ML20209B284
| ML20209B284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1987 |
| From: | Guenther S, William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B184 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-08, 50-369-87-8, 50-370-87-08, 50-370-87-8, NUDOCS 8704280404 | |
| Download: ML20209B284 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1987008
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UNITE 3 STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-369/87-08'and 50-370/87-08-
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street.
Charlotte, NC 28242
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Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17
Inspection Conducted:
February 21, - March 20, 1987
Inspectors:
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Drtiers, p Tor Res/ dent Inspector
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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ision of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
safety verification,
surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and
follow-up of previous enforcement actions / inspection findings.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified in the area of
procedural compliance relating to temporary modification control.
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UNITE') STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-369/87-08'and 50-370/87-08'
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Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
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Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos.:
50-369 and Sc 370
License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17
Inspection Conducted:
February 21, - March 20, 1987
Inspectors:
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Wprders,pTorRes/dentInspector
Date Signed
NW~Yn
WH/t?
Gu6nthepesidenVInst ector
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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.'Peeblg Section CKef
Date Signed
ision of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
safety verification,
surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and
follow-up of previous enforcement actions / inspection findings.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified in the area of
procedural compliance relating to temporary modificttion control.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
~ Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
N. Atherton, Compliance
- R. White, Instrument and Electrical Maintenance
- S. Copp, Maintenance Planning
- B. Gragg, Performance / Production Specialist
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 26, 1987, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. One violation concerning the
control of temporary modifications was discussed (see paragraph 6). One
unresolved item concerning post-maintenance valve testing was also
discussed (see paragraph 7). The licensee did not identify as proprietary
any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of
their inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items
An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation
or deviation. One new UNR is discussed in this report.
4.
Plant Operations
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period,
to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control
room logs, shift supervisors
logs, shift turnover records and equipment
removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
and performance personnel.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station
administrative directives.
The
complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum
required by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Both units operated at essentially full power for the entire reporting
period.
5.
Surveillance Testing
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specifications.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved
procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was
calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was
completed and test results were adequate.
6.
Inadequate Control of Temporary Modification
As was reported in report 369,370/87-05, while reviewing the Unit 2
Performance Test (PT) Log on February 11, 1987, the inspector noted that
PT/2/A/4208/048, " Train 2B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Performance
Test", had been entered in the log at 1:10 p.m., on February 9.
Part of
that PT involves heating up the refueling water storage tank (FWST) with
installed electric heaters to create a heat load such that a containment
spray (NS) heat exchanger heat balance can be performed. The FWST heaters
normally are interlocked to trip off at a temperature below that necessary
to perform an adequate capacity test / heat balance on the NS heat
exchanger. Step 8.5 of the PT directs that a lead be lifted in the heater
control circuitry so that the heaters remain energized to elevate the FWST
temperature to approximately 92 degree Fahrenheit (F). This step requires
independent verification to ensure that adequate administrative controls
are maintained over the lifted lead.
The Unit 2 FWST heater control lead was lifted in accordance with the PT
during the evening of February 9 and the Operations Staff was advised to
monitor FWST temperature to ensure that the 100 degree Technical
Specification Ilmit was not exceeded.
Through an apparent misunder-
standing, the Unit 1 Operations Staff was led to believe that an NS heat
exchanger capacity test was also scheduled for Unit 1.
They noted,
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however, on the evening of February 10, that the Unit 1 FWST heaters were
cycling to maintain normal temperature rather than remaining on
continually to raise the temperature in preparation for the anticipated
heat balance test.
Believing that the Performance Group had erred by
failing to lift the FWST heater control lead, the Operations Staff had the
Unit I lead lifted. It should be noted that there had been no PT logged
in on Unit 1 to facilitate this modification, nor had performance
requested it.
On the morning of February 11, performance personnel, in conversation with
the Operations staff, concluded that the modification on Unit I had been
performed in error. The equipment was restored to operable later that
day.
Station Directive (SD) 4.4.2,
" Control of Temporary Modifications",
defines a lifted lead in a list of fourteer types of temporary modifica-
tions.
Activities associated with a test under the direction of an
approved procedure (e.g.,
PT/2/A/4208/04B) may be excluded from the
requirements of the directive if the procedure includes appropriate steps
for the installation and removal of the temporary change, including
provisions for independent verification.
The Unit 1 FWST heater control lead lifted on February 10 was not removed
in accordance with the administrative controls established by SD 4.4.2,
nor was the lead lifted under the guidance of the NS heat exchanger PT.
During an exit interview the licensee's representatives informed the
inspectors that the Unit 1 FWST heater lead had been lifted under the
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guidance of IP/0/A/3090/02, " Controlling Procedure for Instrument and
Electrical Troubleshooting", which incorporates provisions for independent
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verification and documentation of lifted leads. At the end of the 87-05
report period, the licensee had been unable to produce the completed copy
of the above referred to procedure. The issue was, therefore, carried as
an Unresolved Item (369/87-05-01).
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The licensee ultimately produced a copy of the appropriate completed
procedure, Enclosure 11.2 which revealed that the Unit I lead had been
lifted and independently verified as previously stated.
Of concern,
however, is the following:
Procedure IP/0/A/3090/02, step 10.5.1 required that the technician
" Ensure that Temporary Modifications are used if required". The step
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refers the technician to IP/0/A/3090/30 for details on Temporary
Modification
determination.
Procedure
IP/0/A/3090/30,
Enclosure 11.1, Determining When A Temporary Change Is A Temporary
Modification, clearly indicates that the lifted lead should have been
controlled as a temporary modification.
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Station Directive 4.4.2 clearly states that when a Temporary
Modification is required, an active or new station Work Request shall
be utilized and will have " Temporary Modification" clearly marked on
it.
The Work Request shall explicitly describe the proposed
modification (e.g., which terminals will be jumped or disconnected
and in which cabinet).
The directive describes in great detail the process to follow when a
Temporary Modification is performed.
Of course, the intent of the
directive is to maintain technical and administrative control over the
modification of station equipment.
In conclusion, the Temporary Modification (lifted lead) performed on the
Unit 1 FWST heaters was required to have been controlled by either an
active test procedure, or as a Temporary Modification with appropriate
accompanying Work Requests and approvals.
This event constitutes a violation 369,370/87-08-01:
Inadequate Control
One violation was identified in this area.
7.
Maintenance Observations
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy
and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where
applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,
that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and
maintenance results were adequate.
During the period from January 15 to February 14, 1987, valve INM-268, the
Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System (NC) hot leg sample header (NM) Outside
Containment Isolation Valve, underwent repair under Work Request (WR)
No. 129992 to replace a failed actuator motor.
The valve motor was
replaced and the valve was functionally tested by cycling it electrically
from the control room. The valve's indications were verified to work
correctly and both the leak test and valve stroke timing test were
completed satisfactorily prior to declaring the valve operable.
A second WR (No. 87433) was written on February 24, 1987, when INM-26B
exhibited unusual behavior during a slave relay test (PT/1/A/4200/28).
When output relays K613 and K646 from the "B" train Solid State Protection
System (SSPS) cabinet were energized 1NM-26B closed but then continued to
cycle repeatedly between the closed and open positions.
Upon investiga-
tion, Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel found wire terminal #24
shorted against the barrel nut for terminal #15.
The short was cleared
and the valve performed satisfactorily.
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Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3 requires that containment isolation
valves, including INM-26B, be operable (i.e., capable of performing its
specified functions) while operating in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Unit I was
. operated in Modes 1, 2 and 3 during the period from February 14 to 24th.
Although INM-268 is normally opened only while drawing an NC System
Sample, the actuator terminals were shorted in such a manner that the
valve would have cycled repeatedly to the open position if an automatic
ESF containment isolation signal was present.
INM-26B could not have
achieved and maintained its required safety position and was, therefore,
inoperable for the period from February 14 to 24th. This is an apparent
violation of TS 3.6.3.
In terms of safety significance, it appears that
the subject penetration would have isolated via the remaining operable
isolation valve.
The failure to detect the short in the INM-268 actuator wiring raises the
concern with the NRC regarding the adequacy of post-maintenance valve
testing,
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states that a test
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program shall be established to assure that all testing required to
demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisfactorily in
service is identified and performed in accordance with written test
procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance units
contained in applicable design documents.
Section 17.2.11 (Test Control) of the Duke Power Company Quality Assurance
Program Topical Report states that electrical tests, operational test,
proof tests or other special tests are performed as required to verify the
satisfactory performance of nuclear safety-related systems and components
after maintenance.
TS 4.6.3.1 requires that containment isolation valves be demonstrated
operable prior to returning the valve to service af ter maintenance,
repair, or replacement work by performance of a cycling test.
The
specified safety function of INM-268 is to close in response to a
containment isolation signal and to remain in the closed position.
Although INM-26B was successfully cycled from the control board, thereby
demonstrating one of its functions (control sample flow), it's safety
isolation function was not demonstrated prior to declaring the valve
operable on February 14.
Review of the adequacy of post-maintenance valve testing at the McGuire
facility is still being reviewed by the licensee as well as the NRC staff
and will remain unresolved pending completion of that review.
This is
UNR 369, 370/87-08-02:
Post Maintenance Testing Program.
The issue has
been referred to NRC Region II management for review because of its
potential generic implications and review of requirements regarding
post-maintenance testing.
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8.
Follow-up on Previous Enforcement Actions / Inspection Findings (92702)
The items detailed below were analyzed to ascertain that the licensee's
response is in conformance with regulatory requirements and that the
corrective measures were completed.
The inspection intent was to verify by record review, observation, and
discussions with licensee personnel the following information relating to
followup on items of noncompliance:
a.
That the licensee responded in a timely manner,
b.
That the measures taken to correct the item and avoid further items
of noncompliance were effected as described and within the time
period specified in the reply.
c.
That other licensee commitments discussed in the reply were also
completed.
(Closed) Violation 369/84-21-01, 370/84-18-01.
Procedure violation
leading to inadvertent engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation
and reactor trip. Licensee Event Report No. 370/84-15 addressed
this same incident and was previously reviewed and closed by
Inspection Report (IR) No. 370/85-32.
This violation is,
therefore, considered closed.
(Closed) Violation 369/84-11-03.
Procedure violation leading to
inadvertent train "A" blackout.
LER 369/84-14 addressed this
same incident and was previously reviewed and closed by IR
369/85-27. This violation is, therefore, considered closed.
(Closed) UNR 369/85-03-02.
LER 369/84-18 inadequacy.
The licensee
submitted Revision 1 to LER 84-18 on March 22, 1985.
The
revised LER was reviewed and appeared to have addressed the
inadequacies discussed in IR 85-03.
This UNR is considered
closed.
(Closed) Violation 369/85-06-01.
Failure to meet adequate wire
separation criteria while installing a reactor trip breaker
modification.
LER 369/85-08 addressed this same incident and
was previously reviewed and closed by IR 369/85-27.
This
violation is, therefore, considered closed.
(Closed) UNR 370/84-09-01.
During the time period covered by IR
370/84-09, the " Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater" procedure
(AP/1-2/A/5500/06) did not address the loss of a single main
feedwater pump.
The AP revisions in effect since December 3,
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1984, have provided operator guidance for response to the loss
of one er both main feedwater pumps.
This UNR is considered
closed.
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(Closed) UNR 369/87-05-01.
Control
of Temporary Modification of
Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) heaters. This UNR has been
resolved as a violation as discussed in paragraph 6.
9.
In-Office Review of Written Reports of Non Routine-Events (90712)
A review was performed of the written reports of nonroutine events at
McGuire.
The objective of the review was to determine, among other
things, if:
additional inspection effort is warranted in the applicable area
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corrective action is appropriate
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reported information satisfies requirements
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generic issues are present
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The delineated LERs appeared to be satisfactory, and herewith will be
closed.
50-369/ Unit 1
50-370/ Unit 2
LER 84-18
LER 84-10
LER 84-29
LER 84-12
LER 85-11
LER 84-16
LER 85-13
LER 84-17
LER 85-23
LER 85-25
LER 84-19
LER 85-30
LER 84-24
LER 85-31
LER 84-25
LER 85-33
LER 84-27
LER 85-35
LER 85-34
LER 84-28
LER 85-36
LER 84-30
LER 85-39
LER 84-31
LER 86-01
LER 85-02
LER 86-02
LER 85-05
LER 86-03
LER 85-09
LER 86-05
LER 85-10
LER 85-14
LER 85-16
LER 85-18
LER 85-20
LER 85-27
LER 85-28
LER 85-30
LER 86-01
LER 86-02
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