_r O ATTACilHEllTS y
8.
C0_11CUREttlCE:
ANKOVAL: *r ECTG PR06kAM MGR.CEG-ll } b A X. ' A s Q ~ ogyg: ~ softe/ Rte ~
DATE:
9.
y,>,,,g g {,K ' '...
v
,.u.,..
DATE* -
N '.NO.. "':. * "
- 0RRECTIVF At!70At.
_. :.~ n-
,,,..f ;f;y:, r.,.,:b :~:-
~-
.. ~.: ;
g-
'-i,.
/
J
- 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
.2
.., '.:j.55 -u T
~,,
' y.; y.t.i..~i...-
,u,
,...v....
.,. q i..; ;
+
g*e
- e,...... >;- '
u,
.d.,
e.
..w:
/.1 s.
A 9
11.
PROPOSED Df:~ DIRECT 02/MGR ~'
O ATTACnHENTS 22.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-II:
DATE:
SRP: -
DATE: _ _ _
DATE:
i
_ DdE:
~
1 DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR:
~ Dl!TE: ~
VE'tIFICt. TION Af!D CLOSE0t;T
_ DArg: -
$pF*oved corrective actions heve been verir!ed as satisf 1A i rcrd er:1e n t e d.
m W"E"lSh !Uh.
i.
DAIE g-i.
2 in
e.
.i '
ECIC C.3 Attachment A Par.e I of I Revlolon 2 - A ECSP Corrective Action Tracting Document
]CATD) 1:
O IIIITIATION
/
!.pplicable ECSP Report NO:
?
1.
Immediate Corrective Action Required: I _3 e s.,
/ofr$-5gw}A}
O No
~.2.
Stop Wort Recommended: O.Toa Of No 3.
CAID No.
/0 9do -A',45-d/
-4 5.
RESPONSIDLE ORGANIZATIOH-INITIATION DATE
/O - G-ffo j
5' <0 AJ - Sj-/ e / ) ;re c r%. -
6.
PRODLEM DESCRIPTION: B QR O NQR _A -//c w n.A / e.
'/f M J-4 4,/
c'%h le
.3">'c2't-n?df di-p rru r --.
/Swf )
u //
.AM rsn' u (W7~) 's-1 no' m,Wmum A&d en Hia e
. m rimum (m/R) Juve hken
&xt~ a e t'en' shed Mtw ei%-
Wer P
-in'~nA:,4 M jn' ALf'A?.S -
- - * ~. * ~
~ ~ ~
//u
,ryce m n-,
~.
r.,o n n /h.J
/
V
. T
,P C -. /)f,, - y V G A )
7.
PREPARED BI: NAME w
eM/77M h )
-i
~O ATTACHHENTS DATE:
E.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-Il e /M" 7 " h v7.~f/
_ / d/4. / fir./; :..
..*2 9.
APPROVAL: ?.TECTG P EkAM 'MGR.'
DATE: _Jo/p'./42 6. '
.' h.:. -
U. 2 !.f..
- DATE:
- z....
.... 'r,. v.::..
..u..>.-
,.. ;.:;.p.,-:::,:.,. :
,,.:'.7 ':. =id ~1.IR '
CORRECTIVE ACTION
, '. '.. ',,' 7,.. - ::::. :.
<. p:.:;.;..
,3 v; 5
.'5. -..;
.. ~ :: i.*J '.
- ... 9.,,
- . ; yr. pf,
"'-' * */- ;.'I."..:.10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACI.I.ON PLAN,:
.......;~,1.l..k ~~4:...
..;. ; ;;' ;.' e ; ;.~::"
3
,,..w
./ ~'"' ~ '- *. -~" ': " " c'? "' '
u..
--" ~ * %,~:'.:*.7 C.J
.. :..,.. ;. m., _,..
y,..
'. : '{..};J "'_.':".
a 9.,
..' ; ; n. ::. r,.
...?.. n.t.t.: n.n *
- i '.'{.
e '.'ety!
. d.,..?.:u..?,.;.? 1
..s.
=.
W..::u-c.' ' P...r.
?
- .Y5"&.
..~....'.v, :. n t -
~ '
~
.,,::r
.1.*[.a t
,.;.. ~~ -
.v0 s
2
- 11.
PROPOSED DY: DIRECIOR/MGRt.'
O LTiscnncNTS 12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-il:
DATE:
4 SRP:
DaTE:
DATE:
0 DATE:
DATE:
DATE:' _.
v ECIG PROGRAM MGR:
yERIFICt. TION ANP CLCOEOUT._
DATE:
s 12.
Approved corrective actions have been ver! fled as setlefecterfly it:plemen t ed.
51GhATURE I;n.E DATE
e ECTG C.3 Attachment A Page ] of 1 Revlalon 2 - A ECSP Corrective Action TractinL Document (CAID}
'I JNITIATIOfl Applicable ECSP Report NO:
1.
Immediate Corrective Action Required:
) if s o s 9 0s N,.
"'~'2.
!!! Ies O No Stop Llock Recommended:
CATD No.__ /8.7 4 0 - A/#.5-CE>'N'4 (.. O.. f oeg 15. No 3.
5.
RESPONSIDLE ORGANIZATION:
INITIATj0N DATg
/o/6+/#(o
.......A PRODLEM DESCRIPTION:
.5GA/
6.
c;Me du e t *w /~
~
E QR kroelt S ep inn r,-;m-c O NQR ___.d//r e,a n#n./H/ I,oorJonf 6 t
a,, n e./A, - d /n h ee. >a n irsJ. u, >, Gd lin&,.r " 4Ko Anne o/kmn hle ;.e n N A 7~- i t au,e el fasl
,/r.fh &a' Jen m alar / MM-/v' etm /,,n,4r / mA S OAl-dih wme r/rnane% L. J., h r h elm,,
e
<?,eu /d kr
~-
7.
PREPARED DI:
NAME __Y h va a r#f'9ffo g /, i O ATTACNNENTS 8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-DATE:
- 9.
- APPROVAL::tECIG f.
WuenLn/) -
_ fo /c./P &.
IRAM MGRI. -
~
DATE:
js / n / / 6./.i'i. M N ~~.l
^
c ' -)
- -i
, r.:
_ DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION
. a.. -
............./
- .
- a,., i.,;.
.: :.'?,~',q. ;...~);
N'10.
?"-
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACI' ION PLAN:
'.'[=""'"
- ~, ~,.
_ c :05,;.'.Ly::
... ~,.....
. '.t s.,..
- s:
-i
.s. <",4.',.. g.;.*
_g..,.)..
~;;,... M.
g....
...s.-
11.
PROPOSED BY:
3 5.i DIRECIOR/MGR.'_*
O ATTACNMEliTS ~
22.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-II: _
DATE: _
~
SRP:
DATE:
~
DATE: __
_ DATE:
~
DATE:
ECIG PROGRAM MGR:
DATEJ _
VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT DATE:
^
13.
Approved corrective actions have been verifi d implementsd.
e as setlefactorily G1GHAJUP.E II I.'.E DATE
~,
o ECTG C.3 Attachment A Pat,e 1 of 1 Kevision 2 ECOP Corractive Action Tractine Document (CATD)
/O p p o
,$p1/, yy 4
INITIATION Applicable ECSP Report No:
1.
Irznediate Corrective Action Required: f Yes O No 2.
Stop 'Jort Reconnended: O Yes 7 No 3.
CATD No.
/O900-NAS c34 INITIATION DATE
/ O/A F/8'(c 5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
S 4 A/
.5 / 7"C
- ))C 7C7t'X._.
6.
PR BLEM DESCRIPTION: e'QR O NQR Ti RN/N4 7'/e(s v5 tr_ ci #f0 C-
&Jn/ ePV Olnrke hw c c -
hew Mn e4 m) o x ev, c n 6 6ccR1Ahh? cts 0 5%'7 * % e o n c/,%w "'holtsise a /cc %r/M M E. WAb 4
O ATTACHMENTS
, DATE:
/o/3 /86 7.
PREPARED BY:
NAME #/r/ omtWS Sdcurchi 8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-F, -/e#/r Pe 7 !r---7M DATE:
s/z//W DATE:
9.
APPROVAL:
ECTG p EAM MGE.
CORRECTITE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED COERECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
4
\\
O LTTACHMENTS l
11.
PROPOSED BY:
DIRECT 0E/MGE:
Di!E:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
SRP:
DATE:
DATE:
I DLTE:
DATE:
3 ICTG FROGF.ix MGE:
DLTE:
7EEIFICATION LND CLOSEOUT
'. 3.
Approved corrective atticn: hr.. e been verified as satisf ac':.crily i=pl e r::e n: e d.
- s i
5 "TGNATUEE
!!!LE DATE l
r
e ECTG C.3 Attachment A Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 ECCP Corrective Action Tractinr Document s
(CATD)
INITIATION Appilcable ECSP Report No:
/O9()O - $[A/ f 2.
f 1.
Irmnediate Corrective Action Required:
O' Tes O No 2.
Stop Wort Recormoended: O Tes O' No 3.
CAID No.
/09dO-A/#$-O M 4
INITIATION DATE
/O[3,5 ((o 5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
SOA/- GMe I/1 t F C D 4 6.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: Ef R O NQR 3%n cgm.nn e th A (Ndu k h% - E /A t- %
s O
ka_.x br e w cme n n% fi 4e 19 u A e 1\\._e k AnM a ewe e b @ cakte e nn Me n Ae n o n e u # Lua M M oA en M b d;,"R uf A b b\\,-
v s
v O ATTACHMENTS 7.
PREPARED BI:
NAME PhosteY F SCgon @2
,DATE:
/0/aS/%
8.
CONCURRENCE:
CEG-H 2M ~/
'W/ DATE: /o7z////_
9.
APPROVAL:
ECIG P MGR.
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
D 0 AT!!CH.".ENTS 11.
PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR /MGR:
DAII:
12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-E:
DATE:
SRP:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
ECTG PROGP.i?. MGE:
DATE:
7EEITICATION AND CLOSEOUT
+
- 3.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily i=plemented.
SIGNA!UEE
!!!LE DATE
e' e s, s
ECTG C.3 Attachment A e
Page 1 of 1 Kevision 2 ECOP Corrective Action Iractinr Document (CATD)
INITIATION Appilcable ECSP Report No: _/d9 6 - 8$/Y
/23 1.
Immediate Corrective Action Required: f Tes O No 2.
Stop 'Jork. Recommended: O Tes D' No 3.
CAID No.
/09dd - A/45-OS 4
INITIATION DATE
///'7/6%
5.
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
e 5 C/A/' cS/7E*
6.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: VQR O NQR
(_'enu- /lup7erra 5 utro
/A>
~
'7 M C O M D u/ r F /L L ProsRA/n were /Vor nun /7ARLs.
GA8w 2bnynr7 rex /r7FA w m A r * ??/A 6 S/AMLe~77A l LART NTPnus/% :
Mrw Aw-ews-CArtr D/A/om-p uAJ-DCX f64 USF M *rNC*,
codom r ewb rA-n/ r~ 779 Y F/LL PenanAm.
For --ins Ke-nsord :.
~
Csenpn>>rtr />1Hrr /NearpoRw w New um Uts
/M7D' N?
4 T/ftr/A f/AL PEOGPA/nr ANb 73r TY1? mink' If OvC/2F/tL Hi* f 1, '
OCC U R R e*D O ATTACHMENTS 7.
PREPARED BI:
NAME W,4f-M h m )
DATE:
// /7 /Eb 8.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H i d % ~% W '7 M DATE: // P/ fM 9.
APPROVAL:
ECIG PFOGRAM MGR.
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION 10.
PEOPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:
4 =
.L
\\.
O ATTACHMENTS 11.
PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR /MGE:
DATE:
i 12.
CONCURRENCE: CEG-H:
DATE:
l SRP:
DATE:
DATE:
i l
DATE:
DATE:
ECTG PROGFJ.M MGF.:
DA~E:
VIEIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT 13.
Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE I;TLE DATE
.,- i 1