ML20207T430

Insp Repts 50-413/87-06 & 50-414/87-06 on 870130-0225. Violations Noted:Inoperability of Containment Air Return & Hydrogen Skimmer Sys Since Initial Required Operation & Failure to Declare Containment Spray Sys Inoperable

ML20207T430
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Lesser M, Peebles T, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T428	List: IR 05000413/1987006 ML20207T427 ML20207T430
References
50-413-87-06, 50-413-87-6, 50-414-87-06, 50-414-87-6, NUDOCS 8703240006
Download: ML20207T430 (6)

See also: IR 05000413/1987006

Text

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Report Nos.: 50-413/87-06 and'50-414/87-06

Licensee: Duke-Power Company

-422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: January 30 - February 25, 1987

Inspecto s:

P. K. V#nDcforn "

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Date Signed

A M. S.~ Lesser,

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Date Signed

Approved by:

T. A. Peeb'les, Section Chief -

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Date Signed

Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY l

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Scope: This special, announced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in

-the area of operability of the Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer

System and the Containment Spray System. <

Results: Of the two (2) areas inspected, two apparent violations were

identified (Inoperability of Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer

Systems Since Initial Required Operation - T.S. 3.6.5.6, paragraph 5,

Failure to Declare Containment Spray System Inoperable - T.S. 3.6.2,

paragraph 6).

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• M. E. Andersnn, Performance Engineer

• H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

• W. F. Beaver, Performance Supervisor

• B. F. Caldwell, Superintendent Station Services

• R. H. Charest, Chemistry Services Supervisor

• M. A. Cote, Licensing Specialist

• D. W. Eaves, Design Engineer Mechanical

• R. G. Eble, Design Engineer Effluence

• J. R. Ferguson, Integrated Scheduling Engineer

• E. W. Fritz, Design Engineer Mechanical

• C. L.-Hartzell, Compliance Engineer

• P. R. Herran, Design Engineer Mechanical

J. A. Kamer, Performance Engineer

• H. J. Lee, Design Engineer M/N

• F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer

F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer

R. O. Sharpe, Licensing Engineer

G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

• H. P. Smith, Nuclear Safety Assurance

• D. L. Ward, Design Engineer Mechanical

• R. F. Wardell Superintendent, Technical Services

• P. M. White, Design Engineer M/N HVAC

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on February 19 and

25, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The

inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the

inspection findings. No dissenting coments were received from the

licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection. Two violations were identified with the potential for

escalated enforcement as follows: Inoperability of Containment Air Return

and Hydrogen Skimer Systems Since Initial Required Operation - T.S.

3.6.5.6 (paragraph 5) and Failure to Declare Containment Spray System

Inoperable - T.S. 3.6.2 (paragraph 6).

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Review of Operability of Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skir.er

System.

a. Background

On January 14, 1987, NRC:RII requested the licensee, via telephone

conversation (Brownlee to Sharpe), to review the design of the

Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer (VX) System. This

request was based on NRC knowledge of a similar plant having

inadequate drainage capability which would in turn cause air return

fans to become inoperable during a LOCA. Initial review of the

drainage capability appeared to indicate that adequate drainage was

available (see NRC Report Nos. 50-413/87-05,50-414/87-05); however,

the licensee indicated that a more detailed design review would be

conducted. Additional licensee review disclosed on January 30, 1987,

that curbs intended to preclude water from entering into the

Containment Air Return fan pits during a LOCA from containment spray

headers were not in place. At the time NRC:RII was notified, Catawba

Unit I was at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).

NRC:RII requested the licensee to shut down Unit 1 to Mode 3 until

0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> on January 31, 1987, while the required curbs were being

installed. In addition, Unit 2 was allowed to remain in Mode 3 until

1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on January 31, 1987, while curbs were being installed.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 would have required the units to

enter Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of discovering the problem, Mode 4 (Hot

Shutdown) within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Installation of the curbs, including

final documentation and declaration of the fans as operable was

completed at 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> and 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br /> on January 31,1987 for

Units 1 and 2, respectively,

b. Technical Evaluation

The licensee indicated that an initial technical evaluation had been

accomplished and documentation was in progress. The curbing was not

included in the design of Catawba. Cause of the design control

breakdown was still in progress. The licensee assumed that the Air

Return Fans would not start since the Containment Spray System would

be operating for approximately ten (10) minutes prior to the fans

being sequenced on and at that point enough water would be present to

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cause the fans to trip on overcurrent. Assuming loss of the fans and

the bounding single failure (loss of offsite power with a Diesel

Generator failure) during a LOCA, the licensee calculated the

containment peak pressure to be 15.06 psig. Design peak pressure is

15 psig. The licensee indicated that this pressure increase would

result in only a slight increase in containment leakage contributing

to a minor increase in effluent caused dosage to the environment.

Further NRC review of the licensee's calculation methodology and

written results is necessary. The inspector requested that the

licensee forward this information to the NRC as soon as possible.

c. Violation

Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5.6 requires two independent

Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems to be operable in

Modes 1 through 4. Due to the design deficiency identified above

these systems were inoperable when required from September 28, 1984

through January 31, 1987, for Unit 1 and April 12, 1986 through

January 31, 1987, for Unit 2. This time period covers the period

from when the units first entered Mode 4 until the deficiency was

corrected. Both units were in various Modes during this time period

including some periods during which the systems were not required.

The systems were required during the majority of the time period.

This is Violation 413/87-06-01, 414/87-06-01: Inoperability of

Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems Since Initial

Required Operation - T.S. 3.6.5.6.

One violation was identified as described above.

6. Review of Operability of Containment Spray System (Unit 2)

a. Background

Generic industry problems with biofouling of cooling water heat

exchangers was identified in 1981, e.g., IE Bulletin 81-03. As a

result of these problems the licensee regularly conducts heat

transfer tests of various heat exchangers. On December 26, 1986,

site personnel conducted a scheduled test of the Containment Spray

System (NS) heat exchanger (HX) 2A. Data from this test indicated a

possible large degradation of the heat exchanger. However, licensee

personnel believed that the data could be in error. Therefore, a

second test was conducted on January 2, 1987. Preliminary review of

this data by site personnel also indicated a possible large decrease

in HX efficiency. However, since final calculations were required to

be performed by Design Engineering (0/E) personnel, the data was

forwarded to D/E. 0/E personnel issued a memorandum on January 13,

1987, to corporate Nuclear Production with a copy to the site person

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responsible for . testing of Unit 1. The site personnel for both

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Catawba Units were not available on-site when the copy ,of the

memorandum was received. The memorandum was discovered on-site on or '

about Januar The memorandum states for NS HX 2A (test

date 1/2/87)y.that

28,1987.

"If there is no mistake in the data, this heat

exchanger does not meet the minimum performance criteria". The

memorandum also stated that "NPD-Performance suspects instrumentation

- errors in the NS HX .2A test of 1/2/87". Discussions with site

NPD-Performance (test) personnel indicate that this statement may be

in error for the January 2nd test but instrument errors were

suspected for the December test. A third test was conducted on

February 18, 1987, leading to essentially the same results (19% of

original design) as the previous two tests and a declaration that the

HX was inoperable. On February 19, 1987, D/E performed calculations

using actual conditions which showed that NS HX 2A was operable under

present actual plant and environmental conditions and the HX was then

declared operable,

b. Evaluation

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D/E personnel have calculated .that NS HX 2A is operable under present

plant and environmental conditions and have defined the parameters to .

be monitored to assure the HX remains operable. Site personnel have

implemented appropriate monitoring of plant and environmental  ;

parameters. D/E personnel indicated that there remains a suspicion

that the test data is in error. The licensee intends to clean the HX

and conduct further testing. The inspector requested the licensee to

evaluate why the decision of inoperability was not made on January 2

rather than February 18 and further requested the licensee to

evaluate the apparent communications breakdowns between D/E,

Corporate Nuclear Production and site Nuclear Production personnel.

The licensee indicated on February 25, 1987, that steps had been

taken to assure direct correspondence between D/E and site personnel

including listing of a site telephone contact for D/E.

Licensee evaluation of operability of the 28 NS train conducted at

the request of NRC disclosed that the 2B NS system was out of service

during the time period in question as follows:

Date Time i

1/05/87 10:05 - 12:00  :

1/05/87 (auto actuation) 12:00 - 14:00

1/05/87 13:05 - 14:00 ,

1/06/87 8:15 - 17:15

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1/06/87 21:35 - to -

1/07/87 14:10

1/12/87 UNKNOWN - 14:15 i

1/15/87 13:20 - 13:45

2/04/87 8:15 - 14:57

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The inspector further requested the licensee to reevaluate the VX

analysis described in paragraph 5 in light of the knowledge of the

degraded NS HX. On March 2,1987 the licensee informed NRC: RII

that a retest of NS HX 2A had shown the HX to be at 95% capacity. A

piping modification adding a local thermowell' had been completed

during a recent short duration outage and this has allowed more

accurate HX outlet temperature measurement. In light of this new

information and since recent cleaning has taken place, further review '

is needed to evaluate whether the HX was actually-within acceptance

criteria during the January / February time frame,

c. Violation

It appears that the licensee had sufficient information on January 2,

1987, to indicate that NS HX 2A, and therefore, NS Train A, was

inoperable, i.e., unable to perform its intended function under '

certain postulated conditions. NS Train A should have been declared

inoperable at this time and appropriate corrective action or

technical evaluation performed. Therefore, this is an apparent

violation of TS 3.6.2 which requires two independent Containment

Spray Systems to be operable in Modes 1 through 4. This is Violation

414/87-06-02: Failure to Declare Containment Spray System

Inoperable - TS 3.6.2.

One violation was identified as described above.

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