ML20207P578
| ML20207P578 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1987 |
| From: | Stewart D, Touchstone C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P454 | List: |
| References | |
| 305.01-SQN, 305.01-SQN-R03, 305.01-SQN-R3, NUDOCS 8701160263 | |
| Download: ML20207P578 (14) | |
Text
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a.
. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 305.01-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 3 TITLE: Accessibility Problems REASON FOR REVISION:
Incorporation of TAS and SRP review comments and documentation Revision 1 of new concern addition.
Additional evaluation for concern RII-86-A-0116 per SRP/ ORC Revision 2 comments Incorporation of SRP review comments and SQN corrective Revision 3 action response.
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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SIGNATURE DATE CONCUEEENCES eCEG-H: ( . #!$
SRP: w QWId /~S-87 SIGNATURE DATE SIGN &TURE* DATE APPROVED BY:
M0/dto,b i-6-87 NiA ECSP MANAdER DATE MANAGFR OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
1266T 8701160263 870109 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR l
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG Subcategory: Accessibility Element: Accessibility Problems Report Number: 305.01-SQN Revision 3 IN-85-189-001 IN-85-189-002 IN-86-306-001 PH-85-003-006 IN-85-220-001 IN-85-617-001 RII-86-A-0116 ,
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Evaluator: /#,kg M /f" /M-O C. W Touchstone Date Reviewed by: .
Ao /gg /2M6/gd OPS CEG Member ' Dat'e I Approved by: ( /A!MDate W. R. Lagergren l
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I. ACCESSIBILITY PROBLEMS This report examines accessibility issues and the program for identifying accessibility problems at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) which may affect normal plant operation, maintenance, testing, or inspection. This scope does not preclude consideration of industrial safety and health physics aspects of these plant activities. Six evaluated employee concerns are Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) specific, but have generic applicability to SQN; the seventh is specific to both plants. Examples of previous corrective actions proposed and/or implemented are included.
II. SPECIFIC EVALUATION METHODOLOGY A thorough review of the K-forms (reference 1) was conducted to evaluate the scope of this element. Historical information such as engineering change notices (ECNs), workplans, previous reports, and surveys are listed in section VI. Interviews with SQN personnel were conducted to address items related to accessibility. Among those contacted were an engineer and supervisors in the Industrial Safety Section, two engineers in the Mechanical Engineering Test Section, an assistant shift engineer (ASE) and unit operator (UO) in Operations Section, several assistant unit operators (AUOs) in Operations Section, and a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) representetive. The evaluation scope for concern RII-86-A-0116 was limited to local control stations which are needed to operate emergency, safety-related, or radwaste equipment in the SQN Auxiliary Building (AB). This scope was met by interviewing operations personnel, by conducting plant walkdowns of affected areas, and by reviewing previous efforts in access determination. Following is a list of the concerns evaluated for applicability to SQN:
Concern IN-85-189-001 WBNP unit number 2, once scaffolding is removed, some valves would be hard to get to, e.g., 15 feet off floor, to manually open or close valve. CI could not provide specific valve numbers, systems, buildings or elevations. CI -
stated thir condition exist throughout the plant.
l Concern IN-85-189-002 Valves located in WBNP number 2 South Valve Room are very congested and inaccessible. Only a small person would be able to get to them. CI stated one example is Drain Valve on Main Steam i
System in South Valve Room unit number 2. CI I
could not provide any additional details.
Concern IN-86-306-001 Various equipment that could be needed during an emergency is not readily acces*1ble to applicable personnel. Example: Auxiliary Building 713' Elev (also Containment Building) the instrument panels and the auxiliary feedwater pumps are so congested it is very time consuming to get in there to read the instruments. Nuclear Power Concern. CI has no further information.
Page 1 of 12
. qr R: vision 3 Concern pH-85-003-006 Watts Bar Instrumentation is not properly designed for accessibility. CI has no more additional information available.
Concern IN-85-220-001 Due to excessive number of hangers and overcrowding in unit 2 Reactor Building, especially accumulater room number 4, Health Physics problems (ALARA concerns) during plant operations are anticipated. CI feels that not enough concern was shown regarding the number of hangers being used. Construction department concern. CI could not provide any additional details / specifics.
Concern IN-85-617-001 The building of hangers & pipe support systems to the point of accessibility being made impossible. This concern involves both units 1 & 2. The primary places of interest are: roof, Auxiliary Building elevation 737, the ERCW vent valves, CCS valves to heat exchangers, number 4 accumulator room, north &
south steam valve rooms & elevation 713, BIT tant room. Accessibility is nonexistant due to potentially hot pipes & congested areas.
Presently there are scaffolds to some inaccessible areas, when scaffolds are removed, no access will be available.
Concern RII-86-A-0116 The alledger stated that at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, control panels or stations are physically located such that there is no way to get to them to operate the emergency equipment. As an example, l
a panel was observed to be located six to eight inches from a wall, facing the wall, so that l there was no physical way to even read the tags on the panel. The alledger said that there were a " lot" of awkwardly located panels at Watts Bar.
l Note: SQN elevations are 23 feet below those at WBN. SQN main steam I valves rooms are situated east and west.
III. FINDINGS SQN, like all nuclear plants, has areas that tend to be less accessible than other areas The primary areas of concern are the main steam valve l rooms, the accumulator rooms, and valve and instrumentation accessibility in general. This report examines first the SQN accessibility program in general and then the specifics of the program including problem identification and resolution.
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'Rsvision 3
- 1. SQN. Accessibility General The accessibility program at SQN basically consists of the Platform and Valve Accessibility Program (reference 2) initiated several years ago_to identify and propose corrective action for specific; l access problems. Industrial Safety Section was unsure of the program's present : status but believed that many of the items were
~
I either canceled'or slow to be implemented. They felt the level of-priority ~given'tossome of tha items was perhaps lower than what i personnel safety dictated.
Investigation of the above revealed that although some of the items have yet to be worked, many are presently scheduled and some-are totally complete. . Few of the items have been canceled and those which have are.mostly minor. Upon hearing this, one Safety Section individual acknowledged that until workplans to correct problems actually "come across the desk" for review, status of proposed items is generally in question.
Although the accessibility program is presently less defined than in the past, access problems are brought to the attention of cognizant l plant personnel. A Safety Section supervisor noted that accessibilits items of any nature are of definite interest to L
Industrial Safety and felt that coordination through them has been fairly ~ good. He noted that plant sections' safety meetings are one
. example of how access concerns may be expressed. Reference 3 documents a few accessibility concerns identified in Electrical Naintenance Section safety meetings. Furthermore, employee suggestions, employee concerns, and plant ~section informal and
(; formal notification are also methods by which access problems may be
- identified. An assistant shift engineer agreed that coordination l with plant "line" organizations was generally not a problem and that Industrial Safety Section would likely be consulted if the need arose. However, he added that the Operations Section does have frequent difficulty in coordinating activities in general with
-design organizations. '
- 2. SQN Accessibility - Specific This section addresses specific accessibility issues discussed in the SQN Generic Concern Report, the SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program, and RII-86-A-0116 specific evaluation.
A. SQN Generic Concern Report SQN Generic Concern Report (reference 4) discusses particular accessibility facets at SQN and additionally comments on how SQN
! solves access problems. The report states that a walkdown was L conducted to evaluate access in the BIT tank room, the east and l
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Rsvisien 3 west main' stear.' valve rooms, and the number 4 accumulator room (most congested of all accumulator rooms). Access was found to be difficult; however, Operations Section personnel are able to.
access and operate all valves within these areas. The walkdown also considered the auxiliary building (elevation 714), the ERCW vent valves, and the CCS Hz valves and found these areas were
' accessible but cumbersome in some cases.
The report further notes that remote operators have been installed for valves that are not readily accessible during normal operation. An ASE at SQN also noted that emergency equipment could be accessed in a timely manner. Examples of
_ such equipmerit are the flood-mode spool pieces, some of which are located in congested areas. The ASE said that despite the congestion, spool pieces could be installed within time limits.
B. SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program The SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program (reference 2) identified numerous access deficiencies which if uncorrected could result.in operational, maintenance, testing, and safety problems for plant personnel. Fifty-three items-were tabulated' and their present status is described in references 2 and 5. Of the fifty-three items identified, forty-seven have either been completed, partially worked, scheduled, or ECNs written.
- Examples of these items and other items mentioned in reference 4 follow:
Main Steam Valve Room (MSVR) i l_
Access to unit 1 and unit 2 west MSVR S/G blowdown throttle
[.
valves Access from north to south walls Access to west MSVR feedwater isolation valves '
Access problems in vicinity of main steam relief valves Accumulator Rooms Platform and ladder for access to SIS cold leg accumulator tank's level transmitter sensor bellows I' Fixed ladder access from Reactor Building raceway to accumulator
! number 4 Poor access to vent valves, check valves, and isolation valves for leak testing. This item (ECN 5531, item 44) was canceled; however, plans are for Mechanical Test Section to consider alternative corrective action after plant startup.
Page 4 of 12
Rsvision 3 Valve / Instrumentation Accessibility Fixed ladders to top of cooling tower lift pump motors for reading gages once per shift Four portable platforms for the condensate demineralizer polishers inspection view ports Installation of larger gages for diesel generator lube oil to allow reading from floor
- Platform installation to allow access to steam generator inspection ports Many other efforts including chain operators for inaccessible valves, steel scaffold, portable ladders, grating, hoists, and guardrails have been implemented to aid access to various equipment at SQN C. RII-86-A-0116 Specific Evaluation The evaluation scope for this concern was limited to inspection of local control stations which are needed to operate emergency, safety-related, or radwaste equipment in the SQN Auxiliary Building. The general criterion for inspection of control stations that operate emergency and safety-related equipment was the local equipment specified in SQN Emergency Instructions (EIs) lR3 reference 11, SQN Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs) reference 12, and SQN Function Restoration Guidelines (FRs) reference 13. A summary of previous efforts in emergency equipment access determination is included. Inspections were also conducted for other safety-related equipment and stations, and for specific local stations that control radioactive waste systems.
Access to the following equipment and/or local control stations is potentially required following main control room (MCR) '
evacuation or during postulated emergencies (as described in the EIs and FRIs). Inspection of these areas was normally limited to either unit 1 or unit 2 equipment for those features which are unitized. This was primarily done to reduce exposure and is l permitted since much of the plant layout and equipment follows an IR3
" opposite hand" pattern. A summary of the inspection is itemized l below; all areas were accessible unless otherwise noted.
- 1. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump and level controls, unit 1 and unit 2 pumps AB 669; level controls in cabinets just outside pump room.
- 2. XS-46-57 TD AFW pump auxiliary / normal switch, 2-XS-46-57 on wall facing TDAFW pump room (unit 2).
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s Rsvisien 3
~Notor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater'(MDAFW) LCVs and isolation valves, AB 714 are very congested. TDAFW LCVs and isolation valves, AB 714 penetration room.and main steam valve rooms (MSRVs) - okay.
- 4. Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal flow indicators, on wall, AB elevation 690 penetration room, unit 1 and unit 2.
- 5. FCV-62 Charging flow, 1B CCP room.
- 7. FCV-62-138 Emergency Boration, 2-FCV-62-128 on wall AB 690
- penetration room - unit 2.
- , 8. HCV-62-929 Alternate Boration, 2-HCV-62-929 on pipe, AB 690 penetration room - unit 2.
- 9. FI-62-137B Emergency Boration flow indication, 2-FI-62-137B, panel 2-L-43 AB 690 penetration room - unit 2.
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- 10. ISV-62-932 Borate flush, 2-1SV-62-932, on pipe. AB 690 f penetration room - unit 2.
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- 11. Primary Water Pump start switch, near pumps AB elevation 669 unit I and unit 2.
- 12. Spent Fuel Pit Cooling (SFPC) pumps start switch, on wall l adjacent to pumps AB elevation 714.
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- 13. Upper Head Injection (UHI) level switches LS-87-21, 22, 23 and
- 24, Additional Equipmens Building (AEB), panels 490, 491, 492, l and 493 located on walls and support columns - unit 2.
- 14. UHI FCVs-87-21, 22, 23, and 24, unit 2 AEB. '
- 15. S/G Blowdown Radiation Monitor RM-90-124, main corridor, AB elevation 690 near pipe chase / chem lab.
- 16. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump start, RHR pump rooms unit 1 and unit 2.
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Pago 6 of 12
. R: vision 3
- 19. Steam generator power operated atmospheric relief valves ]
(S/G PORVs), S/G PORVs in MSVRs; local indicating .l transmitters inspected were 1, 2-PIT-1-6 (SG 1 main steam lR3 header pressure - atmospheric relief valve transmitter), l AB 690 penetration rooms unit l'and unit 2. l These transmitters are located on an instrument rack I shielded by a large corrugated sheet metal wall that l apparently serves as a separation barrier. Both unit 1 l and 2 transmitters are facing the barrier and are lR3 approximately six inches from it. Access to the. l transmitters is difficult and would especially pose l problems for maintenance. l Note: During the evaluation, these transmitters were l mistaken for controllers. SQN in their response l to CATD 30501-SQN-01 notes that 3/G PORV local l controllers are located in the west main steam valvo l rooms and will be relocated under the Environmental IR3 Qualification (EQ) program. Furthermore, the I transmitters are accessible for maintenance and l not required for local operation of the PORVs. l Previous Efforts lR3 In March 1986, SQN Operations in committing to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Verification Program for Local Plant Hardware (reference 14). The purpose of this procedure is to verify local operator actions required in the E0Ps (EIs, FRs, and ECAs) and lR3 objectives include verification that equipment is available and accessible for operators' use. In addition to many of the stations previously discussed, the following were verified accessible in this procedure:
l Steam header traps Main steam line drains i
S/G blowdown monitors RM-90-120, 121 Air supply to S/G PORVs and steam dumps Containment air supply valves (elevation 714) l FCV-32-80 (81, unit 2) l FCV-32-102 (103)
FCV-32-110 (111)
High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) isolation to RCPs (669 penetration room)
Page 7 of 12 l
R3 vision 3 RCS sample valves FCV-43-2, 3
'FCV-43-11,.12 FCV-43-22, 23 BIT bypass valve ISV-63-697-BIT valve to holdup tank (HUT) HCV-63-573 RCP thermal barrier isolation (AB 714)
ISV-70-677A Booster Pump A discharge ISV-70-6778 Booster Pump B discharge RCP seal return isolation (reach rods, AB 690)
ISV-62-642 Seal water filter inlet-ISV-62-643 Seal water filter. bypass RCP seal injection isolation (reach rods, AB 690)
ISV-62-546 Seal water injection filter bypass ISV-62-549 LSeal water injection-filter A outlet ISV-62-550 Seal water injection filter B outlet Interviews lR3 An open forum discussion with seven SQN AUOs did not identify any problems with access to emergency equipment local control stations. However, access to the motor driven AFW pump LCVs (item 3 above) was mentioned as a difficult area to access for operation of the air-operated LCVs and manual isolation valves.
Inspection of unit 1 LCVs-3-148, 156, 164, and 171 and their associated manual isolation valves revealed that accessibility to
' these valves located on an elevated north wall platform on Auxiliary Building elevation 714 is indeed difficult.
I Also mentioned as somewhat inaccessible was the control panel'for '
tha Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator (CDWE) Building ventilation dampers which is located in a high radiation environment and presently accessed by passing through a i contamination (C)-zone. Assistant unit operators stated that up to 10 REM /hr had occurred as the result of the disposal of RCP seals in close proximity.to the control panel's location.
Frequent access to the panel has been necessary in the past to reset dampers which closed on spurious Auxiliary Building isolation signals.
- _ Radwaste Stations lR3
. The following radwaste control stations were inspected for accessibility; each was a large panel and is easily accessed for operation - none were located within or near C-zones.
Waste gas analyzer panel 0-L-206, near AB unit 2 elevation 690 pipochase Page 8 of 12
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Boric acid' evaporator panel -'AB elevation 669 on unit 2 side, 2 large pane)s'in main north-south corridor.
Waste Evaporator and Auxiliary Waste Evaporator on unit 1 side near AB 669 east-west corridor.
CDWE Panel,' located in CDWE building, easily accessed.
Main'Radwaste control panel-669; AUO headquarter station. .
.Other Safety-Relatad' Stations lR3 A thorough inspection of the AB. unit 1 elevation 690 pipe chase (C-zone area) was conducted to evaluate access to local control stations within. Access was'possible to 22 safety-related valve controls mounted on several junction boxes. Examples of controls found include SIS cold leg injection, RHR cold leg injection, and .
RCS charging flow isolation.' Inspection of the AB unit 2 669 pipechase revealed several valve stations for containment spray and safety injection - none of which were inaccessible.
Conclusion
' Accessibility to certain areas is a recognized problem at SQN. SQN has identified many areas in which access is a problem and has.taken measures to rectify same. Consideration of safety, operational, and maintenance aspects of access problems has been used in addressing the issues. Reference 6 notes that experience at SQN indicates that although difficult,' adequate and proper-maintenance can be accomplished.
The concerns below'are all valid to certain extents; however, actions such as those described in this. report-have been taken to minimize the difficulties encountered. No' safety-related deficiencies were identified in this evaluation.
IN-85-189-001 Valve accessibility has been a continual effort at I- SQN with many corrective actions already implemented. -'
Examples are chain operators, steel scaffold, 4-portable ladders, grating, hoists, and guardrails.
IN-85-189-002 Main Steam Valve Rooms (MSVRs) are.high on the " safety list." Efforts by safety section to monitor these areas p have been very safety conscious and several modifications have been planned or implemented. Exemples include access to: S/G blowdown throttle valves, north to' south walls, feed water isolation valves, and main steam relief valve areas. Access to the MSVR's though difficult at times is possible by operations personnel i for operation of equipment.
l' l IN-86-306-001 The Auxiliary Building is indeed congested; however,
[ Operations personnel do not consider the turbine or l motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps excessively congested at SQN. Emergency equipment is accessible ;
l at SQN. i l
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, Rsvision 3' PH-85-003-006 Problems with access to instrumentation have not gone unnoticed and various actions have been taken to identify / correct these problems. Examples include:
platform installation for access to S/G inspection ports,-portable platforms-for condensate domineralizer polisher view ports, fixed ladders to top of cooling tower lift pump motors for reading gages, and installation of larger gages for diesel generator lube. oil to allow reading from floor.
l' IN-85-220-001- The accumulator number 4 is indeed congested, hence, it has received paramount attention. Examples of action
+
planned or taken include a ladder / platform for access-to accumulator tank's level transmitter sensor bellows, P
a fixed ladder access from reactor building raceway to accumulator number 4, and improved access to vent valves, check valves, and isolation valves for leak I testing. Operations personnel are able to access and operate valves in accumulator rooms.
IN-85-617-001 Accessibility to these areas is congested, however SQN has taken actions to minimize its effect.
- Operations personnel are able to access these areas l and operate equipment.
RII-86-A-0116 Inspection of local control stations in the SQN Auxiliary Building indicates panels needed to operate emergency, safety-related, and radwaste equipment are if generally accessible. Access to local controllers for
, S/G number 1 PORVs (both units) is via the west main l l
steam valve rooms. SQN notes these controllers will l be relocated under the Environmental Qualification (EQ) l program. Access to S/G PORV pressure indicating l l
transmitters (PITS) (item 19, this report) is possible l
' for maintenance activities - local operation of the l PORVs is not required from the PITS. The MDAFW pump *l 1evel control and isolation valves are very congested; I however, operation of the LCVs is possible from the MCR lR3 and ACR. The control panel for the ABSCE ventilation l dampers in the CDWE is located in a high rad area l resulting from nearby disposal of RCP seals. SQN notes l these dampers are operated an average of once per l month and are not operated under emergency conditions. l The source of the high radiation will be removed when l the Dry Active Waste (DAW) Building is completed - work l is planned under ECN 6596 (DCR 1898), estimated l completion for this activity is FY'87. l Page 10 of 12
R2visicn 3 IV. ROOT CAUSE The original plant layout was based on data from Westinghouse and on similar designs by other utilities in the late 1960s. Because the internal building design could not be modified to accommodate modifications and additions, certain areas have proven to be insufficient to prevent tight and crowded conditions. (Reference 7)
V. GENERIC APPLICABILITY Crowded conditions are not unusual in nuclear plants, TVA included.
Access issues will continue to arise and be handled on a case basis.
This evaluation is not made generic to other plants since no safety-related deficiencies were identified. lR3 Accessibility concerns for WBN have been evaluated in subcategory report 30500.
VI. REFERENCES
- 1. K-forms: IN-85-189-001 IN-86-306-001 IN-85-189-002 RII-86-A-0116 PH-85-003-006 IN-85-220-001 IN-85-617-001
- 2. Memorandum and status report to Those listed from James Doty,
" Platform and Valve Accessibility Program," June 6, 1984 (RIMS L53 840606 843)
- 3. SQN " Electrical Maintenance January Safety Concerns," January 1986
- 4. TVA SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report on Employee Concern: IN-85-617-001, " Accessibility Impossible Due to Hangers and Pipe Supports," by T. H. Huth, June 6, 1986 (revision 1) and February 18, 1986 (revision 0)
- 5. Status report for platform and valve accessibility as of July 1986 -
data obtained from SQN Planning and Scheduling Section (this information pertains to reference 2)
- 6. Memorandum to W. H. Thompson from W. T. Cottle, "QTC Concern IN-85-430-001," August 13, 1985, reported by R. Goode
- 7. Memorandum to K. W. Whitt from R. V. Pierce, " Employee Concern Evaluation for IN-85-286-002," July 19, 1985
- 8. SQN Engineering Change Notice (ECN)-5889 and SQN Workplan (WP)-10954, " East Main Steam Valve Room Access Platform Addition,"
April 19, 1984
Emergency Descent Device and Hinged Gate," June 28, 1985 Page 11 of 12
Rsvisien-3 -
4
- 10. SQN ECN15635'and SQN WPs 9936 and 11648, "RB Accumulator Room i Ladder," May 30, 1985-- _
111. SQN Emergency Instructions (EIs) i E-0, " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," revision 1. August 21, 1985
! E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," revision 1 August 21, 1985 j E-2, " Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," revision 1 August 21, 1985 E-3.1, "SI. Termination Following Steam Generator Tube Rupture,"
revision 0, October 4, 1984
-12. SQN Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOI)-27 " Control Room Inaccessibility," revision 5,' June 20, 1986
- 13. SQN Function Restoration Guidelines (FRs) "
i H.1, " Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," revision 1, .
ji'
. August 21. 1985 H.3, " Response to Steam Generator High Level," revision 0, August 21, 19g5
[ H.4, " Response to Loss of Normal Steam Relief Capabilities,"
revision 0, August 21, 1985
- j. for Local Plant Hardware, March 1986, Draft.
VII. IMMEDIATE or LONG-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION 1-CATD 30501-SQN-01 issued to SQN to address problem with access to S/G number 1 PORV local controllers.
The SQN response for.this CATD states that S/G PORY local controllers
- l
! are located in the West Main Steam Valve Rooms and will be relocated l j under the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program. The response l notes that equipment identified as pressure indicating controllers lR3 (item 19, this report) are actually S/G PORV pressure indicating l
[ transmitters for which operation is not required and maintenance l 1s not a problem, therefore no corrective action is required. l CATD 30501-SQN-02 issued to SQN to address problem with access to CDWE building damper control panel.
! The SQN response for this CATD states that controls for ABSCE l l ventilation dampers are not operated under emergency conditions. l 1- They are oporated on a once per month average. The source of the IR3 i high radiation area will be removed when the Dry Active Waste (DAW) l building is completed - this work is planned under ecd 6596 l l (DCR 1898). The estimated completion for this activity is FY'87. I t
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REFERENCE - ECPS12OJ-ECP3121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY RUN TIME - 12
- REQUEST OFFICS OF NUCLEAR PONER RUN DATE - 10/
FREQUENCY EW LOYER CONCERN PRv0 RAM SYSTEM (ECPS) '
ONP - ISSS - RHM LIST OF EWLOYtt CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: OP PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 50501 ACCESSIBILITY PROBLEMS KEYWORD A S DENERIC KEYNORD B H APPL GTC/MSRS P 3 CONCERN KEYHORD C CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSH INVESTIGATION KEYHORD D CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT A DESCRIPTION g HUM 5ER DESIGN RELATED NNYN NBNP' UNIT 02, ONCE SCAFFOLDING IS RE IN 189-001 OP 30501 N HBN MOVED, SOME VALVES HOULD BE HARD TO P0HER T50088 REPORT GET TO, EOs 15 FEET OFF FLOOR, TO MA CPERATIONS g NUALLY OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE. CI COUL VALVES S NOT PROVIDE SPECIFIC VALVE 0'S, SY STEMS, BUILDINGS OR ELEVATIONS. CI STATES THIS CONDITION EXIST THROUGH0
-' UT THE PLANT.
'NS VALVES LOCATED IN WBNP 02 SOUTH VALV DE. 1 RELATED IN 189-002 OP 30501 N HBN NNYY I-85-210-H8N POWER K-FORM E ROOM ARE VERY CONGESTED AND INACCE
~ T50089 $$ ISLE. ONLY A SMALL PERSON NOULD B OPERATIONS
> VALVES E ASLE TO GET TO THEM. CI STATED ON E EXAMPLE IS DRAIN VALVE ON MAIN STE AM SYSTEM IN SOUTH VALVE ROOM UNIT S y 2. CI COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIO NAL DETAILS.
91 3 DUE TO EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MANGERS A DESIGN REVIEW g IN 223-001 OP 30501 N HBN NNYY HEALTH PHYSICS K-FORM ND OVERCRONDING IN UNIT 2 REACTOR BU OPERATIDHS T50157 ILDING, ESPECIALLY ACCUMULATOR ROOM 84, HEALTH PHYSICS PROBLEMS (ALARA C EMPLOYEES ONCERNS) DURING PLANT OPERATIONS ARE ANTICIPATED. CI FEELS THAT NOT ENO UGH CONCERN MAS SHONN REGARDING THE
- NUMBER OF HANGERS BEING USED. CONST R. DEPT. CONCERN. CI COULD NOT PROV y IDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS / SPECIFICS
. NO FOLLONUP REQUIRED.
THE SUILDING OF HANGERS 8 PIPE SUPP0 DESIGN RELATED IN 617-001 OP 30201 N HBN NNYH PONER Q T50059 REPORT RT SYSTEMS TO THE PLINT OF ACCESSABI OPERATIONS LITY BEING MADE IMPOSSIBLE. THIS CO PIPE
' NCERN INVOLVES BOTH UNIT 142. THE P f
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RIMARY PLACES OF INTEREST ARE ROOF, AUX SLDO. ELV. 737, THE ERCH VENT V ALVES, CCS VALVES TO HEAT EXCHANGERS
"" , 04 ACCUMULATOR ROOM, NORTH & SOUTH STEAM VALVE ROOMS a ELV. 713 BIT TA g M ROON. ACCESSASILITY IS NONEXISTA NT DUE TO POTENTIALLY HOT PIPES 8 CO II0ESTES AREAS. PRESENTLY THERE ARE SCAFFOLDS TO SOME INACCESSABLE AREAS d .
,letEN SCAFFOLDS ARE REMOVED, NO J
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PA!E , .
REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C '
'RUN TIME E 1' FREQUENCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF CUCLEAR P0HER' EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - ..
[) ONP - ISSS - RHM ' '
LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: CF PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 30501i ACCESSIBILITY PROBLEMS GENERIC ' KEYHORD A y
- S-
'H APPL QTC/NSRS P KEYWORD B-
$ KEYWORD C CONCERN 'SUB R PLT BBSW INVESTIGATION CONCERN KEYNORD NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLQB REPORT: R DESCRIPTION-HNYY NS VARIOUS EQUIPMENT THAT COULD BE NEED DESIGN RELATED IN 306-001 OP 30501 N HBN POWER T50161 K-FORM ED DURING AN EMERGENCY IS NOT READIL Y ACCESSIBLE TO APPLICABLE PERSONNEL OPERATIONS-EXAMPLE: AUX BUILDING 713' ELEV ( GENERAL p .
ALSO CONTAINEMENT BUILDING) THE INST RUMENT PANELS AND THE AUX FEEDHATER PUMPS ARE SD CONGESTED IT IS VERY TI ME CONSUMING TO GET IN THERE TO READ
) THE INSTRUMENTS. NUCLEAR POWER CON CERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION
. NO FOLLONUP REQUIRED.
NNYY NS NATTS BAR INSTRUMENTATION IS NOT PRO DESIGN RELATED PH 003-006 OP 30501 N HBN POWER T50106 K-FORM PERLY DESIGNED FOR ACCESSI6ILITY. C I HAS NO MORE ADDITIONAL INFORMATICN OPERATIONS AVAILABLE NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED INSTRUME' p
l RII-86-A-0116 OP 30501 N NPS NNYY THE ALLEGER STATED THAT AT HATTS BAR REPORT AND SEQUOYAH, CONTROL PANELS OR STA l TIONS ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED SUCH TH i ) AT THERE IS NO HAY TO GET TO THEM TO i
OPERATE THE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT. A S AN EXAMPLE, A PANEL HAS DBSERVED TC
{ BE LOCATED SIX TO EIGHT INCHES FROM 1 ) A NALL, FACING THE '4ALL, SO THAT TH I* ERE WAS NO PHYSICAL HAY TO EVEN READ THE TAGS ON THE PANEL. THE ALLEGER SAID THAT THERE HERE A " LOT" 0F AHKW l }
j ARDLY LOCATED PANELS AT HATTS BAR.
HIS ALLEGATION APPLIES TO HATTS BAR
! AND SEQUOYAH; H0HEVER, IT MAY HA j
- )
j 7 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY OP SUBCATEGORY 30501 l ) '
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